consolidated cases judicial department

7/27/2019 Consolidated Cases Judicial Department

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1. SANTIAGO VS. BAUTISTA32 SCRA 188 (2970)

FACTS:

Teodoro Santiago was a Grade 6 pupil at Sero Elem. School. He was adjudged3rd Honors (3rd placer). 3 days before graduation, Teodoro and his parents sought theinvalidation of the ranking of honor students. They filed a CERTIORARI case againstthe principal and teachers who composed the committee on rating honors.

They contend that the committee acted with grave abuse of official discretionbecause they claim that:

o The 1st and 2nd placers had never been a close rival of Santiago before,except in Grade 5 only.

o That Santiago was a consistent honor student from Grade 1 to 5o that the 1st placer was coached and tutored by grade 6 teachers during the

summer (gaining unfair advantage)o The committee was composed only of Grade 6 teachers.o That some teachers gave Santos a 75% with an intention to pull him to a

much lower ranko That in the Honors Certificate in Grade 1, the word first place was erased

and replaced with second placeo That the Principal and district supervisors merely passed the buck to each

other to delay his grievances.

The respondents filed a MTD claiming that the action was improper, and thateven assuming it was proper, the question has become academic (because thegraduation already proceeded).

Respondents also argue that there was no GADALEJ on the part of the teacherssince the Committee on Ratings is not a tribunal, nor board, exercising judicialfunctions. (under Rule 65, certiorari is a remedy against judicial functions)

ISSUE:

May judicial function be exercised in this case? What is judicial power?

HELD:

A judicial function is an act performed by virtue of judicial powers. The exerciseof judicial function is the doing of something in the nature of the action of the court. Inorder for an action for certiorari to exist,

(TEST TO DETERMINE WHETHER A TRIBUNAL OR BOARD EXERCISES JUDICIALFUNCTIONS)


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1) There must be specific controversy involving rights of persons brought before atribunal for hearing and determination. , and2) That the tribunal must have the power and authority to pronounce judgment andrender a decision.3) The tribunal must pertain to that branch of the sovereign which belongs to the

judiciary (or at least the not the legislative nor the executive)

It maybe said that the exercise of judicial function is to determine what the law is,and what the legal rights of parties are, with respect to a matter in controversy.The phrase judicial power is defined:

As authority to determine the rights of persons or property. Authority vested in some court, officer or persons to hear and determine when

the rights of persons or property or the propriety of doing an act is the subjectmatter of adjudication.

The power exercised by courts in hearing and determining cases before them.

The construction of laws and the adjudication of legal rights.

The so-called Committee for Rating Honor Students is neither judicial nor quasi-judicial bodies in the performance of its assigned task. It is necessary that there be aLAW that gives rise to some specific rights of persons or property under which adverseclaims to such rights are made, and the controversy ensuring therefrom is brought inturn, to the tribunal or board clothed with power and authority to determine what that lawis and thereupon adjudicate the respective rights of contending parties.

There is nothing about any rule of law that provides for when teachers sit down toassess individual merits of their pupils for purposes of rating them for honors. Worse

still, the petitioners have not presented the pertinent provisions of the Service Manualfor Teachers which was allegedly violated by the Committee.

The judiciary has no power to reverse the award of the board of judges. And for thatmatter, it would not interfere in literary contests, beauty contests, and similarcompetitions.


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2. NOBLEJAS VS. TEEHANKEE23 SCRA 405

FACTS:

Noblejas was the commissioner of land registration. Under RA 1151, he is entitled tothe same compensation, emoluments, and privileges as those of a Judge of CFI. Heapproved a subdivision plan covering certain areas that are in excess of those coveredby the title.

The Secretary of Justice, Teehankee, sent a letter to Noblejas, requiring him toexplain. Noblejas answered, arguing that since he has a rank equivalent to that of aJudge, he could only be suspended and investigated in the same manner as anordinary Judge, under the Judiciary Act. He claims that he may be investigated only bythe Supreme Court

Nevertheless, he was suspended by the Executive Secretary (ES)

Noblejas filed this case claiming the lack of jurisdiction of the ES and his abuse ofdiscretion.

ISSUE:

Whether the Commissioner of Land Registration may only be investigated by theSupreme Court (in view of his having a rank equivalent to a judge)?

HELD:

NO.If the law had really intended to include the general grant of rank andprivileges equivalent to Judges, the right to be investigated and be suspended orremoved only by the Supreme Court, then such grant of privileges would beunconstitutional, since it would violate the doctrine of separation of powers because itwould charge the Supreme Court with an administrative function of supervisory controlover executive officials, simultaneously reducing pro tanto, the control of the ChiefExecutive over such officials.

There is no inherent power in the Executive or Legislative to charge the Judiciarywith administrative functions except when reasonable incidental to the fulfillment of

judicial duties.

The judiciary cannot give decisions which are merely advisory, nor can itexercise or participate in the exercise of functions which are essentially legislative oradministrative. The Supreme Court and its members should not and cannot be required


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to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to orconnected with the administration of judicial functions.

As such, RA 1151 while conferring the same privileges as those of a judge, didnot include and was not intended to include, the right to demand investigation by the

Supreme Court, and to be suspended or removed only upon the Courtsrecommendation. Said rights would be violative of the Constitution.

The suspension of Noblejas by the ES valid.

Also, the resolution of the consulta by a Register of Deeds is NOT a judicialfunction, but an administrative process. It is conclusive and binding only upon theRegister of Deeds, NOT the parties themselves. Even if the resolution is appealable, itdoes not automatically mean that they are judicial in character. Still, the resolution of theconsultas are but a minimal portion of the administrative or executive functions.


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4. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS VS. ANG CHO KIO33 SCRA 494

FACTS:

Ang was convicted and was granted conditional pardon. He was never to returnto the Philippines. In violation of his pardon, he returned. He was recommitted by orderof the Executive Secretary.

He filed a petition for habeas corpus. RTC denied. CA also denied it. But the CAmade a recommendation that Ang may be allowed to leave the country on the firstavailable transportation abroad.

The Solgen assailed this CA decision, claiming that the recommendation by theCA should not be part of the decision, because it gives the decision a politicalcomplexion, because courts are not empowered to make such recommendation, nor is

it inherent or incidental in the exercise of judicial powers. The Solgen contends thatallowing convicted aliens to leave the country is an act of the state exercises solely inthe discretion of the Chief Executive. It is urged that the act of sending an undesirablealien out of the country is political in character, and the courts should not interfere with,nor attempt to influence, the political acts of the President.

ISSUE:

Whether the CA decision was proper? Can it make recommendations?

HELD:

NO.The case in the CA was for habeas corpus. The only issue there waswhether the RTC correctly denied the petition. The CA was not called upon the reviewany sentence imposed upon Ang. The sentence against him had long become final andin fact, he was pardoned. The opinion should have been limited to the affirmance of thedecision of the RTC, and no more.

The recommendatory powers of the courts are limited to those expresslyprovided in the law, such as Art 5 RPC. (When an act is not punishable by law judgeshould report it to the executive).

The CA was simply called to determine whether Ang was illegally confined or notunder the Director of Prisons (for violating the pardon). It was improper for the CA

justices to make a recommendation that would suggest a modification or correction ofthe act of the President. The matter of whether an alien who violated the law mayremain or be deported is a political question that should be left entirely to the President,under the principle of separation of powers. It is not within the province of the judiciaryto express an opinion, or a suggestion that would reflect on the wisdom or propriety ofan action by the President, which are purely political in nature.


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5. In re LAURETA148 SCRA 382

FACTS:

MaravillaIllustre wrote to the justices of the SC, complaining about the dismissalof the her case (a land dispute involving large estate) by a minute-resolution. Illustreclaims that it was an unjust resolution deliberately and knowingly promulgated by the 1stDivision, that it was railroaded with such hurry beyond the limits of legal and judicialethics.

Illustre also threatened in her letter that, there is nothing final in this world. Thiscase is far from finished by a long shot. She threatened that she would call for a pressconference.

Illustres letter basically attacks the participation of Justice Pedro Yap in the first

division. It was established that Justice Yap was previously a law partner of Atty.Ordonez, now the Solgen and counsel for the opponents.

The letters were referred to the SC en banc. The SC clarified that when theminute-resolution was issued, the presiding justice then was not Justice Yap but Justice

Abad Santos (who was about to retire), and that Justice Yap was not aware that AttyOrdonez was the opponents counsel. It was also made clear that Justice Yap eventuallyinhibited himself from the case.

Still, Illustre wrote letters to the other justices (Narvasa, Herrera, Cruz), againwith more threats to expose the kind of judicial performance readily constitutingtravesty of justice.

True to her threats, Illustre later filed a criminal complaint before theTanodbayan, charging the Justices with knowingly rendering an unjust MinuteResolution. Justice Yap and Solgen Ordonez were also charged of using their influencein the First Division in rendering said Minute Resolution.

Atty. LAURETA was the counsel of Illustre. He circulate copies of the complaintto the press, without any copy furnished the Court, nor the Justices charged. It wasmade to appear that the Justices were charged with graft and corruption.

The Tanodbayan dismissed the complaint.

Now, the SC is charging them with contempt.

They claim that the letters were private communication, and that they did notintend to dishonor the court.


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HELD:

The letters formed part of the judicial record and are a matter of concern for theentire court.

There is no vindictive reprisal involved here. The Courts authority and duty underthe premises is unmistakable. It must act to preserve its honor and dignity from thescurrilous attacks of an irate lawyer, mouthed by his client, and to safeguard the moralsand ethics of the legal profession.

Werenot convinced that AttyLaureta had nothing to do with Ilustres letters, norwith the complaint filed with the tanodbayan. AttyLaureta repeated disparaging remarkssuch as undue influence, powerful influence in his pleadings. This was bolstered bythe report that Laureta distributed copies of the complaint to the newspaper companiesin envelopes bearing his name. He was also heard over the radio. Lastly, as Illustreslawyer, he had control of the proceedings.

In short, SC resolutions are beyond investigation from other departments of thegovernment because of separation of powers. The correctness of the SC decisions areconclusive upon other branches of government.


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6. MARCOS vs. MANGLAPUS177 SCRA 668 (1989)

FACTS:

Ferdinand E. Marcos who was deposed from his seat through the EDSA peoplepower revolution was forced into exile in 1986 and Corazon C. Aquino was declaredPresident of the Republic under a revolutionary government. When Marcos was dying,he wished to return to the country along with his family but Pres. Aquino stood in hisway and contended that Marcos cannot return to the country considering that his returnwould be a threat to the stability of the government and the countrys economy.

The Marcoses assert that their right to return to the country is guaranteed by theBill of Rights of the 1987 Constitution and that under international law, the right of

Marcos and his family to return to the Philippines is guaranteed by the UniversalDeclaration of Human Rights.

ISSUE:

Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the constitution, thePresident (Aquino) may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.

HELD:

The Supreme Court held that the president, as part of her residual power, canban the return of Marcos and his family to the country considering the consequenceswhich could pose a serious threat to national interest and welfare of the country. TheUniversal Declaration of Humans Rights and the International Covenant on Civil andPolitical Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of astate, the right to leave a country, and the right to enter one's country as separate anddistinct rights.

The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine andbroadens the scope of judicial inquiry into areas which the Court, under previousconstitutions, would have normally left to the political departments to decide. But

nonetheless there remain issues beyond the Court's jurisdiction the determination ofwhich is exclusively for the President, for Congress or for the people themselvesthrough a plebiscite or referendum. We cannot, for example, question the President'srecognition of a foreign government, no matter how premature or improvident suchaction may appear. We cannot set aside a presidential pardon though it may appear tous that the beneficiary is totally undeserving of the grant. Nor can we amend theConstitution under the guise of resolving a dispute brought before us because thepower is reserved to the people.


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7. UNITED STATES vs. Nixon418 U.S. 683 (1974)

FACTS:

A subpoena was issued was issued to the President Richard Nixon of the UnitedStates. The subpoena directed the President to produce certain tape recordings anddocument relating to his conversation with aides and advisers. The court rejected thePresidents claim of absolute executive privilege.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the President can use executive privilege as an excuse towithhold evidence that is demonstrably relevant in a criminal trial?

HELD:

The Supreme Court does have the final voice in determining constitutionalquestions: no persons, not even the president of the United States, is completely abovethe law; and the President cannot use executive as an excuse to withhold evidence thatis demonstrably relevant in a criminal trial.

In the Philippines, Judicial power is also vested in one Supreme Court and it is itsduty to settle controversies such as presented in the case.


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8. ESTRADA VS. DESIERTO

FACTS:

This is a petition to question the legitimacy of the assumption as President of thePhilippines by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo.

Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada alleges that he is the President on leave whilerespondent Gloria Macapagal Arroyo claims she is the President.

At about 12:00 noon of January 20, 2001, Chief justice Davide administered theoath to respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. At 2:30 pm, petitioner and hisfamily hurriedly left Malacanang Palace. He issued the following press statement:

STATEMENT FROM PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA

At twelve oclock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took heroath as President of the Republic of the Philippines. While along with many other legalminds of our country, I have strong and serious doubts about the legality andconstitutionality of her proclamation as President, I do not wish to be a factor that willprevent the restoration of unity and order in our civil society.

It is for this reason that I now leave Malacaang Palace, the seat of thepresidency of this country, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healingprocess of our nation. I leave the Palace of our people with gratitude for theopportunities given to me for service to our people. I will not shirk from any futurechallenges that may come ahead in the same service of our country.

I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in the promotion of aconstructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.

May the Almighty bless our country and beloved people.

MABUHAY!

ISSUE:

Whether or not the assumption of the Vice President on July 20, 2001 wasconstitutional?

HELD:

Yes, In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation ofthe President, the Vice-President shall become the President to serve the unexpiredterm. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of the


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President and Vice President, the President of the Senate, or, in case of his inability, theSpeaker of the House of Representatives, shall then act as President until the Presidentor Vice-President shall have been elected and qualified.


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9. ARROYO VS. DE VENECIA277 SCRA 268 (1997)

FACTS:

A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certainprovisions of the National Internal Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are members of theHouse of Representatives, charged that there is violation of the rules of the Housewhich petitioners claim are constitutionally-mandated so that their violation istantamount to a violation of the Constitution.

The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it withcertain amendments. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile thedisagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill. The bicameralcommittee submitted its report to the House. During the interpellations, Rep. Arroyomade an interruption and moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. But after a roll call, the

Chair declared the presence of a quorum. The interpellation then proceeded. After Rep.Arroyos interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report, Majority Leader Albanomoved for the approval and ratification of the conference committee report. The Chaircalled out for objections to the motion. Then the Chair declared: There being none,approved. At the same time the Chair was saying this, Rep. Arroyo was asking, Whatis thatMr. Speaker? The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus,although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leaders motion, theapproval of the conference committee report had by then already been declared by theChair.

On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House ofRepresentatives and the President of the Senate and certified by the respectivesecretaries of both Houses of Congress. The enrolled bill was signed into law byPresident Ramos.

ISSUE:

Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of therules of the House.

HELD:

Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They aresubject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting themas they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with theirobservance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.


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Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect ofnullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members has agreed to a particularmeasure. But this is subject to qualification. Where the construction to be given to a ruleaffects person other than members of the legislative body, the question presented isnecessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to question in a case where

private rights are involved.

In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of amember who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute tothe Court.

The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the Housewith which the Court should not be concerned. The claim is not that there was noquorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning thepresence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyos earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum hadalready been defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The

question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the quorum isobviously present for the purpose of delaying the business of the House.


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Held:

The Court has explained that COMELEC flagrantly violated the public policy onpublic biddings (1) by allowing MPC/MPEI to participate in the bidding even though itwas not qualified to do so; and (2) by eventually awarding the contract to MPC/MPEI. It

is clear that the Commission further desecrated the law on public bidding by permittingthe winning bidder to alter the subject of the contract, in effect allowing a substantiveamendment without public bidding.


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11. Mattel, Inc. v Emma FranciscoG.R. No. 166886 July 30, 2008

FACTS:

Jimmy A. Uy (Uy) filed a trademark application with the Bureau of Patents,Trademarksand Technology Transfer (BPTTT) for registration of the trademark"BARBIE" for useon confectionary products, such as milk, chocolate, candies, milkbarand chocolate candies Mattel, Inc. (Mattel), filed a Notice of Opposition against Uy's"Barbie" trademark as thelatter was confusingly similar to its trademark on dolls, dollclothes and doll accessories, toys and other similar commercial products.

Public respondent Estrellita B. Abelardo, the Director of the Bureau of LegalAffairs, IPO, rendered a Decision dismissing Mattel's opposition and giving due courseto Uys application for the registration of the trademark "Barbie" used on confectionaryproducts. The Director held that there was no confusing similarity between the two

competing marks because the goods were non-competing or unrelated.

Mattel filed MR which was denied then it appealed the decision with theDirector General.

Public respondent Emma C. Francisco, the Director General, rendered aDecision denying the appeal on the ground that there was no proof on record that Mattelhad ventured into the production of chocolates and confectionary products under thetrademark "Barbie" to enable it to prevent Uy from using an identical "Barbie"trademark on said goods; that the records were bereft of the fact that the Director of theBureau of Trademarks (BOT) had already declared the subject trademark applicationabandoned due to the non-filing of the Declaration of Actual Use (DAU) by Uy.

ISSUE:

Whether the application is deemed withdrawn or abandoned for failure to file the DAU.

HELD:

Uy's declaration in his Comment and Memorandum before this Court that he hasnot filed the DAU as mandated by pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 8293 is a

judicia l admiss ion that hehas effectively abandoned or withdrawn any right orinterest in his trademark. Section 124.2 of R.A. No. 8293 provides: The applicant or theregistrant shall file a declaration of actual use of the mark with evidence to that effect ,as prescribed by the Regulations within three (3) years from the fil ing date ofthe application.

Otherwise, the applicant shall be refused or the marks shall be removed from theRegister by the Director. Moreover, Rule 204 of the Rules and Regulations on Trademarksprovides: Declaration of Actual Use. The Office will not require any proof of


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use in commerce in the processing of trademark applications. However, without needof any notice from the Office, all applicants or registrants shall file a declaration ofactual use of the mark with evidence to that effect within three years, withoutpossibility of extension, from the filing date of the application.


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rule on the JTV votes.As applied to a judicial proceeding, however, it may be laiddown with certainty that the requirement of due process is satisfied if the followingconditions are present, namely; (1) there must be a court or tribunal clothed with judicialpower to hear and determine the matter before it;(2) jurisdiction must be lawfullyacquired over the person of the defendant or over the property which is the subject of

the proceeding; (3) the defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard; and (4)judgment must be rendered upon the lawful hearing. The essence of due process is thereasonable opportunity to be heard and submit evidence in support of ones defense. Tobe heard does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one maybe heard also throughpleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings,is accorded, there is no denial of due process


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13. VINUYA VS. SEC. ROMULOG.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010

FACTS:

This is an original Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court withan application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against theOffice of the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of the DFA, the Secretary of the DOJ,and the OSG.

Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock, non-profitorganization registered with the SEC, established for the purpose of providing aid to thevictims of rape by Japanese military forces in the Philippines during the Second WorldWar.

Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the Executive

Department through the DOJ, DFA, and OSG, requesting assistance in filing a claimagainst the Japanese officials and military officers who ordered the establishment of thecomfort women stations in the Philippines. But officials of the Executive Departmentdeclined to assist the petitioners, and took the position that the individual claims of thecomfort women for compensation had already been fully satisfied by Japanscompliance with the Peace Treaty between the Philippines and Japan.

Hence, this petition where petitioners pray for this court to (a) declare thatrespondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess ofdiscretion in refusing to espouse their claims for the crimes against humanity and warcrimes committed against them; and (b) compel the respondents to espouse their

claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan before theInternational Court of Justice (ICJ) and other international tribunals.

Respondents maintain that all claims of the Philippines and its nationals relativeto the war were dealt with in the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 and the bilateralReparations Agreement of 1956.

On January 15, 1997, the Asian Womens Fund and the Philippine governmentsigned a Memorandum of Understanding for medical and welfare support programs forformer comfort women. Over the next five years, these were implemented by theDepartment of Social Welfare and Development.

ISSUE:

WON the Executive Department committed grave abuse of discretion in notespousing petitioners claims for official apology and other forms of reparations againstJapan.


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both the interests of the petitioners and those of the Republic, and decide on that basisif apologies are sufficient, and whether further steps are appropriate or necessary.

In the international sphere, traditionally, the only means available for individualsto bring a claim within the international legal system has been when the individual is

able to persuade a government to bring a claim on the individuals behalf. By taking upthe case of one of its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or internationaljudicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own right to ensure,in the person of its subjects, respect for the rules of international law.

Within the limits prescribed by international law, a State may exercise diplomaticprotection by whatever means and to whatever extent it thinks fit, for it is its own rightthat the State is asserting. Should the natural or legal person on whose behalf it isacting consider that their rights are not adequately protected, they have no remedy ininternational law. All they can do is resort to national law, if means are available, with aview to furthering their cause or obtaining redress. All these questions remain within the

province of municipal law and do not affect the position internationally.

Even the invocation of jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations will notalter this analysis. Petitioners have not shown that the crimes committed by theJapanese army violated jus cogens prohibitions at the time the Treaty of Peace wassigned, or that the duty to prosecute perpetrators of international crimes is an ergaomnes obligation or has attained the status of jus cogens.

The term erga omnes (Latin: in relation to everyone) in international law hasbeen used as a legal term describing obligations owed by States towards thecommunity of states as a whole. Essential distinction should be drawn between the

obligations of a State towards the international community as a whole, and those arisingvis--vis another State in the field of diplomatic protection. By their very nature, theformer are the concern of all States. In view of the importance of the rights involved, allStates can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations ergaomnes.

The term jus cogens (literally, compelling law) refers to norms that commandperemptory authority, superseding conflicting treaties and custom. Jus cogens normsare considered peremptory in the sense that they are mandatory, do not admitderogation, and can be modified only by general international norms of equivalentauthority


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14. Garcia vs. Board of Investments (BOI)191 SCRA 288 , November 1990

FACTS:

Former Bataan Petrochemical Corporation (BPC), now Luzon PetrochemicalCorporation, formed by a group of Taiwanese investors, was granted by the BOI itshave its plant site for the products naphta cracker and naphta to based in Bataan. InFebruary 1989, one year after the BPC began its production in Bataan, the corporationapplied to the BOI to have its plant site transferred from Bataan to Batangas. Despitevigorous opposition from petitioner Cong. Enrique Garcia and others, the BOI grantedprivate respondent BPCs application, stating that the investors have the final choice asto where to have their plant site because they are the ones who risk capital for theproject.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the BOI committed a grave abuse of discretion in yielding to theapplication of the investors without considering the national interest

RULING:

The Supreme Court found the BOI to have committed grave abuse of discretionin this case, and ordered the original application of the BPC to have its plant site inBataan and the product naphta as feedstock maintained.

The ponente, Justice Gutierrez, Jr., first stated the Courts judicial power to settleactual controversies as provided for by Section 1 of Article VIII in our 1987 Constitutionbefore he wrote the reasons as to how the Court arrived to its conclusion. He mentionedthat nothing is shown to justify the BOIs action in letting the investors decide on anissue which, if handled by our own government, could have been very beneficial to theState, as he remembered the word of a great Filipino leader, to wit: .. he would notmind having a government run like hell by Filipinos than one subservient to foreigndictation.

Justice Grio Aquino, in her dissenting opinion, argued that the petition was notwell-taken because the 1987 Investment Code does not prohibit the registration of acertain project, as well as any decision of the BOI regarding the amended application.She stated that the fact that petitioner disagrees with BOI does not make the BOI wrongin its decision, and that petitioner should have appealed to the President of the countryand not to the Court, as provided for by Section 36 of the 1987 Investment Code.

Justice Melencio-Herrera, in another dissenting opinion, stated that the


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Constitution does not vest in the Court the power to enter the realm of policyconsiderations, such as in this case.


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15. ECHEGARAY VS. SECRETARYG.R. No. 132601 October 12, 1998

FACTS:

The SC affirmed the conviction of petitioner Leo Echegaray y Pilo for the crime ofrape of the 10 year-old daughter of his common-law spouse and the imposition uponhim of the death penalty for the said crime.

He filed an MFR and a supplemental MFR raising for the first time the issue ofthe constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7659 and the death penalty for rape. The Courtdenied both motions.

In the meantime, Congress had seen it fit to change the mode of execution of thedeath penalty from electrocution to lethal injection, and passed Republic Act No. 8177,

AN ACT DESIGNATING DEATH BY LETHAL INJECTION AS THE METHOD OFCARRYING OUT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSEARTICLE 81 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE, AS AMENDED BY SECTION 24 OFREPUBLIC ACT NO. 7659.

The convict filed a Petition for prohibition from carrying out the lethal injectionagainst him under the grounds that it constituted cruel, degrading, or unusualpunishment, being violative of due process, a violation of the Philippines' obligationsunder international covenants, an undue delegation of legislative power by Congress,an unlawful exercise by respondent Secretary of the power to legislate, and an unlawfuldelegation of delegated powers by the Secretary of Justice to respondent Director.

In his motion to amend, the petitioner added equal protection as a ground.

The Office of the Solicitor General stated that this Court has already upheld theconstitutionality of the Death Penalty Law, and has repeatedly declared that the deathpenalty is not cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment; execution by lethalinjection, as authorized under R.A. No. 8177 and the questioned rules, is constitutional,lethal injection being the most modern, more humane, more economical, safer andeasier to apply (than electrocution or the gas chamber); the International Covenant onCivil and Political Rights does not expressly or impliedly prohibit the imposition of thedeath penalty; R.A. No. 8177 properly delegated legislative power to respondentDirector; and that R.A. No. 8177 confers the power to promulgate the implementingrules to the Secretary of Justice, Secretary of Health and the Bureau of Corrections.The Commission on Human Rights filed a Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and/or

Appear as Amicus Curiae with the attached Petition to Intervene and/or Appear asAmicus Curiae. They alleged similarly with Echegarays arguments.

The petitioner filed a reply similar to his first arguments. The court gave duecourse to the petition.


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Concisely put, petitioner argues that R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules donot pass constitutional muster for: (a) violation of the constitutional proscription againstcruel, degrading or inhuman punishment, (b) violation of our international treatyobligations, (c) being an undue delegation of legislative power, and (d) beingdiscriminatory.

ISSUE:

1. Is it a violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading orinhuman punishment?

2. Is it a violation of our international treaty obligations?

3. 3. Is it an undue delegation of legislative power?

4. 4. Is it discriminatory and contrary to law?

HELD:

No 1st three issues. Yes to last. Petition denied.

Ratio:

1. Petitioner contends that death by lethal injection constitutes cruel, degrading andinhuman punishment considering that (1) R.A. No. 8177 fails to provide for the drugs tobe used in carrying out lethal injection, the dosage for each drug to be administered,and the procedure in administering said drug/s into the accused; (2) R.A. No. 8177 andits implementing rules are uncertain as to the date of the execution, time of notification,the court which will fix the date of execution, which uncertainties cause the greatest painand suffering for the convict; and (3) the possibility of "botched executions" or mistakesin administering the drugs renders lethal injection inherently cruel.

Now it is well-settled in jurisprudence that the death penalty per se is not a cruel,degrading or inhuman punishment.

Harden v. Director of Prisons- "punishments are cruel when they involve torture or alingering death; but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of thatword as used in the constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barbarous,something more than the mere extinguishment of life." Would the lack in particularitythen as to the details involved in the execution by lethal injection render said law "cruel,degrading or inhuman"? The Court believes not. For reasons discussed, theimplementing details of R.A. No. 8177 are matters which are properly left to thecompetence and expertise of administrative officials.Petitioner contends that Sec. 16 of R.A. No. 8177 is uncertain as to which "court" will fixthe time and date of execution, and the date of execution and time of notification of the


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death convict. As petitioner already knows, the "court" which designates the date ofexecution is the trial court which convicted the accused. The procedure is that the"judgment is entered fifteen (15) days after its promulgation, and 10 days thereafter, therecords are remanded to the court below including a certified copy of the judgment forexecution. Neither is there any uncertainty as to the date of execution nor the time of

notification. As to the date of execution, Section 15 of the implementing rules must beread in conjunction with the last sentence of Section 1 of R.A. No. 8177 which providesthat the death sentence shall be carried out "not earlier than one (1) year nor later theneighteen (18) months from the time the judgment imposing the death penalty becamefinal and executory, without prejudice to the exercise by the President of his executiveclemency powers at all times." Hence, the death convict is in effect assured of eighteen(18) months from the time the judgment imposing the death penalty became final andexecutor wherein he can seek executive clemency and attend to all his temporal andspiritual affairs.

Petitioner further contends that the infliction of "wanton pain" in case of possible

complications in the intravenous injection that respondent Director is an untrained anduntested person insofar as the choice and administration of lethal injection isconcerned, renders lethal injection a cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment. This isunsubstantiated.

First. Petitioner has neither alleged nor presented evidence that lethal injection requiredthe expertise only of phlebotomists and not trained personnel and that the drugs to beadministered are unsafe or ineffective. Petitioner simply cites situations in the UnitedStates wherein execution by lethal injection allegedly resulted in prolonged andagonizing death for the convict, without any other evidence whatsoever.Second. Petitioner overlooked Section 1, third paragraph of R.A. No. 8177 whichrequires that all personnel involved in the execution proceedings should be trained priorto the performance of such task. We must presume that the public officials entrustedwith the implementation of the death penalty will carefully avoid inflicting cruelpunishment.

Third. Any infliction of pain in lethal injection is merely incidental in carrying out theexecution of death penalty and does not fall within the constitutional proscription againstcruel, degrading and inhuman punishment. "In a limited sense, anything is cruel whichis calculated to give pain or distress, and since punishment imports pain or suffering tothe convict, it may be said that all punishments are cruel. But of course the Constitutiondoes not mean that crime, for this reason, is to go unpunished." The cruelty againstwhich the Constitution protects a convicted man is cruelty inherent in the method ofpunishment, not the necessary suffering involved in any method employed to extinguishlife humanely.

What is cruel and unusual "is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning aspublic opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice" and "must draw its meaningfrom the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."2. International Covenant on Civil And Political Rights states:


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2. In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may beimposed only for the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at the timeof the commission of the crime and not contrary to the provisions of the presentCovenant and to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime ofGenocide. This penalty can only be carried out pursuant to a final judgment rendered

by a competent court."

The punishment was subject to the limitation that it be imposed for the "most seriouscrimes".

Included with the declaration was the Second Optional Protocol to the InternationalCovenant on Civil and Political Rights, Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty wasadopted by the General Assembly on December 15, 1989. The Philippines neithersigned nor ratified said document.

3. R.A. No. 8177 likewise provides the standards which define the legislative policy,

mark its limits, map out its boundaries, and specify the public agencies which will applyit. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative purpose may be carriedout. R.A. No. 8177 specifically requires that "the death sentence shall be executedunder the authority of the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, endeavoring so far aspossible to mitigate the sufferings of the person under the sentence during the lethalinjection as well as during the proceedings prior to the execution." Further, "the Directorof the Bureau of Corrections shall take steps to ensure that the lethal injection to beadministered is sufficient to cause the instantaneous death of the convict." Thelegislature also mandated that "all personnel involved in the administration of lethalinjection shall be trained prior to the performance of such task." The Court cannot seethat any useful purpose would be served by requiring greater detail. The question raisedis not the definition of what constitutes a criminal offense, but the mode of carrying outthe penalty already imposed by the Courts. In this sense, R.A. No. 8177 is sufficientlydefinite and the exercise of discretion by the administrative officials concerned is,canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing.

However, the Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 suffer seriousflaws that could not be overlooked. To begin with, something basic appears missing inSection 19 of the implementing rules which provides a manual for the executionprocedure. It was supposed to be confidential.

The Court finds in the first paragraph of Section 19 of the implementing rules avacuum. The Secretary of Justice has practically abdicated the power to promulgatethe manual on the execution procedure to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, bynot providing for a mode of review and approval. Being a mere constituent unit of theDepartment of Justice, the Bureau of Corrections could not promulgate a manual thatwould not bear the imprimatur of the administrative superior, the Secretary of Justice asthe rule-making authority under R.A. No. 8177. Such apparent abdication ofdepartmental responsibility renders the said paragraph invalid.


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4. Petitioner contends that Section 17 of the Implementing Rules is unconstitutional forbeing discriminatory as well as for being an invalid exercise of the power to legislate byrespondent Secretary. Petitioner insists that Section 17 amends the instances whenlethal injection may be suspended, without an express amendment of Article 83 of theRevised Penal Code, as amended by section 25 of R.A. No. 7659.

"SEC. 17. SUSPENSION OF THE EXECUTION OF THE DEATH SENTENCE.Execution by lethal injection shall not be inflicted upon a woman within the three yearsnext following the date of the sentence or while she is pregnant, nor upon any personover seventy (70) years of age. In this latter case, the death penalty shall be commutedto the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties provided in Article 40of the Revised Penal Code."

Petitioner contends that Section 17 is unconstitutional for being discriminatory as wellas for being an invalid exercise of the power to legislate by respondent Secretary.Petitioner insists that Section 17 amends the instances when lethal injection may be

suspended, without an express amendment of Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, asamended by section 25 of R.A. No. 7659, stating that the death sentence shall not beinflicted upon a woman while she is pregnant or within one (1) year after delivery, norupon any person over seventy years of age.

While Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of Republic ActNo. 7659, suspends the implementation of the death penalty while a woman is pregnantor within one (1) year after delivery, Section 17 of the implementing rules omits the one(1) year period following delivery as an instance when the death sentence issuspended, and adds a ground for suspension of sentence no longer found under

Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code as amended, which is the three-year reprieve aftera woman is sentenced. This addition is, in petitioner's view, tantamount to a gender-based discrimination sans statutory basis, while the omission is an impermissiblecontravention of the applicable law.

Being merely an implementing rule, Section 17 aforecited must not override, but insteadremain consistent and in harmony with the law it seeks to apply and implement.


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17. LIBAN VS. GORDON639 SCRA 709

FACTS:

Petitioners are officers of the Board of Directors of the QC Red Cross Chapterwhile Respondent is the Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Boardof Governors. Petitioners allege that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Boardof Governors, respondent has ceased to be a member of the Senate.

The PNRC Chairman is elected by the PNRC Board of Governors; he is notappointed by the President or by any subordinate government official. Moreover, thePNRC is NOT a GOCC because it is a privately-owned, privately-funded, and privately-run charitable organization and because it is controlled by a Board of Governors four-fifths of which are private sector individuals. Therefore, respondent Gordon did not

forfeit his legislative seat when he was elected as PNRC Chairman during hisincumbency as Senator.

The Court however held further that the PNRC Charter, R.A. 95, is void insofar

as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation.

ISSUE:

Was it correct for the Court to have passed upon and decided on the issue of the

constitutionality of the PNRC charter? Corollarily: What is the nature of the PNRC?

HELD:

[The Court GRANTED reconsideration and MODIFIED the dispositive portion of the

Decision by deleting the second sentence thereof.]

NO, it was not correct for the Court to have decided on the constitutional issue

because it was not the very lis mota (cause of action) of the case. The PNRC is sui

generis in nature; it is neither strictly a GOCC nor a private corporation .

The issue of constitutionality of R.A. No. 95 was not raised by the parties, andwas not among the issues defined in the body of the Decision; thus, it was not the verylis mota of the case.


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18. BAYAN MUNA VS. ROMULO641 SCRA 244

FACTS:

Petitioner Bayan Muna is a duly registered party-list group established torepresent the marginalized sectors of society. Respondent Blas F. Ople, now deceased,was the Secretary of Foreign Affairs during the period material to this case. Respondent

Alberto Romulo was impleaded in his capacity as then Executive Secretary.

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Having a key determinativebearing on this case is the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court(ICC) with the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimesof international concern and shall be complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions

The serious crimes adverted to cover those considered grave under international

law, such as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of aggression.On December 28, 2000, the RP, through Charge d Affaires Enrique A. Manalo, signedthe Rome Statute which, by its terms ,is subject to ratification, acceptance or approvalby the signatory states. As of the filing of the instant petition, only 92 out of the 139signatory countries appear to have completed the ratification, approval and concurrenceprocess. The Philippines is not among the 92.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner has locus standi.

HELD:

Petitioner, through its three party-list representatives, contends that the issue ofthe validity or invalidity of the Agreement carries with it constitutional significance and isof paramount importance that justifies its standing. Cited in this regard is what is usuallyreferred to as the emergency powers cases, in which ordinary citizens and taxpayerswere accorded the personality to question the constitutionality of executive issuances.

Locus standi is "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question."Specifically, it is "a partys personal and substantial interest in a case where he hassustained or will sustain direct injury as a result" of the act being challenged, and "callsfor more than just a generalized grievance."

Locus standi, however, is merely a matter of procedure and it has beenrecognized that, in some cases, suits are not brought by parties who have beenpersonally injured by the operation of a law or any other government act, but byconcerned citizens, taxpayers, or voters who actually sue in the public interest.


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Consequently, in a catena of cases, this Court has invariably adopted a liberalstance on locus standi.

In the case at bar, petitioners representatives have complied with the qualifyingconditions or specific requirements exacted under the locus standi rule. As citizens,

their interest in the subject matter of the petition is direct and personal. At the very least,their assertions questioning the Agreement are made of a public right, i.e., to ascertainthat the Agreement did not go against established national policies, practices, andobligations bearing on the States obligation to the community of nations.

At any event, the primordial importance to Filipino citizens in general of the issueat hand impels the Court to brush aside the procedural barrier posed by the traditionalrequirement of locus standi. The Court may relax the standing requirements and allow asuit to prosper even where there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right of

judicial review.


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With regard to the petitioners assertion that RA 9522 has converted the internalwaters into archipelagic waters, the Court did not appear to be persuaded. Instead, theCourt suggested that the political branches of Government can pass domestic laws thatwill aid in the competent security measures and policies that will regulate innocentpassage. Since the Court emphasized innocent passage as a right based on customary

law, it also believes that no state can validly invoke sovereignty to deny a rightacknowledged by modern states.

In the case of archipelagic states such as ours, UNCLOS III required theimposition of innocent passage as a concession in lieu of their right to claim the entirewaters landward baseline. It also made it possible for archipelagic states to berecognized as a cohesive entity under the UNCLOS III.

Hacienda Luisita Inc. (HLI) v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC), etal., G.R. No. 171101, November 22, 2011


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20. HACIENDA VS. PARCGR NO. 171101, NOVEMBER 22, 2011

FACTS:

On July 5, 2011, the Supreme Court en banc voted unanimously (11-0) toDISMISS/DENY the petition filed by HLI and AFFIRM with MODIFICATIONS theresolutions of the PARC revoking HLIs Stock Distribution Plan (SDP) and placing thesubject lands in Hacienda Luisita under compulsory coverage of the Comprehensive

Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the government.

The Court however did not order outright land distribution. Voting 6-5, the Courtnoted that there are operative facts that occurred in the interim and which the Courtcannot validly ignore. Thus, the Court declared that the revocation of the SDP must, byapplication of the operative fact principle, give way to the right of the original 6,296

qualified farm workers-beneficiaries (FWBs) to choose whether they want to remain asHLI stockholders or [choose actual land distribution]. It thus ordered the Department ofAgrarian Reform (DAR) to immediately schedule meetings with the said 6,296 FWBsand explain to them the effects, consequences and legal or practical implications of theirchoice, after which the FWBs will be asked to manifest, in secret voting, their choices inthe ballot, signing their signatures or placing their thumbmarks, as the case may be,over their prited names.

The parties thereafter filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the Courtdecision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court can order that DARs compulsory acquisition ofHacienda Lusita cover the full 6,443 hectares allegedly covered by RA 6657 andpreviously held by Tarlac Development Corporation (Tadeco), and not just the 4,915.75hectares covered by HLIs SDP?

Held:

NO, the Court CANNOT order that DARs compulsory acquisition of HaciendaLusita cover the full 6,443 hectares and not just the 4,915.75 hectares covered by HLIsSDP.

[Since what is put in issue before the Court is the propriety of the revocation of the SDP,which only involves 4,915.75 has. of agricultural land and not 6,443 has., then the Courtis constrained to rule only as regards the 4,915.75 has. of agricultural land.Nonetheless, this should not prevent the DAR, under its mandate under the agrarianreform law, from subsequently subjecting to agrarian reform other agricultural lands


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originally held by Tadeco that were allegedly not transferred to HLI but were supposedlycovered by RA 6657.

However since the area to be awarded to each FWB in the July 5, 2011 Decisionappears too restrictive considering that there are roads, irrigation canals, and other

portions of the land that are considered commonly-owned by farmworkers, and thesemay necessarily result in the decrease of the area size that may be awarded per FWBthe Court reconsiders its Decision and resolves to give the DAR leeway in adjusting thearea that may be awarded per FWB in case the number of actual qualified FWBsdecreases. In order to ensure the proper distribution of the agricultural lands ofHacienda Luisita per qualified FWB, and considering that matters involving strictly theadministrative implementation and enforcement of agrarian reform laws are within the

jurisdiction of the DAR, it is the latter which shall determine the area with which eachqualified FWB will be awarded.

On the other hand, the majority likewise reiterated its holding that the 500-

hectare portion of Hacienda Luisita that have been validly converted to industrial useand have been acquired by intervenors Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC)and Luisita Industrial Park Corporation (LIPCO), as well as the separate 80.51-hectareSCTEX lot acquired by the government, should be excluded from the coverage of theassailed PARC resolution. The Court however ordered that the unused balance of theproceeds of the sale of the 500-hectare converted land and of the 80.51-hectare landused for the SCTEX be distributed to the FWBs.


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21. SANA VS. CESBGR No. 192926, November 15, 2011

FACTS:

On 4 August 2010, petitioner Atty. Elias Omar A. Sana (petitioner) filed thepresent petition, contending that EO 883 and the subsequent appointment of the 13executive officials to CESO rank are void for violating the constitutional ban on midnightappointment under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution. Petitioner theorizes thatappointments to positions and ranks in the CES are executive in nature and, if madewithin the period provided under Section 15, Article VII, fall under its prohibition.Petitioner submits that CESB Resolution No. 870 circumvents Section 15, Article VII bydistinguishing the terms appoint and appointment. He contends that CESBResolution No. 870 cannot give new meaning to presidential issuances, laws, and theConstitution.

In its Comment, the CESB prays for the dismissal of the petition as the issue itraises was rendered moot by EO 3s revocation of EO 883. Alternatively, the CESBdefends the vesting of CESO rank to the 13 officials based on an opinion given by Atty.Ferdinand Rafanan (Rafanan), head of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) LawDepartment, that the appointment to a CES[O] rank is not equivalent to an appointmentto an office since the latter entails the conferment of an authority to exercise thefunctions of an office whereas the former is merely a completion of a previousappointment. Rafanan further opined that such vesting of CESO rank is valid becauseit does not contemplate any hiring or appointment since it involves only the confermentof a rank rather than a selection for a position.

The CESB agrees with Rafanans view, invoking Article IV, Part III, paragraph (c)of the Integrated Reorganization Plan (IRP), which states that [a]ppointment toappropriate classes in the Career Executive Service shall be made by the Presidentfrom a list of career executive eligibles recommended by the Board. Such appointmentsshall be made on the basis of rank. Nevertheless, the CESB submits that the grant ofCESO rank III or higher to lawyers in the executive service under EO 883 is notautomatic because this needs prior guidelines from the CESB. The CESB points outthat President Arroyo did not confer CESO rank to any official based on EO 883.

Alternatively, the OSG argues that EO 883 is unconstitutional forbeing violative of Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution. The OSG adds that even ifEO 883 is valid, it does not automatically confer CESO rank to lawyers holding CESpositions.

ISSUE:

Whether or not EO 883 and EO 870 is unconstitutional.


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HELD:

We dismiss the petition on the threshold ground of mootness.

The pet i t ion seeks a review o f the co nst i tut ional i ty of EO 883 and CESB

Resolution No. 870 for being repugnant to Section 15, Article VII of theConst i tut ion. At the t ime this pet i t ion was f i led, however, President Aq uino h ad

already issued EO 3 revok ing EO 883 expr essly (und er Sectio n 1) and CESB

Resolu tion No. 870 imp liedly (under Section 2). EO 883 and CESB Resolu tion No .

870 having c eased to h ave any force and effect , the Court f ind s no reason to

reach the merits of the petition and pass upon these issuances validity. To do sowou ld transgress the requirement of case and co ntroversy as precond i t ion for

the Courts exercise of judicial review. (Art. VIII: Judicial Departmen t S.1)True, this Court h ad relaxed the case and con troversy requirement to resolve

moot issu es. In tho se instances, however, the issues presented were groun ded

on p ecul iar set of facts giv ing r ise to important cons t i tut ional quest ions capable

of repet i t ion yet evading review or ind icat ing intent on the part of p otent ial oractual part ies to place a const i tut ional quest ion b eyond th e ambit of judic ial

review by performing acts render ing moot an incipient or

pend ing ju sticiable con trov ersy. (Art. VIII: Jud icial Department S.1)

These factors do not obtain here. The question whether an appointment to aCESO rank of an executive official amounts to an appointment for purposes of theconstitutional ban on midnight appointment, while potentially recurring, holds nocertainty of evading judicial review as the question can be decided even beyond theappointments-ban period under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution.

Indeed, petitioner does not allege to have suffered any violation of a right vestedin him under EO 883. He was not among the 13 officials granted CESO ranking byPresident Arroyo. The CESB itself stated that no conferment of CESO rank was evermade by President [Arroyo] in relation to EO 883. Hence, for the Court to neverthelessreach the merits of this petition and determine the constitutionality of EO 883 and CESBResolution No. 870 despite their unquestioned repeal and the absence of any resultingprejudice to petitioners rights is to depart from its constitutional role of settling actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable.


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22. Gamboa vs. Teves652 SCRA 690

FACTS:

This is a petition to nullify the sale of shares of stock of PhilippineTelecommunications Investment Corporation (PTIC) by the government of the Republicof the Philippines, acting through the Inter-Agency Privatization Council (IPC), to MetroPacific Assets Holdings, Inc. (MPAH), an affiliate of First Pacific Company Limited (FirstPacific), a Hong Kong-based investment management and holding company and ashareholder of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT).

The petitioner questioned the sale on the ground that it also involved an indirectsale of 12 million shares (or about 6.3 percent of the outstanding common shares) ofPLDT owned by PTIC to First Pacific. With the this sale, First Pacifics common

shareholdings in PLDT increased from 30.7 percent to 37 percent, thereby increasingthe total common shareholdings of foreigners in PLDT to about 81.47%. This, accordingto the petitioner, violates Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution whichlimits foreign ownership of the capital of a public utility to not more than 40%.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners choice of remedy is proper.

HELD:

No. However, since the threshold and purely legal issue on the definition of theterm capital i Sec. 11, Art. XII of the Constitution has far-reaching implications to thenational economy. The courts treats the petition for declaratory relief as one formandamus. It is well-settles that this court may treat a petition for declaratory relief asone for mandamus if the issue involved has far-reaching implications.


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discharge of its functions and the implementation of its decisions in connection with theacquisition, sale or disposition of assets transferred to it.


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24. MALAGA VS. PENACHOS, Jr.213 SCRA (1992)

FACTS:

The Iloilo State College of Fisheries (ISCOF) through its Pre-qualifications, Bidsand Awards Committee (PBAC) caused the publication in the November 25, 26 and 28,1988 issues of the Western Visayas Daily an Invitation to Bid for the construction of aMicro Laboratory Building at ISCOF. The notice announced that the last day for thesubmission of pre-qualification requirements was on December 2, 1988, and that thebids would be received and opened on December 12, 1988 at 3 o'clock in the afternoon.

Petitioners Malaga and Najarro, doing business under the name of BEConstruction and Best Built Construction, respectively, submitted their pre-qualificationdocuments at two o'clock in the afternoon of December 2, 1988. Petitioner Occeanasubmitted his own PRE-C1 on December 5, 1988. All three of them were not allowed to

participate in the bidding as their documents were considered late.

On December 12, 1988, the petitioners filed a complaint with the Iloilo RTCagainst the officers of PBAC for their refusal without just cause to accept them resultingto their non-inclusion in the list of pre-qualified bidders. They sought to the resetting ofthe December 12, 1988 bidding and the acceptance of their documents. They alsoasked that if the bidding had already been conducted, the defendants be directed not toaward the project pending resolution of their complaint.

On the same date, Judg e Lebaquin issued a restraining order proh ibi t ing

PBAC from cond uct ing the bidding and award the project . The defendants f i led a

mo tion to l i f t the restraining o rder on the ground that the court is prohibi ted from

issuing s uch ord er, prel iminary injunct ion and prel iminary mandatory injunct ion

in gov ernment infrastru cture pro ject under Sec. 1 of P.D. 1818. They also

con tended that the prel iminary injunct ion had become moo t and academic as i t

was served after the bidding had been awarded and closed.

On January 2, 1989, the trial court lifted the restraining order and denied thepetition for preliminary injunction. It declared that the building sought to be constructedat the ISCOF was an infrastructure project of the government falling within the coverageof the subject law.

HELD:

It was previously declared the prohibition pertained to the issuance of injunctionsor restraining orders by courts against administrative acts in controversies involvingfacts or the exercise of discretion in technical cases. The Court observed that to allowthe courts to judge these matters would disturb the smooth functioning of theadministrative machinery. On issues definitely outside of this dimension and involving


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questions of law, courts could not be prevented by any law (in this case, P.D. No. 605)from exercising their power to restrain or prohibit administrative acts.


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25. Lupangco vs. CA160 SCRA 848

FACTS:

PRC issued Resolution No. 105 as parts of its "Additional Instructions toExaminees," to all those applying for admission to take the licensure examinations inaccountancy.

Petitioners, all reviewees preparing to take the licensure examinations inaccountancy, filed with the RTC a complaint for injunction with a prayer with theissuance of a writ of a preliminary injunction against respondent PRC to restrain thelatter from enforcing the above-mentioned resolution and to declare the sameunconstitutional.

ISSUE:

Whether or not courts of general jurisdiction have authority over administrativeagencies depend on the statutes governing the subject.

HELD:

Where the statute designates the court having jurisdiction other than courts ofgeneral jurisdiction, then courts of general jurisdiction do not have authority. But wherethere is silence, the general rule applies.


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rooms would permit the court to exercise its functions in a reasonably effective

manner.

In case of conflict to, the court shall overpower the officials as they will be the

ultimate judge in determining what is necessary for its efficiency.

Officials have the power to assign a particular room or court room to the Court of

First Instance and change the assignments provided that the new rooms are

reasonable adequate.

Courts have the power to refuse dispossession of the room if they deem that the

new room would be inadequate in the exercise of their duties.

If board refuses to furnish the articles mentioned by law, then the court would

have the power either to purchase things directly or by proper proceedings to

compel the officials to perform their duties to the law.

Executive does not have power over the purchase of books and other office

equipment needed for the convenient transaction of its business.

Court could not maintain its independence and dignity if it executive could

determine what the courts should have. They are of equal footing when it comes

to the requisition of for fixtures, equipment and supplies.


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27. Bengzon vs. Drilon

208 SCRA 133

FACTS:

The petitioners are retired Justices of the Supreme Court and Court of Appealswho are currently receiving monthly pensions under R.A. No. 910 as amended by R.A.No. 1797. Section 3-A, which authorizes said pensions, of R.A. No. 1797 was repealedby President Marcos. The legislature saw the need to re-enact said R.A.s to restore saidretirement pensions and privilege. President Aquino, however, vetoed House Bill No.16297 as well as portions of Section 1 and the entire Section 4 of the Special Provisionsfor the Supreme Court of the Philippines and the Lower Courts (GAA of FY 1992).

ISSUES:

1. Whether the President may veto certain provisions of the General Appropriations Act.

2. Whether the questioned veto impairs the Fiscal Autonomy guaranteed to the

Judiciary

HELD:

1. The act of the Executive in vetoing the particular provisions is an exercise of a

constitutionally vested power. But even as the Constitution grants the power, it also

provides limitations to its exercise. The Executive must veto a bill in its entirety or not at

all. He or she is, therefore, compelled to approve into law the entire bill, including its

undesirable parts. It is for this reason that the Constitution has wisely provided the item

veto power to avoid inexpedient riders from being attached to an indispensable

appropriation or revenue measure. What was done by the President was the vetoing of

a provision and not an item.

2. Section 3, Article VIII of the Constitution provides for the Fiscal Autonomy of the

Judiciary. The veto of the specific provisions in the GAA is tantamount to dictating to the

Judiciary how its funds should be utilized, which is clearly repugnant to fiscal autonomy.

The freedom of the Chief Justice to make adjustments in the utilization of the funds

appropriated for the expenditures of the judiciary, including the use of any savings from

any particular item to cover deficits or shortages in other items of the judiciary is

withheld. Pursuant to the Constitutional mandate, the Judiciary must enjoy freedom in

law. It knows its priorities just as it is aware of the fiscal restraints. The Chief Justice


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must be given a free hand on how to augment appropriations where augmentation is

needed, which is provided for in Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution.


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28.. FORTICH VS. CORONA312 SCRA 751 (1999)

FACTS:

Concerns the MR of the courts resolution dated November 17, 1998 and motion

to refer the case to the Court en banc. In previous case, the Court voted two-two on the

separate motions for reconsideration, as a result of which the decision was

affirmed. The Court noted in a resolution dated January 27, 1999 that the movants have

no legal personality to seek redress before the Court as their motion to intervene was

already denied and that the motion to refer the case to the Court en banc is akin to

a second MR which is prohibited. In this motion, both respondents and intervene orsprayed that the case be referred to the case in banc inasmuch as their earlier MR was

resolved by a vote of two-two, the required number to carry a decision under the

Constitution (3 votes) was not met.

ISSUE:

Whether or not failure to meet the three votes justifies the referral of the case to

the court en banc

HELD:

No. A careful reading of the constitutional provision reveals the intention of the

framers to draw a distinction between cases, on the one hand, and matters, on the

otherhand, such that cases are decided while matters, which include motions, are

resolved. Otherwise put, the word decided must refer to cases; while the word

resolved must refer tomatters, applying the rule of redden do singula singulis. With

this interpretation, it is clear that only cases are referred to the Court en banc for

decision whenever the required number of votes is not obtained. Conversely, the rule

does not apply where, as in this case, the required three votes is not obtained in the


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resolution of a MR. Hence, the second sentence of the provision speaks only of case

and not matter. The reason is simple. Article VIII, Section 4(3) pertains to the

disposition of cases by a division. If there is a tie in the voting, there is no decision. The

only way to dispose of the case then is to refer it to the Court en banc. On the

other hand, if a case has already been decided by the division and the losing party files

a MR, the failure of the division to resolve the motion because of a tie in the voting does

not leave the case undecided. There is still the decision which must stand in view of

the failure of the members of the division to muster the necessary vote for its

reconsideration. Quite plainly, if the voting results in a tie, the motion for reconsideration

is lost. The assailed decision is not reconsidered and must therefore be deemed

affirmed. Such was the ruling of this Court in the Resolution of November 17, 1998


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29. People Vs. Dy158 SCRA 111

FACTS:

Pat. Padilla reported along with Benny Dy, with caliber .38 as suspect to theshooting incident at "Benny's Bar," at Sitio Angol, Manoc-Manoc Malay, Aklan (Boracay)

situated on the Island which caused the death of Christian Langel Philippe, tourist, 24

years old and a Swiss nationale. He was charged with the Murder With the Use of

Unlicensed firearms. Appellant alleges that he carried the victim to the shore to be

brought to the hospital to save the latter, and who facilitated the surrender to Pat.

Padilla a gun which his helper found the following morning while cleaning the bar.

Accused posted bail which was granted. The accused denied having made any oral

confession alleging that he went to Pat. Padilla not to report the incident but to state that

a boy helper in the bar had found a gun on the sand floor while cleaning and that Pat.

Padilla picked up the gun from the bar at his request. The Accused argues that even ifhe did make such a confession, the same would be inadmissible in evidence. He was

found guilty in the RTC. Hence the appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not the lower court correct in saying that the constitutional procedure

on custodial interrogation is not applicable in the instant case.

HELD:

YES. Appellant's assertion that the gun he had surrendered was merely found bya boy helper while cleaning the bar deserves no credence for, if it were so, it would

have been absurd for him to have placed himself under police custody in the early

morning after the incident. Sworn Complaint for "Murder with Use of Unlicensed

Firearm" signed by the Chief of Police also attests to Appellant's oral confession. That

Complaint forms part of the record of the proceedings before the Municipal Circuit Trial

Court of Buruanga, Aklan, and is prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.

Appellant's voluntary surrender implies no violation as "no warrant of arrest is issued for

the apprehension of the accused for the reason that he is already under police custody

before the filing of the complaint." What was told by the Accused to Pat, Padilla was a

spontaneous statement not elicited through questioning, but given in ordinary manner.No written confession was sought to be presented in evidence as a result of formal

custodial investigation.


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30. PEOPLE VS. EBIOGR No. 147750, September 29, 2004

FACTS:

This refers to the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the accused Gerry Ebio yHermida of the Court's Decision dated October 14, 2002. The per curiam Decisionaffirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Sorsogon finding theaccused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of raping his eleven-year old daughter, andsentencing him to death. In his motion for reconsideration, the accused calls theattention of the Court to the fact that only seven out of the fourteen Justices sitting in theCourt signed the Decision. The other seven Justices were on official leave at the time.

ISSUE:

Whether the votes of only seven Justices of the Court sitting en banccan validlyimpose the death penalty and whether there is a need for a quorum when it sits enbanc.

HELD:

Article VIII Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution provides the composition of theCourt and the number of votes required to render a decision, thus:

(1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteenAssociate Justices. It may sit en bancor in its discretion, in divisions of three, five, orseven members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrencethereof.

(2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executiveagreement, or law, which shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, and all othercases which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc, including thoseinvolving the constitutionality, application or operation of presidential decrees,proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations, shall be decidedwith the concurrence of a majority of the members who actually took part in the

deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.

(3) Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with theconcurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations onthe issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case, without the concurrence of atleast three of such Members. When the required number is not obtained, the case shallbe decided en banc: Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the Court


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in a decision rendered en bancor in division may be modified or reversed except by thecourt sitting en banc.

There is no question that the Court's Decision in this case was concurred in bymajority of the members of the Court who actually took part in the deliberations. It was

in fact unanimously signed by the seven Justices who were present during thedeliberations. The issue now is whether the seven constitute a quorum of the 14-member Court.

The term "quorum"' has been defined as "that number of members of the bodywhich, when legally assembled in their proper places, will enable the body to transact itsproper business, or, in other words, that number that makes a lawful body and gives itpower to pass a law or ordinance or do any other valid corporate act."1The question ofthe number of judges necessary to authorize the transaction of business by a court is asa general rule to be determined from the Constitution or statutory provisions creatingand regulating the courts, and as a general rule a majority of the members of a court isa "quorum" for the transaction of business and the decision of cases.2

The Constitution is clear on the quorum when the Court meets byDivision. Thereshould be at least three members present for the Division to conduct its business. Thismay be deduced from paragraph 3 of Section 4 Article VIII. There is no similarpronouncement, however, when the Court meets en banc. The second paragraph of

Article VIII Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution does not expressly state the number ofJustices required to be present to constitute a quorum of the Court en banc. Thedeliberations of the 1987 Constitution are also silent on what constitutes a quorum whenthe Court is composed of only fourteen members. In case of doubt in a criminal case,especially where the death penalty is imposed, the doubt should be resolved in favor ofthe accused.

Thus, in this case, considering that the life of the accused is at stake, we deem itwise to resubmit the case to the Court en bancfor re-deliberation.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court resolves to RECALL the Decision dated October14, 2002 and RESUBMIT the case to the Court en bancfor RE-DELIBERATION.
http://nlpdl.nlp.gov.ph:9000/shares/finders/SC02/2004sep/147750.htm#_ftn1http://nlpdl.nlp.gov.ph:9000/shares/finders/SC02/2004sep/147750.htm#_ftn1http://nlpdl.nlp.gov.ph:9000/shares/finders/SC02/2004sep/147750.htm#_ftn2http://nlpdl.nlp.gov.ph:9000/shares/finders/SC02/2004sep/147750.htm#_ftn2http://nlpdl.nlp.gov.ph:9000/shares/finders/SC02/2004sep/147750.htm#_ftn2http://nlpdl.nlp.gov.ph:9000/shares/finders/SC02/2004sep/147750.htm#_ftn2http://nlpdl.nlp.gov.ph:9000/shares/finders/SC02/2004sep/147750.htm#_ftn1


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31. FIRESTONE CERAMICS V. CAGR No. 127245, June 28, 2000

FACTS:

The government filed a case to annul the certificate of title of D covering

forestland. X wanted to intervene believing that if Ds title would be annulled and after

declassification of the forestland to alienable land, then his title over a portion of the

property would become valid. Y also wanted to intervene because the cancellation of

Ds title would allegedly pave the way for his free patent application.

ISSUE:

Whether X and Y should be allowed to intervene.

HELD:

No. Intervention is not a matter of right but may be permitted by the courts when

the applicant shows that he is qualified to intervene as provided under Sec. 1 of Rule

19. The legal interest of the intervenor must be of direct and immediate character and

not merely contingent or expectant so that he will either gain or lose by the direct

operation of the judgment. X and Y merely have a collateral interest in the subject

matter of the litigation, thus, allowing intervention would not be justified.


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32. TANO v. SOCRATES278 SCRA 154 (997)

FACTS:

The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing theconstitutionality of:(1) Ordinance No. 15-92 entitled:

" AN ORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF ALL LIVEFISH ANDLOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FROM JANUARY 1, 1993 TOJANUARY 1,1998 AND PROVIDING EXEMPTIONS, PENALTIES AND FOR OTHERPURPOSES THEREOF"(2) Office Order No. 23, requiring any person engagedor intending to engage in any business, trade, occupation, calling or profession orhaving in his possession any of the articles for which a permit is required to be had, toobtain first a Mayors and authorizing and directing to check or conduct necessaryinspections on cargoes containing live fish and lobster being shipped out from Puerto

Princesaand,(3) Resolution No. 33, Ordinance No. 2 entitled: "A RESOLUTION PROHIBITING THECATCHING, GATHERING, POSSESSING, BUYING, SELLING AND SHIPMENT OF LIVE MARINECORAL DWELLING AQUATIC ORGANISMS

The petitioners contend that the said Ordinances deprived them of dueprocess of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the practiceof their trade, in violation of Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of

Art ic le XI II of the 1987 Const itution and that the Mayor had the abso luteauthority to determine whether or not to issue the permit. They also claimthat it took away their right to earn their livelihood in lawful ways; and insofaras the Airline Shippers Association are concerned, they were undulyprevented from pursuing their vocation and entering "into contracts which areproper, necessary, and essential to carry out their business endeavors to asuccessful conclusion Public respondents Governor Socratesand Members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan defended thevalidity of Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1993, as a valid exercise of theProvincial Government's power u

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