Victoria KingLovern – ExistentialismSpring 2011

Considerations on Being Human alongside a Moral Way to Live

What does it mean to be completely aware of what it means to exist? How do we know if

what we are doing is right? This paper only goes a small distance into considering these issues

from a limited amount of perspectives. However, it is acceptable to take these particular

perspectives into account, because they are published and here to be considered. In this paper, I

shall consider some of these questions from the points of view of a couple of philosophers; most

prominently, from the points of view of Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein.

With the first portion of my paper, I shall lay the necessary groundwork behind the notion

of Kierkegaard concerning the method of self-actualization and realization of freedom in

becoming wholly aware of our individual existence. With the second article, I shall cover how it

is possible to still be evil and self-actualized at the same time. The third article used in my paper

comes from the point of view of Wittgenstein, and it argues that some issues in existence not

only involve Christians or one specific religious group, but includes the entirety of the human

population, and the guilt involved in not fulfilling one’s responsibility to another, regardless of

personal religion.

Kierkegaard attempts to lay out the requirements for becoming human in addition to

explaining that a person of faith becomes more sober the more that person suffers. Let us first

look at what it means to become human, according to Kierkegaard. In becoming human, first one

must become in finitude. The concept of finitude explains how to become oneself sincerely, in

the moment, as a result of teaching oneself what this entails. This part involves faith in the first

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degree, or a generic version of faith. This type of faith sheds light on the way that one can be

considered a hero, considered from a social context, rather than a knight of faith, which would be

marked by a purely internal consideration and involves faith in the second degree. We shall look

more at the former type for now.

Part of becoming human involves thoughtful honesty alongside a dash of humor. One

cannot become human by imitating others. Consider a man trying to become free within a

democratic society. Let us hypothetically consider trying to become free within the confines of

the United States, which is supposedly a democratic society. Within the confines of the United

States, the majority are said to rule, and everyone is said to be treated equally. This is a

generalized notion that the majority may accept as true; however, it is not necessarily true. Not

everyone is treated equally financially or personally. Certain jobs or professions receive more

merit and financial backing than others. This is only one example involved; going back to the

main point of my example, let us say that most people within the United States may claim that

we are free citizens as a result of being citizens of the United States. This is not necessarily the

case. We are free to the extent that we will not be granted a sanction so long as we act in

accordance with the local and federal rules set for us and fail to break any or get caught doing so.

This is not complete freedom. If we were free in this sense, I could live on a small plot of land

and provide nourishment for myself by farming and hunting alone. We can no longer live in a

place without paying taxes for living there. In order to pay taxes, we must work or produce

something to sell for a price in order to pay those taxes. Certain jobs are tax-free if one gets paid

in cash; however, most jobs or careers have a certain percentage of their checks taken out. Either

way, in this hypothetical example, I remain unable to legally live completely freely within the

confines of the United States, regardless of the supposed majority claim that this system does

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enable us to live freely. If becoming human involves that we observe our situation honestly, and

it also involves the understanding that we cannot become human via imitation but by serious

consideration of our particular conditions, then my hypothetical example above describes an

instance in which following the majority-held notion proves ineffective to becoming human. The

comical side of this is that the majority in question might accept titles or take on identities, yet

never consider what it means to become themselves, (Matustik, 251-252). By that same token,

one cannot learn didactically, or by formal instruction, what it means to be human. One must

accomplish this autodidactically, or by means of learning without formal instruction. This is

ironic on my part in that I am learning this autodidactically yet via means of formal instruction,

and it is doubly ironic in that I am didactically repeating in a paper the same claims of a

philosopher who held that we must learn these things autodidactically.

Matustik holds of Kierkegaard that “human becoming is a finite venture marked by…a

threefold dimension of existential pathos in the immanence of the moment: pathos in its initial,

essential, and decisive expression,” (252). I take pathos to mean the quality of an actual life

experience which evokes compassion and I take immanent to portray what goes on internally, or

within the mind. That being said, I understand the first sentence of this paragraph to mean that

becoming human involves a focused, internal awareness of actual life experience which takes

place in the present moment. One might also say it takes place within each present moment, with

time as a progressive series of present moments; but we are only worried about the finite here,

and the finite is concerned with the present and what exists. However, this also needs be tied to

ethical action, (252). The problem with this is that human becoming in its finite state escapes the

possibility of ethical action, thus, “in my becoming unfinished, I set myself for myself as a task,”

(252). The absurdity here is that I have to live life before I am able to finish it, (252). Next, I

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want to embrace an eternal aspect such as love or happiness. In order to do this, it is necessary to

transcend the finite in order to gain insight into the infinite. I do not want happiness for a time; I

want happiness for all time. “To care with existential pathos means to seek my eternal happiness

in every now,” (Matustik, 253). In the sense that one acquires happiness right now and here, for

all time, for existence, allows infinite and finite to merge, or it allows for the infinite to become

an aspect of the finite, (253). Also, if one henceforth fails to live by this regimen, nothing outside

of the individual can save them from the “path out of the anguish into the moment,” (253).

The absurdity of the above lies in the notion that one can care absolutely for something

relative. In order to do this, we had and continue having to distinguish between the immanent

degree of faith and the transcendent degree of faith. That is, to discern between what is absolute

and what is relative within life. The relation to the absolute cannot be experienced empirically,

and it can only be experienced subjectively and immanently. Once this task has been completed,

we must begin to discard all false senses of ourselves, (Matustik, 255). This is known as “dying

unto oneself,” and becoming human by this task is the suffering action, (255). It is in this action

that we realize that we are capable of nothing, or no-thing, while simultaneously our present

situation presents itself as being capable of everything—anything is possible, (255). We learn

that we cannot win love or gain anything infinite by any objective means. Consider having an

addiction for something and endeavoring to recover from it. In order to do this, the addict must

push him or herself further within the depths of withdrawal and angst by replacing the object of

his or her addiction with a void. This is done because to substitute the object of addiction with

something else would not be curing one of addiction absolutely, it would be replacing one

addiction with another. Therefore, what we are learning to love absolutely, we learn that it is an

uncertain venture to love it, (256). Indeed, this is risky business. It is there that we take the leap

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of faith and consider that what we do in our everyday, transformative actions determines the

paths of our existence and what physically lies therein, (257).

There are more modes of despair that reflect what has been stated already. My intention

has been to give enough background information over Kierkegaard in order to graze the surface

of what it means to be human and how to overcome personal transgressions, such as addictions,

as well as the level of anxiety this possibly entails. The next thing we shall look at is a

consideration of evil with regard to Kierkegaard.

Socrates held that to know what was good was to do it, and so to do evil was committed

out of ignorance, (Roberts, 364). Kant believed that committing evil acts came about as a result

of acting with regard to incentives rather than in accordance with the rational good will.

Augustine held that evil actions came about as a result of an inadequacy of the will that has lost

itself in the empirical world, (264). According to an article, “The Integrity of Evil: Kierkegaard

on the Actualization of Human Evil,” by David Roberts, “each of these renditions of evil…

leaves a person’s life weakened and disordered…. Thus, evil is a kind of disintegration,” (364).

Roberts counters this view of evil with Kierkegaard’s criticism of it. According to him, effects

of evil result from “a powerful integrity within the nature of moral evil itself,” (264).

Ultimately, according to this article, the foundation of existence is ordered. That which is

closer to the foundation is better, so that which is further away from the foundation is worse, or

more evil, or less rational. Evil involves a lack of order and rationality. It is void. This void, or

insufficiency of the will, leads to corruption of the soul, (365). These are the privation views

which conceive of

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“evil as a movement away from an integrity and order that are established in a

relationship of dependence on the Ground of existence (God, the Good, Fate,

Providence, Reason…), and toward a disintegration and disordered life of

emptiness,” (Roberts, 365).

In an ideal world, this view stands. We run into problems when considering it in actual

life situations. Roberts gives a couple of examples to explain. His first example was that Nazi

Germany did not seem to have more or less being than it does today; the second example he uses

is that Charles Manson does not seem to have less being or integrity than another person who

suffers from kleptomaniac tendencies. Roberts contrasts these privation views of evil with the

view of Kierkegaard that the unactualized forms of a positive form of evil are present in these

weaker forms of evil, (365). Let us continue to a Kierkegaardan analysis of evil.

Remember the comical or absurd contradictions of self we covered earlier in the paper. A

person gains freedom by getting into these contradictions and working through them, (Roberts,

366). The self is actually recognized by an external force; or, that force which determines the

entire relation of the self to itself, (366). Whether the self acts with good or evil intent is

determined by the way in which the self relates itself to its external force which recognizes that

relation.

Roberts delineates two poles of the contradiction: one involves aspects of the expansion

of the self (the infinite) and the other pole is involves aspects of the limiting of the self (finitude).

If one relates to only one pole of the contradiction, the outcome is spiritlessness despair. If one

relates the infinite to the absence of finite, the outcome is self-deception, (366). “Kierkegaard

says that what spiritless people want in life is comfort and ease, but since they do not want to see

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themselves this way, infinite willing is used as a means of deception,” (Roberts, 367).

Sometimes people fail to act upon the way they feel about an issue, or rather, they fail to act the

way they believe they actually act in accordance with how they feel that they should act when

faced with a given issue. One might claim universal love and respect for humanity and at the

same time may treat others cruelly or with contempt.

On the flipside, when one relates the finite to the absence of the infinite, the result is the

despair of finitude. In this type, a person gathers freedom by a range of limited possibilities with

regard to the self such that it fits the expectations of the conventional order, (Roberts, 367). The

one who does this may believe oneself to be oneself while in actuality he or she has been

imitating others. Within this sort of despair, everything is a means to some other end, and in its

cycle of restricted responses, the individual never considers pondering what everything actually

means, (367). This evil form of despair entails weakness, or “a privation of actuality and

integrity,” (Roberts, 367). All of their efforts are futile, their energy spent goes nowhere, for they

are merely coming along for the ride. At any time either of these poles are unbalanced, the

person in despair has the possibility of becoming free of the despair so long as she takes herself

up as a task, or takes responsibility for herself. (368).

When the poles are balanced and a person has overcome despair on the path to becoming

fully human, that person gains freedom. Freedom is gained by a self-positing that sheds light on

the sovereignty of the self, (Roberts, 368). With this comes ethical self choice, in which one

becomes responsible for the qualities assigned them by nature and transforms them into essential

qualities. Now, the self integrates these qualities into itself in an ordered, meaningful manner,

(368). The ethical person aims to actualize his or her ideal self, rendering what has been called

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the “paradigmatic human being,” (Roberts, 368). When the ethical self chooses to despair of the

ethical stage, it makes a leap toward the religious stage, (370).

In the religious stage, God has all the power of transforming the self and the world in

which the self exists. In addition to the relation of a being to that power which established the

structure of the self, self-consciousness increases in terms of actualization, and that renders a

new perspective concerning the nature of moral evil. This means that evil may be an additional

method of self-actualization, rather than good as the only method of self-actualization (Roberts,

370). This involves infinite resignation, which requires that one die to itself and also to its

egoistic aims at self-mastery. From this viewpoint, one realizes that he or she is not the center of

all that occurs in reality, and that he or she does not help merely by doing his or her own duty;

God does not require that duty to keep the world in order or toss it into chaos, (370). This entails

a new type of freedom: freedom from content. By this concept freedom is understood by means

of this deficiency of the finite within the infinite; freedom is without content, (370). One has to

struggle with the deficiency or void of what content one wishes to shed, and within this abyss

lies the evil foundation one must tackle. One binds their freedom within this dark abyss, and in

doing so they have only the void to experience upon craving some content. Only after one learns

not to crave content does that individual experience the absolute good, (Roberts, 372).

Again, once one is within the confines of the infinite after that individual has come to the

religious sphere, one must once again consider the process by which one freely returns back to

the finite sphere, (Roberts, 373). It is at this point that the individual must choose whether to

accept freedom by yielding to God or to accept freedom for oneself and gain the finite by means

of this freedom. The former type is an act of faith, the latter is an act of defiance.

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Roberts considers defiance as the actualization of evil, (Roberts, 373). Defiance is the

“despair of wanting in despair to be oneself,” (Kierkegaard, 98). It is the despair of infinite

resignation. Kierkegaard disagreed with the Socratic notion by claiming that it is possible for an

individual to have aversion to the good, even when they know the good as the good; they can be

off-put by what this relationship with God delivers, and so they may choose to shed this

relationship, (Roberts, 373). The relationship with God means one must experience the dread of

being nothing at the hands of the infinite. If one accepts God as this, that person may begin to

worship God; if the individual defies this, then it exalts itself in rebellion against the power of

God, or the infinite, (Roberts, 374). In defiance, the self attempts to create itself from out of the

dark abyss, and in doing so, it seeks to affirm its own particular will upon the world by rebelling

against the source of its creation, (374). By this token, the self makes itself what it chooses to be,

(375). It defies disintegration of itself because it establishes its integrity via its self-conscious

freedom. This process inevitably leads to despair since it provides freedom itself as its

foundation; nothing can bind or constrain this freedom, (375). The irony here is that the freedom

that allows one to establish itself in an act of defiance is the same freedom that may also

eliminate this act of self-creation. According to this, defiant individuals are not necessarily

weaker and more ignorant than others, (Roberts, 367).

So far we have seen freedom and actualization as being present alongside an aspect of

religion, whether self-actualization is achieved via evil or moral means, and primarily this has

been considered from the point of view of ideas stemming from Kierkegaard. Now let us

consider another point of view concerning a conception of belief itself.

Wittgenstein believes that the purely religious individual considers himself or herself to

be wholly wretched in nature, (Wittgenstein, 45). In an article titled “The Wretchedness of

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Belief: Wittgenstein on Guilt, Religion, and Recompense,” Bob Plant considers this point of

view, (Plant, 449). Plant argues that, in order to understand the importance of this point of view,

that absolutely religious people consider themselves as being wretched, it is necessary to

consider the function of guilt within the equation of many religious and ethical themes.

First, Wittgenstein explains that no contradiction exists between a “believer” and

“nonbeliever”. This is because their relative points of view are coming from entirely different

perspectives, (Plant, 454). He claims that both groups are united in their common, primitive,

natural human activities, (455). Plant lists a number of examples of connecting links between the

two groups:

i. “Certain religious and nonreligious acts of piety,

ii. A confession of sins and a confession of love or guilt,

iii. The adoration of a religious image and the devotion exhibited toward a picture…

of a loved one,

iv. Talk of ghostly “visitations”…

v. The absolute trusting demanded by religious faith and that which governs the

parental relation,

vi. Prayer and expressions of human vulnerabilities and needs,

vii. Notions of fate and predestination, and natural feelings of vulnerability in the

face of the world’s vacillations,

viii. Following the notion of something as the “Cause” [of everything]…may suggest

that certain eschatological beliefs correspond to a natural desire or hope for

justice,”

(Plant, 455-456).

What Wittgenstein manages to explain here is a common point by which all groups might

identify with each other on certain issues and this allows a dialogue between the two groups,

irrespective of differences in religion or culture, (457). He notes that a man of science might

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argue that all other explanations of reality fall short of the ability to adequately explain reality.

He counters the argument by explaining that one “can fight, hope, and even believe without

believing scientifically,” (Wittgenstein, 60). Humans might benefit from realizing that they

share common beliefs and experiences, regardless of personal belief. So far we have considered a

broad account of religious belief within Wittgenstein’s naturalism; now we shall consider a

specific approach.

If there is personal existence after death, we will continue to suffer, (Plant, 459). This

may lead us to ethical considerations concerning responsibilities or duties to fulfill. If, even in

death, we consider these tasks as still requiring accomplishment, then we might imagine a form

of guilt which could be involved in knowing one has not and cannot complete those unfinished

tasks which linger on after death, (459). Those who live must attempt to complete these tasks

while living; else, there is the possibility that one might have to continue existing while enduring

a bad conscience over having not finished a certain project or task, (464). In this sense, “a bad

conscience is the minimal manifestation required of the genuinely religious life,” (Plant, 464).

Wittgenstein admitted the possibility of these notions, though he did not consider himself

a proponent of any specific religion in full. The way this ties together even more is that he grants

the possible truth of any of these notions, although he cannot personally conceive of a creator. In

granting the possibility of religious notions even though he does not belong explicitly to any

specific religion, he also includes himself among those allowed to have an allowable opinion

concerning what considerations are being made by these religions. His opinion may be

considered allowable although he may still not be able to understand it from the point of view of

the religious individual involved, (465). Going from this, he explains a sort of all-Powerful God

who smites or punishes those of his followers who fail to obey His command, (467). In this

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example, not even death can relieve them of their responsibilities, for God is with them always;

therefore, they must experience religious life as wretched insofar as they must do as they are

commanded by an external force rather than by the will of their own freedom, (468).

Wittgenstein explains that a factual and necessarily true book on ethics is not possible

because ethics are unexplainable while we are only capable of explaining facts; however, while a

conversation or dialogue upon what constitutes the ethical may be objectively hopeless, it is not

without its respectful merit (Plant, 469). I will give an example of the absolute relativity

involved in considering a code of ethics. Consider that a man is playing baseball when another

individual comes up and tells him that his baseball skills are in dire need of improvement. The

man playing baseball explains that it is not his aim to become good at it, to which the other

person replies with understanding and makes no more issue of it. Now, consider that the second

man comes up to the first and charges him of having an irrefutably rotten demeanor; to which,

the first man replies once again that he is not concerned about changing his behavior. This time,

the difference in critique between the first and second man is that the second believes the first

ought to improve his demeanor, (470). The importance of either situation could be reasonably

argued from relative standpoints. However, the first example of not caring whether a person

wants to improve at baseball does not involve a normative moral dilemma. From here,

Wittgenstein delineates that the right road is the one “which leads to an arbitrarily predetermined

end” by which one might be “ashamed for not going,” (Plant, 471).

This is what brings us to a connection among this article and the last that failure to follow

the right path does not constitute wrongness, but only shame or guilt for not following it.

Granted, it may be sanctioned by the wrath of God. However, if a person follows the right road

out of fear of guilt or sanction for not following it, then he is not purely religious at all, (Plant,

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472). By this token, it might be understood that religious faith or a reason for doing anything

might be most purely upheld without regard for the rewards offered by its actual fulfillment.

Still, if our souls are immortal and everlasting, and if being religious is wretched in the sense that

we must complete external obligations and receive guilt when we fail to do so, then this eternity

leads to the possibility of a state of eternal guilt or wretchedness, (473). Although Wittgenstein

does not claim any specific religion, he sides with the view of Dostoevsky that “Every one of us

is responsible for everyone else in every way, and I most of all,” (Dostoevsky, 339).

In conclusion, I have answered the questions posited at the beginning of this paper

through the points of view of various authors. Kierkegaard provides a meaning of what it means

to exist and be aware of the nature of one’s existence. Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein both

consider what it means to perform the right. Kierkegaard allowed us to see that even defiant

beings are capable of self-actualization and freedom, however they risk a great chance at despair

in that their possibility of freedom lies upon the foundation of freedom itself. Wittgenstein

showed that the failure to follow the right path does not necessitate wrongness in being, although

it may still render guilt or shame for not fulfilling one’s responsibility to another. He personally

believed everyone to be responsible for everyone else, although he makes no outright claim to

belong to any specific religion.

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Works Cited

Dostoevsky, Fyodor. The Brothers Karamazov. 1. England: Penguin, 1967. Print.

Kierkegaard, Soren. The Sickness Unto Death. London: Penguin Books, 1989. Print.

Matustik, Martin Beck. "Becoming Human, Becoming Sober."

Springer Science+Business Media. (2009): Print.

Plant, Bob. "The Wretchedness of Belief: Wittgenstein on Guilt, Religion, and Recompense."

Journal of Religious Ethics, Etc.. 32.3 (2004): Print.

Roberts, David. "The Integrity of Evil: Kierkegaard on the Actualization of Evil."

Philosophy Today. 54.4 (2010): Print.

Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Culture and Value. Oxford: Blackwell, 1994. Print.

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