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i
Conflict, Environmental Security and Governance, Among
Pastoralists in Kenya: A Case Study of the Turkana Community
Kizito M.S Sabala
R/80/7079/2003
A thesis submitted in fulfillment of the requirements of the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.) in International Studies, Institute of
Diplomacy and International Studies, University of Nairobi
October 2013
ii
DECLARATION
This thesis is my original work and has not been submitted for a degree to any other
University.
……………………….. ……………………....
Kizito M.S. Sabala Date
Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies (IDIS)
University of Nairobi
This thesis has been submitted for examination with our approval as University
supervisors.
1. Prof. Makumi Mwagiru
Professor of Diplomacy and International Conflict Management
Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies (IDIS)
University of Nairobi
Date
…………………………………. …………………….......
2.Prof. Patricia Kameri-Mbote
Professor of Law
School of Law
University of Nairobi
Date
……………………………… …………………….......
3.Prof. Peter Wanyande
Department of Political Science and Public Administration,
University of Nairobi
Date
…… ……………………… …….…………………
iii
ABSTRACT
This study is about the links between conflict, environmental security and governance
among pastoralists in Kenya and particularly the Turkana community. It investigates the
theoretical and practical linkages between conflict, environmental security and governance,
interrogates the nature and form of the relationships among these variables including the
effect on pastoralists’ livelihood and establishes the significance the normative and
institutional frameworks on the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts and
environmental insecurity within the context of governance deficit. It is anchored within the
modified Thomas Homer-Dixon’s environmental scarcity theory. The theory which is
expressed in terms of reductions in the relative availability of renewable natural resources
aptly captures the issues under investigation. Furthermore, the model is flexible and therefore
permits the inco-operation of other important factors not in the original formulation. The
customization of the model within the pastoral setting allows for the analysis of the supply,
demand and structural factors which are central to the questions of conflicts, environmental
security and governance among the pastoral communities in Kenya.
The study used both primary and secondary data and employed the (Sources, Issues
Parties, Attitude/Feelings, Behaviour, Intervention and Outcome (SIPABIO) conflict analysis
model to examine the information. The content-relationship analytical framework allows the
utilization and integration of both qualitative and quantitative approaches into the study.
Moreover, it does not only allow for the systematic examination of the relevant issues but
also provides for the inclusion of factors missing in the original conceptualization to situate
the plight of the pastoralists within the broader framework of literature at the intersection of
intermittent conflicts, environmental stress, resource scarcities and of poor governance.
The study concludes that there are links between conflicts and environmental security
against the backdrop of governance deficit manifested in historical neglect, weak and limited
state presence worsened by the geographical continuity across international borders of
Uganda, South Sudan and Ethiopia. The form and nature of the link is double edged; conflict
elements can cause environmental security and verse versa. But more important the study
problematizes these factors within the context of the pastoral setting and identifies very
specific conflict causing factors and environmental insecurity generating factors. It refutes the
notion that conflicts among the pastoralists are mainly a consequence of the scarcity of
resources and environmental stress and instead acknowledges a combination of various
factors behind instability in pastoral areas but more fundamental identifies governance deficit
as the missing gap. Furthermore, the study does not only affirm the theoretical prepositions to
the environmental conflict thesis and scarcity driven explanations of violent conflict fostered
by environmental conditions, but also notes that conventional and traditional institutional and
legislative frameworks for conflict prevention, management resolution related to resources
are important considerations.
These factors are closely intertwined, very complicated and combine in a very
complex and crucial way to shape and influence the livelihood of the pastoralists. The
solution to the perennial conflicts and environmental insecurity lies largely in the promotion
of good governance that will ensure effective institutional, normative, policy and
administrative frameworks for sustainable exploitation, utilization and management of the
resources (water pasture) including security within the pastoral areas and not in providing
them abundantly and cannot be divorced from the contemporary regional and global issues in
time and place.
iv
ABBREVIATIONS
ACP-EC African Caribbean Pacific-European Commission
ADOL Action for Development of Local Communities
APFO Africa Peace Forum
ARS Alliance for Re-liberation of Somalia
ASALs Arid and Semi Arid Lands
AU African Union
AU-IBAR African Union/Inter African Bureau for Animal Resources
AUC African Union Commission
AMISOM African Union Mission in Somalia
BBC British Broadcasting Co-operation
BICC Bonn International Center for Conversion
CAR Central African Republic
CBOs Community Based Organizations
CBS Central Bureau of Statistics
CEWARN Conflict Early Warning and Early Response Mechanism
CHS Commission on Human Security
COMESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CPMR Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution
CSAS Center for South African Studies
DRC Democratic Republic of Congo
DC District Commissioner
DEC’s District Environment Committees
DO District Officer
DMO District Medical Officer
DPC District Peace Committee
DRC Democratic Republic of Congo
DSICs District Security Intelligence Committees
EAC East African Community
EAPCCO East Africa Police Chiefs Co-operation
EAANSA Eastern Africa Action Network on Small Arms
v
EMCA Environmental Management and Coordination Act
ENCOP Environment and Conflicts Project
FAO Food and Agricultural Organization
FESS Foundation for Environmental Security and Sustainability
FEWSNET Famine Early Warning System Network
GoK Government of Kenya
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GHA Greater Horn of Africa
GJLOS Governance, Justice, Law and Order Sector
HESAD Health and Social Affairs Desk
HIV/AIDS Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
ICC International Criminal Court
ICGL International Conference on the Great Lakes
ICPAT IGAD Capacity Building Programme against Terrorism
IDEA Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
IDPS Internally Displaced Persons
IDRC International Development Research Centre
IEBC Independent Elections and Boundaries Commission
IGAD Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
IGADD Intergovernmental Authority for Drought and Development
ISS Institute for Security Studies
ITDG Intermediate Technology Development Group
KANU Kenya National African Union
KANSA Kenya Action Network on Small Arms
KPF Kenya Pastoralism Forum
KPR Kenya Police Reserve
LRA Lords Resistance Army
LSD Lumpy Skin Disease
MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MRG Minority Rights Group International
NAP National Action Plan
NBSAP National BiodiversityStrategy and Action Plan
NES National Environment Secretariat
vi
NEMA National Environment Management Authority
NEC National Environment Council
NET National Environment Tribunal
NFPs National Focal Points
NPCS National Peace Commission Secretariat
NSC National Steering Committee
NEPAD New Partnership for Africa’s Development
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
NORAD Norwegian Agency for Development
NFD Northern Frontier District
OCPD Officer Commanding Police Division
OLF Oromo Liberation Front
ONLF Ogaden National Liberation Front
ODM Orange Democratic Movement
OAU Organization of African Unity
PAES Partnership for African Environmental Sustainability
PCC Public Complaints Committee
PEC’s Provincial Environment Committees
PPR Peste de petis ruminats
PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PPF Provincial Peace Fora
PSC Peace and Security Council
PTG Pastoral Thematic Group
QUNO United Nations Quakers Office
RECs Regional Economic Communities
RECSA Regional Centre on Small Arms
RVF Rift Valley Fever
SALW Small Arms and Light Weapons
SAPs Structural Adjustment Programmes
SAS Small Arms Survey
SNV Netherlands Development Organization
SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SRA Strategy for Revitalization of Agriculture
vii
SPLM/A Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/ Army
TOPADO Turkana Pastoralist Development Organization
UNAMID United Nations/ African Union Mission in Darfur
UNCEF United Nation Children Education Fund
UNDESA United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNDIR United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
UNEP United Nations Environment Programme
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNHCR United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
UNITA União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola or National
Union for the Total Liberation of Angola
UNPoA United Nations Programme of Action
UPEACE United Nations University for Peace
UNPOA United Nations Program of Action
US/A United States of America
USD United States Dollars
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VSF BelgiumVeterinaires Sans Frontiers- Belgium
viii
DEDICATION
I dedicate this thesis to my parents; Peter Sabala and Antonina Makuli despite limited
education they ensured that all their siblings ‘were well educated. They are indeed and will
remain a great source of inspiration for my writing and life.
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The journey to the completion of this thesis has been an academically enriching
experience professionally and socially challenging yet exciting. In the course of writing,
many people and two institutions supported me in various ways and I want to acknowledge
their contributions. I would like to thank everyone who has been part of my intellectual
community that molded me. I thank the Geneva-based Small Arms Survey (SAS) especially,
Dr Krause Keith, Dr Peter Batchelor and Eric Barman for granting me tuition fees that
enabled register for the course. In addition, I wish to express special gratitude to the United
Nations University for Peace (UPEACE), Africa Programme in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia for
awarding me research fellowship that supported the field research in Turkana. In particular I
want to appreciate Dr Aboud Cheboud (deceased may rest in peace), Dr Jean Butera and the
support staff at UPEACE, and M/s Njeri Karuru from the International Development
Research Centre (IDRC). The UPEACE training in research methodology improved and
shaped the approach that this study adopted.
Most specifically, I want to acknowledge with deep gratitude my three supervisors,
Professor Makumi Mwagiru, Professor Patricia Mbote, Prof Peter Wanyande and Dr Kindiki
Kithure (initial stages) for the invaluable guidance, support, brilliant comments, advice,
encouragement and time given for steering the entire study right from scratch to the final
product. I have benefited a lot from the rich knowledge at their disposal. Appreciation also
goes to Dr Josephine Odera for identifying the potential in me, inspiring and encouraging me
to register for the program. She continued to offer valuable advice, comments and
encouragement throughout the study period. Other people who have contributed to this
journey include Prof Gilbert Khadiagala, Dr Katumanga Musambayi and Ambassador
Bethuel Kiplagat. To my research assistants Mr Michael Kopolot, Mr Chris Ekurudi, Mr
Jackson Kiyonga in Turkana, M/s Christine Baari at NEMA, Mr Lazarus Kubasu in Nakuru,
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Mr. Vincent Chibini of Strathmore University Library, and Mr. Sam Aguyo they all were
very useful. Credit also goes to all the respondents and members of the focal group
discussions whose contributions were enriching.
To my spouse Doris and children Gloria, Camelline, Constance, Gonzaga, and
Floribert for bearing with my long absence from the house and silence as I burned the mid-
night oil. They have all been lovely and above all inspiring. Final appreciation goes to my
sisters, Petronilla, Edlequinn, Genevieve and Emily for their prayers. However, despite the
valuable contributions of many people to this dissertation, I bear the full responsibility for
any errors and omissions contained therein.
To all I say THANK you and GOD bless
xi
TABLE OF CONTENTS
DECLARATION .................................................................................................................................... ii
ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................................................... iii
ABBREVIATIONS ............................................................................................................................... iv
DEDICATION ..................................................................................................................................... viii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ................................................................................................................... ix
Chapter One ............................................................................................................................................ 1
Introduction to the Study ........................................................................................................................ 1
1.1 Background to the Study ............................................................................................................... 1
1.1.1 An Overview of the Pastoralists Globally and in the IGAD Region ..................................... 3
1.1.2 Turkana Community as a Case Study .................................................................................... 5
1.1.3 Turkana within the Context of International Relations .......................................................... 8
1.2 Statement of the Research Problem ............................................................................................ 12
1.3 Study Objectives ......................................................................................................................... 13
1.4 Research Questions ..................................................................................................................... 13
1.5 Study Hypotheses ........................................................................................................................ 14
1.6 The Scope of the Study and Limitations ..................................................................................... 14
1.7 Justification and Significance of the Study ................................................................................. 16
1.7.1 Academic Justification ......................................................................................................... 16
1.7.2 Policy Justifications ............................................................................................................. 20
1.8 Conceptual and Operational Definition of Environmental Security and Governance ................ 20
1.8.1 Environmental Security ........................................................................................................ 21
1.8.2 Governance .......................................................................................................................... 23
1.9 Study Methodology ..................................................................................................................... 24
1.9.1 Approach to the Study ............................................................................................................. 24
1.9.2 Sources and Data Collection ................................................................................................ 26
1.9.3 Structure of the Study .......................................................................................................... 31
Chapter Two.......................................................................................................................................... 34
Issues in Conflict, Environmental Security and Governance ................................................................ 34
xii
2.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 34
2.2 Discourses on Conflict among Pastoralists ................................................................................. 34
2.3 Discourses on Environmental Security ....................................................................................... 44
2.4 Discourses on Governance .......................................................................................................... 48
2.5 Discourses on the links between Conflict and Environmental Security ..................................... 51
2.6 The Interface between Conflict, Environmental Security and Governance ................................ 64
2.7. Theoretical Framework .............................................................................................................. 68
Chapter Three........................................................................................................................................ 72
The Policy Context: The Normative and Institutional Frameworks on Conflict and Environmental
Security in Kenya .................................................................................................................................. 72
3.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 72
3.2 Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (CPMR) Frameworks in Kenya .................. 72
3.2.2 The Legal Framework on Small Arms in Kenya-The Kenya Firearms Act ........................ 87
3.2.3 Institutional Framework on Peace Building and Conflict Resolution .................................. 94
3.3 Frameworks on Environment Security in Kenya ...................................................................... 110
3.3.1 Policy and Legal Framework on Environment Security .................................................... 113
3.3.2 Institutional Frameworks on Environment Security .......................................................... 116
Chapter Four ....................................................................................................................................... 122
Conflict, Environmental Security and Governance among the Turkana Community in Kenya ..... 122
4.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 122
4.2 Conflicts and Human Security among the Turkana Community .............................................. 123
4.2.1 Food Security ..................................................................................................................... 126
4.2.2 Economic and Social Security ........................................................................................... 128
4.2.3 Health Security ................................................................................................................... 130
4.2.4 Physical Security/Personal Security in Turkana ................................................................ 133
4.2.5 Community Security .......................................................................................................... 135
4.3 The State of Small Arms among the Turkana Community ....................................................... 139
4.3.1 Stockpile, Effects and Transfers ........................................................................................ 139
4.4 Challenges, Interventions and Opportunities for CPMR in Turkana ........................................ 147
4.4.1 Interventions ...................................................................................................................... 148
xiii
4.4.2 Opportunities for Peace in Turkana ................................................................................... 149
4.4.3 Factors Affecting Environmental Security in Turkana ...................................................... 150
Chapter Five ........................................................................................................................................ 154
Conflict, Environmental Security and Governance, among the Pastoral Communities in Kenya: A
Critique ........................................................................................................................................... 154
5.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 154
5.2 Conflict and Environmental Security among Pastoral Communities in Kenya ........................ 155
5.3 Critical Issues Emerging from the Study .................................................................................. 169
5.3.1 Historical Injustices and Governance Issues ...................................................................... 170
5.3.2 Regional Political and Security Environment .................................................................... 179
5.3.3 The Traditional Justice System verses the Conventional Judicial System ......................... 182
5.3.4 Ecology and Climatic Conditions ...................................................................................... 185
5.3.5 Policy Issues ....................................................................................................................... 187
Chapter Six.......................................................................................................................................... 197
Summary, Conclusion, and Recommendations .................................................................................. 197
6.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 197
6.2 Summary ................................................................................................................................... 198
6.3 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 201
6.4 Recommendations ..................................................................................................................... 204
6.4.1 Policy ................................................................................................................................. 204
6.4.2 Academic: Areas for further Research ............................................................................... 206
BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................................... 209
ANNEX 1 ........................................................................................................................................... 227
xiv
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1: Conflict Areas in Turkana ..................................................................................................... 124
Table 2: Factors affecting Food Security in Turkana .......................................................................... 127
Table 3: Main Economic Activities among the Turkana .................................................................... 128
Table 4: Factors affecting Economic Security among the Turkana .................................................... 129
Table 5: Factors affecting Livestock among the Turkana ................................................................... 132
Table 6: Factors affecting Physical Security in Turkana .................................................................... 133
Table 7: Factors affecting Community Security among the Turkana ................................................. 135
Table 8: Factors on Political Security among the Turkana ................................................................. 138
Table 9: Major challenges facing CPMR in Turkana ......................................................................... 147
Table 10: Factors affecting environmental security in Turkana ......................................................... 151
xv
LIST OF MAPS
Map I: A Map of the Africa showing the location of Pastoralists ....................................................... xvi
Map II: The Administrative Map of Turkana County ........................................................................... 11
Map III: Conflicts Prone Areas and Grazing fields in Turkan County and the surrounding areas .... 125
xvi
Map I: A Map of the Africa showing the location of Pastoralists
1
Chapter One
Introduction to the Study
1.1 Background to the Study
Kenya’s development policies and strategies relating to the expansive arid areas and
semi-arid lands (ASAL) of the country relative to the agriculturally rich ones have been
fundamentally skewed and biased. The colonialist’s delimited parts of north eastern Kenya
then referred to the ‘Northern Frontier District’ (NFD) as insecure, unproductive, and of low
potential. This meant a conscious and deliberate formulation of development policies that
largely directed resources to ‘high potential’ agricultural land that consisted of mainly the
highland areas of the country thus alienating pastoral regions from the rest of the country.
This position was reinforced by the policy documents such as ‘African Socialism and its
Application to Planning in Kenya (Sessional Paper No.10 of 1965) that were supposed to
spur equitable development throughout the country.1Consequently, the post-independence
years have witnessed state absence manifested in the limited presence of governance
institutions and development projects including infrastructure.
Decades of marginalization, neglect and omission of the pastoral areas in the
country’s development agenda have left a significant gap not only the development of
institutions of governance but also in security that continue to inform and define the
communities’ livelihood.2 This study uses the term marginalization to mean, being at the
edge, being far removed from the centre, on the periphery, having no voice or limited
influence on national politics, being neglected by the political leadership, lack of effective
1African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya accessed on 5 May 2010, at
http://www.scribd.com/doc/14288722/Mboya-et-al-African-Socialism-and-Its-Application-to-Planning-in-
Kenya, See also The Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation (2003-2007,(2003))
Government of Kenya, Ministry of Planning and National Development, P36 2Ministry of Planning and National Development, (2003)The Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and
Employment Creation (2003-2007),Government of Kenya, Ministry of Planning and National Development, p1
2
representation at the highest policy making decision on national issues and exclusion from
mainstream social, political, economic and technological engagement.
Though the pastoral areas face many challenges, the Government of Kenya (GoK)
through the Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation (2003-2007)3
has argued persuasively that the gap in human security has been the most single factor in
leading to armed violent conflicts among pastoralists. Furthermore, high levels of poverty,
poor social and economic infrastructures, weak and ineffective governance structures, weak
institutional and regulatory frameworks coupled with environmental related problems among
others, have combined to influence in a crucial way, the pastoral livelihood. Drought and
famine negatively affect the main sources of pastoral livelihood i.e. pasture and water which
often leads to death of livestock because pastoralists depend mainly on meat, blood and milk
though they occasionally practice transhumance nomadic system that primarily depends on
animal sales to purchase food mainly grains.
For a long time, pastoralism as a mode of life has been � abeled as primitive,
backward and untenable in the modern age, yet it is a livelihood system that supports between
100 and 200 million mobile pastoralists globally and many more if extensive ago-pastoralists
are included.4 Ecologists recognize pastoralism as a way of natural resource management
system that provides a wide range of services and products such as biodiversity, tourism and
raw materials and therefore represents a sustainable method of utilizing certain types of
ecosystems such as deserts, steppes and mountain areas.5 As a result, the availability of these
resources locates the issue of environmental security at the centre of the pastoral livelihood.6
3Ibid P36, See also the Report of the Parliamentary Select Committee to investigate the Root Causes of Cattle
Rustling in Kenya, September, 2010. 4Hatfield, R. et al(eds) (2006) Global Review of the Economics of Pastoralism, (IUCN, Nairobi) p 1
5Onyango, E.O (2010), Pastoralists in Violent Defiance of the State: The Case of the Karimojong in
Northeastern Uganda, unpublished Dissertation for the Degree Philosophiae Doctor (PhD) at the University of
Bergen. 6Markakis, J. et al. (1994), Ethnicity & Conflict in the Horn of Africa, (London, James Currey, Ohio University
Press) and Markakis, J. (2004), Pastoralism on the Margin, (London, Minority Rights Group International)
3
Generally, pastoral areas in Kenya are viewed as a problem or hardship zones despite
having opportunities in the renewal of energy, livestock production and marketing, crop
production, strategic location in terms of the un-exploited richness in republic of South Sudan
and natural resources among others.7 Living under the most difficult ecological conditions
and making life possible in regions that are otherwise unsuitable for agriculture, pastoralists
have demonstrated exceptional resilience in coping up with pressures from environmental
related problems as well preserving their cultural values.8
In order to cope, adapt, and optimally exploit and utilize the resources within their
environment for food and water, many pastoralists are nomadic or semi-nomadic. This means
they practice seasonal movements characterized by migrations and population shifts in search
of these essential commodities. However, in the twenty first century, pastoralism is
increasingly under pressure from socio-economic changes, modern/technological
developments and development policies. The existence of modern nation state system that
created international borders, government seizure of pastoral land, unfavourable land tenure
laws including frequent drought and famine have restricted movements and impacted
negatively on the traditional migration patterns that served as a coping mechanism.
Furthermore, increased competition for pastoral resources with other actors such as ranchers
often leads to violent conflicts.
1.1.1 An Overview of the Pastoralists Globally and in the IGAD Region
Pastoralists inhabit the arid and semi-arid areas of the world where the potential for
crop cultivation is limited.9 There is no reliable information on the number of pastoralists
world-wide but according to one estimate there are around 50 million in Africa, 3.4 million in
7Statement by Hon Mohamed Elmi, Minister for Northern Kenya and other Arid Areas of the Republic of Kenya
at a seminar held at Red Court Hotel, Nairobi on 24 November, 2011. 8Onyango, E.O. (2010), Pastoralists in Violent Defiance of the State: The Case of the Karimojong in
Northeastern Uganda, op cit 9Hatfield, R. et al (eds), (2006), Global Review of the Economics of Pastoralism, op cit p 1
4
the Middle East and South Asia and no more than 2 million in Central Asia.10
Pastoral
livelihood is depended primarily on livestock which is determined by the surrounding
environment and includes sheep, goats, cattle and camels, but also yaks and horses in Central
Asia, buffalo in South Asia, llamas and alpacas in South America, and reindeer in the
Palearctic region.11
In Africa, pastoralists are found in southern Africa, West Africa, North
Africa and eastern Africa.
In the Horn of Africa which for the purpose of this study consists of the Inter-
Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) member states of Djibouti, Eritrea,
Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, and South Sudan, the number of pastoralists is
estimated at 17.3 million which makes it the largest concentration in the world.12
South Sudan
(created in 2011and became a member of IGAD during the organization’s 16 Extra-Ordinary
Summit of Heads of State and Government held in Ethiopia on 25 November, 2011).13
Pastoral communities in Kenya include; the Pokot, the Samburu, the Marakwet, the
Borana, the Rendile, the Gabra, the Burgi, and the Turkana. (Map 1).The Kenyan based
pastoral communities also conflict with their neighbours across the borders i.e. the
Karamojong, the Dodoth, Jie, Tepes, Tepeth, Matheniko, Pian, Sabiny, and Bakora of
Uganda; the Dassenech, Changila, and the Nyangtom of Ethiopia; some sections of the
Toposa, Dindinga and the Murle in south Sudan and the Somalis of Kenya, Ethiopia and
Republic of Somalia.14
10
Sanford, S. (1983), Management of Pastoral Development in the in the Third World.(Chichester, UK, John
Wiley). 11
http://www.pastoralpeoples.org/pastoralists.htm downloaded on 17 March, 2011 12
Timura, C.T (2001), ‘Environmental Conflict and Social Life of Environmental Discourse in Anthropological
Quarterly,Vol, 74 No 3, July, (Washington, The George Washington University, Institute of Ethnographical
Research), 104-113 13
See the Communiqué of the 19th Extra-Ordinary Session of the IGAD Assembly of Heads of State and
Government on the situation in Somalia and a briefing on the outstanding issues of the Sudan Comprehensive
Peace Agreement 14Interview with Yacob Arsano of Addis Ababa, University Ethiopia on 27 November, 2007, Alex Nkabahona,
Makerere University, Kampala, Uganda on 22 November, 2007 and Darlington Akabwai and Michael Kapoloni
Turkana Central on 27 August, 2009
5
Due to the migratory nature of the pastoral lifestyle, the recorded number of
pastoralists in Kenya varies widely because they have never been counted accurately. The
2004 report by the Minority Rights Group International (MRGI) estimated that there were
about 6 million or roughly 18% of the country’s total population.15
This figure ranks Kenya
6th
in the world in terms of pastoral population size behind Sudan, Somalia and Ethiopia that
are ranked 1st, 3
rd and 5
th, respectively.
16 Pastoralists occupy about 72% of Kenya’s land that
is ASALs, held in trust for future generations and belong to a group or family with descent or
cultural affiliation relationship.
1.1.2 Turkana Community as a Case Study
The study uses the Turkana community, which keeps livestock mainly cattle, goats’ sheep,
donkeys’ and camels and depends on their products for livelihood as a window to examine
the relationship between conflict, environmental security and governance and its implication
on the pastoralists in Kenya. However, they supplement diet by small scale rain-fed sorghum,
millet and maize cultivation (sometimes through irrigation), hunting and fruit planting and
gathering along river valleys, seasonal rivers/streams and around Lake Turkana. They
undertake small scale trading and fishing on Lake Turkana. The use of case study stems from
several advantages that come with such an approach in both scientific and social science
research. It is a preferred approach because it allows for the collection of very specific
information, deeper investigation and comprehensive analysis of the multifarious
phenomenon of the linkage between these variables with a view to establishing
generalizations about similar situations.
15USAID,(2005), ‘Horn of Africa-Multi-Sectoral Interventions in Pastoralist Communities’ USAID Fact Sheet
#2, Fiscal Year (FY), September 30. 16
The 2004 report by the Minority Rights Group International (MRGI)
6
The choice of the Turkana community as a case study which is a group of Nilo-
Hamites (Other plain Nilotics are the Masai, Samburu, Njemps and Elmolo)17
speaking one
language, Kiturkana18
stems from a number of reasons. First, several studies19
show that it is
not only the second largest pastoral community after the Masai but also one of the most
militarized in Kenya and the entire IGAD region. Some of the explanatory factors why the
Turkana community is more militarized include their proximity to the equally militarized
neighbours across and within Kenya to enable them defend themselves in case of any attack
by their neighbours but also aid raids to restock and increase their stocks.20
Akabwai21
notes
that the Turkana are more often instigators of livestock raids rather than victims, and as a
result, many communities fear them although they are also targets of attacks.22
Furthermore,
the Turkana community is the largest beneficiary of illegal guns which come through the
porous borders of Kenya, Uganda, and Kenya and south Sudan23
and therefore provide a fair
representation of other pastoralists in Kenya.
Secondly, the focus on Turkana which are sometimes classified under the
Karamojong, or Karimojong or “Karamoja cluster, (a term that is used to describe the
geographical area across the borders of Ethiopia, Kenya, South Sudan, and Uganda) is due to
the persistent conflictual situation that pervades the region and hence provides a conducive
environment for the proliferation and use of small arms among the communities. Northern
Uganda has experienced episodes of conflicts that includes between the Lord’s Resistance
17
Ibid 18
Ibid 19
Bollig, M. (1990), Ethnic Conflicts in North West Kenya: Pokot, Turkana Raiding 1969-1984 Op cit, Human
Rights Watch, (2002) Playing with Fire: Weapons Proliferation, Political Violence and Human Rights in
Kenya, (Human Rights Watch, Washington,) p 78, and Kamenju, J. et al, (2003) Terrorised Citizens: Profiling
Small Arms and Insecurity in the North Rift Region of Kenya,(Nairobi, Security Research and Information
Centre (SRIC). 20
Akabwai, D. (1992). Extension and Livestock Development: Experience from among the Turkana Pastoralists
of Kenya. Pastoral Development Network Paper No. 33b. (London, Overseas Development Institute). 21Ibid 22
Ibid 23
The Standard, (2008) 11 December, (Nairobi, The Standard Group Ltd)
7
Army (LRA) and the Uganda government through 1985 to2009 and the civil war between the
Sudanese Peoples Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) and the Government of Sudan that
ended with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005.
Thirdly, the community’s geographic location in relation to other armed pastoral
groups in Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia and Sudan has influenced the decision to use it as a case
study.24
The Turkana’s are centrally located relative to the other neighbouring communities
(Map I). This location provides an opportunity to examine for instance the dynamics of small
arms including the role of kith and kin across national borders within the framework of the
Implementation Plan of the Co-ordinated Agenda for Action on the Problem of the
Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa.
This is particularly in relation to the two provisions on the cross border aspects of small arms.
The Nairobi Declaration (2000) on the Problem of the Proliferation of Illicit Small Arms and
Light Weapons (SALW) in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa and the Nairobi
Protocol (2004) for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons
in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa and Bordering Areas recognizes the cross
border dimensions of small arms.
Fourthly, the Turkana region epitomizes the limited and weak governance institutions
that continue to attract insecurity in pastoral areas as the government grapples to address the
problem. As a result, the community lags behind in terms of development and exploitation of
resources which could release the regions’ potential. Consequently, it is one of the armed
pastoral communities’ with little confidence in the ability of the government’s security and
administrative institutions to comprehensively address the widespread insecurities and
vulnerabilities. This has led to acquisition of illicit small arms ostensibly for self and
community protection and that of their animals which has in turn intensified conflicts with
24
Khadiagala, G. (2003), A Report on ‘Protection and Poverty: Community Weapons Collections Experiences in
Northern Kenya’ (Nairobi, Oxfam (GB), p17.
8
serious consequences on environmental security. How the Turkana are able to cope up with
the governance deficit, the attendant conflicts coupled with the harsh environment makes the
community compelling case study to examine the issues under investigation. Overall, the
Turkana presents a unique case among the pastoral communities, its historical background,
geographical location and livelihood dynamics makes it a microcosm of the country as well
as the IGAD region.
1.1.3 Turkana within the Context of International Relations
The focus on pastoralists and particularly the Turkana community fits within the
domain of the international studies due to the concepts applied and issues that the study
investigated. The concepts of conflicts, community, environmental security and governance
are components of the expanded notion of security which belongs to the international
environment. The community security and questions of communal land ownership are
subjects of International Studies. Furthermore, issues of militarization/weaponization of the
Turkana community link with the question of international organized crimes particularly
small arms. The proliferation of small arms among pastoral communities that sucks Nairobi,
Juba, Khartoum, Kinshasa, Bangui, Ndjamena, and Mogadishu into the equation extent
beyond the immediate borders and link with capital cities in the West to international crime
cartels. It is within this context that cities such as Mogadishu and Kismayo in Somalia and
the question of terrorists and piracy emerges and finds currency justifying further that by the
very definition, the concept security and its attendant elements addressed in the study belongs
to the epoch of international studies.
While environmental security is increasingly developing into a specialized branch of
International Relations, the nature and scope of the issues knows no boundaries and Turkana
is no exception. This is even more so when considered against the on-going construction of
the dam on the Omo River by Ethiopia whose effects are being felt at the local level on Lake
9
Turkana. The construction of the Dam on the river Omo that empties its water in Lake
Turkana has not only brought into focus the question of the ecological systems in Turkana
but has led to numerous bilateral discussions between Kenya and Ethiopia, between Ethiopia
and development partners funding the project including environmental conservationists hence
bringing to the fore the question of the trans-boundary water resources in the. Environmental
concerns have become an important part of the discussions on global security reinforced by
the emerging consensus on human security. The redefinition of the term security25
over the
recent years has encapsulated environmental and other concerns thus giving legitimacy to the
term environmental security. Whether under the rubric of environment as part of the broad
human security agenda setting or one among a number of global threats, environmental
themes are firmly ingrained in international politics and scholarly debates in international
relations.
Similarly, the concept of governance as applied in this study has three dimensions
namely; national, regional, and international. Governance at the regional level is a concern
among the Kenyan, Ethiopian and south Sudanese authorities who acknowledges the need for
collective approaches in dealing with security and development challenges in the cluster. The
question of marginalization and under-development of the cluster demonstrates that the
Turkana region is not only locked into the Kenyan territory alone but is anchored in the other
two levels.
Therefore, though the case study of the Turkana community is within the Kenyan
territory, the issues investigated and the concepts applied demonstrate that it is beyond the
national jurisdiction and has tentacles within the regional and international domain. It is
within this context that the study adopted a multidisciplinary approach and borrowed from
25
Lester, B. (1977) ‘Redefining Security’, Worldwatch Paper No. 14, (Washington, D.C. Worldwatch Institute),
Ullman, R. (1983) ‘Redefining Security’ International Security 8 Summer 129-153), Mathews, J, T (1989)
‘Redefining Security’, Foreign Affairs, 68: 162-177 and Buzan (1998) etal Security: A New Framework for
Analysis, (Colorado, London, Lynner Rienner).
10
other disciplines such as international relations, strategic and security and peace studies,
conflict studies, international economics, political science, health, human rights, geography,
international environmental law and environment and bio-diversity and bio-diplomacy to
examine the relationship between conflict, environmental security and governance among the
pastoralists.
Map II: Shows the Administrative Boundaries and the Neighbouring Communities.
The former larger Turkana district (now Turkana County) whose population was 855,
39326
comprising 445,069 males and 410,339 females27
in 2009 is situated between
longitudes 34o0’ and 36
oE and between latitudes 10
o30’ and 5
o30’N. It was the largest district
in Kenya, spanning 77,000Km2, with 17 divisions, 56.
28 It has six constituencies namely;
Turkana Central, Turkana North, Turkana East, Turkana West, Loima and Turkana South
(Map II). The Female: Male ratio was 1:1 while the life expectancy stood at 50 years.
Furthermore, the infant mortality rate was at 170 per 1000, while the total fertility rate was at
5.5. The population growth rate was 3.3%, while the average population density was seven
persons per km2
with an estimated growth of about 22 per cent for the period 2002 to 2008.
The male/female ratio for the 0-19 year’s age bracket was 92:100 while the average gender
ratio (male/female) was 100:103.29
The Turkana County borders Ethiopia to the North East, Sudan to the North West,
Uganda to the West, Baringo and West Pokot Counties to the South, Samburu County to the
South East, and Marsabit County to the East including Lake Turkana and its volcanic hills.30
The Turkana County is within the lowland areas of the country and has an arid and hot
26
Kenya National Bureau of Statistics Kenya(2009): 2009 Population and Housing Census held on 22 August,
(Nairobi, Government Printer). 27
Ibid 28Ministry of Finance and Planning (2002), Turkana District Development Plan, 2002-2008 (Government
Printer, Nairobi) 29Ibid 30
Bollig, M. (1990), Ethnic Conflicts in North West Kenya: Pokot, Turkana Raiding 1969-1984, in Zeitschrift
for Ethnologie, Vol. 115, pp73-90
11
regime with an average precipitation rate of less than 500 mm but in many years, the rainfall
is scant or fails altogether and a moisture index of minus 40 to minus 50. In these arid lands,
soil and climatic conditions demand a high water requirement for meaningful cultivation. In
total about 72% of the country which is in the north western part falls in this category, a
regime that is insufficient for regular cultivation and only migratory pastoralists find a
livelihood here.31
Furthermore, the main sources of water are shallow wells on the beds of
seasonal rivers/streams, and surface/runoff water harvesting. During drought, the community
loses their livestock, in which case their coping mechanisms are exposed to severe stress,
hence, making them more vulnerable.
Map II: The Administrative Map of Turkana County
Source: Arid Lands Management Programme II (2012)
31
Bollig (1990) op cit
12
1.2 Statement of the Research Problem
The problems of conflict and environmental security among the pastoral communities
in Kenya are largely an outcome of the inability of the post-independence state to extend its
legitimate institutions of governance, administration and development programs to
marginalized areas. Since the pre-independence days, the successive governments in Kenya
have not paid sufficient attention to the development imperatives of the pastoral
communities. The situation is worsened by skewed and biased development policies that
have failed to promote the exploitation of resources in these marginal areas, attend to special
circumstances of the pastoral communities and sometimes even envisaged the erosion of
pastoralism.
Furthermore, a combination of other factors such as availability of small arms,
unfavourable climatic conditions and geographical contiguity to pastoralists across Kenya,
Uganda South Sudan and Ethiopian borders have conspired to confine the pastoral
communities to the lowest levels of poverty. These factors have led to the shrinking of the
resources and provoked persistent inter-communal conflicts with devastating ramifications on
environmental security.
Though the problem of insecurity among pastoral communities is a consequence of
several factors, governance deficit is a major one. It is in this regard that this study aims to fill
the existing analytical knowledge gaps on the linkage between conflict, environmental
security and governance including weaknesses in methodological and theoretical approaches
that have guided past studies. It is against this background that this study situates the plight of
pastoralists within the broader framework of literature at the intersection of intermittent
conflict, environmental security and governance in Kenya, statement that informs the central
problem of this study. Therefore, in order to investigate the problem, the study sets out four
objectives and the research questions.
13
1.3 Study Objectives
Broadly, the study examines the relationship between conflict, environmental security
and governance and its influence on pastoral livelihood.
Specifically, the study:
1. Interrogates the theoretical and practical linkages between conflict, environmental
security and governance among the pastoral communities in Kenya.
2. Examines the nature of the relationship between conflict, environmental security and
governance among the pastoralists in Kenya.
3. Evaluates governance and management structures (normative and institutional
frameworks) for addressing conflict environmental security and development in
Kenya and their applications to pastoral communities.
4. Synthesizes the implications of the nexus between conflict, environmental security
and governance on pastoralists in Kenya.
1.4 Research Questions
The central research question that this study investigates relate to the relationship between
conflict, environmental security and governance, among pastoralists. Specifically;
1. What are the theoretical and practical linkages between conflict, environmental
security and governance?
2. What is the nature of the relationship between conflict, environmental security and
governance in pastoral areas of Kenya?
3. How do conflict, environmental security and governance deficit impact on pastoral
livelihood in marginal areas?
4. What is the significance (explanatory and causal) of the normative and institutional
frameworks on the management of conflicts, environmental security and governance
among the pastoralists in Kenya?
14
1.5 Study Hypotheses
The research proceeds with three hypotheses, namely;
1. There is a positive correlation between conflicts, environmental security and
governance among pastoral communities in Kenya.
2. The problems of conflict and environmental security among the pastoralist in Kenya
is a consequence of institutional and policy failure.
3. The problems relating to conflict and environmental insecurity among the pastoral
communities in Kenya are largely outcomes of governance deficit.
1.6 The Scope of the Study and Limitations
This study examines the links between violent conflict, environmental security and
governance and explores its implication on pastoral communities in Kenya. Several scholars
and policy makers32
have rightly posited that the security challenges facing the country’s
ASALs is a consequence of many interrelated factors but this study focused mainly on
conflicts, development, environment security, governance and the corresponding normative
and institutional frameworks. This ensured adequate in-depth analysis was given to these
factors which have become analytically and politically linked, and are the cause and
consequence of the deteriorating human security in pastoral areas.33
However, other factors
were only examined in as far as they relate to the research problem.
There are a number of limitations to consider while reading the findings of this study.
Population census is the most ideal method of gathering information in any social research but
this was not the case for this study due to financial limitations and time constraint. Furthermore,
majority of the Turkana region is remote and under developed with no proper access roads a fact
curtailed the movement of the research team. Research assistants from the community were
32Ministry of Planning and National Development, (2003), The Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and
Employment Creation (2003-2007), Op cit, p36 33
Ibid.
15
engaged to overcome language barrier but also since the issues under investigation required
some level education the respondents identified had good grasp of English or Kiswahili.
Other challenges were related to the unavailability of some respondents at the time of the
field work because some of the areas earmarked could not be reached for security reasons.
During the field visit, some parts of the region and in particular in Turkana south were
experiencing high levels of insecurity occasioned by cattle raids. The other challenge was that
some of the targeted respondents were not available since they were involved the preparations
for the national census exercise of 24 August 2009 that was just a week away. Moreover, there
was serious food shortage in many parts of Turkana due to famine and members of the
provincial and security personnel including employees of some non-governmental organizations
were involved in the distribution of relief to the affected people. Although women respondents
were very few, the study ensured that those invited either to participate in the FGD or as
individual respondents were knowledgeable about the issues under investigation and as such
provided a fair gender perspective in the study.
However, despite these challenges, the study findings represents the research problem
because of the diversity of respondents from government, Non Governmental Organizations
(NGOs),Community Based organizations(CBOs), research institutions and the inter-
governmental structures including women, youth and disabled that were reached and
therefore balanced any biasness that may have occurred. Furthermore, the problems of
inaccessibility of certain areas either due to security or no access roads and unavailability of
earmarked respondents were addressed by making deliberate efforts to ensure that their
perspectives were considered by either inviting them to the FGD or interviewing them during
the validation exercises. A few others were interviewed through telephone calls and or
emails. Moreover, the study approaches of data collection, namely; desk research, interviews,
focus group discussion, snowballing and triangulation complemented each other which
16
allowed for a holistic synthesis of the research problem which counteracted limitations and
shortcomings inherent in each and allowed for contextual and situational analysis among the
pastoral communities in Kenya.
1.7 Justification and Significance of the Study
This study has both policy and academic justification and significance, which are mutually
reinforcing.
1.7.1 Academic Justification
In Kenya, pastoral communities reside in areas regarded as environmentally harsh and
for years have been engaged in conflict within themselves (inter clans), with the neighbours
(other communities) and with policy makers. Yet only few studies34
locating the plight of the
pastoral livelihood within a myriad of, conflict, environmental stress and governance
including the development of cooperative mechanisms for peace building and conflict
prevention exist.35
Accordingly, the relationship between aspects of conflict, environmental
security and governance is understood poorly which calls for a more systematic
comprehensive assessment of the issues.
Empirical foundation for a general relationship between resource scarcity and armed
conflict is indicative at best, and numerous questions regarding the assumed causal
association remain unanswered. Several single-case analyses suggest that resource scarcity
contribute to outbreak of organized violence, though always in interaction with exogenous
conflict-promoting factors. Daniel, M.36
et al notes that ‘environmental scarcity is never a sole
or sufficient cause of large migrations, instead poverty or violence always joins with other
34Onyango, E.O. (2010), Pastoralists in Violent Defiance of the State: The Case of the Karimojong in
Northeastern Uganda, op cit 35
Governing Council of the United Nations Environment Programme ‘Environment and Security: a Global
Agenda for UNEP’ Twenty-Third Session of the Governing Council/Global Ministerial Environment Forum
Nairobi, 21–25 February 2005,UNEP/GC.23/INF/21 36
Daniel, M. et al (2000),’The Environment and Violent Conflict:A Response to Gleditsch’s Critique and Some
Suggestions for Future Research’ in Environmental Change &Security Project Report, Issue 6 (Summer) 77-
106
17
economic, political, and social factors to produce its effects. The statistical literature, in
contrast, has failed to converge on any significant and robust association between resource
scarcity and conflict. While the possibility of no general linkage cannot be ruled out
substantial limitations in data and research designs are issues of concern.
Some of the knowledge gaps in the link between conflict and environmental security
are a consequence of the weakness in approaches adopted when studying under the Bern-
Zurich and the Toronto school,37
the two dominant schools that have undertaken numerous
studies on the issue. Anton Leist and Lukas Meyer initiated the Bern-Zurich Working Group
on Environmental Justice in September 2007. The Group aims to provide a public academic
forum for debates relating to the ethical and politically normative problems inherent in
environmental degradation, resource depletion and climate change, including their social
impact both nationally and globally. On the other hand, the Toronto school is a project led by
Thomas Homer-Dixon of the Toronto University in Canada.
The methodological limitations of some of the research have undermined the
credibility of the findings that seem to point to a linkage between conflict and environmental
security. For instance, Hagmann38
observes that some of these studies have come up with
divergent conceptual approaches, methodologies and levels of analysis that makes a coherent
and systematic presentation of the environmental literature difficult. Due to these gaps, the
relationship between aspects of environmental security and violent conflict is poorly
understood and therefore warrants more research. Hagmann notes that the concept of
‘environmentally-induced conflicts’ is fundamentally flawed as it neither allows for
convincing empirical substantiation nor sound theory building.
37Ibid 38
Hagmann, T. (2005), ‘Confronting the Concept of Environmentally-Induced Conflicts’ Peace Conflict and
Development: Issue Six, January.
18
Levy39
argues that the Toronto research design was flawed because it partly relied on
a null hypothesis. In respond to Levy’s criticisms, Brock40
notes rightly that Levy
undervalues the richness of empirical research. Brock argues that the findings do not simply
amount to the observation of environment matters in violent conflicts, rather they respond to
the assumptions with empirical evidence and thus help to expose the shortcomings of the
preferred conceptualizations of reality with which each individual tries to make sense of the
world. Therefore, a case study of a community that has known conflicts for decades allows
for a more thorough analysis that is detailed, coherent and systematic and adds to the existing
knowledge with evidence from the field.
Academically, there is no consensus on the exact meaning of the term environmental
security and this is worsened by the use of various terminologies synonymously around the
concept.41
For instance, resource scarcity and degradation have been used synonymously and
environmental conflicts used interchangeably with environmental security; a trend that has
made a number of terminologies imprecise and ambiguous.42
It is even complicated by the
categorization of environment literature into sub-themes such as trans-boundary water
conflicts; resource-based conflicts, land and territorial disputes among others. This problem
has been dealt with through definitions of key terminologies used in the study.
39
Levy, M. (1995a), ‘A Time for a Third wave of Environment and Security Scholarship’ in Environmental
Change and Security Project, Report No 1, Spring (Washington DC, Woodrow Wilson Center, ).pp 44-45: 45 40Brock, L (1997) ‘The Environment and Security: Conceptual and Theoretical Issues’ in Conflict and
Environment (ed) Nils Petter Gleditsch (Dordrecht, Kluwer). 41
For several contestations on the meaning of environmental security, see Roger, S. K. (1997) ‘Pre empting
Violent Conflicts: Learning from Environment Co-operation Chapter30 and Spring D (1997) ‘Regulating the
International Environment: A Conceptual Model of Environmental Security and Instrument Choice’, ch 29 all in
Gleditsch, N.P. (1997) Conflict and the environment NATO ASI Series, Vol 33, (Kluwer Academic Publishers,
Dordecht, The Netherlands). 42
Levy M. (1995), ‘A Time for a Third wave of Environment and Security Scholarship’ in Environmental
Change and Security Project, Op cit pp 44-45: 45. Other readings are Libiszewsk (1992):13. ‘What is an
Environment Conflict? Environment and Conflicts Project’ (ENCOP), Occasional Paper No 6 Zurich, Center for
Security Studies and Conflict Research and Dokken and Graeger (1995) ‘The Concept of Environmental
Security-Political Slogan or Analytical Tool’, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, (PRIO) Report 2.p
38
19
In the recent past, there has been a proliferation of studies on various issues among
the pastoralists particularly on the drivers of conflicts in their habitation. Equally pertinent
studies, on the sources of conflicts within the pastoral setting have been dominated primarily
by NGO driven-prescription that has often had only tenuous anchorage in critical conceptual
and intellectual thinking. Therefore, thesis is one of the emerging studies43
that investigate
the link between conflicts, environmental vulnerability and governance in Turkana County
against the backdrop of poor governance, unfavourable environment, and the geographical
contiguity to pastoral communities across Kenya, Uganda, South Sudan and Ethiopia borders.
Lastly, compared to other disciplines, motivation to focus on partly on environmental
security is driven by the fact the subject is fairly recent and a grey area in academic circles.
As noted in some works44
, research into environmental links with violent conflicts is in a
transition stage. Although some early works can be traced back to mid-1970s, serious
empirical research on environment and conflict emerged in the 1990s while the conceptual
development debate of environmental security as a new theme in international relations and
diplomacy studies is a 1980 development.45
For instance, Choucri,N.etal46
in 1975 developed
the theory of lateral pressure to explain state motivations for crossing borders in search of
resources thereby precipitating conflicts. In the 1980s, scholars such as Westing47
sought to
expand the conventional security thinking to include other issues such as environmental
change and resource depletion. Before this development, aspects of environment were
pursued as units under more established disciplines such as international environmental law
43
Others are Ken Mkutu (2005) and Onyango, E.O (2010), Op cit 44
State-of-the-Art Review on Environment, Security and Development Co-operation for the Working Party on
Development Co-operation and Environment, OECD Development Assistance Committee, IUCN, the World
Conservation Union, 2000 45
Choucri, N and Robert North, (1975) Nations in Conflicts, (San Francisco, W.H. Freeman) 46
Ibid 47
Westing, A.H. (1986), Environmental factors in strategic policy and action: an overview. In: A.H. Westing,
ed., Global Resources and International Conflict: Environmental Factors in Strategic Policy and Action. New
York: Oxford University Press. pp 1-20. Westing, A.H. (1989),The Environmental Component of
Comprehensive Security, Bulletin of Peace Proposals 20: 129-34.
20
and geography and as deforestation, a forestation and soil degradation. Moreover, new
knowledge from recent studies48
is increasingly shedding light on the serious consequences of
climate change on environment and by extension human, animal, plant and sea species and
therefore opening up opportunities for more studies on many unresolved in the literature of
environmental security, hence compelling research on the subject.
1.7.2 Policy Justifications
This study has three policy justifications. First, the unending conflicts and violence over
water and pasture among the pastoral communities in Kenya that normally sucks in
neighbouring communities from Uganda, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia means that so far the
current regulatory and management frameworks are ineffective in addressing conflicts among
pastoralist across and within national borders. Secondly, the continued rapid degradation of
environment and emerging effects of the climate change necessitates a re-examination of the
policies that govern environment with specific focus on pastoralists. Finally, traditionally,
human beings have exploited the environment and recovered naturally. But with the ever
increasing population, industrialization and global warming, it has become increasingly
evident that the natural system of environmental recovery cannot cope with natural disasters
and destructive activities of human beings. Overall, the study will serve as a source of
reference for academic as well as policy makers.
1.8 Conceptual and Operational Definition of Environmental Security and Governance
To date there is no consensus on the definition of environmental security, and
governance which are used in this study.
48
Brauch, G, H. et al (eds) (2008) Globalization and Environmental Challenges: Reconceptualizing Security in
the 21st Century. (Springer, Berlin Heidelberg). For critical areas for further research see Geofrey D and David
D Dabelko, ‘Environmental Security: Issues of Conflict and Redefinition’ pp 3-13: 9
21
1.8.1 Environmental Security
Environmental security is one of the components of human security widely accepted
as a normative concept yet its meaning remains contested.49
It is abroad term that refers to
protection from pollution and depletion of non-renewal resources and degradation of the local
ecosystems. Environmental degradation includes desertification, deforestation, ecosystem
degradation, and environmental pollution, considered to be worsening and rendering the
population more vulnerable to other hazards. Environmental degradation processes induced
by human behaviour and activities sometimes combine with natural hazards to damage the
natural resource base and adversely alter natural processes or ecosystems.50
The concept of
environmental degradation means different things to different people at different time. The
United Nations defines environmental degradation as “the reduction of the capacity of the
environment to meet social and ecological objectives, and needs.51
At times, this process
may refer to biodegradation or chemical decomposition. The process by which living
organisms break down organic substances is biodegradation. On the other hand, chemical
decomposition is the degradation of chemical compounds. Generally, the implication in
discussion of the deterioration of the environment is reference to the process of the depletion
of resources such as air, water and soil; the destruction of ecosystems and the extinction of
wildlife.
Salih52
defines environmental security from two perspectives, first, is the capacity of
individual groups to meet their basic needs from a sustainable environment and secondly
49
Homer-Dixon, H. et al (1996), 'Environmental Scarcity and Violent Conflict: Debate', Environmental Change
and Security Project, 2, Spring, 49-71 [23],Dabelko, G.D. and D. Dabelko (1995). ‘Environmental Security:
Issues of Conflict and Redefinition’ Environmental Change and Security Project, Washington: (The Woodrow
Wilson Center. Issue, 1) 50
Awimbo, J.etal (2004) Community Based Natural Resources Management in the IGAD Region, (Nairobi,
IUCN USAID and IGAD). 51
The United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR) 2005-2015, OCHA and UNDP at
http://www.preventionweb.net/files/2615_UNMechanisms.pdf, accessed on 7.8.2010 52
Mohammed, S. (1992) ‘Environmental and Social Insecurity in the Arid and lands of Sudan’ in Hjout of Ornos
A (ed) Security in African Drylands, (Uppsala, EPOS).
22
environmental security should by necessity involve serious consequences for social,
economic, political, and physical security. From this standpoint, the traditional
conceptualization of security should be re-configured to include non-military threats such as
human rights abuses, outbreak of diseases, resource scarcity and environmental degradation.
Buzan53
views environmental security as the capacity to live harmoniously with
nature or to maintain sustainable environment. According to Constantine,54
the term
environmental security connotes three broad areas of focus. These are; concerns about the
negative impact of human activities on the environment, concerns about the direct and
indirect effects of various forms of environmental changes especially scarcity and
degradation, which may be natural or human generated on national or regional security. From
this standpoint, environmental security also entails issues about loss of security of individuals
or groups from small communities to human kind experience due to environmental change
such as water scarcity, air pollution, and global warming. According to Constantine, in order
to provide sustainability, environmental security represents the intersection between social
and political systems on one hand with ecological systems on the other.
The Foundation for Environmental Security and Sustainability (FESS) defines
environmental security as a condition in which a nation or region through sound governance,
capable management and sustainable utilization of its natural resources and environment
takes effective steps towards social, economic and political stability and ensuring the welfare
of its population. FESS notes that environmental security is a multi-disciplinary field and
encompasses security concerns from individuals to the state level and should be viewed
through a perspective of individuals and communities allowing them a voice in identifying
threats to their own security. FESS contends that it is also essential to better understand how
53Buzan, B. (1992) People, States and Fear; An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold
War, New York, Harvester, Wheatsheaf). 54
Constantine-Horia, B. et al(2007) Introduction to Environmental Security (SpringerlinkSibiu Romania)
23
environment affects local populations and vice versa which implies environmental security
not only includes resource management but also issues such as development, the economy
and governance. The Foundation cites ‘the resources curse’ thesis as an example of how poor
governance and poor resource management can devastate both the natural and human capital
of a country.55
This study adopts the definition of environmental security by FESS because unlike
others, it brings into the analysis the multiplicity nature of the subject, individuals,
communities and management and governance issues which are at the heart of the
reconceptualised notion of security. Furthermore, it impresses issues of development and
governance as critical to the improvement of human security.
1.8.2 Governance
According to the UN Economic Commission of Africa (UNECA), governance is the process
and institutions by which power is exercised. Hence, good governance is the exercise of such
power that is effective, efficient, equitable and inclusive, transparent and accountable,
consensus oriented, responsive to the present and future needs of the society and respects rule
of law at all levels of government. Good governance further minimizes corruption, respects
the rights of the minority and the voices of the vulnerable members of the society.
On the other, UNDP defines governance as comprising of complex mechanisms processes
and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, mediate their
differences and exercise their legal and constitutional rights. Viewed from this perspective,
governance can be carried out at the political institutional and administrative and economic
levels. Governance at the state level is political governance while institutional and
55
Workshop Report (2009) ‘Environmental Security and Company Responsibilities’ Business Forum, Geneva,
September 30.
24
administrative governance is what institutions carry out. Political governance involves
political decisions and their execution by the politicians and other state operatives. It is also at
this level that major political actors regulate social, economic and political relationships. This
regulation can either promote tensions or create conditions for peace or trust among citizens
irrespective of the variety of interests represented in the country. Administrative governance
is carried out by those charged with the implementation of public decisions in public
administrative and legal institutions and agencies. These agencies include the civil service
and departments parastatals and public administrative organizations. Economic governance
refers to those decisions relating to the management of the economy by the state and its
agencies.
This study uses governance to refer to the conscious management of the public affairs
through publicly promulgated rules and structures, which help effect political action and the
solution to societal problems. The rules in question would also determine the extent to which
those in authority can legitimately exercise their power in attempting to address societal
problems. In the context of this study, governance focuses on formal and informal structures
that are in place to exercise, power. Specifically, the study focused on the presence, capacity
and performance of governance structures as evaluative parameters.
1.9 Study Methodology
1.9.1 Approach to the Study
The status and the living conditions of the pastoral communities in Kenya and indeed
in the IGAD region remain a matter of major concern among the policy makers, development
partners, scholars and researchers on the subject. Since independence, the pastoral areas have
lagged behind in terms of social and economic development compared to the non-pastoral
ones, being a consequence of a multiple of factors. Conflict and environmental security are
25
just but among the many factors that shape and influence the livelihood of these
communities. Livelihood
‘comprises the capabilities, assets including both material and social resources
And activities required for a means of living. A livelihood is sustainable when it
can cope with and recover from assets and shocks and maintain or enhance
its capabilities and assets both now and in the future while not undermining the
natural resources base’.56
Conflict and environmental insecurity are not mutually exclusive and factors affecting
pastoral livelihood combine in different forms and varying proportions with differing impacts
on the security of the pastoralists. In particular, variables such as small arms and drought and
famine require a thorough examination of the aspects that link conflict and environmental
security and the impact on the coping mechanisms of pastoral livelihood. This is because they
partly explain the intensification of conflicts among the pastoral communities.
It is in this regard, that the liberal point of view is preferred as opposed to the
conservative or radical approaches because it explains how the interactions of the various
factors combine and the subsequent impacts on the livelihood of the pastoral communities.
For instance, unlike the radical approach which seeks fundamental changes to the approaches
to improve the livelihood of the pastoral communities, the liberal approach recognizes the
piecemeal efforts taking place and calls for building on the same. The liberal approach is
important in two ways, first; it allows for the appreciation of the role of environment in the
livelihood of the pastoralists and secondly, it enhances the understanding of the various
factors affecting environment and promoting insecurity. In order to respond to the key
question of what form and the impact of the link between conflict and environmental security
in the context of the pastoralists, the study examines two issues; first whether the activities of
56
Robert, C. et al(1991) Sustainable Rural Livelihoods: Practical Concepts for 21 Century,IDS Discussion
Paper 296, retrieved on 4 October 2011 at http://ww.smallstock.infor /reference/ids/dp29.pdf
26
the pastoralists directly or indirectly provoke conflict and secondly if environmental
insecurity results into conflicts.
1.9.2 Sources and Data Collection
The information used for this study is from primary and secondary sources and was obtained
through interviews, (telephone, questionnaire and observation), focus group discussions and
review of literature. Respondents to interviews were drawn from Turkana central, Turkana
south, Turkana west and Nairobi. Participation to the focus group discussion was diverse and
included members of the District Peace Committee (DPC) teachers, nurses, religious leaders,
officers from the ministries of health and livestock development and security forces and
youth.
Primary sources also included a review of relevant legal and policy related documents
that included legislations, the Kenya Constitution 2010, resolutions/declarations,
treaties/agreements and protocols, development plans and in particular for ASAL of the
country, bilateral security arrangements with neighbouring countries and police records.
Others were the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) of Kenya, Kenya’s Economic
Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employments Creation (2003), the Strategy for
Revitalization of Agriculture (SRA) of 2004-2014 and the country’s Vision 2030 policy
paper. The use of secondary data in this study entailed a review of relevant scholarly
publications, journals, studies/papers, articles, reports and dissertations on pastoralism,
climate change, small arms, conflict, human and environment security including archival
research from Kenya National Archives particularly on history of small arms among the
27
Turkana community. Other secondary sources included the print and electronic media and
internet searches.
Phase I: Preliminary Discussions and Visit to the Study Area
The primary and secondary data collected for this study begum with preliminary
discussions and selection of focus areas. The first phase involved preliminary discussions
with government officials, scholars, researchers and selected respondents in Nairobi and
Turkana. This informed the questionnaire and helped in delimiting the geographical areas for
fieldwork in manageable regions conditioned by the vastness of the region, time frame and
resources. Data for this study was collected from Turkana Central, which was selected
because it houses the headquarters of the former larger Turkana district and contains a rich
resource of documents and records on the rest of the other constituencies. It also has some of
the longest serving civil servants with knowledge about the area including issues under
investigation. The other region is Turkana South, which borders former West Pokot district
now county. This constituency borders the Pokot community who are known to clash with
the Turkana.57
Hence, it brings into the study the dynamics of inter-pastoral conflicts within
the country. The third area is Turkana West, which borders Uganda and part of South Sudan
and therefore introduces into the study the international dimension of the issues under
investigation. (Map II) The map shows that this region is bordering Uganda and parts of
South Sudan.
The preliminary discussions with various stakeholder was followed by field visit that
served to establish contacts with key players such as the provincial administration, security
officers, local and international organizations working in Turkana region. The visit also served
57
Mkutu, K. (2006) ‘Small Arms and Light Weapons among Pastoral Groups in the Kenya-Uganda Border Area
in African Affairs, 1 of 24. Also Khadiagala, G (2003), A Report on ‘Protection and Poverty: Community
Weapons Collections Experiences in Northern Kenya’) op cit, p 17
28
as a learning experience of the terrain within the study area, which was important in planning
the dates and logistics during the actual fieldwork. Through the visit a substantial amount of
information on the subject matter was gathered that informed the identification of the broad
themes around which interview questions were formulated (Annex I). The questions were
pretested in both Nairobi and Turkana and revised accordingly to ensure clarity, precision, and
collection of relevant information.
The questionnaire was adjusted for relevance depending on the respondents’ which
allowed the interviewer to use probing techniques to collect more information, interpret and
analyze the data and the findings. The semi-structured interviews were preferred because they
are flexible in nature and only broad themes for discussion were identified. However,
structured interviews targeted very specific respondents who were identified in advance
because of their knowledge on the subject. The semi-structured approach allowed for
venturing into some relevant issues that were not envisaged during the development of the
questionnaire. Specific questions were set and send via email in advance to identified
respondents to allow them prepare for the interview. Information was also collected by sending
the questionnaire to other respondents in both Turkana and Nairobi who were not available for
personal interview. Overall, responses to the questionnaire via email were very poor because
only three responded out of seven. Few respondents who were not available for personal
interviews were interviewed through telephone including clarifications during the analysis
phase. However, with the diversity of the respondents interviewed this does not affect the overall
study findings in any significant way.
Phase II: Interviews and Focus Group Discussions
The next phase was interviews in Turkana and Nairobi where the key informant
approach entailed identification of key respondents. It involved conducting interviews with
selected members of the Turkana community because they are both victims as well as
29
perpetrators of conflicts with serious consequences on environmental security expert
informant interviews entailed interviewing people with certain degree of expertise and
knowledge on the subject. This category included intelligence personnel, security personnel,
investigative journalists, and community leaders working on or have looked into the issue.
This group also included researchers who have conducted studies in pastoral areas of the
IGAD region and people who were working on this subject from the provincial
administration in Nairobi.
During the fieldwork, four focus group discussions of up to 10 participants were
organized.58
Participants were selected mainly through information and in certain instances
using snowballing reference technique in which the first informant recommended others who
in turn recommended others.
Phase III: Data Processing-Analysis and Interpretation
Content, Relationship SIPABIO Model–A Conflict Analysis Model
The information presented in this study was analyzed using the C.R SIPABIO model
that combines content, critical discourse and narrative analyses. This model allows for utilization
and integration of both qualitative and quantitative approaches into the analysis and it has two
broad elements namely Context (C) and Relationship (R). Content allows for systematic
58
More information on focus group methodology can be found from North Carolina University website
http://www2.chass.ncsu.edu/garson/pa765/focusgroups.httm#notrec
30
examination of class issues, the environment, history, and ethnicity and ‘other’ which allow for
Figure 1: A Conflict Analysis Model
Source: Say Peace Conflict Resolution Training Manual for Muslim Communities, Amr
Abdallaet al. The Gradual school of Islamic and Social Sciences Virginia USA 2002
incorperation of unforeseen elements into the analysis. Other elements provided for in the model
are media, gender, religion and culture. Relationship allows an examination of power, bond and
patterns. A combination of content and relationship is integrated with seven conflict elements,
namely; Sources/Causes (S), Issues (I) and Interests, Parties (P), Attitudes/feelings (A),
Behaviours (B), Intervention (I) and Outcome (O). The Context Relationship (CR) SIPABIO
model allows for the analysis of the interaction between context, relationship and the seven
conflict elements.
Review of Data, Validation and Filling Gaps
Initial data analysis took place following the completion of literature review,
interviews and the focus group discussions. Preliminary results revealed some gaps that were
filled by conducting further interviews to selected respondents either face to face or through
7. Outcome/
31
telephone calls. Cross checking and clarifying some issues that were emerging from the study
was done in March 2010. The various approaches to data collection allowed for deeper
investigation into the research problem and provided an indication of the form of the
relationship between conflict and environmental security and its implication on the pastoral
groups in Kenya. Throughout the data presentation and analysis, the study has integrated the
descriptive, analytical and prescriptive aspects. The descriptive approach presents the
situation as it obtains while the analytical element offers an appraisal of the issues described
and the prescriptive one proffers some solutions.
1.9.3 Structure of the Study
This study is organized around six chapters.
Chapter One, “An introduction to the Study” introduces the subject matter of the study,
sets the context and delimits its scope that includes limitations. It contains the statement of
the problem, objectives, hypotheses and policy and academic significance of the study. It has
a definition of conceptual issues mainly environmental security and governance and
concludes with a discussion on research methodology that includes the analytical model, and
note on the structure of the thesis.
Chapter Two, “Issues in Conflict, Environmental Security and Governance”
reviews literature on pastoralism, conflict and management of conflicts, and the interface
between conflict, environment security and governance. The literature on environmental
security is mainly on the debate around securitization of environment. The literature on the
interface between conflict and environment is analyzed from the perspective of the Toronto
and the Environment and Conflicts Project (ENCOP) of Zurich and Bern Schools which is
followed by the conceptual framework used for the study.
32
Chapter Three, “The Policy Context: Normative and Institutional Frameworks
on Conflicts, Environmental Security and Governance in Kenya” examines critically
the existing normative and institutional frameworks conflict resolution, management,
environmental conservation, and management in Kenya. It identifies the key relevant
agreements and policy documents on these issues, analyses their strength and weaknesses
and highlights the complementary nature of various provisions contained therein. It also
looks at the institutional arrangements, their efficacy and responsiveness to the
management of conflicts in pastoral areas. In order to show causality and due the centrality
of small arms in pastoral the study examines the relevant institutional and legislative
frameworks on SALW under the CPMR.
Chapter Four, “Conflict, Environmental Security and Governance among the
Turkana” examines the question of conflict and environmental security with specific
reference to the Turkana community using evidence from the field. It also discusses the
question of small arms given its centrality in promoting insecurity among the pastoral
communities including other factors beyond small arms that affect their livelihood.
Succinctly, this chapter brings very specific details on the interface between conflict and
environmental security on the Turkana community.
Chapter Five, “Conflict, Environmental Security and Governance among the
Pastoral Communities in Kenya: A Critique” discusses the main issues emerging from the
study. The issues revolve around the three principal themes of conflicts, environmental
security and governance with a view to establishing any possible link between them. It is
organized into two parts. Part 1 is a critique of conflict and environmental security while part
two is a critical review on the various important issues that emerged from the study. These
are historical and governance issues, traditional versus conventional systems of justice,
33
ecology and climatic conditions, the regional political and security situation (regional
environment) and policy related issues.
Chapter Six, “Summary Conclusions and Recommendations”, it provides an
overview of the current state of knowledge on conflicts, environmental vulnerability and
governance that informs future studies in general but more important revisits the core
conceptual and empirical issues that framed the study. Based on the emerging issues,
including developments after the conclusion of the study, it informs future research on the
gaps/loopholes in the understanding of this area. In this regard, it identifies three key areas
for further research because their findings will complement this study. This is followed by a
bibliography and an annex of the sample questionnaire used to collect the primary data for
the study.
34
Chapter Two
Issues in Conflict, Environmental Security and Governance
2.1 Introduction
This chapter discusses the various discourses on the links between conflict, environmental
security and governance. The reviewed literature is on various debates on the interface
between conflict, environmental security and governance with respect to pastoral
communities in the IGAD region. The literature on environmental security is mainly on the
debate around securitarization of environment. The literature on the interface between
environmental vulnerability and conflict is analyzed from the perspective of the Toronto and
the Environment and Conflicts Project (ENCOP) of Zurich and Bern Schools.
2.2 Discourses on Conflict among Pastoralists
For centuries, the livelihood of pastoralists has revolved around questions of survival
strategies such as mobility and seasonal migration to sustain pastoralism. However, the
twentieth century saw pastoralism come under great stress as pastoralists in the region
experience widespread violence in an effort to respond to the various challenges, a situation
that has driven them in what one writer describes as a persistent state of crisis.1 The natural
endowment of the pastoral areas is limited and unevenly distributed and large parts of it are
not suitable for sedentary life. In addition, due to low rainfall, these areas are subjects of
recurrent and prolonged famine and drought and therefore unable to support sustainable
vegetation growth.
In order to cope and adapt, the lifestyle of pastoral communities is modeled around
seasonal movements that are characterized by migrations and population shifts in search of
pasture and water, hence exposing their livestock to more risks such as attacks and diseases.
1Onyango, E.O (2010), Pastoralists in Violent Defiance of the State: The Case of the Karimojong in
Northeastern Uganda, op cit
35
Succinctly, constant jostling and shoving of people in search of resources, mobility and the
vagaries of harsh environmental conditions in pastoral areas and mobility is a crucial part of
the community’s livelihood.2
Generally, explanatory factors for conflict among pastoral communities in the IGAD
region range from resource scarcity theories, social and psychological reasons, structural
arguments, the nature of the global political and economy and lack of fulfillment of basic
human needs. The survival strategies takes advantage of the mixed social environment that
many pastoralists live in through trading, exchanging, building alliances among themselves
but also with ranchers, crop farmers and urban dwellers.3 Often such relations and alliances
end up becoming competitive and lead to violent conflict and armed clashes over the
resources, a situation worsened by the population increase, loss of land, and civil strife.
Competition over pastureland, watering points, control and access to routes and market places
and the traditional practice of livestock raiding are perennial bone of contention and remains
at the heart of insecurity among the pastoralists in the IGAD region.
Furthermore, the conventional explanation of the seasonal migration by the
pastoralists and increased conflicts is that resources are becoming scarcer due high incidence
of drought, instruction of commercial agriculture, and increased involvement of pastoralists
in trade.4 Some studies
5 have shown that the scarcity of water and grazing land contributes to
conflicts among pastoralists in Kenya. Such conflicts are mainly common between ethnic
communities but in certain instances, they occur within the same ethnic group. On this basis
elements of group identity theory which uses social psychology in explaining conflicts
2Markakis, J. et al(1994), Ethnicity & Conflict in the Horn of Africa, (London, James Currey, Athens, Ohio
University Press). 3Fratkin, E. (2004). Ariaal Pastoralists of Kenya: Studying Pastoralism, Drought, andDevelopment in Africa’s
Arid Lands. (Boston: Pearson Educ) 4Ibid
5Pkalya, R. et al (2003),Conflict in Northern Kenya: A focus on the internally displaced conflict victims in
Northern Kenya; (Nairobi, Practical Action) : 5
36
relating to ethnicity among others finds relevancy in explaining pastoral conflicts.6 The focus
is on the way groups reinforce their identities and the "us-them" cleavages that often result.
Individuals may have a need for a sense of camaraderie or "we-ness" that can be satisfied in a
group when it discriminates against or attacks another group. Similarly, a person's sense of
self-worth may be strengthened when his or her group's status is enhanced relative to that of
other groups. By attacking outside groups, leaders may try to exploit these needs in order to
increase their political power within their own groups, but this behavior makes divisions
between groups deeper and more acrimonious. In the context of the pastoral communities this
happens mostly across communities rather within. In many cases, conflicts in pastoral areas
are common across communities and clans rather within or across where the other is viewed
as outsiders.
The claim that competition over access and control of scarce natural resources is the
cause of the conflicts is being challenged since societies all over the world compete for
exploitation of natural resources but do not persistently engage in deadly violence.7 Although
the claim that natural resource scarcity induces conflicts has been found to be true in some
situations, a recent study8 has revealed otherwise. An empirical work on the relationships
between natural resources, scarcity and pastoral conflicts in Kenya challenges the widely held
view that inter-ethnic pastoral conflicts are mostly motivated by declining per capita,
livestock wealth (or wealth differentiation between different groups) or induced by scarcity of
natural (or environmental) resources. The study, which is, based on long time data analysis
points to the fact that the frequent occurrence of violent conflicts is due to the failure of local
and national institutions in building peace thereby laying the blame on governance.
6Geisinger, A..(2004), ‘A Group Identity Theory of Social Norms and its Implications’ Tulane Law
Review,Vol 78, pp 605-652 7Onyango, E.O (2010),Pastoralists in Violent Defiance of the State: The Case of the Karimojong in
Northeastern Uganda, op cit 8Wario, R. etal (2009), ‘Scarcity of Natural Resources and Pastoral Conflicts in Northern Kenya: An Inquiry’ in
theHorn of Africa Bulletin, Volume 21, No, 1, January, (Life & Peace Institute), pp 1-5.
37
Some analysts9 focus on the level of states suggesting that government policies, which
promote structured inequality along group lines, are behind various conflicts while others
focus on group and individual level suggesting ethnic, racial or religious lines amid
competition for power. Part of this argument has some relevancy when discussing the
question of governance in relations to the pastoralists. The problem of human insecurity
among the pastoral communities is largely an outcome of the failure of the post-colonial
independent states to extend their institutions of governance to pastoral areas.
Marginalization of the pastoralists has its roots from the colonial period and perpetuated
throughout the post independence period. Overtly, the colonial administration considered
pastoral lands as uneconomical due to its poor resource base (basically arid). The bulk of
public resources were concentrated in the ‘high potential areas’ leaving the pastoral
communities lagging behind in all spheres of development.10
Economic and political
activities were concentrated in high potential areas. The government developed schools,
health facilities, roads, communications infrastructure, and administrative structures in these
areas and left the arid zones with little or no activity to support meaningful development. The
postcolonial administrations have not done much to correct this imbalance, instead they have
promoted the same by simply concentrating most of development initiatives in ‘high
potential’ areas.
This ties in well with some elements of the neo-liberal economic theory that posits
that causes of conflicts may be found in the analysis that emphasizes the structure of the
international system such as the historical legacy of colonial era and delimitation of borders
9Ibid
10African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya accessed on 5 May 2010 Op cit,
38
that have produced dysfunctional states or globalization-induced growth of social and
economic inequalities.11
The behavioral school of thought locates conflict causes within the social and
psychological frameworks in which human behavior is the key determinant whether at the
individual or group levels.12
They highlight perceptions and misconceptions as causes of
conflict. Frustration and aggression theories use individual psychology to explain civil strife,
including strikes, riots, coups, revolutions, and guerrilla wars. They suggest that individuals
become aggressive when they feel frustrated by something or someone they believe is
blocking them from fulfilling a strong desire. An important subset of these theories suggests
that relative deprivation can cause this frustration and aggression when people perceive a
widening gap between the level of satisfaction they have achieved (often defined in economic
terms) and the level they believe they deserve. They argue that an aggressive behaviour is
innate and biologically programmed in the human species. One dimension of the behavioral
theory argues that processes of group formation and differentiation, particularly the role that
images, (mis)perceptions, stereotyping, and dehumanizing play in decision making lead to
violent conflicts and represent a psych-social perspective.
Aspects of this school of thought are true regarding pastoral communities in Kenya.
The structural approaches advance conflict theories and issues related to structural causes of
conflicts. It issues out of the assumption that the structural arrangement of the society itself
creates the causes and conditions for conflict. According to Mwagiru13
structural conflicts are
part of the non violent conflicts and exist because there is something wrong with the structure
11El-Tom, A O(1994),‘Mugging the Poor: The Bretton Woods Institutions and the Pursuit of African
Development’ (Maynooth, Ireland, Institute for African Alternatives) 12
Lorenz, K, (1974) On Aggression Marjorie Kerr Wilson (trans) (New York and London, Hancourt Brace
Jovanovich), Volkan, V. (1988)The Need for Enemies and Allies From Clinical Practice to International
Relations, (Northvale, New Jersey Aronson,), Bloom, W. (1990) Personal Identity, National Identity and
International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 13
Mwagiru, M. (2003) Peace and Conflict Management in Kenya, Nairobi, Catholic Justice and Peace
Commission–Nakuru Diocese, P9
39
of relationship between people. Writing on structural violence, Galtung14
argues that unequal
social structures produce unequal access to resources for different social groups. A structural
conflict is a consequence of structural factors and necessitates an examination of factors
beyond triggers and accelerators, which are immediate and often provide an opportunity for
long standing problems to manifest themselves. Recognizing these underlying problems and
understanding their root causes is a difficult task as the fabric of conflict rarely is woven of a
single thread. These structures are economic, social, psychological, religious, and legal
frameworks. The differentiation and inequalities that occur in various sectors along these
lines is a consequence of these structures, which eventually effects relationship within and
across society.15
The structural approach to conflicts requires a deeper analysis of the structure that
defines social relationships in particular settings and entails addressing the hard questions
concerning the fundamental causes of conflict and not what has instigated or sparked off a
conflict. The search for root or structural causes lies in efforts to find the underlying and
sometimes elusive source of violence. Many times structural factors are not always visible
and issues such as ethnic enmity, religious intolerance or hate speech are often manifestations
of deeper structural issues. Structural causes are deep-seated social structures that give rise to
individual and group grievances. Issues of natural resource management such as access to
water, absence of water and security and systematic economic marginalization have been
underlying drivers of conflicts in pastoral areas.
Marginalization of pastoral zones demonstrates the crisis of governance in the entire
IGAD region: The governments have privileged some areas and communities over others in
the development process of the country. Apart from the parallel marginalization, parts of the
14Galtung, J. (1996),Peace and Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict Development and Civilization (Oslo,
Norway and Thousand Oaks, California International Peace Research Institute, Sage Publications,) 15
John, B. (1990),Conflict Human Needs Theory (London, Macmillan)
40
citizenry have been excluded from the mainstream political and economic affairs. This has
led to resentment that has sometimes spawned violent conflicts in the region.
The unusually high-level intensity conflicts has escalated among pastoralists across
and within international borders in what looked much like cattle raiding. The introduction of
automatic weapons and intermittent episodes of civil strife, which have, became almost
synonymous with pastoralism have worsened the situation. This locates the question of
security among the pastoral communities in the IGAD region within the international political
economy. A study by Sandra16
has demonstrated the connection of Africa with the global
political economy through crime networks, illegal trade in natural resources or small arms
trade which exacerbate and prolong if not necessarily cause war. In this regard, and within
the context of conflicts in pastoral areas, local and regional actors in international networks
are contributors as actors through illegal trade in small arms and it is therefore imperative that
conflict prevention and management need to be treated as process involving local, national,
regional, and global complexes.
The introduction of cheap and easily accessible small arms and light weapons has
intensified the situation resulting in continuous insecurity and loss of life and property.
According to the UN Panel of Experts definition and which this study uses light weapons
refers to a range of weapons designed for use by more than one-person serving as a crew.17
They include heavy machine guns; hand held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers;
portable anti-tanks and anti-aircraft guns; recoilless rifles; portable launchers of anti tank and
anti aircraft missiles and mortars of carbines less than 100mm. On the other hand, small arms
are a sub-set of light weapons that are designed for personal use and include revolvers and
16
Maclean, S. J. ‘Fighting Locally, Connecting Globally: Inside and Outside Dimensions of African Conflict’ in
the Roots of African Conflicts, the Causes and Costs. (eds) Nhema, A. and Zeleza, P.T, (2008) OSSREA, Addis
Ababa, 166-180 17
See the UN Panel of Experts (1997) definition which distinguishes between Small arms and light weapons
41
self-loading pistols, rifles and carbines, assault rifles, sub-machine guns and light machine
guns. Ammunitions and explosives are considered an integral part of the small arms and light
weapons. This study also uses the term small arms to refer to both small arms and light
weapons.
Overall these arms do not require extensive logistical capabilities and thus are
convenient for high mobile operations. They are widely available, durable, highly portable,
easily concealed, and possess legitimate military, police and civilian uses (so are present in
virtually every society) and often so easy to operate and require minimal training. Due to the
enormous firepower and lethality in particular of light weapons such as mortars, rockets and
grenade launchers, individuals or armed groups can cause heavy civilian causalities and
massive destruction of properties even with limited financial, material and technical support.
Furthermore, their relatively low acquisition and maintenance cost in comparison with other
conventional arms, makes them weapons of choice to armed non-statutory actors. These
weapons are also relatively light in weight, and therefore convenient among child soldiers
that have been participated in Somalia, Sierra Leon, Liberia, Sudan and Uganda.18
Initially, raiding animals among the pastoral communities was contacted under certain
norms and values that were designed to limit damage to life and property and was resolved in
a manner that provided for mediation, dialogue and compensation rather than punishment.19
The introduction of small arms has drastically altered the rules of the raiding in that they have
intensified and increased the scale and lethality of conflicts in pastoral areas. The situation
was worsened by the experience gained by pastoralists who have fought in some of the civil
18
Human Rights Watch/African Rights Watch, (1997) The Scars of Death Children abducted by the Lord’s
Resistance Army in Uganda, Children’s Rights Project, (New York, Human Rights Watch/African Rights
Watch,) 19Wairagu, F. ‘Raids and Battles involving Turkana Pastoralists' in Fighting for Inclusion: Conflicts among
Pastoralists in Eastern Africa and the Horn (eds) Goldsmith, P. et al (2007) Development Policy Management
Forum (DPMF) pp 33-54
42
wars in the IGAD region.20
According to the African Union/InterAfrican Bureau for Animal
Resources (AU/IBAR) the availability of automatic weaponry from macro-level conflict in
the region (such as Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia) have led to increased banditry and made
commercial raids more viable. Small arms have intensified, spread violent conflicts and
allowed smaller groups of raiders to act sometimes without the approval of the community
through elders.21
Before the influx of small arms to pastoral areas in the late 1970s, pastoralists
competed for land and cattle and still faced inadequate state security but relied on less lethal
weapons such as bows, arrows and spears for protection. In a context of increasing
vulnerability at the household level, both from insecurity and economic decline, small arms
are regarded as household or community assets. In some families, within the pastoralists,
small arms are transferred from father to son as an inheritance and it is difficult to separate
such people from the arms while in others they are community properties which must
sanction their usage.22
The diffusion and use of illicit small arms among the pastoral groups
have intensified the traditional practice of livestock raiding, continues to fuel, and sustain
conflicts hence creating zones of insecurity across the arid and semi arid areas of the region
of the country. They have increased hostility and invariably created ‘zones of insecurity’
where banditry, low-level insurgency, and insecurity thrive. Chweya23
note that while
conflicts in pastoral areas are a historical feature of the pastoral communities rather than an
emerging security issue, the infiltration of firearms has exacerbated the magnitude, the
frequency and the scale of atrocity associated with them. Chweya note further that ‘the
20For comprehensive discussion on how pastoral groups have been enlisted in civil wars in the region read
Markakis, J. ‘Conflict in the Horn of Africa’ in Environment and Conflict in Africa: Reflections on Durfur.
Leroy, M. (ed), (University for Peace Programme, Addis Ababa, 2009) pp 54-59:57 21
AU/IBAR, Pastoralism and Conflict: Getting Policies Right. Policy Briefing Paper No. 10, Nairobi. 22
Marwa, P.‘Sungusungu in Kuria: An Indigenous Approach towards Control and Management of Small Arms’
in Small Arms in the Horn of Africa: Challenges Issues and Perspectives, Brief No 23 (Bonn, BICC,( 2002), 30. 23
Chweya, L. ‘Emerging Dimensions of the Security in the IGAD region’ in M. Makumi (ed) African Regional
Security in the Age of Globalization (Nairobi, Heinrich Boll Foundation, 2004) pp.31-48:40
43
increased use of firearms rather than spears and arrows has elevated the military technology
applied in the defense or acquisition of scarce water, and pasture and thereby transformed
conflicts from previously occasional mid night raids to outright and drawn out war’.
Ufuho24
notes that although certain practices such as cattle rustling are linked to
indigenous cultural practices, the introduction of modern weapons has contributed directly to
the intensity of conflicts in pastoral areas. Pastoral groups attack each other during cattle
raids, which have gained a high currency due to the use of small arms. A study by the
Institute for Security Studies (ISS) observed that;
‘The arid and semi-arid parts of the horn are beset by recurring periods of drought.
Pastoralist societies both sedentary and nomadic have been struggling with these
conditions. The fight for resources, historically a source of conflict among the people
of these lands, has now become aggravated by the increased availability of small
arms.25
The resultant conflicts are interlinked and have identical roots, structural causes and
triggers. Patterns of conflict in pastoral regions in the IGAD region are at large complex.
There are many factors contributing to the incidences of violent conflict involving
pastoralists, and these have tended to become mutually reinforcing. Some conflicts among
and between pastoralist communities, such as cattle rustling have a long history and have
partly become an aspect of traditional pastoralist culture.
The literature on the discourses of conflicts shows that insecurity in pastoral areas
over the past decades have been over tough issues of security, access to resources, and
territory rights under the law in an environment of governance deficit. Furthermore, these
literatures cannot be located within one theoretical framework instread the instability in these
marginal regions of the IGAD region find accommoadation in anumber of theoretical
frameworks that includes structural theories, the level of states, social and psychological
24Ufuho H. (2004) ‘Security Concerns in the Horn of Africa’ in M. Makumi (ed) African Regional Security in
the Age of Globalization (Nairobi, Heinrich Boll Foundation, ) pp.7-17:12 25
Ibid P.14
44
frameworks, and group identity theories among others. However, elements of all these
frameworks find relevancy in pastoral areas because of governance deficit. Within these
frameworks, it emerges that there is limited state administrative and security structures in
pastoral areas coupled with inadequate policing, widespread use of modern weaponry in the
practice of cattle rustling and the diminishing role of traditional governance systems which is
a consequence of governance deficit. In addition, issues relating to competition over control
and access to natural resources such as pasture and water, land issues, political incitements,
ethnocentrism, increasing levels of poverty and high rate of unemployment particularly
amongst the youth have made hitherto localised conflicts in pastoral areas increasingly
destructive and less manageable.26
2.3 Discourses on Environmental Security
Generally, environment provides all life support systems of every human society.27
While
international environmental concerns are usually couched in broad terms like climatic change
and desertification, the environmental problem to local settings and vulnerable groups visa vis
pastoralists is generally localized in nature, revolving around immediate issues that threaten
their livelihood and survival. Although well suited for pastoralist livelihoods, grasslands are
on the decline attributed to land degradation, bush encroachment, termite invasion in some
areas and change of land use.28
According to Mesele and Coppock,29
land use in pastoral areas can be classified into
grassland, bushed grassland, bush land and cropland. Grasslands have the highest level of
organic matter and, therefore, the highest soil productivity. Bush lands have a prevalence of
26Pkalya,R. et al(2003), 5, Conflict in Northern Kenya: A focus on the internally displaced conflict victims in
Northern Kenya; op cit 27
Onuoha, F. (2009) Environmental Degradation, Livelihood and Conflicts the Implications of the Diminishing
Water Resources of Lake Chad for North-Eastern Nigeria: (Lagos, University of Lagos Press):38. 28
Fafo A. (2010), 28, The impact of Environmental and political influences on Pastoral conflicts in Southern
Ethiopia Draft paper presented at the conference on climate change and security in Trondheim 29
Mesele S. and Coppock D L. (2006), Changes in Land Cover and Soil Conditions for the Yabelo District of
Borana Plateau, 1973-2003.( California: University of California Press,)p.17
45
woody species and the most degraded soils. They lose crucial top soil that contains organic
matter because of being exposed to soil erosion. Traditionally, pastoralists used to limit the
spread of bush lands through the use of controlled fire over rangeland but after its ban, the
land is highly degraded and the bush land spreading. Some of these factors such as pasture
and water are also highlighted in the Commission of Human Security Report30
, which
identifies competition over land and resources as other causes of conflicts.
Contemporary debate on the aspect of environmental security continues to elicit
different reactions from various scholars. This debate takes two perspectives. The first is the
meaning, content and scope of the concept and the second is the securitarization of
environment or simply re-defining environment in security terms. A healthy physical
environment is critical to the survival of human beings. Traditionally, human beings have
exploited environment and rightly assumed that it will eventually recover. But with the ever
increasing world population, industrialization and global warming among other factors, it has
become increasingly evident that the natural system of environmental recovery which
underlines the importance of environmental security cannot cope with the destructive
activities of human beings as well natural disasters. Generally, there is consensus that
environmental security is an important aspect of human life but to be part of the expanded
notion of security, a couple of issues call for clarification. These issues revolve around
whether it should be part of the expanding horizons of the redefinitions of security and
include clarifying its referent object, identifying the subjects (states, society or people) of
environmental security and indicating whether there can be environmental security at all.
Like the notion of human security, it is critical to identify what is being secured and by
whom.
30
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), (1994), Human Development Report: New Dimensions of
Human Security. New York: 1994.p 6
46
Brock31
notes that efforts to redefine security have created a strong impulse to
subsume environmental matters under the logic of security discourses. Brock points out that
this is problematic because the issue of environment is a survival one, therefore such an
approach may limit the scope for healthy discourse on environmental matters, and secondly it
may lead to unwarranted generalizations about different social problems as security issues.
The thrust of the debate on the reconceptualization of security is against the background of
the assumption that if the concept does not go beyond state security then neglect of other
determinants of security could lead to conflict or violence. The proponents of the redefinition
of security stress the need to pay attention to the non-military threats to the life and wellbeing
of people. Following the convincing argument that non-military threats are becoming more
and more important in comparison with military threats environmental degradation is one of
them.32
Furthermore, Brock argues that the underlying epistemology is not convincing
because there have always been non-military threats across borders to the life and wellbeing
of others as the history of imperialism and colonialism demonstrates. He therefore wonders
whether humanity is facing a new situation and if so to what extent. He argues that in post
colonial period there may be simply a new composition of non-military threats instead of a
new balance between military and non-military threats. Furthermore, the threat or the use of
force on one hand and environmental security on the other, constitute different problems,
which presents a policy formulation challenge due to lack of specificity and focus.
Proponents33
of the securitarization of the environment argue that it has political
advantage and justification of the historical military arguments among others. For instance,
31
Brock, L (1997), ‘The Environment and Security: Conceptual and Theoretical Issues’ in Conflict and
Environment (ed) Gleditsch, N.P. (Dordrecht, Kluwer). 32
Ibid 33Lodgaard, S. (1990) ‘Environment and Conflict Resolution’ A paper presented at the UNEP meeting on
Environmental Conflict Resolution, Nairobi, 30 March and Waever, O. (1994), ‘Insecurity and Identity
Unlimited’, Working Papers, No 14, (Copenhagen: Center for Peace and Conflict Research) p6
47
Lodgard34
argues convincingly that securitarization of the environment helps to elevate and
keep the question of environment live at the highest political level. It therefore helps to
sustain the debates at the global level and in doing so galvanizes international support on
related aspects. The second contention is that securitarization of the environment helps to
justify the historical arguments on the use of force. The argument is that military intervention
may be inevitable to prevent the destruction of environment on objective needs therefore
perpetuating the use of force.
Broadening the definition of security to include aspects such as environment, food,
economic, health and personal community and state security undermines the usefulness of the
concept because it exposes inconsistencies.35
However, Ullman36
argues that focusing
exclusively on military threats carries the high opportunity cost of neglecting potentially
more menacing dangers. Mathews37
endorses the broadening of security to include resources,
environment and demographic issues pointing to the interrelated impact of population growth
and resources scarcity. There is also fear that securitarization of the environment could lead
to the militarization of the environment rather than greening of the security.38
The fear is that
military institutions are more likely to co-opt and weaken the non-statist non-threat based co-
34Ibid p6 35
Dokken and Graeger (1995) ‘The Concept of Environmental Security; Political Slogan or Analytical Tool?’
International Peace Research Institute (PRIO), Waever (1995) ‘Securitization and Desecuritization’ in Lipscutz
(ed) on Security, New York, Columbia University Press pp 46-86 and Deudney (1991) Environment and
Security: Muddled Thinking, Bulleting of the Atomic Scientists,( April) 22-28 36Ullman, R ( 1983) Redefining Security International Security 8 Summer 129-153 37
Mathews, J. T. (1989)‘Redefining Security’, Foreign Affairs, 68: 162-177 38
Waever, O (1995), ‘Securitization and Desecuritization’ in Lipscutz (ed) on Security, New York, Columbia
University Press pp 46-86 and Deudney (1991) Environment and Security: Muddled Thinking, Bulleting of the
Atomic Scientists,( April) 22-28,Gleditsch (1997 Conflict and the Environmental (ed) Gleditch, N.P (Dordrecht,
Kluwer Academic Publishers) pp 4-14:4, Conca, K (1994) In the name of sustainability Peace Studies and
Environmental Discourses, Peace and Change 19: 91-113 and Dunlap, Charles ‘The Origins of Military Coup
of 2012’, Parameters, (Winter).
48
operative ethic of environmental rescue at the expense of undergoing radical changes to
reflect on the emerging security threats.39
The perceptions that security institutions are searching for new missions to justify
funding levels and remain relevant in post cold war era where some writers have predicted a
reduction in interstate conflicts reinforces the criticism.40
Some critiques have also noted that
the concept of environmental security is a ‘western term’ and therefore unacceptable to the
south as a paradigm for exposing and addressing environmental related problems.41
Sections
of the debate on securitization of environment notes that it involves more risks than
opportunities for environment, to the extent that it helps to dramatize the situation but may
have unintended consequences that can undermine the original intention.
2.4 Discourses on Governance
Buzan etal42
have shown that weaknesses in the systems of governance in Africa have
intensified tribal and ethnic rivalries, which in turn have contributed to fragile political
structures and failed to create a sustainable political power base necessary for pluralist
transformation. The failure at creating a plural society has translated into other consequences
of security nature. Particularly, the absence of popular participation and official
accountability has resulted into widespread social injustice and gross inequalities in many
African countries. The failures in governance have also been expectedly accompanied by
political repressions and intolerance exacerbated by glaring insensitivities to the misery of the
39Conca, K (1994) Ibid19: 91-113 and Finger, M. (1994) Global Environment Degradation and the Military in
Jyrki Kikanen, (ed) Green Security or Militarized Environment, (Brookfield, Drathmouth Publishing Co) pp
169-192 40
Walt, S. M. (1991), ‘The Renaissance of Security Studies’, International Studies Quarterly 35 (2) 211-239,
Butts (1994) ‘Why the Military is Good for Environment’, Jyrki Kakonen (ed) Green Security or Militarized
Environment (Brookfield, Dartmouth Publishing Co.) 41
Conca (1994) ‘In the name of sustainability Peace Studies and Environmental Discourses’, Peace and Change
19: 91-113 op cit, Shiva,V (1994) Conflicts and Global Ecology: Environmental Activism in a period of Global
Reach, Alternatives Social Transformation and Global Governance 19:2 195-207 and Dalby, S (1998) Human
Security Environmental Dimensions of a contested Concept. Paper for a government of Canada department of
Foreign Affairs and International Trade Workshop on ‘Taking Human Security Seriously’ 42Buzan etal (1991)
49
majority of the people in many African countries. In some cases, governments have armed
specific communities43
. This selective arming of certain communities to counter livestock
rustling countries, overtly or covertly is an indirect state’s admittance that it does not have the
have the capacity to provide adequate security to their citizens. Unfortunately, the practice
has created a false impression that security is found in guns. The tragic insecurity
implications of these conditions and practice are the excruciating and increasing scale of
dehumanizing poverty, which have driven communities to acquire arms.
Mkutu44
indicate that governance in the Horn of Africa is characterized by
manipulation of ethnicity patronage and a political culture of exclusion. This has been a
phenomenon in both pre and post independence periods. Although governments of the Horn
have made some attempts to include pastoral communities in government, overall such
communities have been under-represented in the political life. The pastoral regions remain
hugely underdeveloped and the population impoverished. They have limited access to
education which has been criticized for being insensitive to nomadic lifestyle. The low
literacy levels adversely affect development and more important reduce opportunities for
influencing political decision-making process at all levels.
Several studies45
have indicated why sections of the population acquire arms in the
Horn. Explanatory factors range from policy to cultural ones. The demand for arms is easily
satisfied as arms are easily purchased, obtained through barter trade or stolen from
government depots. In pastoral areas, small arms acquisition is seen as means of widening
options for: personal, communal, clan or larger family defense requirements. It entails
protection from armed groups, bandits and other clans and securing their interests for
43This has included some sections of the Tesos and Marakwet communities in Uganda and Kenya
respectively 44Ken Mkutu (2001), Pastoralism and conflict in the Horn of Africa report, (London, Africa Peace
Forum/Saferworld/University of Bradford). 45
(BICC 2000)
50
example, raiding other communities and taking way their animals to restock their heads after
period of drought and for pride price. Other reasons for intermittent conflicts among pastoral
communities include interference with their cultural way for example privatising their land
which disrupts grazing patterns and coping strategies, commercialisation of livestock raiding
where businessmen and in certain cases officers from the provincial administration collude
with raiders to buy the stolen stock for commercial purposes. Other reasons include the small
arms economy, introduction of new natural resource management and land tenure systems
that conflict with the traditional systems of resource management. This has resulted in the
reduction and fragmentation of grazing areas and increased the impact of droughts and
scarcity.
The security and defence needs of the pastoral communities must be understood in the
context of the reality of the state’s absence in the Horn of Africa. According to Mworozi46
security, cannot be secured by domestic security agencies particularly in marginalized areas.
Tulya Muhika47
has argued that that through a series of chance and bungled circumstances,
civilians in Uganda has been militarized. Traditional safety checks have been lost and the
impact in the region is far reaching raising expenditure in provision of security. Mworozi48
argues that the issue of small arms among the Karamoja in Uganda has made the Pokots and
Turkanas in Kenya also to arm and ensure security of their lives and livestock.
Mkutu and Okoko49
argue that in recent years, customary traditional governance
institutions among pastoral communities have been eroded partly because the governments in
Horn have failed to recognize their role in conflict management. The erosion of traditional
governance institutions among the pastoralist communities has rendered the ability to resolve
46
Eddy Mworozi (2000) 47
Tulya Muhika (2000) 48Mworozi Ibid 49Mkutu (2001) & Okoko (2000)
51
conflict ineffective. In effect conflicts have intensified ‘eldership’ which can now be
achieved by becoming wealthy through raiding.
2.5 Discourses on the links between Conflict and Environmental Security
There have been numerous studies50
on the links between conflict and environmental
security or its elements such as environmental scarcity sometimes referred to as ‘resource
wars’ or conflicts over resource scarcity. However, the Toronto and ENCOP schools have
spearheaded the academic and policy debates surrounding the link between environment and
conflicts within the context of environmental security. Some of these studies51
have
demonstrated the difficulties of proving what appears to be intuitively correct assumption that
there is direct correlation between components of environmental security such as
environmental degradation on the one hand and conflict on the other. The Toronto school
examines the prospect of environmental stress causing acute conflict both within and among
a select group of states.52
The work focuses on three aspects of environmentally-induced
conflict namely, interstate conflict originating in part from resource scarcity, sub-national or
intrastate conflict originating in some part from what was termed as environmental scarcity
driving population movements; and sub-national or intrastate conflict (civil strife and
insurgency) originating in some part from environmental stress exacerbating economic
deprivation and disrupting key social institutions. In their empirical research, the school
focuses on developing countries on the assumption that the linkage between environmental
stress and acute conflict is strongest in these countries. They argued that many less-developed
states of the South tend to have weak institutional capacity for adapting to environmental
50
Leroy, M. (2009),Environment and Conflict in Africa, (Addis Ababa, University for Peace), Barnett, J.
(2001),The Meaning of Environmental Security: Ecological Politics and Policy in the New Security Era,
(London, Zed Books) 51
Hagmann, T. (2005), ‘Confronting the Concept of Environmentally-Induced Conflicts’ Peace Conflict and
Development: Op cit 52
See also various studies from IPRI, Oslo and the US National Academy of Sciences especially in the 1990 and
beyond
52
stress, high levels of biophysical risk, and often-high rate of population growth. The method
used to select the case study stresses the question of how environmentally induced conflicts
occur.53
The group led by Homer-Dixon54
examines seven major environmental problems in
an effort to understand better their roles as potential contributors to conflict. These are global
warming, stratospheric ozone depletion, acid deposition, deforestation, degradation of
agricultural land, overuse and pollution of water supplies, and depletion of fish stocks.
Similar to other researchers of environmentally-induced conflicts, the team focuses on
renewable resources such as fisheries and timber as well as renewable services such as
sustaining agricultural soil. The study also looks at a range of issues, such as population,
social adaptation, and urban growth. The project included case studies in countries such as
Bangladesh, Pakistan, India, the Philippines, Haiti, Lesotho, South Africa, Senegal,
Mauritania, Ethiopia, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Israel, Turkey, Iraq, China, Mexico, Pakistan,
Rwanda, Nicaragua, and Peru.
Thomas Homer-Dixon specifies the relationship among environmental degradation,
the struggle over resources, and conflict and human insecurity. He cautions against assuming
a direct relationship between degradation and conflict. Homer-Dixon identifies three sources
of resource depletion and degradation: supply-induced, demand-induced, and structural
scarcity. Supply-induced scarcity results from a total decrease for resource available for
consumption and related to technologies and practices used in the consumption of the
resource. Demand-induced scarcity results from an increase in total population and other
changes in consumption patterns. The third type, structural scarcity, is caused by a 'severe
imbalance in the distribution of wealth and power that results in some groups in a society
53
Homer-Dixon, T. On the threshold: Environmental Change as Causes of acute Conflict International Security
(1991)16 (2) 234-260 54
Ibid
53
getting disproportionately large slices of the resource pie, whereas others get slices that are
too small to sustain their livelihoods'
Structural scarcity has been a factor in nearly every case where resource scarcity has
resulted in conflict. None of these factors operates alone instead; all interact and reinforce
each other in varying ways. For example, if a rapidly growing population is dependent on a
fixed amount of farm, the demand pressures (requiring more food production per acre) will
result in over-farming of the available land, which reduces the fertility of the soil, which
becomes incapable of producing the required yield to support the population even with the
use of fertilizers (a supply-induced scarcity). Any outside pressure from an elite group (or
warlords) that limits the available land to farm, such as government regulations or a feudal
system (structural scarcity) exacerbates the shortages. Homer-Dixon55
warns that
'environmental scarcity is never a sole or sufficient cause of large migrations, poverty, or
violence; it always joins with other economic, political, and social factors to produce its
effects' In this regard, this is a flaw or a weakness in the framework because it does not
identify the specific factors that combine to produce conflict.
These sources (supply, demand, and structural) can act singly or in combination to
create the general condition of environmental scarcity. The interaction of these sources
produces two phenomena that Homer-Dixon refers to as resource capture and ecological
marginalization. Resource capture occurs when a decrease in the quantity or quality of
renewable resources coincides with population growth “to encourage powerful groups within
a society to shift resource distribution in their favour. This can produce dire environmental
scarcity for poorer and weaker groups whose claims to resources are opposed by these
55
Ibid
54
powerful elites.”56
The resource capture that occurs in pastoral areas is occasioned by a
decrease in the quantity of pasture and water partly because of population increase but more
so drought. Ecological marginalization occurs when population growth and un limited pasture
and water combines as cause migrations to regions that are ecologically fragile, such as steep
upland slopes, areas at risk of desertification, and tropical rain forests. High population
densities in these areas, combined with a lack of knowledge and capital to protect local
resources, causes severe environmental damage and chronic poverty.57
These sources of environmental scarcity in turn can produce social effects that are
linked to violent conflict if countries are unable to adapt to the environmental scarcities.
Homer-Dixon believes that adaptation is more difficult in developing countries due to their
common shortage of social institutions, resources and technical expertise for addressing the
scarcities. He then identifies four social effects, which are intertwined that are particularly
relevant for studying violent conflict: 1) decreased agricultural production; 2) decreased
economic productivity; 3) population displacement; and 4) disrupted institutions and social
relations. Emanating from environmental scarcity, they can undermine the capacity and
legitimacy of a state that increasingly cannot meet the rising demands of the population with
its declining resources. This gap between expectations and the state’s capability to meet the
rising demands may also lead to increased competition among elites according to the Homer-
Dixon findings.
The movement of people (social effect number 3), for example, poses an internal
threat in developing countries exhibiting low levels of state capacity, where most mass
migration is occurring. Beyond presenting an additional burden on the social welfare
functions of the state, migrant populations can challenge the economic and political control of
56
Homer-Dixon, T. (1994), ‘Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases’. Op cit 5-
40:10 57
Ibid pp10-11.
55
the state. It is useful to distinguish between the type and condition of peoples who move
voluntarily from those who are forced to flee life-threatening conditions. The distinction
between voluntary and forced migration does help determine the likely degree of threat posed
to the regime.58
Voluntary migrants are typically equipped with financial and/or educational
capabilities that allow them to make more forceful demands of the state. Forced migrants,
while placing additional social welfare burdens on the state, are typically more disadvantaged
and dis-organized and therefore more easily repressed or absorbed by the country.59
This
study considers the question internal migrations or movements of the pastoral communities
induced by both cultural practices and scarcity of resources.
At the beginning of their project, Homer-Dixon and his team hypothesized that these
four social effects, based on environmental scarcity, would likely contribute to three types of
environmentally induced conflict (namely simple scarcity-conflict between or among states,
group-identity-conflict within or among states; and relative deprivation- conflict within or
among states) surrounding renewable resources. The evidence and analysis coming from the
project suggests that environmentally induced conflict is sub-national, diffuse and persistent
in character.60
Little evidence supports the first hypothesis regarding simple scarcity conflict
between states, with the possible exception of water. Again, the focus on renewable resources
distinguishes the research from non-renewable resource wars. However, hypotheses two and
three did find more support in the in-depth case studies. Some cases supports the hypothesis
that intrastate group identity and deprivation conflicts (and perhaps coups d’état) could be
caused by population movements, economic decline and weakened states. Evidence
58Zohlberg, et al, (1989) Escape from Violence: Conflict and the Refugee Crisis in the Developing World. (New
York: Oxford University Press).p 28 59
Suhrke, A. (1993) Pressure Points: Environmental Degradation, Migration and Conflict. Occasional Paper
No. 3, Project on Environmental Change and Acute Conflict, University of Toronto Peace and Conflict Studies
Program, and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, (Washington, D.C.)Sandberg, K. and D. Smith
(1994) "Conflicts in Africa" North/South Coalition Information Bulletin) 2-94 (December): 5-19. 60
Homer-Dixon, (1994), Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases.International
Security 19(1): 5-40. op cit
56
suggested that global problems such as climate change and stratospheric ozone depletion
were less likely to cause environmentally induced conflict while fish stocks, forests, water
and agricultural land issues were most likely of the renewable resources to induce conflict.
This study takes the view that within the context of pastoral communities environmentally
induced conflicts are mainly around water and pasture.
Three causal scenarios illustrate how the three sources of environmental scarcity,
singly or in combination, may cause a series of social effects that in turn leads to one of the
conflict ideal types. These scenarios are drawn from the project’s case studies and their
reporting in Homer-Dixon. Population growth can result in less agricultural land being
available. This may then induce human migrations that, in turn, may lead to violent conflict.
Unequal access to resources can combine with high rates of population growth to produce
environmental degradation. This degradation can then contribute to “economic deprivation
that spurs insurgency and rebellion”61
Population growth and a decline in quantity and quality
of renewable resources may lead to changes in access to resources (development project,
change in property rights). These changes may in turn; cause violence among those denied or
given reduced access to the resources.
This 'neo-Malthusian’, argument draws a direct correlation between environmental
stress and conflict.62
This school argues that environmental stress and conflict over resources
is the greatest security threat since the end of the Cold War. The neo-Malthusians point to
Darfur as prima facie evidence of the relationship between environmental degradation and
conflict and deteriorating human security. Critics of the neo-Malthusian theory, such as
Deudney63
suggest that fighting to obtain scarce resources is rarely rational, since there are
61
Ibid 62
Renner, M. (1996), Fighting for Survival: Environmental Decline, Social Conflict and the New Age of
Insecurity, (New York, W.W. Norton ) pp. 17-30 63
Daniel, D. (1990), ‘The Case Against Linking Environmental Degradation and National Security’, Millennium
Journal of International Studies 19 (3 ) 461-76
57
cheaper solutions like conservation, trade, and substitution. Based on empirical studies, other
scholars64
have countered that given certain social conditions, violent conflict is more likely if
lootable resources are abundant. Additionally, skeptics such as Gleditsch,65
have cautioned
against the 'neo-Malthusian' tendency to draw direct causal linkages between environmental
scarcity and conflict and human security. Gleditsch has demonstrated empirically that the
links are not as strong as 'neo-Malthusians' claim.
Homer-Dixon66
has enlarged his analysis to include the relationship between climate
change, world energy consumption and violent conflict. In environmental security scenarios,
the determinants of crisis are likely to be rapid population growth, the degradation and
distribution of renewable resources and regime stability. These are generally regarded as
policy failures that allow physical changes to act as major agents in inciting violence. States
are likely to both experience resources scarcity and due to regime weakness suffer more from
it that is generally the position of this study.
Other studies though focused on the concept of environmental scarcity rather than on
environmental degradation per se, the conclusion by Homer-Dixon et al was telling:
“…scarcities of renewable resources are already contributing to violent conflicts in many
parts of the developing world.” Some scholars67
have been critical of this seemingly
deterministic perspective on environment and conflict and argue that violent conflict implied
64
Collier, P. et al(1998) "On economic causes of civil war," Oxford Economic Papers 50, 563-573 and De
Soysa, Indra (2002) "Paradise is a Bazaar? Greed, Creed, and Governance in Civil War, 1989-99," Journal of
Peace Research 39 (4), 395-416. 65
Gleditsch, N P. ‘Armed Conflict and the Environment: A Critique of the Literature’. Journal of Peace
Research, 35(3), 381-400. 66
Homer-Dixon, (1991); On the threshold: Environmental Change as Causes of acute Conflict International
Security and Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases. op cit, Homer-Dixon et al,
(1993), ‘Environmental Change and Violent Conflict’. Scientific American, 268(2): 38-45:42op cit 67
Dalby, S ‘Human Security Environmental Dimensions of a contested Concept’. Paper for a government of
Canada department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Workshop on ‘Taking Human Security Seriously’
24 July (1998), Deudney, D (1991) ‘Environment and Security: Muddled Thinking’, Bulleting of the Atomic
Scientists’, (April), 22-28, Conca, K (1994) ‘In the name of sustainability Peace Studies and Environmental
Discourses, Peace and Change 19: 91-113, Levy. M. ‘A Time for a Third wave of Environment and Security
Scholarship’ in Environmental Change and Security Project, Report No 1, Spring (Washington DC, Woodrow
Wilson Center, 1995a).pp 44-45
58
by Homer-Dixon’s statement above remains speculative and anecdotal. They hold that
despite the range of case studies that was undertaken, the evidence for a direct causal link
between conflict and environmental degradation is not strong. This group has argued that
most of the researchers writing on environment, conflict and security are from the disciplines
of international relations and political science, and therefore biased towards issues of state
and military security.
Furthermore, this school of thought avers that the interrelationships between
environmental change and various aspects of human security, which affects both individuals
and groups of people is not their central argument. They conclude that such research has
focused mainly on a very limited set of cases dealing with inter and intrastate violent
conflicts and state security. Bächler et. al68
demonstrated that environmental degradation and
resource depletion may play a number of different, and sometimes subtle roles in affecting
security and contributing to conflict. These include environment as factor to tensions, as a
channel leading to tension, as a trigger, as a catalyst or as a target. Baechler,et al69
among
other scholars, have strongly linked resource scarcity to violent conflict. They argue that
population pressures, combined with natural resource scarcity, contribute to violence,
especially in local or civil conflicts. While this study agrees to some extent with this
argument, it argues that poor, inadequate and ineffective institutional and legal frameworks
on utilization and management of resources have also been contributory factors to violent
conflicts particularly among the pastoral communities.
Other types of environmental threats have been noted to have the capacity to
contribute to insecurity and to produce conflict as well. Constraints on resources are crucial
68
ibid 69Baechler, G, (1999) Violence through Environmental Discrimination (Netherlands Dordrecht: Kluwer),
Homer-Dixon, T (1999), Environment, Scarcity and Violence, op cit, and Michael Klare (2001), Resource
Wars: The New landscape of Global Conflicts, Henry Holt and Company LLC New York
59
factors that are often discussed in the literature.70
Rapid industrialization and population
growth in many regions have resulted in an increased demand for both renewable and non-
renewable natural resources, and as Ullman and others71
have noted that competition for
resources has historically been a major cause of conflict. This statement seems intuitively
reasonable; however, there are some72
who feel the importance of resources and environment
as contributors to conflict is overstated. For instance, at first glance, the availability of water,
the depletion of fish stocks and deforestation have all been, or have the potential to be, the
source of conflict. According to Myers73
and the U.S. National Academy of Science, it has
further been suggested that atmospheric change both global warming and ozone depletion has
the potential to cause significant societal disruption. In addition, land degradation or land use
change in general may directly affect society's ability to provide food resources for a growing
population, or may indirectly affect other changes, such as global warming. Homer-Dixon74
provides some evidence of these relationships and concludes that environmental scarcity
(which includes environmental change, population growth, and an unequal distribution of
resources) causes violent conflict. While this contention remains open to debate, it is
increasingly accepted that environmental degradation is at least a contributor to conflict and
insecurity.
Barnett75
criticizes this type of literature for engaging in negative argumentation in
which relationship between the environment and conflict are assumed and blanket assertions
about how highly complex political contexts, state failure or bad governance are the link
between the two. In addition, Barnett argues that such studies claim to consider the politics of
70Choucri, N. (1991), ‘Resource Constraints as Causes of Conflict’ (Ecodecision 2: 52-55) 71
Ullman (1983) Redefining Security International Security 8 Summer 129-153 op cit 72
Lipschutz, R. (1995) (ed) On Security, (New York: Columbia University Press,) pp 1-23. 73
Myers, N. (1993) Ultimate Security: The Environmental Basis of Political Stability. (New
York: W.W. Norton & Co.) 74Homer-Dixon, T. (1994) Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases.
5-40. op cit 75
Barnett, J (2000) ‘Destabilizing the Environment Conflict Thesis’. Review of International Studies,271-288:26
60
developing countries yet none consider the powerful effects of political marginalization and
exclusion as a result of patronage politics or checkered capacity and access across state
territory. The dynamics of marginalization and political exclusion are important components
of conflict literature but sometimes receive little critical attention in the environmental
security discourse.76
Furthermore, there is limited evidence to support the claim that
environmental degradation or resource depletion has significant role in precipitating violent
conflicts and especially between states.77
On the same issue, Brock78
observes that most empirical research on the environment
and security has sought to establish the role of environmental scarcity or degradation in
violent conflicts, an approach that partly replaces the focus on security by a focus on conflicts
only and avoids the nuances and impact of environmental security. Brock raises the question
of whether the concern is about environment or conflict. In other words, conflict and
environment are two broad distinct fields that in most cases have been examined separately
and therefore any attempt to link the two must be clear and succinct. This study addresses this
reality by identifying elements of environmental security are linked to conflict.
Thus, coming up with a universal environmental scarcity model has proven to be
highly controversial. For instance, Dalby et al79
argue that international political and
economic factors significantly affect the three causes of scarcity- degradation, demographic
and distributional inequality.80
This means that to treat the relationship between
environmental scarcity and violence as a purely intrastate process is to begin the analysis at
76
Clionadh, R. (2009) ‘New Directions in Climate Change–Conflict Literature’ in Leroy, M.(eds) the
Environment and Conflicts in Africa: Reflections on Darfur, (University for Peace, Addis Ababa) pp.63-72:65 77
Deudney, D (1991) ‘Environment and Security: Muddled Thinking’, Bulleting of the Atomic Scientists’ op cit 78
Brock, L (1997) ‘The Environment and Security: Conceptual and Theoretical Issues’ in Conflict and
Environment (ed) Gleditsch, N P. (Dordrecht, Kluwer). 79
Dalby, S. (2002),, Environmental Security,(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press) p 16, and Fairhead. J
‘International dimensions of conflict over Natural and Environmental Resources’: in Peluso and Watts, (eds)
Violent Environments. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,2001) 213-236 80
Dalby, S. (2002), Environmental Security, op cit
61
an arbitrary point in the causal chain.81
Others like de Soysa,82
assert that it is the resource
abundance, not scarcity that can play a major role in causing intrastate conflicts. This
argument dubbed as ‘Honeypot’ theory argues that scarcity of renewable resources is more
likely to spur cooperation than conflicts, while the struggle to control high value
internationally tradable resources such as oil, diamond, iron ore, and gold as well as the
capacity to export them creates and sustains violent conflicts in many parts of developing
world83
Debate on environmental security by the Toronto School, which also has the support
of the pessimist or neo-Malthusian perspectives, can be classified into three main features. It
privileges the physical environmental in determining conflict risk within and across states and
it increasingly incorporates both distribution and marginalization into models of conflicts.
Both are regarded as functions of the physical proximity and access to scarce resources and
both are considered affected by rising populations and their pressures on non-renewable
resources.84
On the other hand, the Environment and Conflicts Projects (ENCOP) tried to develop
a typology of conflict by investigating what kinds of environmental degradation cause what
kinds of conflict.85
Like the Toronto Project, the ENCOP investigation focused on developing
countries with a series of in-depth case studies. ENCOP utilized a broad definition of
environmentally induced conflict that highlighted environmental degradation and resource
81
Fairhead, ‘International dimensions of conflict over Natural and Environmental Resources’: in Peluso and
Watts, (eds) Violent Environments .op cit 82
Indra de Soysa, Natural Resources and Civil Wars: ‘‘Shrinking Pie or Honeypot?’’ Paper presented at the 41st
Annual Convention of the International studies Association, Los Angels California, March 14-18, 2000 83
Ibid 84
Baechler, G, (1999) Violence through Environmental Discrimination (Netherlands Dordrecht: Kluwer),
Homer-Dixon (1999), Environment, Scarcity and Violence, Princeton NJ Princeton University Press, op cit and
Kahl, C,(2006),State Scarcity, Civil Strife in Developing World (Princeton, NJ and Oxford University Press). 85
Böge, V. (1992), ‘Proposal for an Analytical Framework to Grasp ‘Environmental Conflict’. Occasional Paper
No.1, Environment and Conflicts Project, Swiss Peace Foundation, Berne and Center for Security Studies and
Conflict Research, Zurich, Switzerland), Baechler, G.(1999), Violence through Environmental Discriminationop
cit,Bächler, etal (1996) Environmental degradation as a cause of war – KriegsursacheUmweltzerstörun.. 3
volumes, (Zürich Chur, Switzerland: Rüegger Verlag,).
62
depletion as contributing causal factors to different levels of conflict. Deterioration in
environmental quality or resource scarcities can exacerbate other socio-economic or political
factors that are themselves the proximate causes of violent conflict. The ENCOP research
highlighted development and equity in the form of maldevelopment and environmental
discrimination when trying to understand the role of the environment in conflict. Social and
political maldevelopment, due in part to a degradation of natural resources, has become an
international peace and security challenge. Environmental discrimination was also a critical
factor in the analysis. “Environmental discrimination occurs when distinct actors based on
their international position and/or their social, ethnic, linguistic, religious or regional identity
experience inequality through systematically restricted access to natural capital (productive
renewable resources) relative to other actors.86
The research identified arid and semi-arid
plains (dry lands) and poverty clusters of sprawling metro poles as one of the crisis areas
most susceptible to environmentally induced conflict. Others include mountain areas with
highland-lowland interactions; areas with river basins sub-divided by state boundaries, zones
degraded by mining, dams, and tropical forest belts. ENCOP categorized the types of
environmentally induced conflicts based on these crisis areas and the various case studies at
three levels: 1), when the environment plays a role between groups within a country; 2) when
internal conflicts become internationalized, often through population displacement; 3) and
when interstate conflict arises from the degradation of regional environments or the global
commons for example, state to state conflict over shared river basins.
However, the distinctions among these groups proved to be fluid, making it hard to
identify conflicts in strictly one category. In an attempt to make useful categorizations, the
ENCOP investigators broke down each of these three groups by the types of actors involved
in the conflicts, presenting seven “ideal” types of environmental conflict. Within all of these
86
Baechler, G, (1999) Violence through Environmental Discrimination (Netherlands Dordrecht: Kluwer, ), op
cit p4
63
categories, researchers stressed that social, political and economic factors also played key
causal roles where the environment is not sufficient to cause conflict. Environmental and
ethnic discrimination come together in ethno-political conflicts either when ethnic groups
share a degraded and less productive ecological zone or when a less environmentally
advantaged ethnic group moves into the ecological zone of a more environmentally
advantaged ethnic group. The other is the centre-periphery conflicts, which stem from
different levels of access and control of environmental services between powerful centre
populations and the marginalized periphery. Catalysts such as large cash crop farming
projects, mining and dams further undercut the marginal groups that are highly dependent on
natural resources for survival. In the context of the pastoral communities in Kenya the
establishment of ranches within the grazing areas has been one of the bones of contention
between the headers and ranchers.
According to the ENCOP classification, internal migration conflicts can occur when
1) populations are both pushed and pulled into new areas because of drought, floods, or
desertification, or when 2), populations are forcibly displaced by large dam, agricultural,
industrial or mining projects. Environmental discrimination can contribute to international
migrations that intensify economic or political conflicts in what ENCOP terms cross-border
migration conflicts. While population movements can be sudden and involuntary following
an environmental catastrophe, more often these movements occur gradually for a variety of
environmentally related reasons. The other three are demographically caused migration
conflicts, international water conflicts and global environmental conflicts. The Bern-Zürich
Group have argued that resource scarcity lead to very high risks of violent conflict because of
acute change or stress in resources due to population growth, resource consumption and
socially inequitable distribution of resources. Water scarcity and food-related scarcity are also
64
evaluated as serious threats to the national security of developing countries in their growth
policies.
2.6 The Interface between Conflict, Environmental Security and Governance
Although several studies87
indicate that many conflicts are rooted in poverty and
social inequity, ethnic intolerance, greed, identity and citizenship and human rights
violations, among other factors, attention is increasingly paid to environmental security and
related issues such as environmental degradation resource scarcity and poor governance.
There is consensus among scholars of conflict that security and stability have political,
economic, social as well as environmental dimensions.88
It is also against the realization that
a great deal of human security is closely connected to peoples’ access to natural resources
and environmental change, which to some extent influenced directly and indirectly, by
human activities and conflicts. Pastoral areas are endowed with a variety of natural resources
and vast biological diversity and climate variations. The survival of pastoral communities is
inextricably linked to natural resources and to the fact that life supporting production systems
are dependent on available natural resources. Environmental resources are principal to the
livelihoods of a significant portion of the region’s population and therefore a threat to these
resources through environmental degradation threatens the people’s security.
Consequently, environmental “change” or “degradation” is increasingly seen as either
a cause of political conflict, social stress and ethnic tensions or as a contributing factor to
armed conflict, of which causes and intensities have been thoroughly quantified and their
limits identified. These elements are interlinked and mutually reinforcing, for instance,
87
Donald, L. H. (1985), Ethnic Groups in Conflicts (London, University of California. (eds) Nhema. A. and
Zeleza, T. P (2008) (eds) The Roots of African Conflicts: The Causes and Costs (Oxford, James Currey) 88
Sverre, S. (1997) ‘Our Future-Common–or None at all’ in Conflict and the Environmental (ed) Gleditch, N.P
(Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers) pp 4-14:4. Also, see Buzan, B. (1998) etalSecurity: A New
Framework for Analysis. (Lynne Rienner Publishers) pp71-94 UNDP Human Development Report: (1994) New
Dimensions of Human Security, op cit, UNDP Human Development Report (1994),New Dimensions of Human
Security op cit, Others relevant UNDP reports are 1995,1996 and 1997 and the United Nations Commission on
Human (2003) ‘Security Human Security Now’ Final Report (New York, United Nations Commission on
Human Security)
65
environmental degradation will often have negative economic effects that in turn can lead to
social disruptions, displacements and migrations.
The concept of environmental security has made its mark on the pre-existing debate
on resource-related conflicts with some scholars89
calling for greater rigor in the use of
security as a concept; others have objected to any direct causal linkage between
environmental change and violent conflict or population-induced resource scarcity and armed
conflict across countries. Several studies have identified perceptible relationship between
certain elements of environmental security and intra- and interstate conflict. For example,
Buzan et al90
argue that security should be broadened both horizontally and vertically.
Horizontally, security is seen as dependent on political democracy and culture of human
rights; social and economic development; environmental sustainability as well as military
stability. Buzan identifies five sectors of security namely: political, societal, economic,
environmental and military as closely interlinked. For instance there is a relationship between
environmental security and political security and Oscar91
have argued that when the former
is maintained, marked improvements in political security is achieved but the condition is that
the interaction between the two must be positive and how these interactions contribute to an
enhancement of human security are understood. Predicting mass environmental migration
from environmentally devastated areas into neighboring regions is a crucial aspect of such an
understanding, since such a migration may lead to violent conflicts directly or indirectly,
within a state or between two states. On the other hand, Hauge and Ellingsen92
argue that
89
Penders, M J. et al(2002). ‘Ecoterror: Rethinking Environmental Security after September 11’ NR&E, Winter,
pp159-207 90
Buzan B, et al (1998) Security: A New Framework for Analysis (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers) 91
Mwangi, G.O (2007) ‘Environmental Change and Human Security in Lesotho: The Role of the Lesotho
Highlands Water Project in Environmental Degradation’in African Security Review 17.3, Institute for Security
Studies, pp59-70 and Libiszewsk, Stephan (1992), What is an Environment Conflict? Environment and
Conflicts Project (ENCOP), Occasional Paper No 6 Zurich, Center for Security Studies and Conflict Research 92
Hauge, W. et al (1998), ‘Beyond Environmental Security Causal Pathways to Conflicts’, Journal of Peace
Research, 35(3).pp 299-317
66
most studies that focus on the link between environmental change and conflict pay attention
to the relationship between conflict and degradation and depletion of renewable resources93
Within the pastoral setting, an increase in population leads to environmental
degradation, which contributes to violent conflicts. In the context of pastoral communities’
more people mean more livestock. This means that an increase in the numbers of people and
livestock has done little to enhance the carrying capacity of the land. Instead, factors such as
privatization of land in the hands of commercial owners and drought consistently combine to
reduce the productivity of the land hence diminishing resources, which eventually result into
violent conflicts. Increasing severe and unpredictable droughts due to environmental
degradation have forced pastoralists to travel further and more frequently to find water and
grass for their animals thus exposing themselves to situations that are more insecure. The
result is that the local people have misinterpreted migration to mean aggression, which in turn
triggers violent conflicts.94
Disruption of ecosystems affects the supply of water, pasture and therefore food
(mainly blood and meat) for the pastoralists. By definition, pastoralists derive a substantial
share of their livelihoods from livestock and share communal rangeland resources. The
rainfall patterns that considerably vary between and within years influence the rangelands95
and have direct implications both for livestock mobility and the land-to-livestock ratio (i.e.
carrying capacity), or grazing pressures of the rangelands. Furthermore, the production
potential of livestock and the rangeland resources in pastoral livelihood are low due to erratic
rainfall patterns.96
The increasing population compounds the situation that makes long
seasonal migration short so that land does not have sufficient time to recover fully. Dry land
ecosystems are extremely vulnerable to over-exploitation and inappropriate land use. Pastoral
93
Ibid 94UNHCR Report (2009) on State of Turkana Refugees 10 95
Horn of Africa Bulletin, Volume 21, No. 1.(Uppsala, Life & Peace Institute, 2009). 96
Ibid.
67
societies are exposed to ecosystem frequent changes, which increase vulnerability, affect
capital stocks, undermine coping mechanisms (mainly seasonal migration), decrease the
productive performance of livestock, and generate tensions with other herders as well as
agriculturists. Natural resource degradation may be the cause as well as the effect of social
change that negatively affect the productivity and sustainability of pastoral livelihoods.97
The reviewed literature on conflicts, environmental security and governance the link
between the three is conclusive that there is a relationship among them, which reinforces the
study topic. In terms of knowledge gap, the reviewed works shows that while there is
established causality, it is not definitive instead there are many factors that come into play.
Consequently, the reviewed works suggest a need for further in-depth studies to clarify better
the link between conflict and environmental security hence this study is a step in that
direction and an empirical approach to undertake the analysis within environmental security
and conflict debate. In this regard, the study draws from the Toronto school in as far as
causality is concerned but strengthens that perspective by focusing on pastoral communities
to narrow the unity of analysis and to address the criticism of a limited case study. This
enables an examination of the cause-effect relationship through definitive lenses.
The analysis of the problem benefits from the ENCOP, which situates environmental
conflict within social, economic and political causes of conflict and therefore the individual
case studies and the synthesis of the research, pay particular attention to the institutional
structures that often make the difference between the existence and absence of conflict in the
presence of environmental transformation or discrimination. Furthermore, this study clearly
defines terms and concepts thus overcoming the criticism leveled at previous studies in their
use of terms related to environmental security as synonymous. The study further provides
97Nori Met al.(2005), Herding on the Brink Towards a Global Survey of Pastoral Communities and Conflict An
Occasional Working Paper from the IUCN Commission on Environmental, Economic and Social Policy at
http:www.iisd.org/pdf/2005 Accessed 24/01/08
68
empirical evidence on the implication of the interface between conflict and environmental
insecurity on human security but more specifically on pastoralists.
2.7. Theoretical Framework
This study is anchored in a slightly modified environmental scarcity theory as
developed by Thomas Homer-Dixon. Thomas Homer-Dixon expressed his theoretical
formulation in terms of reductions in the relative availability of renewed resources. His view
holds that resource scarcity, through a complex web of interactive social, economic and
political process can lead to violent conflicts in the developing world.98
Theoretically,
Homer’s model deploys a conceptual framework, which presents the obtaining of social
reality in such a way that the casual process linking environmental scarcity and violence
conflicts falls into three main stages. These are the origin of environmental scarcity, its socio-
economic and political consequences and the outbreak of different forms of violent
conflicts.99
This means that in the process, resource degradation, demographic pressure and
distributional inequalities interact to create environmental scarcity. This then creates the
socio-economic effects of scarcity, which include constrained agricultural production,
marginalization of less powerful groups and probably migration of these groups into
ecologically sensitive areas.100
Figure 2.0, below depicts an illustration of Homer’s model.
Figure 2: A simplified representation of Homer-Dixon's causal model
98Homer-Dixon Environment, Scarcity, and Violence, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1999 xvi, 253 pp
and also 1994 ‘Environment, Scarcity, and Violence: Evidence from Case Studies’ International Security 19(1)
5-40 99
Ibid Homer-Dixon, 1999 100
See a paper by Dirk Druet, ‘Towards a Practical Paradigm: Environmental Security and Small Island
Developing States’ presented at Revolution or Evolution? Emerging Threats to Security in the 21st Century,
First Annual Graduate Symposium, Dalhousie University, Halixfax Canada, 2008 p16 the paper was accessed
on 8 November and can be found at http://centreforforeignpolicystudies.dal.ca/pdf/gradsymp06/Druet.pdf
Source; Dirk and Druent, 2008
Within the context of pastoral areas, the slightly modified environmental scarcity
theory i.e. 2.1 is analytically found to capture, if not explain, the intricate linkages th
develop between resource scarcity as a component of environmental security and conflict.
The modified model introduces into the analysis the
inappropriate and/or ineffective normative and institutional framew
utilization and management of resources in pastoral areas,
livestock given that they are the backbone of the pastoral economy, migration and
are replaced by seasonal migration or movement and
ethnic conflicts is replaced by conflicts in pastoral areas, because though conflicts in pastoral
areas have ethnic elements they cannot be treated purely as ethnic because the driving force is
not ethnicity but resources. Weakened state replaced by limited presence of state and a new
variable, drought and famine is introduced into the model.
69
Dirk and Druent, 2008
Within the context of pastoral areas, the slightly modified environmental scarcity
analytically found to capture, if not explain, the intricate linkages th
develop between resource scarcity as a component of environmental security and conflict.
The modified model introduces into the analysis the issue of governance deficit that lead to
inappropriate and/or ineffective normative and institutional frameworks on development,
utilization and management of resources in pastoral areas, population growth rate includes
livestock given that they are the backbone of the pastoral economy, migration and
by seasonal migration or movement and militarization respectively.
ethnic conflicts is replaced by conflicts in pastoral areas, because though conflicts in pastoral
areas have ethnic elements they cannot be treated purely as ethnic because the driving force is
esources. Weakened state replaced by limited presence of state and a new
variable, drought and famine is introduced into the model.
Within the context of pastoral areas, the slightly modified environmental scarcity
analytically found to capture, if not explain, the intricate linkages that can
develop between resource scarcity as a component of environmental security and conflict.
governance deficit that lead to
orks on development,
growth rate includes
livestock given that they are the backbone of the pastoral economy, migration and coup detat
militarization respectively. Furthermore,
ethnic conflicts is replaced by conflicts in pastoral areas, because though conflicts in pastoral
areas have ethnic elements they cannot be treated purely as ethnic because the driving force is
esources. Weakened state replaced by limited presence of state and a new
Figure 3: A modified representation of Homer
70
: A modified representation of Homer-Dixon's causal model
71
Due to limited presence of the state pastoralists in the marginal areas arm themselves
to take of their own security but also raid. In most pastoral areas where frequent prolonged
drought, famine, and converging environmental trends contribute to the diminishing grazing
grounds and water resources, conflicts are likely to worsen considerably as resource scarcities
interact with, or exacerbate other conflict-related social variables.
Overall the modified model shows the centrality of governance in the state of human
security that obtains among the pastoral communities. With effective governance system,
state presence will increase and particularly that of security apparatus which will in turn
provide sufficient security. Good governance will lead to the development of effective and
appropriate frameworks that will address issues relating to resource accessibility and
utilization, production and marketing of livestock and drought and famine among others.
Effective normative and institutional frameworks will not also address the non exploitation of
other resources but will facilitate allocation of resources of the central governance to
development programs including infrastructure development.
In summary, the model is preferred for this study because of two reasons. First, it is
flexible and can be easily be customized to include other relevant aspects of the study that are
not in the original model. Secondly, it permits for a systematic analysis of the links between
supply, demand and structural driven factors in conflict and environmental studies within the
context of governance deficit.
72
Chapter Three
The Policy Context: The Normative and Institutional Frameworks on
Conflict and Environmental Security in Kenya
3.1 Introduction
This chapter examines critically the existing normative and institutional frameworks
for conflict prevention, management and resolution and environmental protection,
conservation, and management in Kenya. It identifies the relevant policy documents on
these issues, outlines their strength and weaknesses and highlights the complementary
nature of various provisions. It also looks at the efficacy of the institutional arrangements
on peace building, conflict management and environmental security in the country.
3.2 Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (CPMR) Frameworks in Kenya
There are numerous instruments at the international and continental levels that inform the
CPMR in Kenya. This includes the United Nations Charter that calls all the nation states to
promote peace and security. At the continental level there are the Solemn Declaration-
Conference on Security Stability and Cooperation in Africa (2000); Solemn Declaration-
Common African Defense and Security Policy (2004) and the Protocol Relating to the
Establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU) (2002)
among others. At the sub regional level they include the Charter establishing IGAD, the
treaty establishing the East Africa Community (EAC) and the agreement of the International
Conference on the Great Lakes Region(IC/GLR) and their related programs such as the
IGAD Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN).
At the national level, the country’s approach to CPMR since independence in 1963
has been largely adhoc, highly reactive and unsystematic and lacked continuity. The
73
government has in certain cases been deploying various arms of state security forces such as
the administration police, the general service unit, anti-stock personnel unit, and in more
severe cases, the armed forces to deal with conflicts and violence, though in some cases and
through the provincial administration it has been encouraging dialogue.1 The use of state
security agencies has been very unpopular and counter-productive particularly among the
pastoral communities.2 On the other hand, non-state actors such as civil society organizations,
faith-based organizations and Community Based Organizations (CBOs) have focused more
on reconciliation, and building and repairing of broken social relationships amongst the
various ethnic groups. Such activities include dialogue, negotiations and problems solving
workshops, information, education and communication. As a result of the ad hoc approaches,
the government, community committees, civil society networks and likeminded stakeholders’
fora have emerged in the conflict prone areas where peace work has been active. Generally,
non-state initiatives have formed the foundations upon which both the government and
communities have addressed local conflicts
It was not until early 2000 that the country’s approaches to CPMR started becoming
more institutionalized and organized following the creation of the National Steering
Committee (NSC) on conflict management and peace building and later on Agenda 4
framework on undertaking long-term reforms.3 Agenda 4 was as a result of Kenya National
Dialogue and Reconciliation Accord following the post-election violence in 2007. The
Accord was mediated by the African Union (AU) Panel of Eminent African Personalities
chaired by Kofi Annan, the former UN Secretary General and represents a statement of
principles on long-term issues and solutions. Other agendas are 1, 2 and 3 are on ending the
1Nene, M. The Proliferation of Guns and Rustling in Karamoja and Turkana Districts: the case for Appropriate
Disarmament Strategies–Internet source-28 March 2008 2Onyango, E.O (2010), Pastoralists in Violent Defiance of the State: The Case of the Karimojong in
Northeastern Uganda, , Op cit 3Republic of Kenya (2008), Draft National Policy on Small Arms and Light Weapons, April
74
violence following the disputed presidential elections results, addressing the humanitarian
crisis and promoting reconciliation and resolving the political crisis respectively.
Nationally, level there is the Draft Policy on Peace Building and Conflict Management
(2008).4This is complemented by sectoral policies and plans on issues such as natural
resources management, food security, environmental security, wildlife conservation, land
policy and agriculture and livestock development that addresses specific aspects of the causes
of conflicts in the country. Vision 2030 is also another important policy document for Kenya.
It is a development plan covering the period 2008 to 2030. It is a far-sighted national
development strategy to transform Kenya into a rapidly industrializing middle-income nation
in the next two decades. It co-ordinates Government economic policies, including regional
and international cooperation policies and is also involved in preparation of the planning
components of the Medium Term Expenditure Framework, the Fiscal Strategy Paper and
requisite budget documents for various projects. Furthermore, the new constitution that was
promulgated on 27 August, 2010and came into full implementation in 2012 provides for the
establishment of various structures that will promote peace and enhance national cohesion.
3.2.1 Policy Frameworks on CPMR in Kenya
In order for Kenya to contribute to the international, continental, regional, and
national peace agenda but more important to institutionalize and professionalize approaches
to conflict prevention, management and resolution in a very systematic manner, the country
has developed a draft policy on peace building and conflict resolution.5The Ministry for
Provincial Administration and Internal Security is currently reviewing the draft National
Policy on Peace building and Conflict Management. The policy aims to: promote and
establish an institutional framework for peace building and conflict management that fosters
4Draft National Policy on Peace building and Conflict Management, Office of the President Kenya, Ministry of
State for Provincial Administration and Internal Security; Unpublished work. Nairobi. 2007 5 Ibid
75
strong collaborative partnership between the government, the private sector, the civil society,
development partners, grassroots communities and regional organizations; develop peace
building and conflict management guidelines that promote sustainable conflict sensitive
planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation; and mainstream gender issues in
conflict management with emphasis on the empowerment of women towards long-term
conflict mitigation.6Part of the reason why the draft is under review is to ensure that it is in
tandem with the new constitution. Succinctly, this policy essentially aims to institutionalize
professionalize, guide and coordinate the various peace building actors and programs in the
country.
The policy outlines various national values that should guide the approach of
institutionalizing and undertaking CPMR activities in the country. These are national unity
and nationhood; national sovereignty; equality before the law and application of the rule of
law; sanctity of life; integrity, honesty, and accountable leadership; adherence to democratic
principles, equitable distribution of wealth, the right to economic and social development and
inviolability of international borders and peaceful change in the international environment.
These values will form the basis of any peace building initiatives that cannot be negotiated
for but outright rights that must be granted and respected as sine qua non for peace building.
Furthermore, the policy recognizes that every Kenyan citizen is entitled to live in a
peaceful and secure environment that is conducive to sustainable human
development.7Accordingly, Kenyans have the basic right to justice and enjoyment of their
right. The policy also acknowledges that citizens are a prime resource, their involvement in
the process of conflict analysis, decision making and formulation of appropriate conflict
responses is important for effective management of conflicts.8Citizens and citizen groups are
6 Ibid p5–24 7The Government Printer, The Constitution of Kenya 2010, 27 August, 2010 ,
8Draft National Policy on Peace building and Conflict Management, Office of the President Kenya, op cit: 11
76
becoming more involved in decision making and policy debates that aims to address conflicts
in their areas. For better part of the post independence Kenya, the country has relied very
much on informal conflict management mechanism due, in part, lack of faith in the judiciary
and the sheer expense of court procedures. An example is the traditional mechanism in
modern conflict management system of elders under the Land Disputes Tribunal Act, 1990.
The policy identifies three spheres and departs from the view that approaches to
CPMR is not singular but multifaceted. The first sphere is where authority is exercised
through customary or traditional law.9 This sphere is defined loosely as the law regulating the
activities of the civic citizen and is regulated by a normative dialogue, which comprises of
norms that are independent of formal law and based on reciprocity, trust and goodwill.
Conflict amongst pastoralists tend to occur within and is regulated by this sphere. Though the
approach has its own imperfections, stemming from weaknesses in the statue in question, it
has served to ease pressure on the courts of law and to provide disputants with a relatively
affordable and accessible point of redress. Traditionally, African societies had customs and
beliefs to resolve disputes and this was to be respected by all members. Any member who
disregard them attracted received the required punishment by also was believed to receive the
wrath of the gods in addition to ridicule and reprimand from the society. This helped to
ensure that persons shunned conflict-causing conduct and conducted themselves within the
framework of accepted societal norms and values.10
The second sphere that the CPMR concedes very strongly is that of authority
governed by civil law. Activities in the civic sphere are regulated through formal institutions
of government charged with responsibility of rule application and adjudication. For most
part, conflict in Kenya avoids this sphere as happened immediately after the announcement of
9Ibid p 13 10
Aywa and Oloo, (1998), Role of Traditional Societies in Conflict Management, East African Publishers,
Nairobi.
77
2007 election results. The Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) protested the presidential
results and totally refused to go to courts arguing that they lacked independency and the
integrity thereby sparking off a prolonged wave of violence in the early 2008.11
Consequently, within this sphere, violent conflict usually attracts international attention
following the signing of the Rome Treaty establishing the International Criminal Court
(ICC). The recourse to the ICC was occasioned by the failure of the Kenyan parliament’ to
vote for the establishment of a local tribunal as recommended in the Waki report.12
However,
the formal justice institutions in Kenya have proved to be inadequate in responding not only
to the outbreak of violence but in addressing the underlying causes and facilitating peace
building and reconciliation among the communities and Kenyans at large. The result is that
communities and a majority of Kenyans have developed mistrust and lack of confidence in
the country’s judicial system, which further promotes the desire to revenge hence escalating
conflict and violence.13
The third is the predatory sphere, which is partly a creation of the proliferation of the
small arms and the democratization process of 1990s.14
The sphere is regulated by ‘bandit
law’ and has selective application of civic law. It works to generate significant revenue and
constitutes a parallel ‘bandit’ economy, a concept that is used to refer to the non-regulated,
criminal-supported economic sphere. CPMR recognizes that predatory conflict is different.
Its’ context derives from a mutation of historical and cultural practices. It is simply about a
predator, a prey and a parallel market system. Carjacking, organized crimes, small arms and
commercialized livestock raiding are some types of predatory conflicts in this sphere.
11
Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Post Election Violence (CIPEV) in Kenya, Government Printer,
Nairobi 2008, Makumi, M. (2008), The Water’s Edge: Mediation of Violent Conflict in Kenya (Nairobi: Institute
of Diplomacy and International Studies) 12
Ibid 13Interview with Richard Barno, an advocate of the high court in Kenya and a security advisor to IGAD Program
on Against Terrorism in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on 10 January 2011 14
Kamenju, etal , (2003), Op cit
78
Dealing with this sphere sometimes possesses a much bigger challenge than the other two
because some of them such as cattle rustling require a combination of conventional law and
order and traditional mechanisms. The policy recognizes that because of the nature of
conflicts in each sphere, a number of conflict interact with one another. As a result of the
inter-related nature of conflict, response framework has tended to be inadequate. This has
allowed some of actors of conflicts such as cattle rustlers to overlap within the three spheres
in order to maximize their opportunities and evade punishment.
Moreover, within the conventional judicial system, perpetrators of violence are often
prosecuted in the criminal courts. Victims of violence have recourse to seek redress in the
civil courts in form of damages, compensation and restitution. While the courts can
adequately provide justice in cases of crime, they face the numerous obstacles in meeting the
needs of communities involved in conflicts. Courts are often time consuming, costly and slow
in passing judgments. The adversarial system of justice fails to promote reconciliation among
communities and between opposing sides and instead pits them against one another based on
a winner or loser. The remedies available under criminal and civil jurisdictions are fairly
inflexible and do not allow for creative problem solving through granting of redress such as
apologies, traditional peace building rituals and declarations and therefore parties to conflict
often resort to informal traditional conflict resolution processes.
The policy also acknowledges that conflicts in Kenya have an economic dimension
and that there is a close link between poverty and conflict.15
Poverty causes conflict while
conflict keeps poverty afloat. Poverty in Kenya is widespread. Most communities are poor,
with some living way below the accepted poverty threshold.16
Conflict and poverty are self-
perpetuating in Kenya. Scarce resources and unbalanced social structures lead to disputes
often resulting in inappropriate management and damages of these resources. Thus, the draft
15
Draft National Policy on Peace building and Conflict Management, (2007), Op Cit p14 16
Ibid p14
79
policy calls for two-pronged approach where the two are dealt with simultaneously. In the
same breath, the policy acknowledges social and structural factors that nurture conflict such
as ethnic division, social and economic marginalization, inequitable distribution of resources,
disregard for the rule of law and the culture of impunity and high levels of unemployment as
critical factors.17
Indeed, the draft acknowledges that helping young people to realize their
full potential by gaining access to employment should form a key component of any peace
building process in Kenya. In places where there has been widespread violent conflict, youth
employment is a precondition for poverty eradication, sustainable development and lasting
peace.18
Apart from the emerging national framework on CPMR, and more so in recognition
of the link between the structural causes of conflict and other aspects of livelihood such as
employment, economic opportunities and empowerment, poverty natural resources and
governance, the government interventions are also through sectoral policy documents. Key
among these is on the small arms, which are the main tools for exacerbating conflict among
pastoralists. Other equally important documents that are in the field of peace and security and
are relevant to small arms are: the Bamako Declaration on an African Common Position on
the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms Africa signed in Bamako
Mali, on 1 December 2000. The Declaration spells out a wide range of key norms, standards
and programmes to help tackle the problem of SALW. Para 2 states that the Bamako
Declaration was developed to: “Promote measures aimed at restoring peace, security and
confidence among, and, between Member States with a view to reducing the resort to arms;
promote structures and processes to strengthen democracy, the observance of human rights,
the rule of law and good governance, as well as economic recovery and growth; and
17Ibid p 15 18
Youth Employment–key to Conflict Prevention, Poverty Reduction, World Bank Permanent URL for this
page: http://go.worldbank.org/932G1DN8K0 downloaded on 19th January 2010.
80
importantly, to promote comprehensive solutions to the problem of the illicit proliferation
circulation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons that, include both control and
reduction, as well as supply and demand aspects; that are based on the coordination and
harmonization of the efforts of the Member States at regional, continental and international
levels and which involve civil society in support of the central role of governments.”19
Furthermore, there are the non-state actor structures such as the Regional Civil
Society/National Focal Point Dialogue Forum on small arms and the Eastern Africa Action
Network on Small Arms (EAANSA). Moreover, there are two frameworks that are being
developed and which are very relevant to small arms and pastoral community as a whole.
These are the policy on pastoral communities in Africa and the draft Protocol on the
Prevention, Combating and Eradication of Cattle Rustling in Eastern Africa. The African
Union Commission (AUC) supported by the United Nations Office for the Co-ordination of
Humanitarian Affairs is in the process of developing an African Pastoral Policy Framework
for the continent. The framework is expected to act as an advocacy tool to promote and
improve the livelihood of pastoral communities in Africa.20
At the national level, there are two main frameworks on small arms that are relevant
to Kenya and which are discussed here because Kenya is signatory to both of them.(Though
there is also the Kenya National Network on Small arms (KANSA) which is a fora that brings
together civil society that works on SALW.21
The Declaration demonstrates the political will
and commitment by the political leadership on small arms, which is important in
implementing multilateral arrangements of this nature while the Protocol provides the
19
The Bamako Declaration (2000), Paragraph 2 20
CEWARN Monthly Update February 2008, Issue No 4
21The fora of the CSOs that constitute KANSA operate within the parameters of crosscutting issues:
development, conflict management, peace, human rights, victims of gun-violence, aid agencies, faith based,
community-based organizations, and research and policy development, in a scope of other areas of
specialization). These are the Nairobi Protocol and the Nairobi Declaration the focus of this section.
81
necessary legal grounding on the issue of small arms. The UNPoA and the Bamako
Declaration are as important to the extent of providing continental and international
frameworks on small arms in which the Nairobi Protocol on Small Arms which was signed
four years after the Nairobi Declaration are anchored. The Protocol is a comprehensive
mechanism for promoting legal uniformity and standardizing manufacture, possession,
import, export, transfer, transit, transport, and generally streamlines the operational
mechanisms at regional level while encouraging co-operation among the law enforcement
agencies.22
The Protocol is a landmark development to address the problem associated with the
illicit proliferation and misuse of small arms in the Great Lakes region, which the two
documents define them as the geographical area covered by the signatories and includes the
immediate neighbouring states. The protocol is a regional instrument to increase control over
the proliferation of arms in the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa including bordering areas
and one of the few multilateral legally binding instruments on the control of small arms that
entered into force in 2006.The protocol is a far-reaching instrument provides the signatories
with a legal basis upon which to deal with both the lawful and illicit trade in firearms. It
outlines key measures that State Parties are legally bound to fulfill.
On the other hand, the Nairobi Declaration on Small Arms is an important framework
on small arms because it provides the basis for the policies and institutions that have been
developed to tackle the problem of small arms among the signatories. State Parties to the
Nairobi Protocol and Nairobi Declaration are Burundi, Eritrea, Ethiopia Democratic Republic
of Congo (DRC), Rwanda, Sudan, Somalia, the United Republic of Tanzania, Uganda and
Seychelles. The thrust of the Declaration is to strengthen and harmonize legislation on the
22Article 5 of the Nairobi Protocol (2004), for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of SALW in the
Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa and Bordering Areas
82
control of firearms, enhance operational capacity of law enforcement agencies, increase cross
border co-operation between law enforcement agencies, develop strategies for effective
collection and destruction of weapons, enhance the demobilization and re-integration of ex-
combatants, improve police/community relations, and enhance public education and
awareness raising.
The two documents have their strength and weakness that have also impacted on their
implementation. First, they acknowledge the difference between human and state security.
The preamble of the Nairobi Declaration distinguishes between ‘human security’ and ‘state
security’ ‘...fully sharing the growing international concern that the easy availability of illicit
small arms and light weapons escalates conflicts and undermines political stability and has
devastating impacts on human and state security’. On the other hand, the Protocol does
implicitly refer to human security by mentioning that ‘the danger posed by small arms to the
well being of the population in the sub-region’.23
However, despite the explicit reference to
human security and which is also repeated in Para 18 and Para 33 of the Declaration, there is
limited evidence to show that it is being practiced.
Secondly, the two documents recognize small arms as a development and governance
issue.24
The Declaration links small arms and development as a key issue on the national and
regional agenda and proposes concrete recommendations to address the problem from the
development perspective. Para 6 note that a comprehensive strategy to arrest and deal with
the problems of small arms must include economic recovery and growth. The link is
corroborated with several other sections which recognize the multifaceted nature of insecurity
that small arms perpetuate. The text makes an explicit link between human security and
23Para 5 and 6Article 5 of the Nairobi Protocol (2004), for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of SALW in
the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa and Bordering Areas 24
Ibid
83
issues of governance and democracy.25
The Declaration notes that in order to deal with the
small arms problems, state’s must put in place structures that promote democracy and good
governance, observe human rights, respect rule of law thus acknowledging the inter-
connectivity of the explanatory factors for acquisition and use of illicit arms. The Protocol
adds extreme poverty to the governance pillar.
Thirdly, they acknowledge lack of capacity to tackle the problem of small arms. Both
the Protocol and the Declaration acknowledges the weaknesses of States’ to address the
problem of small arms.26
These weakness include lack of capacity to monitor arms flows,
open or weak immigration and custom controls, weak legislative frameworks, lack of
accountability of state owned weapons and limited operational capacity. The Protocol has
detailed sections of these aspects and suggests measures to deal with them. For example
Article 3 is on legislative measures, 4 on operational capacity and 15 on law enforcement and
each one of them has a host of recommendations for signatory states to implement. In
addition to weak legislative and control mechanism, Kenya lack sufficient capacity to
effectively police its expansive borders i.e. the Ethiopia- Kenya boundary is 861km.27
Fourthly, the two documents also recognizes the extra territorial nature of small arms
and calls on pro active regional as well as international efforts to curtail the illicit flow and
use of small arms.28
Small arms have an international dimension that must be considered in
any control and management initiatives. Middlemen are important actors and must be
compelled to respect the international, regional and national laws in their activities. In the
25
Ibid 26
Articles 3-17 of the Nairobi Protocol (2004) for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of SALW in the Great
Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa and Bordering Areas 27
A report by International Boundaries Research Unit (IBRU), International Boundary Demarcation in the IGAD
Region; A review of the Existing Practice and Thoughts on Future Developments (2008) 28
Paragraph 7 of the Nairobi Declaration (2000) on the Problem of the Proliferation of Illicit Small Arms and
Light Weapons (SALW) in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa
84
past, middlemen have ignored, evaded or exploited loopholes in the existing laws to transfer
arms from one region to another.29
Fifth, the two frameworks recognize the link between small arms and conflict. One of
the strength of the two documents is that they recognize the link between instability and small
arms. It is acknowledged that continued conflicts in the region provide a conducive
environment for the illicit proliferation and use of small arms.30
It is pointed out that ‘the
problem of small arms is largely from the past and ongoing conflicts in the region’. In this
regard, paragraph 13 urges for peace building efforts and any measure that will reduce
recourse to small arms by civilians. Para 14 reinforces the statement by urging for nurturing
of environment in which root causes of conflicts are adequately addressed and calls for the
peaceful resolution of conflicts in the region. Article 7 of the Protocol and of the Declaration
decries the creation of armed refugees seeking asylum in relatively peaceful countries.
Studies have shown that there is correlation between refugees and the proliferation of small
arms.31
Sixth, they recognize the importance of information sharing and co-operation.
Information sharing is an important element in fighting cross border criminal activities that
includes arms trafficking and it is aptly captured in Para 21 of the Declaration. The Para calls
on signatory states to co-operate in information sharing on all matters relating to illicit small
arms including promoting co-operation with civil society actors. However, in practice
signatory states are yet to open to each other on this aspect. Co-operation among states
particularly on issues perceived to be security sensitive is still limited. There are no structures
efficient enough to enhance information sharing among relevant organs within the signatory
29
Brian Wood and Johan Peleman ‘The Arms Fixers, Controlling the Brokers and Shipping Agents, A joint
Report by BASIC, NISAT and PRIO (1999). 30
This is well captured in Para 4 of the Nairobi Declaration (2000) on the Problem of the Proliferation of Illicit
Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa 31
Mogire, Edward. A Preliminary Exploration of the Linkages between Refugees and Small Arms, BICC Paper
35, (1994).
85
states. Apart from Interpol, other structures such as East Africa Police Chiefs Co-operation
(EAPCCO) are simply groupings of police chiefs that meet to discuss these issues but do
little in terms of influencing policy formulation to ensure that effective exchange of
information. Even bilateral border structures such as the joint border commissions are in most
cases adhoc their survival depends on the goodwill of civil servants or politicians. In the
absence of formalized and institutionalized structures, there is a limited institutional memory
and follow up mechanisms.
Seventh, they link small arms to terrorism but they ignore Piracy; Terrorism has
emerged as a serious threat to international peace and security particularly after September
11, 2001. Para 4 of the Declaration and 6 of the Protocol recognizes the link between small
arms and terrorist activities. Reports32
imply that Kenya remains a potential terrorist target, as
a result of the government's pro-US and pro-Israel stance, as well as the fairly sizeable
expatriate communities (including about 3,000 Israelis). However, neither of the two
documents links small arms to piracy.
One of the weaknesses of the two documents is that they are silent on the states and
manufacturers who sell arms to non-state actors fuelling conflicts in the region including
those selling arms to conflict zones and sometimes in blatant violation of UN arms
embargoes. Kenya borders countries that host numerous armed opposition groups such as the
Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and the extreme wing of
Alliance for the re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) that continues to be sustained by either
importing arms through friendly countries or given arms by friendly states. For instance
before the UN arms embargo on Somalia under UN Resolution 773 (1992) were lifted in
32
Oloo, A (2010)
86
2006 to allow AU Mission (AMISOMI) to be deployed reports, showed that small arms were
still flowing into Somalia.33
Another weakness is that the documents ignore the gender question and gun victims.
The two documents refer to the impact of small arms on various groups and singles out the
most vulnerable groups of the society namely; women and children particularly child
soldiers. However, the Declaration only mentions women and it ends there. It fails to make
very specific proposals for intervention to ensure gender concerns in debates and policies on
small arms and the Protocol do not even mention the gender issue. The two documents also
fail to recognize the victims of gun violence including child soldiers. None of the documents
makes reference to survivors of gun violence.34
Furthermore, they lack of enforcement mechanism; though the two documents
represent significant norm and standard setting on small arms at the regional level, they
remain weak on enforcement. Like a majority of international agreements, enforcement
remains a challenge and if attempted it is likely to be a protracted legal tussle that will
definitely threaten international relations of various signatory states. Implementation is
largely dependent on the political will of each signatory state. Despite these weaknesses,
policy makers interviewed35
feel that the documents are comprehensive enough and represent
the concerns of the region on small arms. It is believed that if the at least 80% of the
provisions contained therein is implemented the region will drastically reduce the impact of
the illicit proliferation and use of small arms.
33United Nations Security Council Resolution 733 (Implementing an Arms Embargo on Somalia), S.C. res. 733,
47 U.N. SCOR at 55, U.N. Doc. S/RES/733 (1992). Reports on the violation can be found at
http://www.mg.co.za/article/2008-12-20-un-arms-embargo-on- Somalia-constantly-broken accessed on January
20, 2009. 34
On the costs of firearms injuries on public health see Firearms Injuries in Nairobi, Kenya: Who pays the Price?
Journal of Public Health Policy; Vol 28; No 4 December 2007, pp 410-419. 35
Interviews with Francis Sang(and Francis Wairagu of RECSA on 27 and 29 August, 2009 respectively and
Kimaiyo and Dickson Makotsi of the Kenya National Focal Point
87
Finally, the Protocol fails to explicitly recognize the role of civil society; despite the
call for the participation and inclusion of civil society which is mentioned twice in the
Declaration. Co-operation between governments and civil society has led to significant
progress in the implementation of the two documents. It is important to note that civil society
is not mentioned in the Nairobi Protocol despite being informed by the Nairobi Declaration
only makes implicit reference to civil society.
3.2.2 The Legal Framework on Small Arms in Kenya-The Kenya Firearms Act
The Kenya Firearms framework is an Act of Parliament for regulating, licensing, and
controlling the manufacture, importation, exportation, transportation, sale, repair, storage,
possessing and use of firearms, ammunitions, air guns and destructive devices like grenades.
According to Nyinguro36
Kenya has a comprehensive Firearms Act (Rev 1968) but has
several weakness which should be addressed. The Act has provisions relating to certain types
of weapons and ammunitions pertaining to use places of acquisition, restrictions on carriage
and transit through Kenya. Furthermore, there are provisions on possession of firearms and
ammunitions in regard to age, penalty for use and possession or imitation of firearms in
certain cases. Finally the Act provides for appeals in case of conviction.
Generally, the Firearms Act is sufficient in scope and definition of firearms. This can
be qualified by inclusion of weapons such as “air gun” ‘air rifle” and “air pistols”. The Act
also lays out succinctly how the arms are to be transported or handled and the person most
qualified or approved for such engagements. The Act mentions other sections of the law
closely related to it for instance the Immigration Act and points out the relevant sections. The
36
Nying’uro P. (2004) ‘Legislation and Proliferation of Small Arms in Kenya’, A paper presented at a
conference on Improving Human Security through the Control and Management of Small Arms, Arusha,
Tanzania, April 20-22
88
powers vested in the Commissioner of Police that pertains to appointment of the Chief
Firearms Licensing Officer are too discretionary. The Act should require that an independent
body consisting of people with integrity should vet the person appointed to such a position
thoroughly. It should also state clearly the qualification that such an officer should have. At
the same time, the powers vested in the chief licensing officer in relation to the directions
upon other officers under him are subject to abuse owing to the provisions “who shall be
subject to the directions of the Chief Licensing Officer”.
Terms stipulated in the purchase, possession, manufacture and sale of firearms and
ammunition and other transactions are clear up to the section of possessing a certificate.
When it comes to contravention of the provisions, the sentence of a maximum fifteen years
gives much leeway to the courts. Instead, the provision should provide for a minimum
custodial sentence, which should be deterrent enough given the rising incidents of gun-related
crimes in Kenya. The provisions spelling under what conditions a firearm certificate may be
revoked are subject to abuse since a person’s certificate may be revoked subject to pressure
from individual with political or economic influence. At the same time, the fine of a
maximum of six month for those who fail to surrender their firearm certificates within the
stipulated period is too lenient given that some of the individuals could have used their
lawfully guns acquired to commit crime or could hire them out for the same purpose. Persons
with criminal intentions can also take advantage of the penalty provided because they will
apply for a certificate under false pretence.
The Act clearly states that no one should engage in manufacturing of firearms on
behalf of the government. However, the sentence set for those who engage in this business is
not deterrent enough. A maximum of five years and a fine of Ksh 10,000 or 120 USD is at
the discretion of a magistrate or a judge. In this case, a person may be jailed for six months
and fined Ksh2500 or 30 USD for manufacturing firearms. Given the rising number of crimes
89
in which firearms are used and the “benefits” one can accrue by manufacturing the same the
section should be reviewed to provide for stiffer penalty. Failure to produce a certificate to
prove a legitimate possession of a firearm is a serious offence. It is not something that would
be commensurate with the maximum fine of Ksh 10,000. This should be heavily punished
given the high increase of gun related crimes, some of them taking place in broad daylight
with impunity.
The Act requires that every applicant who wants to deal in arms must provide all the
necessary information including where the person wants to carry out the business. That is
fine. But when it comes to people providing false information for instance subletting the
premises or opening another business place without notifying the relevant authorities such
people must be heavily punished. The sentence of up to six months in jail sometimes with the
option of a fine of up to Ksh 2000 or 24 USD is not commensurate enough. For those
licensed to possess or operate firearms and ammunitions shops, the provisions of reporting in
case of loss or destruction are reasonable, especially the time limit. But the provisions do not
state the punishment for loosing firearms under dubious circumstances. The Act only talks of
about those who do not report the loss. Generally; the Act is very clear on the kind of person
who should be allowed to import firearms and ammunitions. At the same time one can import
firearms for personal use provided such arms are not prohibited under the law. However, the
provisions that an authorized custom officer may revoke import and/or export permit at any
time without any reason sounds very unreasonable. An officer can simply revoke a permit on
flimsy grounds or for malicious reasons. There is need to spell reasons as to why a permit
can be revoked or cancelled. Again the sentence of a maximum of six months does not tally
with the offence at hand.
A person under the influence of alcohol handling firearms is dangerous. But the
sentence is not deterrent enough. People who flout their power while in possession of
90
firearms and at the same time being drunk area threat to those nearby and culprits should be
punished in a consummate manner particularly given the increase in the number of
unintentional shooting. The powers given to police officers to inspect premises where
business in firearm or ammunitions is being transacted is fine. This would make gun dealers
to be wary of any misadventure since being caught is always hovering on the horizon.
However, the provision for obstructing a police officer can easily be flouted by the same
officers on flimsy grounds given the nature of the crime.
In general, the Act is clear and adequate. Some of the provisions however, especially
those, which bestow the Minister with powers on various issues, are too unilateral. The
Minister and the Commissioner of Police are the two most important officers in this Act and
being agents of the executive, they can be easily manipulated. Courts have been granted some
recognition, albeit, somehow peripheral. Courts only come in the limelight when someone in
is being jailed or where a warrant of arrest or searching a premises is mentioned. In all the
provisions regarding certificate, acquisition, maintenance of premises and forfeiture of
certificate and thus firearms appeals are provided for. At the same time some of the sentences
and the fine are a bit lenient given the upsurge in gun related crimes in Kenya particularly in
urban centers. The Act should be revised to provide for destruction of recovered arms both
marked or unmarked or inadequately marked small arms. The lacunas exposed in the existing
institutional, policy frameworks aimed at preventing, controlling and eradicating the
proliferation, circulation, and trafficking of small arms in the sub-region explains partly why
the fight against the small arms is a bigger war. However, these institutional and policy
frameworks will no doubt complement other institutions such as the various specialized units
of Police, the Intelligence, the Judiciary and the Anti Stock Unit which are very important in
the fight against the problem of small arms. These traditional institutions are not discussed in
this section because they have a wider mandate beyond small arms.
91
There are also several sectoral policies that are aimed at contributing towards
improving the livelihood of the pastoralists and include the Economic Recovery Strategy, the
National Policy for Sustainable Development of the Arid and Semi-Arid Lands of Kenya,
Forestry Master Plan, the Forest Act 2005, and the National Biodiversity Strategy and Action
Plan (NBSAP).37
Furthermore, the ultimate goal of the National Policy for Sustainable
Development of the Arid and Semi-Arid Lands of Kenya is to create wealth, employment
opportunities and to attain food security in order to achieve economic recovery, improve the
standard of living of the ASAL population by integrating them into mainstream national
economy and social development in an environmentally sustainable manner. This will reduce
pastoralist conflict, the desire for small arms and need to cattle rustling.38
On governance, the government has continued to prioritize good governance in co-
operation with development partners to support the Governance, Justice, Law and Order
Sector (GJLOS) reform program. These include police reforms and therefore support to the
implementation of Kenya's Community-based Policing Programme within the GJLOS.
Community policing is a recent approach in particular to crime prevention, in Kenya. It is a
policing strategy based on the notion that community interaction and support to the police can
help control crime, conflict and reduce fear. The community is expected to help identify
suspects, detain vandals, and bring the various suspects to the attention of the police. It is a
strategy designed to promote mutual trust and cooperation between the public and the police
in the promotion of security and seeks to demystify the public perception by encouraging
information sharing.
The incorporation of policing activities in conflict management framework is
predicated on the assumption that high levels of crime and corruption stifle development in a
37Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation 2003-2007 (June 2003) Ministry of
Planning and National Development, Republic of Kenya 38
Ibid
92
community–business become victims of crime and commercial activities (including those in
the informal sector are interrupted. In addition, the poor and marginalized often lack access to
political or social structures and are unlikely to have any influence over politics and the
programs that affect their lives.39
Therefore, community-policing initiatives attempt to make
people’s access to justice more accessible, regardless of their social and economic status by
bringing law enforcement organization to the populations. In Kenya, however community
policing framework has failed because of the management wrangles among various agencies
and secondly, past human rights violations committed by police officers and non-observance
of the rule of law has contributed to reinforcing mistrust between the local communities and
the general public on one hand and the police on the other.
Apart from governance and conflict prevention being treated as standalone issues,
they are also across cutting. In this regard, governance and conflict prevention are considered
crosscutting themes in planning, and explicitly refer to the need to adopt conflict-sensitive
approaches to development in all focal and non-focal sectors, including budgetary support.
The government is now allocating funds to integrate specific objectives and components
related to conflict-sensitivity and conflict prevention into all sectors. Under the same
approach, the Government also supports efforts to strengthen the capacity of non-state actors
to engage in conflict prevention, small arms control, safety, and security issues and to
participate in programmes such as the GJLOS, and National Action Plan (NAP)on small
arms.
The Government has identified land and natural resources as major causes of disputes
in Kenya and is developing policies and legal framework such as the National Land Policy to
contain conflicts arising from the sharing of natural resources. In this regard, the policy
acknowledges that most conflicts arise from unsustainable utilization of environment and its
39
Mkutu K. and Marani M., The Role of Civic Leaders in the Mitigation of Cattle Rustling and Small Arms: The
case of Laikipia and Samburu (AFPO, Nairobi (2001).
93
attendant resources, which leads to depletion. Thus, scarce natural resources, worsening
environmental condition and increased population have resulted in stiffer competitions for
land, pastures, water, fish, mineral, and forest resources. This has precipitated conflicts over
access, control, and ownership frequently degenerating into violent conflict within and
among communities. It is hoped that this recognition will lead to the development of a policy
framework that identifies and raises awareness about the negative impact of unsustainable use
of environment on conflicts.40
For example, the new Land Reform Policy, the Forestry Master Plan, the Forest Act
(2005), and the National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan (NBSAP) seeks to promote
national interests in relation to international environmental and forest related issues while at
the same time addressing environmental and natural resources related conflicts. These
sectoral policies are aimed at promoting participation and involvement of communities in
promoting sustainable management and utilization of shared resources, ecosystems and
international environment. Apart from the emerging national framework and the sectoral
approaches to conflicts in Kenya other interventions have entailed setting up of Commissions
of Inquiry41
with time bound and involves gathering information from the public. Some of
past commissions and relevant to some of the above issues are; the Ndungu on land reform,
the Truth and Reconciliation ,the Waki, Kriggler, the Parliamentary one on tribal clashes and
the Kiliku report.42
These including the new constitution passed in August 2010 remain
important frameworks to promote national cohesion, and reconciliation and address future
conflicts. Findings of such commissions have sometimes informed policy decisions in
Government. What comes out of most of these Commissions revolve around the need for
40
UNEP 1999, Environmental Conditions, Resources, and Conflict: An introductory Overview and Data
Collection. Downloaded at http://na.unep.net.publications/Conflicts.pdfdownloaded in June, 2009 41
For example the Waki and Kriegler Commission to address the issues of Post-Election; The Akiwumi
Commission was on Tribal Clashes. 42
The National Assembly Report (1992) of the Parliamentary Select Committee to investigate Ethnic Clashes in
Western and Other Parts of Kenya.
94
constitutional reforms, electoral reforms, parliamentary reforms, reform of the public service,
police reforms, land policy issues, legal and judicial reform and other legislative, structural,
political, and economic reforms.
3.2.3 Institutional Framework on Peace Building and Conflict Resolution
3.2.3.1 The National Steering Committee on Peace-building and Conflict Management
The National Steering Committee (NSC) on Peace Building and Conflict
Management was established in 2001 and since then it has been instrumental in spearheading
national efforts on issues related to CPMR in Kenya.43
The Committee comprises
representatives of relevant government ministries and departments, CSOs, NGOs and
development partners. The NSC was established after realization that effective management
of the conflict can only be realized through well co-ordinated joint efforts. Through this
establishment there is some co-ordination of peace initiatives across the country albeit
informal. The country realized that institutions dealing with conflicts operated in a reactive
manner and were mainly active in violent prone districts of the country. The NSC was formed
with the key role of harmonizing peace processes among the stakeholders in Kenya.44
It also
co-ordinates the activities of Provincial Peace Fora (PPF) and District Peace Committees
(DPCs) which are part of the peace structures in the country.
However, the draft policy45
proposes a new structure, the National Peace Commission
(NPC) to replace the NSC. Other proposed structures are; the National Peace Commission
Secretariat (NPCS), and District Peace Committees (DPC). The National Peace Commission
(NPC) shall be made of 13 commissioners, 8 of whom will be from Provinces and 5 to
represent special interests groups of women, youth, civil society, and academia. The
parliament shall vet and endorse the commissioners. The President shall appoint the
43 Interview with SK Maina on 1 April 2011 in Nairobi, Kenya 44
www.provincialadministration.go.ke/.../DraftPolicyPBCMAug2006RegionalConsultations 45
Draft National Policy on Peace building and Conflict Management(2009) op cit p18
95
Commissioners whose mandate shall be to promote sustainable peace and human security in
Kenya. The Commissioners will also advise the Government on policy and legislative matters
related to peace and security; promote values that enhance nationhood; promote proactive
prevention of conflicts; promote peaceful resolution of conflict and reconciliation; support
initiatives that aim to eradicate illicit small arms, promote a culture of peace and cross border
initiatives; promote and coordinate research on peace building and be the chief government
agency on demonstration of regional instrument that may be a threat to peace and
security.46
The Commissioners shall recruit senior staff, provide policy review and direction;
mobilize resources and recognize excellence. They shall also have power to access areas
affected by conflicts; access documents regarding conflict areas; summon individuals that
may assist in understanding conflict situation; and be part of tribunals set to investigate
deeper selected conflicts and whose resolutions shall be binding.
The National Peace Commission shall have a Secretariat headed by a Secretary
responsible for its day to day management. The Secretary shall be the accounting officer. The
Secretariat shall be responsible for the implementation of the mandate and functions of the
Commission on a day-to-day basis. There shall be also a National Peace Forum that will be a
platform for consultation, collaboration, cooperation, and coordination of peace issues
amongst the relevant Government, ministries and departments, the United Nations agencies,
the private sector, civil society organizations, and development partners.
On the other hand, the District Peace Committees (DPCs) are hybrid institutions that
bring together synergies between the traditional and formal mechanisms for conflict
resolution. The DPCs consists of community representatives, the District Security
Intelligence Committees (DSICs), the CSOs, local authorities, women, youth, and the private
sector. The community representatives are drawn from all administrative units of the districts.
46
Ibid
96
The DPCs are collaborative peace structures at the district levels that foster issues of peace
building and conflict management and also link up with very grassroots administrative
structures at the divisional and locational levels. The peace committees at lower levels of
administrative units bring together stakeholders who work on peace and security matters.
The mandate of the DPC is promote sustainable, peace and human security by being
focal points in the districts. Their roles and responsibilities are to coordinate, harmonize and
facilitate peace building activities; promote peace education, a culture of peace and non-
violence; administer and account peace building funds; network with other peace fora to
enhance cross border co-existence; document and keep record of peace processes and
dialogue and other interventions; promote mainstreaming of conflict sensitive approaches to
development in the district; and support initiatives for eradication of small arms. In pastoral
areas, the DPC deal with recurrent disputes over murder, assault, and raiding; facilitate
agreements between conflicting parties, which are then recognized and followed up by
government; organize a rapid respond to impending conflict by sending a team of elders,
facilitated by administration and establishing the best means of responding to inter-district
conflicts.47
The DPC varies in terms of degree of government engagement, from district to
district; the extent to which they are decentralized below district levels and their mechanisms
of resource mobilization and disbursement.48
A written constitution and NSC guidelines
defines membership, election procedures and the roles and responsibilities of members. A
bottom-up structure is in place through community representatives who are then elected to
DPCs from locational and divisional peace committees. A locational committee has 12
elected members and elect representatives to divisional peace committee. A particular feature
47
Ibid 48Galava, D. (2009), A friendship reborn documentation and evaluation of the establishment
of the Nakuru Peace Committee
97
of DPC is its attempt to ensure the involvement and representation of all ethnic groups in a
district. The remaining membership goes to four women, two religious leaders, four District
Security Intelligence Committee, two NGO representative and MPs. Given the large size of
the committee, a smaller executive is charged with oversight of day to day activities. A
community representative chairs the committee rather the District Commissioner. In practice,
its day-to-day running is heavily reliant on an unsalaried coordinator whose post is not
formally defined in the structures.
Some of the lessons and challenges from the DPC are that in some districts, the
number of active stakeholders has reduced over time with initiative vested in one or two key
committed people. This has been matched by a reduction in frequency of meetings. Secondly,
the rapid turnover of Government officials and other staff in district impacts negatively on
peace processes. Induction of new personnel needs sustaining if newcomers are to work well
within existing processes and finally effective government engagement in peace committees
is crucial in providing a conducive environment for other players to operate. DPCs structures
appear to work well when there effective coordination fora that provides a platform for a
range of actors to collaborate, share information and plan response.49
These qualities may be
threatened if peace committees restrict themselves to implementing roles. Importantly,
community representatives on peace committees should be selected through an agreed
process rather than being handpicked, as it is evident in some districts. In other words, the
Committee should be as inclusiveness as possible and ensure that youth, women, minorities
are involved and taking a long-term approach. On the ground, strengthening local level peace
structures would reduce the level of rapid response required from district level and help to
sustain peace initiatives without external funding. It is critical to note that the formation of
local committee rather than working through existing elders councils, may exclude some
49
Ibid
98
stakeholders; a situation that may undermine the traditional process of an open council of
elders by defining a narrow group of named members.
In recent years, there has been a rapid increase in attempt by external actors to
strengthen local peace initiatives or District Peace Committees mostly through the provision
of training. A growing number of organizations now offer training on conflict and peace
issues. However, local peace actors have identified limitation of externally funded and
implemented peace building training. The critique is that the training is tarmac-focused, only
in places easily accessible by good roads than those in more remote areas where the conflict
takes place. Secondly, the training is always conducted at short notice, with limited advance
information about content and is not sustained. The result is that training has often had little
application to practice. Thirdly, there are concerns about transparency and accountability in
the utilization of donor funding by agencies conducting the training. Fourth, there is limited
coordination between organizations providing peace building training at the district level and
finally the peace committees have not been institutionalized thereby relying on the goodwill
of individual officers.
3.2.3.2 Institutional Framework on Small Arms: The Regional Center on Small Arms
(RECSA)
The Nairobi Protocol provides for the establishment of RECSA as corporate body
responsible for the implementation of the Nairobi Declaration and the Nairobi
Protocol.50
RECSA whose member states are signatories to the Nairobi Protocol was
established in 2006 to replace the Nairobi Secretariat of 2002 under the Nairobi Declaration.
It is an intergovernmental organizational with international juridical personality with two
main objectives namely; to coordinate and implement the efforts of the Member States to
50 Article 18 of the Nairobi Protocol (2004) for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of SALW in the
Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa and Bordering Areas
99
fight the proliferation of illicit small arms in the region and to work with civil society and
other international agencies on small arms. The Centre thus provides a link between the
governments of the Member States, other regional and inter-governmental bodies, civil
society and local communities working on Small Arms51
Since its establishment, RECSA has registered eight notable achievements. The most
important one is the transformation of the Nairobi Secretariat to RECSA. This happened in
2006, four years after the establishment of the Secretariat. The Government of Kenya under
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) supported and hosted the Secretariat on behalf of the
Member States. This arrangement posed a number of operational and institutional challenges.
For example under the Nairobi Secretariat, staff recruitment was through secondment by
Member States which denied the Centre any involvement in determining their professional
competence. The change means that the Center is able to engage competent personnel
through a competitive recruitment process. Other achievements include; keeping the issue of
small arms on regional and international agenda through participating in meetings on small
arms and related issues. RECSA works to ensure that the challenges posed by the illicit
proliferation of small arms in the region have remained live on regional and international
agenda. It also convenes meetings to brief signatory States about developments on small arms
at the international level and their obligations under the UNPoA, the Nairobi Declaration, and
the Nairobi Protocol including the Co-ordinated Agenda for Action. RECSA convenes a
ministerial meeting every two years to discuss the progress the region has made in
implementing the regional as well international agreements on the subject.
The other major achievement of RECSA has been the development of a legally
binding instrument in the region. Following the signing of the Nairobi Declaration signatory
states mandated the Eastern Africa Police Chiefs Cooperation Organization (EAPCCO)
51
Interview with Francis Sang, Director, RECSA on 27 August, 2009 but also this information is available at
RECSA website: [email protected].
100
to draft a legally binding document on small arms. This process led to Nairobi Protocol one
of the few binding documents on small arms globally. RECSA was mandated to oversee the
process until its completion and in this regard, it has supported and provided leadership to
EAPCCO. These efforts culminated in the signing of the Nairobi Protocol by the 11
signatories to the Nairobi Protocol in 2004. Seychelles also signed the Protocol though it was
not party to the Nairobi Declaration.
RECSA has been instrumental in spearheading the establishment of the NFPs in all its
11 Member States except Somalia because of the ongoing conflict since 1991. The Nairobi
Protocol and the Declaration provides for the establishment of the NFPs52
with the following
objectives; facilitate rapid information exchange to combat cross border small arms and light
weapons trafficking, establish systems to verify the validity of documents issued by licensing
authorities in the sub-region and develop a regional system to harmonize relevant import and
export transfer documents and end user certificates. Other functions of the NFP include
overseeing the implementation of the Co-ordinated Agenda for Action, serving as clearing
houses for the information on conflicts in the region, sharing strategies for curbing the flow
and stockpiling of weapons in the region, raising awareness on the effects of small arms on
human security and leading the legislative and other reforms to control and manage small
arms in a given country. In some instances, RECSA has facilitated the establishment of NFPs
by providing technical and financial support. In the same vein, RECSA continues to support
the development and establishment of strategic direction by providing guidance.
Consequently, it has continued to support the establishment of National Action Plans (NAPs)
in all its Member States. The co-ordinated agenda provides for the NAP. Presently, it is only
Kenya and Uganda that have developed NAP while preparations are underway to help the
52
Article 16 of the Nairobi Protocol (2004) for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of SALW in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa and Bordering Areas and paragraph (iv) subsection (7) of the
Nairobi Declaration (2000) on the Problem of the Proliferation of Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW)
in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa,
101
rest of the signatories to develop them. Another achievement is that RECSA has sustained the
spirit of destroying recovered arms every year especially during the commemoration of the
signing of the Nairobi Declaration. In this regard by August 2009 Kenya had destroyed
22,000, Uganda 57,000, and Ethiopia 12,000.53
Despite the steady destruction of recovered
weapons, RECSA beliefs there are still surplus stockpiles in the custody of security agents
that need to be destroyed.
Since its inception RECSA, has recognized the limited capacity amongst Member
States to fully implement the provisions of the various documents agreed upon. To date,
RECSA has undertaken several training on different aspect. For instance, the safety of the
weapons in the custody of disciplined forces is crucial and issues of control and state
accountability, marking and tracing and record keeping are candidly captured in articles 6 and
7 of the Nairobi Protocol. Under this, Party States are obligated to mark and keep proper
records of the arms in the custody of security forces and other state agencies. State
accountability is a crucial issue and effective tracing is aimed at ensuring that weapons in the
possession of state are not used for illicit activities. There have been trainings of the senior
Officers on arms marking and destruction.
At the regional level, RECSA has facilitated trainings on stockpile management and
related issues. The last of such meeting was held in Mombasa, Kenya where Party States to
the Protocol agreed to mark and record the stocks by the end of 2008. However, the dateline
was not honoured but by the time of interview, RECSA has facilitated the acquisition of two
electronic arms marking machines to all Member States; one for the police and the other one
for the military. The marking is meant to improve stockpile management measures that will
help identify and locate the source of arms used illicitly in the region once recovered. The
53Interview with Francis Sang and Francis Wairagu, the Executive, Secretary and Research Officer, RECSA
respectively in Nairobi, Kenya on 27 and 29 August, 2009 respectively
102
Center has also developed a training manual on ‘Best Practice Guidelines for the
Implementation of the Nairobi Declaration and the Nairobi Protocol’.
RECSA has also developed a research manual on small arms to be used in the sub
region. Several experiences from within and beyond the region established the use of weak
research approaches to small arms in the region, a fact that undermined the credibility of the
study results. It was therefore imperative for guidelines that aim to standardize research
approaches in the Member States. This is important not only for the purpose of comparisons
of small arms dynamics within Member States but also useful in making sure that the
methodology takes cognizance of the various issues on small arms relevant to the region.
Other achievement is that Member States have agreed that legislative and regulatory
frameworks at the national level need to be harmonized throughout the region and in tandem
with the Protocol and Declaration.54
The Nairobi Protocol lists a litany of measures that each State Party should adopt to
address the problem of small arms. This litany includes crimes that should be defined as
offences across the region; agree to arms embargoes by the UN and/or regional organizations
and illegal activities that should assume domestic force by signatory states. States inco-
operate international obligations such as agreed in treaties into national law in one of the two
ways depending whether a state is monist or dualist. Monist systems reflect a unitary nature
between international obligation and domestic law whereby both sources of law are
considered to belong to the same family. Under this approach when a state ratifies a treaty,
the treaty is given the domestic force of law without the need to enact subsequent
implementing legislation. Democratic processes leading to the domestic approval of a treaty
is attained during the treaty making process.
54
Article 3 of the Nairobi Protocol(2004) for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of SALW in the
Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa and Bordering Areas.
103
Under monist systems, domestic courts and other public bodies refer to the language
of the treaty provisions itself as a source of law. In the IGAD region Djibouti and Ethiopia
are monist states. On the other hand, dualist system of laws, stress that international law and
domestic law exist separately and mostly operate independently of each other. When a dualist
state expresses its consent to be bound to an international treaty, the treaty does not directly
assume the domestic force of law. Rather the enactment of domestic legislation is first
required in order for the treaty to have domestic legal effect. Kenya and Uganda are examples
of dualist states in the IGAD region.55
Succinctly, article 3 seeks to harmonize the definitions
and understanding and penalties for small arms-related crimes within the region.
In order to achieve this RECSA, undertook an audit of the existing laws in each of the
Member States and established that some of the laws were obsolete while others are too
lenient to make an impact in war against illicit proliferation and use of small arms. The
findings of the audit were used to lobby and sensitize Member States on the importance of
strengthening the legislative frameworks but also harmonizing them through visits and
national and regional meetings.56
In order to take the process of harmonizing the laws and
regulations on small arms at regional level, RECSA has facilitated the establishment of a
legal drafting committee in each member states. Each Committee is examining its country
laws on small arms with a view to facilitating the harmonization process at the regional level.
It is not enough just to develop policy documents but more important to ensure that
Member States implement them. RECSA has succeeded in lobbying Member States to accept
the documents that they produce. In this regard, all the signatory states have agreed to
implement the Co-ordinated Agenda for Action. The Agenda which was developed under the
55
Report on the Impact of piracy on the IGAD Region, IGAD capacity Building Program against Piracy
(ICPAT), March, 2009 56Interview with Francis Sang of RECSA in Nairobi on Kenya on 27 9 August 2009
104
auspices of Nairobi Secretariat is roadmap to addressing the identified key thematic areas in
the Declaration as well as the Protocol. These are policy and legislative measures,
institutional framework, stockpile management, public education and awareness; inter
cooperation, border control and refugees, research, human development planning and
capacity building.
RECSA remains a one stop shop for information on small arms from not only Party
States to the two documents but other regions. The resource center at RECSA has
information on progress on the implementation of the Nairobi Protocol and Declaration.
Specific information includes; the status of the various NFPs achievements and challenges,
revision of national firearms and regulatory framework and the overall security reform
agenda. The Resource center also contains material on small arms from other regions
including the UN.RECSA in recognition of the international nature of small arms has entered
into formal arrangement with key regional players to work on small arms. This includes the
International Conference on Great Lakes (ICGL), IGAD, EAC and the African Union (AU).
At the level of the UN, RECSA has observer status. At the level of the AU, RECSA serves as
the Secretariat on the efforts to develop an Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) that brings together all
Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and bodies working on small arms and related
issues in Africa.
Decades of pre occupation with state centric approach to security did not change with
the signing of the Nairobi Declaration in 2000. The whole notion that small arms is a security
issue and therefore outside the purview of non-state actors continues to affect state-civil
society relationship on small arms. In order to consolidate and work in a co-ordinated
manner, RECSA has established a Civil Society Forum that brings together civil society
organizations working on issues of small arms and related aspects (of development, conflict
management and peace building, human rights, victims of gun-violence, aid agencies, faith
105
based, community based organizations, research and policy development among others) and
state actors. During meetings, they exchange and share views on the problem of small arms in
the region. In this regard, RECSA convenes regular meetings to discuss the role of civil
society in supporting the implementation of the Nairobi Protocol.57
The fora meets every two
years and in this way the Center provides a platform for building bridges between civil
society and governments on issues of small arms and contributes to change the perceptions
that small arms is more than a security issue.
The Nairobi Protocol reinforces public education and awareness raising as stated in
the Nairobi Declaration.58
It notes that ‘State Parties should undertake to develop local
national and regional public/community education awareness programmes to enhance the
involvement of the public and communities and support efforts to tackle the illicit
proliferation and trafficking and use of small arms and to encourage responsible ownership
and management. Consequently, RECSA has conducted a series of public awareness
activities through workshops, brochures and calendars at regional level particularly; the
Center has been on forefront in advocating for regional issues rather than national issues on
small arms. These programmes and means that include newsletter ‘Progress’ were launched
in 2002. At national level, more awareness raising programs have been undertaken
particularly in Kenya and Uganda with some limited levels in countries such as Sudan and
Ethiopia. Through workshops and brochures, civil society organizations have been able to
penetrate even the most remote parts of the region to highlight on the effects of small arms.
RECSA has developed an information and education strategy to guide information sharing
and education within and across the Member States. However, the challenge remains the slow
pace of implementation.
57
Activity Report of the Nairobi Secretariat on Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes and the Horn
of Africa January 14, 2003 58
Article 13 of the Nairobi Protocol(2004) for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of SALW in the
Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa and Bordering Areas
106
Initiatives on small arms in the region have made significant strides over the past decade
by implementing a number of activities to contribute to the promotion of peace and security.
Despite this, the country continues to suffer from the illicit proliferation and use of small
arms; a situation that provokes one to ask; what are the challenges facing the implementation
of programs on small arms in the region. One of the challenges relates to the organizational
structure of RECSA which consists of the Council of Ministers; Technical Advisory
Committee (which is consists of NFP Co-ordinators from each Member State) and then the
RECSA Secretariat. What this means is that the highest policy and decision making organ is
the Council of Ministers which can be only be reached through the country co-ordinator in
each country. The Protocol mandates RECSA to oversee the overall implementation of
Nairobi Declaration and the Protocol in each signatory state which means that at one level,
the NFP Co-ordinator oversees that decisions of Member States are implemented by RECSA
while at some point RECSA is to give instructions to the Co-ordinator on the implementation
of Member States’ collective decisions. In short, at one point the Co-ordinator is the boss of
RECSA and verse versa.
The other challenge is related to the institutionalization of the National Focal Points.
NFPs are housed in the Ministries of Internal Security of each Member State. This means that
they do not have the independence but rather operates under the whims of the mother
Ministry. This makes the process of decision making very long and laborious in the sense that
any decision touching for example on police force must be communicated to the police chiefs
for further discussion before a decision is taken. In other words, decisions at the level of
NFPs are discussed further at different levels within the concerned institutions and can be
rejected or altered or delayed thus affecting the original thinking. It thus means that it takes
too long before decisions are arrived at hence affecting the overall implementation of the
states’ obligations under the agreements. It implies that employees at the focal points cannot
107
decide on behalf of the mother institution during meetings and therefore are not able to
influence budget allocations from mother institutions to support the activities of the focal
points. Furthermore, without institutionalizing and some independence, national points are
not able to mobilize resources directly from partners because of the institutional bottlenecks
including procedures tied with acquisition and use of government resources.
The other challenge is the unpredictability of inter-state relations in the IGAD region.
International relations in the IGAD region are very unpredictable. At one point, countries are
close allies with cordial links which can change within a very short time. This means the
nature of relations at a particular point in time have a bearing on the setting and the
implementation of the regional agenda where the cooperation and commitment of each
country is important. For example, the existing sour relationship between Djibouti and Eritrea
and between Eritrea and Ethiopia is impacting negatively on implementation of collective
regional security agenda in the region.59
Since the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea in 1998
relations between the two countries have remained frosty. Also since the occupation of
Eritrean troops of some portion of the Djibouti territory claiming that it is his in 2008,
relations between the two countries are not good.
The other challenge is the limited capacity of RECSA particularly in research. In
order to develop appropriate interventions at national and regional level, there are a number
of issues that need further investigation. The importance of research is highlighted in the
Protocol as well as the Kenya and Uganda National Action Plans. The Plans call for joint
researches between the government and civil society groups and suggests possible areas for
research on small arms. These areas include those that relates to law enforcement agencies,
59
For the border war between Eritrea and Ethiopia see Mulugeta K ‘The Ethiopian-Eritrean War of 1998-2000:
An Analysis of its causes, Course, Impacts and Prospects in Regional Security in the Post Cold war Horn of
Africa (eds) Sharamo, R. et al pp 31-64 .and for inter- state relations in the Horn of Africa see Ibrahim Farah,
(2009) Foreign Policy and Conflict in Somalia, 1960-1990, A thesis submitted in fulfillment of the requirements
of the degree of doctor of philosophy (Ph.D.) in International Studies, Institute of Diplomacy and International
Studies, University of Nairobi
108
approaches to surrender and collection of illegal firearms and the proliferation of military-
type weapons in pastoral communities.60
Within the Protocol research is a running theme
throughout the document because the areas proposed to inform policy and activities demand
sound and credible information. Yet RECSA has only one research officer to serve all the
Member States which means the Center is therefore dependent on outside resources to carry
out studies. Given the importance of the research component, that of informing policy
formulation and strategic direction of the Center, it is imperative that it posses its own
internal capacity to undertake, supervise studies and provide strategic direction on research
matters.
There is also lack of sustainable funding. Almost 90% of RECSA activities are
dependent on donor funding although the Member States have streamlined the financial
support to the Center in their budget, since 2006, but they don’t honor their commitment in
time. At the time of interview, only Kenya among the signatory states had made its
contribution. To worsen the funding situation, donor support is mainly programme oriented
with limited funds for institutional support. The contributions from Member States is also
affected by the fact some signatories (such as Djibouti and Seychelles) are not adversely
affected by illicit proliferation and use of small arms and therefore do not priotize their
commitments to the Center. Ideally, every member state should contribute towards the
running of the Center. While several donors have expressed willingness to support the Center
any delay or none payment by members normally affects its operations. The integrity of any
regional body can only stand if Party States owns and take up responsibility. Compounding
the resource scarcity is the fact both RECSA and the various NFPs are yet to develop an
effective resource mobilization strategy to solicit for resources.
60
Government of Kenya, (2006) Kenya National Action Plan for Arms Control and Management, Nairobi
109
Lack of sustained funding also affects RECSA efforts to enhance border co-operation
and by extension with neighbouring states in preventing and reducing the problem of the
illicit proliferation of small arms. As a result of limited financial resources states are not able
to deploy sufficient security, migration and custom officers on border areas. Consequently,
the government organizes limited training courses to improve the capacity of the officers at
the border areas. It therefore means as the border crimes becomes more sophisticated, the
capacity of the border officers do not move in tandem with these developments. There is still
a cloud of suspicion among the member states in what is perceived as confidential
information.61
Related to lack of sufficient resources, the Center cannot recruit the required
personnel. It means those available are either over-tasked or given assignments that they are
least qualify to perform. The other dimension is that the performance of the NFP is affected
adversely by frequent transfers and change of personnel by governments. These changes
continually affect the development of capacity at the regional level. Frequent personnel
transfers or relocation means that new officers take more time to learn the issues before
initiating any activity and this affects progress. Government officers are continually
transferred or allocated different duties without due regard to the knowledge and experience
that one has in particular field. Once this happens the new officer must be trained to be
relevant for the work. In addition to the above, other challenges include the existence of
stockpiles of illicit recovered small, persistent conflicts in the region that undermines efforts
aimed disarmament and awareness raising in insecure areas, lack of a regional strategic plan
to guide its operations, the slow pace of adopting and making provisions assume national
force contained in regional as well as international agreements on small arms, absence of
61
Interview with some of the delegates at RECSA Conference in Nairobi, 2005
110
indicators to monitor and evaluate the implementation of the policy decisions agreed upon by
member states including the legal documents.
Following the violence that ensued after the announcement of the 2007 general
elections, in which the ODM alleged that the election was rigged, two Commissions namely;
The Waki and Kriggler were formed and a new constitution passed in a referendum in August
2010.A number of institutions to promote national cohesion and reconciliation and deal with
future conflicts have been or are being established. This includes the Truth Justice and
Reconciliation and the National Cohesion and Integration Commissions. Under the new laws,
all judges and magistrates will be vetted within a year of promulgating the new
dispensation.62
The CPMR framework in Kenya consists of a draft policy on peace building and
conflict management and adhoc institutions that is under revision to ensure that it is in line
with the new constitution. Once endorsed, the draft policy will provide the overall framework
to the CPMR activities in the country and institutionalize the hitherto adhoc pedestrian
approach to maters of peace and security in the country. In addition, to the sectoral policies
that addresses specific issues related to improving security in the country, the new
constitution together with the National Peace Accord and National Reconciliation, and the
post electoral violence, Kriggler and Waki reports provide for more institutions in which the
pursuit for peace and national cohesion is to be anchored.
3.3 Frameworks on Environment Security in Kenya
The supreme policy framework on matters of environment and natural resources is the
Constitution of Kenya (2010) and specifically chapter five. The presentation of environment
62
Chapter Seven of the Constitution of Kenya (2010)
111
and natural resources is recognition of the explicit link between the two. Part I of the Chapter
states that law in the country shall be held used and managed in a manner that is equitable
efficient productive and sustainable and in accordance to several principles that include
equitable access to land security of land rights sustainable and productive management of
land resources sound management and production of ecologically sensitive areas,
encouragement of communities to settle land dispute through recognized local community
initiatives consistent with the constitution. The constitution provides for a national land
policy which will spearhead the National Land Commission.
In terms of ownership the constitution states that land in Kenya is owned collectively
as a nation, communities and individuals. Land can be privately, community or publicly
owned. It goes further to distinguish between public, private, and community land, In relation
to pastoralists the later is very relevant. The constitution notes that community land shall vest
in and be held by communities identified on the basis of ethnicity culture, or similar
community interest. The constitution bestows powers into the state to regulate the use of any
land or any interest in or right over any law in the interest of defence, public safety public
order public morality public health and land use planning.
The constitution makes the Commission the most important agency in relation to land
matters. Among other tasks it is expected to undertake research related to land and use of
natural resources and recommend to the appropriate authorities., initiate investigation own its
own or on a complaint into present or historical injustices and recommend appropriate redress
and encourage application of traditional dispute resolution mechanism in land disputes.63
All
these are important issues in relation to pastoralists. But the major weakness is that the
Commission is limited to only making recommendations and action is supposed to be taken
63
Article 66 (1) and (2) of the Constitution of Kenya 2012
112
somewhere else probably the executive. It has no redress if their recommendations are
ignored. There is nothing in the constitution that compels the executive to implement the
recommendations. The section bestows powers to the national assemble to enact relevant
laws that will facilitate the achievement of the overall state obligation on matters relating to
land and environment. Overall, the constitution provides a framework for the country to
d3ealwith maters of land, environment and natural resources
Part II on Environment and Natural Resources obligates the state to ensure that there
is sustainable exploitation utilization and management and conservation of the environment
and natural resources and ensure equitable sharing of the accruing benefits and eliminate
processes and activities that are likely to endanger the environment.64
The government of Kenya singly or in conjunction with development partners, UN
agencies, and NGOs have developed arrange of policies and programmes on varied
environment related issues including food security, early warning, livestock development,
integrated population, health, and environmental programmes which have slowed but not
reversed the problems associated with environmental insecurity. Prior to the enactment of the
Environmental Management and Coordination Act (EMCA) in 1999, there was no
framework environmental legislation, Kenya’s approach to environmental legislation and
administration was highly sectoral and legislation with environmental management
components had been formulated largely in line with natural resource sectors such as land,
forestry, mineral oils, water etc, being the legacy of “colonial resource” management
legislation.65
The sectoral approach, have diffused and decentralized power and responsibility in
numerous government departments and created jurisdictional overlaps and conflicts and
64
Article 69 (1) 65Interview at with Christine Baari on 19 August 2010
113
ignored the indivisibility of and the interrelationships within the ecosystem.66
It therefore
became very necessary to have a focal point within the government to coordinate activities,
policies and to advise on environmental management issues. Through administrative
instructions, several institutions were created to serve in various area of environmental
management. These include; the National Environment Secretariat (NES) established in
1971,the Permanent Presidential Commission on Soil Conservation and afforestation
established in 1981. Both the Secretariat and Commission had no solid foundation having
been created by administrative fiats with no legislative backing.
3.3.1 Policy and Legal Framework on Environment Security
Due to the short comings of the sectoral laws such as failure to recognize the inter
sectoral linkages, the Environmental Management and Coordination Act No. 8 of 1999 was
enacted and came into force on 14th
January 2000. It is the framework law on the
management of environment and natural resources in Kenya and is the single piece of
legislation that contains to date a comprehensive system of environmental management in
Kenya. The Act is based on the recognition that improved legal and administrative co-
ordination of the diverse sectoral initiatives is necessary in order to improve national capacity
for the management of the environment, and accepts the fundamental principle that the
environment constitutes the foundation of the country’s national, economic, social, cultural
and spiritual advancement. It establishes a legal and institutional framework for the
management of environment in Kenya.
From that date, all sectoral laws were expected to be reviewed or amended to ensure
consistency with the requirements of EMCA. According to EMCA
“Any written law, in force immediately before the coming into force of this
Act, relating to the management of the environment shall have effect subject to
66
Ibid
114
modification as may be necessary to give effect to this Act, and where the
provisions of any such law conflict with any provisions of this Act, the
provisions of this Act shall prevail”.67
The Environmental Management and Coordination Act of 1999, was enacted to
provide an appropriate legal and institutional framework for the management of the
environment and for matters connected therewith and incidental thereto. EMCA does not
repeal the sectoral legislation but seeks to coordinate the activities of the various institutions
tasked to regulate the various sectors. These institutions are referred to as Lead Agencies in
EMCA. Lead Agencies are defined as any Government ministry, department, parastatal, and
state corporation or local authority in which any law vests functions of control or
management of any element of the environment or natural resource.68
Due to these, several
agreements and conventions relevant to the management and protection of the environment
and natural resources were adopted
The multi lateral treaties and conventions, brought with them fundamental principles
on the environment which include; sustainable development of the environment and natural
resources, precautionary measures to mitigate environmental degradation, integration of the
environmental considerations into development and planning, promotion of public
participation in environmental decision making and enforcement. The principles essentially
breathed life into the environmental framework law that the country has today. The Act
enumerates the general principles guiding the implementation of the Act. “Every person in
Kenya is entitled to a clean and healthy environment and has the duty to safeguard and
enhance the environment”.69
It is worth noting that the entitlement to a clean and healthy
environment carries a correlative duty. Hence, there is not only the entitlement to a clean and
67Under Section 148 of EMCA
68 Section 2 of the Environmental Management and Coordination Act of 1999
69 Section 3 of the Act
115
healthy environment, but also the duty to ensure that the environment is not degraded in order
to facilitate one’s own as well as other persons’ enjoyment of the environment.
The Act70
further provides that if a person alleges that the said entitlement has been, is
being or is likely to be contravened in relation to him, then, notwithstanding that such person
cannot show any personal loss or injury suffered or likely to be suffered, the person may
bring an action for necessary redress by the high court. In essence, this section introduces the
most liberal locus standi in seeking judicial intervention for protection of the environment,
thereby affording every person access to environmental justice. With the advantage of this
liberal locus standi rules, the days when the High Court routinely dismissed suits for failure
by the applicants to prove personal or proprietary injury will be banished into oblivion.
However, the section cautions that persons seeking to take advantage of this liberal locus
standi must not bring actions that are frivolous and vexatious or an abuse of court process.
The Constitution of Kenya as the supreme law of the land contains specific provisions
regarding the environment. It lists the right to life as one of the fundamental rights an
individual is entitled to. The right to life guaranteed by the Constitution can be interpreted to
include the right to a clean and healthy environment. To operationalize the Act, NEMA
through several committees has promulgated the following regulations, which have a bearing
on the proposed project in regard to compliance with national requirement: The
Environmental (Impact Assessment and Audit) Regulations, 2003. Legal Notice No. 1; the
Environmental Management and Coordination (Water Quality) Regulations, 2006, Legal
Notice No. 120; the Environmental Management and Coordination (Waste Management)
Regulations, 2006, Legal Notice No. 121, the controlled substance regulations; Conservation
of Biological Diversity Regulation and Noise Regulation.
70 Section 3 of the Act
116
3.3.2 Institutional Frameworks on Environment Security
The Act71
establishes key institutions for sound environmental management, namely:
National Environment Council (NEC); National Environment Management Authority
(NEMA); National Environment Tribunal (NET); Provincial and District Environment
Committees; and Public Complaints Committee (PCC).
3.3.2.1 The National Environment Council
The National Environment Council is established under Section 4 as the body responsible for
policy formulation and directions for purpose of the Act, as well as setting of national goals
and objectives and the determination of policies and priorities for the protection of the
environment. The Council is chaired by the Minister responsible for environmental matters
and its composition is drawn from all relevant sectors in the country.
71
See part three, of the Act
117
3.3.2.2 The National Environment Management Authority (NEMA)
The Act72
provides for National Environment Management Authority (NEMA)’s role
vis-à-vis multi-lateral environmental agreements as to initiate legislative proposals to the
Attorney General to give legislative effect to the provisions of the treaties and conventions,
identify other appropriate measures necessary for the national implementation of treaties and
conventions and to assist relevant lead agencies in negotiating environmental related treaties.
NEMA is established under Section 7 of the Act as a body corporate with perpetual
succession, capable of suing and being sued, holding and disposing of property, borrowing
money, an entering into contracts in its corporate name. It is the principal government
institution charged with the overall supervision and co-ordination over all matters relating to
the environment, as well as implementation of all policies relating to the environment.
NEMA has to date considerably developed its human and other resource capacity to enable it
coordinate the environmental management activities of Lead Agencies.
EMCA also establishes several statutory committees that work under NEMA, namely;
Standards and Enforcement Review Committee, the National Environment Action Plan
Committee and the Environmental Impact Assessment – Technical Advisory Committee. In
addition, there is also the Provincial and District Environment Committees. EMCA also
establishes the National Environment Trust Fund that operates through five Boards of
Trustees appointed by the Minister. All these Committees feed into each other and are inter-
connected.
72
Section 124 of the Act
118
3.3.2.3Public Complaints Committee
The Public Complains Committee (PCC) is established under sections 31 to 36 of EMCA
(1999). It is a Semi Autonomous Government Agency (SAGA), operating independently with
power to regulate its own procedure. It reports and makes recommendations to the National
Environment Council. Its main mandate is to investigate any allegations or complaints
against any person in relation to the condition of the environment in Kenya, investigate any
allegations or complaints against the Authority, investigate on its own motion any suspected
case of environmental degradation and make a report of its findings together with its
recommendations thereon to the Council as well as prepare and submit to the Council
periodic reports of its activities, which shall form part of the annual report on the State of the
Environment.
3.3.2.4 The National Environment Tribunal (NET)
The National Environnent Tribunal (NET) is established under Section 125 of EMCA for
the purpose of hearing appeals from administrative decisions made by organs responsible for
enforcement of environmental standards. An appeal may be lodged by a project proponent
upon; denial of an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) license or by a local community
upon the grant of an EIA license to a project proponent. NEMA may also refer any matter
that involves a technical point of law or is of unusual importance or complexity to NET for
direction. The proceedings of NET are not as stringent as those in a court of law and is not be
bound by the rules of evidence as set out in the Evidence Act. Upon the making of an award,
NET’s mandate ends there as it does not have the power to enforce its awards. The Act
provides that any person aggrieved by a decision or award of NET may within 30 days appeal
to the high court.
119
3.3.2.5 Normative and Institutional Framework on Environmental Security: A Critique
The Environmental Management and Co-ordination Act established the legal and
institutional framework for the co-ordination of the diverse sectoral initiatives for
environmental management in Kenya. However, as it is framework legislation, its
implementation is dependent on the promulgation of enabling regulations that NEMA is
currently working on. Until all the enabling regulations have been promulgated and are in
force, it would be presumptuous to evaluate its efficacy. The institution of NEMA is still in
its formative and nascent stage. It still requires critical mass of expertise not only to cover its
vast array of functions, but also to build up credibility and blaze the trail in the enforcement
of the law for sound environmental management in Kenya. Presently NEMA has district
environment offices in some districts that are headed by environment officers. The challenge
was the arbitrary creating of many districts that made it impossible for NEMA to have
officers in all of them.
Furthermore, although the Act establishes the various institutions as outlined above, it
does not give them power to enforce their decisions. The provisions on the PCC does not
provide it with the mandate to see its recommendations carried through as NEC is not
specifically required to do anything in regard to the reports submitted by the PCC and will
often note and adopt the same without any further follow up action. So far the PCC has
experienced challenges such as failure to honour summons by witnesses, hostility between
parties, hostility directed at PCC investigators, lack of understanding of EMCA and
abdication of duty by Lead Agencies.
The Act73
which allows appeals to the high court from the NET further goes to
prejudice the actions of the Tribunal which should be the final arbiter in regard to
Environmental issues. Section 129 of Act also breaches the Rules of Civil Procedure as once
73
See ssection 130, of the Act
120
an appeal is filed at the Tribunal; the Act provides that “status quo shall be maintained until
the case is heard and determined’. This section creates an avenue for settling scores amongst
business rivals, who file cases solely to steal their rivals developments and not for
environmental protection purposes as the interpretation of the section is largely
misinterpreted.74
Although the framework law allows any body to file a case where they feel their right
to a clean and healthy environment has been breached, the cost of litigation is still prohibitive
for an ordinary person making impossible for most them to file the cases. It’s thus until courts
are able to waive filing fees that this will be achieved. Furthermore, without the amendment
of Article 27 of the Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community (EA Treaty),
through a protocol, to extend the jurisdiction of the court to environmental matters, the courts
will not be in a position to intervene taking into account the trans-boundary nature of
environmental issues and the need for common standards.
Additionally, there is lack of capacity within the legal profession and the judicial
system for the use of public interest litigation, and an absence of organized and professional
civil society institutions to pursue environmental rights through the courts. It has been
observed that the promulgation of the framework Environmental Law reflects the
Government of Kenya’s commitment to implement international obligations in general. The
legislation represents a paradigm shift in environmental rights jurisprudence, especially with
regard to the coverage on a range of important international law principles and sustainable
development.
However in relation to environment issues relating to ASAL areas, its current form,
and the framework will not be able to deal with the rapid degradation present in these
regions. The framework is tailored mainly to address environmental conflicts related to
74
Interview with Christine Baari of NEMA in Nairobi on 19 August 2010
121
development agenda and not community related issues of grazing, and effects climate change
particularly in arid areas.
122
Chapter Four
Conflict, Environmental Security and Governance
among the Turkana Community in Kenya
4.1 Introduction
Chapter three examined critically the existing normative and institutional
frameworks for conflict prevention, management and resolution and environmental
protection, conservation, and management in Kenya and specifically outlined their strength
and weaknesses. Furthermore, the chapter discussed the frameworks relating small arms as
an intervening variable including other factors that affect the livelihood of the Turkana
community. It identified several factors relating to the linkage between conflict,
environmental security and governance that explain the persistent instability among the
Turkana community which this chapter tested through field interviews.
This chapter presents the findings of the field study on the links between conflict and
environmental security against the backdrop of poor governance in pastoral areas. It brings
together the results of the fieldwork from Turkana central, Turkana south, Turkana west and
Nairobi, and representatives of regional structures such as the IGAD. It also discusses the
question of small arms as an intervening variable given its centrality in conflicts among the
pastoral communities including other factors beyond small arms that affect the livelihood of
the Turkana community. Furthermore the study discussed other forms of insecurity that the
Turkana community experiences. This is followed by understanding the nature and
perceptions around the environment in Turkana, questions on causes, institutional
frameworks, challenges and opportunities for promoting environmental security. Succinctly,
this chapter presents empirical data on the interface between conflict and environmental
123
security in the Turkana region. Therefore, this chapter presents the findings of the fieldwork
on these issues. For the purpose of the presentation, the section is divided into three broad
parts namely conflicts, small arms, and environmental security with governance as across
cutting theme.
4.2 Conflicts and Human Security among the Turkana Community
Questions on conflicts and the Turkana community sought to know the causes/
sources, spread, effects, challenges, and opportunities for conflict prevention, resolution and
management in Turkana. According to 90% of those interviewed, natural resource related
conflicts are the dominant disputes in Turkana. Other types of conflicts identified by the
respondents were environmental, political, wildlife/human and livestock rustling. Natural
resource-based conflicts in Turkana mainly revolve around the question of land, pasture, and
watering points. Map III depicts the conflict prone areas and grazing grounds at the time of
the study.
A hundred percent of the respondents noted that natural resource based conflicts in
Turkana is hinged on the desire to control, access, and utilize the land related resources of
pasture and water. The limitation of these resources has generated stiff competition with other
pastoral communities within and across national borders. Likewise, when there is abundant
pasture in one area, pastoralists move to such areas and conflict ensues. The question of
historical claims to pasture land also arises when pastoralists in search of pasture and water
clash with commercial farmers in ranches.
Environmental conflicts were another form of conflict in Turkana at the time of
research. Environmental conflicts are a consequence of unsustainable utilization of land and
the consequent degradation and scarcity of resources.1 In this regard, due to large number of
1Mwagiru, M. (2003) Op cit
124
animals that the community keeps, the existing land and pasture cannot sustain them.
Therefore overgrazing normally leads to land degradation and hence exposes the land to
climate vulnerabilities, climate change, and related aspects. It was noted that environmental
conflicts are in most cases internationalized. This is because IDPs, refugees and small arms
were sometimes felt across the national borders. The following areas (Map III) were
identified as frequently experiencing conflicts in the larger Turkana at the time of interview.2
Table 1: Conflict Areas in Turkana
Counties Area
Turkana North Todonyang, Kibish, Kokuro, Kataruk
Turkana South Kataruk, Epuke Juluk, Lorokon Kaputir, Nakwamoru, Kainuk,
Kakongu, Kalemungorok
Turkana East Kochodin, Nakukulas, Lokori, Elelea Kapedo, Lochwaakula,
Lokwamosing, Napeitom, Lomelo
Turkana West Nadapal,Nanam, Lokipoto Lokichokio , Oropoi, Loreng, Letea
Loima Urum, Loima, Kalemunyang
Source: A summary of the information collected by the researcher during the field work in
August 2009 and February 2010 in Turkana
2Group discussions in Turkana Central, Turkana South, Turkana West and Turkana north and interviews with
DC’s George Ayong’a, Caleb Ongoma and Mr Kanyiri. Others are; James Loititip, Eregay Akinyesi and Sam
Ekal
125
Map III: Conflicts Prone Areas and Grazing fields in Turkan County and the surrounding
areas
126
The focus group discussions3 identified major approaches to CPMR in Turkana as;
disarmament operations mounted by security forces, confiscation of stolen animals, leaders,
elites, women, church meetings, intercommunity dialogue, exchange visits, school children
music festivals, sports events among the warring communities, intercommunity projects such
as access roads, opening up common markets for exchange of goods and interactions, follow
up and return of stolen animals and peace rallies that benefit the warring communities. These
interventions were also supported by those interviewed from the provincial administration,
the police, community based organizations and individual researchers at the time the study.4
The respondents5 noted that a part from environmental security, Turkana experiences the
following forms of insecurity namely food, economic, health, social, and physical/personal
and some aspects of political security.
4.2.1 Food Security
Dependency on livestock mainly cattle, goats’ sheep, donkeys’ and camels and their
products of blood, milk, and meat for diet is not sufficient to provide livelihood for the
Turkana community year round. Even with limited small scale rain-fed sorghum, millet and
maize cultivation (sometimes through irrigation), hunting and fruit planting and gathering
along river valleys, seasonal rivers/streams, and fishing around Lake Turkana does not result
into adequate production of food stuff. As a result, the region has become one of the
chronically food insecure in Kenya and its survival is begged on food aid, a situation that was
attributed to factors summarized in Table 2 below
3ibid
4ibid
5These are participants to the three focus group discussions from Turkana Central, Turkana South, and Turkana
West. Individual interviews were held with James Loititip, Eregay Akinyesi and Sam Ekal
127
Table 2: Factors affecting Food Security in Turkana
Factors Percentage (%) of the respondents
Insecurity (small arms, IDPs, destruction of crops) 10
Frequent drought and famine 20
Harsh climatic conditions 40
Unviable size and management of herds 8
Overreliance on relief food 6
Pastoralism 4
High levels of poverty 10
Lack of collateral security for loans 0
Cattle raids 2
Total 100%
Source: Information collected from the field data collected in August 2009 and February
2010, in Turkana
According to the table above, 40% of the respondents blamed the harsh environmental
conditions that obtain in Turkana County as the major source of food insecurity among the
community while 20% felt it was due to frequent prolonged drought that has characterized
the region in the last five years. 10% indicated that food insecurity is also perpetuated by the
acquisition and use of illicit small arms by other pastoral communities neighbouring the
Turkana.6 Factors such as high levels of poverty, cattle raids, unviable size and management
of herds and overreliance on relief food were rated 10%, 7%, 8%, and 6% respectively as
factors influencing food security among the Turkana community. The respondents did not
consider lack of collateral security for loans as an issue in food security because livestock is
regarded as a social investment rather than a commercial venture.
6Interview with Darlington Akwabai, Researcher and Geoffrey Kaituko, Drought Monitoring Officer (DMO) of
the Arid Lands Resource Management Project II in Turkana on 15th and 17th August, 2009 respectively.
128
4.2.2 Economic and Social Security
Table 3: Main Economic Activities among the Turkana
Activity Percentage (%)
Livestock keeping 85
Limited farming and bee keeping 3
Paid employment 5
Self employed- handcraft 4
Mining 1.5
Fishing 1
Tourism 0.5
Source: Summary of the field data gathered in Turkana in August 2009 and December 2009
There are a number of economic activities that take place among the Turkana that
underpin their economic survival. These include livestock keeping and limited crop farming.
According to table 3, 85% of the respondents noted that the economic mainstay of the
Turkana community is livestock keeping. In addition, 3% noted that some limited farming is
practiced along riverine of rivers Kerio, Turkwel and Suguta, the three main rivers that pass
through the region and bee keeping while 4% cited paid employment.7 Other income
generating activities but which do not contribute significantly to the economy of the
community include self employment, mining, fishing and tourism all rated at less than 2%.8
Some gold is mined at Nariomoru, which also produces precious and gypsum stones for
construction. The gum arabica in the mountainous and plain Turkana remains unexploited
due to insecurity. Self employment is mainly in handcraft, basket and curio making and
tourism in Turkana South Game Reserve.
7ibid
8 ibid
129
Table 4: Factors affecting Economic Security among the Turkana
Factor Percentage (%)
Insecurity 10
Poor or lack of effective government policy on the
development of livestock in arid and semi arid areas
77
High levels of illiteracy and limited entrepreneurial skills 3
High levels of poverty 6
Harsh climatic conditions 4
Total 100%
Source: Summary of the field data gathered in Turkana in August 2009 and December 2009
According to table 4, 77% of the respondents noted that poor or lack of appropriate
policy on the development of the livestock sector in the arid and semi arid areas of the
country adversely affects economic security among the Turkana.9 This is largely due to lack
of the seemingly lack of government interest in the potential of the arid areas and therefore
inability to address diseases, drought, and famine and develop an effective marketing strategy
for livestock and their products. Lack of proper policy is partly attributed to lack of effective
political representation of the community at the key decision policy-making organs in the
country since independence occasioned by the fact that the post independence leadership for
many years was largely guided by the colonial mentality, which dismissed pastoralism as a
primitive, non-viable economic activity.10
Insecurity was voted by 10% of the respondents while high levels of illiteracy and
poverty, limited entrepreneurial skills, harsh climatic conditions had 3%, 6% and 4%
respectively. Insecurity is rated relatively higher because the illicit proliferation and use of
small arms discourages exploration and exploitation of resources while the rampant raids
reduce the number of livestock in possession of the Turkana. The implication is that there are
9Interview with Lesirima Member of Parliament Samburu West Constituency and an Assistant Minister
Provincial Administration Office of the President on 17 August 2010 10
Goldsmith, P. etal (2007) (eds) Fighting for Inclusion: Conflicts among the pastoralists in Eastern Africa and
the Horn, Developmemt Policy Management Forum, Nairobi
130
few animals to sell for grains and in particular maize remains in the region. Also when a
section of the community is driven out of the grazing fields they have limited or restricted
area for pasture and water. This means that animals have insufficient water and pasture and
therefore not healthy enough to fetch competitive prices in the market.11
Due to the great social value attached to the livestock, the majority of the Turkana people
decide to sell their animals when there are in dire need of resources and especially at the
height of severe drought. This is the time when the animals are weaker and cannot fetch
competitive prices. High levels of illiteracy and limited entrepreneual skills was partly
attributed to the fact that the country’s education system is insensitive to the pastoral way of
life because it does not take into account the realities of pastoralism.12
The current education
system is more suited to the sedentary communities rather than the pastoralism whose way of
life entails seasonal migration and movements. The curriculum is insensitive to the pastoral
way of life and hence fails to respond immediately to the needs and aspirations of the pastoral
lives, the school going children withdraws from school and goes back to herding while the
girls are married off.
4.2.3 Health Security
Human health in the entire Turkana region is dependent on the Lodwar county (formerly
district) hospital and numerous health facilities spread across other counties including
Lopiding in Lokichoggio. The Lodwar Catholic Church constructed the hospital located in
Turkana central but now the government supports 50% of its operations.13
Other health
facilities that support the hospital are 8 private clinics, 2 health facilities, 31 dispensaries out
11
ibid 12
ibid 13
Interview with Dr Gischarist Lokoel, the District Medical Officer (DMO) Turkana Central on 10.am on 16
August 2009 at his office at the Lodwar District Hospital
131
of which 21 are operational.14
There are about 1000 beds and 43 cots hospitals. The average
distance to the nearest health facility is 50km, which makes accessibility of health services a
difficult task. The doctor patient ratio is at 1:75000 probably one of the highest in the country
at the time.15
The hospital attend to almost all kinds of ailments including gun related injuries
and receives patients from all the six constituencies including border areas of the
neighbouring counties of Pokot and Samburu in Kenya, Moroto in Uganda, Kapoeta County
in Sudan and Omurate in Ethiopia.16
Other factors affecting health security in Turkana
include lack of sufficient staff, inadequate transport and resources, HIV-AIDS and
unemployment.17
The other aspect of health security among the Turkana is the animal health. Livestock
movement whether stolen or in search of pasture and water is a key factor in animal health.
The community prefers water in the shallow wells for their animals rather than boreholes.
This is because water in shallow wells, which is dug at the common watering point, is left
when it reduces to a certain level to fill again. Wild animals cannot infect or contaminate this
water because they cannot reach the low level. On the other hand, a borehole becomes a
center of daily visits and even settlement. Therefore, the animals together with the herders
deplete the environment around the borehole making it difficult for the vegetation to recover
until the borehole tries up completely. Respondents also identified the following as other
factors affecting livestock health in Turkana.
14
Interview with Dr Gischarist Lokoel, the District Medical Officer (DMO) Turkana Central on 10.am on 16
August 2009 at his office at the Lodwar District Hospital. 15
Ministry of Finance and Planning, Op cit, 16
Other cases that the hospital deals with include malnutrition both in adults and children and Malaria. 17
Interview with Dr Gischarist Lokoel,
132
Table 5: Factors affecting Livestock among the Turkana
Factor Percentage (%)
Lack of community health animal services 68
Underdeveloped and poor infrastructure 24
Diseases, drought and famine 5
Small arms 3
Total 100%
Source: Information derived from the field data collected in Turkana in August 2009 and
December 2009
Accordingly, 68% of the respondents believed that the major factor bedeviling livestock
health sector among the Turkana was lack of community health animal services, a situation
that was attributed to lack of effective government policy on the development of livestock
sector in pastoral areas. This was followed by underdeveloped and poor infrastructure which
received 24% of the people interviewed. Diseases received only 5% while small arms as a
factor in livestock health got 3%.
The effects of small arms that affect animal health in Turkana come in a number of
ways. For instance, successful raids bring home several animals from neighboring
communities some of which may be infected with serious diseases. For example, in 2006, the
community faced three successive diseases that decimated hundreds of livestock as a result of
raided animals.18
The first one was Lumpy Skin Disease (LSD) which was brought by
animals that were raided from Uganda. In the same year, the community’s animals were
attacked by Menge, a disease that also came with raided animals from Uganda and wiped
almost 60% of the livestock population in Turkana land. In the same year, Peste de petis
ruminats (PPR) attacked Turkana animals through animals stolen from Sudan and first
detected in Oropoi and Lokichoggio in March 2006.19
PPR is a disease that affects mainly
sheep and goats. A sick animal gets pneumonia before becoming diarrhoeic. It kills animals
18
Interview with Michael Loel.from VSF Belgium on at VSF officers in Lodwar 16 August 2009 19
ibid
133
within a week or two. It spreads when infected livestock comes into contact with healthy ones
or when a sick animal contaminates watering points or pasture. Menge in Kiturkana is called
Akiko which means to scratch. Fur of the affected animals fall off little by little and sores
appear on the skin. Animals rub themselves against trees and shrubs to relieve the itch.
4.2.4 Physical Security/Personal Security in Turkana
The absence of physical security among the Turkana is attributed to the following
factors as listed in the table below.
Table 6: Factors affecting Physical Security in Turkana
Factor Percentage (%)
Neglect and marginalization 70
Limited security presence with capacity 18
Armed a pastoral communities 4
Lack of effective political representation 8
Total 100%
Source: Information derived from the field data collected in Turkana in August 2009 and
December 2009
According to the results depicted in the above table, 70% of the respondents attributed
lack of personal security to the government neglect and marginalization of the community
and generally the arid and semi arid conditions of the area. Eighteen percent noted that it is
mainly due lack of enough security personnel with capacity to guarantee the community’s’
security and in particular secure the borders against the heavily armed neighbours across
them due to the question of neglect and marginalization. Eight percent went further to
attribute lack of personal security to absence of effective political representation. This group
pointed out that the political leaders have not represented them effectively in national level
politics.20
20The focus group discussion held in Turkana central on 14 August, 2009.
134
Consequently, they have not been able to articulate the concerns and interests of the
community at the national level. At the time of the field visit, none of the respondents was
able to identify anybody from Turkana County in government at the level of permanent
Secretary or a managing director of any of the pastoralists in the country. Four percent
responded that the presence of armed communities was not a serious threat because it was felt
if the government can increase the number security personnel and give them capacity to
secure the borders this problem will be contained. However, small arms are a major factor in
personal security. They cause death and injury. For instance during the interview, the focus
group estimated that over 20 people had died in one month preceding the interviews as a
result of attacks by the Pokots and the Dasnach. The OCDP said the police force/service had
lost two officers to bandits over a period of 8 months before the date of interview.21
Furthermore, personal safety in Turkana community is dependent on two main factors
namely profession and location. On location, urban centers such as Lodwar and Lokichoggio
are safer except for isolated incidences of crimes such as robbery, murder and thefts. It is
unconceivable that an attack by another pastoral community will take place in a town that is
well in the interior. But as one moves away from the urban centers towards remote border
areas security threats increases. One is exposed not only to bandits on the highways but also a
threat of meeting advancing or returning raiders. It is therefore common to seek armed escort
from the Kenya Police Reserve (KPR) or police force when travelling towards rural areas.
The KPR was formed in 1948 to assist the regular Kenya Police in the maintenance of law
and order. The KPR now only exists in rural areas and in particular pastoral areas of Kenya,
where is it sometimes called the Kenya Home Guards, although this title has no official
standing. In May 2004, the Kenya Government disbanded the KPR in urban areas, noting that
the various city units had become corrupt and unmanageable. In 2005, the Government
21
Ibid but see subsection on health security for more on gun related injuries in Turkana
135
announced an aspiration to re-constitute the KPR, but this is yet to happen.22
It is therefore
common to observe escorts accompanying NGOs, government officials and even politicians
including vehicles distributing relief foods. However, in some rural areas for example in
Loima the major threats to security are the raiders and not robbers.23
In terms of professional,
security officers from the police and military are more exposed and vulnerable to attacks by
either robbers or raiders. This is because of the nature of their work that entails keeping law
and order. Several police and military officers have lost their lives or injured in the course of
their duty.24
4.2.5 Community Security
Table 7: Factors affecting Community Security among the Turkana
Factor Percentage (%)
Armed neighbors 90
The Kenya Police Reserves 3
Political incitement 3
Border dispute with the Pokots 4
Total 100%
Source: Information derived from the field data collected in Turkana in August 2009 and
December 2009
Generally, the Turkana Community is threatened by the armed neighbouring
communities from Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda and Sudan as shown on Map 1.25
Table 7 shows
that 90% of the respondents decry the existence of armed neighbours as a major threat to their
livelihood. At the time of the visit, areas around Loima and South Turkana were more
insecure owing to the attacks by the Pokots and the Karamojong.26
The southern and eastern
corridors occupied by the Pokots and the Dasnach respectively were the worst hit. In the
22
More on the KPRs can be read at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kenya_Police_Reserve. 23
Mr Moses Ivuto, DC Loima district interviewed in Lodwar on 17 August, 2009. 24
Interview with Moses Luvisia, OCPD Lodwar on 17 August, 2009 25
These communities are the Pokots, Samburu, Rendile, Gabra, Changila (Kenya) Merrile/Dasanach and
Nyangatom (Ethiopia) Toposa, Didinga, (Sudan), Jie, Matheniko, Dodoth and Tepeth (Uganda). 26
Interview the Dr Gischarist Geofry Lokoel, District Medical Health Office, Turkana on 16 August, 2009 and
Mr George Ayong’a, DC Turkana central on 17 August, 2009
136
northern corridors, tension was building up with the Nyangtom while the western corridor
there is latent conflict with the Toposas and the Dodoth.27
The Pokots are the major enemy of the Turkanas in Kenya although they are also
attacked by the Samburus and Gabra but on a small a scale. The Pokots have a major alliance
with their kin and kith in Uganda who in turn are conduits of arms to the community. It was
reported that caches of new weapons spotted in central Pokot prior to the field visit originated
from Sudan.28
The Toposa used to get the arms from SPLM/A (not as an SPLM/A official
policy but a few of its former fighter and current soldiers) (who still hold large stocks of
arms used in the 22year old war that ravaged Sudan and from militias. These arms are sold to
the Dodoth who in turn sell them to Jie who by the time of interview had severed links with
the Turkanas. The Jie sells them to the Mathenikos who in turn sell them to Pokots who then
avail the guns to other members of the community.
Three percent of the respondents responded that the security of the Turkana is also
threatened by the changing nature of the KPRs chastened ‘Kufa pamoja na Raia literally
meaning die together with the citizens which according to the interviews, the KPRs have
abandoned their core responsibility of protecting the rural people and gone commercial. The
majority of the KPRs have moved from rural areas where their services are badly needed in
preference to urban where they offer security services for commercial purposes. In urban
areas, the services of the KPRs are in great demand among politicians, business persons, the
NGO staff a particularly those travelling outside the main urban centers. By serving these
cadres of clientele, the KPRs are able to earn some income. Traditionally, KPRs are not paid
a salary, situation that prompts some of them to engage in criminal activities to earn a
27
Focus group discussion held at the Riam Riam offices in Turkana Central district on 14 August, 2009. 28
Central Pokot was described as a hub for selling arms to the Pokots by the Pokot raiders and smugglers.
137
leaving.29
3% and 4% cited political incitement and border dispute with the Pokots
respectively as some of the factors affecting community security. The focus group discussion
was unanimous that the increased attacks against the Turkana have political overtones.
Politicians are not only funding some of the attacks but they are also key beneficiaries in
purchasing stolen livestock for commercial purposes.
On border dispute with the Pokots, the two communities are laying claim on what
they call ‘ancestral’ land on southern part of western Turkana County. The creation of new
districts now counties in Kenya have also affected the former larger Turkana and Pokot
districts now counties.30
The Pokots want some sections of Turkana south to be part of the
Pokot County. These areas include Lomelo, Nepeiton, Kapedo and Napedo. The Pokots are
also laying claimon Katilu, Kaptir, Longoron and Kainuk. On the Loima side (Western
corridor), the Pokots want Kotoruk and Lorengipi. The focus group participants said that
these claims are driven by the desire to get more grazing land and pasture for their animals
because the new administrative units in Pokot are relatively smaller.31
4.2.6 Political Security among the Turkana
Political security examines aspects relevant to the Turkana community. Forty Five
percent of the respondents noted that political security of the Turkana community has been
greatly influenced by the gun.32
Given the small arms related insecurity some aspects of
political security are affected. For instance, freedom of movement is restricted to safe areas.
In some areas such as Kapedo in Turkana South, the community is forced to remain within
their Manyatas and not even the Kraals. Kraals or Adakar (in Turkana) are mobile cattle
29
Interview with Michael Lopolot on in Lodwar on 18 August, 2009.Also Moses Luvisia noted that there is need
for the government to review the whole engagement of the KPRs if they have to help in improve the security
situation in Turkana. He noted that they are tribally inclined and therefore difficult for a Turkana KPR to arrest a
fellow Turkana. 30
Initially Pokot was split in West Pokot, East Pokot and Central Pokot districts. 31
Focus group discussions at Riam Riam offices in Lodwar Turkana central 14 August, 2009. 32
Akabwai and Mathew of Practical Action interviews undertaken in Lodwar on 18 August 2009
138
camps. It is a collection of 10 to 20 households herding their livestock together in one grazing
unit.
Mobility is allowed to access water and pasture in the dry season and historically the
kraals moved across both district now county and international borders. Manyatta or
(Arumrum in Turkana) is a collection of Adakars moving together for security reasons.33
They are enclosed by a fence of thorn trees and bushes in which women, the elderly and
young ones live. To enjoy free movement one has to arrange for security escort, something
that the majority of the community cannot afford. When freedom of movement is curtailed, it
affects freedom of association and speech. Many times because of the enmity that exists
between the Turkana and the neighbouring communities they cannot mix freely and discuss
issues. Each community views the other as an enemy.34
Table 8: Factors on Political Security among the Turkana
Factor Percentage (%)
Insecurity and small arms 45
Lack of effective political representation 20
Neglect and Marginalization 35
Source: Information derived from the field data collected in Turkana in August 2009 and
December 2009
From the table 8, 20% said lack of effective political representation is a reason for the
continuing marginalization of the community. They argued that for decades there was thin,
limited and ineffective political representation of the Turkana at the national level. Over fifty
percent of those interviewed felt that under representation is a critical factor given that only
three Members of parliament not withstanding its sparse population distribution represent the
vast area of (770000 km2). Consequently, they argued that political leadership from the
country is not able to significantly influence the allocation of national resources.35
Given the
33
Explanation given by Micheal Lopolon and Patrick Imana on 22 and 23 February 2010 34
Interview with Michael Lopolon in Turkana central on 15 August, 2009. 35
Focus Group discussion in Turkana central on14 August, 2009.
139
nature of politics in Kenya where one is expected to be not only to be vocal but have links to
be able to influence those who determine and allocate development resources, the
respondents said that they have never had such a leader. They said that once the Members of
Parliament from Turkana region get into parliament they become sycophants of certain key
political figures to sustain their political relevancy. Hence, they are not able to articulate the
interests of the community for fear of losing the political support they real value for their
survival at the expense of the needs of the community.
Closely related to lack of strong political voice to articulate the interests of the
Turkana is neglect and marginalization by the central government. 35% argued that neglect,
and marginalization that has promoted under-development was a major feature of the colonial
economy, and so it is today. Capital and modern technology were introduced to create a new
mode of production namely cultivation of export crops, in areas where suitable land, labour
and water are available. The growth of the modern sector was promoted simultaneously to
provide required services and administration with little regard to the pastoral economy.
4.3 The State of Small Arms among the Turkana Community
The issue of small arms among the Turkana was explored along the following broad themes
stockpiles, effects and transfers.
4.3.1 Stockpile, Effects and Transfers
Questions on stockpile sought to know the approximate proportion of the Turkana
community in possession of illegal firearms, usage, types, and prices and whether there has
been an increase in the proliferation of small arms in the region in recent times. Where
necessary, these issues were examined using gender lenses and age. 90% of the informants
said that they belief that more than 80% male population in Turkana posses illicit firearms
while 2% were of the opinion that it was only about 50% of the male population.7%
140
indicated that more than 50% but less than 80% of the male population own illicit firearms.
Only 1% thought that every adult male person in Turkana poses an illegal arm.36
Overall,
these statistics suggest that the Turkana region has a significant number of illicit small arms.
According to the projected 2009 census estimate results, Turkana population was around
505,00037
with 49% (247,450 ) male and 51% 257,550) female. It means that if more than
80% male were in possession of illicit small arms, then about 197,960 males in Turkana had
illegal firearms. This is real a significant number based on the fact that they are illegal and the
figure is obviously higher if each one had more than one weapon. It thus confirms the widely
held view that the Turkana community may be one of the highly militarized pastoral
communities in Kenya and the entire IGAD region.
The study further established that despite the fact that over 80% of the male
population seem to be in possession of illegal firearms; only less than 10% uses them
frequently. This finding tend to agree with the conventional view that if all those in
possession of illegal firearms were using them, then the results will be more disastrous or
catastrophic. They would have almost eliminated their neighbors particularly the Samburus
and the Pokots in Kenya but also the Karamoja and the Jie in Uganda and the Toposas and
Nyangtom of Sudan and Ethiopia respectively. It seems prudent to conclude that a majority of
the less than 10% are used in raids to attack and repulse an invasion from armed
neighbouring communities while a small portion was being used in banditry at the time of the
study. This finding confirms the long held view that a substantial amount of illicit small
36
Interviews held on 22 and 23 February 2010 with Sam Ekal, Joseph Elim, Patrick Imana
and Michael Kapoloni at Riam Riam offices in Lodwar 37
Interview with a Kenya Bureau Statistics (KBS) in Turkana, who was part of the officials to oversee
population census exercise of 24 August, 2004. By the time of writing this report the official results of the
census had not been released. In 2002, the population was estimated at 497,779 persons 247,916 and 249,863
male and female respectively.
141
arms are held mostly for security reasons. However, within this category, it is possible that
some of the arms are for commercial purposes while others may be obsolete or faulty.38
During the focus group discussion participants noted that a cattle rustling is
increasingly acquiring a commercial dimension where by rich businessmen are paying young
people to raid and in turn purchase the animals at a low price which are later sold to their
counterparts in urban centres for meat. The observation that the Turkana community has a
significant number of illicit small arms received further credence when 88% of those
interviewed said that almost every household in their neighbourhood possess an illegal
firearm. Nine percent said that about three quarters while only 2% said that all household
have a firearm. This suggests that not every household in Turkana own an illegal a firearm,
contrary to what some studies39
have claimed. Ninety-five percent said that among those who
posses illegal firearms each household has an average of two firearms at minimum while only
2% thought they had one and 3% were non committal and said that they did not want to
speculate though they were categorical that it was more than one. The 95% noted that the
majority of the Turkana possess more than two illegal firearms because they are easily
available and obtainable through barter trade.40
The main reason is the importance attached to
the gun. For a Turkana, a gun is very important because it is used to protect the family and
livestock from raiders. More so, the gun is used to acquire more livestock through raiding
when necessary mainly to replenish the reduced stock through raiding, disease or both.
Therefore, the benefit of a gun far outweighs the costs. Finally, it is regarded as very risky to
have one gun only because it can become faulty or stolen, so it important to have an extra one
‘just in case’
38
The focus group discussion was held at the Riam Riam office in Turkana on 14 August, 2009. 39Kamenju, J etal (2003) op cit 40
The focus group discussion held on 19 August 2009 in Turkana South noted that in most cases arms
acquisition is paid through barter trade where a gun is exchanged with livestock.
142
According to 70% of the interviewees, the major types of illicit guns in Turkana are
automatic rifles such as the AK47 which is a weapon of preference though a number of
people have revolvers and pistols. Pistols and revolvers are the last options when the
automatic rifle is faulty or stolen. The observation that the Turkana community is highly
militarized was reinforced by the fact that 95% of those interviewed said that they see
firearms suspected to be illicit at least every two days while only 5% said they never but
added that they hear gunshots at least once every week. They were varied responses on this
question depending on the geographical location of the neighbourhood. Neighbourhoods
close to the borders of Sudan and Uganda tend to hear more gunshots than those in the
interior places such as Nakalale in Turkana west. For example, participants from central
Turkana district reported that they rarely hear gunshots unless security officers, or police
reservists are pursuing criminals or criminals were committing a crime. Similarly,
neighbourhoods close to west Pokot reported hearing gunshots more frequently than those
closer to Turkana Central. This finding suggests that areas closer to a border ( international or
otherwise) are more vulnerable to attacks than those in the interior largely because of the low
presence of security officers in these areas and their remoteness compared to those in the
interior although overall Turkana region is grossly under developed in terms of infrastructure.
In other words, the further it is from the centre, the more insecure it becomes.
The field data pointed to a consensus that small arms proliferation seem to have
increased in Turkana in the last few years. Seventy-five of the respondents said that there has
been an increase in the illicit proliferation of small arms in Turkana while 25% were not
certain. Those who said there was an increase cited prolonged drought, which had affected
the area in the last few years. The respondents noted that for the last three years, the region
failed to receive the normal rainfall. It was therefore opinioned that the community armed
itself to prepare to replenish their livestock through raids when the situation
143
improves.41
During the focus group discussion participants said that it seems that the effects of
the climate change are present in Turkana as the drought that was going on at the time of
interview had been present since 2005. Since this time, the region had not received any
meaningful rainfall during rainy season. Due to prolonged drought, which was in its fourth
year at the time of interviews, the participants noted an increase in the number of raids and
fights over the control of the limited pastureland and watering places. Another factor for the
seemingly increased number of small arms in Turkana is the sporadic disarmament that has
taken place in Kenya and Uganda. Attempts at disarmament in both Kenya and Uganda may
have prompted acquisition of extra arms by the community in fear of losing some of them
during the exercise. Closely related to disarmament is the fact that when the exercise is going
on one side of the border arms are transferred to the next of kin across the border until the
exercise is over. Since the exercise has been on at least for long on the Ugandan side of the
border, the probability that more guns have found their ways into Kenya for safekeeping is a
very high.
Seventy five percent of those interviewed said that almost everyone in Turkana had
access to a weapon at the time of interview. Only 25% said men only had access while none
said the same for women. Those who said almost ‘everybody’ had access to small arms,
argued that any adult man in Turkana can secure a gun either through raiding or purchase
from illicit arms traffickers if necessary. This statement reiterates the fact arms are easily
available in Turkana. The small difference of 5% between women and men is premised on
the notion that it is men who move first to defend and fend for the families needs. Generally,
the implication is that individuals can acquire firearms through direct purchase in the black
market or indirectly through someone who knows the arms traffickers or middlemen such as
brokers. Furthermore, the study established that at least every man in Turkana knows how to
41
The focus group discussion was held on 25 August in 2009 in Turkana east.
144
use a gun while 10% said women but none of the respondents said everyone. There is no
formal training on how to use a gun among the Turkana but instead it ‘is see, learn and use’.
In other words, the young Turkana grow up seeing their seniors using them and in doing so
learns how to use a gun.42
This implies that it is men who participate in cattle rustling,
banditry and other crimes where small arms are used. This view is reinforced by the fact that
90% of the respondents said that at least every Turkana man owns a firearm if not they have
access if they so desire. This means he can borrow the family/clan gun when he wants to
participate in a raid. However, the group noted that cases of borrowing are very rare because
the majority of men have guns and there are always in excess. Another emerging
phenomenon within the Turkana community is guns for hire mainly from some police
officers and reservists at a fee. Such arms are normally used in criminal activities such as
robbery and murder. Fifteen percent of the interviewees said that women own firearms while
none thought that everybody owns a gun. However, it was argued that women who own guns
are very few but they are able to access those owned by their husbands or sons when it is
necessary which is in exceptional circumstances. 43
Some respondents noted that sometimes
women may be forced to arm themselves to fend off fleeing attackers. But it is a rare
occurrence.
The study established that insecurity is the major reason why the Turkana community
own firearms. Ninety five percent of those interviewed cited insecurity mainly from armed
neighbors namely; the Pokots, the Karamoaja, the Toposas, the Didinga, the Nyangtom, and
the Dassanech in Ethiopia as the major threat to their livelihood. Only 4% of the respondents
said that the community owns illegal arms because of the desire to go raiding and commit
other crimes. There was a heated discussion among the focus group members as to whether
42
This explanation was given by Akwabai Darlington on 10 August 2010 and corroborated during the focus
group discussions held on 14 August 2010. 43
Interviews with Michael Kapoloni, Akwabai and Mr George Ayong’a, DC Turkana Central
145
cattle rustling should be categorized as crime or a social practice entrenched in the
community’s tradition. According to some individuals particularly the elderly cattle rustling
should not be criminalized but should be seen as the community’s long standing tradition of
replenishing lost stock through drought, diseases and raids and important stage in life that
marks a passage into manhood.44
Contrary to the prevailing notion that most of the visible
arms common among the Turkana are illegal, the administration noted that most of them are
in the hands of police reservists who are suppose to account for their usage including the
ammunitions.45
Mr Luvisia also noted that due to lack of proper distribution and monitoring
mechanisms to the police reservists the system has not been water tight. This explains why
they are allowed to move around with arms without being arrested by the authorities.
However, based on sheer number of people carrying firearms openly in Turkana it simply
meant that there were a significant number of police reservists in Turkana. However, despite
the big number they have not been able to contain the rampant insecurity conditions in the
County. In addition to the availability, ownership and accessibility of arms, 95% of the
respondents noted that the community has access to ammunitions.
In the order of priority, Uganda was mentioned as a major source of illicit small in
Turkana, followed by southern Sudan and then Somalia. Ethiopia is a minor source compared
to Uganda and Sudan while raids from government installations such as police posts and
military camps and attacks on security officers were rated as the lowest source of illegal
arms. The reasons for Uganda and South Sudan as sources is the long standing conflicts that
has been experienced in northern Uganda since 1970s and in Sudan between the SPLM/A
GOS until the signing of the CPA in 2005. Somalia is a recent source and in particular,
44
The focus group was held on 22 August 2009 at the Lodwar Lodge 45
Interview with OCPD Mr Moses Luvisia on 23 August 2009, at the Lodwar police post, Also for ammunitions
in Turkana see Bevan, J. (2008) Blowback Kenya’s Illicit Ammunition Problem in Turkana North District’ An
Occasional Paper of the Small Arms Survey, (Geneva, Graduate Institute of International and Development
Studies
146
following the fall of the Siad Barre in 1991, which left the country without any effective
central government until the time when this study was being contacted.
According to the interviews,46
small arms enter Turkana via three main routes. This
are Somalia-Wajir-Isiolo (initially it was reported that Garissa was a major conduit but due to
increased patrol and security checkup along the Garissa-Nairobi highway, the route is
avoided in favour of Isiolo, Nyahururu, and Samburu, West Pokot and Lokorio then into
Turkana.47
The second major route is from the Sudan. This route allows arms into Turkana
via Naita border point near Kibishi and then Lokichogio. The third route is on the Uganda
side. This route brings arms into Turkana via any point on the expansive border between the
two countries. These arms originate mainly from the Karamoja groups of the Tepeth, the
Matheniko, the Jie and the Dodoth.48
The effects of small arms in Turkana were identified as directly-death, injury
displacement and indirectly retarding the general development of the area. At the time of
interviews, there were hundreds of internally displaced persons at Alale and Lomelo not only
as a result of famine but also conflicts. Eighty percent of the respondents said that the most
important effect of insecurity exacerbated by small arms is the continued decline in the
development of the area. This group argued that given the insecurity and the seemingly harsh
environment there is no impetus49
by both government and private sector to invest in the
region’s potential resources including livestock. There is also little or no impetus for
professionals such as private veterinary officers to set up private clinics in the region.
46
Mr Moses Luvisia (op cit) and also the focus group held at Riam Riam offices (op cit)
and also that one at Lodwar Lodge 47
Interviews with Patrick Imana, Akwabai, John Mark and James leitiptip. This information was corroborated by
the focus group discussions held in Turkana Central at Lodwar lodge . 48
Ibid 49
Interviews with the focus group discussions in Turkana Central at Lodwar on 18 February2010-, in Turkana
South on 22 February 2010, and Turkana West on 23 February 2010.
147
4.4 Challenges, Interventions and Opportunities for CPMR in Turkana
Table 9: Major challenges facing CPMR in Turkana
Factor Percentage (%)
Lack of confidence in the security agencies 10
Armed neighbors and community 20
Erosion of the traditional structure of CPMR 5
Harsh environment 2
Ad hoc approaches to CPMR 3
Political expediency/interest 3
Unclear demarcation of internal borders 5
Drought and famine 2
Under development 50
Total 100%
Source: This Information was derived from the field data collected in Turkana in August
2009 and December 2009
There are a number challenges facing CPMR in Turkana. According Table 9, the
major one is under-development. Fifty percent of the respondents agreed that under
development is a major challenge to CPMR in Turkana. They argued that unless the region is
developed and its resources exploited for the benefit of the community insecurity will not
end. This argument is reinforced by the widely documented cases of under development,
neglect and marginalization of pastoral areas in Kenya.50
Under-development was followed
by the existence or armed pastoral neighbours to the Turkana community. The Turkana
community is surrounded by armed communities on both sites in Uganda, South Sudan
Ethiopian and within Kenya. This challenge scored 20% while the lack of confidence in the
security apparatus had 10 % of the respondents. Others such as weakened traditional
structures of CPMR and harsh environment scored 5% and 2% respectively. This finding
seems to negate the seemingly held view that the erosion of the traditional mechanism for
50
The Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation (2003-2007) (2003) Government of
Kenya, Ministry of Planning and National Development. P36. Also see, the Report of the Parliamentary Select
Committee to investigate the Root Causes of Cattle Rustling in Kenya, September 2010. Also Eria Olowo
Onyango, (2010) op cit
148
peace making and peace building is a very significant factor in promoting insecurity in
pastoral areas generally. It seems that the challenges of peace making and peace building
particularly among the pastoral communities are getting more complex and therefore beyond
the capacity of the traditional structures.
4.4.1 Interventions
A hundred percentage of the respondents said that there was some form of interventions by
both state and non-state actors to address the problem of small arms and overall insecurity in
Turkana County. However, they were unanimous that responses have been largely reactive,
adhoc, unsystematic and therefore unsustainable and consequently have not been able to
improve in any significant way the livelihood of the community. 80% of the respondents
were of the opinion that more interventions have been by non state actors rather than the
government. Non state actors that have been active in Turkana include Practical Action
(formerly ITDG), Action Aid, VSF, Oxfam (GB), SNV and local NGOs TONADO.
Government’s interventions have been mainly through the military and the arid and semi arid
lands programmes. Non-state actors were involved in training the community in CPMR,
small enterprise management, and provision of humanitarian relief that included provision of
food supplies, medicines and shelter.
Government’s approaches have been faulted as lacking a strong policy grounding for
the development of arid and semi arid areas. While the establishment of the Ministry for the
Development Northern Kenya and Other Arid and Semi Arid Lands in 2007the first one since
independence in 1963 represented a major policy shift by the government, it was predicted
that it will not achieve much unless backed by resources from the central government. Since
independence in 1963, Kenya has never had a dedicated ministry that focused specifically on
the arid and semi arid lands. Eighty percent of the interviewees pointed out that unless the
149
Ministry is allocated sufficient resources it will not make much difference in terms of real
changes to the lives of the community.
Ninety percent of the respondents said that disarmament would not resolve the
problem of societal insecurity exacerbated by the illicit proliferation and use of small arms
among the Turkana community for two main reasons. First, because it does not address the
reasons why the community acquires small arms (insecurity) and secondly it targets mainly
targets one community at a time, a situation that leaves it more exposed and vulnerable to
attacks from the others. Ninety percent said that disarmament can only work if it targets all
the communities within and across the borders simultaneously, but the exercise must be
preceded by consultations by the community leaders. Furthermore, it should be accompanied
by improvements in the provision of security by increasing the number of security personnel,
opening up development opportunities and an improvement in veterinary services and
marketing of livestock products.
4.4.2 Opportunities for Peace in Turkana
The respondents noted that despite the seemingly endless conflicts in Turkana, there
are opportunities for peace. These opportunities include disarmament, inter-community peace
dialogue, development projects, the creation of the new districts, the passing of the proposed
new constitution and the free primary education. Eight five percent of the respondents said
that to improve security in Turkana and the lives of the community, the government should
invest in developing the area in terms of infrastructure and the livestock sector (marketing
and improving veterinary services) among the key sectors.51
Other sectors identified for
development include fishing and mining.
51
Interview with Edwin Rutto and Peter Rutto in Nairobi on 27 November 2010
150
The second opportunity for peace is the use of elders, opinion leaders with the support
of the politicians to dialogue. This aspect was supported by 70% of the respondents. Fifty
five percent said that voluntary disarmament should also be pursuit but with a caveat that it
should be accompanied by protection by the government from attacks by the neighbouring
communities. The new constitution in Kenya, the creation of the counties and the free
primary education scored 45%, 40% and 30% respectively in terms of being opportunities for
peace among the Turkana community.
4.4.3 Factors Affecting Environmental Security in Turkana
Table 10 shows that 40% of the respondents believe that drought and flooding are the
major threats to environmental security in Turkana. Both drought and floods affect pasture
situation in Turkana. During drought, the vegetation dries up leading to shortage of pasture
and compelling the pastoralists to crowd in few areas where it is available. This results in
overgrazing that leaves the land bear hence exposing it to erosion. On the other hand,
flooding causes the trees and other shrubs that cover the soil to fall down hence leaving the
soil bear when it subsides. Drought and flooding as a factor in environmental security is
followed by the cutting of fuel wood for cooking, sand harvesting for construction of houses
and charcoal burning with 15% of the people interviewed believed that it is a key factor that
was partly attributed to high levels of poverty.
151
Table 10: Factors affecting environmental security in Turkana
Factors Percentage (%)
Cutting of fuel wood for cooking, sand harvesting for
construction of houses and charcoal burning
15
Drought and flooding which affects water and pasture 40
Expansion of settlements with unplanned building of
structures
5
Hash climatic conditions 9
Ad hoc expansion of irrigation schemes that are not
subjected to proper environmental assessments
4
Pastoralism-over concentration of livestock to a few secure
areas due to insecurity
12
Damming of River Omo 3
Absence of interaction with abandoned areas 4
Lack of exposure to modern conservatory methods: 2
Global Warming 3
The etirae or Prosopis species 3
Total 100%
Source: Information derived from the field data collected in Turkana in August 2009 and
December 2009
Apart from the communities cutting the trees, the environment is damaged by
refugees from the Kakuma camp as well those in IDPs such as at Alale shopping center. 9%
said that harsh climatic conditions and over-concentration of livestock (12%) to a few secure
areas due to insecurity is also another factor. There are a number of places in Turkana where
communities have sought refugee due to insecurity. Such situation promotes over
concentration of livestock within a limited radius that leads to overgrazing. Apart from the
above factors, the rest scored less than 10% as factors affecting environmental security in
Turkana. 4% of those interviewed felt that the construction of a dam on River Omo by the
Ethiopian government was having a negative impact on environment in Turkana. This is
because it has reduced water levels in Lake Turkana hence affecting activities around it.
Three percent felt that global warming was a factor in environmental security in Turkana.
Due to global warming as a consequence of increased human activities such as pollution and
deforestation, global environment is changing rapidly for the worse. The Turkana region
where the environment is under stress is also experiencing serious environmental
degradation. Vegetation has disappeared in most areas and survival of animals and human
152
being is under threat. Three percent said that the planting of the etirae or Prosopis species52
trees in the dry areas of Kenya including Turkana encouraged by the national governments
and other forest development agencies in 1970s and 1980s as a tree that appeared to offer
solutions to land use problems common in these areas has now become a problem.
The table shows that 4% of the respondents said that the absence of interaction with
abandoned areas is another factor affecting environmental security within the Turkana
community while 2% felt that lack of exposure to modern conservatory methods is another
factor.4% said that ad hoc expansion of irrigation schemes that are not subjected to proper
environmental assessment and expansion of settlements with unplanned building of structures
(5%) were also factors in environmental security in Turkana.
Ninety five percent of those interviewed argued that there is a direct relationship
between conflict and environmental security in Turkana while 5% said were not sure of the
nature of the relationship. They said that the causes and sometimes consequences of conflicts
are what affect environment security among the Turkana. Pressure increases on land when the
community is uprooted and gathers in one area with serious consequences on environment.
The occupied area bears the burden of hosting more people and animals on a land without
enough resources to support them. Consequently, such areas experience further
environmental degradation as the community continues to cut the remaining vegetation for
charcoal and firewood in addition to grazing.
This chapter has discussed conflict, environmental security and governance among
the Turkana community of Kenya including small arms. It is observed that the Turkana
community is faced with other forms of insecurity related to health, economic, social food
and political. The chapter concludes that there is a link between conflict and environmental
52
For origins and impacts of prosopis on ecosystems see proceeding of the workshop on integrated management
of prosopis species in Kenya held at Soi Safari Club, Lake Baringo, Kenya 1-2 October, 2003. In Kiturkana
etirae means something strong and cannot die easily. In Baringo district this tree is referred to as Mathenge
153
security and that small arms are destructive elements within the security equation in Turkana.
This is because small arms also affect all other forms of security such as health, economic,
social, and food. The conflict and environmental insecurity factors that link the two are
dynamic, closely interconnected and affect the relationship in varying proportion but the
major problem is governance deficit. With effective governance that will bring the presence
of governance and administrative structures problems related to conflict and environmental
security will be greatly reduced. It is therefore evident that effective governance is the most
important factor that is missing in the development and security challenges in Turkana
County.
154
Chapter Five
Conflict, Environmental Security and Governance, among the
Pastoral Communities in Kenya: A Critique
5.1 Introduction
This study has examined the relationship between conflict, environmental security
and governance, among the pastoral communities in Kenya using the Turkana community as
a case study. Using the primary and secondary data, it has assessed the nature of conflicts,
relevant aspects of environmental security to the study and the conditions in which they
interact and in a very crucial way, shape and influence the livelihood of the pastoral
communities. This is against the backdrop of governance deficit. The study has also
discussed the concept of the securitization of environment and its applicability to the
pastoralists’ situation. The study also reviewed literature and used field data to examine
conflicts and environmental security that obtains in pastoral areas with a view to establishing
the causal/effect relationship between the two. These issues i.e. conflict, environmental
security and governance have also been examined in detail among the Turkana community
within the broader context of the security debate in Africa and under the framework of human
security. Moreover, the study has analyzed the strength and weakness of Kenya’s normative
and institutional frameworks on conflict and environmental security. Small arms have been
examined as an intervening variable that has not only altered the nature of conflicts among
the pastoral communities but in a very significant way affected their way of life.
This chapter discusses critically the main issues emerging in the five chapter, revisits
the key assumptions in the conceptual literature, explains how this literature contributes to the
broadening of knowledge on the subject matter and assesses how the empirical materials
supports or disputes the main assumptions in the conceptual literature. Specifically, the issues
155
are examined in relation to the Turkana community in Kenya with a view to establishing the
linkage between two. It is divided into two broad sections. The first section presents a critical
review of the question of conflict and environmental security within the pastoral setting. It
examines the extent to which conflict contribute to environmental insecurity and verse versa.
In other words, it seeks to establish the nexus between governance, conflict and
environmental insecurity within the context of the pastoral communities in Kenya. The
second section examines the five broad but critical issues that emerged from the study. These
are related to historical injustices and governance, traditional justice system verses the
modern judicial system, regional political and security environment, ecology and
environmental conditions and policy matters.
5.2 Conflict and Environmental Security among Pastoral Communities in Kenya
The theoretical and practical linkages between security and environmental security
appear obvious because environmental degradation is in itself a severe threat to human
security and all life on earth1. It also can be both a cause and effect of conflicts. Pastoral
areas receive low rainfall; sometimes they go for years without and are characterized by
drought and famine with adverse affects on pasture and water. Consequently, scarcity of
water and pasture due to weak legislative and institutional frameworks on management,
utilization, conservation and development prompts massive movements of pastoral
communities in search of these commodities, a situation that results into conflicts with their
neighbours over these resources. Applying the Homer-Dixon model, there is indication that
environmental scarcity in the context of weak and limited governance and institutional
frameworks, poor and/or inappropriate policy responses, poverty and of high population
1Partnership for Peace ‘Environmental Degradation’ accessed at http://www.partnershipforpeace.eu/rift-
valley/research-findings/181-environmental-degradation#_msoanchor_1 on 4 October 2011. See also ‘Assessing
Environmental Security in Eastern Africa: Achieving Sustainable Peace and Development’ a Report of the
International Workshop held in Kampala Uganda 14-15 October, 2004
156
pressure (both animals and human beings), is bound to induce armed conflict between
pastoral communities.
According to the UN study,2the Maasai, Turkana and Somali are the worse off
deprived of education, health and with poor standards of living compared to other tribes in
Kenya. Such statistics are supported by the 2008 Kenya integrated household survey which
ranked Turkana central, Turkana south, and Turkana north among the top poorest
constituencies in Kenya. The probability of conflict increases, where environmental
insecurity induces population mobility particularly towards heterogeneous communities for
instance ethnic, culture and where they want to control and use the available resources, the
recipient communities become aggravated and the propensity to conflict mounts. Further,
conflicts are almost certain where a weak state fails to deliver law and order, provides
transparent and accountable administration, formulate but more important implement
appropriate development policies and institute effective mechanisms to address and resolve
grievances and disputes that arise from environment related issues and resources3.
Armed conflicts among the pastoral communities in Kenya are largely over control
and access to natural resources and in certain cases political boundaries. Pastoral groups in
the country fight over these resources as they struggle to satisfy social, cultural and economic
imperatives of life.4 There is a positive relationship between these resources and the
prevailing environment within the pastoral areas and therefore on a more general level
connote some linkage between conflicts and environment, the extent to which is the task of
this section. The recent past demonstrates that competition over natural resources and
environmental stress can be implicated in all the phases of a conflict cycle from contributing
2The UNDP Development Report released in October 2010. The Sunday Nation July 25, 2010 at
http://www.accessmylibrary.com/article-1G1-232791007/nyanza-and-nep-poorest.html.accessed in September
2010 3Timura, C.T, (2001) Op cit
4Report on IBAR Pastoral Community Harmonization meeting held at Mount Elgon Hotel, Mbale, Uganda by
Isura, Pauline (2009)
157
to the outbreak of violence to undermining prospects for peace.5 It is therefore true that
natural resources can be inspected for their causal role at the onset of conflict as well as for
their role in prolonging and sustaining violence.6
Among the pastoral groups, resources and in particular water and pasture do not
finance conflicts but instead they are used as basic commodities for livelihood. This is
because these resources are not lootable as would be the case of oil, diamonds and platinum
in rentier states such as Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Sierra Leone and Angola.
These two resources (water and pasture) support both the livestock population and human
life. Resource based conflicts can emanate from structural and systematic factors such as
state policies. The underlying causes of resource-based conflicts can be poverty, policy
choices that states have pursuit over the years and the failure of institutional frameworks for
conflict resolution or prevention and environmental protection.
For instance, a study7 has established that pastoral conflicts recur unabatedly because
of inefficiencies ingrained in the judicial system and poor enforcements of the rule of law.
The study noted that the role of ‘formal politics’ and the behaviour of local politicians in
election-related violent conflicts of manipulating ethnicity and clan differences and
emphasizing politics of difference for electoral gains are significant concerns. The study
observed that the causes of conflicts in pastoral areas might not easily be understood
according to the micro-macro-level categories. Neither can motives of conflicts be combined
into a single factor across groups or over time, nor can the problem be isolated from today’s
global issues. The ‘practicing raiders’ behavior in terms of how violent conflicts of whatever
5Sachs, J D. et al (2001) "The Curse of Natural Resources," European Economic Review 45, 827-838 and also
Williams, P.D. (2007) Thinking about Security in Africa, International Affairs 83(6), 1021-1038, Poku
Renwick and Porto (2007), Human Security and Development in Africa, International Affairs 83(6) 1155-
1171 6Ross, Michael L. (1999) Op cit 7Wario Roba Adano, et al(2009). Scarcity of Natural Resources and Pastoral Conflicts in Northern Kenya: An
Inquiry. Horn of Africa Bulletin (1): 1-5.[16]
158
cause are conceived, meticulously planned, and fought out are difficult to understand, but
extremely important. The study concludes that the landscape of pastoral conflicts changes in
an unpredictable way, which is making responses more difficult and research into the realities
of these conflicts challenging. The problem of conflicts in pastoral areas and violent raids in
the past decades is mainly blamed on increases in populations, ecological stress and a
dwindling resource-base, and the resulting competing claims over scarce natural resources.
At the root of conflicts in pastoral areas are issues of governance and development.
Kiflemariam8identified structural and cultural impediments to conflicts in pastoral areas
including curbing the misuse of small arms and proposed that the obstacles need to be turned
into strategies for preventing the uncontrolled accumulation and the misuse of weapons. The
study identified issues such as politics of social and economic marginalization, refugee crisis
and IDPs, lack of opportunities for youth and resource scarcity as some of the explanatory
factors that underpin the structural causes and impediments to improving human security
among pastoralists. In this regard, pre and post colonial policies have vilified the social and
political integrity of the pastoral society and material hardship, intensified competition for
resources further undermining social cohesion and traditional authority.
The relationship between natural resources, environment and conflict is thus multi-
dimensional and complex but in the context of the pastoral groups in Kenya, two principal
elements can be observed9 i.e. contributing to the outbreak of conflict and undermining
conflict resolution and peace building. Natural resources contribute to the outbreak of conflict
in situation where for instance attempts to control watering points and pasture caused by
environmental degradation. Resources and environment contribute to conflicts in pastoral
areas in three ways. First, conflict occurs over direct use of scarce resources mainly water and
pasture. This occurs when local demand for resources exceeds the available supply.
8Gebrewold, K. etal (2006) op cit pp 21-36,and .Mkutu, K. A. (2006). “ Op cit
9Ross, Michael L. (1999) Op cit
159
Demographic pressures and natural calamities such as drought and flooding normally
compound such situation. Institutions both at local and national levels are weak or absent and
as a result they have not been able to mitigate the competing interests which have led to
violent conflicts and displacements. In other contexts once a conflict has broken out, high
value resources may be exploited to finance armed forces or become strategic consideration
in gaining territory. In such cases, the duration of conflicts is extended by the availability of
new sources of financing or complicated by efforts to gain control over resource rich areas.
Secondly, individuals or armed groups within a community may undermine the
prospect for peace agreement. Among the pastoral groups in Kenya this fact has been well
documented.10
Factors related to environmental security among the pastoral communities
such as drought, water shortages, and desertification has produced famine and other forms of
human insecurity as well as exposing the weaknesses of state and governance structures.11
Environmental degradation and resource scarcity have been largely demand driven by
pastoralists and farmers. Famine has been because of interplay between several factors that
include growing populations’ environmental degradation, drought as well as conflicts and
inadequate capacity to deal with the problem and inappropriate state policies to develop the
pastoral economy. Environmental security is tenuous among the pastoral groups in Kenya as
evidenced by periodic famines, extreme poverty and struggles over water and pasture.
Environmental degradation has led to human insecurity among pastoral communities in
Kenya.
Thirdly, livestock is the economic mainstay of the pastoral economy and therefore
considered a very precious commodity. Cattle are used for bride price, to settle debts and as a
medium of exchange and serves as an indication of wealth. Those without sufficient numbers
engage in cattle rustling to meet the deficit. Among the pastoralists, cattle-raiding is seen as a
10
Wairagu, F. (2007) op cit 11Mwaura, C (2005), Kenya Op cit
160
heroic deed and is praised through songs and poems. The practice of cattle raiding in post
independence Kenya is common among the country’s pastoral groups of Turkana, Pokot,
Samburu among others, but also those a cross border, all whom have acquired arms from
Ethiopia, Uganda, Sudan and Somalia in a complicated cyclic movement.12
Among the
Turkana community, it is difficult to underestimate the degree to which raiding and violence
influence people’s lives. Attacks that accompany raiding can be vicious, brutal and deadly,
often coming just before dawn with little or no warning.
The major threat to the Turkana as identified by McCabe13
comes from Pokots, living
to the south and West. Different members of the community play varying roles in this cultural
phenomenon. For instance, the elders mostly aged between 49 years and above bless young
warriors when they set out to raid for cattle from other pastoralists they regard as enemies or
non-allies. Spiritual leaders perform rituals that help them to decide when raids should be
carried out and foretell whether such raids will be successful or not.14
Raiding typically
provokes retaliatory action from the raided community hence exacerbating violent
conflicts15
As a consequence, the pastoral areas remain volatile with major conflicts among
nomadic pastoralist groups (although there are occasional disputes between the pastoralists
and the commercial farmers) whose logic for socio-economic reproduction revolves around
movement in search of pastures and water with extreme levels of cattle predation.
Weather vagaries and climatic stress in the region inhabited by the Turkana, chief
among them prolonged drought compels the community to move with their herds to places
with grazing resources. More often than not, these dry-season grazing areas are located in
12Aguirre, F. H (2011) ‘Mitigating the Turkana-Dassanech Conflict through Development Action, A Thesis
submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts Social Ministry with
specialization in Management Institute of Social Ministry in Mission Tangaza College, Catholic University of
East Africa 13
MacCabe, R. (2009), Desert Nomads: A Study on the Pattern of Health and Disease of the Turkana People of
North Western Kenya, Ferbane Irish Carmelites Publishing Opt Cit 14
Fafo A. (2010), Op cit 15Ibid 29.
161
border areas or inside the territories of other communities. When livestock from different
communities head for the same grazing areas, then the likelihood of violent conflict
abounds.16
For instance, the Turkana have been faced by drought for several years since 1984
almost in succession.17
To cope with the severe droughts, they have to move with their cattle
to areas like Kaabong in Jie land, Uganda, and to West Pokot where the local communities
like the Karamoja and the Pokots have attacked them several times, and in which they have
lost many lives and property. Large numbers of herds had been lost through famine and
prolonged droughts that have characterized the region.18
This has rendered them poor and
destitute, often turning to cattle rustling and thefts as the only available mechanism for
restoring their herds and livelihoods.
Pastoral societies are critically exposed to ecosystem changes, which increase their
vulnerability, affect their capital stocks, hinder coping mechanisms, decrease the productive
performance of livestock, and generate tensions with other herders as well as agriculturists.
Natural resource degradation may be the cause as well as the effect of social change that
negatively affect the productivity and sustainability of pastoral livelihoods.19
The factors for
environmentally related conflicts are often neither necessary nor sufficient to cause some
unique form of conflict. Therefore, while this study uses the term environmental conflict or
environmentally-induced conflict, it still considers these conflicts to be social and political
events, not inevitable or determined outcomes from certain environmental
conditions.20
Declining water availability, declining arable land, deforestation, desertification,
and natural disasters and effects of climate are increasingly threatening environmental
security in pastoral areas.
16Chweya, L. (2004),Op cit p.31-48:40 17
Fafo A. 2010, 28, Op cit 18
Ibid 19
Nori Met al.(2005), op cit 20Mwagiru. M. (2003) op cit
162
A combination of desertification, bush encroachment, soil erosion, drought and
sometimes-severe cold are factors that worsen the status of environment that support the
pastoral livelihood. For example, rangeland degradation, driven by rising human and
livestock populations, is increasing as evidenced by soil loss, bush encroachment, reduced
bio-diversity, and deforestation close to urban and refugee concentrations. Traditional range
management systems, based on indigenous knowledge, mobility, reciprocity agreements,
fluid boundaries and traditional law are facing new pressures challenging the existing
institutions, old technologies and systems.21
Elements of environmental security that affects
livelihood vary from one situation to another22
and it is increasingly evident that conflict lead
to environmental degradation by undermining and breaking down the traditional resource
management systems. During conflicts, some areas become buffers to direct interaction and
as such are not accessed by any community during the conflict, hence regenerating during the
period of tension. In certain instances, insecurity has discouraged the development of water
management infrastructure, such as dams and maintaining pristine areas.23
Among the pastoral communities’ water shortages as an environmental stress include
struggles over wells, boreholes, and small-scale irrigation along seasonal rivers. Growing
population of people and animals are increasingly depending on a finite or even shrinking
amount of fresh water. Water shortages are widespread in pastoral regions and will be a
major source of human insecurity in the coming decades if not addressed.24
Lowered water
tables and exhausted wells have disrupted both farming and pastoral activities. Famine will
continue to lead to death because of severe drought, poor agricultural practices, rapid
population growth, conflict and the inability of pastoralists to adapt to the worsening
environmental conditions. The inability of the country to mitigate and prevent famine is
21Shazali,S. Pastoral Land Tenure Systems at Federal and Local Levels in the Sudan, UNDP, Khartoum,1999 22
Ibid 23
Ibid 24
Aguirre, F. H (2011)op cit
163
another factor why conflict will continue to disrupt pastoral livelihoods and contribute to
famine. The susceptibility of the pastoral population to diseases such as malaria, cholera,
measles, diarrhoea, and HIV/AIDs coupled with poor public health services worsens the
effect of famine hence undermining the state of human security.
Some elements of environmental insecurity have caused conflicts among the pastoral
groups in the country. For instance, environmental scarcity have worsened factors that fuel
conflicts such as population increases and displacements, heightened sense of marginalization
and ethnic tensions, deepening of poverty and decline in agricultural production. Attendant to
these factors is the lack of capacity of current conflict prevention, management and resolution
interventions to address the underlying issues.25
The consequences of insecurity perpetuated
by conflicts are affecting environmental security among the Turkana. Pressure increases on
land when the community is uprooted and gathers in one area with serious consequences on
environment. The occupied area bears the burden of hosting more people and animals without
enough resources to support them. Consequently, such an area experiences further
environmental degradation as the community continue to cut the remaining vegetation for
charcoal and firewood in addition to grazing. The soil degradation and depletion affects both
water sources and pasture. Furthermore, while initially the community constructed Kraals
using shrubs and grass due to frequent attacks they are also compelled to use strong and big
trees for security reasons.26
Therefore, the lack of livestock rotation contributes to
overgrazing and erosion leading to longer-term ecological problems for the community.
Furthermore, the increasing human and livestock population pressure and an apparent
increasing frequency of drought, has affected the capacity to cope with drought to the point
where there is a growing threat to the survival of viable pastoral production systems and
strained relationships within and between countries. When environmental related problems
25
Ibid 26Interview with Akwabwai in Turkana Central on 30 August 2010
164
such as scarcity which is a consequence of prolonged drought and famine occur, it compels
part of the community to move in search of food, grazing fields and watering points, though it
also leads to death of animals and sometimes even human beings. At the end of drought
period, raids increases because the affected communities have to replenish those lost during
the drought and in doing so more lives are lost while others are injured (physical security).
Pastoral conflicts, violence and tension in Kenya are historically linked to the
instability that accompanied state formation in the colonial era.27
Nomadic pastoralism as a
livelihood is under pressure created by social changes and modern developments that
includes the decrease in available land for pasture due to acquisition of land for other
activities like farming and tensions resulting from underdevelopment and scarce resources
like water and land. The findings of this study indicate that the scarcity of water and grazing
land contributes to conflicts among pastoralists. Conflicts between neighboring ethnic groups
(in both the Karamojong and Somali clusters) due to cattle-rustling and the competition for
natural resources have restricted livestock movements to better grazing locations. This has
resulted in abnormal livestock deaths, loss of body weight of animals and their market value
as well. In other cases, conflicts have triggered internal population displacement and refugee
influx and hampered deliveries of basic humanitarian assistance.28
Due to this, the pastoral communities are increasingly being involved in violent
clashes and armed struggle against each other on the one hand, and against the state on the
other. The Ethiopia–Somalia border, for example, has been the arena for an old and bitter
27
Nyaba, P.A and Otim, P. Conflicts in Pastoral Areas Along Borders: The Kenya, Uganda, Sudan, London:
FEWER, 2001. It is also published under Ciru Mwaura,C Nyaba, P. Otim,P and Gebreselassie,S “ Building
CEWARN Around Entry Points”, eds. Mwaura, Ciru & Schmeidl, Susan. Conflict Early Warning and Conflict
Management in the Horn of Africa, Asmara: The Red Sea Press, Inc. 2002, pp 147-168. See also Abbink, J.
‘The Shrinking Cultural and Political Space of the East African Pastoral Societies’ Nordic Journal of African
Studies 6(1):1-15 (1997). Leiden. 28Guyo, L. D. (2009) Kenya: The Politics of Deprivation and Separation – The Case of Northern Kenya, was
accessed at http://gadaa.com/oduu/1304/2009/10/29/kenya-the-politics-of-deprivation-and-separation-the-case-
of-northern-kenya/ on 14 December, 2011
165
conflict between two pastoral Somali sub-clans: the Isaq and the Ogaden.29
This conflict is
related to access to watering points and pasture and has been greatly exacerbated by the
intervention of political forces like the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), from
outside the pastoralist realm. These forces have laid claim to a ‘Greater Somalia’ that resulted
in inter-state wars between Ethiopia and Somalia in the early 1960s, during the 1977-1978
Ogaden War and since April 2006 tensions near the Ethiopia-Somalia border and the
subsequent Ethiopian military interventions in central and southern Somalia in December,
2006.30
Environmental effects of conflict vary from one situation to another.31
Environmental
resources are principal to the livelihoods all the pastoral communities in Kenya. A threat to
these resources through environmental degradation threatens the societal security. The pre
1984-85 famine and thereafter that ravaged the IGAD Member States have been partly due to
the inexorable escalating land degradation as population doubled in recent times making
traditional systems of cultivation much less viable. The arid and semi arid conditions are
unsuitable to support quality livestock keeping and meaningful crop farming.32
For example,
over 70 per cent of the land in pastoral areas is unsuitable for agriculture in Kenya. Lengthy
drought and emergent diseases threatens herds of livestock. Even in some areas where the
community is in dire need of humanitarian assistance, insecurity and inaccessibility hamper
efforts to provide relief services.
Disruption of ecosystems affects the supply of water, pasture and food for the pastoral
communities. The situation is exacerbated by increasing population that makes long seasonal
29
Markakis, J. (1989).‘The Ishaq-Ogaden Dispute. Ecology and Politics. Environmental Stress and Security in
Africa. A. H. af Ornäs and M. A. M. Sahli. Motala, Scandinavian Institute of African Studies: 157-168. 30
Farah, I.(2009) Foreign Policy and Conflict in Somalia, 1960-1990, A thesis submitted in fulfillment of the
requirements of the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.) in International Studies, Institute of Diplomacy and
International Studies, University of Nairobi 31
Nori, M. etal (2005), op cit 32Aguirre, F. H (2011) ‘ op cit
166
migration short so that land does not have sufficient time to recover fully. Population growth
has long been considered one of the most important factors contributing to environmental
degradation. Among the pastoral communities like the rest of the country, population growth
rates of above 3% per annum for the past five decades have caused mounting resource
constraints.33
Ever increasing numbers of people and animals have resulted in greater
amounts of stress on land and water and have precipitated desertification and water shortages.
Population growth contributes to inter-communal competition and conflict over resources
which produce displaced persons. In turn movements to camps have contributed to
environmental degradation and periodic famine within pastoral areas.
Deforestation, overgrazing and poor conservation methods is accelerating
desertification in the country but more so in the arid and semi arid areas. Like in other areas,
deforestation also contributes to more intense droughts and floods in pastoral areas.
Desertification has been partly the result of poor cultivation and pastoral practices as well as
population growth and expansion and overstocking of livestock herds. Overstocking and poor
farming practices have led to soil erosion and lack of rainfall over a sustained period of time
has further contributed to desertification. Moreover, global warming has only added to the
stresses on land and rainfall that lead to desertification but more so in the arid and semi arid
areas.34
The recent phenomenal climatic change has affected pastoralists greatly. The IGAD
report of 2009,35
states that the IGAD region is one of the most severely affected by climate
change and variability in the world. Over the past four decades, recurrent drought as a
manifestation and consequence of environmental insecurity, has drastically altered the
33See the Kenya: 2009 Population and Housing Census, Kenya National Bureau of Statistics 34
Sivakumar, M. V. K. (2007) Interactions between Climate and Desertification, Agriculture and Forest
Methodology, 142 (2-4) 143-155 35
IGAD-FESS, 2009, 4 Environmental Security in the IGAD Region: an Approach for Building Sustainable
Development and peace workshop report: 5-7 July. Addis Ababa.
167
biophysical and socio-economic landscape in Turkana36
However, that there are a variety of
associated factors that make pastoral regions vulnerable to the projected effects of climate
change and drought, including population growth, poverty, rain-fed agriculture, food
insecurity among others. Impacts of drought on human security include famine and
migration. Consequently, the effects of drought represent perhaps the most important threats
for pastoralists and pastoralism in the future.
Access and control to water and pasture have been crucial factors in the occurrence of
conflicts among the pastoral communities in Kenya. The limited technological expertise and
resources has not helped the utilization of resources in the arid areas. Efforts to develop these
areas are frustrated by lack of basic social and economic infrastructures and the seemingly
hostile environment for investment. Development of pastoral areas in respect to the available
resources such as livestock industry offers hope to address the various forms of human
security that affects them. Pastoral communities are particularly vulnerable to natural and
fabricated disasters due to reliance on natural resources. Under normal circumstances,
pastoral communities often face extreme challenges in meeting basic needs because of
significant reductions in land and water available due to desertification, bush encroachment,
soil erosion, population growth, and economic and political marginalization.
The foregoing discussions indicate that the relationship between conflict and
environmental security is not very obvious. Debate on conflict and environmental security
among the pastoral communities must bring into the equation the primary resources within
the pastoral areas that are at the core of pastoral livelihood namely; water and pasture. This is
because environmental impacts within the pastoral areas have a significant bearing on the two
resources that form the lifeline of the pastoral way of life. The relationship between conflict
and environment is certainly close and complex. It is a two edged sword, on one hand, the
36
Ibid., p 5
168
existence of conflicts and tensions affects environment while on the hand environmental
stress and degradation can cause conflicts.37
The potential consequences of climate change
for water availability and prevalent of diseases may aggravate existing tensions and generate
new conflicts. Furthermore, environment can itself fall victim to conflict as a direct and
indirect environmental damage coupled with lack of effective governance and management
institutions and can lead to environmental risks that threaten people’s livelihood and security.
The link between conflict and environmental security is not very direct. It requires a
careful examination of elements that cause conflicts and environmental insecurity and
identification of specific aspects of pastoral livelihood that is affected to establish the
relationship. Complex social and political factors have exacerbated conflicts and
environmental insecurity in recent times within Turkana and other pastoral areas in general.
Environmental security is at the core of livelihood of the pastoral communities in Kenya. Just
as livestock production is highly dependent on the availability of water, pasture, and market,
the livelihood of pastoral communities is directly linked to their environment. In addition to
these hardships, pastoral communities face a number of persistent crises such as drought,
diseases, severe cold, and lack of access to grazing lands, mis-exploitation of pastoral
resources all these compounded by frequent fights over them with their neighbors.
An examination of the link between conflict and environmental security among the
pastoral communities in Kenya shows that conflict and environmental security in pastoral
areas can be explained by three interconnected factors, i) control and access to land related-
resources ii) weak and absence of governance structures and iii) under- development.
Pastureland depletion and water scarcity are also important factors in explaining conflicts in
pastoral areas that continue to affect the pastoral communities in Kenya. Apart from land use
imperatives and economic and political marginalization from the central authority, other
37
Homer-Dixon, T. (1996), op cit pp. 14-15)
169
factors contributing to conflicts include historical claims to land and reduced access to
markets and extension services.38
However, it is also true that there are many factors that
contribute to conflicts in pastoral areas will little or no link to the environment or natural
resources and vice versa. These ranges from political, religious, ethnic, tribal and clan
divisions to economic factors, land tenure issues and historical demands.39
Nevertheless this
study indicates a “very strong” link between governance, conflict and environmental security
within the pastoral setting. The livelihood of the Turkana community is held hostage mainly
by the environment which obtains in their habitation which makes government policies
towards the development and growth of the pastoral economy in the country and governance
structures are important factors. Consequently, the inter-play between environment and
government development policies and governance structures is central to the state of human
security that prevails among the pastoral groups in the country.
5.3 Critical Issues Emerging from the Study
The question of the conflict and multifaceted and brings to the foe the intersection of
many factors. This section identifies and discusses five broad issues that have emerged from
the study which interacts in varying proportions and affect the security of the pastoral
communities. Broadly, five critical issues have emerged from this study on conflict and
environmental security among the pastoralists in Kenya. These are; historical and governance
issues, the traditional justice system verses the modern judicial system, the political and
security at the regional level, ecology and climatic conditions and policy, which are the
subject of this section.
38
Mwaura, C. (2005), op cit :p 2 39
Goodhand, J. (2003) pp.629-646 Enduring Disorder and Persistent Poverty: A Review of Linkages between
War and Chronic Poverty, World Development
170
5.3.1 Historical Injustices and Governance Issues
The problem of insecurity among the pastoral communities in Kenya is largely an outcome of
the failure of the post-colonial political leadership to extend governance institutions to
pastoral areas.40
Marginalization of the pastoralists has its roots from the colonial period and
perpetuated throughout the post-independence period.Insecurity in pastoral regions is often
associated with their marginal location and weak state penetration.41
Pastoralists are seen as
not only physically distant and occupying peripheral areas, but also as politically and
culturally marginal. Their presumed distance from modern institutions and from the
controlling dominance of the state is often accepted as a self-evident explanation for
widespread violence.42
The situation is much more complex and closer analysis (as highlighted above) shows
that the colonial and post-colonial state has had a direct role in creating an aconducive
environment where insecurity thrive. For example, in Kenya, several shortcomings have
characterised previous government responses to insecurity in the arid areas. These include
lack of or delayed response where on many occasions there has been no response for
‘normal’ killing and raiding; a certain level of inter-clan or inter-ethnic killing among
pastoral communities was often considered usual and acceptable. Furthermore, District
administrations lack basic sufficient resources such as fuel and ‘night out’ allowances to send
timely responses. The useof indiscriminate forceby the security agencies tend to effect
collective punishment rather than apprehending culprits of raiding. Such responses rarely
brings lasting results in terms of ending the cycles of violence. Other challenges are
40
Guyo, L D (2009) Kenya: The Politics of Deprivation and Separation –The Case of Northen Kenya, was
accessed at http://gadaa.com/oduu/1304/2009/10/29/kenya-the-politics-of-deprivation-and-separation-the-case-
of-northern-kenya/ on 14 December, 2011 41
Mwaura, C. (2005) op cit and Leff, J (2009) ‘Pastoralists at War: Violence and Security in the Kenya-Sudan-
Uganda Border Region’ in International Journal of Conflict and Violence (IJCV): Vol. 3 (2), pp.188–203: 194
Khadiagala, G. (2003), op cit p17. 42 Ibid
171
associated with lack of motivation where security personnel have often had limited impetus
or motivation for stemming inter-clan or inter-ethnic fighting.
Almost 50 years ago, an America writer Negley Farson, who traveled all over Kenya
described the beginning of his sojourn to what was then Northern Frontier District (NFD), as
“This is the one half of Kenya that the other half knows nothing about and probably does not
care…”. That statement sums up the plight and situation of the Kenyans in the pastoral areas
and it is still true to large extent today as it more than four decades ago. The colonialists
arrived in this area in 1909. They had no economic interest in the region, declared it a
security risk and deliberately isolated it from the rest of the country.43
This reduced contact
and interaction between pastoralists and the rest of the country’ a situation that sharpened and
deepened ethnic divisions, rivalries and bred and incited ethnic consciousness and animosities
at the same time. The isolationist policy was the beginning of the systematic marginalization
that has been the landmark of the region and its residents.
In an effort to control the movement of “Northerners” into the hinterland of East
Africa and of their integration with others in Kenya, the colonial government enacted several
legislation targeting NFD that have come to hound the region to date. First, there was the
District Ordinance of 1902, which applied exclusively to NF Districts (now counties) of Tana
River, Lamu, Kajiado and Samburu. Under the ordinance, the NFD was declared a ‘closed
area’. This meant that movement in and out of the area was prohibited and allowed only
under special pass (the NFD Pass). However, the colonial state guaranteed adequate security
and created tribal grazing zones to ensure that the pastoral communities maintained their
nomadic lifestyles. Every ethnic group in the arid north had traditional grazing lands and if
any trespassed, their animals were impounded and auctioned. That was deterrent enough to
keep them confined to specific areas and isolated from the rest of the country. This way, they
43Ibid
172
remained enclosed and with limited opportunity to interact with the rest of the Kenyans but
with the increases in population, fragmentation of land and climate change and vulnerabilities
this strategy cannot work.
The second was the Special Districts (Administration) Ordinance Act of 1934 which
together with the Stock Theft and Produce Ordinance Act of 1933, gave the colonial
administrators in the region extensive powers to arrest, restrain, detain and seize properties of
“hostile tribes.” The definition of what constituted a “hostile tribe” was left to the discretion
of Provincial Administration. Worse still, the Stock Theft and Produce Ordinance legalized
the collective punishment of tribes and clans for the offence of individual members once that
tribe or clan was declared a “hostile tribe.” This Act was repealed in 1997 under the Statute
Law (Repealed and Miscellaneous) Amendment Act of 1997.
The Constitutional and Legislative foundation for the application of emergency Laws
(section 127 of the old Constitution) in the Northern region was completed in 1970 with the
passing of the Indemnity Act, Chapter 44 of Laws of Kenya of the old constitution. This Act,
which came into force on 5th June 1970, was meant to indemnify government agents and
members of the security forces working in the region against any claims on account of any
loss or damage occasioned by their actions. The objective of the Act was to restrict the taking
of the legal proceedings in the respect of certain Acts and matters done in certain areas
between the 25th December 1963 and 1st December 1967…”Section 3 of the Act states that:
“No proceeding or claim to compensation or injury shall be instituted or
entertained by any court or by any authority or tribunal established by or
under any law for or on account of or in respect of Act, matter or thing
done within or in respect of the prescribed area, after the 25th December
1963 and 1st December 1967 … It was done in good faith or done in
execution of duty in the public interest by a public officer or member of
the armed forces”
It is notes worthy that the gross human rights violations occurred in the NFD, such as the
Wagalla massacre in 1984 and that those responsible cannot claim indemnity under this Act. In
173
addition, until the passage of the new constitution in 2010, there were still some the vestiges of the
colonial and post-colonial legislation such as the Stock and Produce Theft Act and the Indemnity
Act that remained in the country’s statute books. The colonial policy of gazetting and appropriating
large parts of pastoral communal lands has triggered conflicts between the pastoral communities
and the state. The British authorities administered emergency law to rule northern Kenya, which
also happened with northeastern Uganda, and southeastern Sudan. Unfortunately, to date, the post-
colonial administrations have not corrected this imbalance, instead they have promoted the same
by simply concentrating most of development initiatives in ‘high potential’ areas.
After independence, the Kenyatta government did little to initiate any meaningful
development projects in pastoral areas of the country. Instead, many of the vestiges of colonial
government remained intact whereby the Ordinance Act was replaced by Acts of Parliament.
People of northern Kenya have not benefited from the central Government initiated projects.
Instead the rural development program pursued by the Kenyatta Government was biased in favor
“high potential areas.”44
It was concerned primarily with the acquisition of the settler farms and
development of small-holder coffee, tea and dairy sectors from which, coincidentally, regions
benefited disproportionately. Even the huge livestock potential of semi-arid areas did not qualify
for classifications as “high potential”, notwithstanding the fact that, to date Kenyan’s livestock
potential exceeds either coffee or tea. The Moi regime also did little to initiate development in the
area notwithstanding its reputation for voting his party, the Kenya National African National
Union (KANU) all through and the area being classified as a KANU zone to discourage opposition
politicians from to campaigning in the region.45
Marginalization of dry lands from the mainstream stream political, economic and social
structures of the central government has largely promoted uneven development. Pastoral regions
have not been fully incorporated into broader national strategies to promote sustainable
44
African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya op cit 45Interview with Dickson Makotsi and S. K, Maina of the Office of the President in Nairobi on 24 November, 2010
174
development and are among the most poorly developed in Kenya. Major economic and political
activities were concentrated in high potential areas. Schools, health facilities, roads,
communications infrastructure, and administrative structures were developed in these areas leaving
arid areas with little or no activity to support meaningful development. For example, a police
station in Lodwar, a distance of about 400km, serves a resident of Kapteto. Consequently,
movement from one place to another is greatly hampered by lack of road networks.46
The
problems that affect pastoral areas result from a combination of factors that include systematic
marginalization, deprivation and antiquated economic structures. In Kenya, the policy of ‘closed
district’ during the colonial period and its continued perpetuation by post-independence
governments, explains why pastoral areas remain under developed and their resources grossly
under exploited. 47
Matters are even worsened by the negative prejudices, perceptions and attitudes of civil
servants, ordinary Kenyans and even the mainstream media that describes the area as a no-go zone,
hostile to work and live in as it is inhabited by the Somalis described derogatorily as people of
peppery personality, hostile, warlike, bandits or shiftas.48
Civil servants posted to this region
perceive their assignment as punishment and employ every means to resist deployment. If
unsuccessful, they work very hard to get the transfer out of “the hell on earth” as soon as possible.
Consequently, people from this area are so alienated and detached from the state that the see their
region as being outside of Kenyan territory.49
For example, when going down south, the Northern
people say that they are “going to Kenya”. Because of marginalization and neglect of the pastoral
areas by the central governments, the growth of the modern sector has not been promoted in these
areas to provide required services and administration.
46Interview with Dickson Magotsi on 24 November, 2010 47
Farah, I. (2009) op cit 48
ibid 49Interview with SK Maina in Nairobi on 18 September, 2011
175
The state’s inability to provide adequate security to the pastoral communities and the neglect
and marginalization of semiarid and arid areas in terms of development is adversely affected by the
harsh climatic conditions and a host of social and economic problems such as high poverty levels,
broken social relations and rising levels of unemployment. This combines to create a tragic mix of
social forces that contributes to an increased demand for small arms, conflicts, and environmental
insecurity among these communities. Due to limited presence and ineffective security agencies
within the pastoral areas, the government has not been able to guarantee the security.
Consequently, armed pastoral communities have lost confidence in government’s institutions and
ability to comprehensively address their problems due to failure by successive governments to
successfully deal with these insecurities and vulnerabilities.
Since 1963, when Kenya attained its independence the country has had three governments
under Jomo Kenyatta (1963-1978), Arap Moi (1978-2002) and Mwai Kibaki (2002- to 2013) all of
whom have given limited attention to the development imperatives of the pastoral economy. Lack
of adequate security has led to acquisition of illicit small arms ostensibly for self and community
protection and that of their animals, which has in turn increased and intensified conflicts over
water and pasture with serious consequences on environmental security. Small arms also facilitate
livestock stealing from other armed pastoral communities. However, it is worth noting that
between 1950 and 1970, the Turkana were the predominant force attacking the Pokot, Jie, and the
Toposa. Sooner the Pokot and other neigbouring pastoral communities in Uganda, Ethiopia and
Sudan acquired modern weaponry.50
By 1970, large scale raiding was taking root exacerbated by
the illicit proliferation and use of small arms with AK47 as a weapon of choice. The relative ease
of acquisition and low-cost of these small arms has enabled the pastoral communities to guarantee
a sustained market. Of course, the current volumes of small and ammunitions in pastoral areas
50Interview with Akabwai in Turkana on 15 August 2010
176
were manufactured elsewhere but found their way into the country through either legal or illegal
means.
According to the Small Arms Survey (SAS), more than 1000 companies world-wide are
involved in some aspect of small arms production.51
At least 98 countries produce or have the
capacity to produce small arms and/ or ammunitions while thirteen countries dominate the global
market of small arms. These are Austria, Brazil, UK, US, Belgium, France, Italy, Israel, Germany,
North Korea, Russian Federation, Switzerland and China.52
Ukraine has been identified as one of
the major source particularly of illicit small arms though it is not among the big thirteen. Apart
from the arms supplied during the Cold War era, the end of the Cold war also freed up massive
small arms in many states particularly those that were under the former Soviet Union in addition to
black markets. These arms are transported, purchased, and sold by traders often with active or
passive support of government security officers. Some countries in the IGAD region have been
accused of facilitating movement of arms in the region even when queries about reasons for
acquisition and use are being raised.53
While illicit weapons have permeated into the region, it is also true that the previously legal
arms which were legitimately imported by states to preserve and defend national security in the
event of an external attack have become illicit through corruption, fall of regimes, or sometimes in
unclear circumstances. Some governments54
have been accused of aiding illicit trafficking through
licensing and issuance of vague end user certificates. International arms dealers easily evade the
inadequate national arms control laws in their home countries and disguised routes of their
deliveries while taking advantage of shaky customs, transport and financial regulations to make
51
SAS ‘Counting Human Cost’ Small Arms Survey: A project of Graduate Institute of International Studies, (Oxford,
Oxford University Press, 2002). 52
Landesman, P. “Arms and the Man” The New York Times Magazine, August 17, 2003:31. 53
Bevan, J. (2008), op cit 54
177
their activities as “legal” as possible delivered these weapons.55
As a consequence, pastoral areas
have become zones of insecurity fostered by dynamism where survival imperatives have driven
demand for small arms. Civilians in possession of small arms belief strongly that their security is
enhanced at the expense of those without. Other factors that motivate the pastoral groups in Kenya
to acquire small arms illegally include desire to control /seize pasture and watering points, trade
routes and market places. Another factor that promotes illegal acquisition of small arms among the
pastoral groups is the desire to mount raid on animals. Naturally, these factors singly or jointly
demand for good and reliable small arms and promote violent confrontations and vicious spiral of
violence during raids.56
The use of small arms in raiding has increased the intensity of pastoral
conflicts, the level of casualty and destruction and exposed further the pastoralists to their equally
armed neighbours.57
It follows that civil wars, inter-state conflicts and tensions, collapse of states and weak
governance structures and structural issues across the region, weak and ineffective law
enforcement and security agencies, lack sufficient resources to effectively police the long borders
and points of entry and corruption within the police, security and other law enforcement agencies58
are but some of the main reasons why the question of conflicts and environmental security among
the pastoral groups must take into account the regional dimension and even global environment in
addressing them.
As a consequence the pastoral areas remain largely under-developed in terms of social,
economic, and governance structures in Kenya although the problem of under-development has
historical as well other explanations, the limited presence of the state in these regions is a major
55Wood B. etal (1999) ‘The Arms Fixers, Controlling the Brokers and Shipping Agents, A joint Report by BASIC,
NISAT and PRIO:29 56
Selassie, S, G and Sisay, H. ‘The Gambella Region of Ethiopia: Small Arms in a Border Area’ in Small Arms in the
Horn of Africa: Challenges, Issues and Perspectives (eds) Gebre- Wold, K. and Masson, I.(Bonn International Center
for Conversion (BICC) Brief No 23, 2002). 57
Bollig, M. (1990) Op cit, 58The Kenya Police Reforms Framework Report, undated.
178
one. Due to limited state presence and inability to stem insecurity, pastoralists have lost confidence
in the public security apparatus which has created ‘zones of insecurity’ in their areas. These ‘zones
of insecurity’ are not only limited to pasture and water areas but they have spread to major roads
and rural routes where banditry thrive. The pastoral areas are therefore characterized by banditry
activities, low level insurgency and general insecurity. It is in this regard, that the pastoral
communities feel neglected and marginalized by the central government and especially in the
provision of physical security and construction of social infrastructures. Furthermore, insecurity in
these marginal areas is made worse by increased population, acquisition and seizure of land by the
government for commercial and urban expansion purposes, colonial boundaries, and frequent
droughts that have contributed immensely to the shrinking of land for pasture and water.
Initially, pastoral communities were able to cope with isolated emergencies through migration
and split of livestock but environmental insecurity has seriously challenged their coping
mechanisms. Reduction in pastureland has increased and intensified competition over it. During
the search for these commodities, they provoke conflicts with other communities. In order to
control these vital resources, deter and repulse raiders and have a sense of security, mount
successful raids, pastoral groups who occupy 80% of Kenya’s landscape have been compelled to
acquire small arms. The steady flows of small arms into the region make them easily available and
are weapons of choice due to their portability and lethality. The use of small arms in pastoral
conflicts has made them more bloody and destructive thus posing a serious threat to the welfare of
the pastoral communities. Therefore these regions not only attract small arms but they also serve as
sources to urban areas where they are used in criminal activities. This has fostered by a dynamic
where survival imperatives have driven demand for small arms. The gun is now one of the most
valuable commodities in these areas because it ‘assures’ physical security.
These arms which have replaced the traditional ones of arrows, spears, and bows have
drastically changed the nature and conduct of pastoral conflicts. They have increased the number
179
of casualties during fights and often lead to enormous destruction of dwelling places and property.
The ferocious nature of the battles is a consequence of lethality of small arms. Individually, small
arms do not pose serious threat to human security as are nuclear, biological and chemical weapons,
but the sheer bulk of illicit arms and other infantry-style weapons in circulation outside lawful
state control and their constant misuse makes them a serious threat to livelihood and therefore of
concern. It is against this background that small arms among the pastoral communities in Kenya
have become a necessity rather than an exceptional. Those in possession of arms develop a false
impression that their security is enhanced.
5.3.2 Regional Political and Security Environment
Since Kenya’s political independence in 1963, its neighbors (namely, Uganda, Sudan, before
it split into two to create South Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somali) with large parcels of land that
borders the country’s pastoral areas have experienced unprecedented conflicts that make it
important to analyze the regional environment.59
This is because it partly explains the context in
which conflicts and environmental security occur in pastoral areas. The increased intensity of
conflicts among the pastoral communities is largely explained by the illicit proliferation of small
arms within the broader context of the conflictual situation that has characterized the IGAD region
since 1950s and border tensions between some countries. The devastating wars that have occurred
in Djibouti, Sudan, Ethiopia, Uganda and Somalia provided reason for both legal and illicit arms to
infiltrate into the region including civilian population.
The proliferation of illicit small arms in Kenya should be situated within the broader context
of the conflictual situation that has characterized its immediate neighbors since 1950s, which has
provided a favourable environment for the steady flow of small arms. Although there is limited
59Anyang' Nyong'o, P. "The Roots of Conflict in the Horn of Africa", pp. 27-40 in Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, ed.,
Conflict in the Horn of Africa (1991). And Bereket Habte Selassie, Conflict and Intervention in the Horn of Africa
(Monthly Review Press: New York & London, 1980).
180
production of small arms and ammunitions, within Kenya and its neighborhood,60
the region has not
been spared the devastating effects of the proliferation and use of small arms. There are
ammunition factories in Eldoret, Kenya and Nangasongola, Uganda while Sudan and Ethiopia have
manufacturing capability. Ethiopia currently produces assault rifles; rocket propelled grenades,
small arms and hosts an assembly plant to manufacture tanks. Media and investigative reports have
documented Sudan’s production of arms. There is some evidence that munitions are produced at Al
Shajara/Yarmuk industrial complex on the outskirts of Khartoum. It is reported that this facility
was upgraded in 1990 possibly with the support of Bulgaria and China.61
The devastating wars experienced in Sudan, (1956-1972 and 1982-2004), Ethiopia, (that led
to the overthrow of Mengistu Hail Mariam in 1991) and Uganda attracted inflow of small arms in
the region. In Uganda, a series of coup de tat since 1966 up to 1985, including rebellions that led to
the fall of Idi Amin in 1979, provided an opportunity for civilians to raid and loot military
barracks, took away guns some of which are being illegally used in the ongoing cattle raids in the
region.62
Furthermore, the absence of an effective government in Somalia since 1991 has also
made it easy for small arms to enter into the country. Apart from the open conflicts that remain a
key feature of the region, there are still tensions between countries. These include border tensions
between Somalia and Ethiopia, Eritrea and Djibouti, and Ethiopia and Eritrea.63
In addition, Cold
War politics provided an enabling environment for the illicit arms to flow into the country. The
over-abundance of small arms in conflict prone regions of the world is partly attributed cold war
politics. Dhanpala etal64
writes that ‘the flooding of many parts of the world with these weapons
60Small Arms Survey, (2005) op cit 61
Bevan, J. (2008), op cit 62Mworozi E. A.etal(2000)“Cattle Rusting in Karamoja region, North Eastern Uganda”and Tulya Muhika, S. “the Rise
of Uncivil Society in Uganda” Papers presented at a conference on ‘Improving Human Security through the Control and
Management of Small Arms, Nairobi, APFO 63
Sharamo, R. et al (2011), Regional Security in the Post Cold War Horn of Africa, Institute for Security Studies,
Pretoria, 64
Dhanapala, etalSmall Arms Control Old Weapons, New Issues, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
(UNDIR) (Geneva: Ashgate Publishing Company, 1999).
181
was an unfortunate side-effect of the cold war’. From the end of World War II to the collapse of
the Soviet Union in the late 1980s, the supply of small arms particularly to the developing world by
the two protagonists, the Union of Soviet and Socialist Republic (USSR) and United States of
America (USA) and their allies were used as an instrument of diplomacy.65
The East and the West blocs used arms to gain influence and compete for the allegiance of
certain developing countries. Arms sales in essence became a substitute for the traditional means of
securing influence through alliances and deploying forces to protect “like-minded” nations.
Negotiations on arms control revolved round nuclear, chemical, armor aircraft and warships with
the purpose of controlling and managing competition among antagonistic states. According to
Schelling etal 66
the hope was that arms control measures could reduce the likelihood of war, its
scope and violence if it occurs and the associated political and economic costs. Other factors that
have enabled the diffusion and use of illicit small in Kenya include lengthy, porous and very poorly
policed borders and corruption among state security agencies.67
These factors are interconnected
and operate in a particular situation in varying proportions.
Locally, the practice and culture of livestock raiding amongst pastoralists is dependent on
livestock and is one of the main driving forces behind violent conflicts. Raiding, counter raiding
and warfare has characterized pastoralists living in northern Uganda, Southern Sudan, northern
Kenya and Southern Ethiopia.68
However, some writers have argued that the practice of cattle
rustling is some form of coping mechanism for restocking livestock decimated by drought
epidemics and conflict among other factors69
Based on ecological explanation of raiding among the
pastoralists, large fluctuation in livestock population due to recurrent droughts and occasional
65
Pierre, J. “Arms Sales: The Diplomacy” in Foreign Affairs, Winter 1981/82:269. For further reading read The Global
Politics of Arms Sales(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982) by the same author. 66
For more information on cultural aspects see Halperin, H. etal. ‘Strategy and Arms Control’ (1961) (New York:
Twentieth Century Fund, 1961) p2. 67
Gebrewold, K. etal(2006), op cit pp.21-36, 68
McCabe T. Cattle bring us to our enemies; Turkana Ecology, Politics, and Raiding in a Disequilibrium System.
(Michigan: University of Michigan Press2007),pp. 46-47 69Amene A. (2009), 1 Cattle Rustling a Leadership Crisis. Nairobi:Mifugo Project, ISS
182
outbreak of epizootics are characteristic of arid lands and non-equilibrial ecosystems. Although not
phrased in terms of ecosystem dynamics, the need to restock following a stressful period has often
used to explain the motivation and function of raiding.70
Terming arid rangelands as non-
equilibrium ecosystem and drawing his arguments from the work of Behnke, Scoones and Niamir-
Fuller, Cousin71
States:
The new thinking(nonequilibrium models) also asserts that a
situation of chronic or endemic conflict is a central feature of non-
equilibrium settings This assists in explaining the high degree of
inter-group conflict often associated with pastoralism, but also the
patterns of cooperation and reciprocal access which are found.
Environmental variability thus result in a high degree of political
(and sometimes military) competition, ameliorated by periods
when competition relate to each other as allies, neighbours, or even
kin’
5.3.3 The Traditional Justice System verses the Conventional Judicial System
The existing CPMR structures in Kenya such as courts and peace committees have failed to
provide effective administration of justice and promote peaceful co-existence with respect to
conflicts in ASALs.72
Traditionally, pastoral communities have had societal norms, cultures and
values that were known to regulate human life, relations and promote local governance. The
society operated under these norms and any deviation from the same was a taboo and punished
accordingly. This means that socio-cultural institutions in Turkana community played a key role in
not only solving intra and inter-community conflicts, but also facilitated sustainable
utilization/sharing and management of the available scarce natural resources.73
Unfortunately, the
so called ‘civilization’ and the emergence of the concept of the central form of governance have
greatly diminished and demeaned these traditional institutions. For instance, it is common to find
70
Mcabe Op Cit 95 71Cousin B. (1996), pp. 43, conflict management for multiple resource users in pastoral and agro-pastoral contexts.
IDS bulletin 27(3). The work of Benke is Behnke R.1994 pp.4, Natural resource management in pastoral Africa:
London. Commonwealth Secretariat 72
Kamenju, J. etal, (2003), op cit 73Wairagu, F.(2007)‘ Op Cit pp 33-54
183
the belligerent warriors set for a raiding expedition without the elder’s blessings.74
The situation
has been exacerbated further by emergence of the modern legal system that has weakened the role
of the traditional justice institutions and the conventional justice system that easily challenges the
relevance of traditional conflict resolution institutions in their rulings.
Human rights movements in Kenya have also been arguing that traditional courts impose
undemocratic fines and sentences such as communal punishment and death. These loopholes have
enabled young men to engage in cattle thefts and banditry activities within the pastoral areas hence
increasing the instances of violent conflicts.75
Other challenges are assocaited with ineffective
formal justice where perpetrators of murder, banditry or raiding are processed through the formal
state justice system and have been countless cases of suspects escaping justice through bribing
police or magistrates.76
The non-recognition of traditional justice by CPMR processes under law has resulted
in there being no clear and comprehensive system of justice to resolve conflicts in pastoral areas.
This has partly resulted in disputing parties to rely on self-help mechanisms that lead to more
violence and degeneration of relations among pastoral communities. The CPMR framework has
also witnessed dwindling role of traditional institutions of resolving conflicts among communities
in the country and across the borders. This is fast fading as a result of marginalization by formal
dispute resolution mechanisms and modernization. Indigenous institutions are therefore no longer
significant for resource management as the government appoints community elders and chiefs. The
erosion of traditional governance institutions among the pastoralists has weakened the ability of
community elders to exercise control over young men. Several studies77
have shown that small
arms have adversely affected the traditional conflict resolution mechanisms because they
74
Mkutu, K. A. (2006). “ Op Cit 47-70. 75
Ruto, P. (2004), Indigenous Democracy: Traditional Conflict Resolution Mechanisms; Pokot, Turkana, Marakwet
and Samburu Communities. (Nairobi: ITDG EA), :45 76
Ibid 77
Akwabai, D. etal (2007), Op cit, Foundation for Dialogue (2002) Proliferation of small arms in East Africa,
Foundation for Dialogue, Nakuru, Kenya.See also Wairagu, F. (2007) Op cit and Gebreworld, K, (2006) op cit
184
encourage resort to use of violent means to resolve disputes. This is particularly true among the
pastoral communities whose traditional mechanisms for conflict management are being eroded
gradually following the militarization of the youth.78
For example, between the Turkana and the
Pokot of Kenya, the armed youth are increasingly becoming rebellious of the traditional norms and
values that guided the social organization of the community. The acquisition of arms had made
young people to feel that they can rely less on their parents for survival since they can raid to pay
dowry and set up their homes without their support. Indeed, ‘eldership’ can now be attained by
wealth, and youth are often well positioned to attain wealth if they can gain access to guns. Elders
have now to negotiate with such youth in a way that has not been the case in the past.79
At the
same time, since independence in 1963, official governance structures have either been entirely
absent or weak within the pastoral areas.
The authorities have undermined traditional structures without establishing modern
alternatives to replace them. If somebody kills among the Pokot, Turkana and Karamajong for
instance there is usually a traditional mechanism of managing the problem locally, using
customary law instead of modern legal system of courts. It is important that the government
appreciates the way pastoralists operate and how they obey the system in place because the youth
and elders should never contradict.80
Nevertheless, the situation is changing because today there
are youths who act as thieves and go on their own accord to steal; but they are always punished.
This is a double failure on the government. Corruption is rife among the officials who are
supposed to be preventing the vice. Most chiefs are reported to collude with the members of their
community and use irregular methods to avoid the prosecution of any suspects.81
In some case,
chiefs take a share of the stolen animals. As such, traditional elders are finding it difficult to
78Telephone interview with John Mark in Lodwar, Kenya on 22 November, 2007. 79
Aywa and Oloo, Role of Traditional Societies in Conflict Management, (Nairobi,East African Publishers, 1998) 80
Pauline Isura, Report on IBAR Pastoral Community harmonization meeting held at Mount Elgon Hotel, Mbale,
Uganda, May 2001. 81Aywa and Oloo, (1998) op cit
185
prevent and manage conflict partly because their actions are not anchored in any legal and
institutional framework and because they lack mechanism to enforce their resolutions, which the
existing CPMR rarely address. Yet the institution of elders possesses a potential for conflict
prevention and management especially among the pastoral communities provided it is supported
and institutionalized.
5.3.4 Ecology and Climatic Conditions
Pastoral communities reside in regions, which are characterized by arid and semi-arid
climatic conditions that mainly support nomadic pastoralism (mobility and communal grazing and
very limited crop cultivation). This explains why livestock keeping is the social and economic
mainstay of the pastoral groups. However, these systems have been significantly eroded, partly
because of colonial and post-colonial legal definitions of land ownership and resource utilization.
The increasing emphasis on individual rather than communal property rights that governed
relations and resource use among the pastoralists has led to increasing restrictions on population
movement and grazing rights, the foundation of pastoral economy, which has in turn undermined
the historic coping strategies and increased the vulnerability of pastoral communities. As a result,
communities no longer retain the capabilities, activities and resources required to secure a minimal
means of living.82
Furthermore, limited water and pasture plus restrictions in mobility of the
pastoral groups and animals have not only disrupted the process of adjustment that maintained a
balance between people, land and livestock but has led to frequent clashes among pastoral groups
as well as between pastoralist and agricultural communities over these resources.
Lowlands, rangelands or arid and semi-arid lands are the cradle of pastoralism, and
play an important part in the lives of the pastoralists in Kenya. Pastoralism is a livelihood derived
mainly from livestock browsing or grazing on natural vegetation that is usually operand in
geographical conditions. Furthermore, alternative opportunities for livelihoods, including
82
Mwaura, C. (2005 Op Cit, Leff, J (2009)‘ Op Cit pp.188–203: 194 and Onyango, E.O (2010), Op cit
186
agriculture are limited due to severe environmental conditions mainly characterized by dearth or
inadequacy of water, which cannot sustain domestication of plants. This form of economic
activity has been identified to be a way of life for 16% of the population that operates in the
Sahelian zone of Africa. Nomadic pastoralism involves a seasonal pattern of movement around
more or less regular territorial beats.83
The implication is that pastoralism plays an important role
in the livelihoods of a significant proportion of the Kenyan population and in particular pastoral
communities.
Ecologically, the arid and semi-arid areas of Kenya are characterised by the gradual
erosion of the natural resource and social asset base from which households and communities
depend for their (predominantly pastoral) livelihoods. This is further exacerbated by natural
occurrences like drought. Pastoral livelihood systems have adapted to these ecological patterns
through the development of highly resilient production systems.84
The nature of pastoral
livelihoods demands a high degree of mobility guided by the necessity for access to water and
grazing land without reference to state borders. Environmental related hazards such as periodic
droughts, degradation and flooding has always been detrimental to the livelihoods of pastoral
communities in Kenya. As a result of increasing human and livestock population pressure and
frequency of environmental related problems, the capacity to cope with drought has declined to
the point where there is a growing threat to the survival of viable pastoral production systems and
strained relationships within and between countries.85
The development and livelihoods of the
pastoral communities in Kenya is largely dependent on environmental security and its degradation
thus undermines efforts to enhance their security. This is because environment affects livestock
which is the back bone of the pastoral economy. Literature suggests that environmental resource
83
Berger, R. (2003), ‘Conflicts over Natural Resources among Pastoralists in Northern Kenya: A look at recent
initiatives in conflict resolution’ Journal of International Development, Volume 15, Issue 2, pp 245–257, ( West
Sussex ) Willey Interscience Publishers. 84
Mwaura, C. (2005) op cit ‘Leff, J (2009)‘ Op cit pp.188–203: 194 and Onyango, E.O (2010), Op cit . 85Mkutu, K. A. (2006). Op Cit p47-70
187
scarcity as a result of degradation often lead to disruption of immediate economic livelihoods,
which interact with other social variables such as negative ethnicity to produce conflicts. By and
large, the effects of conflict and insecurity are the most important factors that contribute to the
vulnerability of pastoral groups hindering their development. These intensify other negative
elements, such as recurrent climatic extremes, socio-political marginalization and unfair livestock
market conditions.86
Based on the foregoing discussion, it can be concluded that if the environment is not
managed and its destruction halted, it poses serious security implications to the livelihood of the
pastoral communities. To mitigate the impact, there is need for agreements to allow for utilization
of pasture and water by groups from the opposing communities, greater political cooperation to
save the degraded environment, strengthening of the supranational organizations and other key
normative institutions to ensure sustainable regulation and exploitation of natural resources found
in pastoral areas, and the integration of the local communities in the management of these
resources. Conflict and environmental security within the context of pastoral communities in
Kenya is inextricably linked. There cannot be environmental security in an environment of
conflict and environmental insecurity will thrive in a conflict situation.
5.3.5 Policy Issues
5.3.5.1 Conflict Prevention and Management Policies
In examining the nature and the effectiveness of current and the emerging conflict
prevention, management and interventions architecture in Kenya, this study sought to establish
whether the approaches are based on accurate and update prognosis of the conflict problems in the
country and in particular the pastoral areas. Succinctly, it sought to find out whether the
approaches address the underlying issues that often results into deadly conflicts. This includes
86 ibid
188
recognizing and addressing the widening economic disparities based on regional or ethnic
divisions, high levels of poverty and natural resource utilization among others.
State failure in the provision of security and promotion of peaceful co-existence among
the pastoralists have led increased peacebuilding activities with the supportof local and
international agencies at grassroots. In some cases investment in these initiatives has often
provided the necessary stable conditions for the delivery of services particularly humanitarian.
Peacebuilding interventionsby the international agencies along with communities attempts to fill
the security vacuum created by the absence or weak state structures in remote border regions
albeit with mixed results. However, the absence of legal and insitutional support posses amajor
chalenge to the continuation and sustanability of these efforts.To date, Kenya lacks a well
articulated policy on resolving conflicts and promoting peace building activities. Instead, the
authorities have been reactive and relied very much on adhoc interventions that resembled more
less a firefighting approach to conflicts.87
Generally, apart from the judiciary and the police, the
current CPMR framework in Kenya consists of the District Security Committee (DSC) whose
Chairman is the District Commissioner (DC) with the Officer Commanding Police Station (OCPD
being vice-chairman. Representatives from the National Intelligence Security Services (NISS) and
Criminal investment Department (CID) are also members. The purpose of the DSC is to
investigate and gather intelligence information and report to the Provincial Security Committee.88
Members of the broader civil society are not allowed to sit on this Committee whose operation is
secretive.
The above structures are complemented albeit voluntarily by the Peace Committees
which are in two forms, namely; ad hoc and formal. In conflict prone areas, members of the
parliament, opinion leaders in conjunction with relevant government agencies, ministries and
87Interview with SK Maina and Dickson Magotsi of the National Steering Committee on Peace Building and Conflict
Management in Kenya in Nairobi on 18 April 2011 88
Interview with SK Mainaon 18 April 2011
189
departments can form a committee to mediate in a conflict. Such committees are ad hoc, with no
legal and institutional backing and are dissolved or dissolve themselves once there is some
relative peace.89
In many cases, such committees have also been manipulated to serve political
interests. In some areas where there are serious security concern, civil society organizations have
come together to form peace and development committees whose purpose is to mobilize resources
and people to work for peace. While these committees work closely with the relevant government
agencies they are not institutionalized and therefore co-operation with other stakeholders and in
particular the government depends on the goodwill of certain individuals and therefore
unsustainable.90
In addition to the national based structures and those that bring the government
and non state actors together, there are also the border commissions. Kenya has Joint Border
Commissions with Uganda and Ethiopia. The Commissions consists of representatives from the
CID, NSIS, the police and the provincial administration and their purpose is to address cross
border related crimes such livestock rustling, illegal and contraband trade.
It was not until in early 2000 that the country realized that reactive and un
institutionalized approaches to important matter of peace and security was largely responsible for
the failure to conclusively end conflicts. Currently, the draft policy on conflict and peace building
is under review before it is presented to the cabinet.91
Within the policy, education has been
identified as one of the key pillars to conflict resolution and management in the country.92
The
provision of universal primary education has been recognized as an important component to
conflict prevention in Kenya. In particular, the free primary education will encourages pastoral
communities to take their children to school, which will eventually have a positive influence on
their lifestyle and particularly that of viewing pastoralism as the only way of livelihood. However,
89
Interview with Dickson Magotsi and Lazarus Kubasu Nalasco Provincial Peace Forum Secretariat, Nakuru on 18
April 2011 and May 2010 respectively 90
Interview with Patrick Imana, Secretary of the Peace Committee in Turkana Central on 25 August 2010
91 Draft National Policy on Peace building and Conflict Management, op cit 23
92Ibid:15
190
the CPMR has not linked up with relevant stakeholders to ensure that school-going children to go
back after holidays.93
Pastoral areas in Kenya are still far behind in achieving education goals that
the country committed itself to in the implementation of free primary educations. Indeed, the
gains made in the past are being eroded through which school dropouts in the pastoral areas. The
CPMR in Kenya must recognize that insecurity in pastoral areas will be partly solved by increased
enrolment rates, which will translate to more youths in schools and by extension reduce the
number of conflict actors and factors such as high level of illiteracy in p that drive conflicts..
Importantly, the CPMR framework has recognized that some communities continue to
interact with neighbors with suspicion and hostility arising from past historical grievances relating
to political power, demarcation of boundaries, land allocations and development among others.94
These unresolved conflict issues have continued to dodge development programmes and effective
administration of certain regions and led to interventions that have been perceived as irrelevant or
biased towards certain communities. Therefore, addressing conflicts comprehensively to deal with
real or perceived past injustices including current and emerging security challenges is critical to
pacifying and developing the pastoral regions.
The continued illicit proliferation and use of small arms mainly in pastoral areas
including the country’s urban centers, implies that the existing control and management
frameworks are yet to succeed in curbing the flow and managing those already in circulation. This
insufficiency could be due to inefficiency, inability or simply abdication of responsibilities.95
The
CPMR framework in Kenya has not linked up with security sectors to create an environment
conducive for safety along the borders so as to reduce the problems of small arms. The lack of
sufficient security personnel along the borders has led to feelings of insecurity among local
populations forcing them to take up arms to defend themselves against attacks. In places where
93
Interview with the George Oyonga DC Turkana Central on 17 August, 2009 94
Draft National Policy on Peace building and Conflict Management, op cit 18 95
Interview with the members of the Turkana Peace Committee on 22 February 2010
191
the security personnel are present, they are ill-equipped and ill-trained to deal the growing
complex nature of cross border crimes that facilitate arms, drugs and human trafficking. The KPR
have little or no training at all yet are relied upon by government to provide security in pastoral
areas.96
The CPMR framework needs to strengthen the partnership among the various security
sector stakeholders in order to manage and promote peace and security among the pastoral groups.
In Kenya, the integration of CPMR strategies in national planning is lacking and
therefore public and private sector have no input in solutions that seek to prevent and manage
conflicts. This had lead to conflict insensitive planning and development. For instance, the CPMR
approaches lack a realistic policy to address the problem of ethnicity in Kenya as separate issue on
its own rather than a causal factor to all manner of social wrongs. Consequently, political leaders
and other elites have exploited ethnic differences to further their political and economic interests.
In addition, a largely unprepared population and uncoordinated civil and media society have
provided a ripe environment for ethnic animosity to thrive.97
5.3.5.2 Development Policies in Arid and Semi Arid Areas
The ASALs in Kenya cover 80 per cent of the total landsurface and provide subsistence
economy to 25 per cent of the population who are mainly pastoralists and agro-
pastoralists.98
Among the pastoral communities, tensions and conflict arise from the competing
demands of water and pasture but more so due to failure of the governance (institutions, policies
and laws) to address the root causes. The intensification of violent conflicts in pastoral areas as a
result of development programmes and policies, or their absence or ineffectiveness has in many
cases skewed access to natural resources, accentuated existing levels of completion and
accelerated environmental degradation. Policies pursued by successive post colonial Government
in Kenya have promoted marginalization of pastoralists from the mainstream development thereby
96
Interview with Mr Moses Luvisia, OCS Turkana on 23 August 2009 97
Ibid 98
National Development Plan (2002)
192
aggravating conditions for insecurity. For instance, the Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965 on African
Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya advocated for the allocation of resources to
high potential areas.99
This history of marginalisation has continued as reflected in some of the
recent policy documents such as the Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) in Kenya,
which in a nutshel failed to reflect the priorities and aspirations of pastoral communities.
Consequently, a Pastoralist Thematic Group (PTG) was created to develop thinking on poverty
reduction in pastoral regions of Kenya: “The poverty reduction strategy paper provides an initial
articulation of the government of Kenya’s response to the urgent need to reduce the incidence of
poverty in Kenya. As this is the highest among pastoralist households, (60%), the PTG has
prepared an implementation matrix to accompany the group’s paper for greater articulation in the
final PRSP plan”100
Chronic underdevelopment is at the core of conflict and the general insecurity in
pastoral areas.101
Conflict undermines resource effectiveness and improvements will only be
possible once security is enhanced. However, within the pastoral areas a long history of social
economic and political marginalization from the center is at the heart of the existing security
problems. These areas are scantly policed by the respective states, prompting the law of the jungle
to prevail. Widespread scenes of youthful warriors wielding AK 47 rifles are abound in many
parts of the pastoral areas. In Kenya, the government has lacked the capacity to provide security to
pastoralists a situation that has increased insecurity and the tendency towards self-defense and
99
Kenya, Republic of, Sessional Paper No 10 of 1965 on African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya
pp. Also a statement by Hon Mohammed Elmi, the Minister of State for Development of Northern Kenya and Other
Arid lands made reference to this issue during the launch of the interim Strategic Plan 2008 to 2012 in Nairobi on 21
April 2009. 100
Pastoralist Thematic Group on Poverty Reduction, Ministry of Finance, Republic of Kenya, March 2001. 101
Mwaura, C. (2005) Op cit
193
retaliation among the pastoralists.102
State haphazard arming of local militias’ in response to
security challenges has worsened the situation.103
Furthermore, the Kenya government has formulated and implemented policies that do
not take cognizance of nomadic pastoralist’s needs and aspirations. For instance, the insistence on
fixed schooling system at the expense of mobile and or boarding schools that could fit the
nomadic lifestyles is an example of policies that are insensitive to the pastoral communities’
lifestyle. Closely related to this is the colonial policies legacy that laid the basis for the
marginalization of the pastoral communities. To make matters worse, postcolonial administrations
in Kenya perfected this marginalization by simply concentrating most of development initiatives
in high potentials areas.104
The implication is that pastoralists have felt ignored and overlooked by
the government in the spheres of development, which partly explains why government’s presence
is limited to few towns and their environs within pastoral regions. Pastoralists interprets this as a
conspiracy by those in positions of power to marginalize and exploit them further, and they have
resorted to arming themselves and engaging in violence as a reaction to the structural inequalities.
Moreover, policies pursued by colonial and successive post-colonial governments in
Kenya have also tended to run directly counter to pastoralist interests for example attempting even
to envisage elimination of pastoralism.105
This has exacerbated insecurity challenges of pastoralist
communities, particularly in relation to access to scarce water and pasture. Further to this, the
Turkana, just like other pastoralist communities are represented inadequately in the high decision-
making processes in Kenya. For instance at the national level, Turkana pastoralists are said to
represent a relatively powerless political minority viewed as backward by their
102
Mkutu, K. A. (2006). “ Op Cit 47-70. 103
Ibid 104Kenya, Republic of, Sessional Paper No 10 of 1965 on African Socialism and its Application to Planning in
KenyaOp cit 105Mwaura, C. (2005) ‘Op Cit
194
government.106
This does not allow for their interests and concerns to be duly articulated at the
national level hence resulting in their omission from national development programmes. This
situation limits the scope for official structures to be used for conflict prevention and dispute
settlement.107
There is also a further socio-economic marginalization in terms of infrastructure
development. Turkana remain one of the least developed parts of Kenya. The economic disparity
with the rest of the country is striking. Infrastructure in terms of roads, schools,
telecommunication services and health facilities are poorly developed or completely non-
existence. A large proportion of the Turkana region is so remote, neglected and isolated, that a
visitor would often hear a Turkana, for instance, speak of “going to Kenya”, in reference to a visit
to Kitale, the nearest town or Nairobi! Political and economic exclusion has pushed communities
across ASAL to the periphery. Turkana included to regulate increasingly degraded resource
bases. The political vulnerability considers how limited access to public goods,
humanitarian/adaptation/mitigation aid and government assistance and power has created a high-
risk environment to shocks both in ecological and economic sense.108
There has been little state
impact outside the administration in the Turkana. Missionaries and non-governmental
organizations have provided much of the public services, famine relief and livestock
improvements. In general, the physical and institutional infrastructure is weaker in Turkana
region, which predisposes them to violence.
State policies aimed at improving the life of the pastoralists are leaning towards the
desire to turn pastoral lands to commercial cultivation through irrigation or through ranching
schemes leaving pastoralists alienated as a community without rights of land tenure. The current
106Raleigh, Clionadh, and Henrik Urdal. (2007) Pp. 674–694 Climate Change, Environmental Degradation and
Armed Conflict. Political Geography 26: 107
Department for International Development, The Causes of Conflict in Africa, Consultation Document. (London:
DFID 2001):37 108Raleigh, Clionadh, and Henrik Urdal. (2007) Pp. 674–694 Op Cit 26:
195
land policy in Kenya recognizes the communal ownership and it is hoped that it will address the
issues surrounding pastoral communities’ rights to land and grazing fields. Until now all attempts
to secure ownership rights for the pastoralist have failed. Summing the governments’ lukewarm
response to improve pastoral livelihood, a UNDP109
baseline survey of 2004 noted that many parts
of the arid areas in eastern Africa portray a classical retreat and acute absence of the state. After
years of marginalization and increasing poverty levels, the pastoralist communities have decided
to get the attention of the state through violent conflicts, which partly explain why regions such as
Turkana and Pokot are constantly in a state of violent conflict. This situation has been worsened
by the illicit proliferation and use of small arms over the last three decades, which has made
livelihood in the ASAL of Kenya very problematic as pastoral populations experience unique
forms of conflict often bordering on modern warfare.110
Pastoral areas are the most adversely affected by armed violence and poverty and the
connection between the misuse of illicit small arms and under development is important.
Acknowledging the multifaceted nature of the problem of small arms, the Nairobi Declaration and
Protocol directly note that human security must encompass economic, democratic, and
development agenda and should seek to address a wide spectrum of issues that include
humanitarian needs, conflict and post conflict imperatives, man-made, and natural disasters and
the problem of vulnerable population of the society. A major concern of conflict management in
the pastoral areas has been the regulation and ‘orderly’ use of land. Successive government has
seen it as requiring the further extension of private land tenure.111
This in turn has forced people to
congregate in more secure areas, further increasing the pressure on land and other resources and
109
UNDP, Annex 4: Baseline Survey: Analysis of conflict as it relates to the production and marketing of drylands
products The case of Turkana (Kenya) and Karamoja (Uganda) cross-border sites, Improving Market Access for
Drylands Commodities Project, November 2004. 110
Mkutu, K. (2006), Op cit 111
For example see Memorandum (2002). “The Pokot Land claims in Trans Nzoia district’ 1895-2002 presented to the
constitution of Kenya Review Commission (CKRC), Presidential Commission of Enquiry into Land Law System in
Kenya and His Excellency, The President of the Republic of Kenya, Mr. Daniel T. Arap Moi, 18th April 2002.
196
the potential for conflict.112
It emerges that the problem of conflict and environmental security
among pastoralists is partly a function of policy failure. In particular development and conflict
resolution and peace building policies have been inappropriate lacking and ineffective. The
existing development policies have been insensitive to the needs and aspirations of the
pastoralism. Interventions on CPMR have been adhoc reactive and therefore unsustainable to
resolve the perennial security challenges among pastoralists.
While the above issues related history and governance, the traditional justice system
verses the modern judicial system, regional environment climatic conditions and policy have been
discussed separately in reality they are intertwined and influence each other in varying
proportions. For instance, the question of policy formulation is linked to the issue of governance
in the sense that it may require a policy to change the way certain governance is practiced.
Likewise traditional verses modern judicial system may require a policy to pave way for their
recognition and inco-operation of certain traditional elements into the conventional justice system.
112
Mkutu K. and Marani M., (2001) Op Cit . Also see Conflict Management and mobility among pastoralists in
Karamoja, Uganda in managing mobility in African rangelands.
197
Chapter Six
Summary, Conclusion, and Recommendations
6.1 Introduction
This study set out to interrogate the interface between conflict, environmental security
and governance and its implication on the livelihood of the pastoral communities. Using the
Turkana community in Kenya as a case study, it interrogated the theoretical and practical
linkages between conflict, environmental security and governance among the pastoral
communities in Kenya, examined the nature of the relationship between conflict,
environmental security and governance, evaluated governance and management structures
(normative and institutional frameworks) for addressing conflict, environmental security and
development in Kenya and their applications to pastoral communities and finally synthesized
the implications of the nexus between conflict, environmental security and governance on
pastoralists in Kenya.
This chapter summarizes and concludes the key issues emerging from the study and
ends with recommendations of areas for further research. Specifically, it provides an
overview of the current state of knowledge on conflicts, environmental vulnerability and
governance, and revisits the core conceptual and empirical issues that framed the study.
Furthermore, the chapter elaborates what has been learned and what can be drawn from the
work in understanding pastoral communities in the region and elsewhere. Based on the
emerging issues, including developments after the conclusion of the study, it recommends
future research on the gaps/loopholes in the understanding of the area.
198
6.2 Summary
This study which is about the links between conflict, environmental security and governance
among pastoralists in Kenya and particularly the Turkana community is anchored within the
modified Thomas Homer-Dixon’s environmental scarcity theory. The theory which is
customized to suit the pastoral setting used both primary and secondary data and employed
the Sources, Issues Parties, Behavour, Attitudes, Interventions and Outcomes (SIPABIO)
conflict analysis model to examine the issues under investigation. The study has established
that there is a linkage between conflict and environmental security within the context of the
pastoral communities in Kenya. However, this link is not obvious; instead, it requires a
careful identification of specific aspects that cause conflicts and environmental insecurity and
their impact on pastoral livelihood.
The pastoral economy is very narrow and relies principally on livestock rearing and
therefore is more vulnerable when one or several conditions prevail. Not only are the incomes
and means of livelihood held hostage the environmental stress and climatic conditions but
also options for diversification are limited. The Turkana case demonstrates how the steady
reduction of pasture and watering places coupled with rapidly increasing human and livestock
population against the backdrop of governance deficit is one of a cluster of stresses that has
driven the community into constant conflicts that characterizes the pastoral zones.1
Pastureland, water and access to routes are the main issues of contention. The desire to
control trade routes and market places is a constant factor in the pastoral livelihood.
Livestock raiding is a traditional practice whereby herds depleted by droughts, floods, disease
or raiding are replenished but also where young men acquire animals to pay pride price
ostensibly to mature to manhood. Raiders are also motivated by the fact that more marks one
has that are occasioned by more successful raids, the more popular and respect one gets from
1Khadiagala, G. (2003) Op Cit and Aguirre, F. H (2011) ‘Op Cit
199
the community and the more women he is likely to marry.2 Therefore, raiding demands good
reliable small arms to enable the male and his kin to raid more cattle because their power not
only overwhelms and intimidate the cattle owners but also minimizes the risk of getting
caught. This is because unprepared owners prefer to let the livestock go rather than fight
armed raiders.3
The current volumes of illicit small arms in the IGAD region are a consequence of the
political instability that has characterized it for over decades and the Cold War
environment.4The militarization of the pastoral areas is largely a consequence of years of bad
governance, weak government administration and lack of effective natural resource
utilization and management frameworks in pastoral areas.5 This has in turn created zones of
insecurity in which lawlessness, deprivation of life and property and gun-wielding culture has
thrived. The weaponisation of the pastoral groups has influenced negatively on cultural
institutions, and in particular the traditional mechanism for CPMR, though they have also
undermined and destroyed livelihood survival strategies and alternatives.
On CPMR, the study has established that since independence the country has never
had a policy on peace building and conflict prevention until early 2000 when the process of
developing one begun. To date, a draft policy on peace building and conflict management
exists and together with the adhoc institutions it is under review to be aligned with the new
constitution before it is presented to the cabinet for discussion and approval or rejection.6 The
Regional Center on Small Arms has made some process since its inception in 2002.7 In
particular, it has spearheaded the development of a binding instrument on small arms, led
2ibid.
3Marwa P. ‘(2002), Op Cit. 4Makinda, S.(1982)"Conflict and the superpowers in the Horn of Africa" Third world quarterly 4(1): 93-103
5Mkutu, K.. (2005), Pastoral Conflicts, Governance and Small Arms in the North Rift, Northeast Africa,
(Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Bradford,) and Amene A. 2009, 1 Cattle Rustling a Leadership Crisis.
Nairobi: Mifugo Project, ISS 6 Interview with SK Maina and Dickson Magotsi in Nairobi on 18 April 2011 in Nairobi
7 Interview with Francis Sang and Francis Wairagu on 27 and 29 August, 2009 respectively
200
capacity building programs for Member States, led the development of crucial policy
documents and facilitated the establishment of NFP and NAP where they did not exist.
However, the Center faces both legal, institutional and policy bottlenecks that need to be
addressed. Key among these is the slow pace of the Member States to fully implement the
provisions of the documents, limited human and technical capacity at the Center as well as at
national level, lack of a regional strategic plan to guide its operations and the endemic
conflicts in the region which provides a enabling environment for the continued flow and
circulation of illicit small arms in the region and unpredictable interstate relations.
On environment security, the study concludes that there are some aspects of
environmental security (in particular policy related at global level) that may be addressed
well if environment is securitized while there are some technical and mundane aspects such
as those related to theoretical development that will require some focused attention away
from the realm of the expanded notion of security.
The study notes that scarcity of pasture, water and other related resources, weak and
limited state structures and institutions of governance as well as the erosion of traditional
value systems and the authorities that enforced them combine in an intricate web of
complexity that contributes towards conflict and environmental insecurity that characterizes
the pastoral landscape. Furthermore, conflict driving factors, environmental insecurity
generating factors coupled with governance deficit combine in a very complex manner to
shape and in a very crucial way influence the livelihood of the pastoral communities.
201
6.3 Conclusion
From the analysis and particularly on the on the objectives of interrogating the
theoretical and practical linkages between conflict and environmental security, examining the
nature of the relationship between conflict, environmental security and governance among the
pastoral communities in Kenya including the corresponding research questions, the study
concludes that there is a link between conflict, environmental security and governance. The
form and the nature of the link is double edged i.e. conflict elements can cause environmental
security and verse versa but it is important to identify specific conflict causing factors and
likewise environmental security specific factors because of the existence of many interrelated
factors. Succinctly, one must examine very specific conflict generating factors and
environmental security factors to determine the relationship. It also responds to the first
hypothesis that there is a positive relationship between conflict, environmental security and
governance. Practically, it means that governance deficit breads conditions for conflicts and
environmental insecurity.
The study refutes the notion that conflicts among the pastoralists are mainly a
consequence of the scarcity of resources and environmental stress and instead acknowledges
a combination of various factors behind insecurity in pastoral areas but more fundamental
identifies governance deficit as the missing gap. Furthermore, the study does not only affirm
the theoretical prepositions to the environmental conflict thesis and scarcity driven
explanations of violent conflict fostered by environmental conditions, but also notes that
conventional, traditional institutional and legislative frameworks for conflict prevention,
management resolution related to resources are important considerations.
On objectives three and four that is to evaluate the governance and management
structures (normative and institutional frameworks) for addressing conflict and environmental
202
security in Kenya and their applications to pastoral communities and; to synthesize the
implications of the nexus between conflict, environmental security and governance o within
the pastoral setting including the corresponding questions and the second hypothesis which
states that the problem of conflict and environmental security among the pastoral groups in
Kenya is a consequence of institutional and policy failure, the study has established that
weakness in the existing institutional and normative frameworks have largely contributed to
the deteriorating human security among the pastoral communities. This includes the weak
traditional justice system that has been undermined by young people acquiring small arms.
The study concludes that conflicts in pastoral areas can be explained approximately three
interconnected factors, i.e. i) unhealthy competition over resources ii) weak and/or absence of
governance structures and iii) under-development. These are catapulted by several factors
such as; i) climate change and variability, ii) population increase ,iii) acquisition of small
arms, iv) policy issues, v) lack of harmony of the traditional justice system and the
conventional judicial system, vi) governance and historical issues, vii) political and security
environment at the regional level and viii) generation of ecological refugees. Conflicts occur
at multiple levels and include inter communal, inter-district, national, regional, and cross
border with multiple causes that includes culture, and environmental conditions
From the study findings, it can be concluded that indeed pastoral communities in
Kenya will continue to suffer the effects of conflicts some of which are related directly to
environmental security while the underlying reason is the institutional and legislative failure.
This is likely to be worsened by the ever emerging challenges and sometimes little
understood challenges of the climate change. The link between conflict and environment
security will become even clearer as the effects of climate change and variability become
more visible within the pastoral setting. It is bound to continue for some unforeseeable future
given the fact that the policy makers despite acknowledging the effects of climate change,
203
they are yet to understand the magnitude of the problem and how to deal with the
consequences and more so with respect to the pastoral areas. Until now, authorities continue
to treat the pastoral issues as purely developmental as well as cultural.
Furthermore, the study notes there are links between conflicts and environmental
security against the backdrop of a governance deficit manifested in historical neglect, weak
and limited state presence worsened by the geographical continuity across international
borders of Uganda, South Sudan and Ethiopia. The centrality of all conflicts in pastoral areas
is the question of governance. The state has failed to formulate and implement appropriate
policy interventions to improve pastoral livelihood even at certain point it envisages the
elimination of pastoralism to be replaced by sedentary livelihood. In this regard, the study
concludes that the problem of conflict and environmental insecurity among the pastoral
communities in Kenya is largely an outcome of the inability of the post colonial state to
extend its legitimate institutions of governance and relevant development programs to these
marginalized areas and to improve human security in pastoral areas. Consequently, the study
concludes that factors related to land tenure system; development imperatives and
environmental security among others are largely the outcome of governance deficit. This
places governance at the heart of security and developmental problems facing pastoralists in
Kenya.
In some instances, environment can directly affect security and be identified as the
proximate cause of a conflict. More typically, however, environmental impacts, though
significant tend to be intervening variables that produce indirect effects that act in concert
with more traditionally recognized elements of security such as living conditions, food
security, economic growth, and socio economic and political stability. Environmental stress
associated with deforestation, soil erosion, water scarcity, climate variability, and natural
hazards place essential natural resources at risk. However, though pastoral lands have higher
204
than average levels of poverty and insecurity, they possess rich biodiversity, mineral
resources, livestock and products such as gums, resins, dyes, honey, medicines and
cosmetics, which if exploited will ameliorate the factors that lead to conflicts and promote
environmental insecurity. Conflicts over natural resources are embedded in a tangle of
ecological conditions and regulation mechanisms for their management and utilization.
Ultimately, it will be the institutional and legislative factors that will largely determine
whether or not, Kenya and its various productive systems respond effectively to rising
scarcities of and problems associated land, pasture and water and in particular in arid and
semi arid areas.
In conclusion, this study refutes the common notion that violent conflict in pastoral
areas is a direct function of resource availability as determined by a host of factors such as
climate change, environmental conditions, drought and famine. Instead of firming theoretical
prepositions to the environmental conflict thesis and scarcity driven explanations of violent
conflict fostered by environmental conditions, the study notes that conventional and
traditional institutional and legislative frameworks/structures for conflict resolution related to
resources are important considerations. The central thesis is that the linkage between conflict
and environmental security is critical in understanding and making a meaningful contribution
to the state of human security in pastoral areas. This calls for an effective engagement with
the ecological, socio-economic and political factors that affects the pastoral systems of
production in arid and semi arid areas of Kenya and the IGAD region as a whole.
6.4 Recommendations
6.4.1 Policy
Conflict and environmental security generating factors are closely intertwined, very
complicated and combine in a very complex and crucial way to shape and influence the
205
livelihood of the pastoralists. The solution to the perennial conflicts and environmental
insecurity lies largely in the promotion of good governance that will ensure effective
institutional, normative, policy and administrative frameworks for sustainable exploitation,
utilization and management of the resources (water pasture) including security within the
pastoral areas and not in providing them abundantly and while taking into account the
contemporary regional and global issues in time and place.
The prevalent of conflicts and the declining environmental security in pastoral areas is
a result of a combination of factors that include unhealthy competition over natural resources
particularly water and pasture, worsened by unfavourable and harsh climatic condition
coupled by weak/lack of effective management and utilization mechanisms shows that
solutions to human insecurity in pastoral areas should be multifaceted that takes into account
the connection between conflict, security and development including cultural issues.
Consequently the study recommends that interventions should address not only the root
causes of conflicts but also triggers and accelerators. This should include the promotion of
good governance to ensure effective institutional, normative, policy and administrative
frameworks for sustainable exploitation, utilization and management of the resources (water
pasture) including security within the pastoral areas and not in providing them abundantly
and cannot be divorced from the contemporary regional and global issues in time and place.
The study acknowledges the presence of a constitutional provision within the law to
guarantee a healthy environment but notes lack of enforcement mechanisms, lack of capacity
within the legal profession and the judicial system for the use of public interest litigation
capacity1 and an absence of organized professional civil society institutions to pursue
environmental rights through the courts as a challenge. Furthermore, the study notes that the
1The Constitution of Kenya (2010), Chapter Five, Part 2 on Environment and Natural Resources, Government Printer,
Nairobi.
206
frameworks on environment overlooks the effects of environmental degradation occasioned
by overgrazing and over exploitation of the resources in pastoral areas and leans towards
environmental concerns related to development projects. In this regard, the study
recommends enhancement of enforcement mechanisms, revision of the frameworks to cater
for environment problems occasioned by overgrazing and over utilization of pastoral
resources, building the capacity within the legal profession and providing an enabling
environment for the effective participation of civil society actors to engage effective in
matters pertaining to environment.
The over-dependence on pastoralism as a source of livelihood remains a major
challenge facing the pastoral communities. It means that unless livestock keeping is improved
and more alternative sources of livelihood strategies adopted, pastoral land will soon reach
appoint of no return (where it will not be able to support any livelihood) with devastating
consequences to the pastoralists, their economy and the entire country. This means increased
pastoral/agriculturists conflicts as the former will move into agricultural lands in search of
water and pasture. Therefore the study recommends that policy makers should not only
improve the livestock sector by creating an enabling environment for veterinary doctors to
invest including marketing but also exploit the significant portion of other resources
including wildlife2 to provide alternative sources of livelihood.
6.4.2 Academic: Areas for further Research
This study identifies three areas for further research because their outcomes will
complement the finding of this study. This is against the backdrop of United Nations
Environment Programme (UNEP’s) upgrade to a fully-fledged UN organization, which
makes Nairobi the world’s environment capital. It means Kenya will become the leading
2Onyango, Olowo Eria (2010) Op cit
207
diplomatic hub in the developing world and challenged to revisit its policy frameworks on
matters of environment to set an example.
6.4.2.1 The Discovery of Oil in Turkana and the Implication on Pastoralism in Kenya
In addition to Uganda and Ghana, Kenya is one of the African countries that
discovered viable deposits of oil reserves in recent years. The discovery oil in Ngamia II
Turkana County in 2012 and the possible prospects of more discoveries in the same locality,
introduces an important factor that will have far-reaching implications for the livelihood of
the Turkana community, its neighbours and the country at large. In relation to governance,
conflict and environmental security, it means an alternative source of income but also a
possible source of conflict between the community, the government and the mining company.
The impact of the oil discovery will very much depend on the institutional and normative
framework that will guide among other things the relationship between the three key
stakeholders and in particular revenue sharing among the three stakeholders. This is very
pertinent because the Constitution notes that parliament shall enact legislation to ensure that
investment in property benefit local communities and their economies.3
Environmental Security will remain an important factor because the mining and
extraction of the oil will have to take into account the environmental impact of the activity.
Consequently, a study to assess the likely impact of the discovery of oil on the livelihood of
the Turkana community is compelling to undertake. Some of the key questions could include
now that Turkana has oil will it remain marginalized? Will it be a question of the ‘resource
curse’ thesis? How is the state going to engage the county on these issues? What is the new
leadership around the county positioning itself to do with respect to the new opportunities
3 Article 66 (2)
208
that can easily turn into a resource curse situation? What are the likely environmental
challenges of the discovery of oil or extraction?
6.4.2.2 The Emerging Governance Architecture in Kenya
The promulgation of the new constitution is another important factor that will have
far-reaching implications on governance structures in Kenya. The thrust of the constitution is
devolution of power from the central government to the county governments. This means the
Country governments under the governors are going to be central to the development agenda
of the counties. Not only are they suppose to mobilize resources for the county’s
development agenda but they will lead the process of the formulation and implementation of
governance rules to guide the running of the counties. In relation to conflict, environmental
security and governance, it means formulating and implementing county laws to address
them. It will therefore be interesting to interrogate the implications of the new governance
structures on the pastoral livelihood in Kenya, which should also include the Land Policy.
6.4.2.3 Improving security situation in Uganda and South Sudan
For several decades’ South Sudan and northern Uganda remained the epicenter of
instability in the IGAD region with far reaching implications to pastoral populations. The
instability occasioned by the war that pitted the Government of Uganda and the LRA and the
government of Sudan and SPLM/A provided an enabling environment for the proliferation of
illicit small arms into the pastoral population. The end of the Sudan/SPLM/A conflict and the
fading incursions of LRA that has entailed also stationing of the UPDF on the border areas
between Kenya and Uganda, Uganda and South Sudan and Uganda and DRC, a new
opportunity for peace is slowly emerging in the Karamoja cluster. In this regard, a study on
the implications of the improving peace and security situation in the Karamoja cluster on the
Turkana community will be desirable to complement this work.
209
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ANNEX 1
Questionnaire: Broad Research Questions
Section One
Personal Details
Name of the Respondent: --------------------------------------
Age and Gender of the Respondent---------------------------
Education Level (Highest) -------------------------------------
Profession: -------------------------------------------------------
Location of Interview: -----------------------------------------
Date of Interview: ----------------------------------------------
Section Two
Conflicts, Environmental Security and governance among the Turkana Community
CONFLICTS IN TURKANA
1. Identify the nature and forms of conflicts in Turkana? Questions on conflicts and the
Turkana community sought to know the causes/ sources, spread, effects, approaches
challenges, opportunities and prospects for sustainable conflict prevention, resolution and
management.
2. Identify the various forms of interventions? Indicate by who and and comment on their
effectiveness
Environmental Security
3. Briefly describe the environmental security in Turkana County.
4. What are the critical issues affecting environment security in Turkan County?
5. What are the major challenges in addressing environmental security in Turkan County?
6. How do you think these challenges should be addressed?
7. Critique the way these challenges are being address
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Other Forms of Human Security
8. Briefly describe each of the below aspects of human security as they obtain in Turkana?
1. Political Security
2. Food Security
3. Community Security
4. Health Security
5. Personal/physical Security
6. Economic Security
9. Identify the factors that affect each of the above aspects of human security.
10. In what ways do small arms affect each of the above aspects of human security?
Political Security
11. The status of political security was examined under the guidance of freedom of
movement; freedom of association; right to life; right to vote; freedom from unlawful search
and right to liberty
12. What are other factors that affect these components apart from small arms?
13. What are the major challenges facing efforts to efforts to improve these rights among the
Turkana people?
Food Security
14. Describe the status of food security in Turkana County and identify causal factors
15. Is there a link between small arms and food problem in the region?
16. What is being done to resolve the problem of food security in the region?
Community Security
17. Briefly describe the community security of the Turkana people and identify the causual
factors
18. To what extent do small arms contribute to the community insecurity in the region?
19. What and by who and how is being done to resolve the problem of insecurity security in
the region?
Health Security
20. Briefly describe the health security in the Turkana County.
21. What are the major challenges facing the development of health care in the county?
229
22. Describe the status of health security including livestock among Turkana and identify
causal factors.
23. To what extent do small arms contribute to the health problems in the region?
24. What is being done to address the health challenges in Turkan County and prospects?
Physical Security
25. Kindly describe the physical security situation in the Turkana County.
26. To what extent do small arms contribute to physical insecurity in the region?
27. Identify the major sources of small arms in the region and types used in promoting
insecurity in the region? Respond to questions related to stockpile, effects, movement and
transfers.
28. Identify the major challenges facing efforts to improve physical security in the in the
county?
29. What is being done to address the challenges and what are the prospects?
Economic Security
30. Describe the economic security among the Turkana people.
31. In what ways do small arms affect the economic situation of the Turkan community?
32. Identify the major economic activities in among the Turkana people? Identify the major
challenges facing efforts to improve the economic situation of the Turkana people.
33. What is being done to address the economic challenges and what are the prospects?
34. Explore any linkage between conflict and environmental security among the Turkana
community