conflict of laws cases(prelims).docx

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G.R. No. 161434 March 3, 2004

MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR., petitioners,vs.The COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR.) andVICTORINO X. FORNIER,respondents.

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G.R. No. 161634 March 3, 2004

ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, petitioner,vs.RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE, a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR.,respondent.

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G. R. No. 161824 March 3, 2004

VICTORINO X. FORNIER, petitioner,vs.HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE, ALSO KNOWN AS FERNANDOPOE JR., respondents.

Citizenship is a treasured right conferred on those whom the state believes are deserving of theprivilege. It is a "precious heritage, as well as an inestimable acquisition," 1 that cannot be taken lightlyby anyone - either by those who enjoy it or by those who dispute it.

Before the Court are three consolidated cases, all of which raise a single question of profoundimportance to the nation. The issue of citizenship is brought up to challenge the qualifications of apresidential candidate to hold the highest office of the land. Our people are waiting for the judgment ofthe Court with bated breath. Is Fernando Poe, Jr., the hero of silver screen, and now one of the maincontenders for the presidency, a natural-born Filipino or is he not?

The moment of introspection takes us face to face with Spanish and American colonial roots andreminds us of the rich heritage of civil law and common law traditions, the fusion resulting in a hybrid oflaws and jurisprudence that could be no less than distinctly Filipino.

Antecedent Case Settings

On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (hereinafter"FPJ"), filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the Republic of the Philippinesunder the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the forthcoming national elections. In hiscertificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, statedhis name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and hisplace of birth to be Manila.


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Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner in G.R. No. 161824, entitled "Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner, versus Hon.Commission on Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondents,"initiated, on 09 January 2004, a petition docketed SPA No. 04-003 before the Commission on Elections("COMELEC") to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon thethesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be anatural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother,Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son ofLorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen,he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of analien mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of respondent on two assertions -first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to BessieKelley and, second, even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only ayear after the birth of respondent.

In the hearing before the Third Division of the COMELEC on 19 January 2004, petitioner, in support of hisclaim, presented several documentary exhibits - 1) a copy of the certificate of birth of FPJ, 2) a certifiedphotocopy of an affidavit executed in Spanish by Paulita Poe y Gomez attesting to her having filed a casefor bigamy and concubinage against the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, after discovering hisbigamous relationship with Bessie Kelley, 3) an English translation of the affidavit aforesaid, 4) a certifiedphotocopy of the certificate of birth of Allan F. Poe, 5) a certification issued by the Director of theRecords Management and Archives Office, attesting to the fact that there was no record in the NationalArchives that a Lorenzo Poe or Lorenzo Pou resided or entered the Philippines before 1907, and 6) acertification from the Officer-In-Charge of the Archives Division of the National Archives to the effectthat no available information could be found in the files of the National Archives regarding the birth ofAllan F. Poe.

On his part, respondent, presented twenty-two documentary pieces of evidence, the more significantones being - a) a certification issued by Estrella M. Domingo of the Archives Division of the National

Archives that there appeared to be no available information regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe in theregistry of births for San Carlos, Pangasinan, b) a certification issued by the Officer-In-Charge of theArchives Division of the National Archives that no available information about the marriage of Allan F.Poe and Paulita Gomez could be found, c) a certificate of birth of Ronald Allan Poe, d) Original Certificateof Title No. P-2247 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Pangasinan, in the name of Lorenzo Pou,e) copies of Tax Declaration No. 20844, No. 20643, No. 23477 and No. 23478 in the name of LorenzoPou, f) a copy of the certificate of death of Lorenzo Pou, g) a copy of the purported marriage contractbetween Fernando Pou and Bessie Kelley, and h) a certification issued by the City Civil Registrar of SanCarlos City, Pangasinan, stating that the records of birth in the said office during the period of from 1900until May 1946 were totally destroyed during World War II.

On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA No. 04-003 for lack of merit. Three days later, or on 26January 2004, Fornier filed his motion for reconsideration. The motion was denied on 06 February 2004by the COMELEC en banc. On 10 February 2004, petitioner assailed the decision of the COMELEC beforethis Court conformably with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Thepetition, docketed G. R. No. 161824, likewise prayed for a temporary restraining order, a writ ofpreliminary injunction or any other resolution that would stay the finality and/or execution of theCOMELEC resolutions.


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The other petitions, later consolidated with G. R. No. 161824, would include G. R. No. 161434, entitled"Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr., vs. The Commission on Elections, Ronald AllanKelley Poe (a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.), and Victo rino X. Fornier," and the other, docketed G. R. No.161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio G. Velez, vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.," bothchallenging the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and asserting that, under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7,of the 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court had original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve thebasic issue on the case.

Jurisdiction of the Court

In G. R. No. 161824

In seeking the disqualification of the candidacy of FPJ and to have the COMELEC deny due course to orcancel FPJs certificate of candidacy for alleged misrepresentation of a material fact (i.e., that FPJ was anatural-born citizen) before the COMELEC, petitioner Fornier invoked Section 78 of the OmnibusElection Code

"Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. --- A verifiedpetition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by anyperson exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as requiredunder Section 74 hereof is false"

in consonance with the general powers of COMELEC expressed in Section 52 of the Omnibus ElectionCode -

"Section 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections. In addition to the powersand functions conferred upon it by the Constitution, the Commission shall have exclusive chargeof the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections for the

purpose of ensuring free, orderly and honest elections" -

and in relation to Article 69 of the Omnibus Election Code which would authorize "anyinterested party" to file a verified petition to deny or cancel the certificate of candidacy of anynuisance candidate.

Decisions of the COMELEC on disqualification cases may be reviewed by the Supreme Court per Rule 64 2 in an action for certiorari under Rule 65 3 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 7, Article IX, ofthe 1987 Constitution also reads

"Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or matter brought

before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case ormatter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief,or memorandum, required by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unlessotherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of eachCommission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party withinthirty days from receipt of a copy thereof."


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Additionally, Section 1, Article VIII, of the same Constitution provides that judicial power is vested in oneSupreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law which power "includes the duty ofthe courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable andenforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting tolack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."

It is sufficiently clear that the petition brought up in G. R. No. 161824 was aptly elevated to, and couldwell be taken cognizance of by, this Court. A contrary view could be a gross denial to our people of theirfundamental right to be fully informed, and to make a proper choice, on who could or should be electedto occupy the highest government post in the land.

In G. R. No. 161434 and G. R. No. 161634

Petitioners Tecson, et al., in G. R. No. 161434, and Velez, in G. R. No. 161634, invoke the provisions ofArticle VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution in assailing the jurisdiction of the COMELECwhen it took cognizance of SPA No. 04-003 and in urging the Supreme Court to instead take on thepetitions they directly instituted before it. The Constitutional provision cited reads:

"The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to theelection, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate itsrules for the purpose."

The provision is an innovation of the 1987 Constitution. The omission in the 1935 and the 1973Constitution to designate any tribunal to be the sole judge of presidential and vice-presidential contests,has constrained this Court to declare, in Lopez vs. Roxas, 4 as "not (being) justiciable" controversies ordisputes involving contests on the elections, returns and qualifications of the President or Vice-President. The constitutional lapse prompted Congress, on 21 June 1957, to enact Republic Act No.1793, "An Act Constituting an Independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal to Try, Hear and Decide

Protests Contesting the Election of the President-Elect and the Vice-President-Elect of the Philippinesand Providing for the Manner of Hearing the Same." Republic Act 1793 designated the Chief Justice andthe Associate Justices of the Supreme Court to be the members of the tribunal. Although thesubsequent adoption of the parliamentary form of government under the 1973 Constitution might haveimplicitly affected Republic Act No. 1793, the statutory set-up, nonetheless, would now be deemedrevived under the present Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.

Ordinary usage would characterize a "contest" in reference to a post-election scenario. Election contestsconsist of either an election protest or a quo warranto which, although two distinct remedies, wouldhave one objective in view, i.e., to dislodge the winning candidate from office. A perusal of thephraseology in Rule 12, Rule 13, and Rule 14 of the "Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal,"

promulgated by the Supreme Court en banc on 18 April 1992, would support this premise -

"Rule 12. Jurisdiction. - The Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to theelection, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President of the Philippines.

"Rule 13. How Initiated. - An election contest is initiated by the filing of an election protest or apetition for quo warranto against the President or Vice-President. An election protest shall not


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ongoing and final stage of development, in keeping with the rapidly shrinking global village, might wellbe the internationalization of citizenship. 12

The Local Setting - from Spanish Times to the Present

There was no such term as "Philippine citizens" during the Spanish regime but "subjects of Spain" or"Spanish subjects." 13 In church records, the natives were called 'indios', denoting a low regard for theinhabitants of the archipelago. Spanish laws on citizenship became highly codified during the 19thcentury but their sheer number made it difficult to point to one comprehensive law. Not all of thesecitizenship laws of Spain however, were made to apply to the Philippine Islands except for thoseexplicitly extended by Royal Decrees. 14

Spanish laws on citizenship were traced back to the Novisima Recopilacion, promulgated in Spain on 16July 1805 but as to whether the law was extended to the Philippines remained to be the subject ofdiffering views among experts; 15 however, three royal decrees were undisputably made applicable toSpaniards in the Philippines - the Order de la Regencia of 14 August 1841, 16 the Royal Decree of 23August 1868 specifically defining the political status of children born in the Philippine Islands, 17 andfinally, the Ley Extranjera de Ultramar of 04 July 1870, which was expressly made applicable to thePhilippines by the Royal Decree of 13 July 1870. 18

The Spanish Constitution of 1876 was never extended to the Philippine Islands because of the expressmandate of its Article 89, according to which the provisions of the Ultramar among which this countrywas included, would be governed by special laws. 19

It was only the Civil Code of Spain, made effective in this jurisdiction on 18 December 1889, which cameout with the first categorical enumeration of who were Spanish citizens. -

"(a) Persons born in Spanish territory,

"(b) Children of a Spanish father or mother, even if they were born outside of Spain,

"(c) Foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers,

"(d) Those who, without such papers, may have become domiciled inhabitants of any town ofthe Monarchy." 20

The year 1898 was another turning point in Philippine history. Already in the state of decline as asuperpower, Spain was forced to so cede her sole colony in the East to an upcoming world power, theUnited States. An accepted principle of international law dictated that a change in sovereignty, while

resulting in an abrogation of all political laws then in force, would have no effect on civil laws, whichwould remain virtually intact.

The Treaty of Paris was entered into on 10 December 1898 between Spain and the United States. 21 Under Article IX of the treaty, the civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of theterritories ceded to the United States would be determined by its Congress -


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"Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory over which Spain by thepresent treaty relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty may remain in such territory or mayremove therefrom, retaining in either event all their rights of property, including the right to sellor dispose of such property or of its proceeds; and they shall also have the right to carry on theirindustry, commerce, and professions, being subject in respect thereof to such laws as areapplicable to foreigners. In case they remain in the territory they may preserve their allegianceto the Crown of Spain by making, before a court of record, within a year from the date of theexchange of ratifications of this treaty, a declaration of their decision to preserve suchallegiance; in default of which declaration they shall be held to have renounced it and to haveadopted the nationality of the territory in which they reside.

Thus

"The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded tothe United States shall be determined by the Congress." 22

Upon the ratification of the treaty, and pending legislation by the United States Congress on the subject,the native inhabitants of the Philippines ceased to be Spanish subjects. Although they did not becomeAmerican citizens, they, however, also ceased to be "aliens" under American laws and were thus issuedpassports describing them to be citizens of the Philippines entitled to the protection of the UnitedStates.

The term "citizens of the Philippine Islands" appeared for the first time in the Philippine Bill of 1902, alsocommonly referred to as the Philippine Organic Act of 1902, the first comprehensive legislation of theCongress of the United States on the Philippines -

".... that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein, who were Spanishsubjects on the 11th day of April, 1891, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born

subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and assuch entitled to the protection of the United States, except such as shall have elected topreserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treatyof peace between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris, December tenth eighteenhundred and ninety eight." 23

Under the organic act, a "citizen of the Philippines" was one who was an inhabitant of the Philippines,and a Spanish subject on the 11 th day of April 1899. The term "inhabitant" was taken to include 1) anative-born inhabitant, 2) an inhabitant who was a native of Peninsular Spain, and 3) an inhabitant whoobtained Spanish papers on or before 11 April 1899. 24

Controversy arose on to the status of children born in the Philippines from 11 April 1899 to 01 July 1902,during which period no citizenship law was extant in the Philippines. Weight was given to the view,articulated in jurisprudential writing at the time, that the common law principle of jus soli, otherwisealso known as the principle of territoriality, operative in the United States and England, governed thoseborn in the Philippine Archipelago within that period. 25 More about this later.

In 23 March 1912, the Congress of the United States made the following amendment to the PhilippineBill of 1902 -


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"No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, aregistered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election,and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election."

The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who are citizens of the Philippines frombirth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship." 27

The date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939 during the regime of the 1935Constitution. Through its history, four modes of acquiring citizenship - naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis 28 had been in vogue. Only two, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify aperson to being a "natural-born" citizen of the Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs. Collector of Customs 29 (1912), did not last long. With the adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the reversal of Roa in TanChong vs. Secretary of Labor 30 (1947), jus sanguinis or blood relationship would now become theprimary basis of citizenship by birth.

Documentary evidence adduced by petitioner would tend to indicate that the earliest established directascendant of FPJ was his paternal grandfather Lorenzo Pou, married to Marta Reyes, the father of AllanF. Poe. While the record of birth of Lorenzo Pou had not been presented in evidence, his deathcertificate, however, identified him to be a Filipino, a resident of San Carlos, Pangasinan, and 84 yearsold at the time of his death on 11 September 1954. The certificate of birth of the father of FPJ, Allan F.Poe, showed that he was born on 17 May 1915 to an Espaol father, Lorenzo Pou, and a mestiza Espaolmother, Marta Reyes. Introduced by petitioner was an "uncertified" copy of a supposed certificate ofthe alleged marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez on 05 July 1936. The marriage certificate of AllanF. Poe and Bessie Kelley reflected the date of their marriage to be on 16 September 1940. In the samecertificate, Allan F. Poe was stated to be twenty-five years old, unmarried, and a Filipino citizen, andBessie Kelley to be twenty-two years old, unmarried, and an American citizen. The birth certificate ofFPJ, would disclose that he was born on 20 August 1939 to Allan F. Poe, a Filipino, twenty-four years old,married to Bessie Kelly, an American citizen, twenty-one years old and married.

Considering the reservations made by the parties on the veracity of some of the entries on the birthcertificate of respondent and the marriage certificate of his parents, the only conclusions that could bedrawn with some degree of certainty from the documents would be that -

1. The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley;

2. FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939;

3. Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16 September, 1940;

4. The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and

5. At the time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old.

Would the above facts be sufficient or insufficient to establish the fact that FPJ is a natural-born Filipinocitizen? The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, the birth certificate of FPJ, and thedeath certificate of Lorenzo Pou are documents of public record in the custody of a public officer. The


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other public document." In Pareja vs. Pareja, 35 this Court defined what could constitute such adocument as proof of voluntary acknowledgment:

"Under the Spanish Civil Code there are two classes of public documents, those executed byprivate individuals which must be authenticated by notaries, and those issued by competentpublic officials by reason of their office. The public document pointed out in Article 131 as oneof the means by which recognition may be made belongs to the first class."

Let us leave it at that for the moment.

The 1950 Civil Code categorized the acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate children intovoluntary, legal or compulsory. Voluntary recognition was required to be expressedly made in a recordof birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or in any authentic writing. Legal acknowledgmenttook place in favor of full blood brothers and sisters of an illegitimate child who was recognized or judicially declared as natural. Compulsory acknowledgment could be demanded generally in cases whenthe child had in his favor any evidence to prove filiation. Unlike an action to claim legitimacy whichwould last during the lifetime of the child, and might pass exceptionally to the heirs of the child, anaction to claim acknowledgment, however, could only be brought during the lifetime of the presumedparent.

Amicus Curiae Ruben F. Balane defined, during the oral argument, "authentic writing," so as to be anauthentic writing for purposes of voluntary recognition, simply as being a genuine or indubitable writingof the father. The term would include a public instrument (one duly acknowledged before a notarypublic or other competent official) or a private writing admitted by the father to be his.

The Family Code has further liberalized the rules; Article 172, Article 173, and Article 175 provide:

"Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

"(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or

"(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritteninstrument and signed by the parent concerned.

"In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:

"(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or

"(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

"Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetimeand shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity.In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute the action.

"The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of either orboth of the parties.


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"x x x x x x x x x.

"Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and onthe same, evidence as legitimate children.

"The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when theaction is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be broughtduring the lifetime of the alleged parent."

The provisions of the Family Code are retroactively applied; Article 256 of the code reads:

"Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vestedor acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws."

Thus, in Vda. de Sy-Quia vs. Court of Appeals, 36 the Court has ruled:

"We hold that whether Jose was a voluntarily recognized natural child should be decided underArticle 278 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Article 2260 of that Code provides that 'thevoluntary recognition of a natural child shall take place according to this Code, even if the childwas born before the effectivity of this body of laws' or before August 30, 1950. Hence, Article278 may be given retroactive effect."

It should be apparent that the growing trend to liberalize the acknowledgment or recognition ofillegitimate children is an attempt to break away from the traditional idea of keeping well apartlegitimate and non-legitimate relationships within the family in favor of the greater interest and welfareof the child. The provisions are intended to merely govern the private and personal affairs of the family.There is little, if any, to indicate that the legitimate or illegitimate civil status of the individual would alsoaffect his political rights or, in general, his relationship to the State. While, indeed, provisions on

"citizenship" could be found in the Civil Code, such provisions must be taken in the context of privaterelations, the domain of civil law; particularly -

"Civil Law is that branch of law which has for its double purpose the organization of the familyand the regulation of property. It has thus [been] defined as the mass of precepts whichdetermine and regulate the relations of assistance, authority and obedience among members ofa family, and those which exist among members of a society for the protection of privateinterests." 37

In Yaez de Barnuevo vs. Fuster ,38 the Court has held:

"In accordance with Article 9 of the Civil Code of Spain, x x x the laws relating to family rightsand duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons, govern Spaniards althoughthey reside in a foreign country; that, in consequence, 'all questions of a civil nature, such asthose dealing with the validity or nullity of the matrimonial bond, the domicile of the husbandand wife, their support, as between them, the separation of their properties, the rules governingproperty, marital authority, division of conjugal property, the classification of their property,legal causes for divorce, the extent of the latter, the authority to decree it, and, in general, the


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civil effects of marriage and divorce upon the persons and properties of the spouses, arequestions that are governed exclusively by the national law of the husband and wife."

The relevance of "citizenship" or "nationality" to Civil Law is best exemplified in Article 15 of the CivilCode, stating that -

"Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity ofpersons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad" -

that explains the need to incorporate in the code a reiteration of the Constitutional provisions oncitizenship. Similarly, citizenship is significant in civil relationships found in different parts of the CivilCode, 39 such as on successional rights and family relations. 40 In adoption, for instance, an adopted childwould be considered the child of his adoptive parents and accorded the same rights as their legitimatechild but such legal fiction extended only to define his rights under civil law 41 and not his political status.

Civil law provisions point to an obvious bias against illegitimacy. This discriminatory attitude may betraced to the Spanish family and property laws, which, while defining proprietary and successional rightsof members of the family, provided distinctions in the rights of legitimate and illegitimate children. Inthe monarchial set-up of old Spain, the distribution and inheritance of titles and wealth were strictlyaccording to bloodlines and the concern to keep these bloodlines uncontaminated by foreign blood wasparamount.

These distinctions between legitimacy and illegitimacy were codified in the Spanish Civil Code, and theinvidious discrimination survived when the Spanish Civil Code became the primary source of our ownCivil Code. Such distinction, however, remains and should remain only in the sphere of civil law and notunduly impede or impinge on the domain of political law.

The proof of filiation or paternity for purposes of determining his citizenship status should thus be

deemed independent from and not inextricably tied up with that prescribed for civil law purposes. TheCivil Code or Family Code provisions on proof of filiation or paternity, although good law, do not havepreclusive effects on matters alien to personal and family relations. The ordinary rules on evidencecould well and should govern. For instance, the matter about pedigree is not necessarily precluded frombeing applicable by the Civil Code or Family Code provisions.

Section 39, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides -

"Act or Declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable totestify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage, may bereceived in evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between

the two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or de claration. The word `pedigreeincludes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the placeswhere these facts occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of familyhistory intimately connected with pedigree."

For the above rule to apply, it would be necessary that (a) the declarant is already dead or unable totestify, (b) the pedigree of a person must be at issue, (c) the declarant must be a relative of the personwhose pedigree is in question, (d) declaration must be made before the controversy has occurred, and


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(e) the relationship between the declarant and the person whose pedigree is in question must be shownby evidence other than such act or declaration.

Thus, the duly notarized declaration made by Ruby Kelley Mangahas, sister of Bessie Kelley Poesubmitted as Exhibit 20 before the COMELEC, might be accepted to prove the acts of Allan F. Poe,recognizing his own paternal relationship with FPJ, i.e, living together with Bessie Kelley and his children(including respondent FPJ) in one house, and as one family -

"I, Ruby Kelley Mangahas, of legal age and sound mind, presently residing in Stockton,California, U.S.A., after being sworn in accordance with law do hereby declare that:

"1. I am the sister of the late Bessie Kelley Poe.

"2. Bessie Kelley Poe was the wife of Fernando Poe, Sr.

"3. Fernando and Bessie Poe had a son by the name of Ronald Allan Poe, more popularly knownin the Philippines as `Fernando Poe, Jr., or `FPJ.

"4. Ronald Allan Poe `FPJ was born on August 20, 1939 at St. Luke's Hospital, Magdalena Street,Manila.

"x x x x x x x x x

"7. Fernando Poe Sr., and my sister Bessie, met and became engaged while they were studentsat the University of the Philippines in 1936. I was also introduced to Fernando Poe, Sr., by mysister that same year.

"8. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister Bessie had their first child in 1938.

"9. Fernando Poe, Sr., my sister Bessie and their first three children, Elizabeth, Ronald, Allan andFernando II, and myself lived together with our mother at our family's house on Dakota St. (nowJorge Bocobo St.), Malate until the liberation of Manila in 1945, except for some monthsbetween 1943-1944.

"10. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister, Bessie, were blessed with four (4) more children afterRonald Allan Poe.

"x x x x x x x x x

"18. I am executing this Declaration to attest to the fact that my nephew, Ronald Allan Poe is anatural born Filipino, and that he is the legitimate child of Fernando Poe, Sr.

"Done in City of Stockton, California, U.S.A., this 12th day of January 2004.

Ruby Kelley Mangahas Declarant DNA Testing


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In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would be difficult toobtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child andany physical residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to. A positive match would clear upfiliation or paternity. In Tijing vs. Court of Appeals, 42 this Court has acknowledged the strong weight ofDNA testing -

"Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the modern and scientificways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise in using DNA test for identificationand parentage testing. The University of the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI)DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR)analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person has two (2) copies, one copyfrom the mother and the other from the father. The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and thechild are analyzed to establish parentage. Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNAtest as evidence is still open to challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts should nothesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts should apply the resultsof science when competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said result is todeny progress."

Petitioners Argument For Jurisprudential Conclusiveness

Petitioner would have it that even if Allan F. Poe were a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmittedhis citizenship to respondent FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child. According to petitioner, prior tohis marriage to Bessie Kelley, Allan F. Poe, on July 5, 1936, contracted marriage with a certain PaulitaGomez, making his subsequent marriage to Bessie Kelley bigamous and respondent FPJ an illegitimatechild. The veracity of the supposed certificate of marriage between Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez couldbe most doubtful at best. But the documentary evidence introduced by no less than respondent himself,consisting of a birth certificate of respondent and a marriage certificate of his parents showed that FPJwas born on 20 August 1939 to a Filipino father and an American mother who were married to each

other a year later, or on 16 September 1940. Birth to unmarried parents would make FPJ an illegitimatechild. Petitioner contended that as an illegitimate child, FPJ so followed the citizenship of his mother,Bessie Kelley, an American citizen, basing his stand on the ruling of this Court in Morano vs. Vivo, 43 citingChiongbian vs. de Leo 44 and Serra vs. Republic. 45

On the above score, the disquisition made by amicus curiae Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ, is most convincing; hestates -

"We must analyze these cases and ask what the lis mota was in each of them. If thepronouncement of the Court on jus sanguinis was on the lis mota, the pronouncement would bea decision constituting doctrine under the rule of stare decisis. But if the pronouncement wasirrelevant to the lis mota, the pronouncement would not be a decision but a mere obiter dictumwhich did not establish doctrine. I therefore invite the Court to look closely into these cases.

"First, Morano vs. Vivo. The case was not about an illegitimate child of a Filipino father. It wasabout a stepson of a Filipino, a stepson who was the child of a Chinese mother and a Chinesefather. The issue was whether the stepson followed the naturalization of the stepfather.Nothing about jus sanguinis there. The stepson did not have the blood of the naturalizedstepfather.


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"Second, Chiongbian vs. de Leon. This case was not about the illegitimate son of a Filipinofather. It was about a legitimate son of a father who had become Filipino by election to publicoffice before the 1935 Constitution pursuant to Article IV, Section 1(2) of the 1935 Constitution.No one was illegitimate here.

"Third, Serra vs. Republic. The case was not about the illegitimate son of a Filipino father. Serrawas an illegitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother. The issue was whether onewho was already a Filipino because of his mother who still needed to be naturalized. There isnothing there about invidious jus sanguinis.

"Finally, Paa vs. Chan. 46 This is a more complicated case. The case was about the citizenship ofQuintin Chan who was the son of Leoncio Chan. Quintin Chan claimed that his father, Leoncio,was the illegitimate son of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother. Quintin therefore argued thathe got his citizenship from Leoncio, his father. But the Supreme Court said that there was novalid proof that Leoncio was in fact the son of a Filipina mother. The Court therefore concludedthat Leoncio was not Filipino. If Leoncio was not Filipino, neither was his son Quintin. Quintintherefore was not only not a natural-born Filipino but was not even a Filipino.

"The Court should have stopped there. But instead it followed with an obiter dictum. The Courtsaid obiter that even if Leoncio, Quintin's father, were Filipino, Quintin would not be Filipinobecause Quintin was illegitimate. This statement about Quintin, based on a contrary to factassumption, was absolutely unnecessary for the case. x x x It was obiter dictum, pure andsimple, simply repeating the obiter dictum in Morano vs. Vivo.

"x x x x x x x x x

"Aside from the fact that such a pronouncement would have no textual foundation in theConstitution, it would also violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution not once but

twice. First, it would make an illegitimate distinction between a legitimate child and anillegitimate child, and second, it would make an illegitimate distinction between the illegitimatechild of a Filipino father and the illegitimate child of a Filipino mother.

"The doctrine on constitutionally allowable distinctions was established long ago by People vs.Cayat. 47 I would grant that the distinction between legitimate children and illegitimate childrenrests on real differences. x x x But real differences alone do not justify invidious distinction. Realdifferences may justify distinction for one purpose but not for another purpose.

"x x x What is the relevance of legitimacy or illegitimacy to elective public service? What possiblestate interest can there be for disqualifying an illegitimate child from becoming a public officer.

It was not the fault of the child that his parents had illicit liaison. Why deprive the child of thefullness of political rights for no fault of his own? To disqualify an illegitimate child from holdingan important public office is to punish him for the indiscretion of his parents. There is neither justice nor rationality in that. And if there is neither justice nor rationality in the distinction, thenthe distinction transgresses the equal protection clause and must be reprobated."


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The other amici curiae, Mr. Justice Vicente Mendoza (a former member of this Court), Professor RubenBalane and Dean Martin Magallona, at bottom, have expressed similar views. The thesis of petitioner,unfortunately hinging solely on pure obiter dicta, should indeed fail.

Where jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child as taking after the citizenship of its mother, it did sofor the benefit the child. It was to ensure a Filipino nationality for the illegitimate child of an alien fatherin line with the assumption that the mother had custody, would exercise parental authority and had theduty to support her illegitimate child. It was to help the child, not to prejudice or discriminate againsthim.

The fact of the matter perhaps the most significant consideration is that the 1935 Constitution, thefundamental law prevailing on the day, month and year of birth of respondent FPJ, can never be moreexplicit than it is. Providing neither conditions nor distinctions, the Constitution states that among thecitizens of the Philippines are "those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines." There utterly is nocogent justification to prescribe conditions or distinctions where there clearly are none provided.

In Sum

(1) The Court, in the exercise of its power of judicial review, possesses jurisdiction over thepetition in G. R. No. 161824, filed under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules ofCivil Procedure. G.R. No. 161824 assails the resolution of the COMELEC for alleged grave abuseof discretion in dismissing, for lack of merit, the petition in SPA No. 04-003 which has prayed forthe disqualification of respondent FPJ from running for the position of President in the 10 th May2004 national elections on the contention that FPJ has committed material representation in hiscertificate of candidacy by representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.

(2) The Court must dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction and prematurity, the petitions in G. R. No.161434 and No. 161634 both having been directly elevated to this Court in the latters capacity

as the only tribunal to resolve a presidential and vice-presidential election contest under theConstitution. Evidently, the primary jurisdiction of the Court can directly be invoked only after,not before, the elections are held.

(3) In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave abuse of discretion has been committedby the COMELEC, it is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is anatural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or not the father of respondent, AllanF. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not thealleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of hisputative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawnfrom the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born

sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos,Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence,could have well been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would havebenefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. Thatcitizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father ofrespondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light,confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether suchchildren are legitimate or illegitimate.


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decided to treat his petition as solely for quo warranto and re-docketed it as EPC Case No. 88-19, servinghim notice on February 10, 1988. He immediately paid the filing fee on that date.

The private respondent argues further that during the period when the COMELEC regarded his petitionas a pre-proclamation controversy, the time for filing an election protest or quo warranto proceedingwas deemed suspended under Section 248 of the Omnibus Election Code. 2 At any rate, he says, Rule 36,Section 5, of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure cited by the petitioner, became effective only onNovember 15, 1988, seven days after publication of the said Rules in the Official Gazette pursuant toSection 4, Rule 44 thereof. 3 These rules could not retroact to January 26,1988, when he filed his petitionwith the COMELEC.

In his Reply, the petitioner argues that even if the Omnibus Election Code did not require it, thepayment of filing fees was still necessary under Res. No. 1996 and, before that, Res. No. 1450 of therespondent COMELEC, promulgated on January 12, 1988, and February 26, 1980, respectively. To this,the private respondent counters that the latter resolution was intended for the local elections held onJanuary 30, 1980, and did not apply to the 1988 local elections, which were supposed to be governed bythe first-mentioned resolution. However, Res. No. 1996 took effect only on March 3, 1988, following thelapse of seven days after its publication as required by RA No. 6646, otherwise known as the ElectoralReform Law of 1987, which became effective on January 5, 1988. Its Section 30 provides in part:

Sec. 30. Effectivity of Regulations and Orders of the Commission . The rules andregulations promulgated by the Commission shall take effect on the seventh day aftertheir publication in the Official Gazette or in at least (2) daily newspapers of generalcirculation in the Philippines.

The Court has considered the arguments of the parties and holds that the petition for quo warranto wasfiled on time. We agree with the respondents that the fee was paid during the ten-day period asextended by the pendency of the petition when it was treated by the COMELEC as a pre-proclamation

proceeding which did not require the payment of a filing fee. At that, we reach this conclusion only onthe assumption that the requirement for the payment of the fees in quo warranto proceedings wasalready effective. There is no record that Res. No. 1450 was even published; and as for Res. No. 1996,this took effect only on March 3, 1988, seven days after its publication in the February 25, 1988 issues ofthe Manila Chronicle and the Philippine Daily Inquirer, or after the petition was filed.

The petitioner forgets Ta;ada v. Tuvera 4 when he argues that the resolutions became effective"immediately upon approval" simply because it was so provided therein. We held in that case thatpublication was still necessary under the due process clause despite such effectivity clause.

In any event, what is important is that the filing fee was paid, and whatever delay there may have been

is not imputable to the private respondent's fault or neglect. It is true that in the Manchester Case, werequired the timely payment of the filing fee as a precondition for the timeliness of the filing of the caseitself. In Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion , 5 however this Court, taking into account the specialcircumstances of that case, declared:

This Court reiterates the rule that the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a case onlyupon the payment of the prescribed filing fee. However, the court may allow the


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payment of the said fee within a reasonable time. In the event of non-compliancetherewith, the case shall be dismissed.

The same idea is expressed in Rule 42, Section 18, of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure adopted on June20, 1988, thus:

Sec. 18. Non-payment of prescribed fees . If the fees above prescribed are not paid,the Commission may refuse to take action thereon until they are paid and may dismissthe action or the proceeding . (Emphasis supplied.)

The Court notes that while arguing the technical point that the petition for quo warranto should bedismissed for failure to pay the filing fee on time, the petitioner would at the same time minimize hisalleged lack of citizenship as "a futile technicality," It is regrettable, to say the least, that therequirement of citizenship as a qualification for public office can be so demeaned. What is worse is thatit is regarded as an even less important consideration than the reglementary period the petitionerinsists upon.

This matter should normally end here as the sole issue originally raised by the petitioner is thetimeliness of the quo warranto proceedings against him. However, as his citizenship is the subject ofthat proceeding, and considering the necessity for an early resolution of that more important questionclearly and urgently affecting the public interest, we shall directly address it now in this same action.

The Court has similarly acted in a notable number of cases, thus:

From the foregoing brief statement of the nature of the instant case, it would appearthat our sole function in this proceeding should be to resolve the single issue of whetheror not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the motion for new trial of the GSIS inquestion should indeed be deemed pro forma. But going over the extended pleadings of

both parties, the Court is immediately impressed that substantial justice may not betimely achieved, if we should decide this case upon such a technical ground alone. Wehave carefully read all the allegations and arguments of the parties, very ably andcomprehensively expounded by evidently knowledgeable and unusually competentcounsel, and we feel we can better serve the interests of justice by broadening thescope of our inquiry, for as the record before us stands, we see that there is enoughbasis for us to end the basic controversy between the parties here and now, dispensing,however, with procedural steps which would not anyway affect substantially the meritsof their respective claims. 6

x x x

While it is the fault of the petitioner for appealing to the wrong court and therebyallowing the period for appeal to lapse, the more correct procedure was for therespondent court to forward the case to the proper court which was the Court ofAppeals for appropriate action. Considering, however, the length of time that this casehas been pending, we apply the rule in the case of Del Castillo v. Jaymalin, (112 SCRA629) and follow the principle enunciated in Alger Electric, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, (135SCRA 37) which states:


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... it is a cherished rule of procedure for this Court to always strive tosettle the entire controversy in a single proceeding leaving no root orbranch to bear the seeds of future litigation. No useful purpose will beserved if this case is remanded to the trial court only to have its decisionraised again to the Intermediate Appellate Court and from there to thisCourt. (p. 43)

Only recently in the case of Beautifont, Inc., et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al. (G.R. No.50141, January 29, 1988), we stated that:

... But all those relevant facts are now before this Court. And those facts dictate therendition of a verdict in the petitioner's favor. There is therefore no point in referringthe case back to the Court of Appeals. The facts and the legal propositions involved willnot change, nor should the ultimate judgment. Considerable time has already elapsedand, to serve the ends of justice, it is time that the controversy is finally laid to rest. (SeeSotto v. Samson, 5 SCRA 733; Republic v. Paredes, 108 Phil. 57; Lianga Lumber Co. v.Lianga Timber Co., Inc., 76 SCRA 197; Erico v. Heirs of Chigas, 98 SCRA 575; Francisco v.City of Davao, 12 SCRA 628; Valencia v. Mabilangan, 105 Phil. 162). lwph1.t Soundpractice seeks to accommodate the theory which avoids waste of time, effort andexpense, both to the parties and the government, not to speak of delay in the disposalof the case (cf. Fernandez v. Garcia, 92 Phil. 592, 597). A marked characteristic of our judicial set-up is that where the dictates of justice so demand ... the Supreme Courtshould act, and act with finality.' ( Li Siu Liat v. Republic, 21 SCRA 1039, 1046, citingSamal v. CA, 99 Phil. 230 and U.S. v. Gimenez, 34 Phil. 74). In this case, the dictates of justice do demand that this Court act, and act with finality. 7

x x x

Remand of the case to the lower court for further reception of evidence is not necessarywhere the court is in a position to resolve the dispute based on the records before it. Onmany occasions, the Court, in the public interest and the expeditious administration of justice, has resolved actions on the merits instead of remanding them to the trial courtfor further proceedings, such as where the ends of justice would not be subserved bythe remand of the case or when public interest demands an early disposition of the caseor where the trial court had already received all the evidence of the parties. 8

This course of action becomes all the more justified in the present case where, to repeat for stress, it isclaimed that a foreigner is holding a public office.

We also note in his Reply, the petitioner says:

In adopting private respondent's comment, respondent COMELEC implicitly adopted as"its own" private respondent's repeated assertion that petitioner is no longer a Filipinocitizen. In so doing, has not respondent COMELEC effectively disqualified itself, byreason of prejudgment, from resolving the petition for quo warranto filed by privaterespondent still pending before it? 9


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This is still another reason why the Court has seen fit to rule directly on the merits of this case.

Going over the record, we find that there are two administrative decisions on the question of thepetitioner's citizenship. The first was rendered by the Commission on Elections on May 12, 1982, andfound the petitioner to be a citizen of the Philippines. 10 The second was rendered by the Commission onImmigration and Deportation on September 13, 1988, and held that the petitioner was not a citizen ofthe Philippines. 11

The first decision was penned by then COMELEC Chigas, Vicente Santiago, Jr., with CommissionersPabalate Savellano and Opinion concurring in full and Commissioner Bacungan concurring in thedismissal of the petition "without prejudice to the issue of the respondent's citizenship being raisedanew in a proper case." Commissioner Sagadraca reserved his vote, while Commissioner Felipe was fordeferring decision until representations shall have been made with the Australian Embassy for officialverification of the petitioner's alleged naturalization as an Australian.

The second decision was unanimously rendered by Chairman Miriam Defensor-Santiago andCommissioners Alano and Geraldez of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation. It is importantto observe that in the proceeding before the COMELEC, there was no direct proof that the hereinpetitioner had been formally naturalized as a citizen of Australia. This conjecture, which was eventuallyrejected, was merely inferred from the fact that he had married an Australian citizen, obtained anAustralian passport, and registered as an alien with the CID upon his return to this country in 1980.

On the other hand, the decision of the CID took into account the official statement of the AustralianGovernment dated August 12, 1984, through its Consul in the Philippines, that the petitioner was still anAustralian citizen as of that date by reason of his naturalization in 1976. That statement 12 is reproducedin full as follows:

I, GRAHAM COLIN WEST, Consul of Australia in the Philippines, by virtue of a certificate of appointment

signed and sealed by the Australian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs on 19 October 1983, andrecognized as such by Letter of Patent signed and sealed by the Philippines Acting Minister of ForeignAffairs on 23 November 1983, do hereby provide the following statement in response to the subpoenaTestificandum dated 9 April 1984 in regard to the Petition for disqualification against RAMON LABO, JR.Y LOZANO (SPC No. 84-73), and do hereby certify that the statement is true and correct.

STATEMENT

A) RAMON LABO, JR. Y LOZANO, date of birth 23 December 1934, was married in thePhilippines to an Australian citizen. As the spouse of an Australian citizen, he was notrequired to meet normal requirements for the grant of citizenship and was granted

Australian citizenship by Sydney on 28 July 1976.

B) Any person over the age of 16 years who is granted Australian citizenship must takean oath of allegiance or make an affirmation of allegiance . The wording of the oath ofaffirmation is: "I ..., renouncing all other allegiance ..." etc. This need not necessarilyhave any effect on his former nationality as this would depend on the citizenship laws ofhis former country.


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C) The marriage was declared void in the Australian Federal Court in Sydney on 27 June1980 on the ground that the marriage had been bigamous.

D) According to our records LABO is still an Australian citizen.

E) Should he return to Australia, LABO may face court action in respect of Section 50 ofAustralian Citizenship Act 1948 which relates to the giving of false or misleadinginformation of a material nature in respect of an application for Australian citizenship. Ifsuch a prosecution was successful, he could be deprived of Australian citizenship underSection 21 of the Act.

F) There are two further ways in which LABO could divest himself of Australiancitizenship:

(i) He could make a declaration of Renunciation of Australian citizenship under Section18 of the Australian Citizenship Act, or

(ii) If he acquired another nationality, (for example, Filipino) by a formal and voluntaryact other than marriage, then he would automatically lose as Australian citizenshipunder Section 17 of the Act.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I HAVE HEREUNTO SET MAY HAND AND SEAL OF THEAUSTRALIAN EMBASSY, MANILA, THIS 12th DAY OF APRIL 1984. DONE AT MANILA INTHE PHILIPPINES.

(Signed) GRAHAM C. WEST Consul

This was affirmed later by the letter of February 1, 1988, addressed to the private

respondent by the Department of Foreign Affairs reading as follows: 13

Sir:

With reference to your letter dated 1 February 1988, I wish to inform you that inquirymade with the Australian Government through the Embassy of the Philippines inCanberra has elicited the following information:

1) That Mr. Ramon L. Labo, Jr. acquired Australian citizenship on 28 July 1976.

2) That prior to 17 July 1986, a candidate for Australian citizenship had to either swear

an oath of allegiance or make an affirmation of allegiance which carries a renunciationof "all other allegiance.

Very truly yours, For the Secretary of Foreign Affairs: (SGD) RODOLFO SEVERINO, JR.Assistant Secretary

The decision also noted the oath of allegiance taken by every naturalized Australian reading as follows:


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be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Elizabeth the Second, Queen of Australia ..." and tofulfill his duties "as an Australian citizen."

The petitioner now claims that his naturalization in Australia made him at worst only a dual national anddid not divest him of his Philippine citizenship. Such a specious argument cannot stand against the clearprovisions of CA No. 63, which enumerates the modes by which Philippine citizenship may be lost.Among these are: (1) naturalization in a foreign country; (2) express renunciation of citizenship; and (3)subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country, all of whichare applicable to the petitioner. It is also worth mentioning in this connection that under Article IV,Section 5, of the present Constitution, "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest andshall be dealt with by law."

Even if it be assumed that, as the petitioner asserts, his naturalization in Australia was annulled after itwas found that his marriage to the Australian citizen was bigamous, that circumstance alone did notautomatically restore his Philippine citizenship. His divestiture of Australian citizenship does not concernus here. That is a matter between him and his adopted country. What we must consider is the fact thathe voluntarily and freely rejected Philippine citizenship and willingly and knowingly embraced thecitizenship of a foreign country. The possibility that he may have been subsequently rejected byAustralia, as he claims, does not mean that he has been automatically reinstated as a citizen of thePhilippines.

Under CA No. 63 as amended by PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act ofCongress, by naturalization, or by repatriation. It does not appear in the record, nor does the petitionerclaim, that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by any of these methods. He does not point to any judicial decree of naturalization as to any statute directly conferring Philippine citizenship upon him.Neither has he shown that he has complied with PD No. 725, providing that:

... (2) natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship may reacquire

Philippine citizenship through repatriation by applying with the Special Committee onNaturalization created by Letter of Instruction No. 270, and, if their applications areapproved , taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines,after which they shall be deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. TheCommission on Immigration and Deportation shall thereupon cancel their certificate ofregistration. (Emphasis supplied.)

That is why the Commission on Immigration and Deportation rejected his application for thecancellation of his alien certificate of registration. And that is also the reason we must deny his presentclaim for recognition as a citizen of the Philippines.

The petitioner is not now, nor was he on the day of the local elections on January 18, 1988, a citizen ofthe Philippines. In fact, he was not even a qualified voter under the Constitution itself because of hisalienage. 21 He was therefore ineligible as a candidate for mayor of Baguio City, under Section 42 of theLocal Government Code providing in material part as follows:

Sec. 42. Qualifications . An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines, atleast twenty-three years of age on election day, a qualified voter registered as such inthe barangay, municipality, city or province where he proposes to be elected, a resident


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therein for at least one year at the time of the filing of his certificate of candidacy, andable to read and write English, Filipino, or any other local language or dialect.

The petitioner argues that his alleged lack of citizenship is a "futile technicality" that should not frustratethe will of the electorate of Baguio City, who elected him by a "resonant and thunderous majority." Tobe accurate, it was not as loud as all that, for his lead over the second-placer was only about 2,100votes. In any event, the people of that locality could not have, even unanimously, changed therequirements of the Local Government Code and the Constitution. The electorate had no power topermit a foreigner owing his total allegiance to the Queen of Australia, or at least a stateless individualowing no allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, to preside over them as mayor of their city. Onlycitizens of the Philippines have that privilege over their countrymen.

The probability that many of those who voted for the petitioner may have done so in the belief that hewas qualified only strengthens the conclusion that the results of the election cannot nullify thequalifications for the office now held by him. These qualifications are continuing requirements; once anyof them is lost during incumbency, title to the office itself is deemed forfeited. In the case at bar, thecitizenship and voting requirements were not subsequently lost but were not possessed at all in the firstplace on the day of the election. The petitioner was disqualified from running as mayor and, althoughelected, is not now qualified to serve as such.

Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private respondent, who filed the quo warrantopetition, can replace the petitioner as mayor. He cannot. The simple reason is that as he obtained onlythe second highest number of votes in the election, he was obviously not the choice of the people ofBaguio city.

The latest ruling of the Court on this issue is Santos v. Commission on Elections 22 decided in 1985. Inthat case, the candidate who placed second was proclaimed elected after the votes for his winning rival,who was disqualified as a turncoat and considered a non-candidate, were all disregarded as stray. In

effect, the second placer won by default. That decision was supported by eight members of the Courtthen 23 with three dissenting 24 and another two reserving their vote. 25 One was on official leave. 26

Re-examining that decision, the Court finds, and so holds, that it should be reversed in favor of theearlier case of Geronimo v. Ramos, 27 Which represents the more logical and democratic rule. That case,which reiterated the doctrine first announced in 1912 in Topacio vs. Paredes 28 was supported by tenmembers of the Court 29 without any dissent, although one reserved his vote, 30 another took no part 31 and two others were on leave. 32 There the Court held:

... it would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionallyguaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or

plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as the representative of aconstituency, the majority of which have positively declared through their ballots thatthey do not choose him.

Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have receivedthe highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is a fundamentalIdea in all republican forms of government that no one can be declared elected and no


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measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of thelegal votes cast in the election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676.)

The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declaredto be disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was elected does notnecessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes tobe declared the winner of the elective office. The votes cast for a dead, disqualified, ornon-eligible person may not be valid to vote the winner into office or maintain himthere. However, in the absence of a statute which clearly asserts a contrary political andlegislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in the sincere belief that thecandidate was alive, qualified, or eligible, they should not be treated as stray, void ormeaningless.

It remains to stress that the citizen of the Philippines must take pride in his status as such and cherishthis priceless gift that, out of more than a hundred other nationalities, God has seen fit to grant him.Having been so endowed, he must not lightly yield this precious advantage, rejecting it for another landthat may offer him material and other attractions that he may not find in his own country. To be sure,he has the right to renounce the Philippines if he sees fit and transfer his allegiance to a state with moreallurements for him. 33 But having done so, he cannot expect to be welcomed back with open arms oncehis taste for his adopted country turns sour or he is himself disowned by it as an undesirable alien.

Philippine citizenship is not a cheap commodity that can be easily recovered after its renunciation. Itmay be restored only after the returning renegade makes a formal act of re-dedication to the country hehas abjured and he solemnly affirms once again his total and exclusive loyalty to the Republic of thePhilippines. This may not be accomplished by election to public office.

WHEREFORE, petitioner Ramon J. Labo, Jr. is hereby declared NOT a citizen of the Philippines andtherefore DISQUALIFIED from continuing to serve as Mayor of Baguio City. He is ordered to VACATE his

office and surrender the same to the Vice-Mayor of Baguio City, once this decision becomes final andexecutory. The temporary restraining order dated January 31, 1989, is LIFTED.


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G.R. No. 99358 January 30, 1995

DJUMANTAN, petitioner,vs.HON. ANDREA D. DOMINGO, COMMISSIONER OF THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION, HON. REGINO R.SANTIAGO and HON. JORGE V. SARMIENTO, COMMISSIONERS BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION ANDDEPORTATION, respondents .

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court with preliminary injunction, toreverse and set aside the Decision dated September 27, 1990 of the Commission on Immigration andDeportation (CID), ordering the deportation of petitioner and its Resolution dated January 29, 1991,denying the motion for reconsideration.

I

Bernard Banez, the husband of Marina Cabael, went to Indonesia as a contract worker.

On April 3, 1974, he embraced and was converted to Islam. On May 17, 1974, he married petitioner inaccordance with Islamic rites. He returned to the Philippines in January 1979.

On January 13, 1979, petitioner and her two children with Banez, (two-year old Marina and nine-monthold Nikulas) arrived in Manila as the "guests" of Banez. The latter made it appear that he was just afriend of the family of petitioner and was merely repaying the hospitability extended to him during hisstay in Indonesia.

When petitioner and her two children arrived at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport on January 13,1979, Banez, together with Marina Cabael, met them.

Banez executed an "Affidavit of Guaranty and Support," for his "guests," stating inter alia , that:

That I am the guarantor for the entry into the Philippines of Mrs. Djumantan, 42 yearsold, and her two minor children, MARINA, 2 years old, and NIKULAS, 9 months old, allIndonesian citizens, who are coming as temporary visitors.

That I am willing to guaranty them out of gratitude to their family for the hospitalitythey have accorded me during the few years that I have stayed in Indonesia inconnection with my employment thereat.

That I guaranty they are law abiding citizens and I guaranty their behavior while they are

in the Philippines; I also guaranty their support and that they will not become a publiccharge.

That I guaranty their voluntary departure upon the termination of the authorized staygranted them by the Government ( Rollo, p. 41).

As "guests," petitioner and her two children lived in the house of Banez.


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When asked to comment on the petition, the Solicitor General took the position that the CID could notorder petitioner's deportation because its power to do so had prescribed under Section 37 (b) of theImmigration Act of 1940 ( Rollo, pp. 57-74).

III

We need not resolve the validity of petitioner's marriage to Banez, if under the law the CID can validlydeport petitioner as an "undesirable alien" regardless of her marriage to a Filipino citizen. Therefore, tobe first resolved is the question on petitioner's immigration status, particularly the legality of heradmission into the country and the change of her status from temporary visitor to permanent resident.Upon a finding that she was not lawfully admitted into the country and she did not lawfully acquirepermanent residency, the next question is whether the power to deport her has prescribed.

There was a blatant abuse of our immigration laws in effecting petitioner's entry into the country andthe change of her immigration status from temporary visitor to permanent resident. All such privilegeswere obtained through misinterpretation.

Never was the marriage of petitioner to Banez disclosed to the immigration authorities in herapplications for temporary visitor's visa and for permanent residency.

The civil status of an alien applicant for admission as a temporary visitor is a matter that could influencethe exercise of discretion on the part of the immigration authorities. The immigration authorities wouldbe less inclined to allow the entry of a woman who claims to have entered into a marriage with a Filipinocitizen, who is married to another woman ( Cf. Shiu Shin Man v. Galang, 3 SCRA 871 [1961]).

Generally, the right of the President to expel or deport aliens whose presence is deemed inimical to thepublic interest is as absolute and unqualified as the right to prohibit and prevent their entry into thecountry (Annotations, 8 ALR 1286). this right is based on the fact that since the aliens are not part of the

nation, their admission into the territory is a matter of pure permission and simple tolerance whichcreates no obligation on the part of the government to permit them to stay (3 Am. Jur. 2d. 72).

The interest, which an alien has in being admitted into or allowed to continue to reside in the country, isprotected only so far as Congress may choose to protect it (United States ex rel. Kaloudis v. Shauhnessy180 F. 2d. 489).

There is no law guaranteeing aliens married to Filipino citizens the right to be admitted, much less to begiven permanent residency, in the Philippines.

The fact of marriage by an alien to a citizen does not withdraw her from the operation of the

immigration laws governing the admission and exclusion of aliens (United States ex rel. Knauff v.Shauhnessy, 338 US 537 94 L. Ed. 317, 70 S. Ct. 309 [1950]; Low Wah Suey v. Backus, 225 US 460 56 L.Ed. 1165, 32 S. Ct. 734 [1912]; Annotations, 71 ALR 1213). Marriage of an alien woman to a Filipinohusband does not ipso facto make her a Filipino citizen and does not excuse her from her failure todepart from the country upon the expiration of her extended stay here as an alien (Joaquin v. Galang, 33SCRA 362 [1970]).


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Under Section 9 of the Immigration Act of 1940, it is not mandatory for the CID to admit any alien whoapplies for a visitor's visa. Once admitted into the country, the alien has no right to an indefinite stay.Under Section 13 of the law, an alien allowed to stay temporarily may apply for a change of status and"may be admitted" as a permanent resident. Among those considered qualified to apply for permanentresidency if the wife or husband of a Philippine citizen (Immigration Act of 1940, Sec. 13[a]). The entry ofaliens into the country and their admission as immigrants is not a matter of right, even if they are legallymarried to Filipino citizens.

IV

We now address the issue raised by the Solicitor General that the right of public respondents to deportpetitioner has prescribed, citing Section 37(b) of the Immigration Act of 1940.

Said Section 37(b) provides:

Deportation may be effected under clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 of paragraph (a) of thissection at any time after e

conflict of laws cases(prelims).docx

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