~i ,".

Conceptions of 'State ofIsrael' in Israeli Society

Charles S. Liebman

In an extremely thoughtful article, Baruch Kimmerling has ar­gued that since 1977 Israeli leaders have utilized the concept of Eretz Israel rather than State of Israel to refer to the national collectivity.! The former term, whether used consciously or unconsciously refers to a civil community based on impersonal and universalist standards ofconductand governance. The latter term, Eretz Israel, evokes a collective identity rooted in a moral community based upon primordial symbols and ties. Terminolo­gical usage to the contrary notwithstanding, the orientation to which Kimmerling refers certainly predates 1977. This might suggest to some that Israelis have a weak image of, ororientation to, theirstate. This isnot, however, the case. Whatwe are inclined to argue is that many, and possibly even most Israelis, do not share a Western image of the state. We are tempted to call the alternative image a Jewish model of the state. But it is probably more helpful to think ofit as a communal model.

Although social scientists - political scientists in particular ­make frequent use of the term 'state' there is little agreement as to its definition. But the term does evoke a certain sense. As de­scribed by onepolitical scientist, it is 'thesenseofan organization of coercive power operating beyond our immediate control and

• Charles S. Liebman teaches at the Political Science department, Bar-Ilan University. Togetherwith EliezerDon·Yihiya he is the authorofReligionand Politics in Israeil, Bloomington (Indiana University Press) 1984.

I Baruch Kimmerling, 'Between the Primordial and the Civil Definitionsofthe Collective Identity: Eretz Israel or the State ofIsrael7', in: Erik Cohen, Moshe Lissak and Uri Almagor (eds.I, Comparative Social Dynamics: Essays in Honoro/S.N. Eisenstadt, BoulderlWestview Press) 1985, pp. 262-283.

[The Jerusalem Quarterly, Number 47, Summer 1988]

intruding into all aspects ofour lives'.2 The sense ofstate includes impersonal law and physical sanctions.3 But it is primarily the sense of an entity which is detached from the citizens who com­prise it and yet is in some way responsible for - and in a democ­racy responsible to - them. Finally, and this is extremely import­antfor ourpurposes, the state isconceivedas havingan interestof its own, independentofthe interests ofits citizens.

Community, on the other hand, while also an abstraction, is more readily comprehended. It refers to a group of people who share or believe they share some characteristic and/or value and/or need that defines the nature of their interrelationship. The basis ofcommunity is interrelationship and that which sup­ports and strengthens such interrelationships is most highly valued. Hence, community - unlike state - has no interest inde­pendent of its members. Our argument is that the collectivity of Jewish Israelis has a weak sense ofstate in the Westernsense, the meaning assigned to it here, and a strong sense of community. When they imagine Israel (whether they use the term State of Israel orEretz Israel), they imagine a community and not a state. This phenomenon has been observed by many others, although

the terminology they use sometimes varies. It lies, we believe, at the heart of Ehud Sprinzak's impressive analysis of Israel's cul­ture of illegalism.4 Sprinzak observes that 'rule oflaw' is a relati­vely weak concept or is of rather low priority in Israeli society. Not only do many Israelis violate the law, he argues, but they feel that it is legitimate to do so, particularlyifitservesgroup interests or the interests of the community as they define it. He traces this aspect ofIsraeli political culture to a variety offactors, including the Jewish tradition itself, the experiencesofthe vast majority of Israelis who originate from Eastern Europe or Arab countries, the socialist traditions of Israel's founding fathers and the legiti­mation of extra-legal procedures during the period of the British mandate.5 In our terminology, Sprinzak is demonstrating the weak value Israelis attribute to state and the strong value they attribute to community. Indeed, this is reinforced by the obser­vation thata number ofthe bestknown offenderswho committed their'crimes' notonlyfor personalgain butto enrich thecoffers of their party, committed suicide. According to the testimony of their families, and sometimes according to their own suicide notes, they didso notbecausetheyfacedjail sentences butbecause they felt that their friends had abandoned them.

, Stephen Skoronek, Building a New American State, Cambridge (Cambridge University PressI1982, p. 3.

, Ted C. Lewellen, Political Anthropology, South Hadley, Mass. (Bergin and Garvey) 1983,p.35.

• Ehud Sprinzak. EveryMan Whatsoever isRight in hisownEyes: Illegalism in Israeli Society, Tel Aviv (Sifriat Poalim) 1986 (Hebrewl.

• Yonathan Shapiro (Democracy in Israel, Tel Aviv [Massada] 1977 [Hebrew]) makes a similar point.

96

In the early summer of 1986 the Israel appointment of a new Attorney General, General had resigned. He had been unl pressure in a number of instances, but· stances surrounding his resignation we: mand for an investigation of charges tlu Service had been involved in murder a mony in court to cover this up. His dema had subjected him to a barrage of critici majorpoliticalpartiesandprobablyled h: he had originally intended. On June 1 General, who had served as a District C appointment, had his first official meetin ter. It was assumed that their major topil be how the new appointee would ham[ Service affair. Perhaps it was. But in a pr tely following the meeting the Attorney ( of the meeting focused on the Avraham Gindi, a prominent builder, had been cha misallocation of funds, and had taken hU The new Attorney General was quoted as

I was shocked and sorrowful to h even though I did notknow[him]. II days before, thatifGindihadhadal and this is my main quality, beiI1l people in need -life as a whole WOlL more hopeful to him...1had an urge contact with him, but, beingajudge that. I told Shamir [the Prime Mi: tragedy should not have occurred, • wrong with Israeli society, with ou: to such a tragic death. Shamir felt a:

The significance of community - in this community - incontrast to the statecome in a column by the popularjournalist YOl one of Israel's most popular dailies.7 Gefe and his friends' dislike of the country's Ie Their loyalty, he explains, is to the hevre circle of friends). Homeland, he claims, • the people who live there' and elsewhere

I don't know the meaning ofstate. platoon I understand, its easy for m state [composed]ofhevreh...1amhe .. .And there is nothing to be done e

• TheJerusalemPost,June 12, 1986,p. 5. 7 Ma'ariv('WeekendSupplement'l,OCtober3,19­

97

etsofour lives'.2The sense ofstate includes Ihysical sanctions.3 But it is primarily the ich is detached from the citizens who com­Jme way responsible/or - and in a democ­hem. Finally, and this is extremely import­:testateisconceived ashavingan interestof :3fthe interests ofits citizens. .other hand, while also an abstraction, is hended, It refers to a group of people who ~ share some characteristic and/or value IDes the nature of their interrelationship. ity is interrelationship and that which sup­18 such interrelationships is most highly :unity - unlike state - has no interest inde­tl'S. Our argument is that the collectivity of ...,eaksense ofstate in the Western sense, the it here, and a strong sense of community. Israel (whether they use the term State of they imagine a community and not a state.

lIS been observed by many others, although "USe sometimes varies, It lies, we believe, at ~'s impressive analysis of Israel's cul­rinzak observes that 'rule oflaw' is a relati­is of rather low priority in Israeli society. ~lis violate the law, he argues, but they feel iloso,particularlyifitservesgroup interests !COmmunity as they define it, He traces this ~ culture to a variety offactors, including uelf, the experiences ofthe vast majority of e from Eastern Europe or Arab countries, Ii ofIsrael's founding fathers and the legiti­procedures during the period of the British :minology, Sprinzak is demonstrating the :ttribute to state and the strong value they ty. Indeed, this is reinforced by the obser­Jfthe bestknown offenderswhocommitted -forpersonalgainbutto enrichthe coffers of ed suicide. According to the testimony of Dmetimes according to their own suicide -ecause theyfacedjail sentencesbutbecause :mds had abandoned them.

ding a New American State, Cambridge (Cambridge p.3. ::al Anthropology, South Hadley, Mass. (Bergin and

~an Whatsoever isRight in his ownEyes: lllegalism in (SifriatPoaliml 1986 (Hebrew).

;OCracy in Israel, Tel Aviv [Massada] 1977 [Hebrew])

96

In the early summer of 1986 the Israeli cabinet approved the appointment of a new Attorney General. The previous Attorney General had resigned. He had been under enormous political pressure in a number of instances, but the immediate circum­stances surrounding his resignation were connected to his de­mand for an investigation of charges that the General Security Service had been involved in murder and in fraudulent testi­mony in court to cover this up. His demand for an investigation had subjected him to a barrage of criticism from leaders of the majorpolitical partiesandprobablyled him to resign earlier than he had originally intended. On June 11th the new Attorney General, who had served as a District Court Judge prior to his appointment, had his first official meeting with the Prime Minis­ter. It was assumed that their major topic of conversation would be how the new appointee would handle the General Security Service affair. Perhaps it was. But in a press interview immedia­tely following the meeting the Attorney General stated that most of the meeting focused on the Avraham Gindi affair. Avraham Gindi, a prominent builder, had been charged with tax fraud and misallocation of funds, and had taken his life a few days earlier. The new Attorney General was quoted as follows:

I was shocked and sorrowful to hear of his tragic death, even though I did notknow [him]. Itcrossedmymind, a few days before, that ifGindi hadhad a real friend, like myself­and this is my main quality, being a friend and assisting people in need -life as a whole would have appeared better, more hopeful to him...I had an urge to approach him, make contact with him, but, being ajudge, ofcourse, I couldn't do that. I told Shamir [the Prime Minister] that this type of tragedy should not have occurred. That there is something wrong with Israeli society, with our system, ifa man cango to such a tragic death, Shamir felt as I did.6

The significance of community - in this case a very constricted community - in contrast to the state comes through very strongly in a column by the popularjournalist Yonatan Gefen in Ma'ariv, one of Israel's most popular dailies.7 Gefen writes about his own and his friends' dislike of the country's leaders and government. Their loyalty, he explains, is to the hevreh (a slang term for one's circle of friends). Homeland, he claims, 'is primarily the love of the people who live there' and elsewhere:

I don't know the meaning ofstate. It's too big for me. But a platoon I understand, its easy for me to love....Yes, we are a state [composed] ofhevreh...I amhere becauseofmyhevreh ...And there is nothing to be done about it. This is the only

• The Jerusalem Post, June 12,1986,p. 5. 7 Ma 'ariv ('Weekend Supplement'l, OCtober 3, 1986, pp. 10-11.

97

state in which there is a hevreh and hence it is your fate to continue to hate it but to remain here forever.

Why, he goes on to ask, given the magnitude of emigration (yeri­dah),can'tIsraelisfindahevrehabroad.Gefen'sansweristhathe also loves the land, 'despite the state that hinders...as much as it possibly can'.

Another writer explicitly contrasts state and community argu­ing that Israelis increasingly prefer the latter with its 'limited responsibility for the internal life ofits members, generally [con­fined to] the area of social and religious services' and attributes yeridah to a flight from statehood and the substitution of com­munity.s

There are many examples that point to the ascendancy of com­munity over state or the weak sense of state in Israeli culture. A personal anecdote is illustrative ofwhat we have in mind. Afew years ago the Israel Political Science Association sponsored a ser­ies ofpublic forums in which three political scientists addressed questions to leaders ofvarious Knesset factions. On the eveningin question the presentwriter was invited tojoin two otherpolitical scientists in interviewing four members of the Knesset, two of whom were government Ministers from the same party. One of the Ministers was a very senior member of the government. It was decided thattheparticipantswouldgatheranhour before the time for the public forum to discuss the ground rules for the inter­view. The senior Minister present would not let the group get down to work. He queried all of us about our backgrounds and related a series ofstories, some more relevant and some less rele­vant, whose ostensiblepurpose was tocreate tiesbetween himself orotherpeople he knew and each ofus. The hourwas drawingto a close but efforts to redirect the Minister to the business at hand were of no avail. One of us turned to the second Minister, and whispered, 'I hope that meetings ofyour party executive are not conducted in this manner'. The second Minister responded, 'Not only are party meetings conducted like this, but so are cabinet meetings'. Ofcourse, the story may only illustrate the garrulous­ness ofone Minister. After all, hisjuniorpartnerwas aware ofthe inappropriateness of his behavior. On the other hand, however exaggerated or ironic his own response may have been - surely some business is conducted at cabinet meetings - he was suggest­ing that the senior Minister operated in a government environ­ment supportive of such behavior; behavior that subordinated instrumental needs to expressive needs, manifest goals to inter­personal relationships.

This is behavior commonly associated with traditional rather than modern societies, withprimordial ratherthancivilsocieties (to use dichotomies developed by Edward Shils and Clifford

• ShlomoTanai, 'StateorCommunity',Ma'ariv, August6,1987,p. 11.

98

Geertz), with Gemeinschaft rather than C

use termsfirst suggestedbyFerdinandTo: ratherthan organicsocieties (termsfirstS'" heim), with status based rather than COl! the terminology of Henry Maine). All of­have been used by social scientists to de­we are describing. We make no claimfot of our categories of state and commw: maybe, more helpful in describing Israel

The foregoing example suggests that lsI

premium on efficiency, certainly when c care and concern for the welfare of abound. The cabinetordered all governr. their staff. The Ministry of Education sc for dismissal. Education Minister Izha: because, it was charged, many on his mi ship' cases. In a radio interview (July 2E that he had ordered his department head who were sick, handicapped, heads of members was killed in a war, or heads 0

sole breadwinners. Efficiency, he annOlli terion for dismissal. 'We will make the in

Such instances are not unique to Israe government will serve as the employme_ are otherwise unemployable is not unkn. What is less common is the explicit dis= criterionfor employment-and byagove: Itmight be argued that Navon is a poor e: Sephardi heritage he is, it might be said, culture of community and insensitive to efficiencyassociated with the model ofa l: ment devoted to Sephardi culture, Israel Ha'aretz characterized it as warm, lov: neous, which, they indicated, also m unplanned.9 They cite an example of a transfer an inefficient worker because hurt. 10 Perhaps this is more characteristi. kenazic culture, although Kenneth Avree societyll and studies of Israeli administ: cited by Sprinzakl2 find many such inst zim. Furthermore, as we shall see, NavoD­the cabinet to favor a statist rather thaI: ition on a different occassion. Whateve

• Ha'aretz ('Supp1ement'l, September 13, 1985, P I. Ibid., p. 12. II Kenneth Avrech, American Immigrants inIsra.

cago Pressl 1981. Ii Ehud Sprinzak. op. cit.

99

re is a hevreh and hence it is your fate to but to remain here forever.

~ven the magnitude of emigration (yeri­hevrehabroad. Gefen's answer is thathe ?ite the state that hinders...as much as it

itly contrasts state and communityargu­rlngly prefer the latter with its 'limited ternallife ofits members, generally [con­ial and religious services' and attributes I statehood and the substitution of com­

pIes that point to the ascendancy of com­I weak sense of state in Israeli culture. A lStrative ofwhat we have in mind. Afew tical Science Association sponsored a ser­~hich three political scientists addressed uious Knesset factions. On the eveningin .terwas invited tojoin two otherpolitical ng four members of the Knesset, two of It Ministers from the same party. One of y senior member of the government. It ticipantswouldgatheran hourbefore the nto discuss the ground rules for the inter­;ter present would not let the group get ied all of us about our backgrounds and S, some more relevant and some less rele­urposewas tocreate tiesbetweenhimself and eachofus. The hourwas drawingto a rect the Minister to the business at hand If us turned to the second Minister, and meetings ofyour party executive are not er'. The second Minister responded, 'Not s conducted like this, but so are Cabinet e story may only illustrate the garrulous­;erall, hisjuniorpartnerwas aware ofthe s behavior. On the other hand, however is own response may have been - surely :ted at Cabinet meetings - he was suggest­ister operated in a government environ­h behavior; behavior that subordinated !xpressive needs, manifest goals to inter­

nonly associated with traditional rather vithprimordial ratherthancivilsocieties !veloped by Edward Shils and Clifford

mmunity',Ma'ariv,August6,1987,p.l1.

Geertzl, with Gemeinschaft rather than Gesellschaft societies (to use termsfirst suggested by FerdinandTonniesl, withmechanical ratherthanorganicsocieties (terms first suggestedbyEmile Durk­heiml, with status based rather than contract based societies (in the terminology ofHenry Mainel. All of these terms, and others, have been used by social scientists to describe the phenomenon we are describing. We make no claim for the theoretical priority of our categories of state and community although they are, maybe, more helpful in describing Israeli society.

The foregoing example suggests that Israeli society places a low premium on efficiency, certainly when contrasted with values of care and concern for the welfare of individuals. Examples abound. The Cabinetordered all government ministers to reduce their staff. The Ministry of Education scheduled 270 employees for dismissal. Education Minister Izhak Navon was criticized because, it was charged, many on his ministry's list were 'hard­ship' cases. In a radio interview (July 28, 19851, Navon claimed that he had ordered his department heads to retain all employees who were sick, handicapped, heads of families one of whose members was killed in a war, or heads offamilies who were the sole breadwinners. Efficiency, he announced, was not to be a cri­terion for dismissal. 'We will make the inefficientmore efficient'.

Such instances are not unique to Israel. The expectation that government will serve as the employment agency for those who are otherwise unemployable is not unknown in Western society. What is less common is the explicit dismissal of efficiency as a criterionfor employment-and by agovernmentMinisteratthat. It might be argued that Navon is a poor example. By virtue ofhis Sephardi heritage he is, it might be said, especially rooted in the culture ofcommunity and insensitive to the impersonal value of efficiencyassociated with the model ofa state. In a special supple­ment devoted to Sephardi culture, Israel's most prestigious daily Ha'aretz characterized it as warm, loving, caring and sponta­neous, which, they indicated, also meant disorganized and unplanned.9 They cite an example of an employer refusing to transfer an inefficient worker because his feelings would be hurt. 10 Perhaps this is more characteristic ofSephardic than Ash­kenazic culture, although Kenneth Avrech's discussion ofIsraeli societyII and studies of Israeli administration and bureaucracy cited by Sprinzakl2 find many such instances among Ashkena­zim. Furthermore, aswe shall see, Navon was the only memberof the cabinet to favor a statist rather than a communitarian pos­ition on a different occassion. Whatever the case, as Ha'aretz

• Ha'aretz ('Supplement'), September 13, 1985, pp. 4, 11. 10 Ibid., p. 12.

11 Kenneth Avrech, American Immigrants in Israel, Chicago (University ofChi­cago Press) 1981.

12 Ehud Sprinzak, op. cit.

99 98

itself points out, the significance of Sephardi culture for all Isra­elis is the fact that its influence over Israeli society in general continues to grow stronger.

Another exampleofcommunal rather thanstatistorientationof the society is found in the importance the public attributes to per­sonal tragedies. In June, 1985, a school bus carrying seventh­grade children was struck by a railroad train. Twenty people were killed including seventeen children. Without minimizing the tragic nature of the event one wonders about the amount of coverage it was accorded. Israel's most popular television pro­gram is the nightly Mabat, devoted to the major national and international events of the day. Mabat is Israel's window on the world. Opinion surveys show it is the public's major source of information about what takes place beyond their immediate sur­roundings. Hence, the fact that Mabatdevoted twenty ofits thirty minutes to the bus accident indicates how much importance the public attributes - or how much importance Israel's sole tele­vision channel believes the public should attribute - to personal tragedy.OnthefollowingdaythefirstthreepagesofMa'arivwere devoted, in their entirety, to the tragedy. Thefollowing dayevery story on the paper's first four pages was devoted to the accident.

The fact that news ofthis nature, personal and emotional, over­shadows news of a more cosmopolitan impersonal nature is also true in Western societies. Itis all a matter ofdegree and itseemsto us that the degree to which this is true in Israeli society, especially considering the extent to which Israel must be sensitive to deve­lopments outside its boundaries, is remarkable. Furthermore, the acute concern with the welfare of other members of the com­munity rather than 'interests ofstate', a term virtually unknown in the Israelis'lexicon, can have importantpolicy consequences. The most dramatic example was the exchange of prisoners between Israel and an Arab terroristorganization in the summer of1985. In that incident, after lengthy negotiations, Israel agreed to re­

lease 1,150 terrorists in its prisons in return for the release of three soldierscaptured during the 1982 war in Lebanon and held by a terrorist organization identified with the rejectionist front (more extreme than Arafat). The released terrorists were chosen by the terrorist organization and included those serving life sen­tences for the murder of Israeli citizens. Most Israeli leaders today recognize that the exchange was a major mistake. Itunder­cut Israel's claim that governments ought not make deals with terrorist organizations. It freed over one thousand hardened, trained terrorists with no guarantee that they would not conduct terrorist activity in the future. It greatly increased the terrorist leaders' prestige. Itstrengthenedthe moraleandresolveofterror­ists by conveying the message that no matter how heinous their crime, if captured by Israel, there was a good possibility of their

100

being released. Itdiscouraged captured tI ing with Israeli authorities. It indicated was willing to pay for the release of its I setting a standard for future exchanges tl to meet. Nevertheless, the exchange was nalUnitygovernmentin 1985inaunani Only one Minister, Navon, abstained.ll tion, pollster Mina Zemach revealed that nion taken the day after the exchange V'

that it enjoyed overwhelmingpublic sUPI The exchange came under public au

announced. It is interesting to examine 1

by Israeli spokesmen. Enormous impor the pressure exerted by the parents of tl: diers on the Minister ofDefense. 'Howco' in the eyes?' is the way one army spokel commented that public criticism of tlt exchange was illegitimate, for 'how wou sons were heldprisoners?' Whatcametlu indefense ofthe exchange was the notion great for the state to make for its prisone tige, future cost, responsibility, werealls nal quasi-familial sentiment that one dOl one's child without adding up costs. It· expects ofa family, not from a state.

Other examples of the relative devall mind. Government buildings in Israel he orawe-inspiring effectofsuchstructures is only through the contributions of the that one of Israel's most imposing edific which houses its legislature, was cons through the generosity of that same fow after Israel's creation, a Supreme CoUI1 stages ofplanning. Nowhere is the gener stateand the institutionsofthestate more than in the language and manner ofaddt Israeli government and legislature pem: suggest, is due to the politicalculture whic ships and harbors very weak images ofa alien to the members of the society in 11"

behavior is demanded. The ritual forIm behavior that characterizes governmenl are foreign to the Israeli mentality. Tha quasi-familial community projects itself. Ofall the instrumentalities ofthe state t

alien from the generalpublic would seem they may be trusted to dispensejusticean equally, but they are not institutions wit:

101

lificance of Sephardi culture for all Isra­nfluence over Israeli society in general :er. :nmunal ratherthanstatistorientationof -e importance the public attributes to per­e, 1985, a school bus carrying seventh­uck by a railroad train. Twenty people ;wenteen children. Without minimizing event one wonders about the amount of 3d. Israel's most popular television pro­abat, devoted to the major national and the day. Mabat is Israel's window on the ; show it is the public's major source of : takesplace beyond their immediate sur­.ctthatMabatdevoted twenty ofits thirty lent indicates how much importance the .ow much importance Israel's sole tele­the public should attribute - to personal gdaythefirstthreepagesofMa'arivwere f, to the tragedy. The following dayevery four pages was devoted to the accident.

"lis nature, personal and emotional, over­:l cosmopolitan impersonal nature is also il, Itisalla matter ofdegreeand itseemsto chthis is true in Israelisociety, especially (J which Israel must be sensitive to deve­Ildaries, isremarkable. Furthermore, the . welfare of other members of the com­3rests ofstate', a term virtually unknown ::an have important policy consequences. :ample was the exchange of prisoners .rab terroristorganization in the summer

lengthy negotiations, Israel agreed to re­:l its prisons in return for the release of :luringthe 1982 war in Lebanon and held ion identified with the rejectionist front nat). The released terrorists were chosen :ition and included those serving life sen­of Israeli citizens. Most Israeli leaders ,exchangewas a major mistake. Itunder­~overnments ought not make deals with . It freed over one thousand hardened, 10guarantee that they would not conduct future. It greatly increased the terrorist

19thenedthemoraleandresolveofterror­.essage that no matter how heinous their rael, there was a good possibility of their

100

being released. Itdiscouraged captured terrorists from cooperat­ing with Israeli authorities. It indicated how high a price Israel was willing to pay for the release of its own prisoners, thereby setting a standard for future exchanges that Israel will find hard to meet. Nevertheless, the exchange was approved by the Natio­nal Unity government in 1985 ina unanimous vote ofits Cabinet. Only one Minister, Navon, abstained. In a private communica­tion, pollster Mina Zemach revealed thathersurveyofpublic opi­nion taken the day after the exchange was announced, showed that it enjoyed overwhelming public support.

The exchange came under public attack as soon as it was announced. It is interesting to examine the justifications offered by Israeli spokesmen. Enormous importance was attributed to the pressure exerted by the parents of the three imprisoned sol­diers on the MinisterofDefense. 'Howcould he looktheseparents in the eyes?' is the way one army spokesman phrased it. Others commented that public criticism of those responsible for the exchange was illegitimate, for 'how would the critics feel iftheir sonswereheldprisoners?' Whatcamethroughvery dramatically in defense ofthe exchange was the notion thatnosacrifice was too great for the state to make for its prisoners. Calculations of pres­tige, future cost, responsibility, were all secondary to the commu­nal quasi-familial sentiment that one does whatever possible for one's child without adding up costs. It was precisely what one expects ofa family, not from a state.

Other examples of the relative devaluation of state come to mind. Government buildings in Israel have none ofthe grandeur orawe-inspiring effectofsuchstructures throughouttheworld. It is only through the contributions of the Rothschild Foundation that one of Israel's most imposing edifices, the Knesset building which houses its legislature, was constructed, and it is only through the generosity of that same foundation that forty years after Israel's creation, a Supreme Court building is in the final stages ofplanning. Nowhere is the general lack of respect for the stateand the institutionsofthestatemore dramaticallyexpressed than in the language and manner ofaddress that members of the Israeli government and legislature permit themselves. This, we suggest, is due to thepolitical culture whichpersonalizes relation­ships and harbors very weak images ofa remote state somewhat alien to the members of the society in whose forums ritualized behavior is demanded. The ritual forms of speech and stylized behavior that characterizes governments of the Western world are foreign to the Israeli mentality. That is not, after all, how a quasi-familial community projects itself.

Ofall the instrumentalities ofthe state the one most remote and alien from the general publicwould seem to be the courts. At best, they may be trusted to dispensejustice and relied upon to treatall equally, but they are not institutions with which the public feels

101

intimate. It is not surprising that ofall the institutions ofgovern­ment their procedures are the most stylized. They would appear to personify statist rather than communitarian values and, in­deed, it is among the statist proponents in particular that Israeli courts are very popular. Yet note how the attorney for one of the arrested Jewish terrorists addressed the court in appealing for leniency in the sentencing ofhis client:

Your honor; you are a Jewishjudge in the District Court of Jerusalem. You are not thejudge in the International Court in the Hague. 13

Is it surprising, therefore, that the mostpopular form ofcelebrat­ing Israel Independence Day is by family picnic? The state is truly, in the eyes ofso many Israelis, another expression ofcom­munity, i.e., the family writ large. Recall YosefBurg's answer to the question 'What is an Israeli?'. 'My wife and my children; an Israeli is a Jew at home' was his reply. 14

The very impersonality of the Western state suggests the appli­cability of universal law. Its independence from its citizens implies their equality in the eyes of the state. All are equally dis­tant. Community, on the other hand, is personal. Built on status, on past performance and future expectations, on degrees of kin­ship ties, on loyalty and commitment, it suggests that not all are equal. Since membership in the community of Israelis is defined by Jewish identity, the non-Jewish minorities, almost by defini­tion become second-class citizens.

There is no question, in our opinion, that the primary threat to the rightsand statusofthe Israeli ArabsstemsfromtheJews'fear for their security and the threats their Arab neighbors pose. But, we suggest, this threat by itself, is not the immediatecause for the reluctance of so many Israelis to view the Arabs as equal mem­bers of the society. This reluctance, we believe, stems from the political culture thatencouragesconceptions ofcommunityatthe expense ofconceptions ofstate. Perhaps, however, this is putting thecartbefore the horse. One reasonwhyIsraelisemphasizecom­munity so stronglyand deemphasize state may be that the threats to their security stem from the fact oftheir Jewishness and from theircommunalcommitments. Itmay be onlynatural, therefore, for such threats to have produced the counterreaction we have been examining.

Ben-Gurion was aware of or feared the consequences of the rather low value his compatriots put on the state. How could it be otherwise, when the whole phenomenon of Jewish statehood was at variance with two thousand years of Jewish tradition? Ben-Gurion sought to counter the parochialism of community,

" Ma'ariv,June 15,1984,p.4. 14 Ma'ariv ('Weekend Supplement'), September 12, 1986, p. 29.

102

although his concern was to undermine formed around political party and ethnic Jewish particularism of the state. Ben-G. the conception that has been called mal' term he himself frequently invoked, We E

tracing Ben-Gurion's specific conception I ing to the charge that in his own activi­titudes towards the Arab population, his ligious demands for a virtually independe tolerance of some degree of corruption ~

was not always faithful to a blueprint 0

point, instead, is to indicate that, at leas conceptofastrongstatein the Westernme totallyforeign to Israelipoliticalhistory. I tion of the state, Judaism played an impc particular form of Judaism, one which • preted quite selectively. 15 Those elements dition that supported statism were emph2 ments were ignored. How influential are Israeli political culture? The question is I much of what we say here is speculative. statism, in the Western senseofthe term, i nent in the conception of a minority of th. people, predominantly secular rather tha: rather than Sephardi, ofhigh rather than J in the legal and military professions and t tismis an importantvalue. Manywithin t1: however, have gone beyond Ben-Gurion I its Jewish significance. In this respect, ( more Western model. Indeed, thoseconceJ Israeli democracy- and thereare manysu to be those who feel most sympathetic til What they may not appreciate, what the acknowledge, is thattheirproblemisnot0­

orauthoritarian tendencies in Israeliculn but rather overcoming deeply rooted ima the society which has been formed and' society ought to be conducted. As far as II: heirs to Ben-Gurion's statistconceptionsaJ

at most, retains important symbolic signi Israel butshould be virtually bereft ofinfl The question of how important a role the their conceptions of Judaism is somewha itself is a dimension of their lives which i pheral importance.

" On statismand Judaism see CharlesS. Liebmana: Religion in Israel: Traditional Judaism and Pol; State, Berkeley (University ofcalifornia Press) 1

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ising that ofall the institutions ofgovern­Ire the most stylized. They would appear ler than communitarian values and, in­ltist proponents in particular that Israeli . Yet note how the attorney for one of the ists addressed the court in appealing for ing ofhis client:

ll'e a Jewishjudge in the District Court of re not thejudge in the International Court

re, that the mostpopular form ofcelebrat­~e Day is by family picnic? The state is lany Israelis, another expression ofcom­writ large. Recall Yosef Burg's answer to 1 Israeli?'. 'My wife and my children; an 'washis reply. 14

~ of the Western state suggests the appli­aw. Its independence from its citizens 11 the eyes of the state. All are equally dis­e other hand, is personal. Built on status, ld future expectations, on degrees of kin­I commitment, it suggests that not all are ip in the community ofIsraelis is defined non-Jewish minorities, almost by defini­lS citizens. n our opinion, that the primary threat to he Israeli Arabsstemsfrom the Jews' fear Ie threats their Arab neighbors pose. But, Iy itself, is not the immediatecause for the [sraelis to view the Arabs as equal mem­s reluctance, we believe, stems from the couragesconceptionsofcommunityatthe ofstate. Perhaps, however, this is putting l. Onereason why Israelis emphasizecom­deemphasize state may be that the threats 'om the fact oftheir Jewishness and from .tments. Itmaybeonly natural, therefore, e produced the counterreaction we have

re of or feared the consequences of the npatriots put on the state. How could it be I1hole phenomenon of Jewish statehood wo thousand years of Jewish tradition? :ounter the parochialism of community,

4. ~ment'),September12,1986, p. 29.

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although his concern was to undermine the sub-communities formed around political party and ethnic origin rather than the Jewish particularism of the state. Ben-Gurion was the father of the conception that has been called mamlakhtiut ('statism'), a term he himself frequently invoked. We are not concerned with tracing Ben-Gurion's specific conception of statism nor respond­ing to the charge that in his own activity, particularly his at­titudes towards the Arab population, his compromises with re­ligious demands for a virtually independentschool system, or his tolerance of some degree of corruption within his own party, he was not always faithful to a blueprint of a statist society. Our point, instead, is to indicate that, at least in broad outline, the conceptofastrongstate in the Western meaningofthe term, isnot totallyforeign to Israelipoliticalhistory. InBen-Gurion'sconcep­tion of the state, Judaism played an important role, but it was a particular form of Judaism, one which was defined and inter­preted quite selectively. IS Those elements within the Jewish tra­dition that supported statism were emphasized, while other ele­ments were ignored. How influential are statist orientations in Israeli political culture? The question is difficult to answer and much of what we say here is speculative, But it seems to us that statism, in the Western sense ofthe term, is an important compo­nent in the conception of a minority of the population. For such people, predominantly secular rather than religious, Ashkenazi rather than Sephardi, ofhigh rather than low educational status, in the legal and military professions and the foreign service, sta­tism is an importantvalue. Manywithin thesepopulationgroups, however, have gone beyond Ben-Gurion by denuding statism of its Jewish significance. In this respect, they are faithful to the more Western model. Indeed, those concernedaboutthe future of Israeli democracy - and there aremanysuch Israelis today-tend to be those who feel most sympathetic to this statist tradition. What they may not appreciate, what they may be reluctant to acknowledge, is that theirproblem is notovercomingtotalitarian orauthoritarian tendencies in Israeli culture (these hardlyexist), but rather overcoming deeply rooted images about the nature of the society which has been formed and the vision of how that society ought to be conducted. As far as many who feel they are heirs to Ben-Gurion'sstatistconceptionsare concerned, Judaism, at most, retains important symbolic significance for the State of Israel but should be virtually bereft of influence on public policy. The question of how important a role the State of Israel plays in their conceptions of Judaism is somewhat misleading. Judaism itself is a dimension of their lives which is of secondary or peri­pheral importance.

.. Onstatismand Judaism see CharlesS. Liebman and Eliezer Don Yehiya, Civil Religion in Israel: Traditional Judaism and Political Culture in the Jewish State, Berkeley (University ofCalifornia Press11983.

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The alternate image of the State ofIsrael, which can also claim ties, however tenuous, to Ben-Gurion's conception of the state, is not necessarily a weak one. But it is a conception of state as the extensionofcommunity- notassomeabstractorsomewhatalien entity with interests of its own, independent of the body of its citizen-members, but ratheras the arm ofthe community. This is very noticeable in attitudes towards the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), the Israeli army, which commands universal respect, on the one hand, but a mixture of familiarity and contempt on the other. The army commands an element offear but it isalso some­thing ofa home. It is notalien. Itis not anarm ofthe state, reflect­ing the power ofsome abstract entity with an interest of its own. The IDF is the army of the people, the power of the community. Hence the resistance to the rituals and mannerisms oftraditional armies, the insistence on informality, the involvement of fami­lies in army rituals, as audience ifnot as participants. 16

The State of Israel, in this conception, represents the authority of the Jewish community and exercises power on its behalf. To those who hold this conception ofstate, the State ofIsrael plays a veryimportant role in the meaning they attribute to Judaismand in this respect theyare also heirs ofBen-Gurion's legacy. Afterall, the statement, 'what counts is not what the goyim say but what the Jews do' is attributed to Israel's founding father. As one his­torian ofthe State ofIsrael points out:

Israel's leaders mighthave interpreted Jewishstatehoodas the expression of a national liberation movement, some­thing every former colonialpeople wouldhave understood. The term was scarcely mentioned, however, in the addresses and writing of Ben-Gurion, Sharett, or Eban. Rather, the Israeli statesmen chose to discern a profounder explanationfor the 'miracle' ofrebirth in the historical and theological roots ofthe Jewish people.17

The alternative conceptionsofthe StateofIsraelare contrasted in the debate over the extradition ofWilliam Nakash, a debate that engaged the interest of Israelis from 1986 through 1987, although, as we shall see, circumstances stacked the case some­what in favor of the statist position. William Nakash was con­victed in a French court of murdering an Algerian resident of France. He fled to Israel and maintained that the murder had been provoked byterrorist threats. Furthermore, he argued, ifhe were returned to a French prison, his life was in jeopardy from otherArabprisoners. Thesefaetswerechallengedbymanynews­paper reports. In addition, Israel is bound by an extradition

.. For a description of such a ceremony see Ruth Wisse, 'Israel: A House Divided', Commentary 84 (September, 1987), pp. 33-38.

17 Howard Sachar,A HistoryofIsrael, New York (Knopf) 1976, p. 471.

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treatywith France. Aftera longhesitatioJ: underpressure from statistelements insc Attorney General's office in particular a ash. The Supreme Court sustained this d. tuallyplayed itselfout in the question oft. lar courts versus the authority of a r granted Nakash's wife's request for a wri the country on the grounds that this WOl:

her to force Nakash into granting her a question but that there was collusion bt wife and the argument over divorce w avoid extradition. But the original issue 1i Israel ought to act in compliance witt gations to extradite a convicted murden primary obligation of the State of Israe claimed that because he was a Jew his r guarded in a foreign country? Each sid justice ofits position. By the end of 1986• lishment politicians, leaders of the Likll extradition, and the media were extreme this statistposition. There is no question the explanation for their attitude stemm to the rabbinicalcourts and theirsense tb stepped their bounds in seeking to impos­secular courts. Public opinion was not as The Dahaf Research Institute informe­Israeli public opinion twice on attitudes December, 1986 theyfound that 53 percE tion of Israel favored extradition and AmongSephardi Jews, natives or the chi or African countries, 45 per cent favorec cent opposed it. Among Ashkenazim, the ern extraction, 62 per cent favored em opposed it. In March of1987 the effector port for extradition did not appear to ha1i those favoring this alternative. The chax: percent (from 43 percent to 33 per cent) J

dition, and the rise in the group who said December, 1987, the issue was resolved i to ourconcernsand Nakashwas extradiu the rabbinical courts.

For the communitarians, the State of I important role in their conception ofJue ultra-nationalist religious Zionists theyD

Israel does notbehave inaccordance witl state. Rav Zvi Yehudah Kook attributee Israelaswellasthe land ofIsrael, Indeed. above he argued that this sanctity extenc

105

fthe State ofIsrael, which can also claim to Ben-Gurion's conception of the state, is one. But it is a conception of state as the y-notassomeabstractorsomewhatalien f its own, independent of the body of its ither as the arm ofthe community. This is tudes towards the Israel Defense Forces " which commands universal respect, on xture of familiarity and contempt on the ands an elementoffear but it isalso some­talien. It is not an arm ofthe state, reflect­abstract entity with an interest of its own. 'the people, the power of the community. the rituals and mannerisms oftraditional )n informality, the involvement of fami­ludience ifnotas participants. IS

this conception, represents the authority ityand exercises power on its behalf. To lception ofstate, the State ofIsrael plays a hemeaning they attribute to Judaismand also heirs ofBen-Gurion's legacy. Afterall, )unts is not what the goyim say but what ed to Israel's founding father. As one his­-ael points out:

ighthaveinterpretedJewishstatehoodas ra national liberation movement, some­:lrcolonialpeople would have understood. scarcely mentioned, however, in the Titing of Ben-Gurion, Sharett, or Eban. listatesmenchose to discern a profounder le 'miracle' ofrebirth in the historical and :lftheJewish people.17

tionsofthe StateofIsraelare contrastedin radition of William Nakash, a debate that of Israelis from 1986 through 1987,

ee, circumstances stacked the case some­atist position. William Nakash was con­It of murdering an Algerian resident of leI and maintained that the murder had rist threats. Furthermore, he argued, ifhe nch prison, his life was in jeopardy from hesefaetswerechallengedbymanynews­ition, Israel is bound by an extradition

h a ceremony see Ruth Wisse, 'Israel: A House ,(September, 1987), pp. 33-38. ~ofIsrael,New York (Knopfll976, p. 471.

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treatywithFrance, Aftera longhesitation the MinisterofJustice, underpressure from statist elements insocietyat largeand in the Attorney General's office in particular agreed to extradite Nak­ash. The Supreme Court sustained this decision. The issue even­tuallyplayed itselfout in the question ofthe authority ofthe secu­lar courts versus the authority of a rabbinical court which granted Nakash's wife's request for a writ forbidding his leaving the country on the grounds that this would render it difficult for her to force Nakash into granting her a divorce. There was no question but that there was collusion between Nakash and his wife and the argument over divorce was merely an excuse to avoid extradition. But the original issue was whether the State of Israel ought to act in compliance with its international obli­gations to extradite a convicted murderer to France, or was the primary obligation of the State of Israel to defend a Jew who claimed that because he was a Jew his rights would not be safe­guarded in a foreign country? Each side was convinced of the justice ofits position. By the end of 1986 virtually all ofthe estab­lishment politicians, leaders of the Likud and of Labor, favored extradition, and the media were extremelyone-sided infavoring this statist position. There is no question in our mind, that part of the explanation for their attitude stemmed from their antipathy to the rabbinical courts and theirsensethatthesecourtshad over­stepped their bounds in seeking to impose theirjudgementon the secular courts. Public opinion was not as one-sided as the media. The Dahaf Research Institute informed us that they sampled Israeli public opinion twice on attitudes towards extradition. In December, 1986 theyfound that 53 percentoftheJewishpopula­tion of Israel favored extradition and 43 per cent opposed it. AmongSephardi Jews, natives or the children ofnatives ofAsian or African countries, 45 per cent favored extradition and 51 per cent opposed it. Among Ashkenazim, those of European or West­ern extraction, 62 per cent favored extradition and 35 per cent opposed it. In March of1987 the effectofthe establishment's sup­port for extradition did not appear to have had marked effects on those favoring this alternative. The change came in a drop often percent (from 43 percent to 33 percent) for those opposingextra­dition, and the rise in the group who said they had no opinion. In December, 1987, the issue was resolved in a manner not relevant to ourconcernsand Nakashwas extradited with theagreementof the rabbinical courts.

For the communitarians, the State of Israel certainly plays an important role in their conception ofJudaism, although, like the ultra-nationalist religious Zionists they maybe disappointed that Israeldoesnotbehave inaccordance with their imageofa Jewish state. Rav Zvi Yehudah Kook attributed sanctity to the State of Israel aswellasthe land ofIsraeI. Indeed, in thearticle referredto above he argued that this sanctity extended to all the instrumen­

105

talities of the state including the IDF and its arms. 18 But this, in

turn, stemmed from the fact that the State ofIsrael was endowed with purpose. Hence, according to the resolution adopted by the Council of Jewish Settlements in Judea, Samaria and Gaza, if Israel should surrender sovereignty over Judea or Samaria it would

represent a primafacie annulment ofthe State ofIsrael as a Zionist Jewish state whose purpose is to bring Jews to the sovereign Land of Israel, and not, perish the thought, to re­move them from the Land ofIsrael and replace them witha foreign sovereignty. 19

This is not the statement of a group to whom the State ofIsrael is unimportant but of a group with a particular image of what the State of Israel represents. Indeed, among religious Zionists the state assumesparticularly important significance. Some, like the ultra-nationalists, have a particularly vivid image ofits role and, therefore, may argue that the present leadership or the govern­ment is subverting its purpose. They, like those arrested for com­mitting terrorist acts against the Arabpopulation, will argue that they are serving the true interests of the state. More moderate elements in the religious Zionistcampare far more accommodat­ingto the stateas it exists. Onespokesman argues on the pagesofa leading religious Zionistjournal:

...education for military service, study of science, and res­pecting the rule oflaw must serve, in a principled manner, as the basis for all religious values....That is the purpose of religious Zionism which finds its expression in expanding the concept of religion until it includes service to the needs ofthe national state. 2D

The associations between groups of Israelis and each of the con­ceptions of the state offered here are not static. Conceptions may certainly change. For example, the ultra-orthodox (haredi) com­munity in 1948 perceived Israel in statist terms. (The fact that many ofthem were hostile to the state is not the important issue.) The haredim were concerned solely with protection oftheir own interests in the contextofthe alien state. This has changed. Forty years of living in Israeli society, along with the growing confi­dence ofthe haredim about theirprospects has transformed their conception ofIsrael from a statist to a communal one. There is no

II Zvi Yehuda Kook, 'TheSanctityofthe Holy People inthe Holy Land', in: Yosef Tirosh (ed.), Religious Zionism and the State, Jerusalem (The World Zionist Organization) 1978, pp. 140-146 (Hebrewl.

.. The statement was issued November 4, 1985, reprinted in Davar, November 22, 1985, and translated into English in the International Center for Peace in the Middle East, Israel Press Briefs, 40 (December 1985), p. 17.

20 Michael Nehorai, 'Education Outside the Boundaries', Emdah, 18 (August, 1987),p.6.

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better explanation for their readiness 1

activity in areas which do not impinge c the haredi community's welfare.

Nevertheless, at the risk of oversimpl the Israeli population in accordance Wi1 and argue that these conceptions, ro Judaism andthenature ofsociety, have I

In the eyes ofone setofIsraelis - compr ists, Ashkenazim, professionals, those: particular and the well educated - the SI

from, one might even say alienated frot in their eyes, the state mustjustify itself provides the individual. These citizens ability to do so. But, by virtue oftheir cfu the state, they also acknowledge that tl pursue interests of its own. Ifone seare dents for this group they can be found iJ programs of Herzl, Jabotinskyand ev tainly a partial heritage ofBen-Gurion. prised primarily of the religious, Sepha views the state as an extension of (kehilla). Thestate represents thepower ish people, or at least the Jewish people i conception also has antecedents within . too, is at least a partial heir to Ben-Gw: fact, in manyrespects, thisconception oj of Israel's founders than are those of ti provide the greatestparadox ofall, in ur. temporary political culture.

107

:lding the IDF and its arms. IS But this, in fact that the State ofIsrael was endowed

::cording to the resolution adopted by the .ements in Judea, Samaria and Gaza, if l" sovereignty over Judea or Samaria it

facie annulmentofthe State ofIsrael as a !I.te whose purpose is to bring Jews to the •Israel, and not, perish the thought, to re­:he Land ofIsrael and replace them with a ty.19

It ofa group to whom the State ofIsrael is :'Oup with a particular image of what the lts. Indeed, among religious Zionists the :oly important significance. Some, like the a particularly vivid image ofits role and, :lat the present leadership or the govern­..1I'Pose. They, like those arrested for com­ainst the Arabpopulation, will argue that ue interests of the state. More moderate s Zionistcampare far more accommodat­:So Onespokesmanargues on the pagesofa tjournal:

rilitary service, study of science, and res­flaw must serve, in a principled manner, I religious values....That is the purpose of which finds its expression in expanding

igion until it includes service to the needs .te.20

en groups of Israelis and each of the con­3red here are not static. Conceptions may xample, the ultra-orthodox (haredi) com­lTed Israel in statist terms. (The fact that tile to the state is not the important issue.) .ernedsolely with protection oftheir own ofthe alien state. This has changed. Forty ·li society, along with the growing confi­lOut theirprospects has transformed their m a statist to a communal one. There is no

:letityoftheHoly People in theHoly Land', in: Yosef "ism and the State, Jerusalem (The World Zionist 10-146 (Hebrew). November4,1985,reprintedinDavar,November nto English in the International Center for Peace in ~ss Briefs, 40 (December 19851, p. 17. lion Outside the Boundaries', Emdah, 18 (August,

106

better explanation for their readiness to assault the state for its activity in areas which do not impinge on the narrow concerns of the haredi community's welfare.

Nevertheless, at the risk of oversimplification, one can divide the Israeli population in accordance with conceptionsofthe state and argue that these conceptions, rooted in basic images of Judaism and the nature ofsociety,have remainedfairlyconstant. In the eyes ofone setofIsraelis - comprised primarily ofsecular­ists, Ashkenazim, professionals, those in the legal profession in particular and the well educated - the state is an entity distanced from, one might even say alienated from its citizens. Ultimately, in their eyes, the state mustjustify itselfin terms ofthe services it provides the individual. These citizens may easily despair of its ability to do so. But, by virtue oftheir distancing themselvesfrom the state, they also acknowledge that the state may legitimately pursue interests of its own. Ifone searches for historical antece­dents for this group they can be found in political Zionism, in the programs of Herzl, Jabotinsky and even Weizmann. It is cer­tainly a partial heritage of Ben-Gurion. The second group - com­prised primarily of the religious, Sephardim, the less educated­views the state as an extension of the Jewish community (kehilla). Thestate represents thepowerand authorityoftheJew­ish people, orat least the Jewish people in the Land ofIsrael. This conceptionalso has antecedents within the Zionistmovement. It, too, is at least a partial heir to Ben-Gurion's notions of state. In fact, in manyrespects, this conceptionofthe state iscloser to those of Israel's founders than are those of the statists. And this may provide the greatestparadox ofall, in understanding Israel's con­temporary political culture.

107