Conference Report Singapore, 12-14 April 2016

2

© 2016 UNDP Global Centre for Public Service Excellence

#08-01, Block A, 29 Heng Mui Keng Terrace, 119620, Singapore

www.undp.org/publicservice

UNDP partners with people at all levels of society to help

build nations that can withstand crisis, and drive and

sustain the kind of growth that improves the quality of life

for everyone. On the ground in more than 170 countries

and territories, we offer global perspective and local insight

to help empower lives and build resilient nations.

The Global Centre for Public Service Excellence is UNDP’s

catalyst for new thinking, strategy and action in the area

of public service, promoting innovation, evidence, and

collaboration.

Disclaimer

The views expressed in this publication are those of the

author and do not necessarily represent those of the United

Nations, including UNDP, or the UN Member States.

3

Executive Summary

From 12 – 14 April 2016, the UNDP Global Centre for Public Service Excellence (GCPSE)

convened a Conference on Political Settlements and Public Service Performance at its

premises in Singapore. The Conference aims were to: clarify the evidence of the impact of

political settlements in non-crisis settings on public service; analyse the complex politics of

change; and identify opportunities to “work with the grain” to develop practical solutions

for improving public service performance for the delivery of the 2030 Agenda.

The conference brought together over 70 internationally renowned development thinkers

and practitioners with a rich and deep understanding of ‘politics’ in a specific country

context. This interaction between ‘theory’ and ‘practice’ was critical to achieving the

conference objectives.

The conference was organised by GCPSE with the support of Development Leadership

Program (DLP) and the Centre for Public Impact (CPI).

4

Conclusions

This pioneering event featured speakers of international renown, who are on the frontlines

of transformational thought and practice about how development ‘really happens’. Their

research on the political roots of public sector performance has practical implications of

importance for everyone concerned about strengthening state capacity to deliver on an

increasingly complex development agenda, including the SDGs. After three days of animated

discussions and robust debate, the Conference arrived at the following conclusions:

Political settlements, power and politics influence public service performance. These

factors create different institutional environments in which public service

organisations, although structurally similar, behave and perform in significantly

different ways. A public service cannot be separated from the political settlement it

operates in, although there is a temptation in similar discourses to conflate government

and public services.

This impact is felt across all layers and activities of a public service, from mandates,

recruitment policies to policy pathways. Much of this impact is appraised in normative

terms (deviating or adhering to ‘good practice’) instead of being understood as stages

of institutional development in a particular political (and economic) constellation.

There is an urgent need for clear methodologies (and agreement on key concepts) about

how to study (or uncover) political settlements, its horizontal (among elites) and

vertical (among elites and constituencies) dimensions, the relationship between formal

and informal institutions, and especially its impact on institutional development.

There is an equally urgent need for a conceptual framework to analyse public service

systems in terms of different political settlements, as extensions of the political

government, as autonomous organisations and as ideational structures with their own

political interests and incentives, and the impact these have on organisational

development and performance.

An area of special interest arising from the conference was, given a particular political

settlement, the role of the public service to mediate between the economic and political

elites on the one hand and citizens on the other hand.

It is possible to broadly categorise the relationship between political settlements and

institutional environments, and therefore to identify context-sensitive and politically

smart solutions that will promote SDG delivery.

In most development contexts, incremental approaches, political and policy

entrepreneurship and islands of excellence, all of which integrate ‘political’ dimensions,

would work better than standard ‘good practice’ or wholesale reform approaches.

It is important to differentiate between ‘inclusive processes’ and inclusive outcomes’,

although the difference might be, to a certain extent, artificial. A normative agenda can

sometimes complicate the situation further.

5

Follow-up

The conference participants asked GCPSE and experts

to contribute to disseminate and mainstream this

message in the development dialogue, to explore

further implications and to support practitioners with

the practicalities of public service organisations

‘working with the grain’ under different political

settlements.

Concretely, GCPSE will:

launch a Joint Fundraising Proposal (GCPSE-SIGOB Facility) for Advisory and Technical

Support Services for Public Service Excellence.

Together with Graduate School of Development Policy and Practice of the University of

Cape Town, South Africa, and other experts, the Centre will develop and offer Solution

Labs - mixed learning and solution events - on how to ‘work with the political grain’.

GCPSE will also work on a Strategy Workshop offer for UN Country Teams (UNCT) that

are about to embark on their UNDAFs to facilitate innovation and “new thinking” –

incorporating political settlements/thinking and working politically (TWP),

foresight/alternative futures and reform moments/islands of excellence.

6

Introduction

The public service, a key state organisation to project power, implement political priorities

and accumulate governing capacity, is central to the political settlement i on which

development depends - but rarely viewed in that light.

No fewer than 10 of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals require effective public

institutions. Without a capable public service, the vision of the 2030 Agenda will be out of

reach for a substantial number of people. Governments will look for new opportunities to

improve public service performance. Previous reform efforts have been unsatisfactory. The

results of 30+ years of technical fixes and ‘good practice’ models have been underwhelming.

Future efforts to strengthen institutional capacity for SDG implementation should

incorporate the crucial lesson learned: that power and politics have a huge impact on the

ability and desire of public service systems to deliver on inclusive development.

This impact goes far beyond the occasional or systematic meddling of politicians in

bureaucratic affairs. Bureaucracies do not exclusively, and often not predominantly, exist

for the sake of public welfare and the provision of social goods. Governments in the real

world do not neatly divide in political and technocratic spheres of influence; in any political

reality, the lines are blurred and messy, and politicians and bureaucrats constantly bump

into each other in the grey zones of governance. A bureaucracy is by its very nature invested

with power, susceptible to political contestation and a political actor with vested interests

of its own. Crisp moral categories are of little use in dealing with this situation: ‘power’ and

‘politics’ are not necessarily evil forces that undermine public sector performance, while

technical competence is not the sole basis of ‘capability’.

The public service, a key state organisation to project power, implement political priorities

and accumulate governing capacity, is central to the political settlement 1 on which

development depends - but rarely viewed in that light. For the purpose of this event,

“Political settlements are the expression of a common understanding, usually forged

between elites, about how power is organised and exercised. They include formal

institutions for political and economic relations… But they also include informal, often

unarticulated agreements that underpin a political system….”2 The event focuses on non-

crisis contexts.

The technical jargon of public sector reform – HRM policies such as recruitment, promotion,

and performance management; policies aimed to improve accountability, transparency and

responsiveness; and, more recently, the ‘science of delivery’ and the policy cycle – hides a

complex political reality. For example, the staffing of a civil service is not solely determined

by ‘meritocratic’ arguments: a political settlement, and the resulting social and political

peace, might partly depend on equal representation of ethnic groups in government

1 In the current development debate, the structure of ‘power’ and ‘politics’ is captured by the concept of ‘political settlements’. There are multiple definitions of this concept, with contestation and uncertainty over context (post-conflict vs. stable), actors (exclusively elites vs. elites, institutions and society) and temporality (one-off vs. on-going). Implicit in these multiple definitions is a different understanding and capacity to spot and explain dynamics and opportunities for change. 2 Edwards Laws and Adrian Leftwich, Political Settlements, DLP Concept Brief 01 October 2014

7

institutions, access to ‘safe’ government jobs, or opening up government employment to

previously excluded social groups. In these circumstances, an insistence of ‘meritocracy’ to

improve performance will not survive the political calculus or could destabilise a fragile

political balance of power.

Disillusioned with the slow pace of progress, if any, of work on the structural dimensions of

public management systems, and the potential impact this might have on performance,

practitioners have increasingly turned to those dimensions where performance can actually

be measured: delivery. But politics also plays a crucial role in the not so straight forward

‘science of delivery’. The process of translation of broad strategic decisions in concrete

policies, for example, involves many political choices. Which policies are put forward? Who

stands to benefit most from these policies? Will they be sufficiently funded? How do they

compete with other policies over scarce resources? Which implementation mechanisms

work best in which circumstances? Are all the key people on board to provide leadership?

Is a centrally located delivery unit the solution to all delivery woes or does that disturb a

fragile balance of power among the different agencies involved?

Armed with a better understanding of the ‘politics’ of public service performance,

governments, development practitioners and development thinkers can start to explore,

prototype and implement feasible activities that will strengthen the performance of public

management systems for SDG implementation. It should be possible to identify politically

feasible, expedient or beneficial entry points for structural reforms (while avoiding

politically fraught choices). One can also start to identify and test ‘politically informed’

activities, such as coalition building, policy entrepreneurship, etc.

The event addressed the following issues:

a deeper understanding of how the political settlement impacts the performance of

public service

an identification of the political dimensions of crucial areas of public service

performance (and a way to ‘measure’ the relative impact of politics on these areas in

different political settlements)

clarification of concrete opportunities and activities that, while in keeping with,

leverage ‘politics’.

To find ‘what works’ and let independent evidence speak requires examining political

realities – without partisan or ideological posturing.

8

Opening Session

Max Everest-Phillips, Director of GCPSE, welcomed the audience to the conference. In his

speech, Max drew attention to the fact that some of the topics that would be discussed

remain sensitive in some quarters; the proverbial elephants in the room. He listed six

sensitive topics that would be discussed: a re-evaluation of ‘politics’ in development; the

conceptualization of ‘political settlements’; the centrality of an ‘effective public service to

development outcomes’; an explicit discussion of the question ‘why so many public service

reform fail’; the acceptance of ‘how the broader political settlement have an impact on

political and administrative leadership pacts’ and the realization that ‘failure is indeed

endemic in public service reform’. At its core, the problem lies not in unsuccessful public sector

reform as such but the daily politics and the deep, underlying political settlement that, may be

either deliberately or accidentally weakening the public service. Nevertheless a demoralized,

disillusioned and disempowered public service is not going to deliver the SDGs.

Session 1: On Theory of Political Settlements & Impact on the Nature of Public Service

Organisations

Magdy Martinez-Soliman, UN Assistant

Secretary-General, UNDP Assistant Administrator

and Director Bureau for Policy & Programme

Support (BPPS), opened the first day of

presentations. In his Key Address, Magdy firmly

framed the discussion in terms of implementation

of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). He

reiterated the imperative of Agenda 2030,

emphasized the importance of a well-performing

public service for attaining the SDGs and exhorted

the conference to come up with practical solutions

to make ‘the system work’ for an equitable and

sustainable future. Public Service Performance is, ultimately, a measure of political leadership,

wisdom of budget investments, and a mirror in which each society can compare itself with its

neighbours and with its past. Reasonable political settlements need to include consensus on

vision, a model of activist developmental State that opens avenues to vibrant private initiative,

and a stellar performance of a public service committed to sustainable development.

Brian Levy, Academic Director of the Graduate School for Development Policy and Practice

at the University of Cape Town and the author of the book Working with the Grain:

Integrating Governance and Growth in Development Strategies, gave the Keynote

Presentation. He presented a conceptual framework that categorized in a 2x2 typology how

different political settlements combined with institutional arrangements, and

demonstrated persuasively, with country examples, how some of the key assumptions of

development partners with regards to institutional performance are wrong.

The ‘good governance’ approach conjectures that a good dose of political will is sufficient to

make the basic systemic relations between state, providers and citizens, supposedly similar

everywhere, work for inclusive development. Brian’s conceptual framework shows that

different political settlements create radically different systemic relationships between

9

state, providers and citizens. For example, in his category characterized by ‘personalized

competition’, to which a substantial number of developing countries belong, these systemic

relationships are marked by broken hierarchies, public officials with high discretion,

multiple contending factions and civic pressures, NGOs and lobbying.

When looking to improve public service

performances for inclusive development

under these ‘political’ conditions, it might be

more productive to approach ‘delivery

problems’ not in terms of technical

(organizational) structures, but by analysing

the attitude and interests of multiple

principals and stakeholders involved

(informed by their position and role in the

political settlement) and identifying reform

and blocking coalitions, and possible islands

of effectiveness.

Verena Fritz, Senior Public Sector Specialist at the World Bank, explored the relationship

between political settlements and failed public sector reform and, while emphasizing that

the correlation between political constellations and dynamics and performance is far from

straightforward and that sound technical advice remains important, she concluded that the

available evidence showed that ‘politics’ should be integrated in reform.

In her extremely rich presentation, Verena gave interesting evidence that questioned some

of the more ingrained assumptions with regards to the relationship between economic

growth, good governance and institutional development. For example, there are many

public administration strengthening plans but little progress on government effectiveness,

including in high non-OECD countries. Equally, we cannot automatically assume that

economic growth will lead to better public service; there is only a limited correlation

between levels of GDP and public sector performance. Regime type also does not make a

significant difference on performance.

When looking for the impact of political settlements, or more broadly, political

constellations and dynamics, on public sector performance, one has to look beyond crude

categories like ‘regime type’ or the existence of ‘programmatic parties’. Although political

and technical dynamics might play out differently across countries and time periods, there

are some common patterns. For example, the available evidence shows that legitimacy and

‘looking good’ are key political drivers for governments to initiate and sustain public service

reform, while the much vaunted ‘development state’ with a clear ‘development vision’ is

much less prevalent.

10

Sometimes reforms go directly against the ‘logic’ of the prevailing political settlements, for

example when efforts to introduce meritocratic recruitment is seen to undermine

patronage and loyalty rewards on which the political settlement is based, or when technical

efforts to improve procurement practices endanger illicit forms of financing electoral

reform. Sometimes the ingrained political settlement simply turns the reforms on their

head: anti-corruption campaigns unleashed on political opponents, performance bonuses

allocated on the basis of loyalty, etc. Privatizations might offer opportunities to distribute

assets among ‘friends’, while greater ‘managerial control’ (a New Public Management

favourite) opens up possibilities for ‘leakage’. Politically harmless reforms, on the other

hand, are either abandoned or have little impact.

11

Session 2: On Politics and Public Service Performance

Michael Woolcock, Lead Social Development Specialist in the World Bank's Development

Research Group, kicked off Session 2 with his presentation Engaging the ‘everyday state’.

Like the speakers before him, Michael uncovered some of the key assumptions driving

development activities. Too often, in his experience, development outcomes are reduced to

‘sound policy + effective implementation’. However, Michael persuasively argued that the

gap between the capacity to design beautiful policies and actually implement them is wide

and growing.

Efforts to address this imbalance between ambitions and capacity are historically naïve and

pointlessly uniform. For example, public education in today’s OECD countries builds on

consolidated and highly variable pre-existing systems (‘functional literacy’). ‘Good practice’

de facto denies developing countries this rich institutional diversity and perpetuates

‘capacity traps’ from which they cannot escape. ‘Isomorphic mimicry’, i.e. looking like an

effective state, keeps the aid flowing but changes little.

It is about to get worse. State capacity in historically developing countries is stagnating or

even declining (with a few notables exceptions), due to the tyranny of ‘good practice’, the

practice of ‘isomorphic mimicry’ and, crucially, the depletion of ‘low-hanging development

fruits’. The switch from quantity (e.g. number of school buildings, teachers trained, kids in

school) to quality (e.g. curriculum and pedagogy relevant to 21st century, learning

experiences integrated with other social welfare programs) will be tough. The complexity

of quality development outcomes cannot be simply engineered by technocratic approaches.

Michael presented the Problem-Driven

Iterative Adaptation (PDIA) approach as a

possible solution. PDIA looks for local

solutions for local problems; pushes local

‘positive deviance’ for real problems;

propagates the virtuous cycle of try-learn-

iterate-adapt, and; scales learning through

diffusion. The emphasis on ‘positive

deviance’ puts a premium on more granular

data, for example at sub-national or sub-

sectoral level.

Alina Rocha Menocal, Senior Research Fellow at DLP, drew the participants’ attention to

‘inclusion’, a crucial aspect of Agenda 2030, and the challenges ahead to make a public sector

work for inclusive development in an ‘exclusive’ political settlement. Political settlements

have to be understood as continuous, evolving and dynamic processes, shaped almost every

day by countless transactions, not just between elites (horizontal) but also between elites

and their broader constituencies (vertical). Both processes have a significant impact on the

public service.

Alina illustrated her point with the comparative example of Costa Rica and Guatemala,

countries which shared many structural characteristics and political and socio-economic

development in the 1950s but which ended up in sharply different situations because of

12

political settlement dynamics. In Costa Rica, where elite divisions combined with popular

demand led to the opening up of the political settlement and the establishment of a

progressive pro-reform coalition committed to democracy and broad-based development,

democracy took root. Interestingly, the 1949 Constitution, the blueprint of the new political

settlement, devolved important policy responsibilities to autonomous bureaucratic entities.

In Guatemala, on the other hand, a military regime

in the same period stamped down on popular

demands for democracy and social reform, and

enabled the landowners (the economic elite) to

dominate the political space. They tended to see

the state as their personalized source of

enrichment – including the politicization and use

and abuse of the public sector – and certainly not

for social welfare provision. Even after the post-

conflict transition in the 1990s, this underlying

political settlement is subverting many formal

arrangements.

Alina drew a sharp distinction between ‘inclusive processes’ (how decisions are made and

who is involved) and ‘inclusive outcomes’ (a state’s broad or narrow responsiveness to

different social priorities). Her statement that ‘a state can be inclusive without being

broadly responsive (e.g. Lebanon) and it can be also be broadly responsive without being

inclusive (e.g. Rwanda, Ethiopia and Singapore)’, goes to the heart of many ‘good

governance’ discussions and was the subject of much subsequent discussion and soul

searching.

Jairo Acuna-Alfaro, Policy Advisor of UNDP Responsive and Accountable Institutions

Team, highlighted three key functions of political settlements, viz. distribution of power and

resources; regulation of monopoly of violence and taxation-;, and fears and favours in the

public sector. Political settlements inevitably entail trade-offs, and so do development

partners’ efforts to modify it.

The majority of developing countries find themselves in ‘limited access orders’.

Development assistance to institution building (for inclusive and equitable development)

cannot be business as usual. It requires more realistic priorities and a better sequencing of

interventions that are sensitive to the evolving dynamics of the political settlements, the

disposition of implementers, and the balance between formal and informal processes.

Governance ‘deficiencies’ have as much a political as a technical origin.

Jairo used the two examples of Costa Rica and El Salvador to illustrate the importance of

‘critical junctures’ at which the scope for possible action widens significantly (and

conversely, the futility of trying to do something ‘transformational’ outside these critical

junctures.) In this sense, ‘cleavages’ or ‘crisis’ are opportunities (although constrained by

antecedent conditions) which lead to a ‘turning point’ (the selection of a particular option –

democracy in the case of Costa Rica, political repression in El Salvador). If (and that is a big

‘if’) the core attributes of the selected option are stable enough the system will solidify.

13

The moderator of Session 2, Thomas Parks, Governance & Fragility Specialist of Dept. Of

Foreign Affairs & Trade, Australia, in his closing remarks focused on the tension between a

normative and a ‘delivery’ agenda (closely related to Alina’s point about the apparent

contradiction that ‘exclusive processes’ can still provide ‘inclusive outcomes’) and asked the

audience to carefully consider what to work on.

14

Session 3a: Country Cases on Political Settlements and Efforts to Improve Public

Sector Performance

Michelle Gyles-McDonnough, UN Resident Coordinator and UNDP Resident

Representative Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei Darussalam, moderated the in-depth

discussion following the presentations of the country cases on Rwanda by Anastase

Shyaka, CEO of Rwanda Governance Board, and on Papua New Guinea by John Ma’o Kali,

Secretary of the Dept. of Personnel Management.

Anastase presented the audience with the bleak outlines of the situation in Rwanda after

the Genocide in the 1990s: over a million people massacred, more than five million refugees

in the country and region, severe disruption of the fabric of society, devastated economy

and collapsed public institutions. The response was guided by a set of imperatives: the unity

of Rwandans, Accountability and Think Big.

Key drivers were the resilience of Rwandans, home grown

solutions and transformational leadership. Public service

innovations such as IMIHIGO (performance contracts), the

National Leadership Retreat and the importance of Citizen Report

Cards in both have made a major contribution to the real and

steady transformation in the country. The case of Rwanda

demonstrated how important an inclusive and shared sense of

purpose, inherent to the political settlement (elements of which

are still part of an on-going discussion with the wider

development community), is key to the performance of the public

service.

In the case of Papua New Guinea, John devoted his whole working

life to the performance of the Papua New Guinea Public Service,

from Graduate Cadet in 1976 to Departmental Head. He brought

some of his experience with the interaction between the political

system and the civil service to bear during his presentation on

Papua New Guinea. The Papua New Guinea is currently going

through a range of reforms, as enshrined in the new 2014 Public

Services (Management) Act, and amendments to the Organic Law

on Provincial Governments. The civil service strives hard to

adhere to the normative ‘good practice’ agenda, but is

encountering political challenges rooted in historical

developments.

The Development Research Centre in China was represented by Zhang Hongfei. Hongfei

was candid in his characterisation of public sector reforms in China as state-led and

experimental.

15

Session 3b: Country Cases on Political Settlements and Efforts to Improve Public

Sector Performance

In the afternoon of the second day, the tables were turned and the Conference audience

became active participants. People were divided into small working groups (around 10

members each, five groups in total) and were asked to select one or two country examples

to discuss in more detail. Brian Levy’s 2*2 typology provided the navigational tools to make

sense of the main characteristics of the current political settlement in the country under

consideration and to identify possible clues to vexing problems or promising opportunities

in public service performance.

The ensuing discussions were rich and complex. The countries discussed in depth were

Egypt, Indonesia, Myanmar and Vietnam. Although it was difficult to neatly fit each country

in the theoretical categories – as Brian Levy had already pointed out during his short

presentation - some clear patterns emerged. For example, Egypt is currently reverting to

the political order pre-dating the Arab Spring; the polity is dominant and ruled by an

autocratic strong man, while the institutions – the rules of the game – are discretionary, i.e.

centred around personalized deal making. The core of the bureaucracy – part and parcel of

what is often called the ‘Deep State’ of Egypt - has deeply entrenched interests in this regime,

while it also plays an important role in sustaining it. Not coincidentally, the efforts by the

previous regime of the Muslim

Brotherhood to appoint an increasing

number of its own people in the public

service contributed significantly to its

eventual disposal by the military. As in

many other country cases, in as far as the

political order is either the main obstacle

or the most promising opportunity for

inclusive development, in Egypt it is very

difficult, if not impossible, to isolate

institutional development of the public

service from the purpose of the political

settlement.

Vietnam, on the other hand, provided an example of a country where a dominant political

order combines with institutions that rely on the impersonal applications of the rule of law

(a combination referred to as ‘rule-by-law’). Vietnam is a prime example of a country where

a ‘exclusive decision making process’ provides ‘inclusive outcomes’ (as discussed by Alina

Rocha Menocal) and where, perhaps, development practitioners are more inclined to

temporarily shelf the ‘normative’ agenda and exploit the many opportunities for ‘delivery’

of development outcomes (as mentioned by Tom Parks). The success of ‘development

states’ like Vietnam seems to subvert some of the key principles of the ‘good governance’

agenda, especially the need for representative institutions. The fact that the public service,

which plays a key role in the delivery of inclusive development outcomes in Vietnam, is open

to receive and adapt to public feedback, is another indication of its complex role in the

political settlement.

16

According to the discussants, Indonesia was a clear example of Country Type #3, in which

politics were fiercely competitive but the rules of the games, including the behaviour of

institutions, was heavily personalized and based upon personal deal-making. They

recognized many of the characteristics given in Levy’s typology. The hierarchy between the

political government and public service is broken. Public officials have a high level of

discretion which is all too often used to further their own (individual or organizational)

interests. Citizens, including economic and social elites, use a multitude of strategies to

make the government and public service responsive to their needs. In this seemingly chaotic

constellation – in which many late developing countries find themselves – ‘development’ is

just one of the many objectives of the key players and institutions involved, including the

public service. Systematic efforts to make the system work (primarily) for development face

an uphill battle.

The last country example which was discussed extensively was Myanmar. The inconclusive

discussions reflected the exceptionally fluid situation in the country. For example, it was

obvious that Myanmar has just moved out of Country Type #1 and was no longer an

autocratic polity. It was less obvious whether, under the old regime, the rules of the games

and the institutions were personal

or impersonal. The public service,

outwardly at least, seemed

professional and well-disciplined;

whether it was experienced as

such by the citizens is another

matter. The big question looming

over Myanmar, however, is

towards which box of Levy’s

typology it is moving, and what the

consequences for public service

performance, and the attainment

of development outcomes, would

be. Some discussants were

optimistic and were convinced

that Myanmar made steady

progress towards the antechamber of a full blown liberal democracy, Country Type #4 (with

open competition for political power and impersonal rules of the game). Others were less

optimistic. One discussant saw ominous signs in the behaviour of the leader of the current

government and half expected a move toward Type #4 (dominant and rule of law). Others

were afraid that Type #2 (competitive but personalized) was to be the next station.

Everybody agreed that Myanmar was a special case, in which an old political settlement had

just been discarded and a new one still had to emerge fully. It would be extremely

interesting to see how all of this would impact the bureaucracy and, not unimportantly, how

the bureaucracy, in many ways a relic from the old regime/political settlement, would

respond to the new situation.

17

Session 4: Transforming Big Ideas into Everyday Solutions – Reform Entrepreneurs

In Session 4, a high-level panel reflected upon some of the core ideas discussed. Brian Levy

reflected on the tension between the ‘safe conversation’ (about the things we have been

doing all the time, the repetition of the familiar) and the ‘frontier conversation’ (about the

things that are tricky, full with dilemma’s etc.) It was also obvious that the distinction

between engaging the political settlement as such and working with the public service in

any given political context is to a degree artificial; ‘processes’ and ‘outcomes’ are often

intertwined. Brian had observed four separate conversations. The first was related to

country contexts as found in Egypt and Ethiopia. In these circumstances, development

partners have little choice but to accept the political settlement as a given and try to ‘work

with the grain’. The social sector, in particular, offers interesting opportunities in these

situations. The second discourse centred on country contexts as exemplified by Vietnam:

the ‘sweet spot job’. The regime might not be very democratic, but it is stable, well-

functioning and very development oriented. Development partners can add a lot of value in

terms of development outcomes. The third narrative is probably the least explored but may

be the most common. In countries like

Indonesia and Papua New Guinea,

development partners are outside their

comfort zone and struggling to achieve clear

development objectives. Lastly, the

Myanmar conversation is about a country

transitioning from one political order to

another, but the uncertainty over which

creates huge dilemmas. The total of these

conversations revealed a hunkering to the

familiar but also a willingness to engage with

the messiness.

Michelle Gyles-McDonnough addressed

the question on how to operate in a given

political settlement from the perspective of

a UNDP Resident Representative. Her main

message was: act smart. Acting smart is not

easy and can be dangerous; political

missteps can ultimately result in expulsion.

In many middle income countries, further

progress often requires a new or at least

renegotiated political settlement and

therefore a need to stay engaged. This,

however, is still a difficult conversation with

other development partners, especially

donors, although the universality of the SDGs offers some recognition of this need. The

normative framework of development can be rather problematic and progress is not at all

straightforward in individual countries. Acting smart is greatly enhanced by being physical

present in a country, but the current funding situation is challenging its sustainability.

Acting smart also demands an answer to some important questions: how do we value and

evaluate political entrepreneurship? How is it reflected in our risk system? What

18

organizational support systems are available? How do we equip people to walk through

these spaces? The ‘best practice’ approach is persistent; reporting and accountability

systems of the organisation and donors expect ‘Denmark’ and have little room or patience

for new thinking or hard evidence of the contrary. Lastly, organisations like UNDP need the

safe space provided by GCPSE to probe these issues and to grapple with possible solutions.

Gambhir Bhatta (Technical Advisor Asian Development Bank) gave the perspective of the

ADB on the issues discussed. ABD does not have the mandate to involve itself in politics.

Before deciding on a specific loan, the Board requires a political economy analysis to gauge

the risks, but it draws a very clear distinction

between economic policies and politics. ADB prefers

to outsource ‘good governance’ activities to

multilateral organisations like UNDP or bilateral

organisations like DfID. This intervention led to some

discussion with the audience. One participant

pointedly drew attention to the fact that in peace

negotiations funding is a key element of any political

settlement. Another questioned the feasibility of

distinguishing between ‘politics’ and ‘economics

policies’.

Adrian Brown (Centre for Public Impact) was struck

by the sheer complexity and multi-dimensionality of

the problems development practitioners and their national partners were working on. He

reminded the audience that it shouldn’t remove itself too far from the real issues. Action

happens on the frontline and it is therefore important to bring the big conceptual discussion

back to a level where real impact can be achieved.

Maria Eugenia Boaz briefly presented the

work of UNDP Sistema de Gestion para la

Gobernabilidad (SIGOB). SIGOB has done

over 80 projects with President’s or Prime

Minister’s Offices, mainly in Latin America.

Their focus is on problem-driven and

process-oriented interventions. Maria

introduced a role play game developed by

SIGOB that mirrored daily practices of a

politician interacting with civil servants and

citizens.

Adrian Brown presented a newly developed

framework to identify problems hampering

delivery and to create more public impact

(i.e. the set of outcomes that governments achieve for their citizens). On the basis of an

extensive literature review (and hundreds of on-going case studies), CPI has identified three

key factors that influence public impact: policy, action and legitimacy. Each factor divides

into three sub-factors which can be further analysed. The main focus of the framework is to

get to effective delivery.

19

Conclusions

Political settlements, power and politics matter in public service performance. These

factors create different institutional environments in which public service

organisations, although structurally similar, behave and perform significantly different.

A public service cannot be separated from the political settlement it operates in,

although there is a temptation in similar discourses to conflate government and public

services.

This impact is felt across all layers and activities of a public service, from mandates,

recruitment policies to policy pathways. Much of this impact is appraised in normative

terms (deviating or adhering to ‘good practice’) instead of being understood as stages

of institutional development in a particular political (and economic) constellation.

There is an urgent need for clear methodologies (and agreement on key concepts) about

how to study (or uncover) political settlements, its horizontal (among elites) and

vertical (among elites and constituencies) dimensions, the relationship between formal

and informal institutions, and especially its impact on institutional development.

There is an equally urgent need for a conceptual framework to analyse public service

systems in terms of different political settlements, as extensions of the political

government, as autonomous organisations and as ideational structures with their own

political interests and incentives, and the impact these have on organisational

development and performance.

An area of special interest arising from the conference was, given a particular political

settlement, the role of the public service to mediate between the economic and political

elites on the one hand and citizens on the other hand.

It is possible to broadly categorise the relationship between political settlements and

institutional environments, and therefore to identify context-sensitive and politically

smart solutions that will promote SDG delivery.

In most development contexts, incremental approaches, political and policy

entrepreneurship and islands of excellence, all of which integrate ‘political’ dimensions,

would work better than standard ‘good practice’ or wholesale reform approaches.

It is important to differentiate between ‘inclusive processes’ and inclusive outcomes’,

although the difference might be, to a certain extent, artificial. A normative agenda can

sometimes complicate the situation further.

The conference participants asked GCPSE and experts to contribute to disseminate and

mainstream this message in the development dialogue, to explore further implications and

to support practitioners with the practicalities of ‘working with the grain’ of public service

organisations under different political settlements.

20

Concretely, GCPSE will:

launch a Joint Fundraising Proposal (GCPSE-SIGOB Facility) for Advisory and Technical

Support Services for Public Service Excellence

Together with Graduate School of Development Policy and Practice of the University of

Cape Town, South Africa, and other experts, the Centre will develop and offers Solution

Labs - mixed learning and solution events - on how to ‘work with the political grain’.

GCPSE will also work on a Strategy Workshop offer for UN Country Teams (UNCT) that

are about to embark on their UNDAFs to facilitate innovation and “new thinking” –

incorporating political settlements/TWP, foresight/alternative futures and reform

moments/islands of excellence.

i In the current development debate, the structure of ‘power’ and ‘politics’ is captured by the concept of ‘political settlements’. There are multiple definitions of this concept, with contestation and uncertainty over context (post-conflict vs. stable), actors (exclusively elites vs. elites, institutions and society) and temporality (one-off vs. on-going). Implicit in these multiple definitions is a different understanding and capacity to spot and explain dynamics and opportunities for change.