The Development of a Ph(Diffi

ByINTRODUCTION While the country may have introduced pro-competitive policy reforms,… …such as the Tariff Reform and Import Liberalization Programs, among other structural reforms,… …the country’s global competitiveness can still be enhanced.

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1970s and 1980s, Philippine economic policies cted towards an inward-looking protectionist an industrial structure characterized by high oncentration. The results were the capture of y the few, economic growth characterized by

roductivity, and a very unequal distribution of

uction of significant policy reforms, i.e., e, banking), deregulation (shipping, airline, oil

nopolization (telecommunications industry), and er), the country’s economic growth performance to external shocks improved. The structural eir significance when the country was able to

ct of the Asian crisis, escaping relatively well the output experienced in the region.

for competition policy in the Philippines are e Tariff Reform Program, the average overall

dropped sharply from 42% in 1981 to 6.49% at protection rates have declined from 49.3% in On the other hand, the Import Liberalization ced the number of items with import restrictions .

0% of the total products in the Inclusion List on Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) for the e Area (AFTA) have been reduced to 0%.

ent-enhancing program, retail trade has been % foreign ownership under certain conditions,

rticipation in financing and investment houses d from 40% to 60%, foreign equity participation

25% of land areas of the country has been exploitation.

e country may have introduced policy reforms

The momentum must be sustaine1d by putting in place a comprehensive competition policy.

fostering competition, its declining international competitiveness, especially when compared with other major economies in the region, highlights that the achievements so far have still not been sufficient to lock in long term sustainable economic growth, stability and international competitiveness. The challenge confronting the country is to sustain the momentum, by extending the various pro-competitive reforms in a well-defined and transparent process. In line with policy developments in many countries, the direction for the Philippines to take is the formulation and implementation not only of a competition policy but, more importantly, a comprehensive competition policy.

WHERE ARE WE? The Constitution provides the basis for regulating and prohibiting anti-competitive behavior in the market.

A. Survey of Existing Laws

1. The 1987 Philippine Constitution

Article XII, Section 19 of the Constitution provides that:

“The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when

the public interest so requires. No combinations in restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be allowed.”

The Constitution does not prohibit monopolies by

themselves. There is no legal presumption on the illegality of monopolies. However, the government can prohibit or regulate monopolies on the ground of public interest.

Combinations in restraint of trade as well as unfair

competition are illegal per se. They are to be prohibited without exception.

It must be noted, however, that there are no

constitutional definitions of what would constitute monopolies, or combinations in restraint of trade or unfair competition, or a constitutional provision for the imposable sanctions for any violations. Hence, separate legislation and/or judicial interpretation of the constitutional provision were needed for these purposes.

*The co-author is the Director of the Philippine Tariff Commission

2

Competition law, particularly antitrust, is not new to the Philippines. Eight separate Acts address elements of competition policy in some way.

2. Current Legislation

The basic, and probably the oldest, law addressing anti-competitive behavior is penal or criminal in nature. Article 186 of the Revised Penal Code (R.A. 3815)defines and penalizes monopolies and combinations in restraint of trade and provides penalties such as imprisonment (prision mayor) of six years and one day to twelve years or fine ranging from Two Hundred Pesos (P200.00) to Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00) or both.

The Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. 386),

which came into effect in August 1950, also allows the collection of damages arising from unfair competition in agricultural, commercial, or industrial enterprises. The law does not define what unfair competition is and merely proceeds to enumerate methods by which unfair competition can be committed: force, intimidation, deceit, machination, or any other unjust, oppressive or highhanded method.

The Revised Penal Code also penalizes other

frauds in commerce and industry such as falsely marking gold and silver articles and altering trademarks. These provisions were based on the Sherman Act of the United States of America.

Recovery of treble damages for civil liability arising

from anti-competitive behavior is allowed under Republic Act No. 165, otherwise known as An Act to Prohibit Monopolies and Combinations in Restraint of Trade.

Special laws or statutes have also been enacted to

specifically address some unfair trade practices. The Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines (R.A. 8293) provides for the protection of patents, trademarks, and copyrights.

The Corporation Code of the Philippines (Batas

Pambansa Blg. 68) provides for the rules regarding mergers and consolidations, and the acquisition of all or substantially all the assets or shares of stock of corporations. The Revised Securities Act, as amended by the Securities Regulation Code (R.A. 8799), complements the Corporation Code. The Act proscribes the manipulation of security prices and insider trading. The

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No central agency exists to oversee the implementation of competition policy and law and no administrative mechanisms are in place to comprehensively enforce competition provisions.

corporation and securities laws are particularly relevant for evaluating vertical or horizontal cartels or arrangements.

Consumer welfare and protection is also an

important field for laws on anti-competitive behavior. The most important laws, in this regard, are the Price Act (R.A. 7581) which defines and identifies illegal acts of price manipulation (such as hoarding, profiteering and cartels) and the Consumer Act of the Philippines (R.A. 7394)which, among other things, provides for consumer product quality and safety standards.

B. Enforcement Agencies Enforcement and regulation or monitoring of unfair trade practices and anti-competitive behavior are vested in numerous agencies. To cite a few:

• Tariff Commission - an agency attached to the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) mandated to assist the Cabinet Committee on Tariff and Related Matters in the formulation of national tariff policy, to administer the implementation of the Tariff and Customs Code and, as a quasi-judicial body, to conduct formal investigation of dumping, subsidization and safeguards cases

• Bureau of Import Services - a staff agency of the

Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) mandated to monitor import quantities and prices of selected sensitive items (particularly liberalized ones), to anticipate surges of imports, and to assist domestic industries against unfair trade practices. The agency also undertakes the preliminary investigations of dumping and safeguards cases.

• Bureau of Trade Regulation and Consumer

Protection – another staff agency of the DTI mandated to formulate and monitor the registration of business names and licensing and accreditation of establishments, evaluate consumer complaints and product utility failures and protect and safeguard the interest of consumers and the public with regards to health and safety implications of intrinsic product failures.

• Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) - an

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attached agency of the Department of Finance mandated to administer corporate governance laws such as the approval and registration of corporate consolidations, mergers and combinations. The Commission also implements the Securities Act of 1982 which penalizes fraudulent acts in connection with the sale of securities (e.g. price manipulation, inside trading, short selling, failure to disclose, delayed disclosures).

Other agencies likewise enforce laws on anti-competitive

behavior such as:

• DTI and its attached agencies including the Bureau of Food and Drugs, Intellectual Property Office, and the Bureau of Product Standards - for consumer welfare and protection.

• Philippine Economic Zone Authority - for ecozone developers and ecozone-registered enterprises

Certain enforcement agencies are also industry-specific

like:

• Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas - for banks and financial institutions

• Insurance Commission - for insurance companies • National Food Authority - for rice, corn, wheat and

other grains and food stuff • Sugar Regulatory Administration - for the sugar

industry • Philippine Coconut Authority - for the coconut industry • Garments and Textile Export Board - for garment

manufacturers and exporters • Board of Investments - for pioneer/non-pioneer

industries and those listed in the Investments Priorities Plan, availing of the incentives under the Omnibus Investments Code

• National Telecommunications Commission - for telecommunications companies

• Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board - for common carriers for land

• Civil Aeronautics Board - for companies engaged in air commerce

• Maritime Industry Authority - for the shipping industry • Philippine Ports Authority - for port operators and

arrastre services • Department of Energy, Energy Regulatory Board, and

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The lack of enforcement of competition laws has been due to: ineffective and inadequate laws,… … the lack of a central enforcement agency,… …minimal fines, substantial evidence requirements,… …inadequate judicial experience,… …SEC’s limited mandate,… …and most important, the lack of a comprehensive competition policy.

the National Power Corporation - for power generation companies and oil companies

C. Problems In Enforcement There is a lack of enforcement of competition laws. Several reasons have been identified:

• Present laws have proven inadequate or ineffective to prevent anti-competitive structures and behavior in the market. Despite the number of laws and their diverse nature, competition has neither been fully established in all sectors of the economy nor has existing competition been enhanced in other sectors. Since each law is meant to address specific situations, there runs the risk of one law negating the positive effects of another.

• There is no central enforcement agency. Enforcement

is spread through several agencies which do not operate in a coordinated manner and sometimes produce conflicting policy. Moreover, responsibility is too diffused and accountability for implementation of the laws is difficult to locate or fix. There is also a lack of expertise in the appreciation and implementation of competition laws.

• Fines imposable for breaches of the laws are minimal.

Most punishments are penal in nature and hence, evidence requirements are substantial and guilt must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.

• There is a lack of jurisprudence and judicial experience

in hearing competition cases.

• The SEC regards “efficiency gains” as more important than competition considerations in mergers and does not have a mandate to challenge mergers unless it can demonstrate they are against the public interest.

To these reasons may be added the overarching reason:

there is no comprehensive competition policy in place.

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WHAT DO WE WANT? Competition policy is a cornerstone of microeconomic policy…

A. The Need for A Comprehensive Competition Policy Increasingly, competition policy is regarded as a very effective arm of economic policy to assist countries to maximize economic efficiencies in the use of limited resources. Around the world, almost 80 countries have some form of competition policy in place and many economies in the Asia-Pacific region have in place or have begun to implement competition policy. Although each nation has its own model of competition policy to fit its socio-economic development, there are broadly similar patterns. Two countries with very comprehensive competition policies/laws are Australia (Australian Competition and Consumer Commission), Japan (Japan Fair Trade Commission) and Korea (Korea Fair Trade Commission).

… and there are other compelling reasons why a well-developed, comprehensive and workable Philippine competition policy is needed.

In the Philippines, a well-developed, comprehensive and workable competition policy needs to be immediately put in place for the following reasons:

• Existing competition laws are inadequate and ineffective.

• The economy continues to be dominated by groups of

businesses with substantial market power and political influence. Many industries in the Philippines are highly concentrated. Ownership of assets is also highly concentrated. Based on data from SEC, the top ten corporations accounted for 21% - 26% of revenue, 44% – 47% of profit and 25% - 43% of assets of the top 1,000 corporations from 1998 to 2000.

• Competition in the domestic market is not fully

promoted in such key sectors as telecommunications, air transport, and petroleum products, amongst others.

• Continuing trade reforms to meet the challenges of

international competition require the support of a broader policy framework to improve productivity through greater competition in domestic markets.

• Competition policy can likely achieve higher economic

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growth through enhanced economic efficiency and consumer welfare.

• Economic reform measures put in place must not be

negated by anti-competitive practices and behaviors.

As an APEC member economy, the Philippines committed to the establishment of a Fair Trade Commission.

B. Individual Action Plan of the Philippines on Competition Policy

In APEC, the Philippines’ commitments in its Individual Action Plan include:

• Review of existing laws on competition with the end in

view of improving the competition environment • Enactment of an anti-trust, anti-monopoly law including

the establishment of a Fair Trade Commission (FTC) to enforce competition laws

• Active participation in dialogues and exchanges of

information among APEC economies to ensure transparency and enhance mutual understanding of national competition laws and policies.

HOW DO WE GET THERE? Although obstacles exist ,…

A. Obstacles A number of underlying issues exist which may hinder the development of a workable competition policy. These issues include:

• Cultural Issues - Traditional Philippine social morals incorporate a strong belief in the necessity of reciprocity. As such, there is generally an expectation that people will distribute favors when in a position to do so, and that businesses will seek to operate in harmony, rather than fierce competition. This may hinder the implementation of competition policy.

• Corruption and Cronyism - Cultural issues can lead

to corruption and cronyism, as those in power use this power to reward friends and associates who assisted them in reaching their positions. In 2000, Transparency International rated the Philippines 69th out of 90 countries in its Corruption Perceptions Index, which measures the degree of transparency in the business environment of a

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country. The introduction of competition policy may adversely affect people who have amassed concentrations of wealth and who may seek to use their connections to hinder its progress.

• Lack of Political Will – Certain influential members

of Congress are themselves corporate owners/majority stockholders of dominant firms who are threatened by the enactment of a comprehensive competition policy/law. They will resist at all cost the passage of a competition bill.

• Lack of Understanding and Education on the

Rational for Competition Law – on the part of concerned stakeholders, e.g., consumers, business community, and government officials.

• Lack of Technical Expertise and Experience – The competition authority should have very competent and knowledgeable manpower to define markets, identify anti-competitive actions, and judiciously construct and administer “competition tests” on issues of concentration, agreements, mergers and acquisitions. The question is what would be the best way of developing such expertise and institutions?

One approach is to do this gradually, possibly on a piecemeal basis. We can begin with the creation of a coordinating body, and an austere law, which can be augmented over time and emphasize the establishment of implementing institutions and promotion of competition advocacy. Another approach is to transform an existing body which is performing some of the functions of competition policy. A third approach would be to create a new central body which could be designed to develop and evolve into what it should ideally become.

Another critical issue is the current lack of experience

and knowledge in competition policy matters in the judiciary. If this is not addressed, then the new law will remain un-enforced (as existing legislation is) or worse, enforcement will be inappropriate, creating potential economic inefficiencies.

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The issue in respect to insufficient knowledge and experience is clear. It is one thing to know that a firm in a position to control the relevant market for a particular good or service is not permitted to limit production for the purpose or raising prices, but quite another to prove that the firm in question firstly has control of a market and secondly reduced production to raise prices, and another still to adjudicate in a case where such accusations are made.

…the task is doable.

B. Immediate Implementation Tasks

• Sustain advocacy and public information campaign to raise public awareness on the need and benefits of a pro-competitive environment

• Pass a comprehensive competition policy/law and create a

Fair Trade Commission with utmost fiscal independence to shield it from political pressures

• Ensure implementing staff are adequately trained and

consider staff exchanges to bring in experienced foreign staff early in the process for training purposes

• Create an enforcement agency, give the agency

appropriate powers, responsibilities and reporting arrangements/structure and adequate funding

• Create and appoint members to the specialized court, and

establish its jurisdiction • Train judges/justices in other courts who may be hearing

appeals cases

HOW ARE PRESENT COMPETITION ISSUES ADDRESSED?

Trade liberalization and competition policies are complementary and mutually reinforcing. For much of the 1970s and 1980s, Philippine economic policies were largely directed toward an inward-looking protectionist trade regime and an industrial structure

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characterized by high levels of market concentration. The results were the capture of economic rents by the few, economic growth characterized by low multifactor productivity, and a very unequal distribution of wealth. With the introduction of significant policy reforms, i.e., trade liberalization (tariff and import), deregulation, demonopolization, and privatization, the country’s economic growth performance and its resilience to external shocks improved. The structural reforms proved their significance when the country was able to weather the impact of the Asian crisis, escaping relatively well the severe declines in output experienced in the region. The link between competition and trade policy is best observed by noting that they have a common objective, namely the efficient operation of markets, both international and domestic. In recent times, the connection between trade and competition policy has been made stronger because of increasing globalization of the international economy. However, this does not automatically imply that active trade liberalization substitutes for competition policy. Rather, it is a question of the appropriate level of policy harmonization.

Hence, it is argued that trade and competition policy are complementary, rather than direct substitutes. On this basis it is desirable that the Philippines move towards a policy regime incorporating both the establishment of a national competition policy as well as substantial degree of trade liberalization. This ensures that domestic firms are subject to a more complete set of competition rules, in the context of an internationally open environment. The Tariff Reform Program (TRP)

It is the review/restructuring of the Philippine tariff system, undertaken by government on a continuing basis, to make the tariff structure responsive to the needs of the economy, taking into account changing patterns in trade and advancements in technology. The objectives of the TRP are:

1. Establish globally competitive industries 2. Reduce overall level of protection and disperse

tariff within and across industries 3. Correct distortions in tariff structure where tariffs on

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inputs/semi-processed products are higher than those on the finished products

4. Simplify the tariff structure for ease of customs administration

5. Improve access of domestic industry to essential inputs at lower prices

6. Provide more affordable and better-quality goods to

consumers 7. Enhance competitiveness of local industries in the

domestic and export markets Shown below are the four phases of the TRP:

Program

Period

Policy

Outcome/Target

TRP – I

1981 to 1985

Export Promotion

Tariff band narrowed from 10%-100% to 10%-50%

TRP – II

1991 to 1994

Trading Environment Liberalization

Under E. O. 470, final tariff rates cluster around 4 levels: 3%, 10%, 20% & 30%

TRP - III

1994 to 1997

Global Competitiveness

Under E. O. 264, tariff rates of 3% and 10% in 2003 and uniform 5% in 2004

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TRP - IV

1998 to 2003

Competitiveness of Local Industries

0% - 10% in 2003

Review

2004-2005

Competitiveness / temporary relief for ailing major industries

Simple average tariff – 6.49% Trade-weighted average tariff – 3.79%

In the process of tariff restructuring, tariff distortion, (i.e.,

import tariff on raw materials is higher than that on the finished product), is corrected to ensure a level playing field for the downstream industries. In the case of polymer resins vis-à-vis packaging raw materials however, the distortion in the AFTA-CEPT tariff has been maintained to allow temporary protection to the infant petrochemical industry. An annual review will be conducted whether or not to continue the protection. To provide the necessary assistance to the industrial and agricultural sectors by way of reducing the cost of doing business vis-à-vis foreign counterpart, the tariff rates on raw materials (not locally produced) and capital equipment were reduced to one percent (1%) pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 83, 84 and 91. In assessing petitions for tariff adjustment, the level of competition and the contestability in an industry/market is one of the factors considered. The country’s unilateral TRP in itself promotes competition in the domestic market. Future prospects for competition policy in the Philippines are good. Under the Tariff Reform Program, the average overall nominal tariff has dropped sharply from 42% in 1981 to 6.49% at present. Effective protection rates have declined from 49.3% in 1985 to 14.38%. On the other hand, the Import Liberalization Program has reduced the number of items with import restrictions from 1,829 to 106. Tariff rates on 60% of the total products in the Inclusion List under the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) for the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) have been reduced to 0%.

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Tariff Structure Under the TRP

• Basic raw materials, intermediate inputs and capital equipment not-locally produced – 1% or 3%

• Intermediate raw materials and inputs that are

produced locally – 5%; 7%; 10%

• Finished products (consumer goods) – 15% to 30%

• Sensitive agricultural products (e.g., sugar, rice, motor vehicles) – 30% to 65%

Trade policy and tariff setting are not only about protecting producers’ interest. They are also about protecting consumer interest. They’re not just taking care of the profits and employment in big upstream industries. They’re also concerned with profits and employment in small downstream industries. Hence, trade policy and tariff setting must be integrated and coordinated with a host of other economic and social policies of the government. Article 9 (Imposition and Collection of Anti-Dumping Duties) – WTO Agreement on Anti-Dumping Practices The decision whether or not to impose an anti-dumping duty in cases where all requirements for the imposition have been fulfilled, and the decision whether the amount of the anti-dumping duty to be imposed shall be the full margin of dumping or less, are decisions to be made by the authorities of the importing Member. It is desirable that the imposition be permissive in the territory of all Members, and that the duty be less than the margin if such lesser duty would be adequate to remove the injury to the domestic industry. (Underscoring supplied) Section 18 (Application of the Anti-Dumping Duty) – Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 8752

(a) The amount of the anti-dumping duty shall not exceed the margin of dumping as established by a fair comparison of the normal value and the export price for the dumped product. However, the anti-dumping duty may be less than the margin if such lesser duty will be adequate to remove the injury to the

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domestic industry. In determining such lesser duty, the Secretary or the Commission may also consider, among others, the effect of imposing the full margin of dumping on the welfare of consumers and/or the general public, and other related local industries. (Underscoring supplied)

(b) Even when all the requirements for the imposition

of an anti-dumping duty have been fulfilled, the Commission may or may not impose the definitive anti-dumping duty or may suspend its actual imposition. In deciding among the foregoing options, the Commission may consider the following factors, among others: 1) if the imposition of an anti-dumping duty will result in a political or economic crisis; or 2) if such imposition will cause a severe shortage of the like product in the domestic market. The Commission shall only exercise said prerogative after giving the Secretary and all known interested parties the opportunity to present their views. (Underscoring supplied)

In Sodium Tripolyphosphates Dumping, the Tariff Commission considered the promotion of consumer welfare and the enhancement of competition since the protestant is a monopoly. Hence, the Commission recommended the imposition of definitive anti-dumping duties lesser than the full dumping margins. In Cold Rolled Coils (CRC) and Steel Billets Dumping, the Tariff Commission suspended the application of the definitive anti-dumping duties due to the non-operational status of the domestic industry. Article 3 (Investigation) – WTO Agreement on Safeguards A Member may apply a safeguard measure only following an investigation by the competent authorities of that Member pursuant to procedures previously established and made public consonance with Article X of GATT 1994. This investigation shall include reasonable public notice to all interested parties and public hearings or other appropriate means in which importers, exporters and other interested parties could present evidence and their views, including the opportunity to respond to the presentations of other parties and to submit their views, inter alia, as to whether or not the application of a safeguard measure would be in the public interest. The competent authorities

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shall publish a report setting forth their findings and reasoned conclusions reached on all pertinent issues of fact and law. (Underscoring Supplied) Rule 5 (Conditions for the Application of General Safeguard Measures) - Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 8800 Rule 5.1 The Secretary shall apply a general safeguard measure

upon a positive final determination of the Commission that a product is being imported into the country in increased quantities, whether absolute or relative to the domestic production, as to be a substantial cause of serious injury or threat thereof to the domestic industry. However, in the case of non-agricultural products, the Secretary shall first establish that the application of such safeguard measures will be in the public interest. (Underscoring supplied)

Rule 5.2 The Secretary, when establishing that the application of

a safeguard measure will be in the public interest, shall take into consideration the following factors, among others: i) whether the imposition of the provisional measure will result in a political or economic crisis; and ii) the extent to which such imposition will cause a shortage of the product under consideration in the domestic market.

In the Cement Safeguards case, the Tariff Commission

ruled that: 1. The non-imposition of a safeguard measure

protects consumer welfare by improving consumer choice, i.e., consumers retain the option to choose between local and imported cement. Consumers are also spared the increase in domestic cement prices that can be expected from the imposition of a safeguard measure.

2. To the extent that imports serve to check unnecessary domestic price increases, the competitiveness of the local construction industry, which uses cement as one of its major inputs, would not be prejudiced. Unpredictable construction costs (that may result from varying cement prices) and the consequent negative impact on private and government infrastructures are avoided.

In the Ceramic Tiles case, the Tariff Commission ruled

that: 1. A safeguard measure in the form of a tariff rate

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quota will promote competition since significant volumes of ceramic tiles can still come in without additional duty.

2. The ceramic tile market is a buyers’ market. Thus, any unreasonable price increases are unlikely.

3. With the continued existence of a viable domestic industry, consumers are assured of on-time delivery of volume orders and replacements to take care of breakages and defects.

THE WAY FORWARD As enunciated by the President, a framework for competition policy including the creation of FTC is an urgent action agenda of the MTPDP.

Leaders of the political branches of government, labor organizations, business sector, and civil society are committed to accelerate the implementation of the Medium-Term Philippine Development Plan (MTPDP): 2001 – 2004. In the immediate term, efforts will be focused on, among other action agenda, the strengthening of enforcement of competition and anti-trust policy.

Legislative measures shall be enacted to provide the framework for a national and comprehensive competition policy and the creation of a Fair Trade Commission. The Philippine Tariff Commission, among other agencies, is most active in the advocacy of the passage of the bill on competition policy. The means to reach this end can either be: • Act of Congress A number of competition bills have been introduced in

Congress. The educated stakeholders need to lobby with the members of Congress against the strong intervention of Big Business.

• Competition Authority As A Constitutional Body

The clamor for the amendment of the 1987 Constitution can

pave the way for a constitutional provision on the creation of a supra independent competition authority.

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ANNEX A

Competition Policy/Law in APEC Economies

Country

Competition Laws

Enforcement Agencies

1. Australia • Trade Practices Act

1974 • State and Territory

Competition Policy Reform Application Acts

• Prices Surveillance Act 1983

• Australian Competition & Consumer Commission

2. Brunei Darussalam

• There is no specific legislation pertaining to competition policy.

3. Canada • Competition Act (Amended in 1986)

• Competition Bureau of Industry Canada

4. Chile • Competition Law (1973)

• National Economic Prosecutor’s Office

• Antitrust Commission

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Country

Competition Laws

Enforcement Agencies

5. China • Regulations on

Development and Protection of Competition (1980)

• The Law of the People’s Republic of China for Countering Unfair Competition (1993)

• The Law of the People’s Republic of China for Protecting Consumer’s Rights and Interests (1993)

• Regulations on Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidization (1997)

• Industrial and Commercial Administration of China

6. Hong Kong • There is no comprehensive competition law.

7. Indonesia • Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices and Unfair Business Competition (1999)

• Commission on Business Competition Supervision

8. Japan • Anti-Monopoly Act (1947)

• Act Against Unjustifiable Premiums and Misleading Representations (Premiums and Representations Act)

• Act Against Delay in Payment of Subcontract Proceeds

• Fair Trade Commission

9. Korea • Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (1980)

• Korea Fair Trade Commission

10. Malaysia • There is no specific Act governing competition policy at present.

11. Mexico • Federal Law on Economic Competition (1993

• Federal Competition Commission

12. New Zealand • Commerce Act (1986) • Commerce Commission

13. Papua New • There is no

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Country

Competition Laws

Enforcement Agencies

Guinea comprehensive

competition law or specific institution to enforce competition policy.

14. Peru • Legislative Decree 701 (2000)

• Law 26876 • Supreme Decree No.

017-98-ITINCI (2000)

• INDECOPI, Commission on Free Competition

15. Philippines • There is no comprehensive competition law or specific institution to enforce competition policy.

16. Russia • RF Law “On Competition and Limitation of Monopolistic Activity on Commodity Markets”

17. Singapore • There is no comprehensive competition law or specific institution to enforce competition policy.

18. Chinese Taipei

• Fair Trade Law (1991) • Fair Trade Commission

19. Thailand • There is no

comprehensive competition law or specific institution to enforce competition policy.

20. United States • Sherman Act (1980) • Clayton Act (1914) • Federal Trade

Commission Act (1914) • Robinson-Patman Act

(1914) • Hart-Scott-Rodino

Antitrust Improvement Act (1976)

• Antitrust Division, Department of Justice

• Federal Trade Commission

21. Vietnam • There is no specific law on competition policy at present.

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ANNEX B

Competition Policy Bills Currently Before the 12th Congress

Number

Author(s)

Title

HB 198 Monfort The New Anti-Trust Act of 2001 HB 335 Gonzales The Competitive Public Bidding Act of 2001 HB 387 Salceda The Government Competitive Neutrality Act of 2001 HB 1906 Badelles Economic Sabotage Act of 2001 HB 2439 Espina The Fair Trade Act of 2001 SB 1361 Ople The Philippine Anti-Trust Act of 1998 SB 92 Flavier The Competitive Public Bidding Act SB 220 Osmeña

Amending R.A. 7851 (otherwise known as the “Price Act”)

SB 175 Osmeña Fair Trade Act of 2001 SB 1600 Lacson The Philippine Anti-Trust Act of 2001

REFERENCES

Free Trade Asia Consulting (1996). Setting the Agenda for Competition Policy in the Philippines, Manila: Asia Foundation. FT Asia Consulting, Inc. A Framework for Promoting the Competitiveness of Philippine Industries Through Competition Policy, Manila: PHILEXPORT. Institute for Research into International Competitiveness, Curtin University of

Technology (1999). “A Policy Framework for Competition Policy in the Philippines”. A study undertaken for the Philippine Tariff Commission funded by the United Nations Office for Project Services, Australia: IRIC.

Institute for Research into International Competitiveness, Curtin University of

Technology (2001). Issues in the Implementation of Competition Policy in the Philippines. A study undertaken for the Philippine Tariff Commission funded by the Australian Agency for International Development,

Australia: IRIC.

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Patalinghug, Epictetus (1997). “The Philippines In A Global Economy: Competition Policy and APEC”, Manila: U.P. Center for Integrative and Development Studies.

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