concepts and-the-varieties-of-content

Concepts and the Varieties of Content

Angela Mendelovici

PhilSoc, RSSS ANU, August 12, 2008

John is a modal realist.


believes that possible worlds exist in the same

way that the actual world exists.

Q: Does MODAL REALIST represent all that all along?

A: Yes and no

1. A theory of concepts that can account for such phenomena

2. Making sense of other notions of content in light of this theory of concepts

3. Reconciling internalist and externalist intuitions

4Preliminaries

Plan

Mental representation is a phenomenon to be explained.

5

What is mental representation?

Preliminaries

Content:

What a state “says”

Vehicle:

The state itself that does the representing (brain state, functional state, symbol in LOT, etc.)

Concept:

The vehicles of representation often used in thought (e.g. CAT, CUP,PHILSOC), perhaps also used in perception or imagination

6

Content versus vehicle (Dretske)

Preliminaries

cat

The content we intuitively take a representation to have

May be informed by

Introspection

A folk theory of mind

Something else

Some combination of the above

7

Intuitive content

Preliminaries

General idea: Some types of representation represent only in virtue of their relations to other types of representation (e.g. linguistic representation in terms of mental representation)

Original representations: The primary bearers of representational properties

Derived representations: Representations that derive their representational properties from

their relations to originally representational representations

E.g. “cat”

Grice, Searle

8

Original vs. derived representation

Preliminaries

1. The Efficient Concept viewa. Hard versus easy thoughts and chunking

b. The need for unpacking

2. Varieties of contenta. Total content

b. Intuitive content

c. Other types of content


9Intuitive content is partly derived content

Outline







10The Efficient Concept view

Outline

Two claims:

[Distinct Representations (DR)] (Many) concepts are distinct

representations from representations of their intuitive contents.

[Distinct Original Contents (DOC)] (Many) concepts do not (originally)

represent their intuitive contents.

In particular, (many) concepts (originally) represent less and involve fewer or smaller vehicles of representation than their intuitive contents.

11

The Efficient Concept view


bachelor

unmarried man

The Efficient Concept View

unpacking


Three models of concepts

unmarried man

MolecularismRejects (DR) and (DOC)

unmarried man

unmarried man

The Complex Content ViewAccepts (DR) and rejects (DOC)

bachelor

unmarried man

The Efficient Concept ViewAccepts (DR) and (DOC)

unpacking








Outline


Hard versus easy thoughts and chunking

unmarried man

unmarried man

unmarried man

The Complex Content ViewAccepts (DR) and rejects (DOC)

bachelor

unmarried man


unpacking


[PhilosophersHARD]

The first philosopher believes that possible worlds

exist in the same way that the actual world exists, the

second philosopher believes that the right act is the

one that maximizes utility, and the third philosopher

believes that the content of a mental state is at least

partly determined by facts about the subject’s

environment.

[PhilosophersEASY]

The first philosopher is a modal realist, the second

philosopher is an act utilitarian, and the third

philosopher is an externalist about mental content.

Same intuitive content

But (PhilosophersHARD) was more difficult to entertain than (PhilosophersEASY).

Difficulty:

An intuitive notion

I expect you can find experimental measures

17

Hard versus easy thoughts


Ways of getting at the difference in difficulty:

(A) Compare difficulty of entertaining both thoughts for you now

(B) Compare your case to that of an undergraduate freshman

• It is easier for you to entertain a thought with the intuitive content of (PhilosophersHARD)/(PhilosophersEASY) than for the undergrad to do the same thing.

(C) Compare yourself now with a past time-slice of yourself

18

Hard versus easy thoughts


There’s converging evidence for this sort of distinction from memory research on chunking.


Converging evidence

7 9 3 5 6 2 3 4 8 2

79 35 62 34 82

The recoding of a larger number of items (chunk targets) into a smaller number of items (chunks)

Short-term memory (STM) is limited by the number of chunks stored.

Chunks: 79 35 62 34 82

Chunk targets: 7 9 3 5 6 2 3 4 8 2

22

Chunking (Miller 1956)


Chunk concepts are concepts representing chunks.

Chunks are contents.

Chunks unpack into their targets.

23



Chunking can be hierarchical.

A chunk concept might have targets that are themselves chunks.

24



25

Evidence for chunking (De Groot 1966, Chase and Simon 1973)


26



27



28



Best explained by chunking

Experts have chunk concepts in long-term memory corresponding to multiple-piece configurations.

Chess masters have about 50,000 chunks (Simon and Gilmartin1973).

A lot of our concepts bear the hallmark of chunking: they help us overcome short-term memory limitations.

You can remember more of the footy game if you have lots of footy concepts.

29

Chunking and concepts


Chunk concepts are used in both thought and STM.

Chunking allows you to entertain easier thoughts.

Two effects of concept acquisition:

The ability to entertain easier thoughts

STM benefits


Chunking and hard/easy thoughts

Why is it easier to entertain thoughts involving chunk concepts than thoughts involving their target concepts?


Question

32

The Efficient Concept view explains this


modal realism

possible worlds

existence actuality …

In entertaining the easy (chunked) thought, you’re thinking less

Less content, fewer representational vehicles

Thinking less is easier than thinking more

33



modal realism

possible worlds





34



modal realism

possible worlds





In entertaining the easy (chunked) thought, you’re involving fewer representations

35

The Complex Content view can say something similar


possible worlds exist in the same way that

the actual world exists

possible worlds



36





possible worlds



37





possible worlds


Easy thoughts and hard thoughts involve the samerepresentational vehicles and the same original contents

38

Trouble for Molecularism


possible worlds


Easy thoughts and hard thoughts involve the samerepresentational vehicles and the same original contents

39

Trouble for Molecularism


possible worlds


Deny that (PhilosophersHARD) and (PhilosophersEASY) induce thoughts in us that differ in difficulty.

Instead, the perceived difference in difficulty has something to do with the more or less complex linguistic processing required to get from the sentence to the thought.

What about spontaneously generated thoughts?


Possible alternative explanation of phenomena for the Molecularist

What about the undergrad/previous self cases?

Concept acquisition involves a reorganization of constituent concepts such that they token more easily together.

41



possible worlds


What about the undergrad/previous self cases?

Concept acquisition involves a reorganization of constituent concepts such that they token more easily together.

42



possible worlds


Tokening representations involves activating neurons.

There are metabolic constraints on how many neurons can be active at a given time (Lennie 2003).

Setting aside absolute constraints, activating neurons is costly.

So we should expect brain to strive towards minimization of activation, where possible.

Tokening fewer concepts is one way to do this.

Molecularist’s explanation does not have this virtue.

43

Some indirect support for preferred explanation


But there’s more…


[Modal Realist]


[Vegetarian]

John is a vegetarian.

The thought invoked by (Modal Realist) has more intuitive content than the thought invoked by (Vegetarian).

But they’re roughly equally easy to entertain (for us).

45

A related phenomenon


[Modal Realist]


[Vegetarian]

John is a vegetarian.

Explanation: The thoughts induced by (Modal Realist) and (Vegetarian) involve roughly the same number and/or size of representational vehicles (and perhaps have roughly the same amount of original content).

46

A related phenomenon


47

John vegetarian

eat meat

The Efficient Concept View:

Johnmodal realism

possible worlds


Johndoesn’t

eat meat

eat meat

The Complex Content View:

Johnpossible worlds exist

in the same way actual world exists

possible worlds


48

John vegetarian

eat meat


Johnmodal realism

possible worlds


Johndoesn’t

eat meat

eat meat

The Complex Content View:

Johnpossible worlds exist

in the same way actual world exists

possible worlds


According to Molecularism, the thought induced by (Modal Realist) contains more representational vehicles than the one induced by (Vegetarian).

Whatever else we say about what determines difficulty, it’s very plausible that how much is represented (i.e. how many representations and/or original contents are involved) plays a significant role in determining difficulty.

So then the thought induced by (Modal Realist) should be harder to entertain than that induced by (Vegetarian).

But it’s not.

49

Pressure on Molecularism


possible worlds

existence actuality …JohnJohn eat meat

50

John vegetarian

eat meat


Johnmodal realism

possible worlds


Molecularism:

John eat meatpossible worlds

existence actuality …John

51

John vegetarian

eat meat


Johnmodal realism

possible worlds


Molecularism:

John eat meat

…

existence actuality …John

… …

…

……

… …

Chunk concepts are used in thought and in memory.

So we might want to offer a explanation of the STM benefits of chunking that’s continuous with the explanation of the harder/easier thought distinction.

The Efficient Concept view and the Complex Content view can do this: In remembering chunked thoughts, you’re remembering less (fewer

representations involved, perhaps fewer original contents).

The Molecularist cannot offer this type of explanation. This casts doubt on whatever explanation he wants to give of the STM benefits of chunking.


Explaining the STM benefits of chunking







53Intuitive content is partly derived content

Outline


The need for unpacking

unmarried man

unmarried man

unmarried man

bachelor

unmarried man


unpacking

The Complex Content ViewAccepts (DR)

Rejects (DOC)


Accepts (Distinct Representations)

Rejects (Distinct Original Contents)

Concepts are distinct representations from the representations of their intuitive contents, but their content is just their intuitive content.

Fodor holds a version of this view.

55

The Complex Content view


unmarried man

unmarried man

The facts about tables supervene on the

physical facts.

What’s supervenience?

It takes time and effort to answer.

You’re unpacking.

Unpacking is required for

Retrieval/introspection of intuitive content.

Use of intuitive content for further thought or behavior.

58

The need for unpacking


Case 1:

You and I are comparing notes on who’s a modal realist.

Case 2:

You and I are arguing about whether or not modal realism is true.

In case 2 but perhaps not in case 1, we have to unpack our concepts of modal realism.

59

Not all uses of chunk concepts require unpacking


The need for unpacking suggests that the intuitive content of chunk concepts was not available prior to unpacking.

Otherwise, we would expect it to do some of the work for which unpacking is required.

60

This supports (Distinct Original Contents)


Project: Assign (original) contents to mental representations.

What do we assign to SUPERVENIENCE?

Some considerations:

Introspective availability

Functional/behavioral role

Unpacking is needed for introspection of intuitive content and certain behaviors/inferences.

61

Another way to put the point


So it’s unnecessary to say that BACHELOR has content unmarried man, since those contents are already had by other concepts (UNMARRIED and MAN).

Need to unpack to use those contents anyways.

Attributing that content to BACHELOR is redundant.

62

Unnecessarily redundant


unmarried man

unmarried man

The Complex Content View

bachelor

unmarried man


So it’s unnecessary to say that BACHELOR has content unmarried man, since those contents are already had by other concepts (UNMARRIED and MAN).

Need to unpack to use those contents anyways.

Attributing that content to BACHELOR is redundant.

63

Unnecessarily redundant


unmarried man

unmarried man


bachelor

unmarried man


There are other ways to assign content:

Based on causal co-variation/nomic dependence

But a causal theory still…

Doesn’t explain the need for unpacking

Attributes isolated contents

Attributes redundant contents

64

Objection


unmarried man

unmarried man


1. Hard versus easy thoughts and the STM benefits of chunking

3. The need for unpacking

65

Two supporting phenomena


bachelor

unmarried man


Not everything retrievable through unpacking

Not nothing either


What’s the original content?

modal realism

possible worlds


Some options:

A very vague content (e.g. some philosophical view)

Parts of the target content (e.g. some view having to do with possible worlds)

New primitive content (e.g. (primitive) modal realism)

Some combination of the above


What’s the original content?

modal realism

possible worlds








68Varieties of content

Outline

Chunk concepts are used instead of their targets for certain purposes.


Derived mental representation

modal realism

possible worlds


You use your chunk concept/icon instead of its targets for certain purposes.

For other purposes, you can unpack more information.

But the chunk concept/icon represents the unpackableinformation before you unpack it.


Analogy

modal realism

possible worlds


modal realism

possible worlds






Analogy

We need a way to distinguish more content that is a further cashing out of some other content from more content that’s unrelated to the other content or related in the wrong way.


When does more content count as derived content?

Bachelors….

Unmarried!

Kangaroos…

They’re usually under 40…

Certain further thoughts come as or present themselves asfurther cashings out of previous thoughts.

79

The phenomenology of unpacking

Varieties of content

That’s what I was

thinking all along!

Presenting as a further cashing out is a matter of original content.

Why think that?

We can tell whether one content comes as a further cashing out of another.

Original content and phenomenal character are the best candidates for something mental and introspectively accessible.

80

The phenomenology of unpacking


The content that can potentially come as a further cashing out of the original content

83

Unrestricted total content (first pass)


Different ways of filling in C will yield different notions of total content.

84

Total content schema 1


A mental representation with original content X has total content Y (for a subject S)

iff in circumstances C, Y is disposed to present itself as a

cashing out of X (to S).

In sufficiently distant circumstances, lots could come as a further cashing out of some content.

Drugs

More theoretical knowledge


Why restrict the appropriate circumstances?

electron

negative charge

fairies

C: Normal circumstances

C: Sufficiently nearby circumstances

C: Circumstances I count as authoritative

Etc…

86



A mental representation with original content X has (partial) total content Y (for a subject S)

iff in circumstances C, Y is disposed to present itself as a


Sometimes further thoughts specify what it would take to be a further cashing out of the original content.

87

There’s more


I don’t know what exactly

modal realism is, but I know

it’s that extremely

counterintuitive view David

Lewis developed.

All the content that can potentially come as a further cashing out of the original content

and

all the content that can potentially specify what it would take to be a further cashing out of the original content

88

Unrestricted total content (second and final pass)


We might want to keep contributions to total content of type (i) and (ii) apart. Then we might want to talk of two types of total content.

89



A mental representation with original content X has (partial) total content Y (for a subject S) iff in circumstances C,

(i) Y is disposed to present itself as a cashing out of X (to S), or

(ii) Y is disposed to present itself as a condition on what it would take to be a cashing out of X (to S).

90



Different ways of filling in C get us different notions of total content.

If we fill in C such that it does not differ between intrinsic duplicates, we get something that looks like the first dimension of 2-D semantics (Chalmers, Jackson).

A subject S’s mental representation with original content X

(i) has (partial) total contenti Y iff in circumstances C,Y is disposed to present itself as a cashing out of X (to S),

and

(ii) has (partial) total contentii Z iff in circumstances C, Z is disposed to present itself as a condition on what it would take to be a


91



We might also fill in C such that it includes circumstances the subject will find herself in in the near future. Then C might differ for intrinsic duplicates.

Can include circumstances involving interaction with artifacts. This gets us an “extended mind” notion of content (Clarke and Chalmers).



and



92



No right notion of total content.



and










Outline

Folk psychology attributes beliefs, desires, and other contentful states.

The content it attributes is not (merely) original content.

So why is it so good at predicting behavior?

94

Challenge from the success of folk psychology


The intuitive concept of content tracks (correlates with) something that is fairly closely related to original content.

The extra ingredients that the notion of intuitive content tracks (apart from original content) do not hinder folk psychology’s predictive accuracy and may even enhance it for certain purposes.


Strategy

96

Extra ingredient #1: Total content


Fill in C with conceptual analysis.



and



Arguably, we think and speak as though objects (and/or properties, events, states of affairs, etc.) were literally part of our thoughts.

We think we’re having a thought about this screen. This very one. Really. This one here.


“Object” or “object-dependent” contents

Usually, it’s the ones that the subject actually manages to refer to.

Otherwise, it’s unclear how object contents could allow you to accurately predict behavior.


Which objects?

b

a

Fred desires to climb .b

[I want to climb that tree

over there in front of

me… that is causing my

visual experience…]total

Usually, it’s the ones that the subject actually manages to refer to.

Otherwise, it’s unclear how object contents could allow you to accurately predict behavior.


Which objects?

a

b

Fred desires to climb .b

Any story of content will need to offer a story of reference and truth-conditions.

Reference might be relative to a center, subject, or time and place (as in 2-D semantics), or

Reference might involve direct reference to a center, subject, or time and place (Searle, Ishmael)

The intuitive notion of content partly tracks the referents of a concept’s total contents.


Extra ingredient #2: Reference of total content

101

Intuitive content

Referents of total

contents

Potential cashings

out

Potential conditions

on cashingsout

Original

content

It’s ok that intuitive content partly tracks total content:

Whenever a subject needs some further information, it can be readily unpacked. So it’s ok if we attribute all that content to her all along. For most purposes, we don’t need to keep track of her moment-to-moment occurrent thoughts (and we can’t do that anyways).


Folk psychology is all right

John believes that the right act is the one that

maximizes happiness and minimizes suffering.

Blah blah blah. [This is so boring. And so

incompatible with my act

utilitarianism.]original

John believes that the right act is the one that

maximizes happiness and minimizes suffering.

But won’t that end up

harming more people than

it helps?

Questions?...

Yes, Mr. Doe?

It’s ok that intuitive content tracks referents:

We sometimes want to make predictions about successful behaviors, not just behaviors (Williamson and others). Whether or not a behavior is successful can depend on whether or the total content of the mental states giving rise to it (e.g. beliefs) succeed in referring.

Whether or not a behavior is successful also affects subsequentbehavior.


Folk psychology is all right

Fred desires that glass of water ( ).

FRIDGE

[Want glass of

water]original

FRIDGE

[Want glass of

water]original[Want myself to have the

glass of watery stuff in

front of me and to the left

that is causing my visual

experience.]total


FRIDGE


This isn’t a conceptual analysis of the intuitive notion of content.

This isn’t a cognitive story about what we do when we attribute contentful states to ourselves and others. (See Koralus and others)

This is a story about what the intuitive notion of content tracks and why that’s not such a bad thing to be tracking if we’re interested in predicting certain sorts of behaviors given limited knowledge.


What this is and isn’t

Folk psychology does not track original content.

Folk psychology tracks a complex combination of original content, total content, and referents.

Folk psychology is not wholly divorced from psychological reality. (Good)

But intuitive content is not original content. Intuitive content is not the metaphysically interesting notion of content.


The status of folk psychology








Outline

We can do the same to construct other notions of content.

These other notions might match the notions of content used in other areas (personal-level psychology, political philosophy, action theory, epistemology, etc.).

That would be good news. It would lend psychological reality to those notions of content.

114

Pluralism about non-original content








115Reconciling internalist and externalist intuitions

Outline

Internalist intuition

What I’m thinking depends on what’s going on in me.

Destruction (brain lesions have effect on mental states, “world lesions” do not)

Psychologists think externalism is crazy.

This conclusion [that beliefs are not in the mind] may be acceptable to philosophers… but I think that psychologists are liable to take it as a reductio ad absurdum. (Johnson-Laird, 1982, p. 62)

Externalist intuition

Twin Earth (Putnam), arthritis/tharthritis (Burge)


Conflicting intuitions

I have arthritis

in my thigh. I have arthritis in

my thigh.

I have arthritis

in my thigh. I have tharthritis

in my thigh.

“Arthritis” is used to denote an

inflammation of the joints or

thighs (tharthritis).


inflammation of the joints.

Alf Twin Alf

Internalist intuition

What I’m thinking depends on what’s going on in me.

Destruction (brain lesions have effect on mental states, “world lesions” do not)

Psychologists think externalism is crazy.

True of original content

Externalist intuition

Twin Earth (Putnam), arthritis/tharthritis (Burge)

True of intuitive content


The intuitions can be made compatible

Two ways to get externalism:

Referents of total content can differ between intrinsic duplicates.

Appropriate circumstances for total content can differ between intrinsic duplicates.

119

Externalism about intuitive content

Reconciling internalist and externalist intuitions

Intuitive content

Referents of total

contents

Potential cashings

out

Potential conditions

on cashingsout

Original

content

I have arthritis

in my thigh.

I have arthritis

in my thigh.

First way: Total content has different referents so intuitive content

can differ (2-D semantics way)

[I have arthritis in

my thigh.]original


my thigh.]original

[I have that disease

normally called “arthritis”

in my community in my

thigh.]total

[I have arthritis

in my

thigh.]intuitive

[I have tharthritis

in my thigh.]intuitive






Alf Twin Alf

[I have that disease

normally called “arthritis”

in my community in my

thigh.]total

121

Second way: Appropriate circumstances can differ between intrinsic duplicates

Reconciling internalist and externalist intuitions

C: Circumstances in which subject has a (local) dictionary handyC: Circumstances in which subject has (his own) mother handyC: Circumstances in which subject has mastered his own languageEtc…



and



I have arthritis

in my thigh.

I have arthritis

in my thigh.

Second way: Appropriate circumstances include those in which subject

has a (local) dictionary available.


my thigh.]original


my thigh.]original

[I have an

inflammation of the

joints (arthritis) in my

thigh.]total

[I have an

inflammation of

the joints or thighs

(tharthritis) in my

thigh.]total






Alf Twin Alf

We can be externalists about intuitive content while remaining internalists about original content.

Respects both externalist and internalist intuitions.


Externalism about intuitive content

The Efficient Concept view is the right view of concepts.

Different notions of total content are different idealizations of unpacked content.

Diverse notions of content can be related to what’s really going on in the head.

Distinguishing between original content and intuitive content allows us to reconcile internalist and externalist intuitions.

124Conclusion

Conclusion bachelor

unmarried man

The End

Preliminaries/definitions

1. The Efficient Concept viewa. Hard versus easy thoughts

a. Chunking


2. Varieties of content (DC)a. Total content

a. TC schema 1, 2, 3

b. Intuitive contenta. Extra ingredient #1: Total content

b. Extra ingredient #2: “Object” content

c. Funnel


126Outline

Outline


a. Way #1

b. Way #2

4. Extras

a. Traffic controller example

b. The OC of chunk concepts diagram

c. Pluralism diagram

d. Fodor on analytic/synthetic

e. Heidi

f. George example

g. Object contents – mental models story

h. PIT

Dasein

Being-in-the-world

Facticity

…

Différence

…

Extras

Heidi the Heideggerian

- Oxygen truck

- Driver: John Doe

- Oxygen truck

- Driver: John Doe

- Hydrogen truck

- Driver: Jane Smith

Traffic controller case:

You use the red rectangle instead of the full description of the vehicle for certain purposes (detecting crashes).

For other purposes, you need to retrieve more information.

But the red rectangle in some sense represents the full description.

Analogy

- Oxygen truck

- Driver: John Doe

Extras

The original content of chunk concepts

Extras

Intuitive

ContentIntuitive ContentIntuitive Content

Original

Content

Original

Content

Original

Content

(a) Original content is a

proper subset of

intuitive content

(b) Original content is

entirely distinct from

intuitive content

(c) Part of original

content is a proper

subset of intuitive

content

Pluralism about non-original content

Extras

Unrestricted

Total

Content

Intuitive

Content

Decision

Theory

Content

Psychological

Content

Fodor argues against conceptual role semantics by arguing that there’s no principled way to distinguish content-endowing connections from non-content-endowing connections.

This may still be a problem for conceptual role semantics.

But it isn’t a problem for us.

Smelly doesn’t come as a further cashing out of bachelor.

Analytic/synthetic distinction(s)

Extras

bachelor

unmarried smelly

Extras

Example

George

college student

belief …modal realism

possible worlds


college learning

Extras

What’s really going on? (Koralus)

Mental model

think

Extras

Do they match up?

Mental model

think

[ ]total

Hard to specify

Fleeting

We don’t have words for it (all our content-related terms refer to intuitive contents).

Extras

What is original content anyway?

Bad candidate:

Full-fledged external world properties, relations, and objects

These things are too determinate

Content might not be rich enough to determinately pick out properties etc. prior to unpacking.

Better candidate:

Modifications of the subject

This would be a type of adverbialism

Extras

What is original content anyway?

Act-object views:

Representation consists in a relation between a subject and something else (objects, property instances, universals, events, etc.).

Adverbialism:

Representation does not consist in a relation; it is a monadic property.

Extras

Adverbialism

It’s like something to think thoughts.

But what it’s like does not correlate well with the thought’s intuitive content.

This might explain some of the disagreement over the phenomenology of thought.

Extras

One possibility: phenomenal character

Phenomenal character modifications are the relevant modifications for content.

The requisite correlation between phenomenal character and content holds in perception (Dretske 1995, Tye 1995, Jackson 2005).

Your phenomenal states are assessable for accuracy (Siewert 1998).

Extras

One possibility: phenomenal character

When you have enough phenomenal character, you get something with truth conditions.

Thought has some phenomenal character. Unpacking yields more… and more… and more…

So maybe this isn’t so crazy.

The point

Extras

concepts and-the-varieties-of-content

Documents

mental content

efficient concept view10

efficient concept view13

efficient concept view11

efficient concept view22

total content

derived content

intuitive contentthe