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design, the unforeseen can and will occur, bringing failure tothe most well thought out strategy.

In the spring of 1940, Benito Mussolini’s strategy wassimple — cash in on the demise of an already beaten enemy,the French.

A year later, in Russia, German overconfidence and therefusal to concentrate on Moscow early enough eventuallybrought low all of Hitler’s grandiose dreams, but at least hisgeneral staff had a plan — and his armies the wherewithal toachieve it. Mussolini’s plans for Africa were based on strut-ting hubris.

In the Pacific, after their stunning series of relatively easyconquests, Japan’s war council never really addressed what itsmilitary would do once an aroused America got off the floorand began building up its forces, but at least it had a strategyof concentric rings of island defenses and the US would paydearly in order to crack them. Mussolini had no such fallbackposition. To his overconfident mind, the out-numberedBritish would collapse against the onslaught of his valorouslegions and Africa and the Mediterranean would be his.

Of all the whys connected with military avia-tion, none remains more mysterious or unfath-omable than the Italian dictator’s decision to goto war in 1940 with the puny, under-strength air

force he possessed — particularly when its areaof operation extended as much as 3000-miles

from the Italian peninsula and, when lament-ing the quality of his soldiers

and airmen, heremarked that

had the sculp-

tor Michelangelo been forced to work with such inferior materi-al, he would have been no more than a humble potter. Qualityaside, not only was Mussolini’s Regia Aeronautica weak andobsolete, but it had little prospect of making good operationallosses based on what can only be described as woefully inade-quate production capacity.

Even in 1941, when the Axis forces were at the zenith oftheir powers, Mussolini’s air arm was already failing. As badlyprepared and outmanned as the Americans were in thePacific, during the first full year of war, even then a squadronof US fighters numbered a nominal 18 planes and, often, 21.When losses from combat, aircraft out of commission or await-ing replacement are figured in, a combat-ready US squadronmight still be able to muster say 14 aircraft. Given the samecircumstances, an Italian WWII squadron of fighters, bombers,transports, or reconnaissance aircraft, normally composed ofnine planes, was hard pressed to deliver three or four.

In order to bring units up to something approaching afighting standard, a Gruppo, or group, which normally fieldedthree squadrons totaling 27 planes, would be reduced to oper-ating three skeleton squadrons in what was dubbed anautonomous group. With

a handfulof fighters and perhapshalf a dozen bombers and a few transport and recon aircraft,this mixed improvisation would be sent to the front to beburned away in the first few days of combat, whereupon it

would cease to exist. In the WWII Italian table of orga-nization, a Stormo, or wing, was usually composed of twogroups. The resultant wing was supposed to total between 50and 60 aircraft. That same number would represent approxi-mately two full US squadrons, with spares. Just prior to the

20 AIR CLASSICS/September 2017

Planning for war is neither the most enjoyable norrewarding of pastimes, particularly when those plansgo awry. When they are foolhardy, it is even worse.Sometimes this is due to faulty intelligence gathering

concerning a potential adversary’s strength and skill or, con-versely, an overly optimistic evaluation of one’s own capabil-ities. Sometimes it stems from the quality of information andmaterial one is given to work with. In Fascist Italy’s case, itwas an example of all three.

Even when the concept is brilliant, as in Germany’s inva-sion of France, and the enemycooperates in aiding the grand

CONSIDERED OBSOLETE AT THESTART OF THE SECOND WORLDWAR, THE SM.79 SOON FOUND

ITSELF AS ITALY’S BESTTORPEDO BOMBER

BY ALDOLATRENTA

Sparrowhawks on the prowl. Heading to enemy targets,pilots of the SM.79s would fly tight formation to allow theirgunners to utilize massed machine gun fire to dissuadeenemy fighter attacks. These two machines werephotographed over Sciacca.

Fresh out of the factory and highly polished for a press display, the eighth production SM.79 was displayed as a symbol of Italy’sincreasing role in aviation. The aircraft, photographed in 1937, was camouflage in brown, green, and sand before being sent off toparticipate in the Spanish Civil War.

Flight of SM.79s shows the belly gunner’s position toadvantage as well as the Fascist insignia on the wings and the

Italian crown with the House of Savoy crest on the rudders.