consciousness from a first-person perspective, maxvelmans

7/17/2019 Consciousness From a First-person Perspective, MaxVelmans

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Velmans, Max (1991) Consciousness from a first-person perspective, Behavioral and Brain

Sciences, 14, (4): 702-719.

(Reply to first 36 commentaries on "Is human information processing conscious?" BBS, 1991,

651-669. Following BBS guidelines, commentators are mentioned in bold when first referred

to in any paragraph; the original target article is referred to as TA)

CONSCIOUSNESS FROM A FIRST-PERSON PERSPECTIVE

Max Velmans, Department of Psychology, Goldsmiths, University of London, Lewisham Way,

London SE14 6NW, England

Email: [email protected]

URL: http://www.gold.ac.uk/psychology/staff/velmans/

KEYWORDS: attention, complementarity, consciousness, functionalism, epiphenomenalism,

reductionism, information processing, mind, unconscious, first person, third person,

ontological monism, epistemological dualism, complementarity, psychological

complementarity, causal role of consciousness, consciousness and evolution

Abstract (added for the uploaded PDF in 2012). This paper replies to the first 36

commentaries on my target article on “Is human information processing conscious?”(Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1991, pp. 651-669). The target article focused largely on

experimental studies of how consciousness relates to human information processing, tracing

their relation from input through to output, while discussion of the implications of the

findings both for cognitive psychology and philosophy of mind was relatively brief. The

commentaries reversed this emphasis, and so, correspondingly, did the reply. The sequence

of topics in the reply roughly follows that of the target article. The discussion begins with a

reconsideration of the details of the empirical findings, whether they can be extrapolated to

non-laboratory settings, and the extent to which one can rely on their use of subjective

reports. This is followed by an in-depth discussion of what is meant by “conscious

processing” and of how phenomenal consciousness relates to attentional processing. Wethen turn to broader philosophical and theoretical issues. I point out some of the reasons

why I do not support epiphenomenalism, dualist-interactionism, or reductionism, and

elaborate on how first- and third-person views of the mind can be regarded as

complementary and mutually irreducible. I suggest how the relation of conscious experiences

to their neural correlates can be understood in terms of a dual-aspect theory of information,

and how this might be used to resolve some of the paradoxes surrounding the causal

interactions of consciousness and brain. I also suggest that, viewed from a first-person

perspective, consciousness gives purpose to existence, which allows a different way of

viewing its role in evolution.

mailto:[email protected]



http://www.gold.ac.uk/psychology/staff/velmans/







INTRODUCTION

The sequence of topics in this reply roughly follows that of the target article. The latter

focused largely on experimental studies of how consciousness relates to human informationprocessing, tracing their relation from input through to output. The discussion of the

implications of the findings both for cognitive psychology and philosophy of mind was

relatively brief. The commentaries reverse this emphasis, and so, correspondingly, does the

reply.

Sections 1.1 to 1.9 begin with details of the empirical findings (Underwood, Inhoff, Mangan,

Van Gulick, Shevrin, Dagenbach, Spiegel, Rey, Lloyd, Wagstaff, Block, Carlson, Mandler,

Libet, and Keane).

Sections 2 and 3 deal with general comments about the laboratory-based approach of thereview (Kinsbourne, Reznick & Zelazo, Bowers, and Foulkes) and the status of subjective

reports (Gregson, Economos, Gray, and Lloyd).

Sections 4 to 6 discuss the nature of "conscious processing," beginning with differences

between conscious and non-conscious processing in section 4 (Wilson, Bowers, Carlson,

Block, and Inhoff ), followed by a detailed treatment of the relation of consciousness to

focal-attentive processing in sections 5.1 to 5.4 (Mandler, Baars, Carlson, Rey, Mangan,

Klein, Van Gulick, and Block) and a further discussion of what is meant by a "conscious

process" in section 6 (Van Gulick, Dretske).

Sections 7 to 9, deal with broad philosophical and theoretical implications, starting (in 7.1 to

7.3) with the mistaken assumption (of Baars, Block, Lloyd, Mangan, Van Gulick,

Kinsbourne, Corteen, Rey, and Hardcastle) that I support epiphenomenalism, and the

problems of dualist-interactionism (MacKay, and Mangan) and reductionism (Sloman,

Hardcastle, Rey, and Stanovich). Section 8 gives a fuller account of "first-person" vs. "third-

person" perspectives (Stanovich, Schaeken & d'Ywalle, Shevrin and Gardiner), and section

9, of "complementarity." 9.1 replaces the privileged status of "third-person" accounts with a

more balanced view of the two perspectives (Lloyd) and 9.2 moves on to a proposed

resolution of the paradoxes surrounding the causal interactions of consciousness and the

brain (Libet). A "complementary" account is given of the relation of consciousness to its

neural correlates in 9.3 (Economos, Koch & Crick, Van Gulick, and Navon) and, finally, of the

role of consciousness in evolution in 9.4 (Mangan, Corteen, Klein, editorial, and Schaeken &

d'Ywalle).

1. The review of experimental findings: points of detail.

1.1 The limits of input analysis in non-selected channels.

Underwood, and Inhoff focus on the limits of input analysis in non-selected channels.

"Early-selection" models of attention assume that preliminary analysis of verbal stimuli is

restricted to physical properties. "Late-selection" models such as that of Underwood (1979),

assume it to be restricted to accessing the memory traces (and meanings) of individual



words (see TA section 1.4). In TA section 2.1, I argue for a further loosening of restrictions.

Drawing on evidence from Treisman (1964a, 1964b) and Lackner & Garrett (1973), I argue

that it is possible for analysis in the non-selected ear to extend to the meanings of spoken

phrases and sentences—a complex task requiring a combination of phonemic, syntactic and

semantic analysis.

It is important to note, however, that I do not claim such an analysis always takes place (see

TA 1.2, end); in Treisman's (1964a) study, just over half the bilingual subjects did not

recognise the non-selected French translation of the shadowed message. Inhoff provides

further examples (Inhoff & Briihl, 1991; Yantis & Johnston, 1990; Kahneman et al, 1983).1

The extent to which preliminary analysis is carried out appears to be both task and resource

limited. Inhoff & Briihl found that semantic analysis of non-attended, visually presented text

did not take place without (momentary) eye fixations on the non-attended material. On the

other hand, in Treisman's (1964b) experiment, the more skilled subjects were at French, the

more difficult it was for them not to analyze the message in the non-selected ear, often

giving a shadowing response in mixed English and French. Limits on preliminary analysis arealso set by the complexity of the material. As Underwood rightly points out, without focal

attention while reading, the comprehension of difficult text is likely to meet with mixed

success. Focal-attentive processing provides options additional to preliminary analysis. For

example, information given focal-attentive processing may become generally available

throughout the processing system (TA section 8). This makes it possible both to assimilate

input and to contextualise it, enabling comprehension of difficult or novel material.

In short, while I suggest that in some circumstances preliminary analysis may be more

extensive than hitherto thought, I do not make the general claim that (focal) "attentional

processing is unnecessary for the recognition of complex environmental events," or dismiss"the premise that the processing of novelty requires attention," as Underwood claims. Nor

do I regard the difference between preliminary and focal attention to be "negligible," as

Inhoff implies. Although the sentences in Treisman’s and Lackner & Garrett's studies formed

complex, potentially novel patterns, when preliminary analysis was possible, both the

component words and the rules for sentence formation were well known. Focal attention is

required when novel stimuli or stimulus combinations that do not follow known rules are

being learnt. Whether consciousness is required for such learning is a different matter (see

TA section 4).

According to Underwood, however, preliminary analysis of non-selected verbal materialnever proceeds beyond accessing the meaning of individual words. Accordingly, he attempts

to argue that in the experiments I cite, a more complex analysis did not take place. He

suggests that subjects' ability to recognise the French translation in Treisman's experiments

might have come about from corresponding English and French words occurring in temporal

proximity, in which case the interference effect (Treisman, 1964b) might have come about

through simultaneous word recognition. However, the effects found by Treisman occurred

even when the selected passage lagged behind the non-selected passage by one or two

1 Inhoff also points out that the Treisman's (1960) findings, often cited as evidence of semantic analysis on the

non-selected channel, are ambiguous. I agree—

but I did not cite this study.



seconds; given the further variations produced by differences in French and English syntax,

it is difficult to know how Underwood defines "proximity." Even if (decontextualised) French

synonyms had been simultaneous with their English counterparts, it is difficult to see why

they should intrude; no similar intrusions are reported in Lewis' (1970) shadowing task using

English words, when English synonyms were simultaneously presented to the attended ear.

Given this, it seems more plausible to suggest that the interference was caused by a deeper

analysis of the non-selected message producing the realisation that the messages (encoded

in French and English) were the same, leaving subjects confused about whether they should

respond in English or French.

Lackner & Garrett (1973) found that context sentences presented to the non-selected ear,

biased the paraphrases of ambiguous sentences in the attended ear. They also point out

that for most of the context sentences they used, at least a phrasal analysis would have

been necessary to produce the required disambiguation (see TA section 2.1). Underwood

challenges Lackner & Garrett's (1973) interpretation of their own findings, on the grounds

that "Mackay (1973) and Newstead & Dennis (1979) report very limited effects ofunattended messages upon the interpretation of shadowed messages." He concludes that,

"At best it seems that individual words might have an effect upon the lexical ambiguity in

the attended message, but these experiments together do not provide convincing evidence

of deep structural analysis without attention." What Underwood obscures in this argument

is that the disambiguating cues used both by Mackay (1973) and Newstead & Dennis (1979)

were restricted to individual words (although in one of the conditions in the latter

experiment, these were embedded in sentences). Consequently, it is hardly surprising that

these two experiments provide evidence only of the disambiguating effect of individual

words. They have no bearing whatsoever on the evidence for phrasal analysis (and

consequent disambiguation) in the Lackner & Garrett study.2

Underwood goes on to describe two experiments (Underwood, 1977; Kleiman, 1975) which

"suggest that without attention there is limited integration of words in a sentence." In

Underwood's dichotic listening task, shadowing latencies of attended words progressively

decreased as prior, attended context increased. While prior context words on the non-

selected ear also produced some reduction in shadowing latency to attended words, there

was no further progressive reduction as non-selected context increased. He concludes that

the additional non-selected context words must either have been forgotten or (without

attention) they could not be contextually integrated. It is not obvious, however, that

successful integration of non-selected word strings would produce decreasing shadowinglatencies to words in the attended ear.

2 A variation of the masked priming design used by Marcel (1980) experiment 5 could provide a relatively

direct test of whether phrasal analysis prior to focal attention is possible in the visual domain. Marcel found

that in three word sequences such as "save - bank - money," and "save - bank - river," if the word "bank" was

masked, preliminary analysis unselectively primed following targets (both "money" and "river"); if the prime

was not masked, focal-attentive processing selectively primed following targets ("money" but not "river")—see

TA section 2.2. If phrasal analysis is possible, it might be that masked word combinations such as "venetian

blind" would prime not only individual word associates such as "Italian" and "deaf" but also associates of the

combination, such as "window"; similarly, a phrase such as, "insect under foot," might prime "crushed."



Focal-attentive processing enables full assimilation and contextualisation of input in the

light of current knowledge, expectations, needs, goals and so forth. According to Posner &

Snyder (1975) and Neeley (1977) it both activates related traces and inhibits unrelated

traces as expectations regarding subsequent stimuli increase. In attended-to connected

speech, for example, it appears that all meanings associated with a given word are initially

activated in parallel, but once context is taken into consideration, irrelevant meanings are

inhibited (Pynte, Do & Scampa, 1984; Swinney, 1979). This combination of activation and

inhibition would account for the progressive decrease in shadowing latencies, with

increasing, attended context, in Underwood's experiment. Non-selected stimuli, on the

other hand, receive only preliminary analysis. This activates traces of related stimuli, but

produces no combined activation of related traces and inhibition of unrelated traces as

context increases. This would apply irrespective of the complexity of preliminary analysis.

Consequently, Underwood's finding that shadowing latency does not progressively decrease

as context in the non-selected ear increases, may have no bearing on whether a relatively

complex analysis of non-selected word strings took place.

Kleiman's (1975) divided attention study demonstrates that digit shadowing reduces

subjects' ability to read text, and that reading sentences requires more processing capacity

than the identification of individual words. Given the relatively complex nature of sentence

integration when reading, this is hardly surprising; both preliminary and focal-attentive

processing are thought to be subject to capacity constraints (see TA section 2.4). But this

does not establish that preliminary analysis is invariably restricted to individual words, either

in reading or in dichotic listening tasks, as Underwood claims. 3

Currently, no definitive

answers are available on these issues. The relation of preliminary processing to focal-

attentive processing is extremely complex and requires more detailed exploration both in

different sense modalities, and different task and resource limited conditions.

The central theme of my target article however concerns the relation of consciousness to

human information processing. My argument that preconscious analysis in non-selected

channels may sometimes be more extensive than hitherto thought, is preliminary to the

stronger point that even when stimuli are subject to focal-attentive processing, awareness

follows the processing to which it relates and does not enter into it. These arguments,

developed in relation to input analysis in TA sections 2.2 to 2.5, and more generally in

sections 3 to 8, are ones that Underwood chooses not to address.

Instead, he offers the opinion that "the suggestion that we become aware of a stimulus or aresponse only after processing is...misguided." He supports this by asserting that focal-

attentive processing "associated with the vividness of awareness" depends on novelty, and

by elaborating on the theme that in different situations we become aware of our

3 Conveniently, this question can be settled experimentally. According to Underwood, deeper analysis of the

non-selected message does not contribute directly to the interference effect Treisman found with bilinguals. If

so, interference should be equally strong whether the French synonyms occur in syntactically well-formed,

meaningful paraphrases (of the shadowed passage) or in random French strings, provided that, in the two

conditions, synonyms are matched for proximity to their shadowed counterparts.



processing, although sometimes we are not. Neither of these points has any bearing on my

arguments.

1.2 The processing of complex, attended information.

According to Mangan, consciousness is particularly necessary "in processing complex, novelinformation to be used to plan, reflect and create," and he complains that my treatment of

these complex tasks is relatively thin. In a sense, this is fair. In comparison, say, to input

analysis of individual words, the relation of consciousness to more complex tasks has been

less well explored; consequently, less evidence is available.

The available evidence nevertheless supports a dissociation of consciousness from

functioning; and the evidence does extend to complex tasks. Treisman's (1964) shadowing

experiments, for example, appear to show analysis of prose passages on the non-selected

ear (TA 2.1). TA 2.3 deals with preconscious word identification in attended, connected

speech. But Mangan chooses to focus on my example of preconscious analysis in silentreading of a single sentence at the focus of attention (end of TA 2.3); as he points out, "This

is not exactly Proust." I agree. But what he needs to show is that the principles which apply

to the (silent) reading of individual sentences do not apply to more complex passages.

Consider, for example, your own silent reading of this text. My claim is that "while reading,

one is not conscious of any pattern recognition processing to identify individual words or of

any syntactic analysis being applied to the sentence. Nor is one aware of the processing

responsible for the resulting covert speech" (TA 2.3). If my own silent reading is

representative, not just individual words and sentences, but entire complex arguments (like

the present one) are processed in preconscious fashion.

According to Van Gulick, evidence from the comprehension and production of speech is

irrelevant to the analysis of novel stimuli, or the planning and control of novel responses, on

the grounds that these skills "are generally agreed to be the result of task-specific modular

processors which operate in an automatic and informationally encapsulated way." As noted

in TA 2.1, 2.3 and 5.4, language processing is amongst the most complex of human cognitive

skills, and there is no definable limit to the novel sentences we can comprehend and

produce. Processing may be automatic (in the sense of involuntary ) without being effortless

or inflexible (TA 2.4, 2.5). Much of the processing may be modular, but the extent to which it

is "informationally encapsulated" depends on the nature of processing. Full sentence

comprehension, for example, requires the integration of input strings with storedknowledge of the world. And the design of utterances requires the speaker not only to

arrange words in a syntactically appropriate way, but to take into account the physical and

social context (as well as the prior verbal context) of the utterance. Mangan suggests that to

establish my case I need to consider the role consciousness might play at the upper end of

the cognitive spectrum. Language is at the upper end of this spectrum. If consciousness

does not enter into functioning, added complexity will make no difference.

1.3 Memory without prior experience.

In TA 4.2, I suggest that preconscious contents can influence long-term memory (e.g. Eich,

1984). Further evidence of memory without prior experience is mentioned by Shevrin



(1986, 1990); subjects given subliminal stimuli, without any memory of having seen them

were nonetheless shown to have been influenced by them in subsequent responses,

associations, images, and dreams. But, as Dagenbach notes, such studies do not

demonstrate episodic memory of the non-experienced stimulus (at the time of its

occurrence). For this, one has to turn to the "hidden observer."

According to Spiegel, recall of painful stimuli by the "hidden observer" involves

consciousness at the time of retrieval. However, there seems to be little that is conscious,

about "conscious retrieval." Only the end product of such processing enters consciousness

(Miller, 1987). In any case, in TA 4.3, this phenomenon was intended to illustrate entry of

information into long-term memory, without consciousness, at the time of encoding.

It is, of course, difficult to be certain about what, if anything, the hidden observer might be

aware of at the time of encoding; Spiegel, Rey, Lloyd and Dagenbach suggests that it is

aware of the pain. According to Spiegel, the subject is simply not "aware of being aware."

The latter involves an added act of self-reflection. As Wagstaff makes clear, this issue is acontinuing source of confusion in the field. Hilgard (1978), for example, writes that "The

hidden part represents data that are processed and not consciously perceived," yet

elsewhere implies that "the effect occurs, not so much because information is processed

entirely 'without consciousness', but rather because it is perceived in 'another part of

consciousness'." Cases of multiple personality present similar problems.

In TA 4.3, I suggest the hidden observer is "cognizant" (rather than "conscious") of what is

going on—that under special circumstances, painful stimuli can be preconsciously processed

and entered into episodic memory without first entering consciousness. Subjects' claims not

to experience pain support this interpretation, particularly when combined with evidence ofreduced bleeding and salivation. This interpretation also has the advantage of parsimony. In

place of multiple consciousnesses, which somehow escape the subject's awareness, non-

dominant (multiple) personalities and hidden observers remain unconscious until the time

they become dominant. In this, they might resemble repressed memories that remain

active, although unconscious.

Wagstaff attempts to be even more parsimonious. For him, there is no hidden observer to

explain; hidden observer effects result entirely from social compliance. Suggestion-induced

pain reduction, he argues, may be explained in socio-cognitive terms, without invoking a

"hidden observer." In subsequent recall, some subjects may be induced (by task demands)to exaggerate the pain they have experienced (Spanos, 1989).4 My argument regarding pain

4 According to Wagstaff , if the hidden observer is conscious, maybe all cases of preconscious processing are

cases of hidden consciousness (in dichotic listening, implicit learning, and the like). Abandoning the hidden

observer (in favour of social compliance theory) would avoid this unacceptable conclusion. However,

Wagstaff's argument is equally unacceptable. If the hidden observer effect were paradigmatic of preconscious

processing in general, then explanations of the hidden observer would apply to preconscious processing in

general. That is to say, all the preconscious phenomena reviewed in TA 1 to 8, would just be the result of social

compliance (a dubious suggestion). It seems more plausible to assume that the hidden observer is not

conscious (while hidden); and that hypnotically induced dissociations differ in important ways from other

forms of preconscious processing.



encoding without awareness, however, is neutral as to why pain reduction (during

encoding) takes place. In TA 4.3, the hidden observer exemplifies the ability to remember

pain, without prior experience. That subjects might sometimes be induced to exaggerate,

does not imply they recall no pain at all.

1.4 Implicit learning and memory: a case of focal-attentive processing without awareness?

The evidence for implicit learning and memory is extensive (Schacter, 1987; Reber, 1989a).

In TA 4.4, I focused on Nissen & Bullemer (1987), for the reason that their findings

demonstrate implicit sequence learning in amnesics, with focal-attention, but without

conscious awareness.

Block points out that amnesics might simply have forgotten5--but misses the fact that I have

considered the same point and rejected it, on the grounds that sequence learning with the

same task has been found in healthy young adults (Willingham, Nissen & Bullemer, 1989)6

(see TA 4.4, for extensive, additional evidence). Carlson points out, however, that in implicitlearning tasks, such as that used by Reber, subjects sometimes have fragmentary knowledge

which might have sufficed to support their performance, and the same might have applied

in Willingham, et al's (1989) study. Reber (1989a, 1989b) reviews the evidence (with normal

subjects) relating to this point, and concludes that while knowledge in earlier studies might

not have been completely unavailable to consciousness, knowledge acquired from implicit

learning procedures is always ahead of subjects' explicit knowledge. Thus, as suggested in

the target article, consciousness follows the information processing to which it relates. In

any case, there appears to be no evidence of fragmentary knowledge in Nissen & Bullemer's

amnesics.

1.5 Is consciousness necessary for declarative knowledge?

According to Mandler, my analysis of implicit learning ignores the implicit/procedural -

explicit/declarative distinction. I agree that this distinction is a useful one, although one

must be cautious about bracketing (implicit/procedural) and (explicit/declarative) together;

procedural information is sometimes explicit and declarative information is sometimes

implicit; sometimes we are conscious of how to do something, and sometimes knowledge

that something is the case remains concealed in long-term memory. I also agree with

Mandler, that focal-attentive processing is required for learning declarative information (as

well as procedural knowledge). But I do not ignore this distinction in my treatment ofimplicit learning in section 4.4, as he claims. Nissen & Bullemer's (1987) demonstration of

implicit (procedural) sequence learning in amnesics without explicit awareness (of what

5 As Block (and Dennett, 1988) point out, in some situations, consciousness-plus-forgetting cannot be

distinguished from no-consciousness. This point is fair—but only when there is some independent theoretical

or evidential reason for invoking forgetting. Otherwise, all claims about subjects not being able to hear, see,

and so on, are unfalsifiable (subjects might simply have forgotten). Block (and Rey) argue that a driver who

exclaims "I don't know how I missed him" might simply have forgotten how he avoided an accident (TA 5.3). It

seems more plausible, however, to treat this statement as an expression of the driver's amazement at his own

preconscious (executive) motor skills.

6 My thanks to a vigilant reviewer for bringing this study to my attention.



they have learnt) relies on this distinction, as do the many other studies cited in this section.

How else could one demonstrate implicit learning without explicit knowledge? Mandler's

point that consciousness is always present when declarative knowledge becomes explicit

does not establish a special role for consciousness in the acquisition of such knowledge;

when knowledge (declarative or procedural) becomes explicit, consciousness is always

present by definition. But, as Baars (1989) notes, the contribution of consciousness to

learning remains a mystery (see section 4.1).

1.6 Does consciousness exercise a veto?

Libet's (1985) experiment demonstrated that the initiation of a voluntary act develops

unconsciously in the brain, about 350 msec. before the subject is consciously aware of the

urge or intention to act. But the awareness preceded the motor act by about 150 msec.

Libet therefore opposes my contention that consciousness does not enter into brain

processing; he argues that "the subject could consciously control the outcome by vetoing

the intention to act and not moving at all, or by passively or actively promoting itscompletion." Consequently, "There is no experimental evidence that would deny a causal

role for consciousness here, although admittedly there is none to prove such a role either"

(Dixon makes a similar suggestion).

I agree. Nevertheless, my generalisation is consistent with the existing experimental

evidence. Viewing the brain from the outside, Libet has shown that the experienced

intention to perform an act is preceded by cerebral initiation. Why should the experienced

decision to veto that intention, or to actively or passively promote its completion, be any

different?7

1.7 Is blindsight conscious?

I have argued (TA 5.2) that blindsight exemplifies overt identification and discrimination

without awareness. According to Spiegel, however, when subjects are persuaded to guess

about stimuli they cannot see, "The initial reports of ignorance are overridden through the

addition of conscious effort...Thus conscious effort makes up for some of what the missing

cortex did, and in combination with non-conscious processing, provides new and accurate

information." For Spiegel, this implies that the information subjects give is partly conscious.

I do not deny that guessing requires effort. But in what sense is the effort "conscious"? Once

the guess is made, the verbal response enters consciousness. But subjects remain convinced

they cannot see the stimulus—a clear case of identification (of a stimulus) without

awareness (of that stimulus).

1.8 Is consciousness required for creativity?

According to Keane my case for creativity outside of consciousness (in the "incubation

period") is based on relatively loose or anecdotal evidence; recent experimental evidence,

he suggests, gives a different picture. He argues that creative problem solving involves

7 This question is testable. But, to establish that consciousness, rather than antecedent neural events exercised

a veto, one would have to eliminate all antecedent neural events that might produce the required effects.



retrieval of an appropriate analogy followed by "a suitable analogue mapping" between the

domain of the analogy and that of the problem. Recent studies with Duncker's radiation

problem show that subjects previously given analogous situations (in the form of stories) did

not draw on the stories unless explicitly instructed to do so (Gick & Holyoak, 1980) and that

the difficulty of retrieving a given analogy increases as its semantic distance from the

problem increases (Keane, 1987; Holyoack & Koh, 1987). He speculates that if these results

apply generally to creativity, "there is no evidence in the literature of subjects

spontaneously retrieving analogues without explicit instructions to do so....This indicates

that the spontaneous retrieval of analogues, when it does happen, only happens when a

conscious search is instigated." The unconscious incubation period may be devoted to the

difficult business of retrieving remote analogies.

The extent to which such results do 'capture' the creative process is, of course, open to

question. The fact that there is no evidence of subjects spontaneously retrieving analogies

(without explicit instructions to do so) in the few artificial situations Keane describes, hardly

rules out the spontaneous emergence of self-generated inspirations, intuitions and the likereported by creative artists and scientists. In any case, the creative ability to construe

hypothetical universes as well as actual ones (past or present) may not be entirely reducible

to analogy formation. But these caveats are largely tangential. Keane's central point is that

unconscious incubation does not occur without conscious instigation (of a memory search),

and consciousness is therefore necessary for creativity. In part, I agree. Generally,

unconscious incubation appears to be preceded by a conscious "preparation period"

involving extensive focal-attentive processing, accompanied by consciousness (of the

problem to be solved, of trial solutions, and so on—see TA section 6). Consequently, from

the first-person perspective of the creative artist or scientist, consciousness often seems

essential.

But this does not clarify the relation of consciousness to the processes that initiate and

enable creativity. As noted in TA section 9.1, a process might "be conscious" (a) in so far as

one is conscious of it, (b) in that it is accompanied by consciousness (of its results), and (c) in

that consciousness enters into the process. My claim is that information processing may be

conscious in senses (a) and (b), but not in sense (c). In his analysis of "conscious instigation",

Keane ignores these distinctions.

Keane accepts (as I do) that creative problem solving requires focal-attentive processing, at

least in its initial stages. Focusing attention on a problem is usually accompanied byawareness of the problem, possible routes to solution, trial solutions, and so on –making the

processing partly "conscious" in senses (a) and (b). But one cannot assume from this that

the "awareness" which accompanies (or follows from) such processing is just another form

of processing which "initiates" subsequent pattern recognition, analogue memory search

and retrieval, information transformation and so on. Focal-attentive processing itself

initiates such functioning (see TA section 7). What enters awareness results from such

processing and cannot therefore enter into it ("conscious initiation" is not "conscious" in

sense (c)).

Keane accepts that in some situations awareness can be operationally dissociated from

focal-attentive processing (see TA section 8); but he argues that this does not apply to



creativity—because "in creativity involving analogy there is ... no evidence ... (at present) ...

of such a dissociation." However, once one accepts that "awareness" can be dissociated

from "focal-attentive processing" both conceptually and (in some situations) operationally,

the burden of proof falls not on those who presume them to be dissociable (in principle) in

other situations, but on those who presume them to be one and the same.

1.9 Miscellaneous mistakes.

According to Rey I have not even established the case for semantic analysis, without

consciousness. The only evidence he challenges, however, relates to priming, and silent

reading. Priming, he writes, "might be modularised, purely syntactic processing, involving,

e.g. lexical associates." This is a non-sequitur. Priming does involve lexical associates, but

the associates are semantic ones, not syntactic ones (doctor will prime nurse, but not bread,

in spite of the fact that all three words are nouns). Rey writes that I need to show semantic

processing in silent reading of "The forest ranger would not permit us to enter the park

without a per mit." But he does not explain how the appropriate meanings of "permit," withthe appropriate stress patterns, could be obtained without semantic processing. He also

omits the further extensive evidence for semantic analysis without consciousness reviewed

in TA 1.2, 1.3, 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 (see also Dixon, 1981).

Rey misinterprets my analysis of "sleeping on a problem" to imply that dreams are

unconscious. They are not. Solutions emerge spontaneously into consciousness after

unconscious incubation, whether (symbolically) in dreams or in the waking state. He writes

that "it is extremely odd" I do not discuss the computational processes involved in

introspection (I frequently cite Ericsson & Simon, 1984) and that I entirely ignore "second-

order" propositional attitudes (e.g. thinking about thoughts). I have ignored self-awareness(also mentioned by Klein) along with many other candidates for a conscious function, not

because they present difficulties, but because they can be dealt with in the same way as the

many cases which are discussed. In functional terms, any system capable of self-awareness

must be capable of self-representation. But if it already has self-representation, what need

has it of self-awareness? As before, the functioning implicit in a first-person account, can be

translated into a third-person description.

According to Rey, the dissociation of consciousness from focal-attentive processing, "is the

only argument Velmans (is) prepared to raise against such proposals." It should be apparent

from the above, that this distinction is irrelevant to Rey's varied proposals (and I don't raiseit).

2. Are the target article conclusions an artifact of laboratory -based research?

Kinsbourne, Reznick & Zelazo, and Bowers suggest that the conclusions drawn in the target

article regarding consciousness, may be an artifact of laboratory-based research. Foulkes

suggests that consciousness may relate differently to dreams.

According to Kinsbourne, in laboratory experiments, subjects are instructed how to

respond, told what displays to expect, practised, and given "unnatural" forced-choice

paradigms. Consequently, "the results reflect performance that is to a variable degree



automatic."8 On reading further, however, it is difficult to know what Kinsbourne intends

with this point. His implication seems to be that under natural conditions, consciousness

does play a role in information processing (when behaviour is automatic). However, in the

following paragraph he writes "consciousness is not thought to have a role in information

processing anyway. It is not process but representation."9 This is followed by the claim that

representation in consciousness is a necessary antecedent to action "when performance is

not automatized." But if conscious representation is necessary for action, Kinsbourne's

distinction between process and representation loses its force; in so far as representations

enter into the determination of action, they do "have a role in information processing."

In any case, Kinsbourne's description of my own position on these issues is a complete

misrepresentation. I do not deny that integrated representations (of inner and outer events)

produced by focal-attentive processing are necessary for subsequent action. What I do

resist is the ontological identification of such representations with "conscious awareness"

(see section 9.3 below). According to Kinsbourne, "Velmans' commitment to the

psychological laboratory reaches its acme when he identifies consciousness with focalattention." In TA section 8, I explicitly dissociate consciousness from focal attention. While I

respect laboratory-based approaches, they are but one of a number of methods for the

exploration of mind.

Bowers also criticizes the research I review, on the grounds that "it relies heavily on

experimental methodology." This is certainly an unusual criticism of research. Bowers goes

on to explain that experimental "effects" can be attributed to the independent variable (a

stimulus) with less ambiguity than to whether the stimulus is consciously perceived (the

latter is not manipulable). Consequently, whether subjects are conscious or not is "very

much a matter of interpretation" and "underdetermined by data." Dagenbach also notesthe "inherent difficulties in assessing processing without awareness."

As Gregson points out, around threshold, consciousness does not have a sharp edge. In

psychophysics it is well established that threshold reports are influenced both by stimulus

level and response criterion. The reliability of subjective reports (around threshold) has also

been challenged by Lupker (1986). We can be wrong about what we experience, and at

threshold levels we may be uncertain about whether we experience. Well above and below

threshold, however, there seems little reason to doubt subject's reports about whether or

not they are conscious of a stimulus. Attended-to connected speech, for example, is

consciously perceived, although word identification takes place too quickly forconsciousness to play a role (TA 2.3); in blindsight, there seems little reason to disbelieve

8 This is a rather biased description of the literature. In most experiments, subjects do not know exactly what

stimulus to expect, and while the manner of responding might be determined (recall, reaction time, and so

forth) the processing strategy need not be. In any case, the evidence reviewed also draws on clinical

observation and observation in the field (e.g. the hidden observer, blindsight, studies of creativity, and the

like).

9 One might ask, "thought by whom?" The list of theorists who think consciousness does play a role in

information processing is extensive (see, for example TA note 2, and many of the commentaries).



subjects' claims that they cannot see stimuli, in spite of being able to identify them (TA 5.2),

and so on.

In any case, interpretations of experimental findings are always underdetermined by data.

This is particularly true in psychological research, where the bridging assumptions linking

data to theory are frequently extensive (witness the ubiquitous use of reaction times incognitive research). That alternative explanations might be available for some experimental

findings is hardly a criticism of a research area. On the contrary, it is the staple diet of

research.10

Bowers also criticises the typical research paradigm for the study of (un)conscious

processing for its focus on "basic" processes; research should also focus on "whether

noticed information is influential." This may be so, but this point has little relevance to the

issues addressed in the target article.

Reznick & Zelazo suggest that once consciousness is recognised to be a continuous stream,one opens up the possibility "that it enters into and causally influences information

processing by altering the subsequent perception of a stimulus and the probabilities of

various responses." I agree that it is important to study how information is integrated over

time to produce a "conscious stream" (see Blumenthal, 1977, for a review). But this is

tangential to whether consciousness enters into processing. As argued in TA section 7, focal-

attentive processing enables integration and dissemination of information throughout the

processing system. This, and not the accompanying (dissected or integrated) consciousness,

alters the subsequent perception of stimuli and production of responses. This argument

does not "murder consciousness" as Reznick & Zelazo maintain. It is the elimination of a

first-person perspective from psychology that achieves that dire end.

According to Foulkes, dreams integrate currently active information with prior information

in a way that is both internally consistent and faithful to the diversity of the material. This

reveals "the integrative, model-building, constructive, and narrative nature of the non-

conscious processes that generate conscious experience" more clearly than cognitive

studies of the waking conscious state (which involve "mere stimulus identification"). Given

this "ambitious", constructive processing, Foulkes concludes that, "it seems less probable

that consciousness, either as contents or as system (i.e. the processes generating those

contents) can be epiphenomenal, even from a third-person viewpoint." I agree that dreams

form an important area of study, although constructive processes operate similarly in thewaking state (perceptual processing involves not only stimulus identification but also the

construction of an entire phenomenal world). But, it is not clear that Foulke's conclusions

follow from his premises.

As Foulkes goes on to note, "Dreaming establishes that highly elaborate conscious contents

can be experienced through processing that is wholly nonconscious." That is precisely my

argument. From a third-person perspective, conscious contents appear as output . Foulkes

calls the "wholly nonconscious (involuntary, unintended)" system responsible for such

10 Bowers and Dagenbach, mention Holender's alternative interpretation of some of the findings in TA sections

1 and 2. But these have already been critically discussed in the target article, and they suggest nothing further

on this issue.



output, the "consciousness system." I agree that there is such a system; but it is a (non-

conscious) system for producing conscious experience; consciousness cannot enter into its

own production.

3. The status of subjective reports.

Economos wonders about the legitimacy of subjective reports. But her judgements of

legitimacy presuppose a psychology dominated by radical behaviourism. They might be

acceptable as barks and grunts, she writes, but they are "not to be interpreted

anthropomorphically" as being about something. If they are, psychology "is not at all like

other sciences which do not ever deal in intentional matters." Thankfully, following the

cognitive revolution, and the emergence of the psychology of language, psychologists no

longer have to regard the efforts of other people to communicate as nothing more than

fancy barks and grunts ("verbal behaviour"). Economos' anxiety about anthropomorphizing

the utterances of other people just needs a little semantic therapy. If what others tell us is

not about anything, conversations would be dull indeed.

Economos is right, of course, to imply that the status of subjective reports for cognitive

modelling requires further clarification (Ericsson & Simon, 1984), as does the question of

how utterances become intentional in humans and other animals (see Gauker, 1990;

Harnad, 1991; Savage-Rumbaugh, 1990). It is also fair for her to ask why human subjective

reports should be any different to verbal "protocols" produced by computers.

My own approach to this is implicit in the target article. In humans, sentience is dissociable

from functioning. Human information processing operates non-consciously. Computer

models that are designed to simulate or emulate functioning may therefore be presumed tooperate in a similar, non-conscious fashion. At present the sufficient conditions for

consciousness in humans are unknown. While it might have arisen in a computer by

accident (or, perhaps, through being a natural accompaniment of matter of any kind) no

living engineer knows how to create it by design. Consequently, verbal protocols produced

by computers are nothing more than the output of non-conscious processing operations.11

On the other hand, we know that the sufficient conditions for consciousness are met in our

own case, and that our reports may (to the best of our knowledge) be reports of what we

experience. Given our shared heredity with others, we have good reason to believe that

their reports (in combination perhaps with corroborating overt behaviour) may also bereports of what they experience. That we cannot be certain is irrelevant (there is no

certainty in science). It is simply the most plausible inference, given the available evidence.

Gray notes that I stress the primacy of subjective reports in determining what enters

consciousness—but asks whether there can be, or whether we can judge there to be,

consciousness without such reports either in humans or other animals. The dissociation of

11 Even if the machine had a silicon consciousness, there would be no guarantee that its verbal protocols

(designed by humans) were reports of that consciousness.



consciousness from functioning, he suggests, seems to rule this out. But if we cannot make

inferences about consciousness based on observations of functioning, are we not

committed either to the view that consciousness in non-human animals (without language)

is absent, or that we must remain forever agnostic about its presence? According to Gray,

both conclusions are unpalatable, and I agree.

The thrust of my argument on this point was to establish that when subjective reports are

available they provide a valid basis for assessing whether or not an item enters

consciousness that is operationally separable, in principle, from measures of functioning

such as discrimination, reaction time, error score and so forth. TA 2.2, for example, reviews

findings that stimuli at the "subjective" threshold (at which subjects report they cannot see

the stimulus) are operationally distinct from stimuli at the lower "objective" threshold (at

which subjects cannot make a better than chance discriminative judgement about the

stimulus); stimuli at these respective thresholds have different effects on subsequent

processing (Cheesman & Merikle, 1984,1986; Dagenbach, et al, 1989; Forster & Davis, 1984;

Marcel, 1980,1983 experiment 5). Cheesman & Merikle stress that in masked primingstudies it is the "subjective" threshold, obtained from subjective reports, which defines the

transition between whether a stimulus is or is not experienced. Below the subjective

threshold (but above the objective threshold) discriminative responding to the stimulus may

remain possible in the absence of reportable experience (TA sections 1 & 2 review

analogous findings with other input analysis tasks). At or below the subjective threshold,

therefore, discriminability cannot be the sole criterion of whether an item enters

consciousness. For normally functioning human beings, able to communicate what they

experience through language, subjective reports provide a more reliable criterion.

It does not follow, of course, that verbal reports provide the only indicator of what is or isnot experienced, particularly when stimuli are above the subjective threshold. Pope &

Singer (1978) review a range of experimental, non-verbal reporting techniques, and there

are many natural forms of non-linguistic communication. The cries, chuckles, smiles, etc. of

pre-linguistic babies no doubt signal something of how they experience the world and this is

no less true of adults; behavioural techniques have also been developed to explore the

experiences of other animals (see in particular, Dawkins, 1980, 1990). That consciousness

does not enter into cerebral functioning (viewed from a third-person perspective) is

tangential to this point. As I note in section 9.1, many human processes (input analysis,

motor control, etc.) are accompanied by consciousness of their results—and the results of

processing determine overt behaviour. Consequently, overt behaviour can provide usefulevidence about what is experienced, both in other animals and other human beings.

Lloyd has similar worries about the stress the target article places on subjective reports,

which he thinks, "implicitly identifies consciousness with introspection." Introspections

necessarily follow what they are about, and that he argues, is the basis for my claim that

consciousness follows the information processing to which it relates.

I disagree. For subjective reports to be possible there must be something to report, i.e. a

conscious experience. Subjective reports provide one method of communicating about such

experience. The thrust of my argument is not that subjective reports follow the processes to



which they relate, as Lloyd claims, but that experiences do so (see, for example, TA section

2.3). To argue that reports follow what they are reports of would be trivial.

Nor do I identify subjective with introspective. The target article focuses on how

consciousness relates to human information processing. Consequently, much of the

discussion focuses on the awareness of inner events (stimulus analysis, learning, memory,and the like). But I agree with Lloyd that under normal waking conditions, awareness is

dominantly "awareness of the world." Reports of such awareness are simply reports of the

phenomenal world . These remain subjective but are not introspective. I have not focused on

this theme for the reason that it raises issues well beyond the scope of the target article

(but see Velmans, 1990, for an extensive discussion).

I also agree with Lloyd that experiences often cannot be fully translated into words.

Nevertheless, subjects remain the best judge of whether they have or have not had an

experience. As should be clear from the discussion of masked priming (TA section 2.2) and

blindsight (TA section 5.2), Lloyd is wrong to "consider experience to be signalled by anydiscriminative response."

4. Conscious processing is different.

A number of commentators have argued that consciousness must play some role in

information processing, because conscious processing is different. Wilson, for example,

agrees that evidence of non-conscious processing in realms previously thought to be the

exclusive domain of conscious processing requires the boundaries of conscious vs. Non-

conscious processing to be redrawn; but it does not demonstrate that consciousness plays

no role in information processing, or that we do not need the concept of consciousness tounderstand how such processing occurs. He goes on to list a range of interesting social

psychological studies which demonstrate that subliminal stimuli have different effects to

supra-threshold stimuli and that when people consciously reflect on their feelings they

respond differently from when they do not. Bowers reviews studies of problem solving

which demonstrate differences in processing strategy before and after subjects have a

(conscious) "hunch" about the solution. As he notes, it is difficult to understand how

scientific hypotheses could be tested, if they remained unconscious. Carlson points out that

explicit knowledge of patterns is typically associated with better performance than implicit

knowledge in implicit learning tasks. Block and Inhoff make the point that without conscious

information, blindsight patients do not initiate voluntary action. To this one might add thelong history of research into subliminal effects (see Dixon, 1971, 1981 for extensive

reviews), along with many other demonstrations of how processing that is accompanied by

consciousness differs from non-conscious processing (see the target article). Such studies

demonstrate that people often respond in a different way when they are conscious (as

opposed to not conscious) of input stimuli, of their own thoughts, of their overt response,

and so forth.

But this does not address the question of what role awareness plays in human information

processing. The target article ranges over all the main phases of information processing

(from input to output) and demonstrates that consciousness (of a stimulus, response, or

intervening process) follows the processing to which it relates and cannot therefore enter



into it. What enters consciousness is already a form of integrated output; perceived input

has been subject to pattern recognition, thoughts that pop into consciousness have been

formed by prior cognitive processing, one is aware of what one wants to say after phonemic

imagery has been formed, after one has said it, and so on (TA 9.1).12

Few would doubt that when consciousness is present something will be different in theactivities of the brain and that this might have consequences for overt behaviour. If focal-

attentive processing integrates the results of prior processing with stored knowledge,

expectations, goals, etc. and disseminates those integrated results throughout the

processing system, this will have powerful effects not only on resulting conscious states, but

also on consequent cerebral functioning and overt response.13

Demonstrating processing

with consciousness to be different is therefore tangential to whether consciousness enters

into processing.14

Of course, one cannot rule out the possibility that a genuine counterexample may be found.

To reject this possibility would require an infinite number of falsifying observations. But thishas to do with the open-ended nature of science, rather than with any weakness in my case.

A genuine counterexample would have to show that consciousness enters into processing

(viewed from a third-person perspective), as opposed to merely accompanying it, or

resulting from it (see TA 9.1)—and that the functions it performs cannot be explained more

parsimoniously, in purely neural (or other physical) terms.15

Wilson counter argues that attributing the apparent functions of consciousness to focal-

attentive processing will not do, as "without a clearer way of distinguishing between focal-

attentive processing and consciousness ... it is not clear what this distinction buys us." I

would argue that the differences between "awareness" and properties such as "limitedcapacity", "seriality" and the many other operations required to produce the integrated

representations which are manifested in conscious states are clear enough. It is the

misidentification of "awareness" with such properties that is problematic. The ancient

12 Mangan, Block, Libet, Van Gulick, Klein, and Spiegel point out that even if functions can be performed

without consciousness, it might be that they could also be performed by consciousness; nature often

duplicates functional systems. This might be true in principle. But if consciousness follows the processing to

which it relates, it cannot enter into it in practice.

13 Wagstaff's demand that I demonstrate processing accompanied by consciousness to be no different to non-conscious processing is consequently unrealistic.

14 Inhoff also misses this point. As he notes, there are many relatively long tasks in which one becomes

conscious of what is going on. But this does not establish that consciousness enters into processing. According

to Inhoff, I suggest "that there is no significant difference between pre-attentive and attentive processes and

that there is no significant difference between focused attention and awareness." In fact, I suggest the

opposite (see TA 8).

15 This is attempted, for example, by Eccles (1980) and Sperry (1985), who both maintain that consciousness

plays an integrating role in the activities of the brain (which cannot be explained in neural terms). They do not

demonstrate however why this cannot be done (see, for example, note 21).



problem of how consciousness (understood as "awareness") could causally influence brain

functioning is one Wilson does not address (see section 9.2, below). A similar problem led

Leibnitz and Spinoza to reject the dualist-interactionism of Descartes.

5. The relation of consciousness to focal-attentive processing.

5.1 Confusions.

According to the target article, consciousness results (in part) from focal-attentive

processing, but is not ontologically identical to it. Nevertheless it remains open to scientific

investigation (TA 9.2). I found it difficult to recognize my views in some of the commentaries

on this issue. Mandler, for example, accuses me of trying to "proscribe the use of the

concept of consciousness from psychological science" by replacing it with "attention." Baars

accuses me of trying to remove consciousness from scientific discussion by dissociating it

from "attention." Carlson accuses me of "replacing the notion of consciousness with the

notion of focal-attentive processing," yet notes that I reject "the identification ofconsciousness with focal attention." Rey, on the other hand, opposes my attempt to

dissociate consciousness from attention, for the reason that he wishes to remove the

concept of consciousness from psychological science. Their detailed commentaries are

similarly confusing.

According to Mandler, I merely note, and do not consider further "the position exemplified

by Kahneman & Treisman (1984) that attention and consciousness are not coextensive and

separable." Section 8 explicitly distinguishes the concept of consciousness (understood as

"awareness") from focal-attentive processing; the work of Nissen & Bullemer (1987) which

operationalizes this distinction is also extensively considered in section 4.4.

Mandler goes on to list statements about the relationship of consciousness to focal-

attentive processing, drawn out of context from the target article, and suggests that they

are "if not contradictory, at least inconsistent"; he suggests that questions such as "is focal

attention a necessary or a sufficient precursor of consciousness," have not been addressed.

What is inconsistent however is not made apparent, and some of the questions he asks are

explicitly answered in the target article.

The relationship of consciousness to focal-attentive processing is summarized in section 8,

where I state that focal-attentive processing is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for

consciousness in humans; in some circumstances (blindsight, implicit learning, etc.) focal-

attentive processing is not accompanied by consciousness. Usually , however, both the

necessary and the sufficient conditions are met, and focal-attentive processing is

accompanied by consciousness. Consequently, when consciousness is absent, focal-

attentive processing is usually (but not always) absent. Normally, of course, the brain

functions in an integrated way. Experimental disruptions of consciousness are therefore

likely to disrupt those aspects of focal-attentive processing with which it is most closely

associated (e.g. the dissemination of the results of prior processing throughout the



processing system). This multifaceted relationship may complicate research, but it presents

no logical inconsistencies.16

Mandler appears to agree that the mechanisms of selection and choice which determine

what we attend to are preconscious.17

Curiously, given the thrust of his commentary, he

also agrees that "information processing is not conscious, but its products are." But he thenasserts that "properties such as seriality, limited capacity, and relative slowness (are) usually

assigned to consciousness"; he argues that if we assign them to focal attention, attention

and consciousness become once again indistinguishable (which he opposes). I am equally

opposed to such a misassignment of properties, but argue the opposite. Consciousness

primarily refers to "awareness". Seriality, limited capacity, slowness, and the like, are

properties of human information processing. This, Mandler admits, is not conscious. If we

assign these properties to consciousness attention and consciousness become

indistinguishable.

Rey describes my attempt to (partially) dissociate consciousness from focal-attentiveprocessing is "oddly philosophical" and "invalid." I point out that consciousness primarily

refers to "awareness," whereas "focal-attentive" processing refers to a functional

subdivision in an information processing model of the brain. Rey points out that "differences

in ... definition or reference fixer do not entail differences in reference." I agree. But neither

can ontological identity be assumed. Rey notes that we can imagine consciousness and

focal-attentive processing coming apart, "but it doesn't follow that it is genuinely possible

that they do." Given that my case makes no reference to what can be "imagined," I fail to

see the force of this. In TA 8, I argue (a) that consciousness is normally dissociated from

focal-attentive processing conceptually, (b) that they are dissociable operationally, and (c)

that various cases exist where they are actually dissociated, at least in part. Rey claims hedoesn't "see the evidence for it, either in this paragraph (TA 8, para 7) or elsewhere." But,

the evidence is given in TA 8, paragraphs 4 and 6, TA sections 4.3, 4.4 and 5.2—and added

evidence is given in the commentaries by Libet and Stanovich.

According to Carlson, my analysis should start with an "explicit theoretical description of the

term consciousness," using cognitive science concepts such as representation, intentional

state, and working memory. Given that target article aims to distinguish consciousness (in

the sense of "awareness") from such concepts, this does not seem to be very useful

suggestion. He criticises my attempt to relate consciousness to focal-attentive processing on

the grounds that the latter concept is "not developed, and is hardly less vague than the

16 It should be clear from this that the precise relationship of consciousness to focal-attentive processing can

only be determined empirically. I do not assert it "ex cathedra" as Navon maintains.

17 Earlier, Mandler tries to argue that what enters consciousness is not necessarily at the focus of attention;

for example, when "thoughts come to mind unbidden or when we (often unexpectedly) feel (are aware of

being) anxious, happy, etc. ... (where) there does not appear to be a prior focus of attention." Wilson makes

the similar point "that recent experimental work by Wegner (1989) on thought suppression ... shows that

sometimes what pops into consciousness are precisely those thoughts we are trying not to think. These

observations, however, simply exemplify the preconscious nature of the selective mechanisms involved.



concepts of consciousness or awareness." The study of focal-attentive processing, however,

has been central to psychological investigations for almost 40 years (following the seminal

work of Cherry, 1953, and Broadbent, 1958—see TA 1.1 to 2.5). Carlson goes on to complain

that "it is very difficult to know just what hypothesis about consciousness is being rejected."

In TA 9.1, I suggest that a process may be "conscious" in so far as one is conscious of it or of

its results, but not in the sense that consciousness enters into the process. Carlson misreads

this as: "information processing (is) unconscious because outputs or contents but not

processes can be reported," which he describes as, "either trivial or absurd." He argues that

inferred relations amongst conscious states, describing their succession and consequences

for behaviour, do not themselves enter consciousness. So why should theoretical

descriptions of cognitive processes do so?

This combines a misreading of my text with a non-sequitur. Inferred relations or theoretical

descriptions are abstractions. They may be said to be "conscious" only in so far as they are

exemplified in experience. Relations amongst conscious experiences are by definition

conscious in this sense. Cognitive processes such as problem solving, planning, and the likemay also be (partly) conscious in this sense, and can be reported (conscious in sense (a)—

see TA 9.1). However, being conscious of a process (or of its results) does not establish a

causal role for consciousness in human information processing.

Carlson goes on to claim that my references to (unconscious) information processing being

sophisticated or complex is "theoretically loaded." If our theories of intervening processing

are incorrect, he argues, it is hardly surprising that we are not aware of them. A

connectionist theory of word recognition, for example, would have "very different

implications for arguments about consciousness" than one postulating intervening

representational states.

This is another non sequitur. We are no more aware of connectionist processes at work in

our own brains, than of representational ones (whether simple or complex). In any case,

according to TA 9.1 (note 15), without a first-person perspective, cognitive models that deal

only with the way input is transformed to behavioural output remain incomplete whatever

their internal mechanisms.

5.2 Misidentifications.

For Baars, awareness and focal attention "covary so perfectly, we routinely infer in oureveryday life that they reflect a single underlying reality." My target article is just one of a

series of misguided attempts (by philosophers, psychologists, and neuroscientists) to deny

the "common-sense and scientifically useful idea that reports of conscious experience, focal-

attention, and wakefulness reflect an internal but nevertheless knowable aspect of our

nervous system," and to "demonstrate that consciousness cannot be associated with all of

its obvious correlates—in this case with "focal attention."

This is a complete misreading of the text, which emphasises throughout that consciousness

is associated with focal attention (it results from focal-attentive processing). I merely deny

their ontological identity (causes are not ontologically identical to their effects). If Baars



means to imply that "reports of conscious experience," "focal-attention," and "wakefulness"

reflect a single aspect of our nervous system, he is evading the complexities involved.

Baars goes on to complain that "we can in principle call human experience anything we like:

focal attention, wakefulness, awareness, consciousness ... and so on ... The trouble, if we

never go beyond these words, is that they do not allow us to call a spade a spade."(myitalics). I also argue that we should call a spade a spade. Consequently we cannot call

human experience anything we like. Baars (like Mandler) accuses me of behaviourism

(which I oppose in TA 9.2). Unfortunately, he seems blind to the similar dangers of

unreconstructed cognitivism. For radical behaviourists, all talk of mind could be translated,

without scientific loss, into talk about behaviour. For the new "radical cognitivists" all talk of

mind (including consciousness) can be translated, without scientific loss, into talk about

information processing. But the effect of calling "consciousness" (or "experience") "focal

attention," is to remove the subject's experience from science (collapsing the subject's first-

person perspective to the external observer's third person perspective—see TA 9.3).

Curiously, Baars appears to agree. He writes that, "... denial of first-person conscious

experience in other people may lead to a profound kind of dehumanization. It comes down

to saying that other people are not capable of joy or suffering, that in fact, as far as the

outside observer is concerned, we are not to see others as they see themselves. The

consequence of this prohibition against the first-person perspective is a kind of

mechanization of other people. Psychology under the thumb of behaviorism did indeed

display this kind of dehumanizing, mechanistic thinking. It is only when we acknowledge the

reality of conscious experience in the minds of others, that we can recognize their full

humanity" (my italics). I can do no better than to commend Baars to his own eloquent

writing.

Mangan accepts that neurological processes responsible for focal attention also produce

conscious effects. But he asks why, if they are in principle dissociable, do they remain so

closely correlated? Consciousness might, for example, contemplate the fine points of

digestion, while focal-attentive processing played the stock market, etc. He suggests that

the straightforward answer is a functional one. Consciousness performs the functions it

appears to perform, which overlap at times with some of the non-conscious processing

mechanisms which support it. I think there is a more straightforward answer. The conditions

for consciousness in the human brain are (in part) produced by focal-attentive processing.

That is why they correlate so closely.

Spiegel also stresses the close relation of consciousness to give brain events; the P300

component of the ERP, for example, has been found to increase with conscious awareness

of stimuli (Posner, 1978); consciousness also seems to relate closely to the dissemination of

information throughout the processing system. From this, he concludes, that consciousness

cannot be "easily extracted from cognition." However, few would deny that consciousness is

closely related to brain events. The question Spiegel does not address is “what is the nature

of this close relationship?”

5.3 Prevarications.



A number of other commentators prevaricate over the relation of consciousness to focal-

attentive processing. Klein, for example, agrees that consciousness is not identical to focal-

attention and primary memory, although it is closely related to these functions. Yet later, he

writes he is "not convinced" by the evidence for their dissociation (but he doesn't give any

reasons). Van Gulick agrees with me that consciousness in the sense of "awareness" should

"not just be equated with, or used as an alternative name for focal-attentive processing."

But he goes on to equate consciousness with (aspects of) focal-attentive processing in his

claim that, "many of the states of brain activity that constitute focal attentive processing are

in fact identical with states of conscious awareness."

5.4 Reversals.

In the target article, I suggest that focal-attentive processing provides at least some of the

conditions for conscious experience. What enters consciousness follows the processing to

which it most closely relates (and cannot therefore enter into it). By contrast, Block argues

that information cannot pass to the executive without first entering consciousness.Consequently, consciousness is necessary for executive processing (including focal-attentive

processing). He claims the TA shows that some things can be done without consciousness,

but that these cases all deal with processing in specialised modules. However, he selects

only those aspects of my review that fit in with his claim. In fact, much of the target article

focuses on how preliminary ("specialised module") processing relates to focal-attentive

processing (TA sections 1 & 2) and more importantly, how consciousness relates to (and can

be dissociated from) focal-attentive processing (TA sections 8 & 9.1).

Block goes on to list some of the cases I consider (Nissen & Bullemer's experiments,

avoidance of motor car accidents, creative inspirations, and disconnection syndromes suchas blindsight). But his intention is to dismiss them, or argue that they are evidence for his

case. For example, Block accepts that creative thought is a function of executive processing

"which is unconscious except for the conscious result of the processing, i.e. the

sophisticated idea itself. So we have executive activity without consciousness." He notes

that this seems to pose a problem for his theory.

I agree. In creative problem solving, unconscious "incubation" is preceded by conscious

"preparation" (see 1.7 above); but the time interval between conscious preparation and the

emergence of a solution may be considerable. Before "sleeping on a problem," for example,

focal attention is accompanied by consciousness. But it seems perverse to suppose thatduring sleep no further information reaches the executive—else how could a solution "pop

into consciousness" on waking? It is central to Block's model that information does not

reach the executive without first entering consciousness. But his only defence is that his

model, "does not dictate that everything that happens in the executive is passed to

consciousness." Given that spontaneous inspirations are cases where things happening in

the executive are passed to consciousness this defence is obscure in the extreme.

Block's use of blindsight as evidence of "no executive action without prior experience" is

equally obscure. This condition is called "blindsight" for the reason that subjects are able to

identify shapes projected to their blind hemifield, reach for glasses, etc., in spite of the fact

they cannot see them, no matter how closely they attend to what is going on, or how well



they are in control of their decisions and motor movements. This appears to be a clear case

of executive action without prior conscious experience. Block counters that blindsight

patients have not as yet been trained to spontaneously use the non-conscious information.

Why this should be evidence of the priority of conscious information is not clear. As

suggested in TA section 8, blindsight subjects may not be able to use input information

because it is not generally available throughout their processing system, preventing its full

integration and contextualisation (even though it remains available in a relatively "raw"

form to the executive).18

Block's model 1 provides a clear contrast with my own. For Block, consciousness occupies a

box within an information processing model of the brain. That is exactly what I oppose. But

Block's description of my case misrepresents it, and Block's defence of his own case

misrepresents the evidence.

6. What is a conscious process?

In my analysis of what is meant by a "conscious process" (TA 9.1), I argue that one may be

conscious of a process (or of the results of a process) without consciousness entering into

processing. A fortiori if one is not even conscious of a process, it makes no sense to speak of

consciousness entering into that process. One has no awareness, for example, of how

information is integrated and disseminated throughout the processing system.

Consequently, such functioning cannot be conscious.

However, according to Van Gulick, this conflates "control access with introspective access."

Consciousness might provide high level control over low level processes to which it does not

have introspective access in the same way that high level computer instructions controlmachine events, via a compiler. "Might not conscious awareness exercise a similar control

over memory processes or over the processes coordinating muscle movements despite my

introspective ignorance of the details of those processes?" In principle, this might be so, but

the argument is only as good as the analogy.

Unlike computer programs, which provide a high level functional description of machine

language operations, an experienced wish to learn or recall something gives no indication of

how encoding or retrieval processes function. To describe such processes as under

conscious control seems like a contradiction in terms. Motor processes are more complex in

that one may be conscious of motor movements at the focus of attention. Again, however,one needs to ask, just how conscious is "conscious control"? This is extensively discussed in

TA 5.1 to 5.4. To exercise control, program instructions must precede machine language

operations. What enters consciousness, however, appears to be the result of focal-attentive

processing. In speech, for example, there is a sense in which one is only aware of what one

18 This lack of integration (at the processing level) would also account for the dissociations mentioned in

Shevrin's commentary. Conversely, from a third-person perspective, the integration and contextualisation

produced by focal-attentive processing would account for the "quality fixing" he describes (the integration of

quality and content of experience, observed from a first-person perspective).



wants to say, after one has said it. Even the experienced urge or intention to act, appears to

be preceded by (and to be the result of) preconscious neural events (see 1.6 above, and TA

3).

Dretske also elaborates on what is meant by a "conscious process." He distinguishes

consciousness of a process, or consciousness of the results of processing from an active rolefor consciousness in processing, as I do in TA section 9.1. According to Dretske, however, a

conscious process should be redefined as, "the act of awareness, the process by which we

are made aware of whatever objects we are aware of. P is a conscious process (in S) if there

is something, X, that P makes us aware of." This presents difficulties.

The process (or processes) which make us aware are usually thought of as being

neurophysiological ones (involved in perception, emotion, thinking, and so on). They may

cause awareness or (in the case of the neural correlates of consciousness) accompany

awareness, but they are not acts of awareness at all! Awareness does not play an active role

in the processes which make us aware.

Dretske rightly points out that objects or events are not themselves conscious, simply

because we become conscious of them. This applies equally to internal events and

processes (heartbeats, food in the throat, etc.). But he says some internal events and

processes (pains, visual and auditory sensations, etc.) are conscious (in the relevant sense)

because they are acts of awareness, and constitute awareness—not by virtue of us being

conscious of them. I agree that pains, auditory sensations and so on are "conscious" by

virtue of constituting consciousness (they are amongst the contents of consciousness).

Indeed, this applies to the entire phenomenal world.19

But, this does not make them "acts"

or "processes," as Dretske claims. Nor, as he later suggests, can we locate consciousness in"the processes that underlie and constitute our consciousness of things, for the simple

reason that brain processes which underlie (in the sense of cause or correlate with)

consciousness, do not at the same time constitute its contents.

In his attempt to find a role for consciousness in human information processing, Dretske

redefines awareness as an act or process by which we become aware. This confounds

conscious contents with antecedent neurophysiological processing, rather than clarifying

their relationship.

7. Philosophical implications.

7.1 Epiphenomenalism

According to Baars, Block, Lloyd, Mangan, Van Gulick, Kinsbourne, Corteen, Rey, and

Hardcastle, I support epiphenomenalism and their commentaries are largely devoted to the

19 Unlike Dretske, I would argue that this applies equally to external or bodily events as-experienced. As this is

peripheral to Dretske's main theme, I will not develop this point here. But see Velmans (1990a), for a detailed

discussion.



case against it. Let me repeat at the outset that I do not support epiphenomenalism. In TA

9.3, I argue that from a third-person perspective epiphenomenalism appears true, but from

a first-person perspective it appears false—an apparent paradox, that any complete theory

of the mind must offer to resolve. For these commentators however, the first-person

perspective is not to be taken seriously. If consciousness plays any causal role that matters,

it must do so from a third-person perspective.

My argument is that the instances of consciousness not playing a causal role reviewed in the

target article, exemplify a general relationship. Viewed purely from a third-person

perspective, consciousness is (inferred) output, and consequently epiphenomenal. The

manifest implausibility of this (given the many cases where we cannot function without

relevant experience) arises from our first-person perspective. Consequently, any complete

account has to take the first-person perspective seriously (I return to this in 9.1 below).

7.2 Dualist-interactionism.

MacKay is a dualist-interactionist (in the tradition of Eccles, 1980), and claims consciousness

to be the "king of the neuronal processors." It "sets the goals," "issues commands, "plays

power broker," and has the ultimate "veto." It also "synthesizes the highly distributed

information from neuronal processors into unified percepts." "Consciousness coexists with

the nervous system in symbiotic relationship."

What I share with MacKay is his anti-reductionism, his intuition that it is no recent arrival,

and his conviction that the phenomenon is basic. I also agree that there are mysteries here.

There is something happening in the brain which both enables functioning and awareness.

But, in allocating the highest brain functions to awareness, MacKay attempts to straddle thisdivide, with all the usual, attendant problems. For example, he does not address how a

symbiotic consciousness could set goals, issue commands, etc., or why such functions could

not be performed by the brain itself. Nor does he address the evidence (reviewed in TA) that

consciousness follows the processing to which it relates—that once information enters

consciousness it is already integrated, and that the operation of human information

processing is unconscious. Dixon's suggestion that hydrocephalus cases might show "how

consciousness can take over when the usual machinery for complex cognitive activity is

grossly impaired" faces similar problems. For these reasons, I adopt a monist view.

Functioning and awareness are the manifestations of one process viewed from different

perspectives (see 9.3 below).

Mangan is also a dualist-interactionist, but accepts that there is a mystery about how (a

nonphysical) consciousness could interact with the physical brain. He rightly points out that

epiphenomenalists face the same problem. This is one of the reasons I reject both dualist-

interactionism and epiphenomenalism, in favour of a "complementary perspectives"

approach.

7.3 Functionalist reductionism.



Many commentators have tried to show that consciousness deserves its own "box" within a

functionalist model of the mind. By contrast, Sloman, Hardcastle, Rey, and Stanovich

attempt to "deal" with consciousness by eliminating it.

If consciousness is distinguishable from functioning, yet open to scientific investigation, as

my target article claims, this eliminative programme fails. Accordingly, Sloman seeks toundermine my case by arguing that, "people who discuss consciousness delude themselves

in thinking that they know what they are talking about ... it's not just one thing but many

things muddled together"—rather like our "multifarious uses of "energy" (intellectual

energy, music with energy, high energy explosion, etc.)." Stanovich likewise points out that

"the term "consciousness" fractionates into half a dozen or more different usages." Given

this, they argue, one can make no generalizations about it.

I disagree. There is nothing to prevent organized discussion of a specific usage of a term. The

target article, for example, picks out consciousness in the sense of "awareness." The

contents of consciousness may be indefinitely varied, but this does not mean theirdependence on physical stimuli, sensory physiology, and the like, cannot be studied

systematically within perception, psychophysics, and so forth. Nor does this prevent

investigation of the conditions under which each of these contents become conscious. There

is extensive evidence, for example, that events enter consciousness only if they are at the

focus of attention, irrespective of their variety (see TA 1 and 2). The neural conditions for

consciousness can also be experimentally explored (see, for example, Libet; Koch & Crick;

and TA 9.1). In short, the conditions for the existence of consciousness can, in part, be

distinguished from the added conditions required to produce its varied contents. The

dissociation of awareness from information processing (proposed in TA 9.1) applies in every

case (irrespective of the object of awareness). The analogy Sloman draws betweenmetaphorical uses of the term "energy" and non-metaphorical use of the term

"consciousness" is therefore a false one.20

Sloman's attempt to fragment consciousness is followed by an attempt to eliminate it from

the analysis of mind altogether, to be replaced by a study of capabilities. "If we give up the

idea of a unique referent, we can instead survey relevant phenomena, analyze their

relationships to other capabilities ... and try devising mechanisms capable of generating all

these capabilities, including self-monitoring capabilities." He goes on to discuss

architectures that might support monitoring, information integration and higher level

control. I have no objection to the study of capabilities or to the investigation ofarchitectures that instantiate them, but if my TA argument is right, a psychology that speaks

only of capabilities and their embodying architectures has nothing to say about

consciousness at all (whether fragmentary or unified)!

20 The term "consciousness" like any other, is "theory-laden." And, as our understanding of how it relates to

"mind" and "brain" increases, our understanding of "consciousness" will deepen. But that does not mean there

is nothing to which the term refers.



This is neatly illustrated by Sloman's final conjecture, "That this ... design-based strategy for

accounting for phenomena supporting talk of consciousness will eventually explain it all.

We'll have evidence of success if intelligent machines of the future reject our explanation of

how they work, saying it leaves out something terribly important, something that can only

be described from the first-machine point of view ..."

I agree. If consciousness is dissociable from functioning, a nonconscious intelligent machine

would accept a complete explanation of how it functions as having left out nothing.

Conversely, if the machine were conscious, and consequently rejected a purely functional

account, that would be because this said nothing about its "first-machine" perspective.

For Hardcastle, such consequences are of little concern. If consciousness is not captured by

(a third-person) psychology, so be it; "consciousness could simply be outside the domain

that psychologists are trying to capture ... Whether an information processing model is

complete depends on what it is explaining." In any case, she argues, reduction between

perspectives is relatively straightforward, "since science regularly and nonproblematicallyredescribes the way the world seems to us from a first-person perspective in third-person

objective terms. To wit, objects which appear red to us do so because they reflect a certain

wavelength of electromagnetic radiation. Surfaces which seem warm to us do so because

their mean molecular kinetic energy is above a certain level relative to the MMKE of our

skin. There is no reason why consciousness should not be reducible in the same way."

However, it should be clear from the target article and the commentaries that many

psychologists are concerned to capture consciousness; and Hardcastle's old reductionist

argument (see, for example, Place, 1956) is based on a simple error. It assumes that if C is

shown to cause E, then E reduces to C. A sensation of redness might be caused by certainelectromagnetic wavelengths interacting with the colour coding mechanisms of the visual

system, but that is not to say that the resulting sensation is nothing more than

"electromagnetic radiation." On the contrary, such cases exemplify the need to incorporate

first- and third person perspectives into any complete cause-effect description. From a

third-person perspective, electromagnetic energy can be observed to innervate the eye and

visual system; but there is no way of knowing that this results in a "red" sensation, without

incorporating the subject's point of view. And the same applies to all other contents of

consciousness.

To be sure, the red sensation is (the subject's experience) of something going on in theworld; and for the purposes of physics it may be useful to redescribe that event (in the

world) as electromagnetic radiation. The ability of the visual system to translate

electromagnetic frequencies into colour sensations, however, is what is of interest to

psychology .

Hardcastle goes on to dismiss consciousness as cognitively irrelevant "noise." She maintains,

"... we have simply talked ourselves into believing that consciousness has certain causal

powers ... perceptual experiences tell us nothing." Ironically, one of the most remarkable

facts about consciousness is its well-integrated nature. In spite of the complexity of

antecedent preconscious processing, what we experience is not "noise," but a coherent

phenomenal world. From a first-person point of view, such meaningful experience forms the



basis of all our activities. One does not need to talk oneself into believing that the contents

of consciousness have causal powers. If one ignores what one experiences one is likely to be

run over by a bus.

Hardcastle argues (following Wilkes, 1988), that some languages do not have a word for

"consciousness" (including ancient Greek) and that our assumptions about its causal powerare peculiar to "our epistemic milieu." The notion that man is something more than a body,

however, is evident in the funereal furniture and artefacts meant to accompany the souls of

the dead in Palaeolithic graves, and in Egyptian and Assyrian mythology. Dualist-

interactionism, furthermore, originates not with Descartes, but with Plato's deliberations on

the nature and activities of nous. That some languages do not have an exact word for

consciousness is irrelevant. As Block, Sloman and Stanovich point out, one would have to

include English amongst their number. What is important is that all languages describe

causal sequences from a first-person perspective. It is the attempt to eliminate the first-

person perspective that is peculiar to "our epistemic milieu."

Rey and Stanovich agree with me that consciousness as we normally understand it cannot

be identified with any psychological process. However, they draw entirely different

conclusions. I argue that if information processing models do not encompass consciousness

they are incomplete. Rey argues that this is "a reason to disbelieve in consciousness

altogether." Stanovich calls consciousness a "botched concept"; a psychiatric institution is

too good for it; it deserves the "death penalty." Not content with throwing the baby out

with the bathwater, they throw out the bath as well.

In TA 9.2, I point out that in studies of perception, psychophysics and so on, the contents of

a subject's experience may be thought of as a form of output (of perceptual and otherprocessing); as such, it is (and always has been) a legitimate object of study. According to

Rey, "... this amounts to reneging on epiphenomenalism: for how can something without

causal consequences be legitimately inferred from such data?" This is a non-sequitur.

Epiphenomenalism, as defined by Thomas Huxley, claims consciousness to be a form of

output, caused by brain processing, which in turn has no causal influence on that

processing. In any case, I do not adopt epiphenomenalism, for the reason that it has nothing

to say about causality viewed from a first-person perspective.

Rey's opposition to this is deep. He writes that consciousness might seem to make a

difference, but, "So does God, the soul and contra-causal freedom." According to him, thevery idea that causal claims are perspective-dependent is suspect, because "Causal claims

are about the world independently of perspective." One does not need to be a relativity

theorist to doubt this. Causal claims may about the world, but they are never independent

of perspective. They are always about events viewed under given conditions, conceptualized

from a given point of view (this point is so well-established that I won't labour it).

Rey concludes by denying the existence of consciousness, comparing my faith in the

existence of consciousness to a theologian's faith in the existence in God: "Why in the world

should one believe in such a God? Why should one believe in such a consciousness? In both

cases, of course, people have been tempted to say, "Because I have direct access to it." But

such first-person breast beating begs the question ... the challenge ... is to come up with



some non-question-begging reason to believe consciousness exists. I doubt there is any to

be had."

This departure into rhetoric is a poor substitute for common sense. In denying the existence

of consciousness, Rey is denying the existence of all its contents. Not just love and hate,

pleasure and pain, and other inner events such as thoughts, images and dreams—but alsothe experienced body and the entire phenomenal world (including visual experiences of

meter readings, brain events in others, etc). Given a denial of this order, not even a direct

line to the almighty will save his argument.

Stanovich focuses on the utility of "consciousness" for psychological theory. He notes that

"... there does not exist one single model in cognitive psychology where "consciousness"

plays a necessary theoretical role." In so far as such models deal solely with human

functioning viewed from an external observer's perspective, I agree. But that is not a reason

for eliminating consciousness. In models of perception, for example, consciousness is one

(inferred) output of human information processing. While resource use, obligatory vs.optional execution, controlled processing, and the like should not be confused with whether

or not information enters consciousness, the relation of consciousness to focal-attentive

processing is close, and deserves more detailed experimental examination (see TA section

8). Processing accompanied by awareness, differs from processing not so accompanied, in

many experimental domains. While this does not establish the causal efficacy of

consciousness within such processing, what enters awareness is of interest in itself. It can

also provide a valuable indicator of functional differences in processing. According to

Stanovich, talk of consciousness is "ineffable" and invariably confuses discussions of

functioning. There is nothing confused, however, in Gardiner's review of the way

differences in phenomenal awareness relate to functional differences in memory, in Libet's comments on how the relation of first-and third-person perspectives can be investigated

experimentally, or in Shevrin's point that therapy primarily relies on the client's first-person

perspective. Worries about the "ineffability" of first-person accounts presuppose

consciousness to be a form of "ghost" lurking around the machinery of the brain.

Reductionists, such as Stanovich, understandably call for the exorcist. Elsewhere (Velmans,

1990a), I have argued that this classical dualist vs. reductionist way of viewing

consciousness, is grounded in fictitious presuppositions about its "ghostly" nature that the

protagonists share. Space prevents me recapitulating here an alternative, reflexive model of

how consciousness, brain and the physical world relate to each other. Given the thrust of

the commentaries, however, it is essential to elaborate on my brief introduction (in TA 9.3)to first- vs third-person perspectives.

8. First-person vs. third-person perspectives.

By "first-person perspective," I simply mean how things appear from the subject's point of

view ; "third-person perspective," refers to how events relating to the subject appear to an

external observer (e.g. an experimenter). Included in the subject's first-person perspective

are not just inner experiences (thoughts, images, emotions, and so forth) but also the body

as-experienced, and the physical world as-experienced, extended in three-dimensional

space beyond the body surface. All these contents are included in what the subject

experiences, and are no more "ineffable" than what the experimenter experiences while



observing the subject. Whether a perspective is "first-person" or "third-person" depends

solely on the relation of the observer to the event of interest . A subject, adopting a first-

person perspective, is focused on his own experience and consequent behaviour; an

experimenter, adopting a third-person perspective, is focused on the brain functioning,

behaviour, and (inferred) experience of a subject.

In TA 9.3, I focus on first- and third-person perspectives of a subject's information

processing; consequently I suggest that the experimenter's and subject's access to that

processing is asymmetrical—via exteroceptors for the experimenter and interoceptors for

the subject. Symmetries and asymmetries of access are complex, however. Subject and

experimenter, for example, have symmetrical access to events out-there in the world (via

exteroceptors). Viewed in this way, differences between first- and third-person perspectives

are far more subtle than generally thought.

Stanovich, for example, argues that first-person accounts are largely a cultural product and

contaminated by our folk theory of the mental. This may be. But reports of external objectsand events are equally a cultural product, paradigm-driven and theory-laden. To be sure,

first-person accounts are corrigible, and need to be assessed in the light of all available

evidence (including third-person evidence). But third-person accounts are also corrigible (if

they were not, there would be nothing for cognitive scientists to discuss).21

Whether first-

person or third-person accounts are more useful depends entirely on the explanatory

context (TA 9.3).

Stanovich cites Churchland (1985), who casts doubt on the content of first-person (vs. third-

person) reports, on the grounds that "the introspective discriminations we make are for the

most part learned; they are acquired with practice and experience, often quite slowly. Andthe specific discriminations we learn to make are those that it is useful to make." But the

partial dependence of discrimination on learning, applies to perception of inner and outer

events alike. It does not make first-person reports more suspect. In any case, it seems

perverse to claim that our ability to distinguish pleasure vs. pain, images vs. percepts,

auditory vs. visual experiences, and so on, are contentless, slowly acquired, culture-bound

discriminations. Babies seem to manage quite well! It is trivially true that one cannot report

on inner events prior to learning the rules of the language game (this applies equally to

external objects and events). But this hardly means there is nothing to report!—or that,

(following Dennett, 1988), "qualia" have "no properties or features at all."

Schaeken & d'Ydewalle accept that whichever perspective one adopts, there is always an

observer and an observed. But they go on to assert that what distinguishes these

perspectives is the object of observation—that the first-person perspective enables only the

investigation of consciousness, whereas the third-person perspective enables investigation

of the entire mind . Consequently, they claim that, "The small focus of the first-person

21 Wagstaff makes the point that the accuracy of first-person reports cannot be guaranteed, given that

subjective reactions to consciousness necessarily follow the events themselves. This, again, applies equally to

third-person reports.



perspective can be the cause of small and distorted theories, whereas the broadness of the

third-person perspective can take into account as much factors or objects as needed,

including the one used in the first-person perspective." I disagree.

The "object of observation" depends entirely on the focus of interest . From a first-person

perspective, consciousness itself might be the focus of interest, but more often the focuswill be on what one is conscious of . Whichever is the case, subject and experimenter may

have the same focus of interest (the experimenter, for example, might be interested either

in the subject's awareness (its qualities, causes, etc.) or in the processing of which the

subject has some awareness (in problem solving, planning, and so forth).

Whether a given perspective is "broader" or relatively "narrow and distorted" also depends

on the focus of interest. First-person accounts reveal little about human information

processing (the subject's access to his own processing is limited). Third-person accounts,

however, reveal little about how subjects experience themselves in the world—and for

psychology this is also of theoretical and practical interest. 22 A client's depression, forexample, might be "broadly" understood in terms of loneliness, or lack of love—and

therapy, as a further exploration of experience. By contrast, a third-person focus on brain

chemistry, antidepressants, and the like, may give a relatively "narrow and distorted"

picture.

As Shevrin notes, "Psychoanalysis is entirely based on introspective first person reports

recounting the individual's own understanding of his/her actions." These reasons or causes

may not be currently available to introspection. But they may be explored from a first-

person point of view, to produce a deeper awareness of one’s "own beliefs, desires, wishes,

memories, judgments, etc.," which does not reduce to "the nonconscious informationprocessing associated with these beliefs, desires, etc." Thus, there may be "An unconscious

from a first-person perspective."23

This is inconsistent with Schaeken & d'Ydewalle's conclusion that "In psychology, there is

no need for an additional first-person perspective, but there is a need for a more complete

third-person perspective which incorporates the first-person perspective." Accounts of how

subjects experience themselves in the world can be translated into accounts of brain

processing, but there will always be something lost in the translation. While first-person

accounts are complementary to third-person accounts, they cannot be reduced to them.

9. Complementarity.

22 As Corteen points out, it might be possible to translate everyday consciously experienced decisions (about

shopping in supermarkets) into their preconscious, information processing antecedents, but for practical

purposes, what would be gained?

23 Shevrin thinks this produces a paradox from my point of view, but it fits in naturally. The subject's

unconscious can be explored, either from a first- or third-person perspective. What emerges from each

perspective depends both on the focus of interest and on what is accessible. In so far as the accounts

(obtained from either perspective) are accurate, they are complementary.



9.1 Neither first-person nor third-person accounts are privileged.

It should be clear from the above, that I not wish to remove consciousness from models of

mental functioning, as Wilson implies, and that in my analysis consciousness does not

"shrink dramatically" as Lloyd maintains; nor do I view first-person and third-person

accounts as "mutually contradictory" as Bowers (falsely) claims. I simply argue thatinformation processing models which view humans only from a third-person perspective are

incomplete. As noted in section 9.3, first-person and third-person accounts are

complementary, and mutually irreducible. A complete psychology requires both (see also

Velmans, 1990b).

But, according to Lloyd, the complementarity I propose, "is an odd one since one main

conclusion is that subjective impressions of the efficacy of consciousness are wrong." This

misreads TA sections 9.1 to 9.3, but Lloyd cannot be entirely blamed for this interpretation.

The bulk of my review necessarily addresses the relation of consciousness to human

information processing from within the current information processing paradigm. This viewswhat is going on in the brain from an exclusively third-person perspective. My argument is

that if one views matters only from this perspective, not only does consciousness appear to

"shrink," if one pursues it closely enough, one chases it out of the system altogether!

However, as consciousness "shrinks" from a third-person perspective (as the attempt to

reduce it to an information processing function progressively fails), it regains its true, first-

person perspective status. Lloyd rightly points out that the contents of consciousness

encompass the entire experienced world . And, from a first-person perspective, instances of

the causal efficacy of conscious states are innumerable (TA section 9.3). These 'subjective

impressions' would only be "wrong" if the third-person perspective were somehow

privileged . This, I reject.

The phenomenal world, experienced body, and experienced inner states such as thoughts,

emotions, and so on, are just as "real" (viewed from a first-person perspective) as are

observations of the brain states of others (viewed from a third-person perspective). The

complementarity I propose is genuine. Lloyd proposes an alternative 'complementarity'

which identifies "states of consciousness with causally active cognitive states." This reduces

the first-person perspective to the third-person perspective and is not complementarity at

all.24

9.2 A resolution of the causal paradox.

Libet agrees with my proposal that first- and third-person perspectives are complementary

and mutually irreducible (the need to relate these perspectives has been central to his own

experimental work). But he thinks I use complementarity to "eliminate the need even to

24 If consciousness follows the processing to which it relates, and does not enter into human information

processing, this reductionist position would in any case have to be abandoned. Another obvious problem for

Lloyd is the extensive evidence for causally active unconscious cognitive states (see TA; Dixon, 1981; Kihlstrom,

1987).



raise the question of whether there is a causal relationship between a brain state and a

conscious experience," thereby begging the question at issue. This is not my intention.

To begin with, I agree with Libet that there appear to be many cases of brain modifications

causing modifications in experience. As Thomas Huxley observed, "one has only to stick a

pin into oneself to perform a sufficient demonstration." I also agree with Libet (againstHuxley) that there appear to be many cases of experiences causing brain and bodily

changes. At the same time, viewed from a third-person perspective, there seems to be no

need to invoke consciousness to explain the activity of neurons (see TA). Nor, from an

everyday first-person perspective, does one need neurophysiology to explain what one

experiences.25

Indeed, it not obvious how events as apparently different as brain states and

experiences could have causal influences on each other. As Mangan points out, this problem

applies to epiphenomenalism as much as to dualist-interactionism. This forms a "causal

paradox" which any adequate theory of how consciousness relates to the brain must

address.

I argue that this paradox can be resolved by recognising that such accounts view matters

from different (first- and third-person) perspectives; some explanations view matters from

both perspectives, although we seldom acknowledge that they do so. Scientific accounts (of

other people) are normally based on what can be observed of them, viewed from an

external, third-person perspective. Everyday accounts of ourselves are normally based on

how we experience ourselves. But we take it for granted that others have a first-person

perspective, and that a third-person perspective can be adopted toward ourselves (that we

can be viewed as others see us, as bodies, brains, and so on). Accordingly, when explaining

others or ourselves we sometimes give mixed perspective explanations.

Explanations of causal interactions between brain states and conscious experiences are of

this kind. Libet's (1985) study, for example, investigates how the readiness potential (viewed

from a third-person perspective) relates to an urge or intention to act (as experienced by

the subject). In the studies of Lassen, et al. (1978), and Roland & Friberg (1985), imagined

movements (experienced by the subject) were accompanied by increases in local cerebral

rates of blood flow (observed by the experimenter). Such accounts of causal sequences

switch from how things are experienced by the subject to how things are experienced by the

external observer, but each perspective is legitimate (a complete psychology requires

both).26

How these perspectives relate can only be understood through experimental

25 Given the widely held presupposition that the third-person perspective is privileged, this point may be less

obvious. I simply mean that in most everyday circumstances, it makes perfect sense to explain what one

experiences in terms of previous experiences. One experience of the world might cause a thought, one

thought might cause another, or an emotion, and so on.

26 Mixed perspective explanations can be given either of brain processing and overt action, or of conscious

awareness itself (along with its contents). Consequently, I disagree with Navon that theories of mind function

cannot subsume "an object of explanation, like the awareness of persons"—and that first-person accounts in

any case attribute causal roles to the contents of consciousness, rather than to "consciousness per se." It

depends on what one is trying to explain. Sometimes, the existence of consciousness, or the formation of one

or other of its contents is the object of explanation. At other times a difference in functioning (with or withoutconsciousness or one of its contents) is the object of explanation. In such instances, either consciousness as

such, or one of its contents, could form part of the explanation provided that one recognizes that these are all



investigation. Accordingly, I do not aim to "inhibit further experimental exploration of the

possibilities of causal interaction between neural and conscious states," as Libet fears. My

aim is to encourage it. The target article demonstrates that first-person accounts can be

translated into third-person accounts, but they cannot be reduced to them.

9.3 Complementarity at the interface of consciousness and brain.

The possibility of translating what is experienced into (third-person) functional terms, is in

any case implicit in the widely-held assumption (which I adopt) that every distinct conscious

experience has a distinct neurophysiological correlate27

; information (about inner or outer

events) experienced by the subject will therefore appear to the external observer to be

coded in a neurophysiological form. According to TA section 8, this neural representation

(like it's conscious accompaniment) is produced by focal-attentive processing; it is an

integrated state, combining information relating to current events with expectations, needs,

goals and so forth, in a way that enables its dissemination throughout the processing

system. 28

As Economos notes, this is a form of dual-aspect theory (in the tradition of Spinoza). In so

far as conscious states and their neural correlates encode identical information this is also a

form of "identity theory" as Libet (and Mandler) suggest. But as Economos rightly insists, it

is not traditional reductionist identity theory. Conscious states no more reduce to

neurophysiological ones (or the reverse) than pictures on television screens reduce to the

magnetic codings on video tapes which encode identical information.29

mixed perspective explanations. Whether it be cause or effect, the subject's consciousness is not reducible toanything the experimenter can observe.

27 Whether such correlates could exist in the brain without accompanying consciousness is partly an empirical

matter and partly a matter of definition. Even if the correlates could not occur without consciousness by

definition, this would not establish a causal role for "awareness" in neural functioning. From a third-person

perspective, causal sequences would remain explainable in purely neural terms. Consequently, I do not agree

with Dagenbach, that unless the form of processing to which consciousness most closely relates can be shown

to occur without consciousness, then consciousness plays a causal role in processing.

28 What neural form such integrated correlates might take, remains an open question. As Koch & Crick point

out, it seems likely that the integrated representations involve some form of co-ordinated activity in disparate

regions of the brain, which is somehow distinguished from other concurrent activity. Whether this is achievedby the phase-locked synchronous firing of the neurons involved (Koch & Crick), by the contour of statistical

deviations from average neuronal firing patterns (John, 1976), by a form of neural holography (Pribram, 1971,

1982; O'Keefe, 1985), or by some entirely different mechanism, can only be decided by empirical research.

29 Whether first- and third-person accounts provide descriptions of the same thing is a separate matter (see

Economos). Note that the information encoded in conscious experience and correlated brain states is usually

about inner or outer events other than the brain states themselves. Accordingly, first-person accounts are

usually descriptions of inner or outer events as-experienced (not descriptions of the correlated brain states).

The extent to which a third-person account can be about the same thing, depends on the extent to which the

inner or outer events are accessible (either observationally or inferentially) to an external observer.

Conversely, the extent to which first-person accounts can be about the same thing as (third-person)

descriptions of brain states and processes depends on the extent to which those states and processes areaccessible (through experience or inference) to both the subject and the experimenter. There are symmetries

and asymmetries of access between experimenter and subject, depending on what is being accessed (see



This position contrasts with that developed by Van Gulick, and Navon, who have similar

views about consciousness being related to the integration and dissemination of

information, but claim consciousness to be identical to the brain processes involved.30

Van

Gulick, for example, suggests that conscious awareness is "identical with (or at least part of)

the process by which information is broadcast." This collapses the subject's first-person

perspective to the external observer's third-person perspective. The difficulty with such a

reduction is illustrated by Van Gulick's subsequent comment that "We should not forget

that our conscious awareness is typically of a phenomenal world in the Kantian sense." It is

important to add that the phenomenal world constitutes (the major part of) the contents of

consciousness (there is no extra experience of a phenomenal world, in the "head","brain" or

"mind"). While information about this world as-experienced may be coded in (suitably

integrated) correlated neural states, it does not make sense to reduce the phenomenal

world to a state of the brain (see Velmans, 1990a, for a detailed discussion).

Navon's position is more complex. Whereas I identify consciousness with "awareness," and

distinguish consciousness from its (integrated) neural correlates (with their attendantfunctions), Navon distinguishes between two forms of awareness. There is "awareness in

the functional sense" which is (identical to) "the availability of information about the output

of a process to other processes within a community of processes"; and there is

"consciousness in its common usage"—which might be "the experiential facet of awareness

defined in this (functional) way." Navon accordingly concludes that, "consciousness (as

function) can be disentangled from awareness." I think this is a good way to tangle them up.

As Navon himself points out, "the state of information dissemination can also be presented

in terms of information processing without any reference to consciousness." So why should

one call this "consciousness" or "awareness"? In any case, my claim is that conscious

experience does not enter into information processing.

9.4 Complementary views of consciousness and evolution.

The interrelation of consciousness and evolution is a deep issue which cannot be adequately

discussed within the limited available space. A few introductory comments may

nevertheless be useful. As Mangan notes, "it would be very odd that something as

remarkable as consciousness evolved and yet did not execute a cognitive function" (a

sentiment shared by Corteen). Klein writes, "If ... consciousness does not enter into ...

human information processing—then it is awfully hard to imagine what the adaptive

functions of consciousness might be that would have conferred a selective advantageleading to its evolution." I agree. Evolutionary theory is a functional theory. If sentience is

dissociable from functioning (TA 9.1) then the emergence of sentience cannot be explained

Velmans, 1993). However, the experimenter is not necessarily privileged (Economos mistakes my intention on

this point).

30 This position also contrasts sharply with that of Koch & Crick, who simply list which TA conclusions they

agree with, and which are "incorrect" or "irrelevant" (i.e. different from their own), without supporting

argument. Without further ado, they go on to develop their own reductionist position, thereby begging all the

questions relating to this issue.



in entirely functional terms. But this too, in my view, has to be looked at from both a first-

and third-person perspective.

Viewed from a first-person perspective, the adaptive advantages of conscious contents

seem clear. There appear to be innumerable situations in which an integrated awareness of

inner and outer events is necessary for adaptive interaction. The problem consciousnessposes for evolutionary theory arises when matters are viewed from an exclusively third-

person perspective (the traditional perspective of science). To an external observer, all the

supposed functions of consciousness are fulfilled by its neural correlates, which embody

integrated information (about inner and outer events) in a form that enables its

dissemination throughout the processing system. The evolutionary advantages of such

integrated information about inner and outer events for adaptive behaviour again seem

clear. First-person and third-person accounts remain complementary, in that they both refer

to the need for integrated representations.

Yet, given the dissociability of sentience from functioning, it is easy to imagine a machine(an android) that functioned (adaptively) just as humans do without awareness (editorial). If

so, what is the added value of awareness? According to Schaeken and d'Ywalle, if

consciousness does not enter into functioning (viewed from a third-person perspective)

then, "considerations about the function or goal of consciousness can no longer be of help

in clarifying its fundamental nature." This impasse, however, presupposes that the

fundamental nature of consciousness can only be understood from a third-person

perspective, and that the only function or goal worthy of consideration is survival fitness. To

avoid the impasse one has to re-examine the presuppositions.

Viewed from a third-person perspective, consciousness does not enhance adaptivefunctioning. Rather, the brain functions, in part, to produce experience. From a first-person

perspective, the difference this makes is obvious. Without consciousness there would be no

experienced world. Denied the possibility of experience, survival appears without purpose.

Placed in irreversible coma on a life support machine, few humans would choose to

continue to survive. From this perspective, consciousness is the goal ... but not one that can

be understood in (third-person) information processing terms.

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