CONSCIOUS A N D NON-CONSCIOUS MENTAL FUNCTIONS ELEANOR M. CHALFANT, A.M.

Consciousness, or the state of being conscious, is the most patent and omni- present fact of human experience. The term “consciousness” has such universal meanings and connotations that it is used by common consent even though no satisfactory definition or demonstra- tion of its nature has been forthcoming. Mind has been defined as the totality of conscious states involving sensations, memories, emotions, ideas, and other data which give man knowledge of his existence and condition. These con- siderations lead to the definition of psy- chology as the study of human behavior with conscious experience as the locus.

The word “conscious” implies the existence of mental states which are not conscious. Leibnitz (51 ) differenti-

,ated between perception as the observa- tion of external objects, and appercep- tion as conscious or reflective knowledge of these observations. The first sys- tematic theory of the relationship of conscious to non-conscious elements of experience was outlined by Herbart (25), who believed that in the conflicts of opposing ideas, the weaker ones were repressed from consciousness. More recently, psychoanalytic and psychiatric viewpoints insist that non-conscious mental activities are as significant as conscious for the understanding of behavior. Any thorough summary must include a discussion of both conscious and non-conscious manifestations.

THE NATURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS

Many of the difficulties encountered in defining the conscious or conscious- ness arise from confusion as to whether it should be considered a structure or a

process. Structural concepts, such as that of Boring (3 ) , describe “dimen- sions of consciousness” as being quality, extensity, intensity, and propensity (duration), implying that conscious- ness has structural manifestations. Woodworth (76) believes that such terms are properly used only as adverbs ; thus, a person acts consciously or un- consciously. Other psychologists speak of the content of consciousness, im- plying that such a state exists and is composed of a number of observable processes.

Consciousness has never been ade- quately defined. Some definitions de- scribe the characteristics of conscious- ness, while others attempt to delineate the functions performed by conscious- ness. An understanding of its nature may be obtained from a consideration of the following outline of descriptive characteristics :

1. Consciousness is synonymous with the waking state of the organism (41). Modified states of consciousness occur in the partial or disturbed awareness in dreams, hypnotism, stupors and delirium (16, 20, 34, 56, 66). 2. Consciousness is subjectively unique

to each individual, and is not amenable to objective study (68). 3. Consciousness involves a stream of

continuously changing sensations, percep- tions, memories, emotions and other ex- periences (33). 4. Consciousness is characterized by

thresholds and levels of attention (77). Attention fluctuates momentarily, produc- ing variations in the clearness of con- sciousness.

5. Although consciousness is increased in rough proportion to the level of motor activity at any moment, it is not synony- mous with motor activity. Conscious-

78 ELEANOR M. CHALFANT

ness and motor activity are the effects, rather than causes, of activity in the cen- tral nervous system ( 1 1,31,46,49,71,73, 69).

6. Consciousness may be altered or de- creased in a constant manner by appro- priate drugs, mechanical shocks, hypnosis, disease, and other agents (9, 16, 18, 20, 31, 45, 56, 61).

7. Consciousness has been correlated with the temporal course of brain poten- tials as measured by the electroencephalo- gram (2, 5, 18, 70)

The latest experimental and clinical evidence (56, 61) indicates that con- sciousness is represented in the dien- cephalon, probably in the hypothalamic centers about the third ventricle. Rea- soning from Spencer’s statement :

“The seat of consciousness is that nerv- ous center to which mediately or imme- diately the most heterogeneous impres- sions are brought,” Penfield (56) concludes that the only neural region capable of satisfying these requirements lies above the midbrain and below the cortex. The probable localization of consciousness in the an- terior and inferior half of the walls of the third ventricle adjacent to centers regulating sleep, tonus, vasomotor, thermal, cardiac and respiratory proc- esses provides important clues in ex- plaining its controlling influence on the whole brain (41). This opinion is supported by experimental lesions of the hypothalamus which produce loss of consciousness for varying intervals of time (9 ,61) . Clinical syndromes of the thalamus produce similar disturbances of consciousness and emotion (16, 56). The role of the frontal lobes in the de- termination of consciousness is diffi- cult to ascertain; probably they are represented in, but not indispensable for, consciousness (57).

Further insight is gained through a consideration of the following func-

tions which consciousness plays in the mental economy :

1. Consciousness makes possible dis- criminatory and selective reactions whereby the organism escapes from a mechanistic control of behavior by the en- vironment (28, 45, 47).

2. Consciousness is related to Purpose and Will. I t enables the organism to de- termine its own coursesof action (44, 48, 63).

3. Consciousness enables the organism to perceive and interpret the environment in the light of past experience. It inte- grates past experience with future ex- pectations to enable the ormnism to react appropriately to present needs (29, 47, 62.64.65).

4. Con&iousness is aroused when the organism must make some difficult or novel adjustment. Perfected responses become automatic, and consciousness is diminished. Difficult new problems arouse tensions which eventually become con- scious, and all the potentialities of the organism are mobilized (29, 45, 47).

5. Consciousness is associated with the development of Ego, self-consciousness. and self-control. The child is at first aware of a wide variety of non-personal objects. Gradually a stream of ever- present organic sensations are differen- tiated and serve as a coenesthetic core for the budding realization of Self. Conscious- ness has been described as a mirror into which we continually gaze ( 1 , 10,62,64).

6. Consciousness is the master sense- organ-the superficies of the mind, which is in close contact with external and in- ternal environments (15 ) . I t enables us to appreciate the feelings and reactions of others (72).

A consideration of these character- istics and functions of consciousness should provide a valuable starting point for further research on one of the most important problems of psychology.

NON-CONSCIOUS MENTAL FUNCTIONS Psychologists have been led to postu-

late the existence of non-conscious mental processes from many varieties of

MENTAL FUNCTIONS 79

evidence. The term “mental” has been used advisedly in this connection to dif- ferentiate between ideological and auto- nomic functions. Scientific psychology has been justifiably critical of these con- cepts because of the inaccessibility of non-conscious functions to objective ex- perimental study, but many of the objec- tions are removed if it is recognized that the subconscious mind is an hypoth- esis, rather than a material entity.

A distinction should be made between the meanings of several terms which have been used to refer to nonconscious processes. Subconscious means below the threshold of consciousness, and in- cludes all which is not conscious at the moment. Unconscious refers to (a) absence of consciousness, as in sleep or coma, or (b) the Freudian concept that ideas which have been repressed from consciousness by the censor (Super- Ego) persist in the unconscious. Co- conscious (Morton Prince) refers to processes proceeding simultaneously with, but outside of, consciousness. Id is a Freudian term referring to the blindly striving, pleasure-seeking im- pulses which constitute the unsymbol- ized innate behavior patterns with which the individual is born.

The following lines of evidence have been advanced to support the concept of non-conscious mental functions :

1. The analysis of subjective experi- ence reveals a continuity of mental proc- esses of every degree of clearness, ranging from that which is subconscious, obscure and undeveloped to that which is con- scious, distinct and fully developed (6, 15, 16, 32, 33, 52).

2. Thought appears to develop from mental processes which are less clear but qualitatively similar to conscious proc- esses. New ideas or thoughts continually come into consciousness which cannot be traced to preexisting elements in con- sciousness ( 15,23,33,76,77).

3. At any given moment, a person is aware of only a small portion of (a) somatic and visceral sensations, (b) mem- ory images which are voluntarily recall- able, (c) autonomic functions, (d) motives determining conduct, and (e) other subliminal activities, which coexist with conscious experience at any given moment. Summation experiments show that subliminal stimuli which are ineffec- tive singly may eventually become con- scious. The organism reacts to, and is modified by, many stimuli of which it is not aware (77).

4. Habitual reactions progress auto- matically in an orderly fashion without conscious direction or attention. These habitual reactions constitute the traits which are so important in determining the broad outlines of personality ( 1).

5. The phenomena of dreams, hyster- ical, dissociation, symbolization, symptom formation, multiple personality, hypnosis, etc., can best be understood by postulating subconscious processes which determine the contents of consciousness (6, 12, 15, 23, 24, 34, 35, 40, 54, 60, 65, 74).

6. Problem solving and creative thought often appear to be carried on out- side consciousness, to which the answer is suddenly presented in complete form. The basis for creative inspirations often lies outside consciousness.

A consideration of these and other facts has led some psychologists to state that consciousness constitutes only the superficial aspect of mind, which can be understood only through a comprehen- sive study of its subconscious or uncon- scious functions. Needless to say, the interpretation of non-conscious content and function is a difficult and hazard- ous proceeding which must be under- taken with full exercise of critical faculties.

DISCUSSION

It is not possible to consider here the manner in which conscious and non- conscious processes cooperate in deter- mining the personality of the individual.

80 ELEANOR M.

The organism must unify all of its ex- periences and actions into one consistent whole. Reflexes, habits, traits and selves are integrated into hierarchical patterns which are combined and re- combined into various groupings as the personality matures. New experiences are evaluated in terms of past expe- rience. Some new experiences are ac- cepted as being consistent with past experience, and are assimilated. Other experiences are rejected or repressed because they are incompatible with pre- existing organization. The organism regulates itself and achieves new adjust- ments to the environment through the exercise of its potentialities. Some of these adjustments are controlled con- sciously, but to a large extent the physical and mental economy are main- tained automatically by functions oc- curring outside of consciousness, and over which little voluntary control can be exerted.

An important area for future re- search in clinical psychology lies in a careful reconsideration of the relations between conscious and non-conscious mental functions. Affective compo- nents of experience are frequently un- verbalized and have sometimes been regarded as unconscious because of the difficulty in recognizing them subjec- tively and describing them objectively. I t is an important question to deter- mine whether these affective compo- nents are unconscious in the Freudian sense or co-conscious (Prince). Is all the material uncovered in psychoanal- ysis genuinely repressed into the un- conscious, or is part of it dimly expe- rienced in consciousness but ignored or poorly integrated by a person untrained to introspect carefully enough to recog- nize and verbalize these affective components ?

CH ALFA NT

CONCLUDING COMMENT

Objective studies concerning the nature, content and functions of the conscious and non-conscious compo- nents of psychic life have now accumu- lated in sufficient numbers to demand due consideration in any comprehensive system of psychology. In contrast with traditional experimental psychology, which largely ignored the problems of consciousness, because it had no tech- niques with which to attack them, the clinical method provides great oppor- tunities for the study of disorders of consciousness in individual cases. Re- cent studies in pharmacology, electro- encephalography and neurosurgery pro- vide suggestive evidence concerning the cerebral localization of consciousness, and it remains for further research to demonstrate the functions of conscious- ness in the mental economy. The cur- rent review represents an attempt to arouse clinical psychologists to the challenge of planning future research to objectify the nature of consciousness.

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