Javellana vs. The Executive Secretary

[50 SCRA 33]

Facts:The present 5 cases (ratification cases) are a sequel of plebiscite cases decided on January 22, 1973.

The Plebiscite Case March 16, 1967--Congress of the Philippines passed Resolution No. 2, which was amended by Resolution No. 4 of said body, adopted on June 17, 1969, calling a Convention to propose amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines.

Resolution No. 2, as amended, was implemented by Republic Act No. 6132, approved on August 24, 1970, pursuant to the provisions of which the election of delegates to the said Convention was held on November 10, 1970, and the 1971 Constitutional Convention began to perform its functions on June 1, 1971.

While the Convention was in session on September 21, 1972, the President issued Proclamation No. 1081 placing the entire Philippines under Martial Law.

November 29, 1972--Convention approved its Proposed Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines.

November 30, 1972--the President of the Philippines issued Presidential Decree No. 73, "submitting to the Filipino people for ratification or rejection the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention, and appropriating funds therefor," as well as setting the plebiscite for said ratification or rejection of the Proposed Constitution on January 15, 1973.

On December 7, 1972, Charito Planas filed a case against the Commission on Elections, the Treasurer of the Philippines and the Auditor General, to enjoin said "respondents or their agents from implementing Presidential Decree No. 73, in any manner, until further orders of the Court," upon the grounds, inter alia, that:

Presidential Decree "has no force and effect as law because the calling ... of such plebiscite, the setting of guidelines for the conduct of the same, the prescription of the ballots to be used and the question to be answered by the voters, and the appropriation of public funds for the purpose, are, by the Constitution, lodged exclusively in Congress ...," and

"there is no proper submission to the people of said Proposed Constitution set for January 15, 1973, there being no freedom of speech, press and assembly, and there being no sufficient time to inform the people of the contents thereof."

On December 17, 1972, the President had issued an order temporarily suspending the effects of Proclamation No. 1081, for the purpose of free and open debate on the Proposed Constitution.

On December 23, the President announced the postponement of the plebiscite for the ratification or rejection of the Proposed Constitution. January 7, 1973--General Order No. 20 was issued, directing "that the plebiscite scheduled to be held on January 15, 1978, be postponed until further notice." Said General Order No. 20, moreover, "suspended in the meantime" the "order of December 17, 1972, temporarily suspending the effects of Proclamation No. 1081 for purposes of free and open debate on the proposed Constitution."

Because of these events relative to the postponement of the aforementioned plebiscite, the Court deemed it fit to refrain, for the time being, from deciding the aforementioned cases, for neither the date nor the conditions under which said plebiscite would be held were known or announced officially. January 12, 1973--the petitioners in Case G.R. No. L-35948 filed an "urgent motion," praying that said case be decided "as soon as possible, preferably not later than January 15, 1973."

January 15, 1973, shortly before noon, the petitioners in said Case G.R. No. L-35948 riled a "supplemental motion for issuance of restraining order and inclusion of additional respondents," praying:"... that a restraining order be issued enjoining and restraining respondent Commission on Elections, as well as the Department of Local Governments and its head, Secretary Jose Roo; the Department of Agrarian Reforms and its head, Secretary Conrado Estrella; the National Ratification Coordinating Committee and its Chairman, Guillermo de Vega; their deputies, subordinates and substitutes, and all other officials and persons who may be assigned such task, from collecting, certifying, and announcing and reporting to the President or other officials concerned, the so-called Citizens' Assemblies referendum results allegedly obtained when they were supposed to have met during the period comprised between January 10 and January 15, 1973, on the two questions quoted in paragraph 1 of this Supplemental Urgent Motion."

While the case was being heard, on the date last mentioned, at noontime, the Secretary of Justice called on the writer of this opinion and said that, upon instructions of the President, he (the Secretary of Justice) was delivering to him (the writer) a copy of Proclamation No. 1102, which had just been signed by the President. Thereupon, the writer returned to the Session Hall and announced to the Court, the parties in G.R. No. L-35948 inasmuch as the hearing in connection therewith was still going on and the public there present that the President had, according to information conveyed by the Secretary of Justice, signed said Proclamation No. 1102, earlier that morning.

Proclamation No. 1102 ANNOUNCING THE RATIFICATION BY THE FILIPINO PEOPLE OF THE CONSTITUTION PROPOSED BY THE 1971 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION. Cases dismissed

The Ratification Case

On January 20, 1973, just two days before SC decided the sequel of plebiscite cases, Javellana filed this suit against the respondents to restrain them from implementing any of the provisions of the proposed Constitution not found in the present Constitution of 1935. This is a petition filed by him as a Filipino citizen and a qualified and registered voter and as a class suit, for himself and in behalf of all citizens and voters similarly situated. Javellana also alleged that: Pres. had announced the immediate implementation of the New CON, thru his Cabinet, respondents including.

Respondents are acting without or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing the said proposed CON upon ground that the Pres., as Commander-in-Chief of the AFP is :

1. without authority to create the Citizens Assemblies

2. without power to approve proposed Constitution

3. without power to proclaim the ratification by the Filipino people of the proposed Consti

4. Lastly, the election held to ratify the proposed Consts was not a free election, hence null and void.

Similar actions followed. Petitioners prayed for nullification of Proc. 1102 and any order, decree, proclamation having the same import and objective.

After deliberating on these cases, the members of the Court agreed that each would write his own opinion and serve a copy thereof on his colleagues, and this they did. Subsequently, Court discussed said opinions and votes were cast thereon. Key issues are:

1) Justiciability of issue of validity of Proclamation 1102.

2) WON the CON proposed by the 1971 CONCON has been ratified validly (with substantial, if not strict, compliance) conformably to the applicable constitutional and statutory provisions.

3) WON proposed CON has been acquiesced in (with or without valid ratification) by the people.

4) WON the petitioners are entitled to relief.

5) WON the aforementioned proposed CON is in force.

Justices1st Issue2nd Issue3rd Issue4th Issue5th Issue

ConcepcionJusticiableNot validly ratifiedCan be no free expression,

there has even been no

expressionGNot in force

MakalintalDid not voteNot validly ratifiedLack of

knowledge/competence to

rule on the questionDDid not vote

CastroDid not voteNot validly ratifiedLack of

knowledge/competence to

rule on the questionDDid not vote

BarredoQualified voteQualifiedPeople have already acceptedDIn force

MakasiarPoliticalValidly ratifiedPeople have already acceptedDIn force

AntonioPoliticalValidly ratifiedPeople have already acceptedDIn force

EsguerraPoliticalValidly ratifiedPeople have already acceptedDIn force

ZaldivarJusticiableNot validly ratifiedCan be no free expression,

there has even been no

expressionGNot in force

FernandoJusticiableNot validly ratifiedNot prepared to stateGDid not vote

TeehankeeJusticiableNot validly ratifiedLack of

knowledge/competence to

rule on the questionGDid not vote

Ruling:

Accordingly, by virtue of the majority of six (6) votes of Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra with the four (4) dissenting votes of the Chief Justice and Justices Zaldivar, Fernando and Teehankee, all the aforementioned cases are hereby dismissed. This being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect. 1. WON the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 is a justiciable or political, and therefore non-justiciable, question. Concepcion, CJ: (justiciable)

To determine whether or not the new CON is in force depends upon whether or not the said new CON has been ratified in accordance with the requirements of the CON35. It is well settled that the matter of ratification of an amendment to the CON should be settled applying the provisions of the CON in force at the time of the alleged ratification of the old CON.

The issue whether the new CON proposed has been ratified in accordance with the provisions of A15/CON35 is justiciable as jurisprudence here and in the US (from whom we patterned our CON35) shall show.

2. WON the CON proposed by the 1971 CONCON has been ratified validly (with substantial, if not strict, compliance) conformably to the applicable constitutional and statutory provisions.

Concepcion, CJ:

CON does not allow Congress or anybody else to vest in those lacking the qualifications and having the disqualifications mentioned in the Constitution the right of suffrage.

The votes of persons less than 21 years of age render the proceedings in the Citizens assemblies is void. Proceedings held in such Citizens' Assemblies were fundamentally irregular, in that persons lacking the qualifications prescribed in A5/S1/CON35 were allowed to vote in said Assemblies. And, since there is no means by which the invalid votes of those less than 21 years of age can be separated or segregated from those of the qualified voters, the proceedings in the Citizens' Assemblies must be considered null and void.

Viva voce voting for the ratification of the CON is void. A15/CON35 envisages with the term "votes cast" choices made on ballots not orally or by raising hands by the persons taking part in plebiscites. This is but natural and logical, for, since the early years of the American regime, we had adopted the Australian Ballot System, with its major characteristics, namely, uniform official ballots prepared and furnished by the Government and secrecy in the voting, with the advantage of keeping records that permit judicial inquiry, when necessary, into the accuracy of the election returns.

The plebiscite on the CON not having been conducted under the supervision of COMELEC is void. The point is that, such of the Barrio Assemblies as were held took place without the intervention of the COMELEC and without complying with the provisions of the Election Code of 1971 or even of those of PD 73. The procedure therein mostly followed is such that there is no reasonable means of checking the accuracy of the returns filed by the officers who conducted said plebiscites. This is another patent violation of A10/CON3 which form part of the fundamental scheme set forth in the CON35, as amended, to insure the "free, orderly, and honest" expression of the people's will. For this, the alleged plebiscite in the Citizens' Assemblies is null and void, insofar as the same are claimed to have ratified the revised CON.

3. WON the aforementioned proposed Constitution has been acquiesced in (with or without valid ratification) by the people.

Concepcion, CJ:

Proclamation 1102 is not an evidence of ratification. A10/CON35 places under the "exclusive" charge of the COMELEC " the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections," independently of the Executive. But there is not even a certification by the COMELEC in support of the alleged results of the citizens' assemblies relied upon in Proclamation 1102. Also, on January 17, 1973 neither the alleged president of the Federation of Provincial or City Barangays nor the Dep of LGs had certified to the President the alleged result of the citizens' assemblies all over the Philippines. The citizens assemblies did not adopt the proposed CON. It is to my mind a matter of judicial knowledge that there have been no such citizens assemblies in many parts of Manila and suburbs, not to say, also, in other parts of the Philippines.

4. WON the petitioners are entitled to relief.

Concepcion, CJ:

I am not prepared to concede that the acts the officers and offices of the Exec Dept, in line with Proc 1102, connote recognition of or acquiescence to the proposed CON.

A department of the Government cannot recognize its own acts. Recognition normally connotes the acknowledgment by a party of the acts of another.

Individual acts of recognition by members of Congress do not constitute congressional recognition, unless the members have performed said acts in session duly assembled. This is a well-established principle of Administrative Law and of the Law of Public Officers.

The compliance by the people with the orders of martial law government does not constitute acquiescence to the proposed CON. Neither am I prepared to declare that the people's inaction as regards Proc 1102, and their compliance with a number of Presidential orders, decrees and/or instructions, some or many of which have admittedly had salutary effects, issued subsequently thereto, amounts to a ratification, adoption or approval of said Proc 1102. The intimidation is there, and inaction or obedience of the people, under these conditions, is not necessarily an act of conformity or acquiescence.

As regards the applicability to these cases of the "enrolled bill" rule, it is well to remember that the same refers to a document certified to the President for his action under the CON by the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Reps, and attested to by the respective Secretaries of both Houses, concerning legislative measures approved by said Houses. Whereas, Proclamation No. 1102 is an act of the President declaring the results of a plebiscite on the proposed CON, an act which Article X of the 1935 Constitution denies the executive department of the Government.

In all other respects and with regard to the other respondent in said case (he mentions some more cases) petitions therein should be given due course, there being more than prima facie showing that the proposed Constitution has not been ratified in accordance with Article XV of the 1935 Constitution, either strictly, substantially, or has been acquiesced in by the people or majority thereof; that said proposed Constitution is not in force and effect; and that the 1935 Constitution is still the Fundamental Law of the Land, without prejudice to the submission of said proposed Constitution to the people at a plebiscite for its ratification or rejection in accordance with Articles V, X and XV of the 1935 Constitution and the provisions of the Revised Election Code in force at the time of such plebiscite.

5. Is the aforementioned proposed Constitution by the 1971 CONCON in force? YES.

Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold that it is in force by virtue of the people's acceptance thereof; 4 members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando and Teehankee cast no vote thereon on the premise stated in their votes on the third question that they could not state with judicial certainty whether the people have accepted or not accepted the Constitution; and 2 members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself voted that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention is not in force; with the result, there are not enough votes to declare that the new Constitution is not in force.

Philippine Bar Association et al vs. The Commission on Election et al (GR No. 72915)

Pls. note that the SCRA has no actual case. What is given in the appendix is the resolution of the En Banc dated Dec. 19, 1985. The Court has rendered a consolidated opinion on cases brought by several parties on the same question of whether BP 883 is constitutional?

These are the events that led to the conclusion that what initially was a constitutional question became a political question.

1. BP 883 is an Act Calling for a Special Election for the President and Vice President, providing for the manner of holding thereof, appropriating funds therefor and for other purposes.

2. The ISSUE to be resolved is:

Is BP Blg. 883 calling for special national elections on Feb. 7, 1986 for the offices of President and Vice President of the Philippines (for the first time since the pre-martial law era 1969 presidential elections) unconstitutional, and should this Court therefore stop and prohibit the holding of the election?

After considering all the pleadings and deliberating on the issues raised in the petitions, as well as on the oral arguments of the parties and the amici curiae in the hearings held in these cases, 6 justices and the Chief Justice Ramon Aquino voted to DISMISS the petition in these cases and to DENY the prayer for the issuance of an injunction restraining respondents from holding the election on Feb. 7, 1986. In the opinion of the Chief Justice, BP 883 is unconstitutional. In as much as there are less than the 10 required number of votes to declare BP 883 unconstitutional, the petitions in these cases are hereby Dismissed and the writs therein prayed for are Denied.

3. Backgrounder;

Several months before the tenure of Pres. Marcos is to expire, (his term should have lasted to June 30, 1987), Pres. Marcos called for a special election called the snap election. BP 883 called for the President to continue holding office after the calling of the special election until his successor is elected or he himself is re-elected. However, the Constitution states that the President must first resign from office in order for the constitutional mandate to go into effect and for the Batasan speaker to assume the post of Acting President. Pres. Marcos and Arturo Tolentino were the candidates for President and VP respectively of the KBL party while Cory Aquino and Doy Laurel were the standard bearers for the United Opposition.

The main objection of the Justices was that there was really no vacancy since Pres. Marcos will not turn over the reins of government to the Batasan speaker. He will continue to hold office until his successor is named (whoever wins the snap election) or upon his re-election.

4. Thus, the real issue has veered from a purely justiciable issue of the questioned constitutionality of the BP 883 due to the lack of actual vacancy in the office of the President and transformed itself into a political question that can only be truly decided by the people in their sovereign capacity in a fair, clean and honest election. Stated differently, may the Court at this advanced stage stop the holding of the election?

5. According the Blas Ople., KBL spokesman, the peoples minds have already been prepared and conditioned to expect the holding of election on Feb. 7, 1986 and that the Court, should not stand in the way. Sovereignty emanates from the people.

6. Senator Emmanuel Pelaez also stated that these supervening events may have converted the snap poll issue into a political one, which would remove from the Supreme court the authority to stop present snap poll activities on its tracks. The issue of the election has been decided by the political will of the people. The Court should not put obstacles to the exercise of that will. Beyond these considerations, national survival depends on the forthcoming snap polls.

7. Senator Padilla, noting that both the President and the Batasang Pambansa having acted in favor of the holding of the scheduled national election, submitted that the Court should defer to the exercise of the peoples public right to vote and to express their judgment since there is no issue or question more political then election.

8. President Marcos, has through his postdated resignation effectively shortened by 16 months his tenure, when his successor elect be it himself or Aquino takes his/her oath of office after proclamation as the winner. The Act has accelerated the restoration of the stabilizing effect of Vice President to succeed the President in the even of the latters permanent disability, death, removal from office or resignation.

9. UP President, Edgardo Angara, stated that whichever way the votes go, what really matters is the majority act of reaffirming the efficacy of the democratic process.

10. Conclusion: The events that transpired since Dec. 3, as the Court did not issue a restraining order, have turned the issue into a political question which can be truly decided only by the people in their sovereign capacity at the scheduled election, which hopefully will be clean, fair and honest . The Court cannot stand in the way of letting the people decide through their ballot, either to give the incumbent president a new mandate or to elect a new president.

11. Not in the case- but the snap election was held, Marcos won (as the KBL claimed) but the people did not accept the result. Thus Cory Aquino was installed as President when Marcos left the country.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF TEODOSIO LANSANG RODOLFO DEL ROSARIO, and BAYANI ALCALA,petitioners,vs. BRIGADIER-GENERAL EDUARDO M. GARCIA, Chief, Philippine Constabulary,respondent.

G.R. No. L-33964 December 11, 1971

Facts:

In August 21, 1971, while the Liberal Party of the Philippines was holding a public meeting at Plaza Miranda for the presentation of its candidates in the general elections, two (2) hand grenades were thrown at the platform where said candidates and other persons were.

On August 23, 1971, the President of the Philippines announced the issuance of Proclamation No. 889. It suspends the privilege of the writ ofhabeas corpus, for the persons presently detained, as well as others who may be hereafter similarly detained for the crimes of insurrection or rebellion, and all other crimes and offenses committed by them in furtherance or on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith.

Petitioners filed a writ of habeas corpus for having been arrested without a warrant therefore and then detained, upon the authority of said proclamation. They assail its validity as well as that of their detention.

On its answer, respondent alleged,inter alia, that the petitioners had been apprehended and detained "on reasonable belief" that they had "participated in the crime of insurrection or rebellion;" that "their continued detention is justified due to the suspension of the privilege of the writ ofhabeas corpuspursuant to Proclamation No. 889 of the President of the Philippines;" that there is "a state of insurrection or rebellion" in this country, and that "public safety and the security of the State required the suspension of the privilege of the writ ofhabeas corpus," . . . that the determination thus made by the President is "final and conclusive upon the court and upon all other persons" and "partake(s) of the nature of political question(s) which cannot be the subject of judicial inquiry," pursuant to Barcelon v. Baker, 5 Phil. 87, andMontenegro v. Castaeda, 91 Phil. 882.

Issue: W/N the SC would adhere to the view taken in Barcelon v. Bakerand reiterated inMontenegro v. Castaeda,pursuant to which, "the authority to decide whether the exigency requiring suspension (of the privilege of the writ ofhabeas corpus) belongs to the President and his 'decision is final and conclusive' upon the courts and upon all other persons.Held: NO

The SC has the authority under the constitution to inquire into the existence of a factual basis for the issuance of a presidential proclamation suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus for the purpose of determining the constitutional sufficiency thereof.

SC may inquirein order to satisfy itself of the existence of the factual bases for the issuance of Presidential Proclamations Nos. 889 and 889-A ... and thusdetermine the constitutional sufficiency of such bases in the light of the requirements of Article III, sec. 1, par. 14, and Article VII, sec. 10, par 2, of the Philippine Constitution. In the exercise of such authority, the function of the Court is merely tocheck not tosupplant the Executive,or to ascertain merely whether he had gone beyondthe constitutional limits of his jurisdiction,not to exercise the power vested in himor to determine the wisdom of his act.

The co-equality of coordinate branches of the Government, under our constitutional system, seems to demand that the test of the validity of acts of Congress and of those of the Executive be,mutatis mutandis, fundamentally the same. The proper standard is notcorrectness, butarbitrariness.

In view of the foregoing, it does not appear that the President has acted arbitrary in issuing Proclamation No. 889, as amended, nor that the same is unconstitutional.

[G.R. No. L-3820. July 18, 1950.]

JEAN L. ARNAULT, petitioner, vs. LEON NAZARENO, Sergeant-at-Arms, Philippine Senate, and EUSTAQUIO BALAGTAS, Director of Prisons, respondents.

DOCTRINE:

RANGE OF LEGISLATIVE INQUIRY. The Congress of the Philippines has a wider range of legislative field than either the Congress of the United States or a State Legislature, and the field of inquiry into which it may enter is also wider. It is difficult to define any limits by which the subject matter of its inquiry can be bounded. Sufficed it to say that it must be coextensive with the range of legislative power.

POWER HOUSE OF CONGRESS TO PUNISH A WITNESS FOR CONTEMPT. No person can be punished for contumacy as a witness before either House unless his testimony is required in a matter into which that House has jurisdiction to inquire. Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the jurisdiction of a legislative body to make, the investigating committee has the power to require a witness to answer any question pertinent to the subject of the inquiry, subject of the course to his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.

POWER OF THE COURT TO PASS UPON MATERIALITY. Where the immateriality of the information sought by the legislative body from a witness is relied upon to contest its jurisdiction, the Court is in duty bound to pass upon the contention. Although the legislative body has the power to make the inquiry, the Court is empowered to correct a clear abuse of discretion in the exercise of that power .LACK OF POWER OF THE COURT TO INTERFERE WITH LEGISLATIVE ACTION. ,Since the Court has no power to determine what legislation to approve or not to approve, it cannot say that the information sought from a witness which is material to the subject of the legislative inquiry is immaterial to any proposed or possible legislation. It is not within the province of the Court to determine or imagine what legislative measures Congress may take after the completion of the legislative investigation.

AUTHORITY OF EITHER HOUSE OF CONGRESS TO COMMIT A WITNESS FOR CONTEMPT BEYOND PERIOD OF LEGISLATIVE SESSION. There is no sound reason to limit the power of the legislative body to punish for contempt to the end of every session and not to the end of the last session terminating the existence of that body. While the existence of the House of Representatives is limited to four years, that of the Senate is not so limited. The Senate is a continuing body which does not ceases to exist upon the periodical dissolution of the Congress or of the House of Representatives. There is no limit as to time to the Senate's power to punish for contempt in cases where that power may constitutionally be exerted.

POWER OF THE COURT TO DETERMINE WHETHER QUESTION IS INCRIMINATORY. It is not enough for the witness to say that the answer will incriminate, as he is not the sole judge of his liability. The danger of self-incrimination must appear reasonable and real to the court, from all the circumstances, and from the whole case, as well as from his general conception of the relations of the witness. Upon the facts thus developed, it is the province of the court to determine whether a direct answer to a question may criminate or not. The witness cannot assert his privilege by reason of some fanciful excuse, for protection against an imaginary danger, or to secure immunity to a third person.

FACTS: OZAETA, J : petition for habeas corpus

Petitioner was confined in the New Bilibid Prison by virtue of a resolution adopted by the Senate (May 15, 1950)"Whereas, Jean L. Arnault refused to reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the P440K, as well as answer other pertinent questions related to the said amount;

1949, the Philippine Government, through the Rural Progress Administration, bought 2 estates (Buenavista, Tambobong) for P4.5M and P500K. P1M was paid to Ernest H. Burt, represented by Jean L. Arnault, for interest of the said Burt in the Buenavista Estate. The second sum of P500Kwas also paid to Burt also represented by Jean L. Arnault.

1950, the Senate adopted its Resolution No. 8 CREATING A SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE BUENAVISTA AND THE TAMBOBONG ESTATES DEAL. To determine whether the said purchase was honest, valid, and proper and whether the price involved in the deal was fair and just, the parties responsible therefor, and any other facts the Committee may deem proper in the premises.

The special committee created by the above resolution called and examined various witnesses, among the most important of whom was Jean L. Arnault. An intriguing question which the committee sought to resolve was that involved in the apparent unnecessariness and irregularity of the Government's paying to Burt the total sum of P1,500,000 for his alleged interest of only P20,000 in the two estates, which he seemed to have forfeited anyway. The committee sought to determine who were responsible for and who benefited from the transaction at the expense of the Government.

It was the desire of the committee to determine the ultimate recipient of this sum of P440,000 that gave rise to the present case.

May 15, 1950, the petitioner was haled before the bar of the Senate for contempt consisting of contumacious acts committed by him during the investigation conducted by the Special Committee.

The Senate then deliberated and adopted the resolution whereby the petitioner was committed to the custody of the Sergeant-at-arms and imprisoned until "he shall have purged the contempt by revealing to the Senate or to the aforesaid Special Committee the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000, as well as answer other pertinent questions in connection therewith.

It is suggested by counsel for the respondents that the power of the Court is limited to determining whether the legislative body has jurisdiction to institute the inquiry or investigation; that once that jurisdiction is conceded, this Court cannot control the exercise of that jurisdiction or the use of Congressional discretion; and, it is insinuated, that the ruling of the Senate on the materiality of the question propounded to the witness is not subject to review by this Court under the principle of the separation of powers. We have to qualify this propositionISSUE: Is the ruling of the Senate on the materiality of the question propounded to the witness subject to review by SC?HELD:Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry with process to enforce it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislations is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information which is not frequently true recourse must be had to others who do possess it. In the present case the jurisdiction of the Senate, thru the special Committee created by it, to investigate the Buenavista and Tambobong estates deal is not challenged by the petitioner; and we entertain no doubt as to the Senate's authority to do so and as to the validity of Resolution No. 8 hereinabove quoted.

Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the jurisdiction of a legislative body to make, we think the investigating committee has the power to require a witness to answer any question pertinent to that inquiry, subject of course to his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of the legislative body to make, must be material or necessary to the exercise of a power in it vested by the Constitution, such as to legislate, or to expel a Member; and every question which the investigator is empowered to coerce a witness to answer must be material or pertinent to the subject of the inquiry or investigation. The materiality of the question must be determined by its direct relation to the subject of the inquiry and not by its indirect relation to any proposed or possible legislation. The reason is, that the necessity or lack of necessity for legislative action and the form and character of the action itself are determined by the sum total of the information to be gathered as a result of the investigation, and not by a fraction of such information elicited from a single question.

We are bound to presume that the action of the legislative body was with a legitimate object if it is capable of being so construed, and we have no right to assume that the contrary was intended. Applying this principle to the question at hand, we may concede that the ruling of the Senate on the materiality of the information sought from the witness is presumed to be correct.

But in McGrain vs. Daugherty, it is a necessary deduction from the decision in Re Chapman, that were the questions are not pertinent to the matter under the inquiry a witness rightfully may refuse to answer. So we are of the opinion that were the alleged immateriality of the information sought by the legislative body from a witness is relied upon to contest its jurisdiction, the court is in duty bound to pass upon the contention. THE FACT THAT THE LEGISLATIVE BODY HAS JURISDICTION OR THE POWER TO MAKE THE INQUIRY WOULD NOT PRECLUDE JUDICIAL INTERVENTION TO CORRECT A CLEAR ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN THE EXERCISE OF THAT POWER.

The question for the refusal to answer which the petitioner was held in contempt by the Senate is pertinent to the matter under inquiry. In fact, this is not and cannot be disputed. Senate Resolution No. 8, the validity of which is not challenged by the petitioner requires the Special Committee, among other things to determine the parties responsible for the Buenavista an Tambobong estates deal, and it is obvious that the name of the person to whom the witness gave the P440,000 it is in fact the very things sought to be determined. It is not necessary for the legislative body to show that every question propounded to a witness is material to any proposed or possible legislation; what is required is that it be pertinent to the matter under inquiry.

The Court cannot determine, any more that it can direct Congress, what legislation to approve or not to approve; that would be an invasion of the legislative prerogative. The Court, therefore, may not say that the information sought from the witness which is material to the subject of the legislative inquiry is immaterial to any proposed or possible legislation.

We are not called upon, nor is it within our province, to determine or imagine what those measures may be. And our inability to do so is no reason for overruling the question propounded by the Senate to the witness.

Petition must be deniedTUASON, J., dissenting: The pending bill was framed on the assumption that Antonio Quirino was a party to the deal in question. As has been said, the committee entertains a moral conviction that this brother of the President was the recipient of a share of the proceeds of sale. IN RE: SATURNINO V. BERMUDEZ, petitioner.

G.R. No. 76180 October 24, 1986Facts:

In a petition for declaratory relief impleading no respondents, petitioner, as a lawyer, quotes the first paragraph of Section 5 of Article XVIII of the proposed 1986 Constitution: Sec. 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President elected in the February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992.

Claiming that the said provision "is not clear" as to whom it refers, he then asks the Court "to declare and answer the question of the construction and definiteness as to who, among the present incumbent President Corazon Aquino and Vice-President Salvador Laurel and the elected President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Vice-President Arturo M. Tolentino.

The legitimacy of the government of President Corazon C. Aquino was likewise sought to be questioned with the claim that it was not established pursuant to the 1973 Constitution.

Issue:

Whether or not the government established by the people thru the 1986 EDSA Revolution is legitimate. Corollarily; whether or not the Presidency of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.

Held: The petition amounts in effect to a suit against the incumbent President of the Republic, President Corazon C. Aquino, and it is elementary that incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure.

Petitioner's allegation of ambiguity or vagueness of the aforequoted provision is manifestly gratuitous, it being a matter of public record and common public knowledge that the Constitutional Commission refers therein to incumbent President Corazon C. Aquino and Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel, and to no other persons, and provides for the extension of their term to noon of June 30, 1992 for purposes of synchronization of elections. Hence, the second paragraph of the cited section provides for the holding on the second Monday of May, 1992 of the first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under said 1986 Constitution.

Petitioners have no personality to sue and their petitions state no cause of action. For the legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the people of the Philippines are the judge. And the people have made the judgment; they have accepted the government of President Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective control of the entire country so that it is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government.

There can be no question that President Corazon C. Aquino and Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel are the incumbent and legitimate President and Vice-President of the Republic of the Philippines.

CIR vs. Campos Rueda (Definition of a State)Facts:Doa Maria de la Estrella Soriano Vda. de Cerdeira, a Spanish national by reason of her marriage to a Spanish citizen, died in Tangier (a city in Northern Morocco, North Africa). At the time of her death, she was a permanent resident of Tangier but had left properties both in the Philippines as well as in Tangier. Respondent Antonio Campos Rueda, her estates administrator, paid the estate and inheritance taxes on the transfer of her real properties in the Philippines, but refused to pay the corresponding deficiency estate and inheritance taxes due on the transfer of her intangible personal properties, claiming that the estate is exempt from the payment of said taxes pursuant to section 122 of the Tax Code, which provides "that no tax shall be collected under this Title in respect of intangible personal property (a) if the decedent at the time of his death was a resident of a foreign country which at the time of his death did not impose a transfer tax or death tax of any character in respect of intangible person property of the Philippines not residing in that foreign country, or (b) if the laws of the foreign country of which the decedent was a resident at the time of his death allow a similar exemption from transfer taxes or death taxes of every character in respect of intangible personal property owned by citizens of the Philippines not residing in that foreign country." The Collector of Internal Revenue denied Campos Ruedas claim for tax exemption on the ground that Tangier was not a foreign country within the meaning of Sec. 22 and thus, there can be no reciprocity with Tangier. CTA, upon appeal, reversed the CIR.

Issue:Must an acquisition of international personality be satisfied for a foreign country to fall within the exemption in Sec. 22?

Held: NO. Foreign Country used in Sec 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code, refers to a government of that foreign power which although not an international person in the sense of international law, does not impose transfer of death taxes upon intangible personal properties of citizens not residing therein. Or whose law allows a similar exemption from such taxes. It is not necessary that Tangier should have been recognized by our government in order to entitle the petitioner to the exemption benefits provided by our Tax Law.

[G.R. No. 1051. May 19, 1903.]

THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appellee, vs. FRED L. DORR ET AL., defendants-appellants.

Facts:

A complaint was filed against the defendants charging them with the offense of writing, publishing, and circulating a scurrilous libel against the Government of the United States and the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands based upon section 8 of Act No. 292 of the Commission, which is as follows:

"Every person who shall utter seditious words or speeches, write, publish, or circulate scurrilous libels against the Government of the United States or the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands, or which tend to disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in executing his office, or which tend to instigate others to cabal or meet together for unlawful purposes, or which suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies or riots, or which tend to stir up the people against the lawful authorities, or to disturb the peace of the community, the safety and order of the Government, or who shall knowingly conceal such evil practices, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars or by imprisonment not exceeding two years, or both, in the discretion of the court."

The alleged libel was published as an editorial in the issue of the "Manila Freedom" of April 6, 1902, under the caption of " A few hard facts.":

This is the kind of foolish work that the Commission is doing all over the Islands, reinstating insurgents and rogues and turning down the men who have during the struggle, at the risk of their lives, aided the Americans.'

xxx xxx xxx

"There is no doubt but that the Filipino office holders of the Islands are in a good many instances rascals.

xxx xxx xxx

"The Commission has exalted to the highest positions in the Islands Filipinos who are alleged to be notoriously corrupt and rascally, and men of no personal character.

xxx xxx xxx

"Editor Valdez, of 'Miau,' made serious charges against two of the native Commissioners charges against Trinidad H. Pardo de Tavera, which, if true, would brand the man as a coward and a rascal, and with what result? . . . [Reference is then made to the prosecution and conviction of Valdez for libel 'under a law which specifies that the greater the truth the greater the libel.'] Is it the desire of the people of the United States that the natives against whom these charges have been made (which, if true, absolutely vilify their personal characters ) be permitted to retain their seats on the Civil Commission, the executive body of the Philippine Government, without an investigation?

xxx xxx xxx

"It is a notorious fact that many branches of the Government organized by the Civil Commission are rotten and corrupt. The fiscal system, upon which life, liberty, and justice depends, is admitted by the Attorney-General himself to be most unsatisfactory. It is a fact that the Philippine judiciary is far from being what it should. Neither fiscals nor judges can be persuaded to convict insurgents when they wish to protect them.

xxx xxx xxx

"Now we hear all sorts of reports as to rottenness existing in the province [of Tayabas], and especially the northern end of it; it is said that it is impossible to secure the conviction of lawbreakers and outlaws by the native justices, or a prosecution by the native fiscals.

xxx xxx xxx

"The long and short of it is that Americans will not stand for an arbitrary government, especially when evidences of carpet bagging and rumors of graft are too thick to be pleasant."

Issue:

The only question which we have considered is whether their publication constitutes an offense under section 8 of Act No. 292, above cited.

Held:

We are all, however, agreed upon the proposition that the article in question has no appreciable tendency to "disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in executing his office," or to "instigate'' any person or class of persons "to cabal or meet together for unlawful purposes," or to "suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies or riots," or to "stir up the people against the lawful authorities or to disturb the peace of the community, the safety and order of the Government." All these various tendencies, which are described in section 8 of Act No. 292, each one of which is made an element of a certain form of libel, may be characterized in general terms as seditious tendencies. This is recognized in the description of the offenses punished by this section, which is found in the title of the act, where they are defined as the crimes of "seditious utterances, whether written or spoken."

And while the article in question, which is, in the main, a virulent attack against the policy of the Civil Commission in appointing natives to office, may have had the effect of exciting among certain classes dissatisfaction with the Commission and its measures, we are unable to discover anything in it which can be regarded as having a tendency to produce anything like what may be called disaffection, or, in other words, a state of feeling incompatible with a disposition to remain loyal to the Government and obedient to the laws. There can be no conviction, therefore, for any of the offenses described in the section on which the complaint is based, unless it is for the offense of publishing a scurrilous libel against the Government of the United States or the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands.

"We understand, in modern political science . . . by the term "government", that institution or aggregate of institutions by which an independent society makes and carries out those rules of action which are necessary to enable men to live in a social state, or which are imposed upon the people forming that society by those who possess the power or authority of prescribing them. Government is the aggregate of authorities which rule a society. By "administration" again, we understand in modern times, and especially in more or less free countries, the aggregate of those persons in whose hands the reins of government are for the time being (the chief ministers or heads of departments)." (Bouvier, Law Dictionary, 891.) But the writer adds that the terms "government and ''administration" are not always used in their strictness, and that "government" is often used for ''administration.''

In the act of Congress of July 14, 1798, commonly known as the "Sedition Act," it is made an offense to "write, print, utter, or publish," or "cause to procure to be written, printed, uttered, or published," or to "knowingly and willingly assist or aid in writing, printing, uttering, or publishing any false, scandalous, and malicious writing or writings against the Government of the United States, or either house of the Congress of the United States, or the President of the United States, with intent to defame the said Government, or either house of the said Congress or the said President, or to bring-them, or either of them, into contempt or disrepute, or to excite against them or either or any of them the hatred of the good people of the United States," etc. The term "government" would appeal to be used here in the abstract sense of the existing political system, as distinguished from the concrete organisms of the Government the houses of Congress and the Executive which are also specially mentioned.

It may be said that there can be no such thing as a scurrilous libel, or any sort of a libel, upon an abstraction like the Government in the sense of the laws and institutions of a country, but we think an answer to this suggestion is that the expression "scurrilous libel" is not used in section 8 of Act No. 292 in the sense in which it is used in the general libel law (Act No. 277) that is, in the sense of written defamation of individuals but in the wider sense, in which it is applied in the common law to blasphemous, obscene, or seditious publications in which there may be no element of defamation whatever. "The word 'libel' as popularly used, seems to mean only defamatory words; but words written, if obscene, blasphemous, or seditious, are technically called libels, and the publication of them is, by the law of England, an indictable offense." (Bradlaugh vs. The Queen, 3 Q. B. D., 607, 627, per Bramwell, L. J. See Com. vs. Kneeland, 20 Pick., 206, 211.)

Defamation of individuals, whether holding official positions or not, and whether directed to their public conduct or to their private life, may always be adequately punished under the general libel law. Defamation of the Civil Commission as an aggregation, it being "a body of persons definite and small enough for its individual members to be recognized as such" ( Stephen, Digest of the Criminal Law, art. 277), as well as defamation of and of the individual members of the Commission or of the Civil Governor, either in his public capacity or as a private individual, may be so punished. The general libel law enacted by the Commission was in force when Act No. 292 was passed.

There was no occasion for any further legislation on the subject of libels against the individuals by whom the Insular Government is administered against the Insular Government in the sense of the aggregate of such individuals. There was occasion for stringent legislation against seditious words or libels, and that is the main if not the sole purpose of the section under consideration. It is not unreasonable to suppose that the Commission, in enacting this section, may have conceived of attacks of a malignant or scurrilous nature upon the existing political system of the United States, or the political system established in these Islands by the authority of the United States, as necessarily of a seditious tendency, but it is not so reasonable to suppose that they conceived of attacks upon the personnel of the government as necessarily tending to sedition. Had this been their view it seems probable that they would, like the framers of the Sedition Act of 1798, have expressly and specifically mentioned the various public officials and collegiate governmental bodies defamation of which they meant to punish as sedition.

The article in question contains no attack upon the governmental system of the United States, and it is quite apparent that, though grossly abusive as respects both the Commission as a body and some of its individual members, it contains no attack upon the governmental system by which the authority of the United States is enforced in these Islands. The form of government by a Civil Commission and a Civil Governor is not assailed. It is the character of the men who are intrusted with the administration of the government that the writer is seeking to bring into disrepute by impugning the purity of their motives, their public integrity, and their private morals, and the wisdom of their policy. The publication of the article, therefore, no seditious tendency being apparent, constitutes no offense under Act No. 292, section 8.

The judgment of conviction is reversed and the defendants are acquitted, with costs de oficio.