consolidated labrel cases

By RICKY BOY CABATU/ 3B/ L-100355

Employer-Employee Relationship

G.R. No. 185251 October 2, 2009

RAUL G. LOCSIN and EDDIE B. TOMAQUIN vs. PLT

VELASCO, JR., J.:

FACTS:

PLDT and the Security and Safety Corporation of the Philippines (SSCP) entered into an agreement whereby SSCP would provide armed security guards to PLDT to be assigned to its various offices. Petitioners, among other security guards, were posted at a PLDT office.

However, respondent issued a letter terminating the Agreement. Despite the termination of the Agreement, however, petitioners continued to secure the premises of their assigned office. They were allegedly directed to remain at their post by representatives of respondent thru presentation of pay slips. Subsequently, they were terminated.

Thus, petitioners filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal and recovery of money claims against PLDT. The Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision finding PLDT liable for illegal dismissal. NLRC affirmed.

CA reversed. According to CA, SSCP was not a labor-only contractor and was an independent contractor having substantial capital to operate and conduct its own business. Further the agreement stipulated that there shall be no employer-employee relationship between the security guards and PLDT. Lastly, the payslips were issued by SSCP.

ISSUE: Whether there exists an employer-employee relationship?

HELD: An Employer-Employee Relationship Existed Between the Parties. They became employees of respondent after the Agreement between SSCP and respondent was terminated. In the ordinary course of things, responsible business owners or managers would not allow security guards of an agency with whom the owners or managers have severed ties with to continue to stay within the business premises. This is because upon the termination of the owners or managers agreement with the security agency, the agencys undertaking of liability for any damage that the security guard would cause has already been terminated. Thus, in the event of an accident or otherwise damage caused by such security guards, it would be the business owners and/or managers who would be liable and not the agency. The business owners or managers would, therefore, be opening themselves up to liability for acts of security guards over whom the owners or managers allegedly have no control.

Further, petitioners remained at their post under the instructions of respondent. Thus, respondent dictated upon petitioners that the latter perform their regular duties to secure the premises during operating hours (proof of control). Hence, there is an existence of an employer-employee relationship.

Power of control is the right to control not only the end to be achieved but also the means to be used in reaching such end. With the conclusion that respondent directed petitioners to remain at their posts and continue with their duties, it is clear that respondent exercised the power of control over them; thus, the existence of an employer-employee relationship.

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G.R. No. 170087 August 31, 2006

ANGELINA FRANCISCO vs. NLRC, KASEI CORPORATION, SEIICHIRO TAKAHASHI, TIMOTEO ACEDO, DELFIN LIZA, IRENE BALLESTEROS, TRINIDAD LIZA and RAMON ESCUETA

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

FACTS:

petitioner was hired by Kasei Corporation during its incorporation stage. She was designated as Accountant and Corporate Secretary and was assigned to handle all the accounting needs of the company. She was also designated as Liaison Officer to the City of Makati to secure business permits, construction permits and other licenses for the initial operation of the company.

Later, petitioner was designated Acting Manager for five years. As Acting Manager, petitioner was assigned to handle recruitment of all employees and perform management administration functions; represent the company in all dealings with government agencies, especially with the BIR, SSS and in the city government of Makati; and to administer all other matters pertaining to the operation of Kasei Restaurant which is owned and operated by Kasei Corporation.

However, petitioner was replaced as Manager. Petitioner alleged that she was required to sign a prepared resolution for her replacement but she was assured that she would still be connected with Kasei Corporation. But her salary was reduced.

She was not paid portion of her salary and when she asked for the unpaid salary, the company informed her that she was no longer connected with it.

Since she was no longer paid her salary, petitioner did not report for work and filed an action for constructive dismissal before the labor arbiter.

According to respondent, petitioners designation as technical consultant depended solely upon the will of management. As such, her consultancy may be terminated any time considering that her services were only temporary in nature and dependent on the needs of the corporation. Further, petitioner did not go through the usual procedure of selection of employees, but her services were engaged through a Board Resolution designating her as technical consultant. The money received by petitioner from the corporation was her professional fee subject to the 10% expanded withholding tax on


professionals, and that she was not one of those reported to the BIR or SSS as one of the companys employees.

The Labor Arbiter found that petitioner was illegally dismissed. NLRC affirmed. CA reversed.

ISSUE: Whether there was an employer-employee relationship between petitioner and private respondent Kasei Corporation (to answer WON there was illegal dismissal).

HELD:

SC adopted a two-tiered test involving: (1) the putative employers power to control the employee with respect to the means and methods by which the work is to be accomplished; and (2) the underlying economic realities of the activity or relationship (the proper standard of economic dependence is whether the worker is dependent on the alleged employer for his continued employment in that line of business). This test is especially appropriate in this case where there is no written agreement or terms of reference to base the relationship on; and due to the complexity of the relationship based on the various positions and responsibilities given to the worker over the period of the latters employment.

By applying the control test, petitioner is an employee of Kasei Corporation because she was under the direct control and supervision of Seiji Kamura, the corporations Technical Consultant. She reported for work regularly and served in

various capacities as Accountant, Liaison Officer, Technical Consultant, Acting Manager and Corporate Secretary, with substantially the same job functions, that is, rendering accounting and tax services to the company and performing functions necessary and desirable for the proper operation of the corporation such as securing business permits and other licenses over an indefinite period of engagement.

Under the broader economic reality test, the petitioner can likewise be said to be an employee of respondent corporation

because she had served the company for six years before her dismissal, receiving check vouchers indicating her salaries/wages, benefits, 13th month pay, bonuses and allowances, as well as deductions and Social Security contributions. Petitioners membership in the SSS as manifested by a copy of the SSS specimen signature card which was signed by the President of Kasei Corporation and the inclusion of her name in the on-line inquiry system of the SSS evinces the existence of an employer-employee relationship between petitioner and respondent corporation.

Thus, petitioner is an employee of respondent Kasei Corporation. She was selected and engaged by the company for compensation, and is economically dependent upon respondent for her continued employment in that line of business. Her main job function involved accounting and tax services rendered to respondent corporation on a regular basis over an indefinite period of engagement. Respondent corporation hired and engaged petitioner for compensation, with the power to dismiss her for cause. More importantly, respondent corporation had the power to control petitioner with the means and methods by which the work is to be accomplished.

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G.R. No. 179652 May 8, 2009

PEOPLE'S BROADCASTING (BOMBO RADYO PHILS., INC.) vs. DOLE SECRETARY , THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, DOLE REGION VII, and JANDELEON JUEZAN

TINGA, J.:

A complaint was filed by Jandeleon Juezan (respondent) against Bombo Radyo for illegal deduction, non-payment of service incentive leave, 13th month pay, etc. before the DOLE Regional Office in Cebu City.

According to Bombo Radyo, Juezan is a drama talent hired on a per drama " participation basis" hence no employer-employeeship existed between them. As proof of this, management presented photocopies of cash vouchers, billing statement, employments of specific undertaking (a contract between the talent director & the complainant), summary of billing of drama production etc. They (mgt.) has no control of the talent if he ventures into another contract w/ other broadcasting industries.

DOLE found that there was an er-ee relationship.

Bombo Radyo elevated the case to CA stating that is no employer-employee relationship had ever existed between it and respondent because it was the drama directors and producers who paid, supervised and disciplined respondent. It also added that the case was beyond the jurisdiction of the DOLE and should have been considered by the labor arbiter because respondents claim exceeded P5,000.00.

Jandeleon, on the other hand, invokes Republic Act No. 7730, which "removes the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representatives, from the effects of the restrictive provisions of Article 129 and 217 of the Labor Code, regarding the confinement of jurisdiction based on the amount of claims."

ISSUE: Does the Secretary of Labor have the power to determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship?

HELD: Art. 228 of LC is quite explicit that the visitorial and enforcement power of the DOLE comes into play only "in cases when the relationship of employer-employee still exists." It also underscores the avowed objective underlying the grant of power to the DOLE which is "to give effect to the labor standard provision of this Code and other labor legislation." Of course, a persons entitlement to labor standard benefits under the labor laws presupposes the existence of employer-employee relationship in the first place.

The clause "in cases where the relationship of employer-employee still exists" signifies that the employer-employee relationship must have existed even before the emergence of the controversy. Necessarily, the DOLEs power does not apply in two instances, namely: (a) where the employer-employee


relationship has ceased; and (b) where no such relationship has ever existed.

In the first situation, the claim has to be referred to the NLRC because it is the NLRC which has jurisdiction in view of the termination of the employer-employee relationship. The same procedure has to be followed in the second situation since it is the NLRC that has jurisdiction in view of the absence of employer-employee relationship between the evidentiary parties from the start.

It has long been established that in administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings, substantial evidence is sufficient as a basis for judgment on the existence of employer-employee relationship. Substantial evidence, which is the quantum of proof required in labor cases, is "that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion." No particular form of evidence is required to prove the existence of such employer-employee relationship. Any competent and relevant evidence to prove the relationship may be admitted. Hence, while no particular form of evidence is required, a finding that such relationship exists must still rest on some substantial evidence. Moreover, the substantiality of the evidence depends on its quantitative as well as its qualitative aspects.

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G.R. No. 192558 February 15, 2012

BITOY JAVIER (DANILO P. JAVIER) vs. FLY ACE CORPORATION/FLORDELYN CASTILLO

MENDOZA, J.:

FACTS:

Javier filed a complaint before the NLRC for underpayment of salaries and other labor standard benefits. He alleged that he was an employee of Fly Ace performing various tasks at the respondents warehouse such as cleaning and arranging the canned items before their delivery to certain locations, except in instances when he would be ordered to accompany the companys delivery vehicles, as pahinante; that he reported for work from Monday to Saturday from 7:00 oclock in the morning to 5:00 oclock in the afternoon; that during his employment, he was not issued an identification card and payslips by the company; that on May 6, 2008, he reported for work but he was no longer allowed to enter the company premises by the security guard upon the instruction of his superior (Ong).

To support his allegations, Javier presented an affidavit of one Bengie Valenzuela who alleged that Javier was a stevedore or pahinante of Fly Ace. The said affidavit was subscribed before the Labor Arbiter (LA).

For its part, Fly Ace averred that it was engaged in the business of importation and sales of groceries; that Javier was contracted by its employee, Mr. Ong, as extra helper on a pakyaw basis at

an agreed rate of P 300.00 per trip, which was later increased. Mr. Ong contracted Javier roughly 5 to 6 times only in a month whenever the vehicle of its contracted hauler, Milmar Hauling Services, was not available. Later, Fly Ace no longer needed the services of Javier. Denying that he was their employee, Fly Ace insisted that there was no illegal dismissal.

Fly Ace submitted a copy of its agreement with Milmar Hauling Services and copies of acknowledgment receipts evidencing payment to Javier for his contracted services bearing the words, "daily manpower (pakyaw/piece rate pay)" and the latters signatures/initials.

LA dismissed the complaint for lack of merit on the ground that Javier failed to present proof that he was a regular employee of Fly Ace: (1) that Javier has no employee ID showing his employment with the Respondent (2) nor any document showing that he received the benefits accorded to regular employees of the Respondents. His contention that Respondent failed to give him said ID and payslips implies that indeed he was not a regular employee of Fly Ace considering that complainant was a helper and that Respondent company has contracted a regular trucking for the delivery of its products. Respondent Fly Ace is not engaged in trucking business but in the importation and sales of groceries. Since there is a regular hauler to deliver its products, we give credence to Respondents claim that complainant was contracted on "pakiao" basis. As to the claim for underpayment of salaries, the payroll presented by the Respondents showing salaries of workers on "pakiao" basis has evidentiary weight because although the signature of the complainant appearing thereon are not uniform, they appeared to be his true signature.

On appeal with the NLRC, Javier was favored. The NLRC stated that a pakyaw-basis arrangement did not preclude the existence of employer-employee relationship. Payment by result is a method of compensation and does not define the essence of the relation. It is a mere method of computing compensation, not a basis for determining the existence or absence of an employer-employee relationship. The NLRC further averred that it did not follow that a worker was a job contractor and not an employee, just because the work he was doing was not directly related to the employers trade or business or the work may be considered as "extra" helper as in this case; and that the relationship of an employer and an employee was determined by law and the same would prevail whatever the parties may call it. In this case, the NLRC held that substantial evidence was sufficient basis for judgment on the existence of the employer-employee relationship. Javier was a regular employee of Fly Ace because there was reasonable connection between the particular activity performed by the employee (as a "pahinante") in relation to the usual business or trade of the employer (importation, sales and delivery of groceries). He may not be considered as an independent contractor because he could not exercise any judgment in the delivery of company products. He was only engaged as a "helper."

The CA annulled the NLRC findings that the non-issuance of a company-issued identification card to private respondent supports petitioners contention that private respondent was not its employee; that Javiers failure to present salary vouchers, payslips, or other pieces of evidence to bolster his contention, pointed to the inescapable conclusion that he was not an


employee of Fly Ace; that Javiers work was not necessary and desirable to the business or trade of the company, as it was only when there were scheduled deliveries, which a regular hauling service could not deliver, that Fly Ace would contract the services of Javier as an extra helper. He contracted work outside the company premises; he was not required to observe definite hours of work; he was not required to report daily; and he was free to accept other work elsewhere as there was no exclusivity of his contracted service to the company, the same being co-terminous with the trip only. Since no substantial evidence was presented to establish an employer-employee relationship, the case for illegal dismissal could not prosper.

ISSUE: Whether Javier is an employee?

HELD:

(1) In dealing with factual issues in labor cases, substantial evidence that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion is sufficient. Although Section 10, Rule VII of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC allows a relaxation of the rules of procedure and evidence in labor cases, this rule of liberality does not mean a complete dispensation of proof. Labor officials are enjoined to use reasonable means to ascertain the facts speedily and objectively with little regard to technicalities or formalities but nowhere in the rules are they provided a license to completely discount evidence, or the lack of it. The quantum of proof required, however, must still be satisfied. Hence, "when confronted with conflicting versions on factual matters, it is for them in the exercise of discretion to determine which party deserves credence on the basis of evidence received, subject only to the requirement that their decision must be supported by substantial evidence."

No particular form of evidence is required to prove the existence of such employer-employee relationship. Any competent and relevant evidence to prove the relationship may be admitted.Hence, while no particular form of evidence is required, a finding that such relationship exists must still rest on some substantial evidence. Moreover, the substantiality of the evidence depends on its quantitative as well as its qualitative aspects." Although substantial evidence is not a function of quantity but rather of quality, the circumstances of the instant case demand that something more should have been proffered. Had there been other proofs of employment, such as inclusion in petitioners payroll, or a clear exercise of control, the Court would have affirmed the finding of employer-employee relationship."

In sum, the rule of thumb remains: the onus probandi falls on petitioner to establish or substantiate such claim by the requisite quantum of evidence. "Whoever claims entitlement to the benefits provided by law should establish his or her right thereto x x x." Sadly, Javier failed to adduce substantial evidence as basis for the grant of relief.

(2) In this case, Javier was not able to persuade the Court that the elements (er-ee relationship) exist in his case. He could not submit competent proof that Fly Ace engaged his services as a regular employee; that Fly Ace paid his wages as an employee, or that Fly Ace could dictate what his conduct should be while at work.

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G.R. No. 184885 March 7, 2012

ERNESTO G. YMBONG vs. ABS-CBN, VENERANDA SY AND DANTE LUZON

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

FACTS:

Petitioner Ernesto G. Ymbong started working for ABS-CBN in 1993 at its regional station in Cebu as a television talent, co-anchoring Hoy Gising and TV Patrol Cebu. His stint in ABS-CBN later extended to radio when ABS-CBN Cebu launched its AM station DYAB in 1995 where he worked as drama and voice talent, spinner, scriptwriter and public affairs program anchor.

Later, the ABS-CBN Head Office in Manila issued a Policy on Employees Seeking Public Office--- that any employee who intends to run for any public office position, must file his/her letter of resignation; that any employee who intends to join a political group/party or even with no political affiliation but who intends to openly and aggressively campaign for a candidate or group of candidates must file a request for leave of absence subject to managements approval.

Subsequently, Ymbong ran for public office (councilor of Lapu-Lapu City) but he lost. When he tried to come back to ABS-CBN Cebu, he was informed that he cannot work there anymore because of company policy.

Ymbong in contrast contended that after the expiration of his leave of absence, he reported back to work as a regular talent and in fact continued to receive his salary but later he received a memorandum stating that his services are being terminated immediately, much to his surprise. Thus, he filed an illegal dismissal complaint against ABS-CBN.

ABS-CBN prayed for the dismissal of the complaints arguing that there is no employer-employee relationship between the company and Ymbong/ ABS-CBN contended that they are not employees but talents as evidenced by their talent contracts. However, notwithstanding their status, ABS-CBN has a standing policy on persons connected with the company whenever they will run for public office.

LA found the dismissal illegal. NLRC ordered for Ymbongs reinstatement. CA reversed.

ISSUE: Whether there was em-ee relationship.

HELD: CA is affirmed.

(1) Working for the government and the company at the same time is clearly disadvantageous and prejudicial to the rights and interest not only of the company but the public as well. In the event an employee wins in an election, he cannot fully serve, as he is expected to do, the interest of his employer. The employee


has to serve 2 employers, obviously detrimental to the interest of both the government and the private employer. In the event the employee loses in the election, the impartiality and cold neutrality of an employee as broadcast personality is suspect, thus readily eroding and adversely affecting the confidence and trust of the listening public to employers station.

(2) Ymbong is deemed resigned when he ran for councilor.

Ymbongs overt act of running for councilor of Lapu-Lapu City is tantamount to resignation on his part. He was separated from ABS-CBN not because he was dismissed but because he resigned. Since there was no termination to speak of, the requirement of due process in dismissal cases cannot be applied to Ymbong. Thus, ABS-CBN is not duty-bound to ask him to explain why he did not tender his resignation before he ran for public office as mandated by the subject company policy.

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G.R. No. 138051 June 10, 2004

JOSE Y. SONZA vs. ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION

CARPIO, J.: Facts: In May 1994, respondent signed an Agreement with the Mel and Jay Management as represented by its President Sonza. MJMDC agreed to provide Sonzas services exclusively to ABS-CBN as talent for radio and television. ABS-CBN agreed to pay for Sonzas services. On April 1, 1996, SONZA wrote a letter to ABS-CBN informing the latter that he is waiving and renouncing recovery of the remaining amount stipulated in paragraph 7 of the Agreement but reserves the right to seek recovery of the other benefits. On April 30, Sonza filed a complaint against ABS-CBN for not paying his salaries and other labor standards benefits. On July 10, ABS-CBN filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that no employer-employee relationship existed between the parties. Issue: Whether or not Sonza is an employee of ABS-CBN Held; No. Sonza is an independent contractor. ABS-CBN was not involved in the actual performance that produced the finished product of SONZAs work.ABS-CBN did not instruct SONZA how to perform his job. ABS-CBN merely reserved the right to modify the program format and airtime schedule "for more effective programming."ABS-CBN did not exercise control over the means and methods of performance of SONZAs work. It is well-settled that the less control the hirer exercises, the more likely the worker is considered an independent contractor.

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G.R. No. 126297 February 11, 2008

PROFESSIONAL SERVICES, INC. vs. CA and NATIVIDAD and ENRIQUE AGANA

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Natividad Agana was admitted at the Medical City because of difficulty of bowel movement and bloody anal discharge. Dr. Ampil diagnosed her to be suffering from "cancer of the sigmoid." Thus, Dr. Ampil, assisted by the medical staff of Medical City, performed an anterior resection surgery upon her. During the surgery, he found that the malignancy in her sigmoid area had spread to her left ovary, necessitating the removal of certain portions of it.

Dr. Fuentes performed and completed the hysterectomy. Afterwards, Dr. Ampil took over, completed the operation and closed the incision. However, the operation appeared to be flawed. Tthey found a piece of gauze in the vagina so Natividad underwent another surgery.

Natividad and her husband filed with the RTC of Quezon City a complaint for damages against PSI (owner of Medical City), Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes.

RTC decided in favor of the Aganas. CA affirmed. The found the Petitioner PSI jointly and severally liable with Dr. Ampil for the following reasons: first, there is an employer-employee relationship between Medical City and Dr. Ampil. The Court relied on Ramos v. Court of Appeals, holding that for the

purpose of apportioning responsibility in medical negligence cases, an employer-employee relationship in effect exists between hospitals and their attending and visiting physicians; second, PSIs act of publicly displaying in the lobby of the Medical City the names and specializations of its accredited physicians, including Dr. Ampil, estopped it from denying the existence of an employer-employee relationship between them under the doctrine of ostensible agency or agency by estoppel; and third, PSIs failure to supervise Dr. Ampil and its resident physicians and nurses and to take an active step in order to remedy their negligence rendered it directly liable under the doctrine of corporate negligence.

PSI contends that there is no employer-employee relationship between it and its consultant, Dr. Ampil. PSI stressed that the Courts Decision in Ramos holding that "an employer-employee relationship in effect exists between hospitals and their attending

and visiting physicians for the purpose of apportioning responsibility" had been reversed in a subsequent Resolution. Further, PSI argues that the doctrine of ostensible agency or agency by estoppel cannot apply because spouses Agana

failed to establish one requisite of the doctrine, i.e., that Natividad relied on the representation of the hospital in engaging the services of Dr. Ampil. And lastly, PSI maintains that the doctrine of corporate negligence is misplaced because the proximate cause of Natividads injury was Dr. Ampils negligence.

ISSUE: WON there exists an er-ee relationship?

HELD: There exists.

Private hospitals hire, fire and exercise real control over their attending and visiting "consultant" staff. While "consultants" are not, technically employees, a point which respondent hospital asserts in denying all responsibility for the patients condition, the control exercised, the hiring, and the right to terminate consultants all fulfill the important hallmarks of an


employer-employee relationship, with the exception of the payment of wages. In assessing whether such a relationship in fact exists, the control test is determining. Accordingly, on the basis of the foregoing, we rule that for the purpose of allocating responsibility in medical negligence cases, an employer-employee relationship in effect exists between hospitals and their attending and visiting physicians.

Even assuming that Dr. Ampil is not an employee of Medical City, but an independent contractor, still the said hospital is liable to the Aganas. In general, a hospital is not liable for the negligence of an independent contractor-physician. There is, however, an exception to this principle. The hospital may be liable if the physician is the "ostensible" agent of the hospital. This exception is also known as the "doctrine of apparent authority." (Sometimes referred to as the apparent or ostensible agency theory). The doctrine of apparent authority essentially involves two factors to determine the liability of an independent contractor-physician which are (1) the hospitals manifestations and is sometimes described as an inquiry whether the hospital acted in a manner which would lead a reasonable person to conclude that the individual who was alleged to be negligent was an employee or agent of the hospital and (2) the second factor focuses on the patients reliance. It is sometimes characterized as an inquiry on whether the plaintiff acted in reliance upon the conduct of the hospital or its agent, consistent with ordinary care and prudence.

Clearly, PSI is estopped from passing the blame solely to Dr. Ampil. Its act of displaying his name and those of the other physicians in the public directory at the lobby of the hospital amounts to holding out to the public that it offers quality medical service through the listed physicians. This justifies Atty. Aganas belief that Dr. Ampil was a member of the hospitals staff. It must be stressed that under the doctrine of apparent authority, the question in every case is whether the principal has by his voluntary act placed the agent in such a situation that a person of ordinary prudence, conversant with business usages and the nature of the particular business, is justified in presuming that such agent has authority to perform the particular act in question. In these cases, the circumstances yield a positive answer to the question.

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Labor Dispute

G.R. No. 108961 November 27, 1998

CITIBANK, N.A., vs CA, and CITI-BANK INTEGRATED GUARDS LABOR ALLIANCE (CIGLA) SEGA-TUPAS/FSM LOCAL CHAPTER No. 1394.

PARDO, J.:

Citibank and El Toro Security Agency, Inc. entered into a contract for the latter to provide security and protective services to safeguard and protect the bank's premises. Citibank renewed the security contract with El Toro yearly until 1990. On April 22, 1990, the contract between Citibank and El Toro expired.

Respondent CIGLA filed with the NCMB a request for preventive mediation citing Citibank as respondent therein giving as issues for preventive mediation the following: a) Unfair labor practice; b) Dismissal of union officers/members; and c) Union bust.

Petitioner Citibank served on El Toro a written notice that the bank would not renew anymore the service agreement with the LATTER. Simultaneously, Citibank hired another security agency to render security services at Citibank's premises.

Then, respondent CIGLA filed a manifestation with the NCMB that it was converting its request for preventive mediation into a notice of strike for failure of the parties to reach a mutually acceptable settlement of the issues, which it followed with a supplemental notice of strike alleging as supplemental issue the mass dismissal of all union officers and members.

The security guards of El Toro who were replaced by guards of the Golden Pyramid Security Agency considered the non-renewal of El Toro's service agreement with Citibank as constituting a lockout and/or a mass dismissal. They threatened to go on strike against Citibank and picket its premises.

Subsequently, petitioner Citibank filed with the Regional Trial Court Makati, a complaint for injunction and damages.

The

complaint sought to enjoin CIGLA and any person claiming membership therein from striking or otherwise disrupting the operations of the bank.

Respondent CIGLA filed with the trial court a motion to dismiss the complaint. The motion alleged that (a) the Court had no jurisdiction, this being labor dispute; b) The guards were employees of the bank; c) There were pending cases/labor disputes between the guards and the bank at the different agencies of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).; d) The bank was guilty of forum shopping in filing the complaint with the RTC after submitting itself voluntarily to the jurisdiction of the different agencies of the DOLE.

RTC denied the motion to dismiss. CA reversed and ruled that the status quo ante declaration of strike shall be observed pending the proceedings in the National Conciliation and Mediation Board, Department of Labor and Employment, National Capital Region.

Petitioner Citibank contends that there is no employer-employee relationship between Citibank and the security guards represented by respondent CIGLA and that there is no "labor dispute" in the subject controversy. The security guards were employees of El Toro security agency, not of Citibank. Its service contract with Citibank had expired and not renewed.

ISSUE: Whether it is the labor tribunal or the regional trial court that has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint filed by Citibank with the trial court.

HELD: There is no labor dispute. RTC has jurisdiction.

It has been decided also that the Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction over a claim filed where no employer-employee relationship


existed between a company and the security guards assigned to it by a security service contractor.

In this case, it was the

security agency El Toro that recruited, hired and assigned the watchmen to their place of work. It was the security agency that was answerable to Citibank for the conduct of its guards.

The question arises. Is there a labor dispute between Citibank and the security guards, members of respondent CIGLA, regardless of whether they stand in the relation of employer and employees? Article 212, paragraph 1 of the Labor Code provides the definition of a "labor dispute". It "includes any controversy or matter concerning terms or conditions of employment or the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or arranging the terms and conditions of employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee.

If at all, the dispute between Citibank and El Toro security agency is one regarding the termination or non-renewal of the contract of services. This is a civil dispute. El Toro was an independent contractor. Thus, no employer-employee relationship existed between Citibank and the security guard members of the union in the security agency who were assigned to secure the bank's premises and property. Hence, there was no labor dispute and no right to strike against the bank.

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G.R. No. 120567 March 20, 1998

PAL vs. NLRC, FERDINAND PINEDA and GOGFREDO CABLING

MARTINEZ, J.:

FACTS:

Private respondents are flight stewards of the petitioner. Both were dismissed from the service for their alleged involvement in the currency smuggling in Hong Kong.

Aggrieved by said dismissal, private respondents filed with the NLRC a petition for injunction praying that a temporary

restraining order be issued, prohibiting respondents (petitioner herein) from effecting or enforcing its Decision or to reinstate petitioners temporarily while a hearing on the propriety of the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is being undertaken;

The NLRC issued a temporary mandatory injunction enjoining petitioner to cease and desist from enforcing its Memorandum of dismissal.

Petitioner argued that the NLRC erred in granting a temporary injunction order when it has no jurisdiction to issue an injunction or restraining order since this may be issued only under Article 218 of the Labor Code if the case involves or arises from labor disputes.

ISSUE: WON there was a labor dispute as to warrant the NLRCs issuance of the assailed writ?

HELD:

In labor cases, Article 218 of the Labor Code empowers the NLRC to enjoin or restrain any actual or threatened commission of any or all prohibited or unlawful acts or to require the performance of a particular act in any labor dispute which, if not

restrained or performed forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual any decision in favor of such party; . . ."

From the foregoing provisions of law, the power of the NLRC to issue an injunctive writ originates from "any labor dispute" upon application by a party thereof, which application if not granted "may cause grave or irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual any decision in favor of such party."

The term "labor dispute" is defined as "any controversy or matter concerning terms and conditions of employment or the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing. maintaining, changing, or arranging the terms and conditions of employment regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employers and employees."

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The term "controversy" is likewise defined as "a litigated question; adversary proceeding in a court of law; a civil action or suit, either at law or in equity; a justiciable dispute."

A "justiciable controversy" is "one involving an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right on one side and a denial thereof on the other concerning a real, and not a mere theoretical question or issue."

Taking into account the foregoing definitions, it is an essential requirement that there must first be a labor dispute between the contending parties before the labor arbiter. In the present case, there is no labor dispute between the petitioner and private respondents as there has yet been no complaint for illegal dismissal filed with the labor arbiter by the private respondents against the petitioner.

The petition for injunction directly filed before the NLRC is in reality an action for illegal dismissal of which the LA has original and exclusive jurisdiction.

_________________

Managerial Employee

G.R. No. 159577 May 3, 2006

CHARLITO PEARANDA vs. BAGANGA PLYWOOD CORPORATION and HUDSON CHUA

PANGANIBAN, CJ:

FACTS:


Sometime in June 1999, Petitioner Charlito Pearanda was hired as an employee of Baganga Plywood Corporation (BPC) to take charge of the operations and maintenance of its steam plant boiler. Later, Pearanda filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal with money claims against BPC and its general manager, Hudson Chua, before the NLRC.

Pearanda through counsel in his position paper alleges that he was employed by respondent as Foreman/Boiler Head/Shift Engineer until he was illegally terminated. Further, [he] alleges that his services [were] terminated without the benefit of due process and valid grounds in accordance with law. Furthermore, he was not paid his overtime pay, premium pay for working during holidays/rest days, night shift differentials and finally claims for payment of damages and attorneys fees having been forced to litigate the present complaint.

Upon the other hand, respondent [BPC] allege that being a managerial employee he is not entitled to overtime pay and if ever he rendered services beyond the normal hours of work, [there] was no office order/or authorization for him to do so.

The labor arbiter ruled that there was no illegal dismissal and that petitioners Complaint was premature because he was still employed by BPC. The temporary closure of BPCs plant did not terminate his employment, hence, he need not reapply when the plant reopened. Nevertheless, the labor arbiter found petitioner entitled to overtime pay, premium pay for working on rest days, and attorneys fees in the total amount of P21,257.98.

13

Respondents filed an appeal to the NLRC, which deleted the award of overtime pay and premium pay for working on rest days. According to the Commission, petitioner was not entitled to these awards because he was a managerial employee.

CA reversed.

ISSUE: WON he is a managerial employee.

HELD:

Managerial employees and members of the managerial staff are exempted from the provisions of the Labor Code on labor standards. Since petitioner belongs to this class of employees, he is not entitled to overtime pay and premium pay for working on rest days.

The Court disagrees with the NLRCs finding that petitioner was a managerial employee. However, petitioner was a member of the managerial staff, which also takes him out of the coverage of labor standards. Like managerial employees, officers and members of the managerial staff are not entitled to the provisions of law on labor standards. The

Implementing Rules of the Labor Code define members of a managerial staff as those with the following duties and responsibilities:

"(1) The primary duty consists of the performance of work directly related to management policies of the employer;

"(2) Customarily and regularly exercise discretion and independent judgment;

"(3) (i) Regularly and directly assist a proprietor or a managerial employee whose primary duty consists of the management of the establishment in which he is employed or subdivision thereof; or (ii) execute under general supervision work along specialized or technical lines requiring special training, experience, or knowledge; or (iii) execute under general supervision special assignments and tasks; and

"(4) who do not devote more than 20 percent of their hours worked in a workweek to activities which are not directly and closely related to the performance of the work described in paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) above."

______________________

G.R. No. 169717 March 16, 2011

SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA SA CHARTER CHEMICAL SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES FOR EMPOWERMENT AND REFORMS (SMCC-SUPER), ZACARRIAS JERRY VICTORIO-Union President vs. CHARTER CHEMICAL and COATING CORPORATION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

FACTS:

SMCC filed a petition for certification election among the regular rank-and-file employees of Charter Chemical and Coating Corporation with the Mediation Arbitration Unit of the DOLE, National Capital Region.

Respondent company filed an Answer with Motion to Dismiss on the ground that petitioner union is not a legitimate labor organization because of (1) failure to comply with the documentation requirements set by law, and (2) the inclusion of supervisory employees within petitioner union.

5

The Med-Arbiter dismissed the petition for certification election for the reason that the list of membership of petitioner union consisted of 12 batchman, mill operator and leadman who performed supervisory functions. Under Article 245 of the Labor Code, said supervisory employees are prohibited from joining petitioner union which seeks to represent the rank-and-file employees of respondent company.

DOLE ruled that there was no obstacle to the grant of petitioner unions petition for certification election.

CA set aside DOLEs ruling upholding the Med-Arbiters finding that petitioner union consisted of both rank-and-file and supervisory employees.


ISSUE: Whether the alleged mixture of rank-and-file and

supervisory employee[s] of petitioner [unions] membership is [a] ground for the cancellation of petitioner [unions] legal personality and dismissal of [the] petition for certification election.

HELD: The mixture of rank-and-file and supervisory employees in petitioner union does not nullify its legal personality as a legitimate labor organization.

Preliminarily, we note that petitioner union questions the factual findings of the Med-Arbiter, as upheld by the appellate court, that 12 of its members are supervisory employees. However, petitioner union failed to present any rebuttal evidence in the proceedings below after respondent company submitted in evidence the job descriptions of the aforesaid employees. The job descriptions indicate that the aforesaid employees exercise recommendatory managerial actions which are not merely routinary but require the use of independent judgment, hence, falling within the definition of supervisory employees under Article 212(m) of the Labor Code. For this

reason, we are constrained to agree with the Med-Arbiter, as upheld by the appellate court, that petitioner union consisted of both rank-and-file and supervisory employees.

Nonetheless, the inclusion of the aforesaid supervisory employees in petitioner union does not divest it of its status as a legitimate labor organization. R.A. No. 6715 omitted specifying the exact effect any violation of the prohibition [on the co-mingling of supervisory and rank-and-file employees] would bring about on the legitimacy of a labor organization.

On June 21, 1997, the 1989 Amended Omnibus Rules was further amended by Department Order No. 9, series of 1997 (1997 Amended Omnibus Rules). Specifically, the requirement under Sec. 2(c) of the 1989 Amended Omnibus Rules that the petition for certification election indicate that the bargaining unit of rank-and-file employees has not been mingled with supervisory employees was removed. Instead, what the 1997 Amended Omnibus Rules requires is a plain description of the bargaining unit.

The applicable law and rules in the instant case are the same as those in Kawashima because the present petition for certification election was filed in 1999 when D.O. No. 9, series of 1997, was still in effect. Hence,Kawashima applies with equal force here. As a result, petitioner union was not divested of its status as a legitimate labor organization even if some of its members were supervisory employees; it had the right to file the subject petition for certification election.

_____________________

G.R. No. 187887 September 7, 2011

PAMELA FLORENTINA P. JUMUAD vs. HI-FLYER FOOD, INC. and/or JESUS R. MONTEMAYOR

MENDOZA, J.:

FACTS:

Petitioner Jumuad began her employment with respondent Hi-Flyer Food, Inc. (Hi-Flyer), as management trainee. Based on her performance through the years, Jumuad received several promotions until she became the area manager for the entire Visayas-Mindanao 1 region, comprising the provinces of Cebu, Bacolod, Iloilo and Bohol.

Aside from being responsible in monitoring her subordinates, Jumuad was tasked to: 1) be highly visible in the restaurants under her jurisdiction; 2) monitor and support day-to-day operations; and 3) ensure that all the facilities and equipment at the restaurant were properly maintained and serviced. Among the branches under her supervision were the KFC branches in Gaisano Mall, Cebu City (KFC-Gaisano); in Cocomall, Cebu City(KFC-Cocomall); and in Island City Mall, Bohol (KFC-Bohol).

In just her first year as Area Manager, Jumuad gained distinction and was awarded the 3rd top area manager nationwide. She was rewarded with a trip to Singapore for her excellent performance.

However, an examination of the KFC branches by respondent revealed several sanitation violations. Moreover, there were cash shortages.

Seeking to hold Jumuad accountable for the irregularities uncovered in the branches under her supervision, and was later on dismissed.

Jumuad filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.

LA found that no serious cause for termination existed, thus Jumuad was illegally dismissed. NLRC affirmed.

CA rendered the subject decision reversing the decision of the labor tribunal.

ISSUE: WON dismissal is proper.

HELD: It cannot be denied that Jumuad willfully breached her duties as to be unworthy of the trust and confidence of Hi-Flyer. First, there is no denying that Jumuad was a managerial

employee for Jumuad executed management policies and had the power to discipline the employees of KFC branches in her area. She recommended actions on employees to the head office. Pertinent is Article 212 (m) of the Labor Code defining a managerial employee as one who is vested with powers or prerogatives to lay down and execute management policies and/or hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees.

Based on established facts, the mere existence of the grounds for the loss of trust and confidence justifies petitioners dismissal. As long as there is some basis for such loss of confidence, such as when the employer has reasonable ground to believe that the employee concerned is responsible for the purported misconduct, and the nature of his participation therein renders him unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded of his position, a managerial employee may be dismissed.


In the present case, the CERs reports of Hi-Flyer show that there were anomalies committed in the branches managed by Jumuad. On the principle of respondeat superior or command responsibility alone, Jumuad may be held liable for negligence in the performance of her managerial duties. She may not have been directly involved in causing the cash shortages in KFC-Bohol, but her involvement in not performing her duty monitoring and supporting the day to day operations of the branches and ensure that all the facilities and equipment at the restaurant were properly maintained and serviced, could have truly prevented the whole debacle from ever occurring.

Moreover, it is observed that rather than taking proactive steps to prevent the anomalies at her branches, Jumuad merely effected remedial measures. In the restaurant business where the health and well-being of the consuming public is at stake, this does not suffice. Thus, there is reasonable basis for Hi-Flyer to withdraw its trust in her and dismissing her from its service.

_____________________

Jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter

G.R. No. 185567 October 20, 2010

ARSENIO Z. LOCSIN, Petitioner,

vs. NISSAN LEASE PHILS. INC. and LUIS BANSON, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

BRION, J.:

FACTS:

Locsin was elected EVP and Treasurer of NCLPI. Locsin held this position for 13 years until he was nominated and elected Chairman of NCLPIs Board of Directors.

Seven months after his election as Chairman of the Board, on a special meeting, Locsin was neither re-elected Chairman nor reinstated to his previous position as EVP/Treasurer.

Subsequently, Locsin filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement, payment of backwages, damages and attorneys fees before the Labor Arbiter against NCLPI and Banson, who was then President of NCLPI.

NCLPI and Banson filed a Motion to Dismiss, on the ground that the Labor Arbiter did not have jurisdiction over the case since the issue of Locsins removal as EVP/Treasurer involves an intra-corporate dispute.

LA denied the motion. CA reversed.

ISSUE: WON LA has jurisdiction.

HELD: The CA correctly ruled that no employer-employee relationship exists between Locsin and Nissan. Hence, LA has no jurisdiction.

Locsin was undeniably Chairman and President, and was elected to these positions by the Nissan board pursuant to its By-laws. As such, he was a corporate officer, not an employee. The CA reached this conclusion by relying on the submitted facts and on Presidential Decree 902-A, which defines corporate officers as "those officers of a corporation who are given that character either by the Corporation Code or by the corporations by-laws." Likewise, Section 25 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 69, or the Corporation Code of the Philippines (Corporation Code) provides that corporate officers are the president, secretary, treasurer and such other officers as may be provided for in the by-laws.

Even as Executive Vice-President/Treasurer, Locsin already acted as a corporate officer because the position of Executive Vice-President/Treasurer is provided for in Nissans By-Laws. Article IV, Section 4 of these By-Laws specifically provides for this position.

Given Locsins status as a corporate officer, the RTC, not the Labor Arbiter or the NLRC, has jurisdiction to hear the legality of the termination of his relationship with Nissan. As we also held in Okol, a corporate officers dismissal from service is an intra-corporate dispute:

A corporate officers dismissal is always a corporate act, or an intra-corporate controversy which arises between a stockholder and a corporation. so that the RTC should exercise jurisdiction.

Therefore, the Labor Arbiter does not have jurisdiction over the termination dispute Locsin brought, and should not be allowed to continue to act on the case after the absence of jurisdiction has become obvious, based on the records and the law. In more practical terms, a contrary ruling will only cause substantial delay and inconvenience as well as unnecessary expenses, to the point of injustice, to the parties. This conclusion, of course, does not go into the merits of termination of relationship and is without prejudice to the filing of an intra-corporate dispute on this point before the appropriate RTC.

_________________________

G.R. No. 160146 December 11, 2009

LESLIE OKOL vs. SLIMMERS WORLD INTERNATIONAL, BEHAVIOR MODIFICATIONS, INC., and RONALD JOSEPH MOY

CARPIO, J.:

FACTS:

Respondent SWI employed petitioner Okol as a management trainee. She rose up the ranks to become Head Office Manager and then Director and Vice President until her dismissal. The dismissal was in connection with the equipment seized by the Bureau of Customs.


Okol filed a complaint with the Arbitration branch of the NLRC against respondents for illegal suspension, illegal dismissal, unpaid commissions, damages and attorneys fees, with prayer for reinstatement and payment of backwages.

Respondents asserted, through their motion to dismiss, that the NLRC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint.

LA granted the motion. The labor arbiter ruled that Okol was the vice-president of Slimmers World at the time of her dismissal. Since it involved a corporate officer, the dispute was an intra-corporate controversy falling outside the jurisdiction of the Arbitration branch.

NLRC reversed.

CA reversed NLRC.

Petitioner enumerated the instances that she was under the power and control of Moy, Slimmers Worlds president: (1) petitioner received salary evidenced by pay slips, (2) Moy deducted Medicare and SSS benefits from petitioners salary, and (3) petitioner was dismissed from employment not through a board resolution but by virtue of a letter from Moy. Thus, having shown that an employer-employee relationship exists, the jurisdiction to hear and decide the case is vested with the labor arbiter and the NLRC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the NLRC has jurisdiction over the illegal dismissal case filed by petitioner.

HELD:

From the documents submitted by respondents, petitioner was a director and officer of Slimmers World. The charges of illegal suspension, illegal dismissal, unpaid commissions, reinstatement and back wages imputed by petitioner against respondents fall squarely within the ambit of intra-corporate disputes. Thus, the question of remuneration involving a stockholder and officer, not a mere employee, is not a simple labor problem but a matter that comes within the area of corporate affairs and management and is a corporate controversy in contemplation of the Corporation Code.

It is a settled rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law. The determination of the rights of a director and corporate officer dismissed from his employment as well as the corresponding liability of a corporation, if any, is an intra-corporate dispute subject to the jurisdiction of the regular courts. Thus, the appellate court correctly ruled that it is not the NLRC but the regular courts which have jurisdiction over the present case.

________________

G.R. No. 89621 September 24, 1991

PEPSI COLA represented by its Plant General Manager ANTHONY B. SIAN, ELEAZAR LIMBAB, IRENEO BALTAZAR

& JORGE HERAYA vs. HON. LOLITA O. GAL-LANG, SALVADOR NOVILLA, ALEJANDRO OLIVA, WILFREDO CABAAS & FULGENCIO LEGO

CRUZ, J.:p

FACTS:

The private respondents were employees of the petitioner who were suspected of complicity in the irregular disposition of empty Pepsi Cola bottles. The petitioners filed a criminal complaint for theft against them but this was later withdrawn and substituted with a criminal complaint for falsification of private documents. After a preliminary investigation conducted by the Municipal Trial Court of Tanauan, Leyte, the complaint was dismissed.

Meantime, allegedly after an administrative investigation, the private respondents were dismissed by the petitioner company. As a result, they lodged a complaint for illegal dismissal with the Regional Arbitration Branch of the NLRC in Tacloban City and decisions manded reinstatement with damages. In addition, they instituted in the RTC of Leyte a separate civil complaint against the petitioners for damages arising from what they claimed to be their malicious prosecution.

The petitioners moved to dismiss the civil complaint on the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the case because it involved employee-employer relations that were exclusively cognizable by the labor arbiter.

The RTC ruled that the present civil case is distinct from the labor case for damages now pending before the labor courts." The petitioners then came to this Court for relief.

ISSUE: WON RTC has jurisdiction.

HELD: It must be stressed that not every controversy involving workers and their employers can be resolved only by the labor arbiters. This will be so only if there is a "reasonable causal connection" between the claim asserted and employee-employer relations to put the case under the provisions of Article 217. Absent such a link, the complaint will be cognizable by the regular courts of justice in the exercise of their civil and criminal jurisdiction.

The case now before the Court involves a complaint for damages for malicious prosecution which was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Leyte by the employees of the defendant company. It does not appear that there is a "reasonable causal connection" between the complaint and the relations of the parties as employer and employees. The complaint did not arise from such relations and in fact could have arisen independently of an employment relationship between the parties. No such relationship or any unfair labor practice is asserted. What the employees are alleging is that the petitioners acted with bad faith when they filed the criminal complaint which the Municipal Trial Court said was intended "to harass the poor employees" and the dismissal of which was affirmed by the Provincial Prosecutor "for lack of evidence to establish even a slightest probability that all the respondents herein have committed the crime imputed against them." This is a matter which the labor arbiter has no


competence to resolve as the applicable law is not the Labor Code but the Revised Penal Code.

____________________

G.R. No. 172013 October 2, 2009

PATRICIA HALAGUEA and other flight attendants of PHILIPPINE AIRLINES vs. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES INCORPORATED

PERALTA, J.:

Petitioners were employed as female flight attendants of respondent Philippine Airlines (PAL) on different dates. Respondent and FASAP entered into a CBA incorporating the terms and conditions of their agreement for the years 2000 to 2005, hereinafter referred to as PAL-FASAP CBA that the compulsory retirement shall be fifty-five (55) for females and sixty (60) for males.

Petitioners and several female cabin crews manifested that the aforementioned CBA provision on compulsory retirement is discriminatory, and demanded for an equal treatment with their male counterparts.

Petitioners filed a Special Civil Action for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction with the RTC of Makati City for the invalidity of the assailed portion of the CBA.

RTC issued an Order upholding its jurisdiction over the present case. According to RTC, this case is not directed specifically against respondent arising from any act of the latter, nor does it involve a claim against the respondent. Rather, this case seeks a declaration of the nullity of the questioned provision of the CBA, which is within the Court's competence, with the allegations in the Petition constituting the bases for such relief sought.

CA reversed which declared that RTC have NO JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE.

ISSUE: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the petitioners' action challenging the legality or constitutionality of the provisions on the compulsory retirement age contained in the CBA between respondent PAL and FASAP.

HELD:

Jurisdiction of the court is determined on the basis of the material allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief prayed for irrespective of whether plaintiff is entitled to such relief.

In the case at bar, the allegations in the petition for declaratory relief plainly show that petitioners' cause of action is the annulment of Section 144, Part A of the PAL-FASAP CBA. From the petitioners' allegations and relief prayed

for in its petition, it is clear that the issue raised is whether Section 144, Part A of the PAL-FASAP CBA is unlawful and

unconstitutional. Here, the petitioners' primary relief in Civil Case No. 04-886 is the annulment of Section 144, Part A of the PAL-FASAP CBA, which allegedly discriminates against them for being female flight attendants. The subject of litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation, exclusively cognizable by the RTC, pursuant to Section 19 (1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended. Being an ordinary civil action, the same is beyond the jurisdiction of labor tribunals.

The said issue cannot be resolved solely by applying the Labor Code. Rather, it requires the application of the Constitution, labor statutes, law on contracts and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, and the power to apply and interpret the constitution and CEDAW is within the jurisdiction of trial courts, a court of general jurisdiction

_______________________

Article 221

G.R. Nos. 191288 & 191304 March 7, 2012

MERALCO vs. JAN CARLO GALA

BRION, J.:

FACTS:

Respondent Gala commenced employment with the petitioner Meralco as a probationary lineman. Barely four months on the job, Gala was dismissed for alleged complicity in pilferages of Meralcos electrical supplies. He filed a complaint for illegal dismissal

The LA dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. She held that Galas participation in the pilferage of Meralcos property rendered him unqualified to become a regular employee.

Gala appealed to the NLRC which reversed the labor arbiters ruling. It found that Gala had been illegally dismissed, since there was "no concrete showing of complicity with the alleged misconduct/dishonesty[.]" The NLRC, however, ruled out Galas reinstatement, stating that his tenure lasted only up to the end of his probationary period. It awarded him backwages and attorneys fees.

Both parties moved for partial reconsideration; Gala, on the ground that he should have been reinstated with full backwages, damages and interests; and Meralco, on the ground that the NLRC erred in finding that Gala had been illegally dismissed. The NLRC denied the motions. Relying on the same grounds, Gala and Meralco elevated the case to the CA through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

CA denied Meralcos petition for lack of merit and partially granted Galas petition. It concurred with the NLRC that Gala had been illegally dismissed, a ruling that was supported by the evidence.


Meralco faults the CA for not giving credit to its witnesses Aguilar, Dola and Riano, and instead treated their joint affidavit (Samasamang Sinumpaang Salaysay) as inconclusive to establish Galas participation in the pilferage of company property.

Gala asks for a denial of the petition because of (1) serious and fatal infirmities in the petition; (2) unreliable statements of Meralcos witnesses; and (3) clear lack of basis to support the termination of his employment.

Gala contends, in regard to the alleged procedural defects of the petition, that the "Verification and Certification," "Secretarys Certificate" and "Affidavit of Service" do not contain the details of the Community or Residence Tax Certificates of the affiants, in violation of Section 6 of Commonwealth Act No. 465 (an Act to Impose a Residence Tax). Additionally, the lawyers who signed the petition failed to indicate their updated Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) certificate numbers, in violation of the rules.

ISSUE: Whether there was procedural defect on part of Meralcos petition.

HELD: It is the spirit and intention of labor legislation that the NLRC and the labor arbiters shall use every reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively, without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, provided due process is duly observed. In

keeping with this policy and in the interest of substantial justice, we deem it proper to give due course to the petition, especially in view of the conflict between the findings of the labor arbiter, on the one hand, and the NLRC and the CA, on the other. As we said in S.S. Ventures International, Inc. v. S.S. Ventures Labor Union,

20 "the application of technical rules of procedure in labor

cases may be relaxed to serve the demands of substantial justice."

_________________

G.R. No. 155844 July 14, 2008

NATIONWIDE SECURITY and ALLIED SERVICES, INC. vs. CA, NLRC and JOSEPH DIMPAZ, HIPOLITO LOPEZ, EDWARD ODATO, FELICISIMO PABON and JOHNNY AGBAY

QUISUMBING, J.:

FACTS:

Labor Arbiter found petitioner, a security agency, not liable for illegal dismissal involving eight security guards who were employees of the petitioner. However, the Labor Arbiter directed the petitioner to pay the aforementioned security guards their separation pay, unpaid salaries, underpayment and 10% attorneys fees based on the total monetary award.

Dissatisfied with the decision, petitioner appealed to the NLRC which dismissed its appeal for two reasons first, for having

been filed beyond the reglementary period within which to perfect the appeal and second, for filing an insufficient appeal bond.

Petitioner then appealed to the Court of Appeals to have the appeal resolved on the merits rather than on pure technicalities in the interest of due process. CA dismissed holding that in a special action for certiorari, the burden is on petitioner to prove not merely reversible error, but grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction on the part of public respondent NLRC.

ISSUE:

(1) WHETHER OR NOT TECHNICALITIES IN LABOR CASES MUST PREVAIL OVER THE SPIRIT AND INTENTION OF THE LABOR CODE UNDER ARTICLE 221 THEREOF WHICH STATES

(2) WHETHER OR NOT THE REQUIREMENT ON CERTIFICATION AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING WHICH WAS RAISED BEFORE THE NLRC IS ENFORCEABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE.

HELD: The petition lacks merit.

In the instant case, both the NLRC and the Court of Appeals found that petitioner received the decision of the Labor Arbiter on July 16, 1999. This factual finding is supported by sufficient evidence, and we take it as binding on us. Petitioner then simultaneously filed its "Appeal Memorandum", "Notice of Appeal" and "Motion to Reduce Bond", by registered mail on July 29, 1999, under Registry Receipt No. 003098. These were received by the NLRC on July 30, 1999. The appeal to the NLRC should have been perfected, as provided by its Rules, within a period of 10 days from receipt by petitioner of the decision on July 16, 1999. Clearly, the filing of the appeal--three days after July 26, 1999--was already beyond the reglementary period and in violation of the NLRC Rules and the pertinent Article on Appeal in the Labor Code.

Failure to perfect an appeal renders the decision final and executory. The right to appeal is a statutory right and one who seeks to avail of the right must comply with the statute or the rules. The rules, particularly the requirements for perfecting an appeal within the reglementary period specified in the law, must be strictly followed as they are considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays and for the orderly discharge of judicial business. It is only in highly

meritorious cases that this Court will opt not to strictly apply the rules and thus prevent a grave injustice from being done. The exception does not obtain here. Thus, we are in agreement that the decision of the Labor Arbiter already became final and executory because petitioner failed to file the appeal within 10 calendar days from receipt of the decision.

______________

Article 223


G.R. No. 168501, January 31, 2011 ISLRIZ TRADING/ VICTOR HUGO LU VS. EFREN CAPADA et al.

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

FACTS:

FACTS:

Respondents were drivers and helpers of Islriz Trading, a gravel

and sand business. Claiming that they were illegally dismissed,

respondents filed a Complaint

for illegal dismissal and non-

payment of overtime pay, holiday pay, rest day pay, allowances

and separation pay against petitioner before the Labor Arbiter.

On his part, petitioner imputed abandonment of work against

respondents.

LA ruled that there was illegal dismissal and reinstatement

without loss of seniority rights and the payment of full backwages

from date of dismissal to actual reinstatement.

On appeal, NLRC ordered respondents' reinstatement but

without backwages.

Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereto but same

was likewise denied in an NLRC Resolution which became final

and executory.

Respondents averred that since the Decision of Labor Arbiter

ordered their reinstatement, a Writ of Execution was already

issued for the enforcement of its reinstatement aspect as same is

immediately executory even pending appeal. But this

notwithstanding and despite the issuance and subsequent finality

of the NLRC Resolution which likewise ordered respondents'

reinstatement, petitioner still refused to reinstate them. Thus,

respondents prayed that in view of the orders of reinstatement, a

computation of the award of backwages.

Petitioner contends that in upholding the issuance of the

questioned Writ of Execution for the enforcement of respondents'

accrued salaries, said Decision and Resolution, in effect, altered

the NLRC Resolution which only decreed respondents'

reinstatement without backwages. Moreover, Article 223 of the

Labor Code only applies when an employee has been illegally

dismissed from work. And since in this case the NLRC ruled that

respondents' failure to continue working for petitioner was not

occasioned by termination, there is no illegal dismissal to speak

of, hence, said provision of the Labor Code does not apply.

Lastly, petitioner claims that the computation of respondents'

accrued salaries in the total amount of P1,110,665.60 has no

legal and factual bases since as repeatedly pointed out by him,

the NLRC Resolution reversing the Labor Arbiter's Decision has

already ordered respondents' reinstatement without backwages

after it found that there was no illegal termination.

ISSUE: Whether respondents may collect their wages during the

period between the Labor Arbiter's order of reinstatement

pending appeal and the NLRC Resolution overturning that of the

Labor Arbiter.

HELD: Employees are entitled to their accrued salaries

during the period between the Labor Arbiter's order of

reinstatement pending appeal and the resolution of the

National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) overturning

that of the Labor Arbiter. Otherwise stated, even if the order of

reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is reversed on appeal, the

employer is still obliged to reinstate and pay the wages of the

employee during the period of appeal until reversal by a higher

court or tribunal. In this case, respondents are entitled to their

accrued salaries from the time petitioner received a copy of the

Decision of the Labor Arbiter declaring respondents' termination

illegal and ordering their reinstatement up to the date of the

NLRC resolution overturning that of the Labor Arbiter.

On the other hand, if the employee has been reinstated during

the appeal period and such reinstatement order is reversed with

finality, the employee is not required to reimburse whatever

salary he received for he is entitled to such, more so if he actually

rendered services during the period.

In other words, a dismissed employee whose case was favorably

decided by the Labor Arbiter is entitled to receive wages pending

appeal upon reinstatement, which is immediately executory.

Unless there is a restraining order, it is ministerial upon the Labor

Arbiter to implement the order of reinstatement and it is

mandatory on the employer to comply therewith.

Application of the Two-Fold Test to the present case

(1) Was there an actual delay or was the order of reinstatement

pending appeal executed prior to its reversal? Yes.


(2) Was the delay not due to the employer's unjustified act or

omission? Yes.

NOTE: Respondents are entitled to their accrued salaries

only from the time petitioner received a copy of Labor

Arbiter Gan's Decision declaring respondents' termination

illegal and ordering their reinstatement up to the date of the

NLRC Resolution overturning that of the Labor Arbiter.

______________________

G.R. No. 196830 February 29, 2012

CESAR V. GARCIA et al. vs. KJ Commercial and Reynaldo Que

CARPIO, J.:

FACTS:

Respondent KJ Commercial employed as truck drivers and truck helpers petitioners.

Later, petitioners demanded for a P40 daily salary increase. To pressure KJ Commercial to grant their demand, they stopped working and abandoned their trucks at the Northern Cement Plant Station in Sison,Pangasinan. They also blocked other workers from reporting to work.

Petitioners filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for illegal

dismissal, underpayment of salary and non-payment of service incentive leave and thirteenth month pay.

The Labor Arbiter held that KJ Commercial illegally dismissed petitioners.

KJ Commercial appealed to the NLRC. It filed before the NLRC a motion to reduce bond and posted a P50,000 cash bond.

The NLRC dismissed the appeal. It must be stressed that under Section 6, Rule VI of the 2005 Revised Rules of this Commission, a motion to reduce bond shall only be entertained when the following requisites concur: (1) The motion is founded on meritorious ground; and (2) A bond of reasonable amount in relation to the monetary award is posted. Further, they are unwilling to at least put up a property to secure a surety bond. The P50,000.00 cash bond posted by respondents-appellants which represents less than two (2) percent of the monetary award is dismally disproportionate to the monetary award of P2,612,930.00 and that the amount of bond posted by respondents-appellants is not reasonable in relation to the monetary award.

KJ Commercial filed a motion for reconsideration and posted

a P2,562,930surety bond. NLRC granted the motion and held that petitioners were not dismissed.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. The NLRC denied the motion for lack of merit.

The CA affirmed.

ISSUE: WON KJ Commercial failed to perfect an appeal since the motion to reduce bond did not stop the running of the period to appeal.

HELD: Petitoners cannot, for the first time, raise as issue in their petition filed with this Court that the Labor Arbiters 30 October 2008 Decision had become final and executory. Points of law, theories and arguments not raised before the Court of Appeals will not be considered by this Court. Otherwise, KJ Commercial will be denied its right to due process.

Furthermore, whether respondents were able to appeal on time is a question of fact that cannot be entertained in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. In general, the jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought before it from the Court of Appeals is limited to a review of errors of law allegedly committed by the court a quo.

KJ Commercials filing of a motion to reduce bond and delayed posting of theP2,562,930 surety bond did not render the Labor Arbiters 30 October 2008 Decision final and executory. The Rules of Procedure of the NLRC allows the filing of a motion to reduce bond subject to two conditions: (1) there is meritorious ground, and (2) a bond in a reasonable amount is posted. The filing of a motion to reduce bond and compliance with the two conditions stop the running of the period to perfect an appeal.

The NLRC has full discretion to grant or deny the motion to reduce bond,

and it may rule on the motion beyond the 10-

day period within which to perfect an appeal. Obviously, at the time of the filing of the motion to reduce bond and posting of a bond in a reasonable amount, there is no assurance whether the appellants motion is indeed based on meritorious ground and whether the bond he or she posted is of a reasonable amount. Thus, the appellant always runs the risk of failing to perfect an appeal.

In order to give full effect to the provisions on motion to reduce bond, the appellant must be allowed to wait for the ruling of the NLRC on the motion even beyond the 10-day period to perfect an appeal. If the NLRC grants the motion and rules that there is indeed meritorious ground and that the amount of the bond posted is reasonable, then the appeal is perfected. If the NLRC denies the motion, the appellant may still file a motion for reconsideration as provided under Section 15, Rule VII of the Rules. If the NLRC grants the motion for reconsideration and rules that there is indeed meritorious ground and that the amount of the bond posted is reasonable, then the appeal is perfected. If the NLRC denies the motion, then the decision of the labor arbiter becomes final and executory.

In the present case, KJ Commercial filed a motion to reduce bond and posted a P50,000 cash bond. When the NLRC denied its motion, KJ Commercial filed a motion for reconsideration and posted the full P2,562,930 surety bond. The NLRC then granted the motion for reconsideration.


In any case, the rule that the filing of a motion to reduce bond shall not stop the running of the period to perfect an appeal is not absolute. The Court may relax the rule when (1) fundamental consideration of substantial justice; (2) prevention of miscarriage of justice or of unjust enrichment; and (3) special circumstances of the case combined with its legal merits, and the amount and the issue involved.

The bond requirement on appeals may be relaxed when there is substantial compliance with the Rules of Procedure of the NLRC or when the appellant shows willingness to post a partial bond. While the bond requirement on appeals involving monetary awards has been relaxed in certain cases, this can only be done where there was substantial compliance of the Rules or where the appellants, at the very least, exhibited willingness to pay by posting a partial bond.

________________

Article 224

G.R. No. 182915 December 12, 2011

MARIALY O. SY, et al. vs. FAIRLAND KNITCRAFT CO., INC.

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

FACTS:

Fairland is a domestic corporation engaged in garments business, while Susan de Leon (Susan) is the owner/proprietress of Weesan Garments (Weesan). On the other hand, the complaining workers (the workers) are sewers, trimmers, helpers, a guard and a secretary who were hired by Weesan.

Petitioners Sy et al. filed with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC a Complaint for underpayment and/or non-payment of wages, overtime pay, premium pay for holidays, 13th month pay and other monetary benefits against Susan/Weesan.

However, Weesan filed before the DOLE-NCR a report on its temporary closure for a period of not less than six months. The complainants them amended the complaint adding illegal dismissal.

LA dismissed the complaint but ruled that respondents are to pay the complainants 5,000 as financial assistance. NLRC reversed and ruled that there was illegal dismissal and ordered the respondents to pay the claims. The NLRC however, denied both motions for lack of merit.

CA affirmed the NLRCs ruling that the workers were illegally dismissed and that Weesan and Fairland are solidarily liable to them as labor-only contractor and principal, respectively.

However, the CAs Special Ninth Division reversed the First Divisions ruling. It held that the labor tribunals did not acquire

jurisdiction over the person of Fairland, and even assuming they did, Fairland is not liable to the workers since Weesan is not a mere labor-only contractor but a bona fide independent contractor. The Special Ninth Division thus annulled and set aside the assailed NLRC Decision and Resolution insofar as Fairland is concerned and excluded the latter therefrom.

With regard to Susans petition, the CA Special Ninth Division issued an order temporarily restraining the NLRC from enforcing its assailed decision and thereafter the CA Special Eighth Division issued a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction.

Citing PNOC Dockyard and Engineering Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, the CA likewise emphasized that in labor cases, both the party and his counsel must be duly served their separate copies of the order, decision or resolution unlike in ordinary proceedings where notice to counsel is deemed notice to the party. It then quoted Article 224 of the Labor Code as follows:

The CA then concluded that since Fairland and its counsel were not separately furnished with a copy of the August 26, 2005 NLRC Resolution denying the motions for reconsideration of its November 30, 2004 Decision, said Decision cannot be enforced against Fairland. The CA likewise concluded that because of this, said November 30, 2004 Decision which held Susan/Weesan and Fairland solidarily liable to the workers, has not attained finality.

In the instant petition for certiorari, petitioner Santos reiterates that he should not have been adjudged personally liable by public respondents, the latter not having validly acquired jurisdiction over his person whether by personal service of summons or by substituted service under Rule 19 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE: WON CA is correct.

HELD: Article 224 contemplates the furnishing of copies of final decisions, orders or awards and could not have been intended to refer to the period for computing the period for appeal to the Court of Appeals from a non-final judgment or order. The period or manner of appeal from the NLRC to the Court of Appeals is governed by Rule 65 pursuant to the ruling of the Court in the case of St. Martin Funeral Homes vs. NLRC. Section 4 of Rule 65, as amended, states that the petition may be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, or resolution sought to be assailed.

Corollarily, Section 4, Rule III of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC expressly mandates that (F)or the purposes of computing the period of appeal, the same shall be counted from receipt of such decisions, awards or orders by the counsel of record. Although this rule explicitly contemplates an appeal before the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, we do not see any cogent reason why the same rule should not apply to petitions for certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals from decisions of the NLRC. This procedure is in line with the established rule that notice to counsel is notice to party and when a party is represented by counsel, notices should be made upon the counsel of record at his given address to which notices of


all kinds emanating from the court should be sent. It is to be noted also that Section 7 of the NLRC Rules of Procedure provides that (A)ttorneys and other representatives of parties shall have authority to bind their clients in all matters of procedure a provision which is similar to Section 23, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. More importantly, Section 2, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure analogously provides that if any party has appeared by counsel, service upon him shall be made upon his counsel.

To stress, Article 224 contemplates the furnishing of copies of final decisions, orders or awards both to the parties and their counsel in connection with the execution of such final decisions, orders or awards. However, for the purpose of

computing the period for filing an appeal from the NLRC to the CA, same shall be counted from receipt of the decision, order or award by the counsel of record pursuant to the established rule that notice to counsel is notice to party. And since the period for filing of an appeal is reckoned from the counsels receipt of the decision, order or award, it necessarily follows that the reckoning period for their finality is likewise the counsels date of receipt thereof, if a party is represented by counsel. Hence, the date of receipt referred to in Sec. 14, Rule VII of the then in force New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC

106 which provides that

decisions, resolutions or orders of the NLRC shall become executory after 10 calendar days from receipt of the same, refers to the date of receipt by counsel. Thus contrary to the CAs conclusion, the said NLRC Decision became final, as to Fairland, 10 calendar days after Atty. Tecsons receipt

107 thereof.

108 In

consolidated labrel cases

Documents

security agency

managers agreement

employeremployee relationship

armed security guards

acts of security guards

business owners andor

representatives of respondent

instructions of respondent