consequence analysis & risk assessment of lpg transportation through rail and road
TRANSCRIPT
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“CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS AND RISK ASSESSMENT OF LPG
TRANSPORTATION THROUGH RAIL AND ROAD”
A PROJECT REPORT
Submitted by
AMALDAS P K
COLIN K PALLIPPATTU
PRASOON K P
SACHIN EARNEST
SANGEETH SATHEESH
SOORAJ A S
In partial fulfillment for the award of the degree of
BACHELOR OF TECHNOLOGY IN
SAFETY AND FIRE ENGINEERING
SCHOOL OF ENGINEERING
COCHIN UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
KOCHI 682 022
APRIL 2015
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CERTIFICATE
Certified that the project report entitled “CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS AND RISK
ASSESSMENT OF LPG TRANSPORTATION THROUGH RAIL AND ROAD” submitted
by Amaldas P K, Colin K Pallipattu, Prasoon K P, Sachin Earnest, Sangeeth Satheesh, Sooraj
A S is a bonafide record of the project carried out by them towards the partial fulfilment of the
requirements for the eighth semester of B-Tech degree course in Safety &Fire, under my
supervision.
SIGNATURE SIGNATURE
Dr. DEEPAK KUMAR SAHOO Dr. V R RENJITH
HEAD OF THE DEPARTMENT ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR
SAFETY AND FIRE ENGG. SAFETY AND FIRE ENGG.
SOE, CUSAT SOE, CUSAT
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
For Successful completion of this Project, we have received so much help from so many people.
This project wouldn’t have been possible without the contribution of so many peoples.
We could like to express our sense of gratitude to our guide Dr. V R RENJITH. It has been our
good opportunity to work with Dr.V R RENJITH. He give us the freedom to work on project.
We would like to express the sense of gratitude to HOD of Safety and Fire engineering Dr. DIPAK
KUMAR SAHOO.
We express our sincere thanks to faculties of Safety and Fire engineering
We express our hearty thanks to Mr. RAIZ (son of victim Chala gas tanker disaster), who helped
to describe about the Chala accident to us
We extend to our sincere thanks to Mr. AMARNATH PhD Scholar, Department of environmental
Studies, Cochin University of Science And Technology for the guidance on ALOHA, MAR PLOT
and Q-GIS software
We express sincere thanks to our friend ASIF Department of Electronics and communication, SOE
CUSAT, for helping us to develop the software FIREMODE.
We are very thankful to our Parents and Friends for their constant encouragement and support
throughout this project
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CONTENTS
LIST OF TABLES
LIST OF FIGURES
ABSTRACT
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 General 14
1.2 Motivation behind project 15
1.3 Objectives 17
2 LPG DEMAND 18
3 LPG MSDS 20
3.1 Identification of substance or Preparation 20
3.2 Hazard identification 20
3.3 First aid measures 24
3.4 Firefighting measures 25
3.5 Accidental release measures 26
3.6 Handling and storage 26
3.7 Exposure control and Personal protection 27
3.8 Recommended Personal protective equipments 27
3.9 Environmental Exposure control 28
3.10 Physical and chemical properties 28
3.11 Chemical stability and Reactivity information 29
3.12 Toxicological information 29
3.13 Ecological information 29
3.14 Transport information 30
3.15 Regulatory information 30
4 MODES OF TRANSPORTATION
31
5
5 HAZARDS ASSOCIATED WITH LPG 33
5.1 JET FIRE 33
5.2 Vapour Cloud Explosion (VCE) 33
5.2.1 Definition of VCE 34
5.2.2 Vapour Cloud Deflagration 34
5.2.3 Vapour Cloud Detonation 34
5.3 BLEVE 35
6 BURNS 36
6.1 Types of burns 36
6.2 Traditional classification of burns 36
6.2.1 Types of burns: cause 38
6.3 Types of burns and treatments in detail 38
6.3.1 First Degree Burns- Superficial Burns 38
6.3.2 Second Degree Burns- Partial Thickness Burns 39
6.3.3 Superficial Second Degree 39
6.3.4 Mid-Second Degree-Mid Partial Thickness Burn 40
6.3.5 Deep Second Degree-Deep Partial Thickness 40
6.3.6 Full Thickness Burns 41
6.4 ZONES OF INJURY 41
6.5 LOCAL EFFECTS FOLLOWING A BURN 41
6.6 SYSTEMIC EFFECTS FOLLOWING A BURN 42
6.7 CRITERIA FOR HOSPITALIZATION 42
6.8 CALCULATING TBSA (EXTENT) 44
6.8.1 Adults: Rule of Nines 45
6.8.2 Children: Rule of Nineteen 45
6.9 SUMMARY OF INJURY AND FATALITY
DATA
45
6.10 BURN VS. THERMAL DOSE
RELATIONSHIP
46
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6.11 THERMAL DOSE HARM CRITERIA
GUIDANCE
47
6.12 DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 48
6.13 TYPES OF FIRE AND ITS EFFECTSs 51
6.14 DIRECT EFFECTS 53
6.14.1 Thermal Radiation Causing Direct Burns 53
6.14.2 BURNS CAUSING FATALITY 53
6.15 TIME DEPENDENCE 54
7 HISTORY OF EVENTS 56
7.1 LIST OF INCIDENTS 58
8 STUDY AREA 71
9 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS 75
9.1 ALOHA 75
9.2 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS USING
ALOHA
77
9.2.1 ALOHA INPUTS- ALUVA RAILWAY
STATION
77
9.2.3 ALOHA INPUTS- ALUVA BYPASS 83
9.2.4 ANALYSIS RESULTS- ROAD 85
9.2.5 ALOHA FOOTPRINTS FORBLEVE OF
OTHER STUDY LOCATIONS
89
9.3 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS USING
MATHEMATICAL MODELS
91
9.3.1 Modelling Of Vapor Cloud Explosion (VCE) 91
9.3.2 TNT Equivalent model for VCE 92
9.3.3 Pressure of blast wave 92
9.3.4 Modelling Of Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor
Explosion (BLEVE)
93
9.3.5 Mathematical modeling –ANALYSIS 97
9.3.6 Inputs Parameters – BLEVE 97
9.3.7 Mathematical modeling inputs – VCE 99
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10 SOCIETAL RISK DIAGRAM 101
10.1 PROCEDURE 101
11 FAULT TREE ANALYSIS 104
12 EVENT TREE ANALYSIS 110
13 FIREMODE 113
13.1 FIREMODE 2 113
14 CONCLUSION 114
15 BIBILIOGRAPHY 115
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ABBREVATIONS
1. LPG - Liquefied petroleum Gas
2. TNT - Tri Nitro Toluene
3. BLEVE - Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion
4. VCE - Vapour Cloud Explosion
5. ALOHA - Areal Location Hazard Atmosphere
6. FTA - Fault Tree Analysis
7. ETA - Event Tree Analysis
8. BPCL - Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited
9. MRPL - Mangalore refinery petroleum limited
10. IOCL - Indian Oil Corporation Limited
11. KRL - Kochin Refinery Limited
12. TMT - Thousand Metric Tonnes
13. PPE - Personal Protective Equipments
14. ANSI - American national standard institute
15. MSDS - Material safety data sheet
16. ISO - International Standard Organization
17. LNG - Liquefied Natural Gas
18. RIL - Reliance Industries Limited
19. UVCE - Unconfined Vapour Cloud Explosion
20. TBSA - Total Body Surface Area
21. VCF - Vapour Cloud Fire
22. EX - Explosion
23. EKM - Ernakulam
24. TSR - Thrissur
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LIST OF TABLES
TABLE NO
TITLE PAGE NO
TABLE 1 LPG Penetration In Domestic Sector 18
TABLE 2 Hazard Category 20
TABLE 3 GHS Category 20
TABLE 4 Route Of Entry: 21
TABLE 5 Acute Toxicity Data 29
TABLE 6 Eco toxicity Data: 29
TABLE 7 Types Of Burns 37
TABLE 8 Special Areas 43
TABLE 9 Characteristics Of Process Fire Incidents 51
TABLE 10 Burn Area For 50% Fatality 53
TABLE 11 Approximate Mortality Probabilities 54
TABLE 12 Karunagappaly incident Data 56
TABLE 13 Uppinagady incident Data 57
TABLE 14 Chala incident Data 57
TABLE 15 BLEVE Incidents 58
TABLE 16 Fire Ball Incidents 59
TABLE 17 VCE Incidents 60
TABLE 18 Incidents Involving LPG 67
TABLE 19 Incidents Involving Road Tankers 69
TABLE 20 Study –Area Details. 72
TABLE 21 Study Area – Population Details 72
TABLE 22 Fire Stations 73
TABLE 23 Study Area – Hospital Details 74
TABLE 24 Aloha Analysis Results 80
TABLE 25 Aloha Results- Road 86
TABLE 26 Distance Vs Radiation 98
TABLE 27 Vce –Analysis Results 99
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LIST OF FIGURES
Fig No TITLE PAGE NO
Fig.1 Demand & availability data of LPG 19
Fig 2 Indigenous Production 19
Fig 3 LPG ship 31
Fig 4 LPG bullet Tanker 32
Fig 5 LPG Wagon- Indian Railway (BTPGLN) 32
Fig 6 Cross-section of degrees of burns 36
Fig 7 Rule of 9 and Rule of 19 44
Fig 8 Fatality Predictions Using Probit Relations (2kW/m2) 49
Fig 9 Fatality Predictions Using Probit Relations (5kW/m2) 49
Fig 10 Fatality Predictions Using Probit Relations (10kW/m2) 50
Fig 11 Dose vs. Time Plot 50
Fig 12 ALOHA footprint- BLEVE 79
Fig 13 ALOHA footprint- Jet fire 79
Fig 14 ALOHA footprint- Blast Area 80
Fig 15 Bleve Area – Aluva Railway 81
Fig 16 Flammable area- aluva railway station 81
Fig 17 Blast Area- Aluva railway station 82
Fig 18 Jet Fire Area – Aluva railway Station 82
Fig 19 ALOHA footprint of Jet fire area 85
Fig 20 ALOHA footprint of Blast Area 85
Fig 21 ALOHA Footprint of BLEVE 86
Fig 22 BLEVE Area Aluva bypass 87
Fig 23 Flammable Area- ALUVA bypass 87
Fig 24 Jet Fire Area- Aluva bypass 88
Fig 25 Blast area- Aluva bypass 88
Fig 26 BLEVE area Angamaly 89
Fig 27 BLEVE Area – Chalakudy 89
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Fig 28 BLEVE Area – Kalamassery 90
Fig 29 BLEVE Area – Paravoor Kavala 90
Fig 30 Graph for Scaled Distance Calculation 93
Fig 31 Distance Vs Radiation Graph 98
Fig 32 Distance Vs Overpressure Graph 100
Fig 33 Societal Risk Diagram 103
Fig 34 FTA Road Accident (VCE) 105
Fig 35 FTA of Road Accident (BLEVE) 106
Fig 36 FTA for Rail Accident (BLEVE) 108
Fig 37 FTA for Rail Accident (VCE 109
Fig 38 ETA for LPG Release 111
Fig 39 ETA For Tire Puncture 112
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ABSTRACT
The Demand of LPG in India is growing tremendously, to satisfies these demands LPG has to
transport by various modes. From exporting country to terminals, terminals to refineries, terminals
to various bottling plants, major industries. In India the mode transportation include by rail, road
and pipelines .This operations are very hazardous in nature. The hazards associated with the
transportation of LPG through rail and road are Fire and explosion .qualitative and quantitative
hazard analysis are essential for identification of quantification of hazards associated with
transportation This project work presents the risk assessment and consequence analysis of the LPG
transportation. For these work two study areas has been selected,
1. 35 km road distance from Kalamassery to Chalakudy
2. Aluva railway station
For consequence analysis two approaches have been applied Mathematical modeling & Software
application. For mathematical modeling TNT equivalent model TNO model, Robertson model are
carried out for BLEVE, VCE For software application ALOHA air modeling is used.
Developments of FTA and ETA for the events associated with LPG accident have been made.
Also develops Risk diagrams for fatalities associated with Fire and explosion in the area. Designed
and developed modeling software in Android platform for the modeling of BLEVE, VCE, pool
fire, jet fire.
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INTRODUCTION
1.1 GENERAL
The LPG demand in the India is increasing in high speed. Every year the percentage of growth is
very high industrially as well as domestically. LPG is well accepted as a user friendly energy
source. Ease of use, more energy content and eco-friendly and no emission to atmosphere.
Although the hazards associated with the LPG is very high. When we consider the midstream
operation of LPG in India. From exporting country to the individual consumers, the mode of
transportation includes. Transportation by ships (exporting country to various importing Terminals
in our country, this may be as direct transportation of LPG or as Crude). Transportation by
pipelines (these may be from terminals to refineries, bottling plants. big industries or refineries to
bottling plant, big industries).But this mode of transportation is very less in India that is due to
various reasons. Especially in Kerala only short length pipeline are available. Pipeline
transportation is much safer mode of transportation
Transportation by rails is from refineries to various demanding locations in large quantity and this
mode of transportation is highly hazardous. Once the scenario occurs there is a possibility of
domino effect and projectiles are possible. The effects due to these sorts of scenarios will be
dreadful. When these types of incidents occur in a major Railway station or highly populated area
surrounding the railway station. We are considering the possibility of terrorist attacks as the worst
case scenario
Transportation through roads, this mode of transportation is widely used for LPG bulk carriage
mainly from refineries to bottling plants and large industries. According to Kerala, this mode of
transportation is considered more other than the remaining two. No transportation through rail is
encouraged due to variety of reasons such as track problem and low production. So that’s why the
transportation of LPG through road is 80 percentages. On an average 200 tanker bullets are passing
daily through Kerala Routes at peak demand of time. From Kochi refinery Limited about 150
tanker bulletins are travelling in its peak demand time. This may increases to 400-500 tankers
when the upcoming Indian oil corporation transporting terminal project is established.
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Transportation through road is highly hazardous process especially in Kerala roads. Many of
highways are surrounded with high populated area. When an accident occur in these areas its result
will be very dreadful. If we didn’t give information about the release and consequences the chance
of increasing fatalities is more. CHALA, KARUNAGAPPILLY, UPPINAGADY are the worst
LPG tanker accidents occur in India. Among these incidents CHALA incident was even bigger
and resulted in 24 deaths.
We cannot avoid the transportation through this ways, it is essential for the national energy security
and development. We can provide a safer mode of transportation and also give awareness to people
who exposed to these area on these scenarios. Risk assessment and consequence analysis helps to
give awareness to government, public although it is helpful in decision making at various levels,
it helps in emergency planning etc. The study areas of the projects are the main LPG routes in
Kerala. The LPG transportation, mainly associated with BPCL Kochi refinery, MRPL Mangalore,
CRPL Chennai.
Concentrated on 35km length of NH47 from Kalamassery to Chalakudy. Five major points have
been selected for study and assumed different scenario going to occur on these points. Different
cause consequences are developed and analyzed. Aluva railway station has been selected for study
area 2. For analysis here the works on LPG wagons risk assessment and consequence analysis.
LPG transportation through rail is now a days is stopped due to track problems, low production of
LPG on KRL. But the expansion of the refinery and new IOCL importing terminal projects may
again give the chance of transportation of LPG through rail.
This project mainly estimates the consequence of BLEVE, VCE, and Jet fire using the
mathematical models, TNO, TNT equivalent model, Robertson Model. Also uses the ALOHA air
modeling for the analysis. Here the radiation and overpressure estimation for various distances
from source of origin can be plotted graphically. Super imposing of the ALOHA modeled design
into study location on Google map is done in with the help of MAR plot software. This project
develops Fault tree analysis and Event Tree Analysis For the various scenarios associated with
both Rail and Road incidents and find out the basic events, cause and consequences. Also
development of risk diagram which tells the Fatality rate for this Probit function equation for
radiation and overpressure is involved. The population data collected from villages is utilized for
risk diagrams
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1.2 MOTIVATION BEHIND PROJECT
Chala, Karunagapilly, Uppinangadi. These three are the major and painful LPG incidents in indian
history. All three are in south India and among them 2 are in Kerala, more than 50 killed from
these three explosions. The severity of the accident can be produced if the people have the
knowledge on how to behave in two occasions. This analysis gives the awareness to the public and
authority to the potential of hazards associated with the operation.
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1.3 OBJECTIVES
Fault Tree Analysis
Find out basic events for various final events like BLEVE, VCE etc.
To find out various causes and consequences of the scenario.
Event Tree Analysis
To find out the various consequences of single basic events.
To find out the cause, consequence and development of scenarios.
Consequence Analysis
Mathematical models provide quantitative estimation of radiation and over
pressure from BLEVE, VCE and radiation from Jet fire.
ALOHA models provides graphical representation of the BLEVE, VCE, Jet fire
on the basis of Radiation, over pressure, vapour cloud depression, etc.
Risk Diagram and Societal Risk
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2.0 LPG DEMAND
India is the Fourth largest consumer of LPG in the world after USA, China & Japan also
the Third largest consumer in domestic sector in the world after China & USA
Major market of LPG is Domestic Sector
Home Delivery of 3 Million LPG Gas cylinders per day(i.e.900 Million/ year)
Steady Growth @ 8% p.a. in LPG Consumption in India
Demand in 2009‐10 stands at 12746 TMT
Indigenous Production in 09‐10 was 10323 TMT
Imports @22% of total LPG Demand
Indigenous LPG production through State Run, Private and Fractionators
TABLE 1: LPG penetration in domestic sector
Particulars Urban Rural Total
Population in Million 326.2 838.8 1165
Households in Million 95 159 254
LPG Connections in Million 83.8 31.2 115
Penetration of LPG 88 % 19.6% 45%
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Fig.1: Demand & availability data of LPG
Fig.2: Indigenous Production
1005210531
1133111778
12746
76488409
8973 9287
10323
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
2005 06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10
DEMAND AVAILABILITY
FRACTINATORS23%
PRIVATE36%
STATE RUN41%
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3.0 LPG MSDS
3.1 IDENTIFICATION OF THE SUBSTANCE/PREPARATION
1. Identification of the substance/preparation:
Commercial name: Liquefied Petroleum Gas
Chemical name: Liquefied Petroleum Gas
2. Use of the substance /preparation: Raw material of petrochemicals
3.2 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION
TABLE 2: Hazard Category:
Health Environmental Physical
Carcinogenicity – Category 1A
Mutagenicity – Category 1B
Aquatic Toxicity –
Category- NA
Flammable – Category 3
TABLE 3: GHS Category
Study/hazar
d statement
Category 1 Category 2 Category 3 Category 4 Category 5
Acute Oral
LD50
< 5 mg/kg
Fatal if
swallowed
> 5 < 50
mg/kg Fatal
if
swallowed
> 50 < 300
mg/kg Toxic if
swallowed
> 300 < 2000
mg/kg Harmful
if swallowed
> 2000 <
5000mg/kg May
be harmful if
swallowed
Acute
Dermal
LD50
< 50 mg/kg
Fatal in
contact with
skin
> 50 < 200
mg/kg Fatal
in contact
with skin
> 200 < 1000
mg/kg Toxic in
contact with
skin
> 1000 < 2000
mg/kg Harmful
in contact with
skin
> 2000 < 5000
mg/kg May be
harmful in
contact with skin
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Acute
Inhalation
Dust LC50
Gases
LC50
Vapours
LC50
< 0.05
mg/L < 100
ppm/V <0.5
mg/L Fatal
if inhaled
> 0.05 <
0.5 mg/L >
100 < 500
ppm/V >0.5
< 2.0 mg/L
Fatal if
inhaled
> 0.5 < 1.0
mg/L > 500 <
2500 ppm/V >
2.0 < 10 mg/L
Toxic if
inhaled
> 1.0 < 5
mg/L >2500 <
20000 ppm/V
> 10 < 20
mg/L Harmful
if inhaled
Flammable
liquids
Flash point
<23 degrees
C and initial
boiling
point < 35
degrees
C.Extremely
flammable
liquid and
vapour
Flash point
< 23
degrees C
and initial
boiling
point > 35
degrees C.
Highly
flammable
liquid and
vapour
Flash point >
23 degrees C<
60 degrees C.
Flammable
liquid and
vapour
Flash point >
60 degrees C <
93 degrees C.
Combustible
liquid
Not Applicable
Study/hazard
statement
Category 1 Category 2 Category 3
Eye Irritation Effects on the cornea, iris
or conjunctiva that are
not expected to reverse
or that have not fully
reversed within 21 days.
Causes severe eye
damage.
2A: Effects on the cornea,
iris or conjunctiva that
fully reverse within 21
days. Causes severe eye
irritation.
2B : Effects on the cornea,
iris or conjunctiva that
fully reverse within 7 days.
Causes eye irritation
Not applicable
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Skin Irritation Destruction of skin
tissue, with sub
categorization based on
exposure of up to 3
minutes (A), 1 hour (B),
or 4 hours (C). Causes
severe skin burns and eye
damage.
Mean value of >2.3 > 4.0
for erythema / eschar or
edema in at least 2 of 3
tested animals from
gradings at 24, 48, and 72
hours (or on 3 consecutive
days after onset if
reactions are delayed);
inflammation that persists
to end of the (normally 14-
day) observation period.
Causes skin irritation.
Mean value of
>1.5 < 2.3 for
erythema / eschar
or edema in at least
2 of 3 tested
animals from
gradings at 24, 48,
and 72 hours (or on
3 consecutive days
after onset if
reactions are
delayed). Causes
mild skin
irritation.
Environment:
Acute Toxicity
Category
96 hr LC50 (fish) <1
mg/L 48 hr EC50
(crustacea) < 1 mg/L,
72/96 hr ErC50 (aquatic
plants) < 1 mg/L Very
toxic to aquatic life
96 hr LC50 (fish) >1< 10
mg/L 48 hr EC50
(crustacea) >1< 10 mg/L
72/96 hr ErC50 (aquatic
plants) >1< 10 mg/L Toxic
to aquatic life
96 hr LC50 (fish)
>10< 100 mg/L 48
hr EC50
(crustacea) >10<
100 mg/L 72/96 hr
ErC50 (aquatic
plants) >10< 100
mg/L Harmful to
aquatic life
Flammable
Aerosol
Extremely flammable
aerosol
Flammable aerosol Not Applicable
Flammable
solids
Using the burning rate
test, substances or
mixtures other than
metal powders: (a)
wetted zone does not
stop fire and (b) burning
Using the burning rate test,
substances or mixtures
other than metal powders:
(a) wetted zone does not
stop fire for at least 4
minutes and (b) burning
Not Applicable
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time < 45 seconds or
burning rate > 2.2
mm/second Using the
burning rate test, metal
powders that have
burning time < 5 minutes
Flammable solid
time < 45 seconds or
burning rate > 2.2
mm/second Using the
burning rate test, metal
powders that have burning
time > 5 < 10 minutes
Flammable solid
Flammable gases Gases, which at 20
degrees C and a standard
pressure of 101.3 kPA:
(a) are ignitable when in
a mixture of 13% or less
by volume in air; or (b)
have a flammable range
with air of at least 12
percentage points
regardless of the lower
flammable limit.
Extremely flammable
gas
Gases, other than those of
category 1, which, at 20
degrees C and a standard
pressure of 101.3 kPA,
have a flammable range
while mixed in air.
Flammable gas
Not Applicable
TABLE 4: Route of entry:
Skin Contact Skin Absorption Eye Contact Inhalation Ingestion
Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes
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Inhalation: Severely irritating if inhaled and acute exposure may be fatal.
Ingestion: May be fatal if swallowed.
Skin contact: Highly irritating to skin. May cause allergic skin reaction.
Eye contact: Highly corrosive to eyes.
Chronic exposure: Weakness, coughing, laboured breathing, headache Confusion
nausea/vomiting convulsions heart rate and pulse variations coma respiratory failure
Aggravations to pre-existing conditions: Those with history of lung diseases, or skin
problems may be more susceptible to the effects of this substance.
Information pertaining to particular dangers for human: Toxic substance with carcinogenic
and mutagenic effects. High vapour concentrations irritate respiratory system and eyes and
may lead to fast coma and death.
Information pertaining to particular dangers for the environment: NA
Other adverse effects: Highly flammable and easily ignitable substance. Danger of ignition at
normal temperature. Readily evaporates and vapours form with air toxic and explosive mixtures
heavier than air. Mixtures keep above ground and after ignition they spread fast into far distances.
Ignition possible when exposed to hot surfaces, sparks, naked flames and by electrostatic
discharges too. The substance is practically insoluble in water, floats on the water level and forms
toxic and explosive mixtures above the water level.
3.3 FIRST AID MEASURES
1. General advice: IMMEDIATE MEDICAL ATTENTION IS REQUIRED AFTER
INHALATION OR AFTER SWALLOWING.
In case of health troubles or doubts, seek medical advice immediately and show this Material
Safety Data Sheet. Ensure activity of vitally important functions until the arrival of the
doctor (artificial respiration, inhalation of oxygen, heart massage). If patient is unconscious, or
in case of danger of blackout, transport patient in a stabilized position. In case of first degree burns
(painful redness), and second degree burns (painful blisters), cool the affected area with cold
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running water for a long time. In case of third degree burns (redness, cracking pale skin, usually
without pain), do not cool affected skin, dress the area with sterile dry gauze only.
2. Inhalation Remove patient to fresh air, keep him warm and in order to rest quietly. Avoid
walking. Seek medical advice. SYMPTOMS AND EFFECTS: irritation, headache, dizziness,
weakness, stupefaction, irritant coughing, convulsions, unconsciousness, possible respiratory
inhibition or arrest.
3. Skin contact immediately take off all contaminated clothing and footwear. Flush effected
area with copious quantities of water. Seek medical advice. SYMPTOMS AND EFFECTS:
mild irritation, degreasing, absorption, blistering.
4. Eye contact Immediately flush eyes with clean lukewarm water and continue flushing
for at least 15 minutes – keep the eyelids widely apart and flush thoroughly with mild
water stream from the inner to the outer. Seek medical advice. SYMPTOMS AND EFFECTS:
severe irritation, cornea damage.
5. Swallowing If patient is conscious and without convulsion, immediately try to induce
vomiting. Never give anything by mouth to an unconscious person, just put patient into a
stabilized position. Seek medical advice immediately. SYMPTOMS AND EFFECTS: nausea,
vomiting, convulsions, irregular heartbeat
3.4 FIRE FIGHTING MEASURES
1. Suitable extinguishing media Foam, Dry chemical powder, CO2. Cool containers which are
not on fire with water spray.
2. Extinguishing media to be avoided: Water.
3. Caution about specific danger in case of fire and fire-fighting procedures Danger of violent
reaction or explosion. Vapours may travel considerable far distances and cause subsequent
ignition. Vapours are heavier than air, may cumulate along the ground and in enclosed
26
spaces – danger of explosion. When burning, it emits carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide
and irritant fumes. Containers with the substance exposed to excessive heat may explode.
4. Special protective equipment for fire-fighters Wear full protective fire-resistant clothing and
self-contained breathing apparatus.
3.5 ACCIDENTAL RELEASE MEASURES
1. Person-related safety precautions Isolate hazard area. Evacuate all unauthorized personnel
not participating in rescue operations from the area. Avoid entry into danger area. Remove all
possible sources of ignition. Stop traffic and switch off the motors of the engines. Do not smoke
and do not handle with naked flame. Use explosion-proof lamps and non-sparking tools.
Avoid contact with the substance. Apply recommended full protective personal equipment.
2 .Precautions for protection of the environment Prevent from further leaks of substance. Do
not allow substance to enter soil, water and sewage systems. In case of substance discharge to
water courses or water containers, inform water consumers immediately, stop service and
exploitation of water.
3. Recommended methods for cleaning and disposal Pump off substance safely, soak up
residues with compatible porous material and forward for disposal in closed containers. Dispose
off under valid legal waste regulations.
3.6 HANDLING AND STORAGE
1. Information for safe handling Observe all fire-fighting measures (no smoking, do not handle
with naked flame and remove all possible sources of ignition). Take precautionary measures
against static discharges. Wear recommended personal protective equipment and observe
instructions to prevent possible contact of substance with skin and eyes and inhalation. Avoid
leak to environment.
2. Information for storage Storerooms should meet the requirements for the fire safety of
constructions and electrical facilities and should be in conformity with valid regulations. Store
in cool, well-ventilated place with effective exhaust, away from heat and all sources of
27
ignition. Store in tightly closed container. Do not store together with oxidizing agents. Take
precautionary measures against static discharges. Avoid leak to environment.
3. Information for specific use: Not applicable.
3.7 EXPOSURE CONTROL AND PERSONAL PROTECTION
Individual protection measures: Personal protective equipment (PPE) for the protection of
eyes, hands and skin corresponding with the performed labour has to be kept at disposition
for the employees. In cases, where the workplace exposure control limits cannot be observed
with the help of technical equipment or where it is not possible to ensure that the respiratory
system exposure does not represent a health hazard for the personnel, adequate respiratory
protection have to be kept at disposition. In the case of continuous use of this equipment
during constant work, safety breaks have to be scheduled, if the PPE-character requires
this. All PPE have to be kept in disposable state and the damaged or contaminated equipment
has to be replaced immediately.
3.8 RECOMMENDED PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT (PPE):
Respiratory protection: If the exposure limit is exceeded and engineering controls are not
feasible, wear a supplied air, full-face piece respirator, airline hood, or full face piece self-
contained breathing apparatus.
Protective mask with canister A (brown coloured, protecting against organic vapours), self-
contained breathing apparatus. Eye protection: Use chemical safety goggles and/or a full face
shield where splashing is possible. Maintain eye wash fountain and quick-drench facilities in work
area.
Hand protection: Wear gloves of impervious material.
Body protection: Wear impervious protective clothing, including boots, gloves, lab coat, apron
or coveralls, as appropriate, to prevent skin contact. Protective coverall antistatic design
recommended, impervious when handling big amounts (nitrile rubber), sealed leather footwear
(free from synthetic adhesives)
28
Hygiene Measures: Wash hands, forearms and face thoroughly after handling. Appropriate
techniques should be used to remove potentially contaminated clothing. Wash contaminated
clothing before reusing. Ensure that eyewash stations and safety showers are close to the
workstation location.
3.9 ENVIRONMENTAL EXPOSURE CONTROLS
Engineering measures: Use only with adequate ventilation. If user operations generate dust,
fumes, vapor or mist, use process enclosures, local exhaust ventilation or other engineering
controls to keep worker exposure to airborne contaminants below any recommended limits. The
engineering controls also need to keep gas, vapor or dust concentrations below any lower explosive
limits. Use explosion-proof ventilation equipment.
3.10 PHYSICAL AND CHEMICAL PROPERTIES
Appearance Liquefied Gas
Odour Mustard
odour Solubility in water Negligible
Relative Density 0.506 – 0.583
Boiling Point °C -162 - -0.5°C
Melting Point °C -183 - -20°C
Relative Vapour Density NA
Flash point °C -56°C
Closed cup Auto ignition °C 410 - 540°C
Vapour pressure (hPa) 600 – 39000
C Molecular weight NA
Explosive limits in air % by volume LEL 1.9% to 5.3 %, UEL 8.5% to 15 %
PH NA
Viscosity mPa.s @25 °C NA
Pour point NA
Evaporation rate (ether=1) NA
Octanol/water partition coefficient log Kow 2.8
29
3.11 CHEMICAL STABILITY AND REACTIVITY INFORMATION
1. Conditions to avoid Concentrations within the explosion limits, sources of ignition, high
temperature, sun radiation.
2. Material to avoid Explosive reaction with chlorine (on light), with acid.
3. Hazardous decomposition products Thermal decomposition generates carbon monoxide and
carbon dioxide.
3.12 TOXICOLOGICAL INFORMATION
1. Acute effects Toxic substance with carcinogenic and mutagenic effects. Acute intoxication
leads to central nervous system attenuation and narcotic effects occur.
TABLE 5: Acute toxicity data
Parameter Route Species Values Exposure period
LC50 Inhalation Rat 800000 ppm 15 minutes
2. Repeated dose toxicity chronic effects cause bone marrow damage, haemopoiesis disorder and
may develop leukemia.
3. Sensitization May cause skin allergy.
4. CMR effects (carcinogenicity, mutagenicity, toxicity for reproduction) Proved carcinogenic
effects for humans. Substance has mutagenic effects.
5. Toxic kinetics, metabolism, distribution: Not applicable.
3.13 ECOLOGICAL INFORMATION
TABLE 6: Ecotoxicity data:
Parameter Route Species Values Exposure
period
Condition of
bioassay
LC50 Inhalation Fish 1000 mg/m3
96 hours Not specified
30
3.14 TRANSPORT INFORMATION
1 International Transport Regulation: ADR/RID (Road/Rail), IMDG (Sea) and ICAO/IATA (Air)
Proper Shipping Name: Liquefied Petroleum Gas
Hazard Class: 2.1, Liquefied Petroleum Gas
UN Number: 1075
Packing Group: II
Emergency Action Code: 2YE
Special transport precautionary measures Not applicable.
3.15 REGULATORY INFORMATION
MSDS format on a 16 Section based on guidance provided in:
Indian Regulation: Manufacture, Storage and Import of Hazardous Chemicals Rule, 1989. The
Factories Act 1948
International Regulations: European SDS Directive ANSI MSDS Standard ISO 11014-1 1994
WHMIS Requirements
United States Hazard Communication Standard
Canada Hazardous Products Act and Controlled Products Regulations
Europe Dangerous Substance and Preparations Directives
Australia National Model Regulations for the Control of Workplace Hazardous Substances
31
4.0 MODES OF TRANSPORTATION
Ship
Pipeline
By rail
By road
The transportation of LPG can be divided into 2-phases, international and national. The
international transportation mainly the exportation of LPG from source countries mainly from the
Middle East ships is mainly used for the international transportation. Cross country pipelines are
a possible way of transportation in international sector. India Iran pipeline is under construction.
Which mainly supplies LNG, LPG is also possible through this stream. If demand and availability
occurs.
In national sector, road transportation is more and railways is used in high demanding sectors and
for transportation from large refineries like RIL and pipelines are employed for short distance from
certain refineries to bottling plants.
Fig.3: Ship Carrying LPG
32
Fig.4: LPG bullet Tanker
Fig. 5: LPG Wagon- Indian Railway (BTPGLN)
33
5.0 HAZARDS ASSOCIATED WITH LPG
Jetfire
Vapour cloud explosion
BLEVE
Poolfire
5.1 JET FIRE
The jet fire occurs when the release of LPG from the pressurised tank through a small hole and the
jet of fuel when catches fire forms a jet fire. It is comparatively small fire and can be controlled
easily.
5.2 VAPOUR CLOUD EXPLOSION (VCE)
A vapour cloud explosion is a result of a release of flammable material in the atmosphere,
dispersion of flammable material in air, and, after some delay, ignition of the flammable portion
of the vapour cloud. First, there must be a release of flammable material into a confined congested
area. Second, ignition must be delayed long enough to allow the formation of the ignitable mixture,
with the fuel-air concentration lying within the flammable limits. Third, there must be an ignition
source of sufficient energy to ignite the fuel-air mixture.
Once the above conditions are met and a VCE is initiated, the following effects to the
surroundings may include:
A wide spectrum of air blast effects, ranging from minimal to catastrophic.
A fireball.
Throw of lightweight materials such as insulation and thin metal sheathing within the
explosion zone and immediate surrounding area.
Dispersal of very light materials carried upward in the fireball or secondary fire updraft
and carried downwind.
Secondary fire at the initial release sources, and often other release sources caused by
displacement of equipment.
34
5.2.1 Definition of VCE
A VCE is one type of fuel-air explosion. Historically, this phenomenon was referred to as
“Unconfined Vapour Cloud Explosion (UVCE)”, to emphasis that the incidents are outdoor events.
But the term “unconfined” is a misnomer, since a truly unconfined scenario will not result in
detectable damage to the surroundings. It is more accurate to call this type of explosion simply a
“vapour cloud explosion (VCE).” Internal vapour explosion is another class of fuel-air explosion
that refers to an explosion inside of an enclosure such as building (room) or vessel. The presence
of the enclosure and turbulence created by failure of any portion of the enclosure affects the
combustion process. Prediction of internal vapour explosions is beyond the scope of this book.
Like other types of explosions, VCEs can also be categorized into two modes, deflagration and
detonation, according to propagation mechanisms.
5.2.2 Vapour Cloud Deflagration
In a vapour cloud deflagration, the flame propagates through the unburned fuel-air mixture at
a burning velocity less than the speed of sound. The overpressure generated in a VCE deflagration
varies with combustion rate: minimal overpressure is produced at low flame speed. Consequently,
the damage to the surroundings caused by VCE deflagration ranges from minimal to more severe.
VCE detonations are typically more severe than deflagration due to the high overpressure
generated by a supersonic wave. The situation for VCE deflagration is complex because the flame
speed and the pressure buildup in the deflagration are not unique for a given cloud composition,
but vary in a wide spectrum depending on many factors. Moreover, the composition of fuel and
combustion products at the flame front within the cloud, which supports the deflagration, changes
continuously. The vast majority of accidental VCEs are vapour cloud deflagrations.
5.2.3 Vapour Cloud Detonation
In a vapour cloud detonation, the combustion wave propagates at supersonic velocity
through the unburned fuel-air mixture. A detonation is the most violent form of vapour cloud
explosions and can cause the most severe damage. While the detonation mode is the expected
result in FAE weapon systems, it is very unlikely to occur in accidental vapour cloud explosions.
As with other types of explosions, VCE detonations can be achieved through either direct initiation
or the transition from a deflagration. One method of direct initiation used in research testing has
35
been a “bang box”, which is a strong enclosure inside of which an internal VCE is initiated, and
allowed to propagate through an opening or breached wall to provide high energy initiation of the
external vapour cloud. A bang box must be capable of withstanding high explosion pressures, and
such strong enclosures are typically not found in chemical processing plants. There are restrictive
conditions that must be met if a detonation is to propagate.
5.3 BLEVE
Boiling liquid expanding vapor explosions (BLEVEs) are one of the most severe accidents
that can occur in the process industry or in the transportation of hazardous materials. Strictly
speaking, these explosions do not necessarily imply thermal effects. However, in most cases the
substance involved is a fuel that causes a severe fireball after the explosion. Usually BLEVE refers
to the combination of these two phenomena, BLEVE and fireball, i.e., to an accident
simultaneously involving mechanical and thermal effects. BLEVEs occur with a certain frequency:
the substances that can lead to them (butane, propane, vinyl chloride, chlorine, etc.) are relatively
common in the industry, as well as the installations in which they can happen (tanks and tank cars).
They can have diverse origins, such as runaway reactions and collisions, but the most frequent one
is the action of fire on a container. 900 fatalities and over 9,000 injured in 77 BLEVEs occurring
between 1941 and 1990. Description of The Phenomenon
If a tank containing a pressurized liquid is heated—for example, due to the thermal radiation from
a fire—the pressure inside it will increase. At a certain moment, its walls will not be able to
withstand the high stress and they will collapse (the steel typically used for the construction of
LPG vessels may fail at pressures of about 15 atm, when the temperature of the walls reaches
approximately 650_C). This is most likely to occur in the top section of the container, where the
walls are not in contact with the liquid and therefore not cooled by it; the temperature of the walls
will increase and their mechanical resistance will decrease (Birk, 1995). Instead, the wall in contact
with the liquid will transfer heat to the liquid, thus maintaining a much lower temperature. If a
safety valve opens, the boiling liquid will have a stronger cooling action due to the heat of
evaporation
36
6.0 BURNS
The results of consequence of LPG tanker explosion are mainly in the form
of burns
6.1 TYPES OF BURNS
In a fire, you may be called on to help a co-worker who has been burned. You need to know the
first aid measure to take until emergency medical assistance arrives on the scene. That means you
must know how to recognize and treat first-, second-, and third-degree burns.
Fig.6: Cross-section of degrees of burns
6.2 TRADITIONAL CLASSIFICATION OF BURNS
1. First-Degree Burns
Signs: Redness of skin, pain, and mild swelling.
Treatment: Apply cool, wet compresses, or immerse in cool, fresh water-not ice or salt
water. Continue until pain subsides. Leave uncovered.
2. Second-Degree Burns
Signs: Deep reddening of skin. Glossy appearance from leaking fluid. Possible loss of some
skin. Blisters.
Treatment: Immerse in fresh, cool water-not ice or salt water-or apply cool compresses.
Continue for 10 to 15 minutes. Dry with clean cloth and cover with sterile gauze. Do not
break blisters. Elevate burned arms or legs. Further medical treatment is required.
37
3. Third-Degree Burns
Signs: Loss of skin layers. Painless. Skin is dry and leathery. Possible charring of skin
edges. Patches of first- and second-degree burns often surround third-degree burns.
Treatment: Cover burn lightly with sterile gauze or clean cloth. (Do not use material that
can leave lint on the burn.) If face is burned, have person sit up. Watch closely for possible
breathing problems. When possible, burned area should be elevated higher than the victim's
head. Keep person warm and comfortable, and watch for signs of shock. Immediate
medical attention is required.
TABLE 7: types of Burns
Degree Depth History Etiology Sensation Appearance Healing
1st degree Superficial Momentary
exposure
Sunburn Sharp,
uniform
pain
Blanches red,
pink,
edematous,
soft, flaking,
peeling
± 7 days
2nd
degree
Partial
thickness
Exposure
of limited
duration to
lower
temperature
(40-55oC)
Scalds,
flash burn
without
contact,
weak
chemical
Dull or
hyperactive
pain,
sensitive to
air/temp
changes
Mottled red,
blanches
red/pink,
BLISTERS,
edema,
serious
exudates,
moist
14-21 days
3rd degree Full
thickness
Long
duration of
exposure to
high
temperature
Immersion,
flame,
electrical,
chemical
Painless to
touch and
pinprick,
may hurt at
deep
pressure
No blanching,
pale white,
tan charred,
hard, dry,
leathery, hair
absent
Granulates,
requires
grafting
38
4th degree Underlying
structures
Prolonged
duration of
exposure to
extreme
heat
Electrical
flame,
chemical
Usually
painless
Charred,
‘skeletonized’
Amputation
fasciectomy
6.2.1 Types of Burns: Cause
Thermal Burn: caused by conduction or convection
Ex. Hot liquid, fire or steam
Electrical Burn: caused by the passage of electrical current through the body. There is
typically an entrance & an exit wound.
Ex. lightning
Chemical Burn: occurs when certain chemical compounds come in contact with the body.
Ex. Sulfuric acid, lye, hydrochloric acid, gasoline
6.3 TYPES OF BURNS AND TREATMENTS IN DETAIL
6.3.1 First Degree Burns- Superficial Burns
A first degree burn is confined exclusively to the outer surface and is not considered a significant
burn. No skin barrier functions are altered. The most common form is sunburn which heals by
itself in less than a week without a scar.
39
Treatment
Topical antimicrobial (Bacitracin) applied several times a day
6.3.2 Second Degree Burns- Partial Thickness Burns
Second degree burns cause damage to the epidermis and portions of the dermis. Since it does not
extend through both layers, it is termed partial thickness. There are a number of depths of a second
degree or partial thickness burn which are used to characterize the burn.
6.3.3 Superficial Second Degree
Involves the entire epidermis and no more than the upper third of the dermis is heat destroyed.
Rapid healing occurs in 1-2 weeks, because of the large amount of remaining skin and good blood
supply. Scar is uncommon. Initial pain is the MOST SEVERE of any burn, as the nerve endings
of the skin are exposed to the air.
Appearance
The micro vessels perfusing this area are injured resulting in the leakage of large amounts of
plasma, which in turn lifts off the heat destroyed epidermis, causing blisters to form. The blisters
often increase in size even after the burn. A light pink, wet appearing very painful wound is seen
as the blisters are disrupted. ** Frequently, the epidermis does not lift off the dermis for 12 to 24
hours and what initially appears to be first degree is actually a second degree burn.
Treatment
Debridement of affected skin to expose underlying wound. Debride blisters that are limiting joint
movement.
Clean wound and apply antimicrobial ointment such as bacitracin. Excellent alternative is the use
of skin substitute which seals the wound and decrease pain. Below is an example of Biobrane
application-usually put on in the Emergency Department setting. Also can apply closed dressing
of gauze for absorbency and wrap. This will need to be changed daily.
Healing
This type of burn heals in 10-12 days without scarring. There is a low risk of infection.
6.3.4 Mid-Second Degree-Mid Partial Thickness Burn
40
In this type of burn, destruction to about half the dermis occurs. Healing is slower due to the fact
that there is less remaining dermis and less of a blood supply. Pain can be severe but is usually less
intense than the superficial due in part by nerves that are destroyed.
Appearance
The burn surface may have blisters but is redder and less wet.
Treatment
Treatment is typically Silvadene cream and occlusive dressing with a closed dressing technique.
A temporary skin substitute is also a treatment of choice.
Healing
This type of burn usually heals in 2 to 4 weeks. The longer the healing time, the more chance of
scarring.
6.3.5 Deep Second Degree-Deep Partial Thickness
In this type of burn most of the skin is destroyed except a small amount of remaining dermis. The
wound looks white or charred indicating dead tissue. Blood flow is compromised and a layer of
dead dermis or eschar adheres to the wound surface. Pain is much less as the nerves are actually
destroyed by the heat. Usually, it is difficult to distinguish a deep dermal burn from a full thickness
burn by visualization. The presence of sensation to touch usually indicates the burn is a deep partial
injury.
Appearance
The wound surface may be dry and red in appearance with white areas in the deeper parts. There
is marked decrease in blood flow making the wound very prone to conversion to a deeper injury
and to infection. Direct contact with flames is a common cause. The appearance of the deep dermal
burn changes dramatically over the next several days after burn as the area of dermal necrosis
along with surface coagulated protein turns the wound a white to yellow color. This resembles the
third degree burn and differentiation sometimes is difficult. The presence of some pain can assist
in diagnosis because the pain is usually absent in full thickness injury.
Treatment
Wash with antimicrobial soap and water. Apply silvadene closed dressing. Often grafting is needed
to speed healing. Monitor for infection. Often converts to full thickness injury.
Healing
This type of burn may heal in 2-3 months. If it heals scarring is usually severe.
41
6.3.6 Full Thickness Burns
Both layers of skin are completely destroyed leaving no cells to heal. Any significant burn will
require skin grafting. Small burns will heal with scar. Entire destruction of the epidermis and
dermis, leaving no residual epidermal cells to repopulate.
Appearance
A characteristic initial appearance of the avascular burn tissue is a waxy white color. If the burn
produces char or extends into fat as with prolonged contact with a flame source, a leathery brown
appearance can be seen along with surface coagulation veins. The burn wound is painless and has
a coarse non-pliable texture to touch.
Treatment
Wash with antimicrobial soap and water. Apply Silvadene cream with a closed dressing. Grafting
is treatment of choice. High risk for infection.
6.4 ZONES OF INJURY
Zone of Coagulation: area of greatest destruction, tissue necrosis, irreversible cell and
tissue damage due to coagulation of the constituent proteins.
Zone of Stasis: damaged tissue, area of less severe injury that possesses reversible damage
and surrounds the Zone of Coagulation
Zone of Hyperemia: Pink, no cell death, the area surrounding the Zone of Stasis that
presents with inflammation, but will fully recover without any intervention or permanent
damage
6.5 LOCAL EFFECTS FOLLOWING A BURN
Loss of water regulation by the skin (direct or by water evaporation)
Loss of protein
Loss of electrolytes
Wound infection
Vascular thrombosis (deep burns)
Development of necrotic tissue
42
Blisters
Oedema.
6.6 SYSTEMIC EFFECTS FOLLOWING A BURN
• Shock
• Hypovolaemia
• Increased blood viscosity
• Pulmonary effects
• Toxic gases (direct)
• Oedema (indirect)
• Airway obstruction
• Hyperventilation
• Increased hormones
Catecholamine
Cortisone
Glucagon
• Gastric effects
Acute gastroduodenalmucosal lesions
Prolonged gastroduodenal mucosal lesions
Duodenal ulcer induced by surgery
Stomach dilatation.
6.7 CRITERIA FOR HOSPITALIZATION
20% or greater TBSA (total body surface area)
10% or greater TBSA in child or older adult
5% or greater full thickness burn
Burns to any of the 4 special areas
Burns to the eyes or ears
43
TABLE 8: SPECIAL AREAS
MAJOR BURNS MODERATE BURNS MINOR BURNS
Burn surface involvement of 25%
body surface area. Full-thickness
burns 10% body surface area.
Deep burns of the head, hands,
feet, and perineum.
Inhalation injury.
Chemical or high-voltage
electrical burn.
Burn area of 15-25% body
surface area.
Superficial partial-thickness
burns of the head, hands, feet or
perineum.
Suspected child abuse.
Concomitant trauma.
Significant pre-existing disease.
15% body surface area.
Nothing involving
head, feet, hands or
perineum.
If any of the 4 special areas are burned, it is classified as a severe burn and will require
hospitalization
Special areas: face, hands, feet, groin
44
6.8 CALCULATING TBSA (EXTENT)
Fig. 7: Rule of 9 and Rule of 19
45
6.8.1 Adults: Rule of Nines
Head & neck 9 %
Anterior trunk 18 %
Posterior trunk 18 %
Bilateral anterior arm, forearm and hand 9 %
Bilateral posterior arm, forearm and hand 9 %
Genital region 1%
Bilateral anterior leg and foot 18 %
Bilateral posterior leg and foot 18 %
6.8.2 Children: Rule of Nineteen
A child under one year has 9 % taken from the lower extremities and added to the head region.
Each year of life, 1 % is distributed back to the lower extremities until age 9 when the head region
is considered to be the same as an adult.
6.9 SUMMARY OF INJURY AND FATALITY DATA
Table 1 shows the spread of selected experimental burn data for infrared radiation. Very little third
degree burn data is available and some non-threshold data has not been selected. Ultra-violet
radiation data has not been considered as typical emissions from hydrocarbon fires mainly
comprise infrared radiation, which is found to produce burns at lower doses (Rew, 1996). Ultra-
violet radiation data has been used historically and frequently since Eisenberg interpreted nuclear
bomb fatalities as a thermal radiation probit (Eisenberg et al., 1975).
46
6.10 Burn vs. Thermal Dose Relationship
Harm Caused Infrared Radiation Thermal Dose (TDU), (kW/m2)4/3s
Mean Range
Pain 92 86-103
Threshold first degree burn 105 80-130
Threshold second degree burn 290 240-350
Threshold third degree burn 1000 870-2600
It is expected that an individual either in pain from a thermal dose received or suffering from 1o
burns should escape rapidly as the injury should not be sufficient to impede movement, yet the
pain will be too uncomfortable to bear standing still.
An individual with 2o burns will have even greater motivation to escape, commonly
referred to as the fight or flight response. However at this level of injury, any exposed skin will be
very uncomfortable and difficult to use in contact with another surface. Simple tasks, such as
turning door handles or dressing in survival equipment will take longer, if they are at all possible.
Depending on the location and extent of injury, more difficult tasks, such as operating control
panels or turning valves may be impossible.
With 3o burns an individual will be in severe pain and will certainly realize that they are
in immediate danger of losing their life. Individual response is hard to predict.
However fine control of injured extremities will be impossible and other functions will be severely
impaired. Escape will probably incur further injury as skin may fall away from the wound.
Individuals with 3o burns should be considered as casualties who cannot evacuate unaided.
Table 2 summarizes the estimated thermal dose to produce the relevant harm criteria.
The values quoted take into account the factors considered in Appendix 2. The dose is relevant for
a typical offshore population on a typical offshore platform, where the source of the radiation is a
hydrocarbon flame from a jet-, pool- or flash- fire or a fireball.
47
6.11 Thermal Dose Harm Criteria Guidance
Harm Caused Thermal Dose (TDU), (kW/m2)4/3s
Escape impeded 290
1-5% Fatality offshore 1000
50% Fatality offshore with radiation only to
the front or back (i.e. from a fireball)
1000
50% Fatality offshore 2000
100% Fatality offshore 3500
The above table shows the best estimates of harm criteria. The 50% fatality level (2000
TDU) is an estimate based on the assumption that, prior to clothing ignition, less than 50% of
individuals will become fatalities and following clothing ignition more than 50% of individuals
will become fatalities. As most offshore clothing is nominally identical, the threshold of piloted
clothing ignition is taken as a conservative value. Where only one side of an individual is presented
to a fire, only half the normal dose is required for the same effect. This will only occur with short
duration (<10s) events.
1% fatality is a conservative estimate based on Rew (1996). Rew concluded that serious
burns may be received or a small % of onshore workers would die following exposure to 1000
TDU. It is assumed that the training and clothing of offshore workers is generally superior to that
of onshore workers, but the increased difficulty of escape etc. nulls this advantage. It is assumed
that the exposure to 1000 TDU is evenly distributed to the front and back of the victim, due, for
example, to a winding escape route.
As stated above, even 2o burns impede escape, however unassisted escape is still possible
until the onset of 3o burns over a large body area or sensitive areas, or until clothing ignition
occurs.
The 100% fatality level is difficult to distinguish from some lower levels. In the interest of
setting a guiding figure, 3500 TDU is estimated. However, 100% fatality may occur at slightly
lower doses. At 3500 TDU, un-piloted ignition of clothing will occur, thus even 100% clothed
individuals will not survive. At this level of thermal dose, self-extinguishment is unlikely due to
injury from heat transmitted through the clothing, unless fire protective clothing (PPE) is worn.
48
6.12 BURNS - DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Above figures present a comparison of commonly used fatality prediction probits. For the probit
equations, discussion of figures below.
The harm criteria guidance in Table 2 has been plotted on Figures 1-3 in order to enable
comparison with other author’s advice. Figures 1-3 have been drawn at selected heat flux levels
for illustrative and comparative purposes only. In particular, 2kW/m2 corresponds to strong
sunlight. 5 and 10 kW/m2 are heat flux levels at which fatality rates are frequently evaluated.
From Figures 1-3, it is clear that both Eisenberg’s (1975) and Lees’ (1994) probits are more
optimistic than Tsao & Perry’s (1979) probit. The harm criteria guidance in
Table 2, reflecting a cautious best estimate, lies centrally within this range; more conservative than
Eisenberg (1975) and more optimistic than Tsao & Perry (1979).
Figure 4 demonstrates the time to 2o burns can be as low as 10s for a 10 kW/m2 heat flux.
Where the flux is only 5 kW/m2, 10s exposure only results in the onset of pain.
Although the logarithmic scale exaggerates the dose scale, Figure 4 indicates a longer duration
between 2o and 3o burn injury than between other injuries. Some authors have reported a period of
constant injury in this region of received dose.
49
Fig.8: Fatality Predictions Using Probit Relations (2kW/m2)
Fig. 9: Fatality Predictions Using Probit Relations (5kW/m2)
50
Fig. 10: Fatality Predictions Using Probit Relations (10kW/m2)
Fig. 11: Dose vs. Time Plot
51
6.13 TYPES OF FIRE AND ITS EFFECTS
The types of fire encountered offshore will usually involve the combustion of large quantities of
liquid or gaseous hydrocarbons. This was the type of fire considered by Rew (1996). He concluded
that such fires emit mainly in the infrared part of the spectrum and fall into four distinct categories:
pool, flash, jet fires and fireballs
(BLEVEs – Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosions are a particular type of fireball
involving pressurized liquefied gases). Table 9 gives the main characteristics of these events in
terms of duration, size, radiation intensity, etc.
TABLE 9: Characteristics of Process Fire Incidents
Type Size Duration Radiated Surface
Emissive Heat
Flux (kW/m2)
Hazard
Pool fire (open) Medium Long 50-150 Radiation,
smoke,
engulfment
Pool fire (severe
or confined)
Medium Long 100-230 Radiation,
smoke
Jet fire (open) Medium Medium/Long 50-250 Radiation,
smoke
Jet fire
(confined)
Medium Medium/Long 100-300 Radiation,
smoke
Flash fire Large Short 170 Engulfment
Fireball Large Short 270 (HID
SRAG)
Radiation
Pool fires may form over liquid or solid surfaces and can spread over large surface areas, thus
increasing the fuel burn rate. The vaporized fuel has little if any momentum and is easily affected
by wind. In general pool fire hazards decay rapidly with distance but, at high speeds, the wind may
cause significant flame tilt and the attacking of areas some distance from the seat of the fire.
Depending on ventilation conditions, large quantities of smoke may be produced. This can make
52
received radiation calculations more difficult but also increase fatality rates and incapacitation due
to smoke inhalation, and prevention of evacuation.
Although flash fires are generally low intensity transitory events, the burning velocity is
quite high and escape following ignition is not possible. Flash fires often remain close to the
ground, where most ignition sources and personnel are present. It is usually assumed that those
caught inside a flash fire will not survive while those outside suffer no significant harm.
Jet fires often have very high thermal radiation emissions, with local maxima up to
300kW/m2. Jet fires may burn for longer than flash fires and fireballs, but the effects are usually
more restricted in space as the release is directed and momentum controlled so that it is largely
unaffected by wind direction or strength.
Fireballs usually burn more fuel rich than flash fires and have a higher surface heat flux.
As the cloud burns, it heats up the remainder of the fuel and entrained air, so that fireballs usually
rise up while they burn, presenting a larger emitting surface to those exposed. Fireball durations
can be predicted with Roberts’ Model (Lees, 1994):
Duration (s) = 0.83 x Mass (kg)0.316
A 2.6 Te flammable gas would take 10 s to burn and a 7.0 Te cloud would take 13.6 s to
burn. Although optimistic, it should be assumed that an individual would turn and flee a fireball
after 10 s, thus the full exposure from a fireball might not only be to a single side of an individual.
Fireballs and BLEVEs may result from a jet or pool fire directly impinging a pressure vessel. As
the tank surface heats up, the steel weakens, while the internal pressure rises. At some point, the
vessel will rupture catastrophically releasing its contents as a cloud.
53
6.14 DIRECT EFFECTS
6.14.1 Thermal Radiation Causing Direct Burns
The effect of thermal radiation is to initially warm the skin, which then becomes painful. Shortly
after, the onset of 2o burns occurs, with depth of burn increasing with time for a steady level of
radiation. Ultimately, the entire thickness of the skin will burn and the underlying flesh will start
to be damaged - 3o burns. Table 1, Section 1 shows the typical radiation dose required to generate
burns. Many factors account for the range of values found in the literature, including type of heat
source and type of animal skin used.
6.14.2 Burns Causing Fatality
Rew (1996) looked for an equivalent LD50 for burns and the thermal radiation that caused burns.
Looking at both the UK population distribution and medical data presented by Lawrence (1991)
and Clark & Fromm (1987) among others, Rew concluded that as little as 30% burn area
(unspecified burn type) is required to produce 50% fatality in conjunction with inhalation injury.
Other data takes account of more recent medical treatment techniques, which have improved
survivability. For example, Davies (1982) presents data from Feller et al. (1980):
TABLE 10: Burn Area For 50% Fatality
Age Group (Years) Burn Area (%)
0-4 60.0
5-34 71.2
35-49 61.8
50-59 52.1
60-74 33.7
Over 75 19.6
The data in this table was reported by National Burn Information Exchange and
corresponds to patients in hospital over the period 1976-79. 50% fatality means 50% of patients
admitted to hospital die of their injuries (either 2o or 3o burns).
54
Davies also presents data from 15 other sources indicating a trend of increasing survival
rates with time, up to 1981, when Griffiths et al. (1981) state that 50% of 15-44 year olds will die
from 70% body area burns.
For reference, the fatality rate for different burn areas is tabulated below for the 40-44 year
old age range. These statistics do not specify which burn type was present, principally because of
the difficulty of assessing the burn depth, without causing further injury. Additionally, there is no
indication of how much of the exposed skin has been burned or the cause of the burn.
TABLE 11: Approximate Mortality Probabilities
Body Area Burned (%) Mortality Probability
78-100 1
68-77 0.9
63-67 0.8
53-62 0.7
48-52 0.6
43-47 0.4
33-42 0.3
28-32 0.2
18-27 0.1
0-17 0
6.15 TIME DEPENDENCE
For short duration fires, e.g. fireballs, account must be taken of delayed reaction. If the entire
thermal dose is on one side of a person (i.e. they don’t turn around as they retreat), piloted ignition
of clothing may occur at thermal doses as low as 900 – 1000 TDU. This is because an even thermal
loading is assumed for longer duration fires where escape is involved. Assumed reaction time must
be at least 5 seconds. For such short duration fires it may be overly conservative to assume 100%
fatality for ignition of clothing, as the thermal radiation after the fireball has burned may be very
low, allowing the approach of colleagues with fire extinguishers.
55
Fatality statistics do not usually discriminate between different survival durations, however
delayed medical attention (as would be expected offshore) can only increase fatality rates.
Additionally, over 1 – 5 days up to 70% of people with 20-30% area, 3o burns will become
‘incapacitated’ (Ingram), whereas <5% will become incapacitated within 15 minutes. If the longer
duration is considered important (e.g. in bad weather when helicopter rescue is impossible), the
criteria may have to be adjusted to minimize long term incapacitation.
56
7.0 HISTORY OF EVENTS
In Indian sector of LPG transportation 3-major incidents are happened. These 3 are in south India,
karunagapailly, chala, uppinangady more than 50 people died in these incidents, lots of people
injured, lost their houses normal life etc.
TABLE 12: Karunagappally incident data
KARUNAGAPPALLY
Date December 31-2009
Thursday
Accident time 3:50 AM
BPCL
LPG route Kochi refinery to IOCL bottling plant kollam
Location Puthebtherur junction
NH-47 karunagapilly
What happened
Tanker rammed with maruthiwagnor
car and overturned, leak of LPG occurred
Formation of vapour cloud
Vapour cloud explosion happens
Causes of Accidents Collision with maruthi car
Causes of Explosion Spark from police jeep when it starts
Consequence VCE
No. of death 4
No. of injuries 15
Remarks
The firefighting personal didn’t have sufficient
knowledge “how to tackle the situation“
People also didn’t have the awareness of these
type of accidents.
They were simply watching the extinguishing
process within 100 meter radius
57
TABLE 13:Uppinangady incident data
UPPINGADY
Date April-9 2013
Accident time Morning 10AM
LPG route HPCL manglore to bottling plant banglore
Location Perne, near uppingamdy NH-47
What happened Tanker overturned, release of LPG in huge
amounts
VCE occurred
Cause Tanker overturned while negotiating of curve
Consequence VCE
No.of death 9
No.of injuries N.A
TABLE 14:Chala incident data
CHALA
Date 27 august 2012
Accident time 10:00PM
LPG route Mangalapuram to Kozhikode
Location Chala bypass NH17
What happened while negotiating a curve it hit the median and
the tanker overturned , release of LPG
occured
Causes Over speed, deep curve, splittedmidean ,no
reflectors
Consequence JET FIRE, VCE, BLEVEE
No.of death 24
No.of injuries 40
58
7.1 LIST OF INCIDENTS
Various industrial disasters happened time to time in world wide , here is some list of incidents
involving BLEVE incidents, VCE incidents, incidents involving LPG, tanker accidents.
TABLE 15: BLEVE Incidents
No. Date & Year Location Plant/Transport Chemical Event Death/Injury
1. July 7, 1951 Port
Newark, NJ
Storage Propane VCF,BL
EVE
0d, 14i
2. July 19, 1955 Ludwigshaf
en, FRG
Rail tank car Ethylene BLEVE 2i
3. July 29, 1956 Dumax, TX Storage vessel HC BLEVE 19d, 32i
4. Oct 22, 1956 Cottage
Grove, OR
Storage LPG BLEVE 12d, 12i
5. Jan 8, 1957 Montreal,
Quebec
Storage vessel Butane BLEVE 1d
6. May 22, 1958 Signal Hill,
CA
Tank farm Oil froth F,
BLEVE
2d, 18i
7. May 28, 1959 McKittrick,
CA
Storage LPG BLEVE 2i
8. Jun 2, 1959 Deer Lake,
PA
Rail tank car LPG BLEVE 11d, 10i
9. Jan 4, 1966 Feyzin,
France
Storage vessel Propane BLEVE 18d, 81i
10. Jan 1, 1968 Dunreith, IN Rail tank car Ethylene
oxide
BLEVE 5i
11. Jan 25, 1969 Laurel, MS Rail tank car LPG BLEVE 2d, 33+i
12. Jun 21, 1970 Crescent
City, IL
Rail tank car Propane BLEVE 66i
13. Oct 19, 1971 Houston,
TX
Rail tank car VCM BLEVE 1d, 5i
14. Sep 21, 1972 Rio de
Janeiro,
Brazil
Storage vessel Butane BLEVE 37d, 53+i
15. Jul 5, 1973 Kingman,
AZ
Rail tank car Propane BLEVE 13d, 95i
16. Jan 11, 1974 West St.
Paul, MN
Storage vessel LPG BLEVE 4d, 6i
59
17. Feb 12, 1974 Oneonta,
NY
Rail tank car LPG BLEVE 25i
18. Apr 17, 1974 Bielefeld,
FRG
BLEVE
19. Aug 31, 1975 Gadsden,
AL
Tank farm Gasoline BLEVE 4d, 28i
20. Sep 1, 1975 Des Moines,
IA
Rail tank car LPG BLEVE 3i
21. Nov 26, 1976 Belt, MT Rail tank car LPG BLEVE 22i
22. Feb 24, 1978 Waverly,
TN
Rail tank car Propane BLEVE 16d, 43i
23. May 30, 1978 Texas City,
TX
Storage vessel LPG BLEVE 7d, 10i
24. Sep 8, 1979 Paxton, TX Rail tank car Chemicals BLEVE 8i
25. Mar 3, 1980 Los
Angeles,
CA
Road tanker Gasoline BLEVE 2d, 2i
26. Sep 28, 1982 Livingston,
LA
Rail tank car Flammabl
es, toxics
DEL,
BLEVE
0d, 0i
27. Jul 23, 1984 Romeoville,
IL
Absorption
column
Propane VCE,
BLEVE
15d, 22i
28. Nov 19, 1984 Mexico
City,
Mexico
Terminal LPG VCF,
BLEVE
~650d,
~6400i
TABLE 16: Fire Ball Incidents
No. Date & Year Location Plant/Transport Chemical Event Death/Injury
1. Jul 29, 1956 Amarillo,
TX
Storage tanks Oil FB 20d, >32i
2. Mar 9, 1972 Lynchburg,
VA
Road tanker Propane FB 2d, 5i
3. Jan 17, 1974 Aberdeen,
UK
Road tanker FB
4. Apr 30, 1975 Eagle Pass,
TX
Road tanker LPG FB 17d, 34i
60
5. Aug 31, 1976 Gadsden,
AL
FB 33d, 28i
6. Dec 28, 1977 Goldonna,
LA
Rail tank car LPG FB 2d, 9i
7. May 29, 1978 Lewisville,
AR
Rail tank car VCM FB 2i
8. Aug 4, 1978 Donnellson,
IA
Pipeline LPG FB 3d, 2i
9. Aug 30, 1979 Good Hope,
LA
Tank barge Butane FB 12d, 25i
TABLE 17: VCE Incidents
No. Date & Year Location Plant/Transp
ort
Chemical Event Death/Injur
y
1. Jan 2, 1939 Newark, NJ Butane VCE
2. Jan18, 1943 Los Angeles,
CA
Road tanker Butane VCF 5d
3. July 29, 1943 Ludwigshafen
, Germany
Rail tank car Butadiene VCE 57d, 439i
4. July 23, 1948 Ludwigshafen
, FRG
Rail tank car Dimethyl ether VCE 207d,
~3818i
5. Dec 30, 1949 Detroit, IL Cat cracker Propane, Butane VCE 5d
6. Aug 1950 Wray, CO Road tanker Propane VCF 2d
7. July 7, 1951 Port Newark,
NJ
Storage Propane VCF,
BLEVE
0d, 14i
8. Aug 16, 1951 Baton Rouge,
LA
Naphtha
treating
HCs VCE 2d
9. Aug 6, 1953 Campana,
Argentina
Refinery
recovery unit
Gasoline VCE 2d
10. Oct 18, 1954 Portland, OR Rail tank car LPG VCE 0d
11. July 14, 1955 Freeport, TX Polyethylene
plant
Ethylene VCE
12. July 22, 1955 Wilmington,
CA
Gasoline
plant
Butane VCE
61
13. July 26, 1956 Baton Rouge,
LA
Alkylation
unit
Butylene VCE
14. Dec 19, 1956 North
Tonawanda,
NY
Polyethylene
plant
Ethylene VCE 0d
15. Oct 24, 1957 Sacramento,
CA
Loading
terminal
LPG VCE 1d
16. Apr 15, 1958 Ardmore, OK Loading
terminal
Propane VCE
17. July 30, 1958 Augusta, GA Loading
terminal
LPG VCE 1d
18. Jun 28, 1959 Meldrin, GA Rail tank car LPG VCE 23d
19. Jan 31, 1961 Lake Charles,
LA
Alkylation
unit
Butane VCE 2d
20. Dec 17, 1961 Freeport, TX Caprolactam
plant
Cyclohexane VCE 1d
21. Apr 17, 1962 Doe Run, KY Feed vessel Ethylene oxide IE, VCE 1d, 21i
22. Apr 17, 1962 Fawley, UK Cat cracker VCE
23. Apr 17, 1962 Houston, TX Tank farm Gasoline VCE 2d
24. July 25, 1962 Berlin, NY Road tanker LPG VCE 10d, 17i
25. Aug 4, 1962 Ras Tanura,
Saudi Arabia
Storage
vessel
Propane VCE, F 1d, 115i
26. May 3, 1963 Plaquemine,
LA
Ethylene
plant
Ethylene VCE 7i
27. Jan 9, 1964 Jackass Flats,
NV
Research
laboratory
Hydrogen VCE
28. Oct 25, 1964 Liberal, KS Compressor
station
Propane VCE
29. Oct 25, 1964 Orange, TX Polyethylene
plant
Ethylene VCE 2d
30. July 13, 1965 Lake Charles,
LA
Ethylene
plant
Methane or
Ethylene
VCE
31. July 31, 1965 Baton Rouge,
LA
Reactor Ethyl chloride VCE
32. Oct 24, 1965 Escambia,
USA
Chemical
plant
Hydrogen,
Carbon
monoxide
VCE
33. Dec 23, 1965 Baltimore,
MD
Detergent
plant
Benzene VCE
62
34. Jan 19, 1966 Raunheim,
FRG
Ethylene
plant
Methane,
Ethylene
VCE 3d, 83i
35. Feb 6, 1966 Scotts Bluff,
LA
Reactor Butadiene VCE 3d
36. May 23, 1966 Philadelphia,
PA
Refinery Benzene,
Cumene,
Propane
VCF
37. Jan 20, 1967 Sacramento,
CA
Saturn rocket Hydrogen,
oxygen fuel
VCE
38. Aug 8, 1967 Lake Charles,
LA
Alkylation
unit
Isobutylene VCE 7d, 13i
39. Jan 21, 1968 Pernis,
Netherlands
Slops tank Oil slops VCE 2d, 85i
40. May 14, 1969 Wilton, UK Oxidation
plant
Cyclohexane VCE 2d, 23i
41. Sept 9, 1969 Houston, TX Pipeline Natural gas VCE 9i
42. Sept 11, 1969 Glendora, MS Rail tank car VCM TOX, VCE 1i
43. Oct 1, 1969 Escombreras,
Spain
Storage Propane VCE 4d, 3i
44. Oct 23, 1969 Texas City,
TX
Butadiene
recovery unit
Butadiene IE, VCE 3i
45. Dec 28, 1969 Fawley, UK Hydroformer Hydrogen,
Naphtha
VCE 0d
46. Feb 6, 1970 Big Springs,
TX
Alkylation
unit
VCE
47. Dec 5, 1970 Linden, NJ Refinery
reactor
C10 HC VCE 40i
48. Dec 10, 1970 Port Hudson,
MO
Pipeline Propane VCE 10i
49. Jan 19, 1971 Baton Rouge,
LA
Rail tank car Ethylene VCE 0d, 21i
50. Feb 25, 1971 Longview, TX Polyethylene
plant
Ethylene VCE 4d, 60i
51. July 19, 1971 Texas Chemical
plant
Ethylene VCE 3d
52. Sept 15, 1971 Houston,TX Butadiene
plant
Butadiene VCE 1d, 6i
53. Dec 23, 1971 Lake Charles,
LA
Chemical
plant
Trichloroethyle
ne,
VCF 4d, 3i
63
Perchloroethyle
ne
54. Aug 14, 1972 Billings, MT Alkylation
unit
Butane VCF 1d, 4i
55. Oct 22, 1972 East St Louis,
IL
Rail tank car Propylene VCE 1d, 230i
56. Feb 1, 1973 St-Amand-
les-Eaux
Road tanker Propane VCE 9d, 37i
57. Feb 22, 1973 Austin, TX Pipeline NGL VCE 6d, many
injured
58. July 5, 1973 Lodi, NJ Reactor Methanol VCF 7d
59. July 8, 1973 Tokuyama,
Japan
Ethylene
plant reactor
Ethylene VCE 1d, 4i
60. Oct 28, 1973 Shinetsu,
Japan
Chemical
plant
VCM VCE 1d, 23i
61. Dec 27, 1973 Freeport, TX Tank Ethylene oxide VCF 29i
62. Jan 4, 1974 Holly Hill, FL Road tanker Propane VCE 0d
63. Jun 1, 1974 Flixborough,
UK
Caprolactam
plant
Cyclohexane VCE 28d, 104i
64. Jun 26, 1974 Climax, TX Rail tank car VCM VCE 7d
65. July 7, 1974 Cologne, FRG Vinyl
chloride plant
VCM VCE
66. July 18, 1974 Plaquemine,
LA
Cracking
plant
Propylene VCF
67. July 18, 1974 Pitesti,
Roumania
Ethylene
plant
Ethylene VCE ~100d
68. July 18, 1974 Texas Chemical
plant
Pentanes VCE 2d
69. July 19, 1974 Decatur, IL Rail tank car Isobutane VCE 7d, 152i
70. July 21, 1974 Zaluzi,
Czechoslovak
ia
Ethylene
plant
Ethylene VCE 14d, 79i
71. Aug 25,1974 Petal, MO Salt dome
storage
Butane VCE 24i
72. Aug 30,1974 Fawley, UK Polyethylene
plant
Ethylene VCE
73. Sept 5, 1974 Barcelona,
Spain
Chemical
plant
VCM, ethylene
dichloride
VCF
74. Sept 21, 1974 Houston, TX Rail tank car Butadiene VCE 1d, 235i
64
75. Nov 29, 1974 Beaumont,
TX
Isoprene
plant
Isoprene VCE 2d, 10i
76. Feb 10, 1975 Antwerp,
Belgium
Polyethylene
plant
Ethylene VCE 6d, 13i
77. Aug 17, 1975 Philadelphia,
PA
Tank farm Crude oil
vapours
VCF, EX 8d, 2i
78. Sept 5, 1975 Rosendaal,
Netherlands
Gasoline VCE
79. Nov 7, 1975 Beek,
Netherlands
Petrochemica
l plants
Propylene VCE 14d, 107i
80. Nov 21, 1975 Cologne, FRG Cyclic
hydroformer
Hydrogen,
Naphtha
VCE 0d
81. Nov 21, 1975 Deer Park, TX Polyethylene
plant
Ethylene VCF 1d, 4i
82. Dec 2, 1975 Watson, CA Hydrogen
plant
Hydrogen VCE
83. Feb, 1976 Texas Pipeline Ethylene VCF 1d, 15i
84. Jun 16, 1976 Los Angeles,
CA
Pipeline Gasoline VCE 9d, many
injured
85. Aug 6, 1976 Lake Charles,
LA
Refinery Isobutane VCE 7d
86. Sept 26, 1976 Puerto Rico Storage Pentanes VCF 1d
87. Oct 15, 1976 Longview, TX Ethanol plant Ethylene VCE 1d
88. Jan 27, 1977 Baytown, TX Tanker Gasoline VCE 3d
89. Feb 20, 1977 Dallas, TX Rail tank car Isobutane VCE 1i
90. Mar 18, 1977 Port Arthur,
TX
Stabilizer
unit
Propane VCE 4d
91. Jun 4, 1977 Abqaiq, Saudi
Arabia
NGL plant Fuel gas VCF
92. Jun 19, 1977 Puebla,
Mexico
VCF
93. July 20, 1977 Ruff Creek,
PA
Pipeline Propane VCF 2d
94. Dec 8, 1977 Brindisi, Italy Ethylene
plant
Light HCs VCE 3d, 22i
95. Dec 10, 1977 Pasacabolo,
Columbia
Fertilizer
plant
Ammonia, etc. TOX, VCE 30d, 22i
96. Feb 11, 1978 Poblado Tres,
Mexico
Pipeline Natural gas VCE 40d
65
97. Apr 15, 1978 Abqaiq, Saudi
Arabia
Gas plant (1)Methane
(2)LPG
(1)F,
(2)VCE
98. July 11, 1978 San Carlos,
Spain
Road tanker Propylene VCF 216d, 200i
99. July 15, 1978 Xilatopic,
Mexico
Road tanker Butane VCF 100d, 220i
100. Sep 16, 1978 Immingham,
UK
Ammonia
plant
Syngas VCE
101. Oct 3, 1978 Denver, CO Cat
polymerizati
on unit
Propane VCE 3d
102. Oct 30, 1978 Pitesti,
Roumania
Gas
concentration
unit
Propane,
Propylene
VCE
103. Mar 20, 1979 Linden, NJ Cat cracker LPG VCF
104. Jun 26, 1979 Ypsilanti, MI Storage Propane VCE
105. July 21, 1979 Texas City,
TX
Alkylation
unit
Propane VCE
106. Sep 4, 1979 Pierre Port,
LA
Pipeline LNG VCF
107. Sep 18, 1979 Torrance, CA Cat cracker C3-C4 HCs VCE
108. Jan 20, 1980 Borger, TX Alkylation
unit
Light HCs VCE 41i
109. Mar 26, 1980 Enschede,
Netherlands
Propane VCE
110. Oct 21, 1980 New Castle,
DE
Polypropylen
e plant
Hexane,
Propylene
VCE 5d, 25i
111. May 8, 1981 Gothenburg,
Sweden
Pipeline Propane VCE 1d, 2i
112. Oct 1, 1981 Czechoslovak
ia
Ammonia
plant
Syngas VCE
113. Mar 9, 1982 Philadelphia,
PA
Phenol plant Cumene VCE
114. Oct 1, 1982 Pine Bluff,
AR
Pipeline Natural gas VCF
115. Jan 7, 1983 Port Newark,
NJ
Storage tank Gasoline VCE 1d
116. Sep 30, 1983 Basile, LA Gas plant HCs VCF
117. Apr 20, 1984 Sarnia, Ont. Benzene
plant
Hydrogen VCE 2d
66
118. July 23, 1984 Romeoville,
IL
Absorption
column
Propane VCE,
BLEVE
15d, 22i
119. Aug 15, 1984 Fort
McMurray,
Alberta
Coking unit HCs VCF
120. Nov 19, 1984 Mexico City,
Mexico
Terminal LPG VCF,
BLEVE
~650d,
~6400i
121. Jan 18, 1985 Cologne, FRG Ethylene
plant
Ethylene VCE
122. Jan 23, 1985 Wood River,
IL
Deasphalting
-dewaxing
unit
Propane VCF
123. Feb 19, 1985 Edmonton,
Alberta
Pipeline NGL VCE
124. Mar 9, 1985 Lake Charles,
LA
Reforming
unit
Propane VCE
125. Nov 5, 1985 Mont Belvieu Salt dome
storage
Ethane, Propane VCE
126. Nov 21, 1985 Tioga, ND Gas
processing
plant
HCs IE, VCE
127. Aug 15, 1987 Ras Tanura,
Saudi Arabia
Gas plant Propane VCE
128. Nov 14, 1987 Pampa, TX Acetic acid
plant
Acetic acid,
Butane
VCE 3d
129. Apr 7, 1988 Beek,
Netherlands
Polyethylene
plant
Ethylene VCE
130. May 5, 1988 Norco, LA Cat cracker C3 HCs VCE 7d, 28i
131. Sep 8, 1988 Rafnes,
Norway
VC plant VCM, Ethylene
dichloride
VCE
132. Jun 2, 1989 Minnebeavo,
USSR
Gasoline
plant
Propane VCE 4d
133. Jun 3, 1989 Ufa, USSR Pipeline NGL VCE 645d, ~500i
134. Jun 7, 1989 Morris, IL Distillation
column
Propylene VCF
135. Oct 23, 1989 Pasadena, TX Polyethylene
plant
Isobutane VCE
136. Dec 24, 1989 Baton Rouge,
LA
Refinery Ethane, Propane VCE
67
137. Mar 3, 1990 North
Blenheim, NY
Pipeline Propane VCF 2d, 7i
138. May 14, 1990 Tomsk, USSR Ethylene
plant
Gas VCE
139. Sep 24, 1990 Bangkok,
Thailand
Road tanker LPG VCF 68d, >100i
140. Nov 3, 1990 Chalmette,
LA
Hydrocracke
r
HCs VCE
141. Nov 6, 1990 Nagothane,
Bombay,
India
Ethylene
plant
Ethane, Propane VCE 31d
142. Nov 15, 1990 Porto de
Leixhos,
Portugal
Deasphalting
unit
Propane VCE
143. Mar 11, 1991 Pajaritos,
Mexico
Vinyl
chloride plant
Propane VCE 3d
144. Mar 12, 1991 Seadrift, TX Ethylene
oxide plant
Ethylene oxide VCE 1d
145. July 14, 1991 Kensington,
GA
Synthetic
rubber
Butadiene plant VCE
146. Oct 16, 1992 Sodegaura,
Japan
Refinery Hydrogen VCE 10d, 7i
TABLE 18: Incidents Involving LPG
No. Date & Year Location Plant/Transport Chemical Event Death/Inju
ry
1. Dec, 1932 Detroit, MI Storage LPG
2. Nov 21, 1944 Denison, TX Tank LPG F 10d
3. Oct, 1949 Winthrop,
MO
Rail tank car LPG F 1d
4. Feb 8, 1951 St. Paul, MN Loading terminal LPG VEEB 14d
5. July 24, 1952 Kansas City,
KS
Loading terminal LPG VCE
6. Oct 18, 1954 Portland, OR Rail tank car LPG VCE 0d
7. Oct 22, 1956 Cottage
Grove, OR
Storage LPG BLEVE 12d, 12i
8. Oct 24, 1957 Sacramento,
CA
Loading terminal LPG VCE 1d
68
9. July 30, 1958 Augusta, GA Loading terminal LPG VCE 1d
10. Feb 27, 1959 Portland, OR Road tanker LPG REL
11. May 28, 1959 McKittrick,
CA
Storage LPG BLEVE 2i
12. Jun 2, 1959 Deer Lake, PA Rail tank car LPG BLEVE 11d, 10i
13. Jun 28, 1959 Meldrin, GA Rail tank car LPG VCE 23d
14. July 25, 1962 Berlin, NY Road tanker LPG VCE 10d, 17i
15. Dec, 1968 Yutan, NE Pipeline LPG F 5d
16. Jan 25, 1969 Laurel, MS Rail tank car LPG BLEVE 2d, 33+i
17. Mar 6, 1969 Repesa, Spain Refinery LPG,
Propylen
e
F 0d
18. Nov 12, 1970 Hudson, OH Road tanker LPG F 6d
19. Dec 5, 1970 Mitcham, UK LPG IE
20. Nov 6, 1973 Ventura
County, CA
Rail tank car LPG REL 2d, 4i
21. Jan 11, 1974 West St. Paul,
MN
Storage vessel LPG BLEVE 4d, 6i
22. Feb 12, 1974 Oneonta, NY Road tank car LPG BLEVE 25i
23. Apr 30, 1075 Eagle Pass,
TX
Road tanker LPG FB 17d, 34i
24. May 13, 1975 Devers, TX Pipeline LPG F 4d
25. Sep 1, 1975 Des Moines,
IA
Rail tank car LPG BLEVE 3i
26. Nov 26, 1976 Belt, MT Rail tank car LPG BLEVE 22i
27. Apr 3, 1977 Umm Said,
Qatar
Gas plant LPG F 7d, 13+i
28. Dec 8, 1977 Cassino, Italy LPG IE 1d, 9i
29. Dec 28, 1977 Goldonna, LA Rail tank car LPG FB 2d, 9i
30. Dec 28, 1977 Jacksonville,
USA
LPG F
31. Jan 12, 1978 Conway, KS Pumping station LPG EX
32. May 30, 1978 Texas City,
TX
Storage vessel LPG BLEVE 7d, 10i
33. Aug 4, 1978 Donnellson,
IA
Pipeline LPG FB 3d, 2i
34. Mar 20, 1979 Linden, NJ Cat cracker LPG VCF
35. Aug, 1979 Orange, TX Pipeline LPG EX 1d, 1i
36. Feb 11, 1980 Longport, UK Warehouse LPG, etc. F, EX
69
37. May 15, 1981 San Rafael,
Venezuela
Pipeline LPG EX 18d, 35i
38. Mar 15, 1983 West Odessa,
TX
Pipeline LPG EX, F 6d
39. Nov 19, 1984 Mexico City,
Mexico
Terminal LPG VCF,
BLEVE
~650d,
~6400i
40. Apr 1, 1990 Warren, PA FCC LPG EX, F
41. Sep 24, 1990 Bangkok,
Thailand
Road tanker LPG VCF 68d, >100i
TABLE 19: Incidents Involving Road Tankers
No. Date & Year Location Plant/Transport Chemical Event Death/Inju
ry
1. Jan 18, 1943 Los Angeles,
CA
Road tanker Butane VCF 5d
2. Oct 13, 1948 Sacramento,
CA
Road tanker Butane F 2d
3. Aug, 1950 Wray, CO Road tanker Propane VCF 2d
4. Feb 27, 1959 Portland, OR Road tanker LPG REL
5. July 25, 1962 Berlin, NY Road tanker LPG VCE 10d, 17i
6. Apr 3, 1963 Norwich, CT Transport tank Organic
peroxides
EX 4d, 4i
7. Aug 21, 1968 Lievin, France Road tanker Ammoni
a
TOX 5d, 20i
8. May 30, 1970 Brooklyn, NY Road tanker Oxygen F 2d, 30i
9. Nov 12, 1970 Hudson, OH Road tanker LPG F 6d
10. Jun 4, 1971 Waco, GA Road vehicle Explosiv
es
HEX 5d, 33i
11. Aug 8, 1971 Gretna, FL Road tanker Methyl
bromide
TOX 4d
12. Mar 9, 1972 Lynchburg,
VA
Road tanker Propane FB 2d, 5i
13. Sept 21, 1972 NJ Turnpike,
NJ
Road tanker Propane F 2d, 28i
14. Feb 1, 1973 St-Amand-
les-Eaux
Road tanker Propane VCE 9d, 37i
15. Jan 4, 1974 Holly Hill, FL Road tanker Propane VCE 0d
16. Jan 17, 1974 Aberdeen, UK Road tanker FB
70
17. Apr 30, 1975 Eagle Pass,
TX
Road tanker LPG FB 17d, 34i
18. Dec 4, 1975 Seattle, WA Road tanker F
19. Dec 14, 1975 Niagara Falls,
NY
Road tanker Chlorine TOX 4d, 80i
20. May 11, 1976 Houston, TX Road tanker Ammoni
a
TOX 6d, 178i
21. Sept 11, 1976 Westoning,
UK
Road tanker Petrol EX 3i
22. Jan 27, 1977 Baytown, TX Tanker Gasoline VCE 3d
23. Sept 24, 1977 Beattyville,
KY
Road tanker Gasoline F 7d, 6i
24. May 29, 1978 Mexico City,
Mexico
Road tanker Propylen
e
F 12d
25. July 11, 1978 San Carlos,
Spain
Road tanker Propylen
e
VCF 216d, 200i
26. July 15, 1978 Xilatopic,
Mexico
Road tanker Butane VCF 100d, 220i
27. July 16, 1978 Tula, Mexico Road tanker Butane EX 12d
28. Jan 8, 1979 Bantry Bay,
Eire
Oil tanker Crude oil EX 50d
29. Apr 19, 1979 Port Neches,
TX
Oil tanker Crude oil EX
30. Nov 1, 1979 Galveston
Bay, TX
Oil tanker Crude oil EX 32d
31. Mar 3, 1980 Los Angeles,
CA
Oil tanker Gasoline BLEVE 2d, 2i
32. July 24, 1980 Rotterdam,
Netherlands
Oil tanker Crude oil Ship
split
apart
33. Nov 25, 1980 Kenner, LA Road tanker Gasoline F 7d, 6i
34. May 3, 1982 Caldecott
Tunnel,
Oakland, CA
Road tanker Gasoline F 7d
35. Dec 29, 1982 Florence, Italy Road tanker Propane EX 5d, 30i
36. Mar 22, 1989 Peterborough,
UK
Road vehicle Explosiv
es
EX 1d, 107i
37. Sept 24, 1990 Bangkok,
Thailand
Road tanker LPG VCF 68d, >100i
71
8.0 STUDY AREA
For the Project two cases are under study transportation of liquefied fuel gases by road and rail
Study Area 1
35 Kilometers road of NH 47 from Kalamassery to Chalakudy has been taken as study area 1. In
this route mainly tankers from Kochi refinery to various bottling plants of different companies are
under consideration. 5 major points in the route have been selected for the study namely
Kalamassery, Aluva, Angamaly, Chalakudy, Paravurkavala. An assumption is made that the LPG
tanker overturned in the points in the study area and LPG released occurred and the different
consequences are Analyses for particular area by considering various atmospheric conditions.
Study Area 2
Aluva Railway station is considered as the study area for the Project for the case of LPG
transportation through rail.(include current situation). Here we assume different scenarios is going
to occur, such as derailment, collision of trains and terrorist attack
Aluva railway station is located one of the most populated and business area of the city. If LPG
explosion occurring in this area have a huge impact on the environment.
Daily a lot of people come around this location and the traffic around this area is very high
72
TABLE 20: Study –Area Details.
No
.
Location
Points
Latitude Longitude Elevation District Distance From
District H-Q
1 Chalakudy
10° 18´ N 76° 20´ E 49 Ft Thrissur 30
1 Angamaly
10° 11´ N 76° 23´ E 63 Ft Ernakulam 25
3 Paravoorka
vala
10° 7 ´ N 76° 20´ E 35 Ft Ernakulam 14
4 Aluva
10° 6´ N 76° 20´ E 26 Ft Ernakulam 13
5 kalamassery
10° 3´ N 76° 19´ E 61 Ft Ernakulam 6
TABLE 21: Study Area – Population Details
Sl. No. Name District Panchayath/
Municipality
Wards Exposed To
The Study Area
Total
Population
1. Chalakudy TSR M 12,8,7,6,5 12121
2. Melur TSR P 14, 15 5556
3. Koratty TSR P 1, 15 6026
4. Karukutty EKM P 13,8,7,3,15 7204
5. Angamaly EKM M 5,8,12,13,15 11233
6. Nedumbassery EKM P 2,4,5,8,9 7512
7. Aluva EKM M 2,5,6,7 9456
8. Churnikara EKM P 3,4,7,12 6320
9. Kalamassery EKM M 5,6,23 6412
73
TABLE 22: Fire Stations
NO FIRE STATION DISTRICT
DISTANCE
FROM
H.Q(KM)
DISTANCE
FROM
N.H(KM)
PH ONE NO
1 CLUB ROAD
ERNAKULAM ERNAKULAM 3 1 2355101
2 COCHIN PORT ERNAKULAM 12 1 2666555
3 COCHIN
REFINERIES ERNAKULAM 13 3.6 2720789
4 FACT
AMBALAMUGAL ERNAKULAM 15 6 2720246
5 FACT
UDYOGMANDAL ERNAKULAM 14 4 2545109
6 GANDHINAGAR ERNAKULAM 7 2 2205550
7 ALUVA ERNAKULAM 18 0.2 04842624101
8 ANGAMALY ERNAKULAM 30 0.85 2452101
9 KOTHAMANGALAM ERNAKULAM 48 0.15 2822420
10 PERUMBAVOOR ERNAKULAM 32 1 2523123
11 THRISSUR THRISSUR 3 1 04872423650
12 CHALAKUDY THRISSUR 30 0.1 04802702000
13 IRINJALAKUDA THRISSUR 20 1 04802820558
14 MUVATTUPUZHA ERNAKULAM 39 0.1 04852832727
15 PARAVOOR ERNAKULAM 29 1 2443101
16 THRIKKAKKARA ERNAKULAM 10 2.5 24223100
TABLE 23: Study Area – Hospital Details
74
No Hospital Name District
Distance From
Head
Quarters(Km)
Distance
From N
H(Km)
Phone No
1 Amritha imsrc Ernakulam 11 1 0484 2802000
2 Ernakulam medical
center(palarivattam) Ernakulam 4.7 0.1 04842807101
3 Lakeshore hospital Ernakulam 15 0.1 0484 2701032
4 Luke memorial Ernakulam 6.2 1.5 0484 522123
5 Medical trust hospital Ernakulam 12 2 2358001
6 PVS memorial Ernakulam 6.8 01 2345451
7 Cochin port hospital Ernakulam 19 3 2666403
8 Lisie hospital Ernakulam 7.7 100 04842452547
9 Little flower angamaly Ernakulam 26 50 04842452547
10 Lourds hospital Ernakulam 10 2.5 391507
11 Elite mission Thrissur 1.9 0.1 2335185
12 Aswini hospital Thrissur 2.9 0.1 04872334238
13 Bishopalappat mission Thrissur 17 3 04802877320
14 Dhanya mission Thrissur 26 0.1 04802703386
15 Holy family hospital Thrissur 6.8 2 04872353030
16 Irinjalakuda co-operative
hospital Thrissur 22 0.1 04802822779
17 Jubilee mission hospital Thrissur 2.4 2.4 04872420361
18 Karuna hospital Thrissur 5.3 2 04872630283
19 Modern hospital Thrissur 39 0.1 2802922
20 St james hospital Thrissur 28 0.15 04802702887
9.0 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS
75
In this project the consequence analysis employed by two methods
1. Using ALOHA air modelling software.
2. Mathematical modelling.
The consequence analysis considered the consequence like BLEVE, VCE and JETFIRE. It
estimates radiation area due to different fires developed and pressure blast area from the explosion
9.1 ALOHA
ALOHA is an air dispersion model which can be used as a tool for predicting the movement
and dispersion of gases. It predicts pollutant concentrations downwind from the source of a spill,
taking into consideration the physical characteristics of the spilled material. ALOHA also accounts
for some of the physical characteristics of the release site, weather conditions, and the
circumstances of the release. Like many computer programs, it can solve problems rapidly and
provide results in a graphic easy-to-use format. This can be helpful during an emergency response
or planning for such a response ALOHA originated as a tool to aid in emergency response. It has
evolved over the years into a tool used for a wide range of response, planning, and academic
purposes. There are some features that would be useful in a dispersion model (for example,
equations accounting for site topography) that have not been included in ALOHA because they
would require extensive input and computational time. Surface topography can modify the general
pattern of wind speed and direction. One such case is the mountain breeze. During the day air near
the mountain slope warms up faster than air at the same altitude but farther from the mountain
[51]. This causes a local pressure gradient towards the mountain side and air is forced to flow up
the mountain slope as mountain breeze. With sun set the pressure gradient is reversed and the less
buoyant air flows downward into valleys One of the limitations of the ALOHA software is that, it
doesn’t account for the effects of topography. But Ichikawa and Sada [56] developed a model
evaluating the topographical effect on atmospheric dispersion using numerical model. In this
model, the topographical effect was evaluated in terms of the ratios of maximum concentration
and the distance of the point of maximum concentration from the source on the topography to the
respective values on a flat plane and the relative concentration distribution along the ground
surface plume axis normalized for the maximum concentration on a flat plane
76
ALOHA is intended to be used for predicting the extent of area downwind of a chemical
accident where people may be at risk of exposure to hazardous concentrations of toxic gas. It is
not intended for use with accidents involving radioactive chemicals. Since most first responders
do not have dispersion modelling background, ALOHA has been designed to require input data
that are either easily obtained or estimated at the scene of an accident. The results of toxic gas
dispersion modelling are used as input data for vulnerability modeling.
77
9.2 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS USING ALOHA
CASE 1 - LPG released from Rail wagon at Aluva Railway station due to Terrorist attack
SCENARIO
Leak from wagons through 2 inch hole. Formation of vapor cloud and after some time VCE
occurred. Leading to the BLEVE scenario on one of the wagon and simultaneously the adjacent
wagons, Causes a Domino effect and Projectile of Bogies
9.2.1 Aloha Inputs- Aluva Railway Station
SITE DATA
Location ALUVA RAILWAY STATION, INDIA
Building Air Exchanges Per Hour 0.66 (sheltered single storied)
Time March 17, 2015 1400 hours ST (user
specified)
CHEMICAL DATA
Chemical Name BUTANE
Molecular Weight 58.12 g/mol
AEGL-1 (60 min) 5500 ppm
AEGL-2 (60 min) 17000 ppm
AEGL-3 (60 min) 53000 ppm
LEL 16000 ppm
UEL 84000 ppm
Ambient Boiling Point -0.5° C
Vapor Pressure at Ambient Temperature greater than 1 atm
Ambient Saturation Concentration 1,000,000 ppm or 100.0%
78
ATMOSPHERIC DATA (MANUAL INPUT OF DATA)
Wind 3.8 meters/second from ESE at 3 meters
Ground Roughness urban or forest
Cloud Cover 0 tenths
Air Temperature 32° C
Stability Class C
No Inversion Height
Relative Humidity 70%
SOURCE STRENGTH:
BLEVE of flammable liquid in horizontal cylindrical tank
Tank Diameter 2.4 meters
Tank Length 17.994 meters
Tank Volume 81.4 cubic meters
Tank contains Liquid
Internal Storage Temperature 32° C
Chemical Mass in Tank 38.2 tons
Tank 75% full
Percentage of Tank Mass in Fireball 75%
Fireball Diameter 172 meters
Burn Duration 11 seconds
Pool Fire Diameter 61 meters
: Burn Duration 25 seconds
Flame Length 85 meters
79
9.2.2 Analysis Results
Fig. 12: ALOHA footprint- BLEVE
Fig. 13; ALOHA footprint- Jet fire
80
Fig.14: ALOHA footprint- Blast Area
TABLE 24: ALOHA Analysis Results
NO INCIDENT EFFECT
1
Spread of flammable
vapor
10 % LEL up to 80 m distance which depend on the wind
direction
2 JET FIRE
Radiation of 10 kw/m2 up to 35m radius area
Radiation of 2 kw/ m2 up to 80 m radius area
3 BLEVE
Radiation of 10 kw/m2 up to 400 m radius area
Radiation of 5kw/m2 up to 500m radius area
Radiation of 2 kw/m2 up to 750m radius area
4 VCE
Overpressure of 8 psi up to 54 m which is depend on the wind
direction
Overpressure of 1 psi up to 120m which is depend on the wind
direction
81
Fig. 15: Bleve Area – Aluva Railway
Fig.16: Flammable area- aluva railway station
82
Fig. 17: Blast Area- Aluva railway station
Fig.18: Jet Fire Area – Aluva railway Station
83
CASE 2 - LPG Release from overturned Bullet tanker at study location ( ALUVA )
SCENARIO
Assumed a LPG tanker bulletin tanker overturned and damage happened to the LPG bullet. A two
inch hole is formed. LPG is spread to the atmosphere according to the wind direction. A cloud of
vapors formed at the different locations and settled in lower regions. After sometime the vapor
cloud met with ignition source and VCE occurred .The fire is reached to the source of release and
the jet fire Radiate the bullet tank and some portion is engulfed by the jet fire. A BLEVE condition
formed finally BLEVE occurred
9.2.3 ALOHA INPUTS- ALUVA LOCATION
SITE DATA
Location ALUVA, INDIA
Building Air Exchanges Per Hour : 0.65 (sheltered single storied)
Time : March 10, 2015 1951 hours ST (user specified)
CHEMICAL DATA
Chemical Name BUTANE
Molecular Weight 58.12 g/mol
AEGL-1 (60 min) 5500 ppm
AEGL-2 (60 min) 17000 ppm
AEGL-3 (60 min) 53000 ppm
LEL 16000 ppm
UEL 84000 ppm
Ambient Boiling Point -0.6° C
Vapor Pressure at Ambient Temperature greater than 1 atm
84
ATMOSPHERIC DATA
MANUAL INPUT OF DATA
Wind 3.5 meters/second from wsw at 3 meters
Ground Roughness open country
Cloud Cover 3 tenths
Air Temperature 32° C
Stability Class E
No Inversion Height
Relative Humidity 70%
SOURCE STRENGTH:
Leak from short pipe or valve in horizontal cylindrical tank
Flammable chemical escaping from tank (not burning)
Tank Diameter 2.3 meters
Tank Length 9 meters
Tank Volume 37.4 cubic meters
Tank contains Liquid
Internal Temperature 32° C
Chemical Mass in Tank 18.7 tons
Tank is 80% full
Circular Opening Diameter .8 inches
Opening from tank bottom 0.71 meters
Release Duration ALOHA limited the duration to 1 hour
Max Average Sustained Release Rate 56.8 kilograms/min (averaged over a
minute or more)
Total Amount Released 3,394 kilograms
85
9.2.4 Analysis Results- Road Tanker
Fig.19: ALOHA footprint of Jet fire area
Fig. 20: ALOHA footprint of Blast Area
86
Fig. 21: ALOHA Footprint of BLEVE
TABLE 25: ALOHA Analysis Results- Road
NO INCIDENT EFFECT
1 Spread of flammable vapor
cloud
10 % LEL up to 80 m in one minute which is depend on
wind direction
2 JET FIRE Radiation of 10 kw/m2 up to 10 m radius area
3
BLEVE
Radiation of 10 kw/m2 up to 250m radius area
Radiation of 5 kw/m2 up to 400m area
Radiation of 2 kw/m2 up to 650m radius area
4
VCE
Overpressure of 8 psi up to 20 m depend on the wind
direction
Overpressure of 2 psi up to 38m depend on the wind
direction
87
Fig.22: BLEVE Area Aluva bypass
Fig.23: Flammable Area- ALUVA bypass
88
Fig.24: Jet Fire Area- Aluva bypass
Fig.25: Blast area- Aluva bypass
89
9.2.5 Aloha Footprints For BLEVE of Other Study Locations (Super Imposed Model
On Google Map)
Fig.26: BLEVE area Angamaly
Fig.27: BLEVE Area - Chalakudy
90
Fig.28: BLEVE Area - Kalamassery
Fig.29: BLEVE Area – Paravoor Kavala
91
9.3 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS USING MATHEMATICAL MODELS
9.3.1 Modelling Of Vapor Cloud Explosion (VCE)
When a large amount of flammable vaporizing liquid or gas is rapidly released, a vapour cloud
forms and disperses with the surrounding air. There lease can occur from a storage tank, process,
transport vessel, or pipelines. If this cloud is ignited before the cloud is diluted below its lower
flammability limit (LFL), a vapour cloud explosion (VCE) will occur. Centre for Chemical Process
Safety (CCPS) of American Institute of Chemical Engineers provides an excellent summary of
vapour cloud behavior. They describe four features, which must be present for a VCE to occur.
First the release material must be flammable. Second, a cloud of sufficient size must form prior to
ignition. Third, a sufficient amount of the cloud must be within the flammable range. Fourth,
sufficient confinement or turbulent mixing of a portion of the vapour cloud must be present.
Following models are used for VCE modelling
1. TNT equivalent model
2. TNO multi energy model
3. Modified Baker model
All of these models are quasi-theoretical and are based on the limited field data and accident
investigation. TNT equivalency model is easy to use andhas been applied for many QRA studies
[8]. It is described in Baker, Decker, Lees and Merex. TNT model is well established for high
explosives but when applied to flammable vapour clouds it requires the explosion yield η,
determined from the past incidents. Following methods are used for estimating the explosion
efficiency.
1. Braise and Simpson uses 2% to 5% of the heat of combustion of the total quantity of fuel spilled.
2. Health and Safety Executive uses 3% of the heat of combustion of the quantity of fuel present
in the cloud.
3. Industrial Risk Insures [33] uses 2% of the heat of combustion of thequantity of the fuel spilled.
92
4 .Factory Mutual Research Corporation [34] uses 5%, 10% and 15% of theheat of combustion of
the quantity of fuel present in the cloud, dependanton the reactivity of the material.
9.3.2 TNT Equivalent model for VCE
The TNT equivalent model is based on the assumption ofequivalence between the flammable
material and TNT factored by an explosionefficiency term. The TNT equivalent W is given by
𝑊 = 𝜂𝑀𝐻𝐶
𝐸𝑇𝑁𝑇− − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − −(3.6)
Where,
𝑊- Equivalent mass of TNT (kg),
𝜂 - Empirical explosion efficiency,
𝑀- Mass of hydrocarbon (kg),
𝐻𝐶- Heat of combustion of flammable substance (J/kg),
𝐸𝑇𝑁𝑇- Heat of combustion of TNT (J/kg).
Pressure of blast wave
The explosion of a TNT charge is shown in Fig. 3.1 for a hemispherical TNT surface charge at sea
level. The pressure wave effects are correlated as a function of scaled range. The scaled range is
defined as distance X by the cube root of TNT mass.
𝑍 = 𝑋
𝑊1
3⁄− − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − (3.7)
Where,
𝑍 - Scaled distance in the graph
𝑋- Radial distance from the surface of the fire ball (m),
𝑊 - TNT equivalent (kg).
93
Using X and W, we can find out Z. From the graph we can find out over pressure corresponding
to Z.
Fig.30: Graph for Scaled Distance Calculation
9.3.4 Modelling Of Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion (Bleve)
Among the diverse major accidents which can occur in process industries, in energy installations
and in the transportation of dangerous materials, Boiling liquid expanding vapor explosions or
BLEVEs are important especially due to their severity and the fact that they involve
simultaneously diverse effects which can cover large areas, overpressure, thermal radiation and
missile effect. Boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion (BLEVE) is a type of physical
significantly higher than its boiling point at atmospheric pressure. The physical force that causes
the BLEVE is on account of the large liquid to vapor expansion of the liquid in the container.LPG
will expand to 250 times its volume when changing from liquid to vapor. It is this expansion
process that provides the energy for propulsion of the container and the rapid mixing of vapor from
the container with air, resulting in the fireball characteristic when flammable liquids are involved.
Boiling Liquid expanding vapour explosions were defined by Walls, who first proposed the
94
acronym BLEVE as “a failure of a major container into two or more pieces occurring at a moment
where the container is at a temperature above boiling point at normal atmospheric pressure.
In most BLEVE cases caused by exposure to fire, the container failure originates in the
container metal significantly where it is not in contact with liquid. The liquid conducts the heat
away from the metal and acts as a heat absorber. Therefore the metal around the vapor space can
be heated to the point of failure. The major hazards of BLEVE are thermal radiation, velocity of
fragments and over pressure from shock wave.
Radiation received by a target
The radiation received by a receptor (for the duration of BLEVE incident) is given by CCPS of
AIChE as.
𝐸𝑟 = 𝜏𝑎𝐸𝐹21 − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − −(3.8)
Where,
𝐸𝑟- Emissive radiative flux received by a receptor (W/m2),
𝜏𝑎 - Transmissivity (dimensionless),
𝐸 -Surface emitted radiative flux (W/m2),
𝐹21-View factor (dimensionless).
Roberts, Hymes and CCPS provide a means to estimate surface heat flux based on the
radiative fraction of the total heat of combustion.
𝐸 = 𝑅𝑀𝐻𝐶
𝜋𝐷𝑚𝑎𝑥2𝑡𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒
− − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − (3.9)
Where,
𝐸 - Radiative emissive flux (W /m2),
𝑅 - Radiation fraction of heat of combustion (dimensionless),
𝑀 - Initial mass of fuel in the fire ball (kg),
95
𝐻𝐶-Heat of combustion per unit mass (J/kg),
𝐷𝑚𝑎𝑥- Maximum diameter of fire balls (m),
𝑡𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒- Duration of fireballs
Hymes [39] suggest the following values for R, 0.3 for fireball from vessel bursting below
the relief set pressure and 0.4 for fireballs from vessels bursting at or above the relief set pressure.
Pietersen and Huerta [40] and TNO [25] recommended a correlation formula that accounts
the humidity for transmissivity.
𝜏𝑎 = 2.02(𝑃𝑊𝑋𝑆)−0.09 − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − −(3.10)
Where,
𝜏𝑎- Atmospheric transmissivity (0-1),
𝑃𝑊- Water partial pressure (N/m2),
𝑋𝑆- Path length distance from the flame surface to the target (m).
An expression for water partial pressure as a function of the relative humidity and
temperature of the air is given by Mudan and Corce.
𝑃𝑊 = 1013.25(𝑅𝐻)𝑒𝑥𝑝 (14.4114 − 5328
𝑇𝑎) − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − (3.11)
Where,
𝑅𝐻 - Relative humidity,
𝑇𝑎- Ambient temperature (K).
As the effects of BLEVE mainly relates to human injury, a geometric view factor for a sphere to
receptor is required. In general the fire ball centre has a height of H above the ground. The distance
L is measured from a point at the ground directly beneath the centre of fire ball to the receptor at
ground level.
96
Equation for view factor given by Sengupta are as follows
Pitblado developed correlation for BLEVE fire ball diameter as a function of mass released
and Tasneem Abbasi et.al. Compared the various correlations for BLEVE fire ball diameter
calculation. The TNO formula proposed by Peterson and Huerta [40] give good overall fit to
observed data. All models use power law correlations to relate BLEVE diameter and duration to
the mass.
Empirical equations for maximum diameter of fire ball, duration of BLEVE and distance
between the fireball centre and the ground given by AIChE/CCPS are as follows
𝐷𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 5.8 𝑀1
3⁄ − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − (3.14)
𝑡𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒 = 2.6 𝑀1
6⁄ − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − (3.15)
𝐻𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒 = 0.75 𝐷𝑚𝑎𝑥 − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − −(3.16)
Where,
𝑀 Is the initial mass of the flammable material in kg.
97
9.3.5 Mathematical modeling –ANALYSIS
SCENARIO:
For mathematical modeling approach the quantity of fuel is mainly considered, an LPG tanker
containing 18 tonnes of LPG is overturned and LPG Release Happened VCE and BLEVE
occurred
9.3.6 Inputs Parameters - BLEVE
SL. NO. PARAMETERS VALUES
1. Distance 120 m
2. Mass Of Fuel
16 Te
3. Temperature 30 oC
4. Height 0.75 Dmax
5. Diameter Of Fireball 5.8 M1/3
6. Heat Of Combustion 4900 kj/kg
7. Radiative Fraction Of Heat Of
Reaction
0.3
8. Relative Humidity 0.7
98
TABLE 26: BLEVE Analysis Results
DISTANCE RADIATION
100
24.9
110
21.8
120
20.7
130
18.1
140
15.8
150
13.9
160
12.2
170
10.7
180
9.5
190
8.4
200
7.5
Fig. 31 Distance Vs Radiation Graph
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
100 110 120 130 140 150 160 170 180 190 200
RA
DIA
TIO
N(k
w/m
2 )
DISTANCE(m)
DISTANCE VS RADIATION
RADIATION
99
9.3.7 Mathematical modeling inputs – VCE
Sl.
No. Parameters Values
1. Distance (R) 45 m
2. Mass Of H.C (M) 250 kg
3. Empirical explosion efficiency (η) 0.05
4. Heat Of Combustion (Hc) 4900
5. Constant a -0.2143
6. Constant b 1.3503
TABLE 27: VCE –ANALYSIS RESULTS
DISTANCE(m) OVERPRESSURE(kpa)
40 4789
45 2579
50 1532
55 949
60 604
65 395
100
Fig.32: Distance Vs Overpressure Graph
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
40 45 50 55 60 65
OV
ERP
RES
SUR
E(kp
a)
DISTANCE (m)
OVERPRESSURE2
101
10.0 SOCIETAL RISK DIAGRAM
CASE: LPG tanker overturned containing 18 tonnes of LPG, BLEVE occurred and the number
of fatalities calculated for Each shell according to Radiation value
10.1 PROCEDURE
1. Compute the distance from Ground zero to the center of the current shell
2. Compute the receptor distance from the fireball center to the current shell
3. Compute the incident heat flux at the shell center using equation 𝐸𝑟 =8.28×105 𝑀0.771
𝑋𝐶2
4. Compute the probit for fatality using equation 𝑌 = −14.9 + 2.56 𝑙𝑛 (𝑡 𝐼
43⁄
104 )
5. Convert the probit to a percentage using table
6. Calculate the total shell area
7. Determine the total workers in the shell
8. Multiply the total number of workers by the percent fatalities to determine the total fatalities
9. Sum up the fatalities in all shells to determine the total
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TABLE 28: Probit to Percentage Conversion
% 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0 - 2.67 2.95 3.12 3.25 3.36 3.45 3.52 3.59 3.66
10 3.72 3.77 3.82 3.87 3.92 3.96 4.01 4.05 4.08 4.12
20 4.16 4.19 4.23 4.26 4.29 4.33 4.36 4.39 4.42 4.45
30 4.48 4.50 4.53 4.56 4.59 4.61 4.64 4.67 4.69 4.72
40 4.75 4.77 4.80 4.82 4.85 4.87 4.90 4.92 4.95 4.97
50 5.00 5.03 5.05 5.08 5.10 5.13 5.15 5.18 5.20 5.23
60 5.25 5.28 5.31 5.33 5.36 5.39 5.41 5.44 5.47 5.50
70 5.52 5.55 5.58 5.61 5.64 5.67 5.71 5.74 5.77 5.81
80 5.84 5.88 5.92 5.95 5.99 6.04 6.08 6.13 6.18 6.23
90 6.28 6.34 6.41 6.48 6.55 6.64 6.75 6.88 7.05 7.33
% 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
99 7.33 7.37 7.41 7.46 7.51 7.58 7.65 7.75 7.88 8.09
TABLE 29:
103
Fig.33 Societal Risk Diagram
104
11.0 FAULT TREE ANALYSIS
CASE 1
LPG Road tanker met with Accident and overturned , considered various cases
For the basic events of LPG Release and source of Ignition
SCENARIO -1
LPG tanker overturned, Release of LPG to the atmosphere, from manifold, pressure gauge, and
from a crack developed is considered
Considered various sources of ignition like spark from electric cable, motor vehicles, open flame
etc
The causes considered for accident are Tyre puncture, over speed, collision with median etc
Fire happened and engulfed the tanker and BLEVE condition satisfied then finally BLEVE took
place
SCENARIO -2
LPG Tanker overturned, Release LPG to atmosphere from manifold, pressure gauge and
crack/hole developed on tanker is considered
The ignition of LPG cloud is delayed vapor cloud is spread to more areas
After some time the ignition source, found that the vapor cloud and VCE took place
The ignition source considered are open flame, spark from the electric cable motor vehicle etc
105
Fig. 34 FTA Road Accident (VCE)
106
Fig.35: FTA of Road Accident (BLEVE)
107
CASE 2
Release of LPG from a Wagon due to derailment, terrorist attack, collision at Aluva railway
station and various sources of ignition are considered
SCENARIO 1
Release of LPG from Various parts like pressure gauge, manifold, crack developed, hole
developed due to terrorist attack. Found the ignition source and Fire occurred. Radiation from this
fire enrich BLEVE condition finally BLEVE took place, the ignition source may be Spark, open
flame, intentionally ignited by the terrorist etc
SCENARIO 2
Release of LPG from Various parts like pressure gauge, manifold, and crack developed/ hole
developed due to terrorist attack, Vapor cloud formed, ignition of vapor cloud delayed for a while,
found the ignition sources and VCE established
108
Fig.36: FTA for Rail Accident (VCE)
109
Fig.37: FTA for Rail Accident (BLEVE)
110
12.0 ETA SCENARIO
CASE 1
LPG Release from tank and various consequences cases like BLEVE, VCE, are considered for
analysis
SCENARIO
Considered the type of release of LPG, type of ignition, protection facility and the consequence
outcome considered
CASE 2
LPG release and Explosion from LPG road Tanker
SCENARIO
LPG tanker met with an accident and overturned due to tyre puncture. Then the possible scenarios
are considered by analyzing various conditions like control of driver on driving. Such situation
will damage the manifold, Release of LPG and considered various possible events like BLEVE,
VCE, and JET FIRE
111
Fig.38: ETA for LPG Release
112
Fig.39: ETA of LPG Road Tanker
113
13.0 FIREMODE
Fire mode is QRA tool for fire modelling it estimates various parameters like Thermal radiation,
air blast overpressure due to explosion of different modes of fire such as BLEVE, VCE,JET FIRE
& POOL FIRE. This software uses proven mathematical models
13.1 FIREMODE 2
Fire mode 2 shall be the updated version for the software firemode, It seems to include
additional features such as graphical representation of models. This features enables to
estimate how much area be affected by a particular consequence from the point source of
origin
Conversion of graphical representation of modelling to KML files. These KML files have
to superimpose the model on google maps
Wish to include societal and individual risk estimating features
Risk contours
114
14.0 CONCLUSION
India is a developing country. For a positive development energy sources are necessary.
LPG is a good mode of energy source. It is very useful in various sectors like Industrial, domestic
and commercial. Even though the LPG is a hazardous energy source, we cannot avoid the use of
LPG. We have seen disasters like Chala, Uppinagady and karunagappilly. But we cannot stop the
transportation of LPG due to that reasons, because it is very necessary for the energy security. Risk
assessment and consequence analysis procedure in this sector will help for emergency planning
procedure, awareness to public and government. Also it will be act as a decision tool for the
Refinery people. For quick actions, it can assess the damage area, effect on population, the damage
to structure etc. Fault tree and event tree analysis will help to find out the frequency of events, also
it will assist to find out the consequences and its initiating events. Probit function for societal risk
and risk diagrams helps to find out the percentage of fatalities in the shell area.The consequence
analysis in study area shows that the Radiation effect from BLEVE reaches up to 2 km with in this
area. Important section like Bus stand, Railway stations, Business buildings etc include this show
that the spread of damage
115
BIBILIOGRAPHY
Less loss prevention volume 1 and 3
Guidelines for chemical process quantitative risk analysis
OISD 144 – LPG Installations
OISD 159 - LPG tank trucks – requirements of safety on design/ fabrication and Fittings.
OISD 161- LPG Tank trucks incidents : rescue and relief operations
Check sheet for BOGIE LPG tank wagon type – BTPGLN - - government of India
ministry of railways.
Q & A for shell LPG depot (PHI Assessment).
CCPS, 1999 Guidelines for Evaluating the Characteristics of Vapour Cloud Explosions,
Flash Fires and BLEVEs Center for Chemical Process Safety.
Case study of chala accident by OISD representatives
Risk analysis of LPG transport by road and rail – Roberto Bubbico, Cinzia Ferrari,
Barbara Mazzarotta – Journal of loss prevention.
J. casal. , J Arnold, H. Montiel, E. Planas-Cuchi,- modelling and understanding of
BLEVE
Experimental charaterisation and modelling of hazards of BLEVE and boilover –
Delphine laborer
www.hindu.com
www.hindustanpetroleum.com
www.youtube.com
www.asianetnews.com
116
www.indiavisiontv.com
www.wikipedia.com
www.keralapcb.org
www.punjllogd.com
www.shell.com
www.totalgas.com