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3.2.5. LIABILITY OF TEACHERS/HEADS OF ESTABLISHMENTS a. Comparisons Bet. Other Obligations/Liabilities As distinguished from Subsidiary Liability SPOUSES FRANCO (petitioners) vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ANTONIO REYES, MRS. SUSAN CHUAY and LOLITA LUGUE (respondents) FACTS: At about 7:30 in the evening of October 18, 1974, Macario Yuro swerved the northbound Franco Bus driving to the left to avoid hitting a truck with a trailer parked facing north along the cemented pavement of the MacArthur Highway at Barrio Talaga, Capas Tarlac, thereby taking the lane of an incoming Isuzu Mini Bus being driven by one Magdaleno Lugue and making a collision between the two (2) vehicles an unavoidable and disastrous eventuality. The mini bus was dragged fifteen (15) meters from the point of impact (midway the length of the parked truck with trailer) and landed right side down facing south in the canal of the highway. The Franco Bus was damaged but not severely. The collision resulted in the deaths of the two (2) drivers, Macario Yuro and Magdaleno Lugue, and two (2) passengers of the mini bus, Romeo Bue and Fernando Chuay. Antonio Reyes, the registered owner of the Isuzu Mini Bus, Mrs. Susan Chuay, the wife of victim Fernando Chuay, and Mrs. Lolita Lugue, the wife of driver-victim Magdaleno Lugue, filed an action for damages against Mr. & Mrs. Federico Franco, the owners and operators of the Franco Transportation Company. Owners and operators of the Franco Transportation Company claimed they exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of all their employees, including the deceased driver Macario Yuro. RTC ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, Antonio Reyes, Lolita Lugue, and Susan Chuay, and against the defendants Mr. and Mrs. Federico Franco. CA affirmed the lower court. It further held that the civil obligation of the appellants arises from Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code resulting in the subsidiary liability of the appellants under the said provisions; that the case subject of appeal is one involving culpable negligence out of which civil liability arises and is not one of civil negligence; and that there is nothing in Articles 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code which requires a prior judgment of conviction of the erring vehicle driver and his obligation to pay his civil liability before the said provisions can be applied. Respondent appellate court also increased the award of damages granted by the lower court. On appeal, petitioners contend that the allegations of herein private respondents as plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 2154 unequivocally claim that the former as the employers of Macario Yuro, the driver of the Franco Bus who caused the vehicular mishap, are jointly and severally liable to the latter for the damages suffered by them which thus makes Civil Case No. 2154 an action predicated upon a quasi-delict. ISSUES: WON the action for recovery of damages instituted by herein private respondents was predicated upon crime or quasi-delict; WON respondent appellate court may properly increase the award of damages in favor of the private respondents Chuay and Lugue, prevailing parties in the lower court, who did not appeal said court's decision.

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RULING: YES. Court found petitioners liable for the damages claimed pursuant to their primary liability under the Civil Code. Distinction should be made between the subsidiary liability of the employer under the Revised Penal Code and the employer's primary liability under the Civil Code which is quasi-delictual or tortious in character. Under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code, liability is based on culpa aquiliana which holds the employer primarily liable for tortious acts of its employees subject, however, to the defense that the former exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employees. On the otherhand, under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, liability originates from a delict committed by the employee who is primarily liable therefor and upon whose primary liability his employer's subsidiary liability is to be based. Before the employer's subsidiary liability may be proceeded against, it is imperative that there should be a criminal action whereby the employee's criminal negligence or delict and corresponding liability therefor are proved. If no criminal action was instituted, the employer's liability would not be predicated under Article 103. In the case at bar, no criminal action was instituted because the person who should stand as the accused and the party supposed to be primarily liable for the damages suffered by private respondents as a consequence of the vehicular mishap died. Thus, petitioners' subsidiary liability has no leg to stand on considering that their liability is merely secondary to their employee's primary liability. There can be no automatic subsidiary liability of defendant employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code where his employee has not been previously criminally convicted. NO. The Intermediate Appellate Court is without jurisdiction to increase the amount of damages awarded to private respondents Chuay and Lugue, neither of whom appealed the decision of the lower court. While an appellee who is not also an appellant may assign error in his brief if his purpose is to maintain the judgment on other grounds, he cannot ask for modification or reversal of the judgment or affirmative relief unless he has also appealed. For failure of plaintiffs-appellees, herein private respondents, to appeal the lower court's judgment, the amount of actual damages cannot exceed that awarded by it.

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As distinguished from Special Parental Authority *see Family Code As distinguished from Contractual Breach SCHOOL OF THE HOLY SPIRIT OF QUEZON CITY and/or TOLENTINO, petitioners, vs. TAGUIAM, respondent. 558 SCRA 223 (2008) Holy Spirit : Petitioner school Tolentino : Petitioner principal Taguiam : Class Adviser of Grade 5-Esmeralda of the petitioner school FACTS:

•   Respondent Taguiam distributed parent/guardian permit form to her students in connection with the year-end celebration held at the school grounds (i.e., swimming pool).

•   Chiara Mae Federico’s permit was unsigned. Yet, respondent allowed her to join the activity because she assumed that Chiara Mae's mother has allowed her to join it by personally bringing her to the school with her packed lunch and swimsuit.

•   Before the activity started, respondent warned the pupils to avoid the deeper area. Respondent followed two pupils who sneaked out, thus, majority of the pupils were left unsupervised since she was the only adult present. Unfortunately during that time, Chiara Mae drowned.

•   Petitioners, after due process, dismissed respondent on the ground of gross negligence resulting to loss of trust and confidence. Meanwhile, Chiara Mae's parents filed a P7 Million damage suit against petitioners and respondent, among others. They also filed against respondent a criminal complaint for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.

•   LA and NLRC: -   declared that respondent was validly terminated for gross neglect of duty. -   He opined that Chiara Mae drowned because respondent had left the pupils

without any adult supervision. He also noted that the absence of adequate facilities should have alerted respondent before allowing the pupils to use the swimming pool.

•   CA reversed the ruling -   The appellate court observed that there was insufficient proof that respondent's

negligence was both gross and habitual ISSUE: Whether respondent had been grossly negligent amounting to loss of trust and confidence which caused her dismissal HELD: Yes.

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At the outset, respondent cannot simply ignore the purpose of the permit by resorting to assumptions. She could have requested the mother to sign the permit form before she left the school or at least called her up to obtain her conformity. As a teacher who stands in loco parentis to her pupils, respondent should have made sure that the children were protected from all harm while in her company. Respondent should have known that leaving the pupils in the swimming pool area all by themselves may result in an accident. A simple reminder "not to go to the deepest part of the pool" was insufficient to cast away all the serious dangers that the situation presented to the children, especially when respondent knew that Chiara Mae cannot swim. Dismally, respondent created an unsafe situation which exposed the lives of all the pupils concerned to real danger. This is a clear violation not only of the trust and confidence reposed on her by the parents of the pupils but of the school itself. This cause is sufficient to dismiss respondent.

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CONTRA ST. MARY’S ACADEMY vs WILLIAM CARPITANOS GR No. 143363, February 6, 2002 FACTS: Herein petitioner, conducted an enrollment drive for the school year 1995-1996 They visited schools from where prospective enrollees were studying. Sherwin Carpitanos joined the campaign. Along with the other high school students, they rode a Mitsubishi jeep owned by Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary School. Such jeep was driven by James Daniel II, a 15 year old student of the same school. It was alleged that he drove the jeep in a reckless manner which resulted for it to turned turtle. Sherwin died due to this accident. ISSUE: WON petitioner should be held liable for the damages. HELD: CA held petitioner liable for the death of Sherwin under Article 218 and 219 of the Family Code where it was pointed that they were negligent in allowing a minor to drive and not having a teacher accompany the minor students in the jeep. However, for them to be held liable, the act or omission to be considered negligent must be the proximate cause of the injury caused thus, negligence needs to have a causal connection to the accident. It must be direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken by any efficient intervening causes. The parents of the victim failed to show such negligence on the part of the petitioner. The spouses Villanueva admitted that the immediate cause of the accident was not the reckless driving of James but the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. Futhermore, there was no evidence that petitioner allowed the minor to drive the jeep of Villanueva. The mechanical defect was an event over which the school has no control hence they may not be held liable for the death resulting from such accident. The registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service, would primarily be responsible to the public or to 3rd persons for injuries caused while it is being driven on the road. It is not the school, but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin. Case was remanded to the trial court for determination of the liability of the defendants excluding herein petitioner.

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b. Liability of school where student Injures another student Old cases may now be overturned by application of the Family Code as well as the contractual obligation of the school – PALISOC vs BRILLANTES FACTS: In March 1966, while Dominador Palisoc (16 years old) was watching Virgilio Daffon and Desiderio Cruz work on a machine in their laboratory class in the Manila Technical Institute (a school of arts and trades), Daffon scolded Palisoc for just standing around like a foreman. This caused Palisoc to slightly slap the face of Daffon and a fistfight ensued between the two. Daffon delivered blows that eventually killed Palisoc. The parents of Palisoc sued Daffon, the school president (Teodosio Valenton), the instructor (Santiago Quibulue), and the owner (Antonio Brillantes). The basis of the suit against Valenton, Quibulue, and Brillantes was Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The lower court, as well as the CA, ruled that only Daffon is liable for damages and that Valenton, Quibulue, and Brillantes are not liable because under Article 2180, they are only liable “so long as they [the students] remain in their custody.” And that this means, as per Mercado vs Court of Appeals, that teachers or heads of establishments are only liable for the tortious acts of their students if the students are living and boarding with the teacher or other officials of the school – which Daffon was not. ISSUE: Whether or not the ruling in the Mercado Case still applies. HELD: No. The SC abandoned the ruling in the Mercado Case as well as the ruling in the Exconde Case as they adopted Justice JBL Reyes’ dissenting opinion in the latter case. Valenton and Quibulue as president and teacher-in-charge of the school must be held jointly and severally liable for the quasi-delict of Daffon. The unfortunate death resulting from the fight between the students could have been avoided, had said defendants but complied with their duty of providing adequate supervision over the activities of the students in the school premises to protect their students from harm, whether at the hands of fellow students or other parties. At any rate, the law holds them liable unless they relieve themselves of such liability, in compliance with the last paragraph of Article 2180, Civil Code, by “(proving) that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.” In the light of the factual findings of the lower court’s decision, said defendants failed to prove such exemption from liability. The SC reiterated that there is nothing in the law which prescribes that a student must be living and boarding with his teacher or in the school before heads and teachers of the school may be held liable for the tortious acts of their students.

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PASCO vs CFI-BULACAN FACTS:

•   Petitioner Reynaldo Pasco together with two companions while walking in the campus of private respondent Araneta University after attending class was accosted and mauled by a group of muslim students led by Abdul alias “Teng”.

•   The said muslim group were also student on the respondent university •   Petitioner was subsequently stabbed by Abdul and was hospitalized at MCU (Manila

Central University) Hospital. •   Petitioner assisted by his father Pedro Pasco filed a complaint for damages against

Abdul and Respondent University was impleaded as a party defendant under the provision of the civil code (Art 2180 NCC)

•   Respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the following grounds o   Art 2180 NCC applies only to vocational school and not to academic

institutions o   The civil liability arises from the criminal action which defendant has not

committed. o   Since it was a civil case, Demand should have been made by the petitioner.

•   Respondent court (CFI) granted the motion to dismiss by the respondent ISSUE: W/N under Article 2180 NCC is applicable to educational institutions (which are not school of arts and trades) and to have the school or university itself (as distinguished from teachers or heads) is liable? RULING: No Article 2180 NCC is not applicable to Respondent University The provision under Article 2180 NCC speaks only of Teachers or heads and not school or university. DISSENT (Melencio-Herrera): Art2180 may be construed as the basis for liability of the school as the employer for the failure of its teachers or school head to perform their mandatory legal duties as substitute parents. DISSENT (SARMIENTO, J.): I dissent. Paragraph 5 of Art. 2180 may be construed as the basis for the liability of the school as the employer for the failure of its teachers or school heads to perform their mandatory legal duties as substitute parents. Herrera, J. concurring.

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AMADORA vs CA (COLEGIO DE SAN JOSE-RECOLETOS, VICTOR LLUCH SERGIO P. DLMASO JR., CELESTINO DICON, ANIANO ABELLANA, PABLITO DAFFON thru his parents and natural guardians, MR. and MRS. NICANOR GUMBAN, and ROLANDO VALENCIA, thru his guardian, A. FRANCISCO ALONSO FACTS: Alfredo Amadora, while in the auditorium of the school, was mortally hit by a gun by Pablito Daffon resulting to the former’s death. Daffon was convicted of homicide through reckless imprudence. The victim’s parents, herein petitioners, filed a civil action for damages against Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rectors, high school principal, dean of boys, the physics teacher together with Daffon and 2 other students. Complaints against the students were dropped. Respondent Court absolved the defendants completely and reversed CFI Cebu’s decision for the following reasons: 1. Since the school was an academic institution of learning and not a school of arts and trades 2. That students were not in the custody of the school since the semester has already ended 3. There was no clear identification of the fatal gun, and 4. In any event, defendants exercised the necessary diligence through enforcement of the school regulations in maintaining discipline. Petitioners on othe other hand claimed their son was under school custody because he went to school to comply with a requirement for graduation (submission of Physics reports). ISSUE: WON Collegio de San Jose-Recoletos should be held liable. HELD: Resolution of all these disagreements will depend on the interpretation of Article 2180 which, as it happens, is invoked by both parties in support of their conflicting positions. The pertinent part of this article reads as follows: Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody. The time Alfredo was fatally shot, he was in the custody of the authorities of the school notwithstanding classes had formally ended when the incident happened. It was immaterial if he was in the school auditorium to finish his physics requirement. What was important is that he was there for a legitimate purpose. On the other hand, the rector, high school principal and the dean of boys cannot be held liable because none of them was the teacher-in-charge as defined in the provision. Each was exercising only a general authority over the students and not direct control and influence exerted by the teacher placed in-charge of particular classes. In the absence of a teacher- in charge, dean of boys should probably be held liable considering that he had earlier confiscated an unlicensed gun from a student and later returned to him without taking disciplinary action or reporting the matter to the higher authorities. Though it was clear negligence on his part, no proof was shown to necessarily link this gun with the shooting incident. Collegio San Jose-Recoletos cannot directly be held liable under the provision because only the teacher of the head of school of arts and trade is made responsible for the damage caused by the student. Hence, under the facts disclosed, none of the respondents were held liable for the injury inflicted with Alfredo resulting to his death. Petition was denied.

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SALVOSA vs IAC FACTS: Baguio Colleges Foundation (BCF) is an academic institution of the arts and trade. Within the premises of the BCF is an ROTC Unit, the Baguio Colleges Foundation Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) Unit, which is under the fifth control of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. The ROTC Unit, by way of accommodation to the AFP, the latter was provided by the BCF an office and an armory located at the basement of its main building. Jimmy B. Abon, a commerce student of BCF was appointed as armorer of the ROTC Unit by the AFP receiving salary from the latter and under the orders of Captain Roberto C. Ungos, the Commandant. Around 8:00 in the evening, Jimmy B. Abon then shot Napoleon Castro a student of the University of Baguio with an unlicensed firearm which the former took from the armory of the ROTC Unit of the BCF and he was convicted crime of Homicide by Military Commission No. 30, AFP for the death of Castro. Trial Court rendered a decision, sentencing defendants Jimmy B. Abon, Benjamin Salvosa and Baguio Colleges Foundation, Inc., jointly and severally, to pay private respondents Eduardo, Diomedes, Virginia and Rodolfo Castro. On appeal, the decision was affirmed stating that although Abon was not attending any class or school function at the time of the shooting incident, which was at about 8 o'clock in the evening; but considering that Abon was employed as an armorer and property custodian of the BCF ROTC unit, he must have been attending night classes and therefore that hour in the evening was just about dismissal time for him or soon thereafter. The time interval is safely within the "recess time". ISSUE: WON Salvosa and BCF can be held solidarity hable with Jimmy B. Abon for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, as a consequence of the tortious act of Jimmy B. Abon. HELD: Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades are hable for "damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody." The rationale of such liability is that so long as the student remains in the custody of a teacher, the latter "stands, to a certain extent, in loco parentis [as to the student] and [is] called upon to exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the [student]." 14 Likewise, "the phrase used in [Art. 2180 — 'so long as (the students) remain in their custody means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in the school, including recess time." A student not "at attendance in the school" cannot be in "recess" thereat. A "recess," as the concept is embraced in the phrase "at attendance in the school," contemplates a situation of temporary adjournment of school activities where the student still remains within call of his mentor and is not permitted to leave the school premises, or the area within which the school activity is conducted. Recess by its nature does not include dismissal. 18Likewise, the mere fact of being enrolled or being in the premises of a school without more does not constitute "attending school" or being in the "protective and supervisory custody' of the school, as contemplated in the law.

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Hence, Jimmy B. Abon cannot be considered to have been "at attendance in the school," or in the custody of BCF, when he shot Napoleon Castro. Logically, therefore, petitioners cannot under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code be held solidarity liable with Jimmy B. Abon for damages resulting from his acts. Before the shooting incident, Roberto B. Ungos ROTC Unit Commandant, AFP, had instructed Jimmy B. Abon "not to leave the office and [to keep the armory] well guarded." c. Liability of school where teacher/school employee injures another student due to negligence YLARDE vs AQUINO (missing) SCHOOL OF THE HOLY SPIRIT OF QUEZON CITY and/or TOLENTINO, petitioners, vs. TAGUIAM, respondent. 558 SCRA 223 (2008) Holy Spirit : Petitioner school Tolentino : Petitioner principal Taguiam : Class Adviser of Grade 5-Esmeralda of the petitioner school FACTS:

•   Respondent Taguiam distributed parent/guardian permit form to her students in connection with the year-end celebration held at the school grounds (i.e., swimming pool).

•   Chiara Mae Federico’s permit was unsigned. Yet, respondent allowed her to join the activity because she assumed that Chiara Mae's mother has allowed her to join it by personally bringing her to the school with her packed lunch and swimsuit.

•   Before the activity started, respondent warned the pupils to avoid the deeper area. Respondent followed two pupils who sneaked out, thus, majority of the pupils were left unsupervised since she was the only adult present. Unfortunately during that time, Chiara Mae drowned.

•   Petitioners, after due process, dismissed respondent on the ground of gross negligence resulting to loss of trust and confidence. Meanwhile, Chiara Mae's parents filed a P7 Million damage suit against petitioners and respondent, among others. They also filed against respondent a criminal complaint for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.

•   LA and NLRC: -   declared that respondent was validly terminated for gross neglect of duty. -   He opined that Chiara Mae drowned because respondent had left the pupils

without any adult supervision. He also noted that the absence of adequate facilities should have alerted respondent before allowing the pupils to use the swimming pool.

•   CA reversed the ruling

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-   The appellate court observed that there was insufficient proof that respondent's negligence was both gross and habitual

ISSUE: Whether respondent had been grossly negligent amounting to loss of trust and confidence which caused her dismissal HELD: Yes. At the outset, respondent cannot simply ignore the purpose of the permit by resorting to assumptions. She could have requested the mother to sign the permit form before she left the school or at least called her up to obtain her conformity. As a teacher who stands in loco parentis to her pupils, respondent should have made sure that the children were protected from all harm while in her company. Respondent should have known that leaving the pupils in the swimming pool area all by themselves may result in an accident. A simple reminder "not to go to the deepest part of the pool" was insufficient to cast away all the serious dangers that the situation presented to the children, especially when respondent knew that Chiara Mae cannot swim. Dismally, respondent created an unsafe situation which exposed the lives of all the pupils concerned to real danger. This is a clear violation not only of the trust and confidence reposed on her by the parents of the pupils but of the school itself. This cause is sufficient to dismiss respondent.

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ST. JOSEPH’S COLLEGE, SR. JOSEPHINI AMBATALI, SFIC, and ROSALINDA TABUGOY vs JAYSON MIRANDA (represented by father RODOLFO MIRANDA) FACTS: On November 17, 1994, at around 1:30 in the afternoon inside St. Joseph College's [SJC's] premises, the class to which [respondent Jayson Val Miranda] belonged was conducting a science experiment about fusion of sulphur powder and iron fillings under the tutelage of Rosalinda Tabugo, she being the subject teacher and employee of SJC. The adviser of [Jayson's] class is . . . Estefania Abdan. Tabugo left her class while it was doing the experiment without having adequately secured it from any untoward incident or occurrence. In the middle of the experiment, [Jayson], who was the assistant leader of one of the class groups, checked the result of the experiment by looking into the test tube with magnifying glass. The test tube was being held by one of his group mates who moved it close and towards the eye of [Jayson]. At that instance, the compound in the test tube spurted out and several particles of which hit [Jayson's] eye and the different parts of the bodies of some of his group mates. As a result thereof, [Jayson's] eyes were chemically burned, particularly his left eye, for which he had to undergo surgery and had to spend for his medication. Upon filing of this case [in] the lower court, [Jayson's] wound had not completely healed and still had to undergo another surgery. Upon learning of the incident and because of the need for finances, [Jayson's] mother, who was working abroad, had to rush back home for which she spent P36,070.00 for her fares and had to forego her salary from November 23, 1994 to December 26, 1994, in the amount of at least P40,000.00. Then, too, [Jayson] and his parents suffered sleepless nights, mental anguish and wounded feelings as a result of his injury due to [petitioners'] fault and failure to exercise the degree of care and diligence incumbent upon each one of them. Thus, they should be held liable for moral damages. Also, [Jayson] sent a demand letter to St. Joseph for the payment of his medical expenses as well as other expenses incidental thereto, which the latter failed to heed. Hence, [Jayson] was constrained to file the complaint for damages. [Petitioners], therefore, should likewise compensate [Jayson] for litigation expenses, including attorney's fees. On the other hand, [petitioners SJC, Sr. Josephini Ambatali, SFIC, and Tabugo] alleged that [Jayson] was a grade six pupil of SJC in the school year 1994-1995. On November 17, 1994, at about 1:30 in the afternoon, the class to which [Jayson] belong[s] was conducting a science experiment under the guidance and supervision of Tabugo, the class science teacher, about fusion of sulphur powder and iron fillings by combining these elements in a test tube and heating the same. Before the science experiment was conducted, [Jayson] and his classmates were given strict instructions to follow the written procedure for the experiment and not to look into the test tube until the heated compound had cooled off. [Jayson], however, a person of sufficient age and discretion and completely capable of understanding the English language and the instructions of his teacher, without waiting for the heated compound to cool off, as required in the written procedure for the experiment and as repeatedly explained by the teacher, violated such instructions and took a magnifying glass and looked at the compound, which at that moment spurted out of the test tube, a small particle hitting one of [Jayson's] eyes.

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Jayson was rushed by the school employees to the school clinic and thereafter transferred to St. Luke's Medical Center for treatment. At the hospital, when Tabago visited [Jayson], the latter cried and apologized to his teacher for violating her instructions not to look into the test tube until the compound had cooled off. After the treatment, [Jayson] was pronounced ready for discharge and an eye test showed that his vision had not been impaired or affected. In order to avoid additional hospital charges due to the delay in [Jayson's] discharge, Rodolfo S. Miranda, [Jayson's] father, requested SJC to advance the amount of P26,176.35 representing [Jayson's] hospital bill until his wife could arrive from abroad and pay back the money. SJC acceded to the request. On December 6, 1994, however, the parents of [Jayson], through counsel, wrote SJC a letter demanding that it should shoulder all the medical expenses of [Jayson] that had been incurred and will be incurred further arising from the accident caused by the science experiment. In a letter dated December 14, 1994, the counsel for SJC, represented by Sr. Josephini Ambatali, SFIC, explained that the school cannot accede to the demand because "the accident occurred by reason of [Jayson's] failure to comply with the written procedure for the experiment and his teacher's repeated warnings and instruction that no student must face, much less look into, the opening of the test tube until the heated compound has cooled. Since SJC did not accede to the demand, Rodolfo, Jayson's father, on Jayson's behalf, sued petitioners for damages. ISSUE: Whether or not St. Joseph College as well as Rosalinda Tabugoy as subject teacher of Jayson Miranda liable to the injury that Jayson suffered? HELD: Yes. In this case, petitioners failed to show that the negligence of Jayson was the proximate cause of the latter's injury. We find that the immediate cause of the accident was not the negligence of [Jayson] when he curiously looked into the test tube when the chemicals suddenly exploded which caused his injury, but the sudden and unexpected explosion of the chemicals independent of any intervening cause. Petitioners could have prevented the mishap if they exercised a higher degree of care, caution and foresight. "All of the petitioners are equally at fault and are liable for negligence because all of them are responsible for exercising the required reasonable care, prudence, caution and foresight to prevent or avoid injuries to the students. The individual petitioners are persons charged with the teaching and vigilance over their students as well as the supervision and ensuring of their well-being. Based on the facts presented before this Court, these [petitioners] were remiss in their responsibilities and lacking in the degree of vigilance expected of them. Petitioner subject teacher Rosalinda Tabugo was inside the classroom when the class undertook the science experiment although Jayson insisted that said petitioner left the classroom. No evidence, however, was presented to establish that petitioner Tabugo was inside the classroom for the whole duration of the experiment. It was unnatural in the ordinary course of events that Jayson was brought to the school clinic for immediate treatment not by petitioner subject teacher Rosalinda Tabugo but by somebody else. The Court is inclined to believe that petitioner subject teacher Tabugo was not inside the classroom at the time the accident happened. The Court is also perplexed why none of the other students (who were

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eyewitnesses to the incident) testified in Court to corroborate the story of the petitioners. The Court, however, understands that these other students cannot testify for Jayson because Jayson is no longer enrolled in said school and testifying for Jayson would incur the ire of school authorities. Estefania Abdan is equally at fault as the subject adviser or teacher in charge because she exercised control and supervision over petitioner Tabugo and the students themselves. It was her obligation to insure that nothing would go wrong and that the science experiment would be conducted safely and without any harm or injury to the students. Petitioner Sr. Josephini Ambatali is likewise culpable under the doctrine of command responsibility because the other individual petitioners were under her direct control and supervision. The negligent acts of the other individual petitioners were done within the scope of their assigned tasks. Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody. Petitioners' negligence and failure to exercise the requisite degree of care and caution is demonstrated by the following:

1.   Petitioner school did not take affirmative steps to avert damage and injury to its students although it had full information on the nature of dangerous science experiments conducted by the students during class;

2.   Petitioner school did not install safety measures to protect the students who conduct experiments in class;

3.   Petitioner school did not provide protective gears and devices, specifically goggles, to shield students from expected risks and dangers; and

4.   Petitioner Tabugo was not inside the classroom the whole time her class conducted the experiment, specifically, when the accident involving Jayson occurred. In any event, the size of the class — fifty (50) students — conducting the experiment is difficult to monitor.

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c. Liability of school where third parties injure another student ST. FRANCIS HIGH SCHOOL vs COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: Ferdinand Castillo, a freshman student at the St. Francis High School, wanted to join a school picnic. His parents, respondents spouses Dr. Romulo Castillo and Lilia Cadiz Castillo, because of short notice, did not allow their son to join but merely allowed him to bring food to the teachers for the picnic, with the directive that he should go back home after doing so. However, because of persuasion of the teachers, Ferdinand went on with them to the beach. During the picnic, one of the female teachers was apparently drowning. Some of the students, including Ferdinand, came to her rescue, but in the process, it was Ferdinand himself who drowned. He died. Respondent spouses filed a civil case against petitioner and some of their teachers. Trial court found teachers liable but dismissed complaint against the school. ISSUE: W/N petitioner school and teachers are liable. RULING: Petition granted. RATIO: 4th paragraph Article 2180 of the Civil Code; When employer held liable for the negligence of its employees; Rule.·Before an employer may be held liable for the negligence of his employee, the act or omission which caused damage or prejudice must have occurred while an employee was in the performance of his assigned tasks. The teachers/petitioners were not in the actual performance of their assigned tasks. The incident happened not within the school premises, not on a school day and most importantly while the teachers and students were holding a purely private affair, a picnic. It is clear from the beginning that the incident happened while some members of the I- C class of St. Francis High School were having a picnic at Talaan Beach. This picnic had no permit from the school head or its principal, Benjamin Illumin because this picnic is not a school sanctioned activity neither is it considered as an extra-curricular activity.Mere knowledge by petitioner/principal of the planning of the picnic does not in any way consent to the holding of the same. No negligence could be attributable to the petitioners. Petitioners Connie Arquio, the class adviser of I-C, the section where Ferdinand belonged, did her best and exercised diligence of a good father of a family to prevent any untoward incident or damages to all the students who joined the picnic. In fact, Connie invited co-petitioners Tirso de Chavez and Luisito Vinas who are both P.E. instructors and scout masters who have knowledge in First Aid application and swimming. Moreover, even respondentsÊ witness, Segundo Vinas, testified that “the defendants (petitioners herein) had life savers especially brought by the defendants in case of emergency.” (p. 85, Rollo) The records also show that both petitioners Chavez and Vinas did all what is humanly possible to save the child. Where no negligence was established no moral damages can be recovered.· Moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendantÊs wrongful act or omission.

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PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, JUAN D. LIM, BENJAMIN P. PAULINO, ANTONIO M. MAGTALAS, COL. PEDRO SACRO, AND LT. M. SORIANO , petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. REGINA ORDOÑEZ-BENITEZ, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 47, Regional Trial Court, Manila, SEGUNDA R. BAUTISTA, and ARSENIA D. BAUTISTA, respondents. FACTS:

•   August 30, 1985 – Carlitos Bautista, a third year commerce student at the PSBA, was stabbed to death while on the second-floor premises of the school. The assailants were not members of the schools’ academic community but were elements from outside the school.

•   The parents of Carlitos filed a civil action against the school authorities, alleging them negligent, reckless and with failure to take security precautions, means and methods before, during and after the attack on the victim.

•   Defendants (now petitioners) sought to have the suit dismissed. •   RTC – denied their motion to dismiss. •   CA – affirmed TC order. CA decided in favor of the parents of Carlitos, primarily

anchoring its decision on the law of quasi-delicts. •   Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

•   Whether or not the appellate court was correct in deciding the case based on Article 2180 (in loco parentis)

HELD: No. Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code, establishes the rule in in loco parentis. It had been stressed that the law (Article 2180) plainly provides that the damage should have been caused or inflicted by pupils or students of the educational institution sought to be held liable for the acts of its pupils or students while in its custody. However, this material situation does not exist in the present case for, as earlier indicated, the assailants of Carlitos were not students of PSBA, for whose acts the school could have been made liable. But it does not necessarily follow that PSBA is absolved form liability. Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation between PSBA and Carlitos, the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern. However, the mere fact that a person is bound to another by contract does not relieve him from extra-contractual liability to such person. When such a contractual relation exists the obligor may break the contract under such conditions that the same act which constitutes a breach of the contract would have constituted the source of an extra-contractual obligation had no contract existed between the parties. Art. 21 of the Civil Code comes to mind, so that should the act which breaches a contract be done in bad faith and violative of Art. 21, then there is a cause to view the act as constituting a quasi-delict. In the present case, there is no finding that the contract between the school and Carlitos had been breached thru the former’s negligence in providing proper security measures. WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of origin (RTC, Manila, Br. 47) is hereby ordered to continue proceedings consistent with this ruling of the Court. Costs against the petitioners.

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SOLIMAN vs TUAZON (missing)

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Saludaga vs FEU, De Jesus (President of FEU) FACTS:

•   A sophomore student of FEU, Saludaga, was shot inside the FEU premises by its security guard on duty, Rosete. Rosete avers that the shooting was accidental.

•   Saludaga was rushed to the hospital and sustained numerous injuries. •   Rosete was taken to the precinct, but was released because no formal complaint was

filed against him. •   Saludaga filed a complaint for damages against FEU and its president De Jesus,

alleging that FEU breached its obligation to provide students with a safe and secure environment, and an atmosphere conducive to learning.

o   FEU filed a 3rd party complaint against Galaxy, its security agency, for indemnification of whatever would be adjudged in favour of Saludaga.

o   Galaxy filed a 4th party complaint against AFP General Insurance. o   RTC held FEU and De Jesus solidarily liable for damages, Galaxy and its

president to indemnify FEU for the awarded damages, and dismissed the 4th party complaint for lack of cause of action.

o   CA set aside the ruling, and dismissed Saludaga’s complaint. ISSUE: Whether or not FEU and De Jesus are solidarily liable for the shooting by the employee of Galaxy HELD: YES It is undisputed that petitioner was enrolled as a sophomore law student in respondent FEU. As such, there was created a contractual obligation between the two parties. On petitioner's part, he was obliged to comply with the rules and regulations of the school. On the other hand, respondent FEU, as a learning institution is mandated to impart knowledge and equip its students with the necessary skills to pursue higher education or a profession. At the same time, it is obliged to ensure and take adequate steps to maintain peace and order within the campus. When petitioner was shot inside the campus by no less the security guard who was hired to maintain peace and secure the premises, there is a prima facie showing that respondents failed to comply with its obligation to provide a safe and secure environment to its students. Respondents failed to discharge the burden of proving that they exercised due diligence in providing a safe learning environment for their students. They failed to prove that they ensured that the guards assigned in the campus met the requirements stipulated in the Security Service Agreement. Indeed, certain documents about Galaxy were presented during trial; however, no evidence as to the qualifications of Rosete as a security guard for the university was offered. Respondents also failed to show that they undertook steps to ascertain and confirm that the security guards assigned to them actually possess the qualifications required in the Security Service Agreement. It was not proven that they examined the clearances, psychiatric test results, 201 files, and other vital documents enumerated in its contract with Galaxy. Total reliance on the security agency about these matters or failure to check the papers stating the

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qualifications of the guards is negligence on the part of respondents. A learning institution should not be allowed to completely relinquish or abdicate security matters in its premises to the security agency it hired. To do so would result to contracting away its inherent obligation to ensure a safe learning environment for its students. Due to this negligence, they cannot claim the defense of caso fortuito. One's negligence may have concurred with an act of God in producing damage and injury to another; nonetheless, showing that the immediate or proximate cause of the damage or injury was a fortuitous event would not exempt one from liability. When the effect is found to be partly the result of a person's participation - whether by active intervention, neglect or failure to act - the whole occurrence is humanized and removed from the rules applicable to acts of God. DE Jesus cannot be deemed to be solidarily liable. The breach of the obligation was due to the omission of the university as a corporate entity, and hence it has a personality separate and distinct from the officers. Furthermore there was no showing that it falls within the exceptions under the Corporation Code. He cannot also be held liable under NCC 2180, since Rosete is not his employee, but is the employee of Galaxy. Galaxy should indemnify FEU for whatever damages it might pay. Thus Galaxy is held solidarily liable with FEU. In contrast, the president of Galaxy, Imperial, is held solidarily liable for being grossly negligent in directing the affairs of his security agency. Evidence duly supports the findings of the trial court that Galaxy is negligent not only in the selection of its employees but also in their supervision. Indeed, no administrative sanction was imposed against Rosete despite the shooting incident; moreover, he was even allowed to go on leave of absence which led eventually to his disappearance. Galaxy also failed to monitor petitioner's condition or extend the necessary assistance, other than the P5,000.00 initially given to petitioner. Galaxy and Imperial failed to make good their pledge to reimburse petitioner's medical expenses.

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3.3. OTHER INDIVIDUALS (CF. STRICT LIABILITY TORTS) 3.3.1. REGISTERED/ACTUAL OWNER OF CARRIER/MOTOR VEHICLE Article 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of the due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty of reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within the next preceding two months. If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of article 2180 are applicable. (n) FILCAR TRANSPORT SERVICES vs JOSE ESPINAS (missing)

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CRIX METRO LEASING vs Minors DENNIS, MULENE, MELANIE, and MARYKRIS MANGALINAO Y DIZON FACTS:

On June 27, 1990, at about 11:15 p.m., three vehicles were traversing the two-lane northbound NLEX in the vicinity of Barangay Tibag, Pulilan, Bulacan. It was raining that night. Anacleto Edurese, Jr. was driving a Pathfinder. His Isabela-bound passengers were the owners of said vehicle, spouses Roberto and Josephine Mangalinao, their daughter Marriane, housemaid Rufina Andres and helper Armando Jebueza . Before them on the outer lane was a Pampanga-bound Fuso 10-wheeler truck (Fuso), driven by Loreto Lucilo, who was with truck helper Charlie Palomar. The Fuso was then already moving in an erratic and swerving motion.Following behind the Pathfinder was another 10-wheeler truck, an Isuzu Cargo driven by Antonio, who was then with helper Rodolfo Navia. Just when the Pathfinder was already cruising along the NLEX’s fast lane and about to overtake the Fuso, the latter suddenly swerved to the left and cut into the Pathfinder’s lane thereby blocking its way. As a result, the Pathfinder hit the Fuso’s left door and left body.7 The impact caused both vehicles to stop in the middle of the expressway. Almost instantly, the inevitable pileup happened. Although Antonio stepped on the brakes, the Isuzu’s front crashed9 into the rear of the Pathfinder leaving it a total wreck.10 Soon after, the Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC) patrol arrived at the scene of the accident and informed the Pulilan police about the vehicular mishap. The Mangalinao spouses, Edurese, Jebueza were declared dead on the spot while 6-month old Marriane and the housemaid were declared dead on arrival at a nearby hospital. The occupants of the trucks escaped serious injuries and death.

The minor children of the Mangalinao spouses, Dennis, Mylene, Melanie and Marikris, through their legal guardian, consequently filed on January 16, 1991 a Complaint for damages based on quasi-delict, before the RTC. They impleaded the drivers Loreto and Antonio, as well as the registered owners of the Fuso and the Isuzu trucks, namely Orix and Sonny respectively.

Orix in its Motion to Dismiss interposed that it is not the actual owner of the Fuso truck. As the trial court denied the motion, Orix reiterated that the children had no cause of action against it because on September 9, 1983, it already sold the Fuso truck to MMO Trucking owned by Manuel Ong. The latter being the alleged owner at the time of the collision, Orix filed a Third Party complaint against Manuel, a.k.a. Manuel Tan.

RTC: Sonny, Antonio, Loreto and Orix liable for damages. It likewise ruled in favor of Orix anent its third party complaint, the latter having sufficiently proven that Manuel of MMO Trucking is the real owner of the Fuso.

CA: affirmed factual findings of trial court. Also, Orix, as the registered owner of the Fuso, is considered in the eyes of the law and of third persons responsible for the deaths of the passengers of the Pathfinder, regardless of the lack of an employer-employee relationship between it and the driver Loreto.

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ISSUE:

Whether or not Orix should be held liable.

HELD:

YES.

Orix as the operator on record of the Fuso truck is liable to the heirs of the victims of the mishap.

Orix cannot point fingers at the alleged real owner to exculpate itself from vicarious liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Regardless of whoever Orix claims to be the actual owner of the Fuso by reason of a contract of sale, it is nevertheless primarily liable for the damages or injury the truck registered under it have caused. It has already been explained:

Were a registered owner allowed to evade responsibility by proving who the supposed transferee or owner is, it would be easy for him, by collusion with others or otherwise, to escape said responsibility and transfer the same to an indefinite person, or to one who possesses no property with which to respond financially for the damage or injury done. A victim of recklessness on the public highways is usually without means to discover or identify the person actually causing the injury or damage. He has no means other than by a recourse to the registration in the Motor Vehicles Office to determine who is the owner. The protection that the law aims to extend to him would become illusory were the registered owner given the opportunity to escape liability by disproving his ownership. x x x

Besides, the registered owners have a right to be indemnified by the real or actual owner of the amount that they may be required to pay as damage for the injury caused to the plaintiff, which Orix rightfully acknowledged by filing a third-party complaint against the owner of the Fuso, Manuel.

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3.3.2. MANUFACTURERS Article 2187. Manufacturers and processors of foodstuffs, drinks, toilet articles and similar goods shall be liable for death or injuries caused by any noxious or harmful substances used, although no contractual relation exists between them and the consumers. R.A. 7394 (Consumer Act of the Philippines) Section 92-107 (Chapter 1) --- 3.3.3. POSSESSOR/USER OF ANIMAL VESTIL vs INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT FACTS: On July 29, 1975, Theness was bitten by a dog while she was playing with a child of the petitioners in the house of the late Vicente Miranda, the father of Purita Vestil, at F. Ramos Street in Cebu City. She was rushed to the Cebu General Hospital, where she was treated for "multiple lacerated wounds on the forehead" and administered an anti-rabies vaccine by Dr. Antonio Tautjo. She was discharged after nine days but was re-admitted one week later due to "vomiting of saliva." The following day, on August 15, 1975, the child died. The cause of death was certified as Broncho-pneumonia. Seven months later, the Uys sued for damages, alleging that the Vestils were liable to them as the possessors of "Andoy," the dog that bit and eventually killed their daughter. The Vestils rejected the charge, insisting that the dog belonged to the deceased Vicente Miranda, that it was a tame animal, and that in any case no one had witnessed it bite Theness. Trial Court: Dismissed the complaint Court of Appeals: It found that the Vestils were in possession of the house and the dog and so should be responsible under Article 2183 of the Civil Code for the injuries caused by the dog. It also held that the child had died as a result of the dog bites and not for causes independent thereof as submitted by the appellees. In the proceedings now before us, Purita Vestil insists that she is not the owner of the house or of the dog left by her father as his estate has not yet been partitioned and there are other heirs to the property. Pursuing the logic of the Uys, she claims, even her sister living in Canada would be held responsible for the acts of the dog simply because she is one of Miranda's heirs. ISSUE: Whether or not Vestil is liable for Dog bite? HELD: Yes. What must be determined is the possession of the dog that admittedly was staying in the house in question, regardless of the ownership of the dog or of the house.

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Article 2183 reads as follows: The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. This responsibility shall cease only in case the damage should come from force majeure or from the fault of the person who has suffered damage. Vestil is not really the owner of the house, which was still part of Vicente Miranda's estate. She and her husband were its possessors at the time of the incident in question. There is evidence showing that she and her family regularly went to the house, once or twice weekly and used it virtually as a second house. Interestingly, her own daughter was playing in the house with Theness when she was bitten by the dog. The dog remained in the house even after the death of Vicente Miranda in 1973 and until 1975, when the incident in question occurred. Also, the Vestils offered to assist the Uys with their hospitalization expenses although Purita said she knew them only casually. The contention that Broncho-pneumonia is not related to the dog bite is belied by the statement of the doctors that it is a complication which may arise from rabies. Theness showed signs of hydrophobia, a symptom of rabies. Lastly, the court ruled that for 2183 applies not only to wild and vicious animals but also tame. “According to Manresa the obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code is not based on the negligence or on the presumed lack of vigilance of the possessor or user of the animal causing the damage. It is based on natural equity and on the principle of social interest that he who possesses animals for his utility, pleasure or service must answer for the damage which such animal may cause.”

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3.3.4. PROPRIETOR OF BUILDING/THING Article 2190. The proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for the damages resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary repairs. (1907) Article 2191. Proprietors shall also be responsible for damages caused: (1) By the explosion of machinery which has not been taken care of with due diligence, and the inflammation of explosive substances which have not been kept in a safe and adequate place; (2) By excessive smoke, which may be harmful to persons or property; (3) By the falling of trees situated at or near highways or lanes, if not caused by force majeure; (4) By emanations from tubes, canals, sewers or deposits of infectious matter, constructed without precautions suitable to the place. (1908) Article 2192. If damage referred to in the two preceding articles should be the result of any defect in the construction mentioned in article 1723, the third person suffering damages may proceed only against the engineer or architect or contractor in accordance with said article, within the period therein fixed. (1909) Article 2193. The head of a family that lives in a building or a part thereof, is responsible for damages caused by things thrown or falling from the same.

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GOTESCO vs CHATTO FACTS: Gloria E. Chatto, and her 15-year old daughter, Lina Delza E. Chatto went to see the movie "Mother Dear" at Superama I theater, owned by Gotesco Investment Corporation. They bought balcony tickets but were unable to find seats considering the number of people patronizing the movie. After 10 minutes, the ceiling of its balcony collapsed. The theater was plunged into darkness and pandemonium ensued. The Chattos crawled under the fallen ceiling. They were confined and treated for one (1) day at the FEU Hospital. Due to continuing pain in the neck, headache and dizziness, gloria went to Illinois, USA for further treatment. She was treated at the Cook County Hospital in Chicago, Illinois. She stayed in the U.S. for about three (3) months during which time she had to return to the Cook County Hospital five (5) or, six (6) times. Gotesco tried to avoid liability by alleging that the collapse of the ceiling of its theater was done due to force majeure. It maintained that its theater did not suffer from any structural or construction defect. The trial court ordered Gotesco to pay Lina moral damages and Gloria actual and consequential damages, moral damages and attorney's fees, plus the cost of the suit. CA affirmed in toto the RTC decision. ISSUES:

1.   Whether or not the collapse of the ceiling was due to force majeure 2.   Whether or not Gotesco was grossly negligent in failing to cause proper and adequate

inspection maintenance and upkeep of the building HELD:

1.   No. Gotesco’s claim that the collapse of the ceiling of the theater's balcony was due to force majeure is not even founded on facts because its own witness, Mr. Jesus Lim Ong. He is not an engineer, and an architect who had not even passed the government's examination. He admitted that "he could not give any reason why the ceiling collapsed." Having interposed it as a defense, it had the burden to prove that the collapse was indeed caused by force majeure. It could not have collapsed without a cause. That Mr. Ong could not offer any explanation does not imply force majeure. There was no authoritative investigation conducted by impartial civil and structural engineers on the cause of the collapse of the theater's ceiling. Bouvier defines force majeure as “Any accident due to natural cause, directly exclusively without human intervention, such as could not have been prevented by any kind of oversight, pains and care reasonably to have been expected.”

2.   Yes. The trial court found that the collapse was due to construction defects. There was no evidence offered to overturn this finding. The building was constructed barely four (4) years prior to the accident in question. Such defects could have been easily discovered if only petitioner exercised due diligence and care in keeping and maintaining the premises. But as disclosed

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by the testimony of Mr. Ong, there was no adequate inspection of the premises before the date of the accident. His answers to the leading questions on inspection disclosed neither the exact dates of said inspection nor the nature and extent of the same. That the structural designs and plans of the building were duly approved by the City Engineer and the building permits and certificate of occupancy were issued do not at all prove that there were no defects in the construction, especially as regards the ceiling, considering that no testimony was offered to prove that it was ever inspected at all. It is settled that: The owner or proprietor of a place of public amusement impliedly warrants that the premises, appliances and amusement devices are safe for the purpose for which they are designed, the doctrine being subject to no other exception or qualification than that he does not contract against unknown defects not discoverable by ordinary or reasonable means. This implied warranty has given rise to the rule that: Where a patron of a theater or other place of public amusement is injured, and the thing that caused the injury is wholly and exclusively under the control and management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of events would not have happened if proper care had been exercised, its occurrence raises a presumption or permits of an inference of negligence on the part of the defendant. Besides, even assuming for the sake of argument that the cause of the collapse was due to force majeure, petitioner would still be liable because it was guilty of negligence, which the trial court denominated as gross. As gleaned from Bouvier's definition of and Cockburn's elucidation on force majeure for one to be exempt from any liability because of it, he must have exercised care, i.e., he should not have been guilty of negligence.

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SPOUSES BENJAMIN AND SONIA MAMARIL vs BOY SCOUTS OF THE PHILIPPINES, AIB SECURITY Principle: Vicarious liability lies with the true employer and not the employer’s client. Liability for illegal or harmful acts committed by the security guards attaches to the employer agency, and not to the clients or customers of such agency. Facts: Spouses Benjamin Mamaril and Sonia P. Mamaril are jeepney operators. They would park their six passenger jeepneys every night at the Boy Scout of the Philippines compound for a fee of P300.00 per month for each unit. However, one of the vehicles went missing and was never recovered. BSP had contracted with AIB for its security and protection. Cesario Peña and Vicente Gaddi were assigned by AIB Security to secure the BSP compound. One night a male person who has the key of the vehicle took the lost jeepney out of the compound and was never recovered.The Sps. Mamaril filed a complaint for damages against BSP, AIB and the two security guards. Issue: Whether or not the Boy Scout of the Philippines is not liable for the lost vehicle owned by the Spouses due to the negligence of the security guards assigned by AIB to BSP under the Guard Service Contract? Ruling: It is undisputed that the proximate cause of the loss of the Sps. Mamaril’s vehicle was the negligent act of the security guards in allowing unidentified person to take the vehicle but there is nothing that point negligence on the part of BSP for it to be liable.The two security guards are employees of AIB and where thus assigned by AIB to BSP in pursuant of the Guard Service Contract between them. There is no employer-employee relationship between the security guard and BSP. The negligence of the security guard cannot be attributed to BSP but rather to its true employer AIB. Liability for illegal or harmful acts committed by the security guards attaches to the employer agency, and not to the clients or customers of such agency. As a general rule, a client or customer of a security agency has no hand in selecting who among the pool of security guards or watchmen employed by the agency shall be assigned to it; the duty to observe the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection of the guards cannot, in ordinary course of events, be demanded from a client company whose premises or property are protected by the security guards. The fact that a client company may give instruction or direction to the security guards assigned to it, does not, by it self render the client responsible as an employer of the security guards concerned and liable for their wrongful acts or omission.

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3.3.5. AGENT OF A PRINCIPAL SPOUSES FERNANDO AND LOURDES VILORIA vs CONTINENTAL AIRWAYS FACTS: Fernando purchased for himself and his wife, Lourdes, two round trip airline tickets from San Diego, California to Newark, New Jersey with Continental Airlines. He purchased the tickets from "Holiday Travel" and was attended to by travel agent Margaret Mager. Fernando initially wanted to travel via AMTRAK, an intercity passenger train service provider in the United States. But they just agreed to buy the said tickets after Mager informed them that there were no available seats at Amtrak. Later, Fernando requested Mager to reschedule their flight to an earlier date. Mager informed him that flights to Newark via Continental Airlines were already fully booked and offered the alternative of a round trip flight via Frontier Air. Because of Frontier’s higher rates, Fernando just opted to request for a refund but according to Mager the subject tickets are non-refundable and the only option that Continental Airlines can offer is the re-issuance of new tickets within one year from the date the subject tickets were issued. Thereafter, Fernando decided to reserve two seats with Frontier Air. At Greyhound Station, Fernando made inquiries at Amtrak and discovered that seats available and may travel anytime and any day he pleased. Fernando then purchased two tickets for Washington, D.C. From Amtrak, Fernando went to Holiday Travel and confronted Mager telling her that she had misled them into buying the Continental Airlines tickets by misrepresenting that Amtrak was already fully booked. Fernando reiterated his demand for a refund but was told that the subject tickets are non-refundable. Upon his return to the Philippines, Fernando sent a letter to CAI demanding for a refund. Continental Micronesia denied Fernando’s request and advised him that he may take the subject tickets to any Continental ticketing location for the re-issuance of new tickets within two years from the date they were issued. Continental Micronesia informed Fernando that the subject tickets may be used as a form of payment for the purchase of another Continental ticket, albeit with a re-issuance fee. Fernando went to Continental’s ticketing office at Makati City to have the subject tickets replaced by a single round trip ticket to Los Angeles, California under his name. Therein, he was informed that Lourdes’ ticket was non-transferable. He was also informed that a round trip ticket to Los Angeles was US$1,867.40 so he would have to pay what will not be covered by the value of his San Diego to Newark round trip ticket. Spouses Viloria filed a complaint praying that CAI be ordered to refund the money they used in the purchase of the subject tickets with legal interest. CAI’s defenses were the conditions attached to their contract of carriage is the non-transferability and non-refundability of the subject tickets. RTC ruled holding that Spouses Viloria are entitled to a refund. Citing Articles 1868 and 1869 of the Civil Code, the RTC ruled that Mager is CAI’s agent, hence, bound by her bad faith and misrepresentation. CA reversed the RTC holding that CAI cannot be held liable for Mager’s act in the absence of any proof that a principal-agent relationship existed between CAI and Holiday Travel. ISSUES: Does a principal-agent relationship exist between CAI and Holiday Travel?

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Assuming that an agency relationship exists between CAI and Holiday Travel, is CAI bound by the acts of Holiday Travel’s agents and employees such as Mager? RULING: 1.   Yes,a principal-agent relationship exists between CAI and Holiday Travel. The CA failed to consider undisputed facts, discrediting CAI’s denial that Holiday Travel is one of its agents. Furthermore, in erroneously characterizing the contractual relationship between CAI and Holiday Travel as a contract of sale, the CA failed to apply the fundamental civil law principles governing agency and differentiating it from sale. The essential elements of agency are: (1) there is consent, express or implied of the parties to establish the relationship; (2) the object is the execution of a juridical act in relation to a third person; (3) the agent acts as a representative and not for himself, and (4) the agent acts within the scope of his authority. The first and second elements are present as CAI does not deny that it concluded an agreement with Holiday Travel, whereby Holiday Travel would enter into contracts of carriage with third persons on CAI’s behalf. The third element is also present as it is undisputed that Holiday Travel merely acted in a representative capacity and it is CAI and not Holiday Travel who is bound by the contracts of carriage entered into by Holiday Travel on its behalf. The fourth element is also present considering that CAI has not made any allegation that Holiday Travel exceeded the authority that was granted to it. In fact, CAI consistently maintains the validity of the contracts of carriage that Holiday Travel executed with Spouses Viloria and that Mager was not guilty of any fraudulent misrepresentation. That CAI admits the authority of Holiday Travel to enter into contracts of carriage on its behalf is easily discernible from its February 24, 1998 and March 24, 1998 letters, where it impliedly recognized the validity of the contracts entered into by Holiday Travel with Spouses Viloria. When Fernando informed CAI that it was Holiday Travel who issued to them the subject tickets, CAI did not deny that Holiday Travel is its authorized agent. 2. In actions based on quasi-delict, a principal can only be held liable for the tort committed by its agent’s employees if it has been established by preponderance of evidence that the principal was also at fault or negligent or that the principal exercise control and supervision over them. Spouses Viloria’s cause of action on the basis of Mager’s alleged fraudulent misrepresentation is clearly one of tort or quasi-delict, there being no pre-existing contractual relationship between them. Therefore, it was incumbent upon Spouses Viloria to prove that CAI was equally at fault. However, the records are devoid of any evidence by which CAI’s alleged liability can be substantiated. Apart from their claim that CAI must be held liable for Mager’s supposed fraud because Holiday Travel is CAI’s agent, Spouses Viloria did not present evidence that CAI was a party or had contributed to Mager’s complained act either by instructing or authorizing Holiday Travel and Mager to issue the said misrepresentation. It is incumbent upon Spouses Viloria to prove that CAI exercised control or supervision over Mager by preponderant evidence. Therefore, without a modicum of evidence that CAI exercised control over Holiday Travel’s employees or that CAI was equally at fault, no liability can be imposed on CAI for Mager’s supposed misrepresentation.