congressional research service - egypt, background and us role

8/7/2019 Congressional Research Service - Egypt, Background and US Role

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CRS Report for CongressPrepared for Members and Committees of Congress

Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations

Jeremy M. Sharp

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

February 1, 2011

Congressional Research Service

7-5700

www.crs.gov

RL33003


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Summary

This report provides an overview of U.S.-Egyptian relations, Egyptian politics, and U.S. foreignaid to Egypt. Major public unrest transpiring in Egypt and elsewhere in the Arab world in late

January 2011 raises challenging policy questions for the United States government and the 112

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Congress. U.S. policy toward Egypt has long been framed as an investment in regional stability,built primarily on long-running military cooperation and sustaining the March 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. Successive U.S. Administrations have viewed Egypts government as amoderating influence in the Middle East. At the same time, there have been increasing U.S. callsfor Egypt to democratize. In recent years, congressional views of U.S.-Egyptian relations havevaried. Many lawmakers have viewed Egypt as a stabilizing regional force, but some membershave argued for the United States to pressure Egypts government to implement political reforms,improve human rights, and take a more active role in reducing Arab-Israeli tensions. Thoseconcerns, in addition to economic frustration, are now driving the most significant public unrestin Egypt in a generation. The Obama Administration has called on the Egyptian government torespect the basic rights of protestors and has expressed concern about violence.

U.S. policy makers are now grappling with complex questions about the future of U.S.-Egyptrelations and these debates are likely to influence consideration of appropriations andauthorization legislation in the 112th Congress. The United States has provided Egypt with anannual average of $2 billion in economic and military foreign assistance since 1979. In FY2010,the United States provided Egypt with $1.552 billion in total assistance. Congress appropriatedFY2010 aid to Egypt in two separate bills: P.L. 111-117, the Consolidated Appropriations Act,2010, included $1.292 billion in economic and military assistance; and P.L. 111-32, theSupplemental Appropriations Act, FY2009, contained $260 million in FY2010 militaryassistance. Under P.L. 111-322, the Obama Administration can provide Egypt aid for FY2011 atFY2010 levels until March 4, 2011, or the passage of superseding FY2011 appropriationslegislation. For FY2011, the Obama Administration is seeking $1.552 billion in total assistance,the exact same amount as the previous fiscal year. The Administrations request includes $1.3billion in military assistance and $250 million in economic aid.

Prior to the recent unrest, Egyptian politics were already focused on the possibility of a leadershiptransition in the near future, and the 112th Congress may decide to express and support a U.S.desire for a more democratic government that preserves human rights and religious freedom forall citizens. In November and December 2010 parliamentary elections in Egypt, just one MuslimBrotherhood independent won a seat, and the ruling National Democratic Party won over 90% ofall seats (as opposed to slightly less than 80% in the last parliament). Some analysts havecriticized the Obama Administration for limiting public criticism of the Egyptian government.Others assert that U.S. democracy assistance funding has been largely ineffective and that U.S.assistance should seek to improve the lives of average Egyptians. Some critics of U.S. policybelieve that U.S. aid should be conditioned on human rights and religious freedom improvements.

On January 28, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton stated that We are deeply concernedabout the use of violence by Egyptian police and security forces against protestors, and we call onthe Egyptian government to do everything in its power to restrain the security forces. At the sametime, protestors should also refrain from violence and express themselves peacefully. As we haverepeatedly said, we support the universal human rights of the Egyptian people, including the rightto freedom of expression, of association, and of assembly. Reconciling those principles withcurrent developments is now the major challenge for U.S.-Egyptian relations.


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Contents

Revolution in Egypt: Latest Developments, U.S. Foreign Policy, and Issues for the 112 thCongress..................................................................................................................................1

OverviewA Changing Landscape for U.S. Foreign Policy............... .......................... ......... 1The Peoples Revolution: A Timeline ......................... ........................... ............................ ....1

New Egyptian Government and Plans for New Voting in Disputed Districts ....................4Tuesday February 1, 2011: The March of Millions and Mubaraks Speech.......................4U.S. Response: Orderly Transition and Potential Issues for Congress ..... ............... .......5Repercussions for Israel and Middle East Peace ....................... ......................... .............. 6Evacuation of American Citizens...................... ........................... .......................... .......... 7

Other Recent Developments........................................................................................................7

Issues for Congress ........................ .......................... ......................... .......................... ................ 8

Reverberations from Tunisias Revolution.............. .......................... ........................... .......... 8Presidential Succession: Who Will Follow Hosni Mubarak?... ......................... ...................... 9Managing Egypts Leadership Transition...................................... ......................... .............. 11

The Legal Framework ......................... ......................... .......................... ....................... 11The Contenders..................... .......................... ........................... ........................... ........ 11The Opposition ......................... ........................... .......................... ........................... .... 14

The Egypt-Gaza Border: Can Iranian Weapons Smuggling to Hamas be Stopped? ............... 17Promoting Democracy in Egypt: What Is the U.S. Role? ....................... ........................... ... 18Human Rights and Religious Freedom ........................... ............................ ......................... 19

Human Rights ........................... ........................... ............................ ............................ . 19Religious Freedom........................................................................................................20

Sudan Referendum and Nile River Basin.................... ........................... .......................... .... 22The Muslim Brotherhood ......................... ........................... .......................... ...................... 22

U.S.-Egyptian Relations............................................................................................................24

U.S. Foreign Assistance to Egypt ....................... ......................... .......................... .............. 25Overview......................... ........................... .......................... ........................... ............. 25Debate over U.S. Assistance to Egypt............ ......................... .......................... ............. 25Economic Aid ....................... .......................... ........................... ........................... ........ 26Military Aid ...................... .......................... ......................... .......................... ............... 29Recent Arms Sales Notifications ........................... .......................... ........................... ... 30

U.S.-Egyptian Trade............................................................................................................30Potential Policy Options for Congress ......................... ......................... .......................... ..... 31

Figures

Figure 1. Map of Egypt ......................... .......................... ........................... .......................... ..... 10

Tables

Table 1. U.S. Direct Funding to International and Egyptian NGOs.............................................28

Table 2. Recent U.S. Foreign Assistance to Egypt.................................... .......................... ........ 31

Table 3. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Egypt, 1946-1997..................................... .......................... 33


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Contacts

Author Contact Information ....................... .......................... ......................... .......................... ..36


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Congressional Research Service 1

Revolution in Egypt: Latest Developments, U.S.

Foreign Policy, and Issues for the 112th Congress

OverviewA Changing Landscape for U.S. Foreign Policy

The political upheaval currently spreading across the Arab world is not only transforming Egyptspolitical landscape, but has the potential to fundamentally alter the basic tenets of U.S. policy inthe Middle East. For years, U.S. diplomatic relationships with friendly Arab governments havebeen based on close ties to individual rulers, such as Hosni Mubarak, whose contested butunrivalled power ensured cooperation with the United States on military, intelligence, andregional diplomatic matters. President Mubaraks apparently imminent departure from power andthe growing possibility that Egypt is on the cusp of meaningful political reform suggest that theUnited States may have to prepare itself for the likelihood that a more democratic Egyptiangovernment may at times act in ways that are contrary to U.S. interests or preferences. Recent

events in Iraq suggest that nationalist rhetoric and unpredictability are likely to accompanyEgypts transition toward more open democratic competition. A newly elected Egyptian presidentmay, in order to bolster his own popular legitimacy, challenge U.S. support for Israel and choosenot to fully support Israels blockade of the Gaza Strip, among other things.

On the other hand, many Western observers see the unfolding revolution in Egypt as a positivelong term development for U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. Although diplomatic disputesare to be expected in the course of any normal bilateral relationship, proponents of democraticchange argue that countries like Egypt and Tunisia will be fundamentally healthier societies ifeach country is able to successfully transition from dictatorship to democracy. While a moreacrimonious Israeli-Egyptian relationship may emerge if the Egyptian government becomes moreresponsive to public opinion, a more democratic Egypt may still uphold the 1979 peace treaty

with Israel because key power centers, especially the Egyptian military, believe that it is inEgypts national interest to do so.

Overall, the U.S.-Egyptian relationship is entering an uncertain period. The ObamaAdministration and members of the 112th Congress may base decisions on whether Egypt remainsa reliable U.S. partner on a number of factors. These factors include, but are not limited to theability of Egypts government to amend the constitution and open political space to theopposition; the role of Egypts military in any transition period; the role and positions of theMuslim Brotherhood and other political groups; and the willingness of the Egyptian people toaccept various scenarios for the governments response to their protests. Key questions will focuson the degree to which any new Egyptian government maintains Egypts internationalcommitments and security cooperation with the United States; the conditions under which the

United States should continue to provide military and economic assistance to Egypt; and thefuture character of U.S. ties to and cooperation with the Egyptian military.

The Peoples Revolution: A Timeline

In perhaps the most unexpected development in modern Egyptian history, a purely popularrevolution that started only seven days ago is on the verge of forcing President Hosni Mubarak tovacate the presidency after 29 years in power. Although for years experts have described


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simmering discontent among the urban Egyptian masses and a host of socio-economic factors thatmay breed instability, none had predicted what has transpired over the last week. TunisiasJasmine Revolution has inspired popular protests against entrenched dictatorships across theArab world, and it resonated strongly in Egypt, where recent sectarian violence, an apparentlyrigged parliamentary election, and the uncertainty surrounding succession all combined to bring

unprecedented numbers of Egyptians into the streets.

Beginning with a day of protest on January 25, young protestors using social media to organizecame out in far greater numbers than initially envisioned, creating a self-sustaining momentumthat culminated in ever larger nationwide protests. On January 28, hundreds of thousands ofprotestors throughout the country clashed with riot police and central security forces controlledby the widely unpopular Ministry of Interior. An estimated 100,000 people turned up in Cairoalone. Although people were largely peaceful, crowds burned several symbols of Mubaraks rule,including the National Democratic Party headquarters building. Police units useddisproportionate amount of force against protesters who at times used violence themselves,although police largely avoided the use of live ammunition. Ultimately the police wereoverwhelmed, and by early evening crowds began to dissipate as the army took to the streets to

try and instill a sense of calm. Since the armys deployment, soldiers have largely refrained fromfiring on crowds and many protestors have embraced the army rather than fight it.

In the early morning of January 29, President Mubarak made what some described as a desperateattempt to cling to power in a televised speech to the nation in which he defiantly insisted that hewould remain in power to protect the nation. During the speech, President Mubarak announcedthat he was dissolving the government and, later that day, he appointed national intelligence chiefOmar Suleiman as his Vice President,1 the first time anyone has held that office under Mubarak.He also appointed Civil Aviation Minister Ahmad Shafiq as Prime Minister. Both men areconsidered military figures with close ties to the President. The moves failed to calm publicanger, and the weekend of January 29-30 witnessed looting, protests, and near-total chaos, withthe army remaining the only authority in the country. The army was also deployed to protect

important national sites, such as the Central Bank, Ministry of Information, and the EgyptianMuseum in Tahrir Square.

Many Egyptian observers have speculated that the withdrawal of police from urban areas was adeliberate policy by the government, a scare tactic intended to sow chaos in order to remindEgyptians that a strongman like Mubarak is needed. Some Egyptians are even accusing the policethemselves of terrorizing the country. Throughout the weekend of January 29-30, there werenumerous reports of looting, and many Egyptians banded together to protect private property andbusinesses from armed gangs. Inmates escaped or were released from four main prisons, andstate-owned television broadcasted images of burned infrastructure and disorder in what appearedto be an attempt to disparage the protest movement by linking it to the ongoing insecurity. Somehuman rights groups have alleged that undercover police loyal to the government were among thelooters.

By Sunday January 30, it appeared that all sides (President Mubarak, the military, and theopposition) were trying to reach a solution in order to stabilize the country and extricate Egypt

1 According to Article 82 of the Egyptian Constitution, Should the President be unable to perform his duties due toany outstanding circumstances, his duties will be performed by the vice president, or (if there is none) the primeminister. The person performing these duties may not request constitutional amendments, dissolve parliament, ordismiss the cabinet.


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from falling further into chaos. Since protests began, media sources are citing unconfirmedreports of at least 300 people killed, the Egyptian stock market has crashed (fallen at least 16%)and trading has halted, and some are predicting that Egypts tourist industry (its main source offoreign exchange) has been severely damaged. It is clear that, the longer chaos persists in Egypt,the more lasting damage will be done to the country as a whole, no matter which government

rises in Mubaraks place. To date, the Suez Canal continues to operate normally.2

Led by Dr. Muhammad ElBaradei, a committee of opposition groups/figures (including theMuslim Brotherhood, Ayman Nour, Osama al Ghazali Harb, the April 6th Movement, and asmattering of Egypts legal opposition parties) has said that it will negotiate with the governmentover the demands of the protestors once Mubarak leaves office.3 Their goals, aside fromMubaraks immediate resignation, are:

to form a more representative interim national unity government to amend the Constitution or form an assembly to rewrite it entirely to remove corrupt Egyptian leaders responsible for repressing protestors to dissolve parliament and hold new free and fair parliamentary and presidential

elections

The Muslim Brotherhood, which has been conspicuously under the radar throughout the last weekof protests, has deliberately deferred to secular opposition leaders and groups, especially Dr.ElBaradei. According to one Brotherhood leader, Were supporting ElBaradei to lead the path tochange. The Brotherhood realizes the sensitivities, especially in the West, towards theIslamists, and were not keen to be at the forefront. Despite ElBaradeis prominence, it is unclearwhether he commands much popular support beyond the educated middle- and upper-classopposition. He has lived outside of Egypt for decades and was out of the country when protestsbegan. Much of the grass-roots organizing of demonstrations has been carried out by activistsseveral generations younger than the traditional leadership of Egypts opposition.

The role of the military in the days ahead will be key in determining what the future holds forEgypt. So far, soldiers and protestors have embraced each other, a purposeful tactic as neither sidewishes to confront the other and lose support of the wider public. Since the army was deployed onFriday, January 28, some Egyptians have been shouting, The army and the people are one!However, others have chanted that The army must choose between Egypt and Mubarak. OnJanuary 31, 2011, Egyptian media reported that protesters announced that they were givingEgypts military until Thursday, February 3 to take their side or be considered enemies of theuprising.

On Monday, January 31, the army said that it would not use force against Egyptians. It also addedthat, Your armed forces, who are aware of the legitimacy of your demands and are keen toassume their responsibility in protecting the nation and the citizens, affirms that freedom ofexpression through peaceful means is guaranteed to everybody. Many observers have interpreted

2 In 2009, oil tankers passing through the Canal carried an estimated 1.8 million barrels per day. The Canal has thecapacity to handle 2.2 million barrels of oil a day.3 Some Egyptians are also calling on other prominent figures, such as Secretary General of the Arab League AmrMoussa and former Nobel Prize for Chemistry winner Ahmed Zewail, to become more politically involved.


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this statement to mean the end of Hosni Mubaraks rule, as it is clear now that the army will notuse force against civilians in order to stop demonstrations.

New Egyptian Government and Plans for New Voting in Disputed Districts

On January 31, President Mubarak named a new cabinet, though it is entirely unclear for howlong it will remain standing. Of note, Mohammed Hussein Tantawi remained Defense Ministerand was also elevated to the position of deputy prime minister. Mahmoud Wagdy, a retiredgeneral, was appointed Interior Minister, replacing Habib El Adli who was widely vilified by theEgyptian public and responsible for police repression against demonstrators. Among others,Foreign Minister Ahmed Aboul Gheit remained in the cabinet. Presently, Vice President OmarSuleiman, Prime Minister Ahmad Shafiq, Defense Minister Tantawi, and Army Chief of StaffSami Anan are all current or former high ranking military officers with close ties to Mubarak.According to Oxford Analytica, These figures represent continuity of the regime's hard militarycore, as well as a commitment to strategic alliances with the United States and pro-Westernpolicies.4

On Monday evening, newly appointed Vice President Omar Suleiman read a statement onEgyptian state television that called for new parliamentary elections to be held in districts whereappeals were submitted prior to the recent unrest.5 Suleiman indicated that President Mubarak hadtasked him with carrying out immediate contacts with all political factions in order to start adialogue around all issues at hand with regard to constitutional and legislative reforms, which willlead to a clear definition of proposed amendments and the specific times for their execution. Hefurther stated that:

The president issued directives to announce the government's policy outline within the nextfew days. It will include clear and definite policies to carry out his pledges within anexpedited timeframe in a way that will restore trust in the Egyptian economy, compensate forthe losses and damage it incurred, and promptly deal with the priorities of tacklingunemployment, fighting poverty and corruption, and achieving the required balance betweenwages and prices.

Tuesday February 1, 2011: The March of Millions and Mubaraks Speech

On Tuesday, February 1, an estimated quarter of a million protestors turned out in downtownCairo for the 8th consecutive day of public protest against the rule of Hosni Mubarak. Largedemonstrations also reportedly took place in Alexandria, Suez, Mansoura, and Luxor. The armymaintained some semblance of order, and protestors and soldiers refrained from any violentconfrontation. Observers reported that the scale of the demonstration was unprecedented. Otherreports emphasized that diversity of the crowd, which was made up of a large number of women,children, and Egyptians of all socio-economic backgrounds.

Late Tuesday night February 1, President Mubarak gave a speech in which he said he would notrun for reelection in the fall of 2011 and wants to oversee a peaceful transfer of power at the

4 "EGYPT: Army decision on Mubarak is key to crisis," Oxford Analytica, January 31, 2011.5 U.S. Open Source Center (OSC) Report GMP20110131950061, Egyptian Vice President Says Re-elections To BeHeld in Districts Under Appeal, Cairo Egyptian Satellite Channel 1 Television, January 31, 2011.


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end of his current term. The crowd reportedly reacted with rage, chanting Leave! Leave! andWe are not leaving!

U.S. Response: Orderly Transition and Potential Issues for Congress

The revolution in Egypt has put the Obama Administration in a major quandary. Since takingoffice, President Obama has devoted greater time and attention to the pursuit of Middle Eastpeace than to efforts to promote reform and democracy in the Arab world. This has been adeliberate tactic of the Obama Administration, designed to differentiate itself from the BushAdministration by giving priority to what President Obama believes is a core national interestthe solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. By switching its public focus to an issue more amenableto the Egyptian government, the Administration also hoped to repair the damage to the U.S.-Egyptian relationship incurred during Presidents Bushs focus on the democracy agenda. By allaccounts, reform efforts remained a component of U.S. diplomacy toward Egypt both in privateand in public, but the Obama Administration had avoided overtly pressuring the Egyptiangovernment for specific changes. Now with the downfall of President Mubarak possiblyimminent, the Administration has had to engage in what some see as rhetorical catch up by

publicly demanding reform.

On Friday January 28, as images of Egyptians clashing with police filled the airwaves, theAdministration said it would reassess U.S. foreign assistance to Egypt. Several days later,Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said that there is no discussion as of this time of cutting offany aid. President Obama and other U.S. officials urged all sides to refrain from violence,though the United States did not publicly call on Mubarak to step down. However, on Sunday,January 30, Secretary of State Clinton expressed in clearer terms the Administrations desire for anew political order in Egypt, stating, We want to see an orderly transition so that no one fills avoid, that there not be a void, that there be a well thought out plan that will bring about ademocratic participatory government. In response, Dr. Muhammad El Baradei stated that:

The American government cannot ask the Egyptian people to believe that a dictator who hasbeen in power for 30 years will be the one to implement democracy.You are losingcredibility by the day. On one hand you're talking about democracy, rule of law and humanrights, and on the other hand you're lending still your support to a dictator that continues tooppress his people.

On January 31, the Administration sent former Ambassador to Egypt Frank Wisner for personaltalks with President Mubarak. In addition, White House spokesman Robert Gibbs said that anynew Egyptian government has to include a whole host of important nonsecular actors that giveEgypt a strong chance to continue to be [a] stable and reliable partner, a remark most likelydirected at U.S. support for the inclusion of the Muslim Brotherhood in any future government.On February 1, the current U.S. ambassador to Egypt, Margaret Scobey, spoke with Dr. ElBaradeito convey support for orderly transition in Egypt.

Lawmakers have an array of concerns with respect to events in Egypt including the following.

The safety and security of American citizens in Egypt and U.S. efforts toevacuate Americans who want to leave Egypt.

The Egyptian governments respect for human rights and the security forcestreatment of civilian protestors.


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The Egyptian governments restoration of Internet service and mobile phonecommunications.

The possible misuse of U.S.-supplied military equipment to the Egyptian army ifsoldiers should fire upon peaceful demonstrators.

The reform of the Egyptian political system into a more democratic space withfree and fair elections for president in the fall of 2011.Repercussions for Israel and Middle East Peace

For more than 30 years, the United States and Israel have based their core assumptions about thebasic stability of the Middle East and the absence of major Israeli-Arab conventional warfare onthe cornerstone of the March 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. The Israeli government isconcerned that its quiet, though cold, peace with Egypt may suffer as a result of the changing ofthe guard in Cairo. According to Eli Shaked, a former Israeli ambassador to Cairo, The onlypeople in Egypt who are committed to peace are the people in Mubaraks inner circle, and if thenext president is not one of them, we are going to be in trouble. Some Israelis believe that a

more pluralistic government in Egypt would be less inclined to side with Israel in containingHamas and blockading the Gaza Strip due to public sympathy for Palestinian rights. In addition, itis uncertain if the next president of Egypt would try to serve as an intermediary between Israelisand Palestinians and between the Palestinian Authority and Hamas. Although a new Egyptiangovernment may be expected to uphold the 1979 peace treaty, it may behave more as Turkey hasover the past year and take a more confrontational approach with its neighbor Israel, a potentiallydangerous development for U.S. foreign policy. Egypt also provides Israel with 40% of its naturalgas, a deal that was widely criticized by the Muslim Brotherhood and other opposition groups.Natural gas export revenue has been an important contributor to Egypts national budget, as oilrevenues have declined in recent years.


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Evacuation of American Citizens

The U.S. State Department has urged all American citizens to leave Egypt. In a warden messagedated January 31, the U.S. Embassy in Cairo has said that for U.S. citizens in Egypt who wish todepart the country, arrangements are being made to provide transportation to locations in Europe,

such as Athens, Greece; Istanbul, Turkey; and Nicosia, Cyprus. According to the StateDepartment there are about 52,000 Americans registered with the embassy in Cairo. Many otherU.S. citizens, however, are not registered with the Embassy. On February 1, the U.S. StateDepartment ordered all nonessential American government personnel to leave the country. Todate, at least 1,600 American citizens have been evacuated. So far, more than 3,000 U.S. citizenshave communicated a desire to be evacuated.

Other Recent Developments

Alexandria Church BombingOn January 1, 2011, a suicide bomber detonatedexplosives outside the Al Qiddissin (Two Saints) church in Alexandria, Egypt,killing 21 people and injuring many more. On January 23, 2011, Egyptian

authorities accused a Palestinian militant group in Gaza, known as the Army ofIslam, of perpetrating the suicide bombing.

U.S. Statement on Parliamentary ElectionsOn November 29, 2010, the U.S.State Department issued a press release on Egypts parliamentary elections afterthe first round of voting. According to the statement, the Obama Administration

6 http://egypt.usembassy.gov/wm_013111.html

Warden Message to American Citizens in Egypt6

January 31, 2011

U.S. Embassy Cairo

The U.S. Embassy in Cairo informs U.S. citizens in Egypt who wish

to depart that the Department of State is making arrangements toprovide transportation to safehaven locations in Europe. Thisassistance will be provided on a reimbursable basis, as required byU.S. law. U.S. citizens who travel on US government-arrangedtransport will be expected to make their own onward travel plansfrom the safehaven location. Flights to evacuation points will begindeparting Egypt on Monday, January 31. There will be a limitednumber of seats available on evacuation flights on January 31.Priority will be given to persons with medical emergencies orsevere medical conditions. Persons interested in departing Egypt viaUSG-chartered transportation should contact the US Departmentof State and Embassy Cairo by sending an email [email protected] or by calling 1-202-501-4444.Please provide the following information:

Name, age, place of birth, U.S. passport number and any specialmedical needs.

Immediate family members (spouses and children) who are not U.S.citizens must be documented for entry into the safehaven countryand/or U.S., if that is your final destination.


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is disappointed by reports in the pre-election period of disruption of campaignactivities of opposition candidates and arrests of their supporters, as well asdenial of access to the media for some opposition voices. The press release alsostated that the Administration looks forward to continuing to work with theEgyptian government and with Egypts vibrant civil society to help them achieve

their political, social, and economic aspirations. On December 18, theWashington Postpublished an op-ed by Assistant Secretary of State for theBureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor Michael H. Posner whoencouraged the Egyptian government to make the September 2011 presidentialelections transparent, free, and fair.

Parliamentary ElectionsIn the November and December 2010 election forthe Peoples Assembly (the lower house), the ruling NDP party won 420 out of504 total seats available. In addition, another 68 elected independents andpresidentially appointed representatives are expected to vote with the NDP bloc,giving the ruling party 96% of the seats in the lower house. The MuslimBrotherhood, which had 88 seats in the last Assembly, did not win a single seat inthe first round of voting and chose to boycott the second round (one Brotherhood

candidate won in a run-off ). Overall, the vote was marred by allegations ofgovernment fraud and abuse, though estimates of the turnout are low (25% orlower), and there was little public protest against the NDPs overwhelmingvictory. Most importantly, because the Egyptian constitution requires that anindependent candidate for president obtain the signatures of 250 elected officials,including 65 from the lower house of parliament, it seems highly unlikely thatany non-NDP candidate could meet this threshold under the existing powerstructure in the Peoples Assembly.

Issues for Congress

Reverberations from Tunisias Revolution

The Tunisian peoples popular ousting of President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in mid-January 2011sparked immediate speculation that a popular revolution could soon occur in Egypt and othercountries in the Arab world. Indeed, between December 2010 and January 2011, an unusualdegree of popular protests have taken place in other Arab states such as Algeria, Jordan, andYemen. Rising political tension in Egypt over the last year associated with a disputedparliamentary election, sectarian tensions between Coptic Christians and Muslims, and widelypublicized cases of police abuse contributed to the atmosphere of speculation. On January 25,2011, Egypt experienced a national day of revolt, an event that witnessed tens of thousands ofEgyptians marching in the streets against the government of Hosni Mubarak. To date, six

Egyptians have set themselves on fire, an act designed to imitate the self-immolation of 26-year-old Tunisian Mohammad Bouazizi, whose act served as the catalyst for Tunisias so-calledJasmine Revolution. Like Tunisia, Egypt has high youth unemployment and underemployment,an autocratic political system dominated by a single family and its allies, and rampant corruption.Egyptian authorities have attempted to quell the unrest. The government has blocked the use ofTwitter and other social media web sites, and government-controlled media have emphasized the


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chaotic nature of Tunisias riots, showing, according to one observer, images of theft, policebrutality, and sabotage. The message was clear: revolutions can get messy, so don't bother.7

Some analysts suggest that while Egyptian popular anger is palpable and the opposition has beenemboldened by events in Tunisia, the regime is better equipped to weather the popular storm.

Despite its small size, Tunisia has a higher proportion of well-educated aspiring middle classworkers than Egypt, as the government invested heavily in education (7.2% of GDP compared to3.8% in Egypt).8 In addition, even critics of the Egyptian government acknowledge that while thegovernment limits free speech and assembly, the media environment in Egypt is far more openthan it had been in Tunisia during Ben Alis more than 20-year reign. According to EgyptsFinance Minister Youssef Boutros-Ghali, Egyptians setting themselves on fire would not spark arevolution. It's an attempt to imitate things that won't happen in Egypt.

On January 28, youth protestors using social media to reorganize demonstrations launched a newset of public protests after Friday prayers. The scale of the nation-wide protests is unprecedented,and many age-old assumptions on the impotence of the Egyptian people to fight back againstgovernment repression and corruption are being shattered. The Muslim Brotherhood has joined

the youth-led demonstrations. Nobel peace laureate and former International Atomic EnergyAgency director general Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei returned to Egypt from Vienna, Austria onJanuary 27 to join protestors, though some reports suggested he was detained on January 28 byauthorities in an attempt to keep prominent opposition figures away from what has been a largelyleaderless protest movement. Police forces have battled demonstrators, and reports suggest thatviolence has escalated throughout Friday. As night fell on Cairo, the military reportedly wasdeploying to enforce an overnight nationwide curfew. It is unclear how the military mightrespond to continued mass unrest. The implications of the militarys deployment for continuedU.S. military assistance may be subject to debate in the 112th Congress.

Looking forward, the scale of the protests in January 2011 raises questions about the plannedpresidential election later this year, as well as about whether Gamal Mubarak will be able tosucceed his father; an assumption many observers had believed until now. Questions abound overwhether or not the military, given the depth of unrest, would allow a scenario of hereditarysuccession to transpire.

Presidential Succession: Who Will Follow Hosni Mubarak?

Since power in the Egyptian political system is highly concentrated in the office of the presidentand his cabinet, the issue of who will succeed President Hosni Mubarak is critical not just for theEgyptian people, but for Egypts relations with the international community and especially withthe United States. Since Mubarak has never personally named a successor and until last week haskept the vice presidents office vacant, the issue of presidential succession has been opaque toEgyptians and foreign observers alike for a decade, perhaps deliberately so. Nevertheless,

Mubaraks health problems in the spring of 2010 led many to speculate that a possible changingof the guard was imminent. While that did not materialize and his health has since improved,presidential elections set for September 2011 and the unrest in the wake of Tunisias popularrevolution have thrust the issue back into the limelight.

7 After Tunisia, Is Egypt Next?, The Atlantic, January 17, 2011.8 See the Central Intelligence Agencys World Factbook available online athttps://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html.


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For some U.S. policymakers, there is a desire to see an orderly, legal, and transparent transfer ofpower in which the incoming president maintains support for key U.S. goals: Egypts peace withIsrael, U.S. access to the Suez Canal, and general bilateral military cooperation. Others see apossible transition as an opportunity to change the trajectory of Egyptian politics away from amilitary dictatorship/oligarchy and toward a genuine democracy even if it empowers the Muslim

Brotherhood. While many analysts find the latters prospect highly unlikely due to the coercivepower of the Egyptian security services and their desire to maintain the status quo, democracyadvocates would like to see the United States vocally support a genuine free and fair presidentialelection in which all opposition groups are fairly represented.

Figure 1. Map of Egypt


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Managing Egypts Leadership Transition

The Legal Framework

Based on a series of constitutional amendments enacted in the last few years, ruling elites haveworked to establish the veneer of a legal framework to facilitate a smooth transition of power,despite claims by the opposition that the amendments are illegitimate. For potential presidentialcandidates not from the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP), Egyptian law sets a high bar forestablishing eligibility to run. For example, amended Article 76 states that for any candidate torun for president, he or she has to gain the approval of 250 members of elected assemblies andmunicipalities, including, among other signatures, 25 members of the Shura Council (upperhouse), which is almost entirely composed of pro-ruling party members. In addition, a candidatemust be a member of a political partys higher board for at least one year. 9 Parties that have had atleast one member in either house of parliament since May 1, 2007 are eligible to nominate acandidate for the presidency until 2017. Finally, all parties that nominate a candidate must havebeen legally operating for at least five consecutive years before the starting date of candidature.

If President Mubarak becomes incapacitated or dies in office, Article 84 of the Constitutionstates:

In case [of] vacancy of the Presidential office or the permanent disability of the President ofthe Republic, the Speaker of the Peoples Assembly shall temporarily assume thePresidency; and, if at that time, the Peoples Assembly is already dissolved, the President ofthe Supreme Constitutional Court shall take over the Presidency, provided, however, thatneither shall nominate himself for the Presidency, subject to abidance by the ban stipulatedin paragraph 2 of Article 82. The Peoples Assembly shall then proclaim the vacancy of theoffice of President. The President of the Republic shall be chosen within a maximum periodof 60 days from the day the Presidential office becomes vacant.

The 2010 elections for the Peoples Assembly (lower house) gave the NDP an overwhelmingmajority (96%), making it nearly impossible for any non-NDP endorsed candidates to obtain theconstitutionally-mandated 65 signatures from members of the Peoples Assembly to stand on theballot for president. Furthermore, only a handful of opposition parties, including the Wafd andTagammu, would be eligible to field a candidate in September 2011.

The next presidential election is scheduled for September 2011. In December 2010, GamalMubarak, the Presidents son and head of the NDP Policies Committee, announced that the NDPwill name its candidate for president 60 days before the scheduled presidential election.

The Contenders

Since Egypts legal framework favors pro-government candidates and many opposition activistscharge that elections are fraudulent, only a handful of NDP or military figures are consideredpresidential frontrunners, including the following.

9 However, an NDP member not in the partys leadership council could run as an independent if the partysrepresentatives in government endorsed such a figure.


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President Hosni MubarakThere are no term limits in Egypts Constitution restricting the rightof President Mubarak to stand for reelection and, should his health remain stable, many observersbelieve that he will run again, fulfilling his own pledge to serve until the last breath in my lungs,and the last beat of my heart. Nevertheless, the President has given no public indication of hisintentions to run for a sixth term in 2011, nor has he appointed a vice president. This cloud of

uncertainty surrounding his decision making may be deliberate. It preserves his authority while heremains in office. It also creates the possibility of a fait accompli for his designated successorshould his health seriously deteriorate. Perhaps the biggest unknown is whether or not PresidentMubarak has designated his successor to an innercircle of military and NDP party leaders who willloyally carry out his wishes after he is gone.

Gamal MubarakGamal Mubarak, thepresidents 47-year-old son, is, according to mostexperts, the overwhelming NDP favorite to followhis father. Over the last decade, the youngerMubarak has had a meteoric rise to the highest

levels of the NDP, suggesting to many observersthat his accession to the presidency may beimminent. Gamal Mubarak is alreadydeputy/assistant secretary general of the NDPparty, and was appointed to the NDPs new 50-member Supreme Council, which will choose thepartys presidential candidate. Many observersassert that changes to Egypts Constitution directlycorrelate to Gamal Mubaraks rising politicalprofile and that they pave the way for his ascent tothe presidency. Despite lacking an official positionin the government, Gamal Mubarak has

accompanied his father on at least two officialvisits to Washington, D.C., most recently inSeptember 2010 at the start of Israeli-Palestinianpeace talks.

Most observers suggest that Gamals strength, aside from having the right last name, is that hesymbolizes Egyptian corporate elites vision of economic development. Gamal appearsparticularly comfortable touting the benefits of economic reform and, over the last decade, theEgyptian cabinet has featured several of Gamals political allies who have attempted to spurmacroeconomic growth, with some success. With Egypt at peace with Israel and having defeatedIslamist insurgent groups in the late 1990s, a considerable number of businessmen would like tosee a leader, such as Gamal Mubarak, who symbolizes private sector growth rather than themilitary. The Coptic Church leadership also is reportedly a major backer of Gamals candidacy,believing that Gamal will continue his fathers policy of supporting church autonomy in exchangefor the loyalty of the Coptic Pope and his disciples.10

On the other hand, Gamal Mubaraks lack of military experience may hinder his candidacy in theeyes of old guard politicians/military leaders. The armed forces and intelligence services, though

10 Oxford Analytica,EGYPT: Pope Shenouda could play key role in succession, October 7, 2010.

At a Glance: Egyptian PresidentHosni Mubarak

At age 82, President Hosni Mubarak has ruled for 29years since ascending to presidency in 1981 afterthe assassination of Anwar Sadat. The following is asummary of his recent health issues:

2003During a speech to parliament, Mubarakreportedly collapsed from what officials described aseither the flu, effects of taking certain medication,

fatigue from fasting during Ramadan, or a drop inblood pressure due to a cold. He then returned tothe podium an hour later.

2004Mubarak undergoes surgery for a slippeddisc at a hospital in Munich, Germany. Mubarakdelegated executive powers to then prime ministerAtef Ebeid.

2009In May, the Mubarak family suffered atragedy when the Presidents 12-year-old grandsondied of an undisclosed illness. Observers suggestedthat the loss of his grandson took a heavy toll onMubaraks health.

2010President Mubaraks undergoes surgery in

Germany. He remained there for three weeks inrecovery. Mubarak designed executive authority toPrime Minister Ahmed Nazif.


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they are less politically visible than in years past, still hold the levers of power in Egyptianpolitics, and they most likely will back a leader who represents their interests as well.Furthermore, the idea of hereditary succession may be distasteful to Egyptian officers who stillbelieve in the 1952 Free Officers revolution which overthrew the monarchy and established themodern republic.

Some analysts suggest that the defense/internal security establishments confidence in Gamalsleadership is uncertain. According to one Israeli academic, It is possible that [PresidentMubarak] has so far avoided declaring his support for Gamals candidacy due to uncertaintyconcerning the support of security top brass. In such a situation, Hosni Mubarak might opt to runfor another term.11 In a recentNew York Times article on succession, military officials and retiredofficers expressed reservations over Gamal Mubarak and said that the military would notsupport his candidacy without ironclad guarantees that it would retain its pre-eminent position inthe nation's affairs.12 Others suggest that President Mubarak has quietly secured high-levelsupport for Gamal Mubarak in the military, intelligence, and Ministry of Interior forces andforced out possible opponents of Gamals succession.

In the summer of 2010, amid rumors of President Mubaraks ailing health, some NDP figuresreportedly backed a pre-campaign movement in support of Gamal Mubaraks candidacy. Dubbedthe Popular Coalition/Campaign for the Support of Gamal Mubarak, the initiative has receivedattention for posting campaign posters in poor Cairo neighborhoods with such slogans as, GamalMubarak: dream/hope of the poor, Egypt is calling on you, and Gamal Mubarak: a newbeginning for Egypt. Ironically, the campaign coordinator is Magdy el Kordy, a formeropposition leader of the leftist Al Tagammu (Rally) party. According to Mustapha Kamal, apolitical science professor at Cairo University, I think this campaign began at the proposal ofsome businessmen who fear a deterioration in President Mubarak's health and believe that it isbetter to quicken Gamal's succession while his father is around.13 Slogans among tens ofthousands of protestors on the street in January 2011 called for Gamal and his family to stepdown and flee the country.

Omar SuleimanUnless a new figure comes to light in the next year, analysts have speculatedthat the only other viable candidate for the presidency is Egyptian intelligence chief OmarSuleiman. However, at age 75, it is unlikely that Suleiman, should he become president, wouldrule for a long period of time. Furthermore, as head of Egypts General Intelligence Service(GIS), Suleiman would need to retire from military service since active-duty military officers arenot allowed membership in political parties.14 In addition, if Suleiman desired party sponsorship,he would need to be a member of a partys supreme council for at least one year before theelection. Suleiman is currently engaged in a number of sensitive diplomatic operations and is oneof President Mubaraks closest confidants, making his departure from military service unlikely.

Suleimans relationship with Gamal Mubarak is the subject of intense speculation by observers ofEgyptian politics. Some suggest that in the event Gamal Mubarak becomes president, Omar

11 Yoram Meital, Approaching the End of the Mubarak Era: Egypts Achievements and Challenges,Institute forNational Security Studies, Strategic Survey for Israel 2010Shlomo Brom and Anat Kurz, Editors , 2010.12 "Succession Gives Army A Stiff Test In Egypt,"New York Times, September 11, 2010.13 "Is he running? Mystery surrounds Mubarak Jr 'presidency bid' ,"Agence France Presse, August 20, 2010.14 Others suggest that Omar Suleiman has not been an active duty officer since 1984 and that if he was determined toserve as a candidate, he would overcome the legal technicalities barring his candidacy.


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Suleiman would serve as his unofficial tutor and assist in military and intelligence matters.Supporters of this theory note that back in 2007, Suleiman served as the official witness atGamals wedding, displaying his loyalty to the Mubarak family.15 According to one closeassociate of Gamal Mubarak, Mohammad Kamal (Hosni Mubaraks former campaign manager),Is Omar Suleiman powerful? Yes he is. Does he have a strong say in politics? Yes. But any

talk about Omar Suleiman drafting domestic policy or competing for power is pure exaggerationand fiction.16 Others posit that should Hosni Mubarak pass away while in office, OmarSuleimans loyalties to Gamal would dissipate, and many in the military and intelligencecommunity would support him.

Ahmed Shafiq69-year-old Ahmed Shafiq, the current Minister of Aviation and former AirForce Commander, is considered a long shot candidate. Observers are intrigued over thespeculation surrounding his potential candidacy due to his background as a military officer whosuccessfully transitioned to the private sector, a profile that epitomizes the modern Egyptianleader. Shafiq is largely credited with revitalizing Egypt Air and expanding Cairo internationalairport. He also served in the Air Force under Hosni Mubaraks command and reportedly is closeto the Mubarak family. According to one unnamed source, Shafiq has a good reputation. He's

tough, honest, and low-key. His name is definitely out there.

17

Field Marshal and Defense Minister Mohammed Hussein TantawiThough too old to beconsidered a long term replacement for President Mubarak, 75-year-old General Tantawi, aMubarak loyalist, might be considered as a possible short-term presidential placeholder. Expertsbelieve that Tantawi, one of the most powerful army officers, would be more likely to serve asone of the few behind-the-scenes regime decision-makers who guide Egypt through the transitionfrom Mubarak to his successor. It is unclear whether or not Tantawi supports Gamal Mubarak orthe idea of hereditary succession. Tantawis Chief of Staff, General Sami Annan, also isconsidered a key decision-maker in the Army and possible behind-the-scenes player in the eventthe military becomes involved in the succession issue. It is unclear what implications, if any, thearmys reported deployment to quell January 2011 protests will have on its potential role as an

arbiter of future leadership questions.

The Opposition

For many Egyptians, young or old, educated or uneducated, urban or rural, and secular orreligious, there is widespread opposition to the concept of hereditary dictatorship.18 Until theprotests of January 2011, there was little way of quantifying the depth of this opposition orassessing the willingness of activists to protest against it, should such a scenario come to pass.Now, it is clear. Many Egyptians want President Mubarak to leave office and his son not to inheritpower. Popular protests against Gamal Mubarak and a familial succession have transpired fornearly a decade, and opposition movements have been formed solely to thwart such a transitionfrom occurring. To his opponents, Gamal Mubarak is the ultimate symbol of Egyptian corruption,

corporate greed, and growing wealth imbalance between workers and private sector elites.

15 "And as a wedding gift from Dad, Egypt's presidency?," Los Angeles Times, May 5, 2007.16 "Powerful Egyptian Spy Chief No Longer Behind the Scenes,"Los Angeles Times, February 8, 2005.17 "New Contender Emerges in Egypt," Wall Street Journal, December 10, 2010.18 When speaking of a father to son succession, Egyptians use the term tawrith al sulta, translated as inheritance ofpower.


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Until the riots of January 2011, many observers believed that the Egyptian opposition wasfractured and feckless and easily manipulated by pro-government forces backed by the veil ofphysical force.19 As has been the case for many years, the Muslim Brotherhood, a political,religious, charitable, and educational group that has been banned as a political party since 1954,remains the only well-organized opposition movement in Egypt today. Other political parties

(Wafd and Ayman Nours Al Ghad partynow banned), labor demonstrations, secular protestmovements (Kefaya, April 6th), and spontaneous demonstrations organized through online socialnetworks all exist in the sphere of opposition politics, but, until January 2011, no single issue orevent was able to unite them against the primary institutions of Egyptian rule, President Mubarak,the NDP party, NDP-affiliated businessmen, and the security forces.

Despite more international attention to Egyptian politics in the last decade, widespreadassumptions held that the apparent political apathy permeating Egyptian society would preventthe kind of mass mobilization capable of bringing about change. These assumptions have beenbrought into question by recent events. As recently as June 2010, Mohamed Sherdy, a high-levelmember of the opposition Wafd party, argued that The people now brand [opposition parties] aspart of the same political charade. We're all facing the same problems, and we all committed

the same mistakeswhich is partially losing touch and partially losing hope.

20

Similarly, StevenCook, an Egypt specialist at the Council on Foreign Relations, suggested in July 2010 that

There is a curious tendency for some reform-minded young professionals to throw their lotin with the regime, despite a professed desire for a fundamental transformation of Egyptianpolitics and society. Protestations abound about the desire to effect change from workingwithin the state apparatus, but reality is that the Egyptian regime manifests a powerfulsystem of reward and punishment that encourages a measure of political conformity for thosenot willing to take their risks with Egypt's vaunted internal security services.21

Cooks dispatch from Cairo in January 2011 paint a much different picture in response to therelatively unorganized but undeniably widespread activism that emerged across the country.Experts have often suggested that poverty, not politics, is foremost on the minds of most

Egyptians, but it appears that the confluence of political and economic frustrations on display inrecent protests have reached a decisive point. According to the World Bank, 16.7% of Egyptianslive below the poverty line (though this figure is trending downward). Millions more struggle aslow wage urban laborers, and 30% of all workers are small subsistence farmers. High rates ofinflation (between 9% and 12% annually) hurt all Egyptians, especially those aspiring to a middleclass lifestyle. Moreover, lack of upward mobility is a major source of frustration for youngworkers. More than half of the Egyptian population is under the age of 24, and approximately600,000 Egyptians join the labor market each year, putting enormous strains on the public and

19

Though periodically Egyptian secular and Islamist (Muslim Brotherhood) opposition groups/political parties unite toprotest government repression. According to the Economist Intelligence Unit, In the 1984 parliamentary election theBrotherhood won 15% of the vote in an alliance with the Wafd Party and in 1987 it campaigned with the Labour andLiberal parties under the slogan Islam is the Solution. Although the names of such political parties suggest a secularliberal ideology, Islam still offers a common ground to unite the small opposition parties. However, such alliances havetended to be temporary and ineffectual in the long term. See, A Potential Coalition of Opposition Leaders Emerges,EIU Egypt Country Report, January 1, 2011.20 "Support for Egypt's Opposition Parties Wanes," Wall Street Journal, June 14, 2010.21 "Can Egypt Change?: Political Institutions Need Reform,"foreignpolicy.com, July 22, 2010.


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private sectors to keep pace.22 Unemployment and underemployment remain high, as about 50%of males and 90% of females remain jobless two years after graduating college.23

Yet, observers suggest that while Egypt faces developmental challenges, such challenges have notyet been accompanied by frequent political unrest. According to anEconomistspecial report on

Egypt:

By and large, though, poor Egyptians grumble surprisingly little. There are some positivereasons for their forbearance. Strong bonds among extended families, neighborly solidarityand the Muslim tradition of charity support many of the needy. Egypt has very low crimerates, and it is the poorest who feel most secure in their homes. With their street life andintimacy under year-round sunshine, Egypts slums are often less grim than those in othercountries. Sociologists have long noted the knack of Egypts poor to appropriate things theylack, such as space and freedom, by nimbly skirting the rules. Egypt may be chaotic, but it isoften joyfully so. However, there are also less attractive reasons for public passivity. One ofthem is fear. Corporal punishment and physical violence persist in Egyptian homes andschools and, most notoriously, in police custody. All of this provides another reason whyso many Egyptians have, for so long, shied away from voicing complaints. In their

experience no one is likely to listen unless they are a relative, a friend, or amenable to abribe. In theory citizens are represented by their MPs, but all too many people enterparliament for perks such as immunity from prosecution. Litigation is possible butunattractive because the courts are slow, capricious and open to corruption.24

Until January 2011, on the issue of presidential succession, there were no indications that thislong-standing pattern of behavior shows any sign of changing, despite the injection of newpersonalities into the mix, such as Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, the former Director General of theInternational Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and 2005 Nobel Prize winner. ElBaradei haspublicly expressed his intention to reform the political system, amend the constitution, andpossibly run for president as an independent candidate. President Mubarak has said that ElBaradeican run for president as an independent so long as he respects the constitution. Becauseindependent presidential candidates must meet extremely rigid criteria in order to run, ElBaradei

has called for free and fair elections that are monitored by both Egyptian judges and internationalmonitors. He also has insisted that the constitution be amended in order to remove all legalimpediments that limit the majority of the people from becoming candidates.

Since returning to Egypt in February 2010 after a 27-year absence, ElBaradei has formed a newpolitical organization called the National Association for Change. He has allied his organizationwith the Muslim Brotherhood, though the latter rejected his call for a boycott of the 2010parliamentary elections. In January 2011, ElBaradei called for a boycott of the 2011 presidentialelection, stating that According to these rules, only five peopleout of some 85 millionEgyptianscan qualify to stand in elections. It would be better if the president appointed hisown successorthan to subject the Egyptian people to the farce of elections.25

22 Egypt Economy: Demographic Profile,EIU ViewsWire, July 7, 2010.23 "Mubarak and Son Limited,"Africa Confidential, January 7, 2011.24 No Paradise, The Economist, July 17, 2010.25 Open Source Center, "Egypt: ElBaradei Calls For Boycott of Presidential Election," Al-Masry Al-Youm Online ,January 9, 2011, Document ID# GMP20110110839002.


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The Egypt-Gaza Border: Can Iranian Weapons Smuggling to

Hamas be Stopped?

Since 2007, Hamas, the Palestinian-Islamist terrorist group/political party, has controlled theGaza Strip, and Israel and Egypt, in order to keep Hamas contained and isolated, have generallysealed Gazas land and sea borders. However, Palestinians in Gaza and Sinai Bedouin Arabs inEgypt have used and expanded a decades-old network of underground tunnels beneath the Gaza-Egypt border to smuggle Iranian-supplied weapons to Hamas and other Palestinian militantgroups. According to various sources, these groups receive weapons that emanate from Iran,Yemen, and elsewhere. Smugglers ship weapons up the Red Sea through Sudan and then overlandthrough the Sinai desert until they reach tunnels in the divided town of Rafah, Egypt at the border.In December 2010, Israels Shin Bet internal security service issued a report asserting that Irancontinued to serve as Hamas's dominant supplier of weaponry throughout the past year, usingsmuggling routes in Sudan and Sinai to send various mortars, rockets, and anti-tank missiles toHamas in Gaza.26 Prior to the release of the report, Israel claimed that Hamas gunmen fired aKornet anti-tank missile at an Israeli Merkava tank along the Gaza border.

Although Egypt may not be as diligent as Israel in sealing its borders with Gaza, it still considersHamas a neighboring threat. Egypt would like to keep Hamas contained and not be heldresponsible by Israel for ruling Gaza as it did between 1948 and 1967. The secular Mubarakregime is opposed to Islamists wielding real political power, and it fears that Hamas could serveas a model for Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood activists who the regime believes may seek toestablish an Iranian-style theocracy in Egypt. In addition, Egypt seeks to maintain a mostly sealedborder with Gaza in order to keep Palestinian civilians from entering the Sinai peninsula in largenumbers, as they did during a January 2008 border breach. Egypt also is concerned about thesecurity of the Sinai peninsula and Hamass (and Hezbollahs) relationship with Sinai Bedouins.Cairo fears the prospect of Hamas sleeper cells in Sinai being activated to carry out anti-Israeliattacks. In August 2010, militants launched rockets at the Israeli Red Sea coastal city of Eilat, buthit the neighboring Jordanian city of Aqaba, killing a taxi driver and wounding four others.

Egypt has followed Israels lead in its blockade of Gaza in order to pressure Hamas intoreconciling with the more moderate Fatah party and merge with the Palestinian Authority in theWest Bank. Some Israelis accuse Egyptian authorities of turning a blind eye to the smugglingtrade underneath the divided town of Rafah on the Egyptian-Gaza border, while other U.S. andsome Israeli officials have praised Egypt for taking a tougher stance on arms smuggling throughthe tunnels. In 2010, Egypt constructed a steel barrier along the border to deter tunnel-digging,though anecdotal reports suggest that smugglers are penetrating the wall with standardblowtorches.

The United States has provided Egypt with Foreign Military Financing (FMF) aid to bolster itsborder security and combat tunnel smuggling, including:

$30.35 million for a Mobile Ground Surveillance Radar and Support System; $16.37 million for a Coastal Border Surveillance System; $8.09 million for an Electro Optical Surveillance System;

26 "Iran Smuggled Hundreds of Rockets, Dozens of missiles to Gaza in 2010,"Jerusalem Post, December 31, 2010.


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$28.60 million for a Border Tunnel Activity and Detection System; $7.23 million for a Mobile field workshop equipment and support; and $25.63 million for other ground surveillance systems.27

Promoting Democracy in Egypt: What Is the U.S. Role?

Since the 1952 revolution, Egypt has officially been a republic, and its political system hasdeveloped some aspects of a democracy, though most observers continue to describe Egypt as anauthoritarian regime dominated by a strong president, who draws his support from the rulingNational Democratic Party (NDP) and the military. Under the 1971 constitution, authority isvested in an elected president who must stand for reelection every six years.28 The presidentappoints the cabinet, which generally drafts and submits legislation to the legislature: the PeoplesAssembly (lower house) and the Shura Council (upper house). The Peoples Assembly debateslegislation proposed by government ministries and calls for amendments to government-sponsored bills but rarely initiates its own bills. The Shura Council has modest legislative powersand must ratify treaties and constitutional amendments. Overall, analysts consider Egypts

legislative branch to be weak; the ruling party constitutes an overwhelming majority. Based onlow voter turnout in recent elections, there appears to be a clear lack of public confidence in theparliament.

U.S. attitudes toward Egypts political system range from passionate opposition to a perceivedbrutal regime to passive acceptance of a stable government that is largely supportive of U.S.foreign policy goals in the Middle East, specifically the pursuit of Arab-Israeli peace. This lack ofconsensus hinders any uniform U.S. approach toward how to best promote democracy in Egypt.To the extent that there is agreement among experts, most espouse the general principle that apolitically and economically vibrant Egypt at peace with its neighbors and legitimate to its ownpeople is not only good for most Egyptian citizens but for U.S. national interests. However, whenit comes to formulating policy to enforce these principles, democracy advocates clash with

realists over the degree of U.S. pressure to place on the Mubarak government, while Egyptitself resists U.S. attempts to influence its domestic politics, charging that U.S. interferenceempowers the Muslim Brotherhood.

Some experts believe that Egypt is already changing in profound ways due to the global spread ofinformation technology, rising economic inequality, and demography, and that the United Statesneeds to vocalize its support for reform regardless of its capacity to bring it about. According toMichele Dunne, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, I think thatthe United States should advocate democratization and greater respect for human rights forEgyptians. This does not mean that the U.S. can make these things happen in Egypt, but weshould be clear that we are in favor and willing to use the influence we have to promote them.29

27 Information provided to CRS by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), January 11, 2011.28 In 1980, the Constitution was amended to allow the president to run for an unlimited number of terms, rather thanone as was stipulated in the 1971 Constitution. An English language version of the Egyptian Constitution is available athttp://www.parliament.gov.eg/EPA/en/sections.jsp?typeID=1&levelid=54&parentlevel=6&levelno=2.29 "Middle East: As Egypt Cracks Down On Critics, U.S. Looks Away," Inter Press Service, November 8, 2010.


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Among the many reforms advocated by proponents of a more democratic Egypt, advocates wouldlike to see: (1) the Emergency Law30 abolished in line with Mubaraks 2005 campaign promise;(2) constitutional reforms enacted to ease barriers for independent and opposition candidates torun for office; (3) judicial independence31 restored by eliminating the state-controlled SupremeJudicial Council that appoints judges; (4) the Legislative branch strengthened; (5) restrictions on

non-governmental organizations curtailed,32

and (5) presidential term limits adopted.

Human Rights and Religious Freedom

Human Rights

As a major recipient of U.S. assistance, Egypt has been of great interest to lawmakers, some ofwhom believe that portions of U.S. aid should be conditioned on improvements in Egypts humanrights record. According to the U.S. State Departments 2009 Country Reports on Human RightsPractices, the governments respect for human rights remained poor, and serious abusescontinued in many areas. The 2009 report, as in past years, documents several instances of

torture allegedly carried out by Egyptian security forces. The prison system, particularly detentionfacilities used for incarcerating suspected Islamist radicals, has come under international scrutinyfor exacerbating militancy in the region due to its tendency to harden some criminals who havebeen tortured over prolonged periods of time. Several of Al Qaedas leaders, including second-in-command Ayman al Zawahiri, are former prisoners in Egyptian jails.

On the positive side, the 2009 report did mention that the government had taken some stepsforward in specific areas, stating:

The government promulgated procedures for members of unrecognized religions, includingthe Baha'i faith, to obtain national identification documents and reportedly issued 17 suchdocuments and 70 birth certificates to Baha'i during the year. The government also permittedthe newly formed Real Estate Tax Collectors Union, the countrys only independent labor

union, to operate. For the first time in the countrys history, a UN special rapporteur and anindependent expert visited at the governments invitation.33

30 Under the emergency law, the government can hold an individual for up to 30 days without charge. In May 2010,parliament approved a two-year extension of the emergency laws, which have been in place since Sadats assassinationin 1981. During his 2005 election campaign, President Mubarak pledged to introduce a number of reforms, includingthe elimination of the emergency laws which have been used to quell political dissent by holding people without chargefor long periods and referring civilians to military courts, where they have fewer rights.31 In addition, proponents of greater judicial independence in Egypt also would like to see the restoration of judicialsupervision of elections and the elimination of state security courts. Earlier versions of the Constitution required that

balloting take place under the supervision of a judicial body. Amended article 88 of the Constitution transfers theoversight of elections to a higher committee (Supreme Electoral Commission), which, although made up of some

judges, removes most from direct oversight of balloting stations.32 In Egypt, NGOs are required to apply for legal status and, according to Association Law 84-2003, NGOs must beregistered with the Ministry of Social Affairs. There are an estimated 16,000 registered civic organizations in Egypt. Insome cases, it may take years before the ministry rules on an application, and many groups are routinely rejected.Often, no response is given to the application, leaving an organization in legal limbo. If an NGOs application isrejected, it has few legal rights and can be shut down.33 See, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/nea/136067.htm.


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In June 2010, two policemen in Alexandria murdered 28-year-old Khaled Said, who shortlybefore his death had posted an online video showing police officers dividing up money seized in adrugs bust. Saids head had been smashed against a marble staircase, and his killing sparked daysof street protest and widespread international condemnation. Under pressure, the governmentprosecuted the two accused police officers. The Obama Administration issued a press release on

Saids killing, stating that the United States is concerned about the death of Khaled MohammedSaid at the hands of Egyptian security forces in Alexandria on June 6th. We have been in touchwith the Egyptian Government on this matter. We welcome the Governments announcement of afull investigation and we urge that it be done transparently and in a manner consistent with theserious allegations that have been made. Perhaps in a politicized attempt to demonstrateleadership, Gamal Mubarak also spoke out against Saids murder, stating Justice must take itscourse. The party insists on the accountability of any wrongdoer within the framework ofjustice, transparency and the rule of law.34

Religious Freedom

In its 2010 report on religious freedom in Egypt, the U.S. State Department concludes that the

status of respect for religious freedom by the government remained poor, unchanged from theprevious year. Although the Egyptian constitution provides for equal rights without regard toreligion, in practice, discrimination against Copts (between 9 and 12% of the population),Bahais, and other small religious communities persists at the both the official and societal levels.Certain residual issues can trigger outbursts of sectarian violence. These include:

Land disputes. Conflicts over land ownership have triggered a number of violentincidents involving members of different religious sects, particularly in ruralUpper (southern) Egypt.

Religious conversions . The conversion of Copts to Islam, as well as the marriageof Coptic women to Muslim men, has been a constant irritant in Muslim-Copticrelations. Converts to Christianity in Egypt also may face bureaucratic obstaclesin registering their new religious status with the government. There also is theissue of forced conversions. The 2010 State Department report states that As inprevious years, there were occasional claims of Muslim men forcing Copticwomen and girls to convert to Islam. Reports of such cases were disputed andoften included inflammatory allegations and categorical denials of kidnappingand rape. In November 2009 an international Christian advocacy group publisheda report regarding alleged cases of forced conversion; however, well-respectedlocal human rights groups were unable to verify such cases and found itextremely difficult to determine whether compulsion was used, as most casesinvolved a female Copt who converted to Islam when she married a maleMuslim. Reports of such cases almost never appear in the local media.35

Church repair and construction. Copts have consistently complained ofexcessive bureaucracy when repairing or building churches. For example, the 10articles of Humayun, or the Humayun Code, a portion of Ottoman legislationfrom 1856, still controls the building or repair of churches in Egypt and is a

34 "Egypt President's Son Wants Justice in Activist Death,"Reuters, July 6, 2010.35 U.S. State Department, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 2010 Report on International ReligiousFreedom, Near East and North Africa, Egypt, November 17, 2010.


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source of great aggravation to Coptic Christians. Under this law, a license isrequired to erect a church. In addition, there are 10 restricting conditions for theconstruction of churches, including a minimum distance between churches andbetween a church and the nearest mosque, as well as the absence of objection onthe part of Muslim neighbors. In December 2004, President Mubarak issued a

new decree that devolved church repair and reconstruction decisions to theprovincial level and stipulated that churches would be permitted to proceed withrebuilding and repair without legal hindrance. However, permits for constructionof new churches require a presidential decree.

Typically, after an outbreak of Coptic-Muslim violence, both the government and the CopticOrthodox Church rapidly respond to ease communal tensions. However, more often than not, theEgyptian government only acts to redress the immediate causes of violence rather than theunderlying symptoms. Despite being nearly 10% of Egypts population of 81 million, Copts arenot widely represented at the highest levels of Egyptian institutions. There is only one provincialgovernor who is Christian (of 28). Few, if any, Christians serve as police commissioners, citymayors, public university presidents, or deans. Christians hold less than 2% of the seats in thePeoples Assembly and Shura Council. There are few Christians in the upper ranks of the securityservices and armed forces. Public funds compensate Muslim imams but not Christian clergy. Onlythree of the cabinets 32 ministers are Christians.

2011 Church Bombing in Alexandria

On January 1, 2011, a suicide bomber detonated explosives outside the Al Qiddissin (Two Saints)church in Alexandria, Egypt, killing 21 people and injuring many more. Coptic worshippers wereattending midnight mass at the church on New Years Eve when a bomb was detonated near theentranceway. Authorities are investigating and no group has claimed responsibility. The attacksparked widespread Coptic protests against the government for failing to protect the community,and officials were quick to blame foreign elements. President Mubarak stated that the attack was

a terrorist operation that carries, within itself, the hallmark of foreign hands which want to turnEgypt into another scene of terrorism like elsewhere in the region and the wider world. 36

There is some suspicion, though unproven, that Al Qaeda in Iraq (the Islamic State of Iraq) isbehind the bombing. This group has previously threatened Egyptian Copts and churches overalleged Coptic mistreatment of female converts to Islam. In July 2010, a Coptic priest's wife,Camilia Shehata, allegedly converted to Islam, and the Egyptian government allowed Copticauthorities to take Shehata, who remains in an undisclosed location under Church supervision.The Church organizes so-called advice-giving sessions for converts and would-be converts toother religions reportedly in order to dissuade them. The Shehata case angered Islamists and someprotested outside a mosque adjacent to Al Qiddissin calling for her release.

On January 23, 2011, Egyptian authorities accused a Palestinian militant group in Gaza, known asthe Army of Islam, of perpetrating the suicide bombing on January 1 in Alexandria. The InteriorMinister also asserted that several Egyptians connected to the attack were in custody and hadprovided details about how they were recruited by the Gaza group.37

36 "A State of Sectarian Denial,"Middle East Report Online, January 11, 2011.37 "Egypt Links Palestinians to Attack at Church,"New York Times, January 23, 2011.


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Sudan Referendum and Nile River Basin

Perhaps of greatest direct concern to Egypt is the situation to its south in Sudan, where southernSudanese residents held a referendum on self-determination in January 2011. Maintaining theunity of Sudan and preserving Egypts share of Nile River flows are primary Egyptian national

security interests. However, with the voting results expected to favor secession, Egyptiandiplomats have been scrambling for alternative solutions which would preserve the countrysoverall unity. Egypt has advocated for southern Sudans confederation with the north, wherebyeach entity would be an independent country, but would share a single currency and have a singleforeign policy. This approach has been rejected by many including the United States. Egypt alsohas sought to delay the referendum to no avail. For several years, Egypt has been preparing for apossible southern Sudanese state and has helped build hospitals, schools and power stations in thesouth in order to curry influence there. It has dispatched 1,200 observers and peacekeepers to thesouth. In November 2008, President Mubarak made a historic visit to Juba, the capital of Sudanssemiautonomous southern enclave.

Egypt fears that its share of the Nile will be curtailed by either a new southern Sudanese state or

other upstream countries further south. The Nile is the lifeblood of Egypt and its main source offreshwater. The Blue Nile and White Nile converge in Sudans capital of Khartoum. According toone Egyptian academic, For Egypt, a threat to the Nile constitutes a threat to national security....In the 1970s, when Ethiopia prepared to embark on river projects that infringed on Egypt's shareof water, (late president Anwar) Sadat threatened to declare war in response. In late 2009,Ethiopia's prime minister, Meles Zenawi, reportedly stated publicly that Egypt cannot win a waragainst Ethiopia over Nile water sharing.38 The Blue Nile begins in Lake Tana in Ethiopia, where85% of the Nile waters originate.

In April 2010, Ethiopia, Uganda, Tanzania, Kenya, and Rwanda agreed to their own Nile BasinInitiative formula plan (formally known as the Comprehensive Framework Agreement) forsharing the river. Under their plan, each country would have more freedom to build irrigation and

dam projects than is currently allowed. The Democratic Republic of Congo and Burundi have yetto sign the deal. Under agreements dating back to 1929 and 1959, Egypt and Sudan (after itsindependence in 1956) controlled 80% of the Niles entire flow. Egypt is demanding that it retainits share while providing more economic aid and water efficiency assistance to upstream states.Egypt and Sudan have until May 2011 to resume negotiations, or else the upstream countries havesaid they will activate the new agreement.

The Muslim Brotherhood

The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) was founded in Egypt in 1928 to turn Egypt away fromsecularism and toward an Islamic government based on sharia (religious) law and Muslimprinciples. The MB operates as a religious charitable and educational institution, having been

banned as a political party in 1954; however, many Brotherhood members run for parliament asindependents. In the 2000 parliamentary elections, 17 independent candidates regarded asBrotherhood sympathizers were elected. In 2005, Brotherhood-affiliated candidates won 88 seatsin parliament. In 2010, just one MB candidate was elected, and the group withdrew fromelections after the first round of voting accusing the government of fraud. Over the years, the

38 "Pope's Mediation Needed over Nile Tensions with Ethiopia,"Economist Intelligence Unit, January 2011.


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Egyptian government has alternated between tolerating and suppressing the Muslim Brotherhood,sometimes arresting and jailing its members, and other times allowing them to operate almostwithout hindrance.

Many foreign observers agree that the organization renounced its former policy of using of

violence as a political tactic decades ago, and point out that the former Brotherhood membersmost committed to violence largely gravitated toward organizations form

congressional research service - egypt, background and us role

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