consolidating a foothold

CHAPTER 3

Consolidating a Foothold

FIRST NIGHT AT AGAT ‘

The day had not gone well for theenemy’s 38th Regiment. Most of themen in the two IA Battalion companiesthat had tried to hold the Agat beachdefenses were dead by noon, includingthe commander of 1/38 who was killedas he led his headquarters and reserveelements in a “Banzai” counterattackagainst 4th Marines assault troops.The guns of the two artillery batteriesthat had fired in direct support of thebeach defenses had been demolished bynaval gunfire and air bombardment.Only a few members of the gun crewssurvived the destructive fire.

On the northern flank of the beach-head, the 22d Marines had wiped outforward elements of 2/38 that tried tohold Agat. Most of the units of theenemy battalion were still intact, how-ever, when darkness fell. Since thebattalion commander had lost contactwith regimental headquarters at about1200, he had little knowledge of howthe battle was going except on his ownfront, where it was going badly.

To the south of the Marine positions,

‘ Unless otherwise noted the material inthis section is derived from: 1st ProwMarBrigWarD; Ist ProvMarBrig URpts; 22d Mar.Jnl; 1/4 WarD; 3/.4 WarD; 6th TkBn SAR;77th InfDiv and 1st ProvMarBrig NGF LnOsRpts to CGFMFPac, variously dtd 14-24Aug44; GSDF Study; Myers, Ours to Hold itHigh.

the 8th Company of 3/38 was commit-ted early on W-Day to reinforce theIst Battalion platoons that had tried tohold Hill 40 and Bangi Point. Theremainder of the 3d Battalion, spreadout through a defensive sector stretch-ing to Facpi Point and beyond, wasassembled by its commander by mid-afternoon, ready to move against theAmerican beachhead. Marine intelli-gence officers considered the situationwas ripe for a Japanese counterattack—and a counterattack was coming.z

From his command post on the slopesof Mt. Alifan, Colonel Tsunetaro Sue-naga had seen the Americans over-whelm his defenses along the islandshore. The resulting swift inland ad-vance of Marine infantry and tanksthreatened to make a mockery of theattempt by the 38th Regiment to holdthe Agat sector unless the Japanesecommander regained the initiative.Suenaga, who felt that his only chanceto retrieve the situation lay in an all-out counterattack, gave orders for his

=Contemporary intelligence studies by thebrigade and IIIAC located 3/38 in reserve inthe Agana area on W-Day. This error wasrepeated in text and maps in both Lodge,Recapture of Guam, and Crowl, MarianasCampaign. The best Japanese account of thebattle, the GSDF Study, correctly places thebattalion in the Agat sector and sheds freshlight on conflicting evidence of 1944, whichwas the basis of the original order of battleinformation.

479

480 CENTRAL PACIFIC DRIVE

battalions to prepare for a three-pronged assault against the center andboth flanks of the 1st Brigade position.By word of mouth and runner, all 1.stBattalion survivors of the day’s battleswere ordered to assemble at regimentalheadquarters.

At about 1730, Colonel Suenaga tele-phoned the 29th Division CP to informGeneral Takashina of his counterattackplans. At first, the general refusedpermission for the attack because theregiment had been “badly mauled dur-ing the day,” s but finally, in view ofthe overall battle situation, he reluc-tantly authorized the assault.~ Taka-shina cautioned the colonel, however, tomake plans for reassembling his menfollowing the counterattack in order tocontinue the defense of Mt. Alifan.Doubt about the outcome of the attackwas obviously shared by Suenaga, who,soon after this call, burned the colorsof the 38th Regiment to prevent theircapture.

The pending Japanese counterattackwas fully anticipated by General Shep-herd’s veteran troops. All along theMarine front lines as darkness deep-ened, company and battalion mortars

SGS’DF~tudy,p. 151.4A Marineofficer, well acquainted with the

Japanese accounts of this action and the per-sonalities involved, commented: “In my judge-ment, permission to launch this piecemealcounterattack was given because the 38th Jap-anese Regiment was isolated and on the ex-treme right flank of the American landing(Japanese left flank) . As this regiment wasisolated and therefore not available to theoverall attack which was planned for later,the Division Commander gave his permission,with hopes of turning the American flank or atleast delaying the inland movement of the 1stMarine Brigade.” Metzgey memo.

registered their fire along possible ave-nues of approach. Taking position off-shore, gunfire support ships checkedinto the control nets shared with theliaison officers and spotter teams. Thesix pack howitzer batteries of the Bri-gade Artillery Group made prepara-tions for their part in the night’sproceedings.

The early hours of the evening weretense but quiet. Occasional brief flare-UPSof firing marked the discovery ofenemy infiltrators. Finally, just be-fore midnight, a flurry of mortar shellsburst on the positions of Company K of3/4, on the right flank of the brigadeline. Japanese infantrymen, bathedin the eerie light of illumination flares,surged forward toward the dug-in Ma-rines. The fighting was close and bit-ter, so close that six Marines werebayoneted in their foxholes beforecombined defensive fires drove the en-emy back.b

This counterattack was but the firstof many that hit all along the beach-head defenses during the rest of thenight. Illumination was constant overthe battlefield once the Japanese hadcommitted themselves; naval gunfireliaison officers kept a parade of 5-inchstar shells exploding overhead. Wherethe light shed by the naval flaresseemed dim to frontline commanders,60mm mortars were called on to throwup additional illumination shells. Theattacking enemy troops were nakedlyexposed to Marine rifles and machine

‘ Bevan G. Cass, cd., Histovy of the SixthMarine Division (Washington: Infantry Jour-nal Press, 1948), p. 15, hereafter Cass, 6th.t4arDiv History.

482 CENTRALPACIFICDRIVE

guns and the lethal bombardmentdirected by forward observers for heav-ier supporting weapons. The carnagewas great, but the men of the 3d Bat-talion, 38th Infantry kept trying tobreak through the American lines.’

Hill 40, 300 yards inland from BangiPoint, became the focal point of the3/3’8 attack. The platoon of CompanyK holding the small rise was hardpressed and driven out of its positionstwice, but rallied each time, counter-attacked, and recovered its ground.Similar dogged efforts by Major Hoy-ler’s men kept the remainder of the3/4 defenses intact, but when smallarms ammunition ran low in the for-ward holes, the Marines reserved theirfire for sure targets. The defensivefusillade, however, had accomplishedits purpose; there were few Japaneseleft alive in front of Company K.

In the confusion of the fighting,small groups of the enemy, armed withdemolition charges, made their waythrough the lines headed for the land-ing beaches. Some of these Japanesestumbled into the night defensive per-imeters of the 1st and 2d Battalions ofthe 305th Infantry; those that did werekilled by the alert soldiers. Other Jap-anese made life miserable for the Ma-rine artillerymen that were firing in

0A Japanese prisoner taken on Guam aptlydescribed the attacking troops’ dilemma in asituation that occurred frequently on the is-land, noting: “We had been thinking that theJapanese might win through a night counter-attack, but when the star shells came over oneafter the other we could only use our men ashuman bullets and there were many uselesscasualties and no chance of success.” Quotedin CominCh, The Marianas, Chap 3, p. 13,

support of the frontline troops. Asone battery executive officer recalled:

BY0130,we wereup to our necksin firemissionsand infiltratingJapanese.Everyso often, I had to call a sectionout for ashort time so it could take care of theintruderswith carbinesand then I wouldsendit backintoactionagain.’

Explosive-laden parties of enemysoldiers got as far as the beach road,where they disabled two weapons car-riers and three LVTS before they weregunned down. A platoon from theAmmunition Company, 5th Field Depotintercepted and killed 14 Japaneseheaded for the brigade ammunitiondumps The 4th Marines Tank Com-pany also had a rough night withinfiltrators; 23 were killed in andaround the service park.

Not all the Japanese that found theirway into the rear areas of the brigadecame through the thinly spread posi-tions on the south flank of the beach-head. A few filtered through the 22dMarines lines on the north, and otherswere offshoots of the force that at-tacked the 4th Marines units dug in onthe lower slopes of Mt. Alifan. Here,where Colonel Suenaga was in the fore-front of the assault troops, the Japa-nese made an inspired effort to breakthrough to the beach, but in vain. Inthe course of the fighting the enemycommander himself was killed.

Japanese probing attacks began hit-ting all along the lines of 1/4 shortlybefore midnight, but the fire fights thatdeveloped were just preliminaries to

‘ Capt BenjaminS. Read ltr to Capt OrlanR, Lodge, dtcl 3Jan52,quoted in Lodge, Re-capture of Guam, p. 55.

85th FldDep SAR, p. 7.

CONSOLIDATING A FOOTHOLD 483

the main event. At about 0230, therumble of tanks was heard above thedin of battle by the Marines guardingHarmon Road. A hurry-up call forMarine tanks was sent to the 2/4 CP,where a platoon of the regimental tankcompany was on alert for just such aneventuality. First two and later theremaining three mediums of the pla-toon moved up to the area where Com-pany B held blocking positions on theroad. At 0300, Marine infantry andtank machine guns opened up on acolumn of Japanese light tanks asthey approached the American lines.When tracers located the targets, tankgunners and a bazooka team close bythe roadside opened fire at pointblankrange. The first two enemy tankswere hit by rockets before the bazookagunner was cut down by the return fire.The 75s of the Shermans also hit bothlead tanks and two others besides.Helped by the light of burning tanksand the flares which sputteredoverhead, the men of Company B beatback the Japanese infantry that hadaccompanied the abortive tank thrust.

To the right of the Harmon Roadpositions, Company A had a hardnight-long struggle to hold its groundagainst the Japanese troops that re-peatedly charged down the heavilywooded slopes of the mountain. Butthe Marines did hold, despite casualtiesthat reduced one rifle platoon to astrength of four able-bodied men.gBy dawn, the worst part of the night’s

SCompanyA operatedwith two platoonsforthe rest of the campaignsince replacementswerenot available.Maj OrvilleV. Bergrenltrto CMC,dtd 6Jun47,hereafterBergren ltr.

battle to hold the center of the brigadeline was over. As the sun came up, aJapanese tank was spotted well up inthe moutain pass near the Maanot Res-ervoir. A Marine Sherman, one ofthose that had helped repulse thenight’s attacks, fired four armor-pierc-ing shells at a range later figured at1,840 yards, and scored two hits, set-ting the tank afire.

Marine tanks, sharpshooting or other-wise, were not needed on the northernflank of the perimeter during thenight’s fighting. Although there wasa constant drumfire from enemy infil-tration attempts all along the 22d Ma-rines lines, there was no all-out effortby the Japanese, since the commandingofficer of 2/38 had received no orders tojoin in the counterattack of his regi-ment. Only his (WL Company, whichwas positioned near Maanot Pass, gotcaught up in the 38th Infantry attemptto break through the Marine lines. Asa consequence, Company G on the rightflank of the lines of 2/22 had a busynight of fighting, killing 30 enemytroops between 0100 and 0500. Bandsof infiltrators that did get into the rearareas harassed the 22d Marines CPuntil daylight, when Colonel Schneid-er’s headquarters troops mopped up thearea.

Dawn brought a general cleanup ofthe surviving Japanese infiltratorsthroughout the brigade perimeter. Lo-cal attacks supported by tanks quicklyrestored the lines wherever they hadcontracted for better night defense dur-ing the height of the fighting. Thebrigade lost at least 50 men killed andtwice that number wounded during the


counterattack,l” but counted over 600enemy dead within, on, and in front ofthe perimeter.

After one day and a night of battle,the 38th Regiment ceased to exist asan effective fighting force. Only its ZClBattalion was still intact, and it nowstarted to pull back from contact withthe 22d Marines and retire towardOrote Peninsula. The dazed and scat-tered survivors of the counterattack,about 300 men in all, gradually assem-bled in the woods northeast of Mt. Ali-fan. There, the senior regimentalofficer still alive, the artillery battalioncommander, contacted the 29th Divisionheadquarters. He soon received ordersto march his group north to Ordot, theassembly point for Japanese reserves inthe bitter struggle for control of thehigh ground that commanded the Asan-Ade]up beaches.

BUNDSCHU RIDGE ANDCABRAS ISLAND II

There were few members of the en-emy’s 320th Independent Infantry Bat-talion left alive by nightfall on W-Day.Two of its companies, once concentratedin the Chonito Cliff area and the otherat Asan Point, had defended the heights

‘0 The American casualty total is an estimatebased on unit accounts of the fighting. Thecasualty figures available in contemporary per-sonnel records generally cover a longer periodthan the time encompassed by the counter-attack.

U Unless otherwise noted the material inthis section is derived from: 3d MarDiv SAR;3d Mar Jnl; 1/3 Jnl; 2/s Jnl; 3/3 Jnl; 9thMar R–2 Jnl, 21Jul-31Aug44, hereafter 9t?lMar Jnl; 21st Mar URpts, 22 Ju1–3Nov44,hereafter 21st Mar URpts; 3/21 Jnl; Craigltr; GSDF Studg.

that rimmed the 3d Marine Divisionbeaches. The third rifle company,originally located along the shore eastof Adelup Point, had been committedearly in the day’s fighting to containthe attacks of the 3d Marines. Thecommander of the 48th IMB, GeneralShigematsu, had also committed hisbrigade reserve, the 319th Battalion, tothe battle for control of the high groundon the left flank of the American beach-head.

According to plan, as soon as thelanding area was certain, General Shig-ematsu assumed command of most ofthe 29th Division reserve strength andbegan its deployment to the rugged hillsabove the Asan beaches. Elements ofthe 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry pluggedholes in the defenses in the center ofthe Japanese position, where they tan-gled with the 21st Marines. The 9thCompany, 38th Infantry reinforced thetroops holding the well-concealed em-placements and trenches atop Bund-schu Ridge. From positions near Or-dot, the 2d and 3d Battalions of the10th Independent Mixed Regiment wereordered to move out to reinforce 2/18,hard pressed by Colonel Butler’s Ma-rines who had seized a lodgement onthe cliffs behind Green Beach.

American carrier planes spotted themovement of the 10th lMR battalionsas soon as they began to move OULabout 1100. Although the regimentwas only 21/2 miles from its initial ob-j ective, it took most of the long, hotafternoon to reach it. Towards dusk,the leading elements of the 10th beganfiling their way up the steep, brush-filled valley between Fonte Plateau andMt. Macajna. (See Map 27.)

Just about the time that the 10th IMR


was reaching the relatively open groundalong the Mt. Tenjo Road, the 321.stand 322d Independent Infantry Battal-ions began moving toward the fighting,too. Leaving one company and a rapidfire gun unit to man its defenses atAgana Bay, the 321st started south at2000.12 An hour earlier, the 322d,which had 2-3 miles farther to travel,had left Tumon Bay on a forced marchfor the battlefield.

Using the Fonte River valley as theirgateway to the heights, Japanese re-serves continued to arrive at their as-sembly area on Fonte Plateau through-out the night. General Shigematsu,operating from his battle command postin a quarry not far from the road, dis-patched reinforcements into the fight asthey became available. Repeatedly, asthe night wore on, small groups of en-emy infantrymen charged out of thebrush, hurling grenades and firing theirrifles as they attempted to drive the de-fending Marines off the high ground.Japanese mortar fire tore at the thinAmerican lines throughout these at-tacks, and casualties were heavy, butthe men of the 21st Marines held. Thebrunt of the assaults fell on 2/21 alongits right flank, but Lieutenant ColonelSmoak drew back his right company tothe edge of the cliff where it held andbeat back all comers.

Helped immensely by the constantflare light overhead, American mortar,artillery, and naval gunfire observers

UConvinced that Agana Bay remainedalogical landing point for the Americans,theJapanesewere reluctantto completelydenudeits defenses.In additionto the infantry thatremained,naval troops continuedto hold re-serve positionsat Tiyan airfield and in thevicinityof theruinsof Agana.

rained a holocaust on the determinedattackers. According to Japanese esti-mates, during this one night’s fighting,2/1 8 had two-thirds of its men killed orwounded, 2/10 suffered comparablyheavy losses, and 3/1 O lost “approxi-mately 200 men.” 13 The remaining at-tackers drew off at dawn to join forceswith the troops that General Shige-matsu had called up from Agana andTumon Bay.

Neither of the battalions of the .48thIMB was able to make its way upthrough the Fonte valley in time tohave a significant effect on the night’sfighting. The 321st in fact was“thrown into utter disorder” 14by Ma-rine artillery fire as the battalion strug-gled upward in the darkness, and wasscattered again by strafing carrier air-craft after first light. The 322d Bat-talion, which followed, could do littlemore than move into holding positionsin the Fonte area, where it arrived neardawn, and wait for a more auspiciousoccasion to launch a counterattack.The focus of Japanese efforts to dis-lodge the Marines now shifted from thecenter to the left of the 3d Divisionlines.

The Marines of 2/3 and 3/3 that hadseized Adelup Point and Chonito Cliffhad a precarious hold on their prize ter-rain. Early in the morning, the menof the 319th and 320th IndependentInfantry Battalions, who had lost thepositions on the 21st, tried to win themback by an all-out counterattack. Thesituation was serious enough for Colo-nel Hall to commit all his strength and,at 0605, to request reinforcement from

= GSDF Study, p. 153.“ Ibid., p. 154.

CENTRAL PACIFIC DRIVE

the division reserve. One company of1/21 was ordered to report to the 3dMarines immediately, the shore partyon the Red Beaches was alerted to backup the lines on the left, and priority ofair support was given to the 3d Marines.Offshore the fire support ships that hadilluminated and fired harassing fires inthe Agana area all night were anxiousto give all the help they could, but theenemy was too close to the Marine lines.The commander of the destroyer Mc-Kee could see Japanese troops attackingthe men on Chonito Cliff, but could notobtain permission to fire from controlparties ashore.16

While some Japanese units madefrontal attacks on the Marine positions,others found their way along the drystream bed that cut between AdelupPoint and the looming cliffs. These at-tackers moved through the 3/3 com-mand post area and began climbing theslopes in the rear of the Marine fox-holes. Fire from Lieutenant ColonelHouser’s headquarters troops and fromsupporting LVTS eventually stoppedthis thrust and eliminated the remain-ing Japanese that had penetrated thelines.’e By 0830, the enemy had startedto withdraw and the threat of the coun-terattack was ended. On the heels ofthe retreating Japanese, the Marinesbegan to advance but the enemy wasable to throw up an almost impenetra-ble barrier of artillery, mortar, andsmall arms fire.

The nature of the Japanese counter-attacks, and of the terrain that gavethem added impetus, provided the pat-

MCO, USS McKee ActRpt of Guam Op, dtd7Aug44 (OAB, NHD) .

‘4 Bastian ltr.

tern for the American response. Orig-inally, the 3d Division had scheduled athree-regiment attack for 0700 on the22d. Now the 21st Marines held fast,since any advance would dangerouslyexpose its left flank. The 3d Marineshad to come abreast of the 21st to makea concerted advance possible. The keyto that advance appeared to be posses-sion of Bundschu Ridge. Until the 3dMarines could win its way to the top ofthis well-defended salient, there couldbe little progress on the left or center ofthe 3d Division lines.

The situation was different on theright, where Colonel Craig’s regimentfought its way into the flats beyondAsan Point and eliminated most of thedefending company of the 320th Battal-ion in the process. Elements of 3/18then attempted to slow the Marine ad-vance during the rest of the day. Af-ter nightfall, as the enemy battalioncommander prepared to launch a coun-terattack, he was ordered instead tomove most of his men, supplies, andequipment into the hills east of the 9thMarines positions. The Japanese wereconcentrating their remaining strengthon the high ground, and the 18th In-fam%y was to hold the left flank of themain defensive positions. As a resultof this withdrawal, only small delayinggroups countered the advance of 1/9 and2/9 when they jumped off at 0715 on 22July.

Inside of two hours the assault com-panies of both battalions were consoli-dating their hold on the day’s first ob-jective, the high ground along theTatgua River. Resistance was lightand plans were laid for a further ad-vance which would include seizure ofthe villages of Tepungan and Piti. At


1300, the battalions moved out again,and by 1700, 2/9 had captured both vil-lages and the shell- and bomb-pockedruins of the Piti Navy Yard as well.Inland, the 1st Battalion had kept pacewith difficulty, as it climbed across thebrush-covered slopes and gulleys thatblocked its path. It was obvious thatthe Japanese had been there instrength; recently abandoned defensivepositions were plentiful. The fire ofthe few enemy soldiers that remained,however, kept the advancing Marineswary and quick to deploy and reply inkind.

While 1/9 and 2/9 were driving for-ward to secure the coastal flats andtheir bordering hills, Colonel Craig wasreadying 3/9 for the assault on CabrasIsland. The regimental weapons com-pany, a company of Shermans from the3d Tank Battalion, and 18 LVT (A)sfrom the 1st Armored Amphibian Bat-talion were all alerted to support theinfantry, which would make a shore-to-shore attack mounted in LVTS. Themorning advance of the regiment haduncovered an area, near the mouth ofthe Tatgua River, that Craig had desig-nated for the assembly of troops andamphibious vehicles.

Shortly after 1400, the armored am-phibians crawled out across the reefand began shelling the beaches on theeastern end of Cabras. The tractor-borne assault platoons followed, avoid-ing the mined causeway and movingacross the reef and water. At 1425,they clattered ashore on the elongatedislet.l? There was no defending fire,

“ “Due to the steep banks in the landingarea, it was necessary to make and issuescaling ladders and these were used.” Although

but there was a defense. Marines soonfound that the ground was liberallystrewn with mines spread out beneatha blanket of thick brush; as a result, thegoing was cautious and slow. At 1650,Major Hubbard reported that 3/9 hadadvanced 400 yards without making en-emy contact, but that the combinationof mines and brambles would keep hismen from reaching the end of the is-land before dark. On order, the battal-ion halted and set up for night defense;two platoons of tanks reinforced thebeach positions. UJith no opposition insight, the early capture of Cabras on23 July seemed assured.

Although the situation of the 9th Ma-rines was a favorable one, the regimentwas fully committed and holding farlonger lines than either the 3d or the21st. Impressed by the need forstrengthening his positions on the leftand center of the beachhead and formaintaining the impetus of the attack,General Turnage asked General Geigerto attach a regimental combat team ofthe corps reserve to the 3d Marine Di-vision. The one reserve infantry bat-talion that was available to the divisioncommander was “40 70 depleted” 18as aresult of two days’ combat, as 2/21 hadbeen pulled out of the cliff positions ithad defended so ably and replaced by1/21 late on the 22d. Colonel Butler,wanting to give maximum effect to any21st Marines attack on W plus 2, hadrequested the switch of battalions indivision reserve and the last units were

none of the assault troops were hit, one LVTwas blown up by a mine, while it was return-ing to the main island; there were four casual-ties. Ch%ig 22.Jun65 ltT.

= Sd Ma~Div Jnl, entry of 1455, 22Ju144.

214-881 O-67—32


exchanged in place on the shell-batteredheights at 2115.

When Lieutenant Colonel Williams’battalion moved into the lines, it hadthe responsibility of extending the zoneof action of the 21st Marines 200 yardsto the left of the regimental boundary,which had remained unchanged sincethe landing. This shift, which ap-peared to offer a better control point forcontact, had been directed by GeneralTurnage in order to improve the oppor-tunity for the 3d and 21st Marines tolink their frontline positions. The gaphad opened and stayed open, not as aresult of a lack of will but of a way, toclose it. Patrols attempting to find alateral route which joined the flanks of1/3 and 2/21 (later 1/21) could findnone that did not include a time-con-suming return to the lower slopes backof the beaches. No amount of maps,terrain models, or aerial photographs,nor advance intelligence from formerisland residents, could do full justice tothe nightmare of twisting ravines, jum-bled rocks, and steep cliffs that hid be-neath the dense vegetation.

With such terrain on its flanks andupper reaches, Bundschu Ridge was anatural fortress for the relative hand-ful of Japanese troops that defended it.Throughout the fighting on 22 July,Major Aplington tried repeatedly towork some of his men up onto the highground that appeared to lead to the en-emy positions. Using Company C onthe right and coordinating his attackwith Company E of 2/3 on the left, the1st Battalion commander maintainedconstant pressure on the Japanese, butcould make no permanent headway.Despite some temporary success, Ma-rine units that fought their way to the

high ground could not hold what theyhad won in the face of punishing enemymortar and machine gun fire. Aboutthe only encouraging event in the day’saction came near nightfall, when theremnants of Company A were finallyable to pull out of exposed positions onthe nose of Buncischu Ridge, after Jap-anese fire, which had pinned themdown, slackened and then ceased.

General Turnage planned an all-outattempt to erase the Bundschu salienton 23 July and to make sure that therewas a firm and permanent juncture be-tween the 3d and 21st Marines. In away, the Japanese helped him by sac-rificing more of their men in anotherfruitless attempt to break through theleft flank positions of the 21st Marineson the night of 22-23 July. The coun-terattack that developed against 1/21was not the one, however, that wasplanned. The operations officer of the29th Division, Lieutenant Colonel Hid-eyuki Takeda, had issued careful in-structions to the commander of the321st Independent Infantry Battalionto work his assault units up close to theMarine lines, to throw grenades at theunsuspecting Americans, and then towithdraw in the resulting confusion.lgIn the heat of combat, the enemy as-sault platoon commanders ignored theirorders and charged the Marines. Theresults were devastating. Japanesecasualties were heavy, and only about50 men of what had been a 488-man

m Curiously, 21st Mar URpts state that thiscounterattack opened with “an intense lightmortar barrage” and make no mention of thehail of grenades ordered by Lieutenant ColonelTakeda,


battalion remained when the last at-tackers pulled back at about 0300.

The losses suffered by the Japanesein this attack, and the steady attritionof tvvo days of battle, vrere rapidly thin-ning the ranks of the 29th Division and44th ZMB. Although there were thou-sands of service and support troops ofvarying quality left alive to fight, thenumber of veteran infantrymen wasfast shrinking. The valley betweenFonte Plateau and Mt. Macajna, site ofthe division field hospital and that ofthe naval guard force too, was crowdedwith wounded men. Aggravating themedical situation was the fact that theFonte River, which coursed the valley,was so fouled by blood and bodies thatit could not be used as a source of drink-ing water. Thirsty Japanese troopsholding the arc of Asan defenses re-ceived short water rations from thesmall supply that could be carried infrom Sinajana.

The enemy situation was deteriorat-ing and no one knew it better thanGeneral Takashina. His aggressive de-fensive tactics had cost him many cas-ualties. Faced with what appeared tobe almost certain defeat by a superiorforce, he had the choice of conservinghis strength and prolonging the battleas long as possible or trying to obtain adecisive advantage by a massive, coor-dinated counterattack. By the 23d, theenemy division commander had madehis decision, the key decision in the Jap-anese defense of Guam. He would

stage a full-blown attack employing allthe men and guns he could bring to bearon IIIAC positions, while he still had

substantial strength in veteran troops.At 1300 on the 23d, he issued ordersoutlining areas of responsibility for

combat and support units in preparingfor the assault.

A lot of fighting, and a lot more cas-

ualties on both sides, occurred beforethe Japanese were ready to strike. Onthe morning of the 23d, the 3d Marinescontinued its attack to seize a firmerhold on the ridges which overlookedevery part of the beachhead. To giveMajor Aplington more men, and thusa better chance to bridge the trouble-some gap between the 3d and 21st Ma-rines, Colonel Hall attached to 1/3 a pro-visional infantry company formed fromhis regimental weapons company. Re-ferring to Bundschu Ridge, he re-ported:

I am going to try to advance up thatmess in front of me. What I really needis a battalion whereas I have only 160men to use on that 500-yard slope. Theymight move to the top but they couldn’tadvance on. Company A is down to about30–40 men with an air liaison officer incharge. Company E is down to halfstrength. They have no strength to pushon.~

To give the new thrust as much im-petus as possible, every availablesupporting weapon—naval guns andcarrier air, field and antiaircraft artil-lery, half-tracks and tanks—bombardedthe wooded slopes ahead of the 3d Ma-rines before the regiment attacked at

0900. ln the center, parallel drives bythe 1st and 2d Battalions converged onthe Bundschu strongpoint, but the Jap-anese position was strangely silent.During the night, the enemy had pulled

back to fight again on some other ridgeof the many that still lay ahead of theMarines. Defense of Bundschu had

cost the 9th Company, 38th Infantry,

S 3d Mar Jnl, 23 Ju144.


30 casualties, but the return exactedfrom the 3d Marines was far greater.

Assault platoons of 1/3 and 2/3linked up atop the ridge at 1108, andthe battalions spent the rest of the daycleaning out nests of enemy riflemenand machine gunners who held out in

deftly hidden cliff side and ravine de-fenses within the Marine lines. The

concealment offered the Japanese bythe dense vegetation and the cover bynumerous caves and bunkers made thetask of consolidating the newly wonpositions a formidable one. The in-credible complexity of the cut-up ter-rain. in this relatively small area was

clearly demonstrated by the failure ofall attemp~s to make permanent contacton the frontline boundary between the3d and 21st Marines, On the 23d, a 1/3patrol in radio contact with both regi-ments moved out from the left flank of1,/21 and “attempting to rejoin its ownlines in broad daylight, over a gap of a

few hundred yards . . . was lost.”The 3d Division comment on the plightof the patrol was sympathetic, notingthat “the innumerable gulleys, valleys,and ridges might as well have beengorges and mountains.” 21

The continued existence of the gapplagued Marine commanders, but the

Japanese did little to exploit its poten-tial.22 ln fact, they, like the Marines,peppered the area with mortar fire atnight to discourage infiltrators.

What the Japanese were really con-cerned about was readily apparent on

= ~d MarDiv S’AR, p. 4.= The commander of 1/3, discounting the

threat posed by the gap, did not believe “thatthe terrain made anything but minor infiltra-tion possible.” Maj Henry Aplington II, ltr toCMC, dtd 9Apr47, hereafter Aplington h-.

the 23d, once 3/3 opened its attack.The enemy reaction was swift, violent,and sustained; a heavy fire fight en-sued. Lieutenant Colonel Houser’s bat-

talion, by virtue of its hard-won posi-tions at Adelup Point and Chonito Cliff,

threatened to gain command of the Mt.Tenjo Road where it climbed to the

heights. Once the Marines controlledthis vital section of the road, tanks andhalf-tracks could make their way up toFonte Plateau and bring their guns to

bear on the enemy defenses that wereholding back the units in the center ofthe 3d division line.

During the morning’s fighting,

Houser was hit in the shoulder andevacuated; his executive officer, Major

Royal R. Bastian, took command of 3/3.At 1217, the major reported that his as-

sault companies, I and K, had seized theforward slopes of the last ridge beforethe cliff dropped off sharply to the rearand the Fonte River valley. The Japa-nese used their positions on the reverse

slope to launch counterattacks thatsorely pressed the Marine assault

troops. Major Bastian put every avail-able rifleman into the front, paring

down supporting weapons crews for re-inforcements, and his lines held. By1400, Colonel Hall was ordering all hisunits to consolidate their hold on theground they had won and to tie in sol-idly for night defense.

The main thrust of the 3d Division at-tack on 23 July was on the left flank;the rest of the division kept pressure onthe Japanese to its front. The battal-ion on the right of the 3d Marines, 1/21,had its hands full destroying a networkof caves and emplacements that covered

the sides of a depression just forwardof its nighttime positions. The 3d Bat-

49’2 CENTRAL PACIFIC DRIVE

talion, 21st Marines spent the day im-proving its positions, establishing

outposts well forward of its lines, andtangling with small groups of Japanese,who themselves were scouting theAmerican defenses. In general, theright half of Colonel Butler’s zone ofaction was as quiet as it had been sincethe night of W-Day.

This absence of significant enemy ac-tivity carried over into the 9th Marineszone. Squad-sized Japanese unitsmade sporadic harassing attacks bothday and night, but there was little or-ganized enemy opposition. The 3dBattalion finished its occupation of

Cabras Island early in the morning andat division order, turned over control ofthe island to the 14th Defense Battalion

at 0900. An hour later, Colonel Craigreceived word from division that his 2dBattalion would replace 2j21 in divisionreserve, The regimental commanderordered 3/9 to take over the lines held

by Lieutenant Colonel Cushman’s unit.The relief was effected at 1230, andCushman moved 2/9 to the positionsformerly occupied by 2/21.

Once it was released to Colonel But-ler’s control, Lieutenant ColonelSmoak’s battalion moved to an assemblyarea near the 21st Marines left bound-ary. In the attack on the 24th, 2/21,which was all too familiar with therugged terrain, would spark the driveto close the gap between regiments.

The lone infantry battalion in reservewas all that General Turnage could

spare from the front lines; he hadlearned earlier in the day that he couldexpect no immediate reinforcement

from the IIIAC reserve. GeneralGeiger had decided that the situationashore did not warrant the landing of a

77th Division combat team in the Asanbeachhead.

Enemy activity was markedly less af-ter dark on the 23d than it had been onprevious nights. Only 2/21 was seri-ously threatened, and the Japanesethrust at its lines was turned back byartillery and naval gunfire. Since mostof the 3d Division front was held bystrongpoints only, the support providedby the howitzers of the 12th Marinesand the guns of destroyers and cruisersstanding by offshore was vital. The

constant harassing fire laid on enemy-held territory and the prompt interdic-tion of actual or suspected routes ofapproach to the American positionsheld the Japanese in check.

The fourth day of attacks to expandthe 3d Division beachhead saw no spec-tacular gains, but Marine assault pla-toons were able to make steadyprogress. Yard by yard, they in-

creased their hold on the high ground,and, on the left particularly, won posi-tions that gave access to the Mt. Tenjo

Road. Not unexpectedly, the hardestfighting took place in a densely woodeddraw in the troublesome boundary areabetween the 3d and 21st Marines.

Lieutenant Colonel Smoak’s battalion

stirred up a hornet’s nest when it at-tempted to center its drive to theheights on the draw. In it, Japanesetroops were set up in mutually support-ing cave positions whose machine guns

drove the Marines to cover. Embold-ened by this temporary success, the en-emy made two counterattacks, whichwere readily beaten back. Assault units,moving upward on the flanks of theJapanese position, were able to bringfire to bear on the caves, but could not

silence the enemy guns. A supporting

CONSOLIDATING A FOO1’HOLD 493

air strike at 1205 enabled a platoonworking its way up the bottom of thedraw to advance 200 yards before heavyfire again forced a halt. This time the

carrier planes, although they were

mainly on target, dropped three bombsamongst the Marines, causing 17 casu-alties. Although this unfortunate acci-

dent marked the end of the day’sadvance, 2/21 had accomplished its mis-

sion. When Smoak adjusted his linesfor night defense, he was able to tie instrongly with both 1/3 and 1/21. Thegap was finally closed.

Highlighting the action on this sameday, in the relatively quiet sector of the9th Marines, was the first attempt to

contact the brigade. In the morning,a 30-man patrol worked its way southalong the Piti-Sumay Road, while acovey of six LVT (A)s guarded its Apra

Harbor flank. Scattered rifle and ma-chine gun fire coming from the high

ground inland, coupled with fragmentsflying from a bombing and shelling ofOrote Peninsula forced the patrol toturn back after it had gone 2,600 yards.It found evidence that the Japanese hadonce occupied the area in force and dis-covered “huge dumps of all classes of

supply near the [Aguada River]power plant, enough to service a regi-ment, but no traces of the regiment.” 23

If the 18th Infantry had disappearedfrom one shore of the harbor, there wasample evidence to show that there wasno lack of Japanese on the other side.Soon after night fell on the 24th, the9th Marines spotted enemy barges alongthe coast. of Orote near Sumay. star

shells were fired by the call fire support

ship assigned to the regiment, the de-

- SdMarDiv SAR, p. 4.

stroyer Frank.s,za and the area of Japa-nese activity was hammered by newly

emplaced 90mm guns of the 14th De-fense Battalion on Cabras Island. At

2010, after receiving permission fromthe shore fire control party with 3/9,which was spotting for it, the Franksilluminated the suspected area with its

searchlight in order to conserve starshells.25 The light on the ship wasshuttered when two 14th Defensesearchlights on Cabras took over thesweeping search of cliff, beach, and wa-ter, looking for targets for the 90s.The night’s events showed plainly thatthe Japanese on Orote Peninsula werestirring. The Marine observers whoknew it best were those who werecharged with its capture.

CLOSING OFF OROTEPENINSULA 26

The heavy losses suffered by the en-emy 38th Infantry in its counterattack

on the 1st Marine Brigade perimeter

opened the way for a rapid advance on

= CO, USS Franks Rpt of Fire Support dur-ing Guam Occupation, dtd 16Aug44 ( OAB,NHD) .

= On 23 July, General Geiger had authorizedthe use of destroyer searchlights for nightillumination “in view of limited star [shells]available.” $d MarDiv Jrd, entry of 23Ju144.

% Unless otherwise noted, the material inthis section is derived from: TG 53.2 OpRpt,dtd llSep44 (OAB, NHD ), hereafter TG 53.2OpRpt; 77th InfDiv OpRpt FORAGER, 21 Jul-16Aug44, containing reports of all major com-ponent units ( WW II RecsDiv, FRC, Alex-andria, Va. ) hereafter 77th Inf Div OpRpt;77th Znf Div Jnl; 1st ProvMavBrig S’AR; IstProvMarBrig Jnl; 1st ProvMarBrig URpts;22d Mar Jnl; 1/22 JYLl; 2/22 Jnl; 1/4 WarD;3/4 WarD; 6th TkBn SAR; Cass, 6th MavDivHistory.


the22d. Isolated from the rest of theJapanese garrison, the remainingtroops were incapable of fighting a de-laying action on all fronts. The enemycould muster strength enough to put upa stiff fight to block one route of ad-vance—the road to Orote Peninsula.The task of opening that road fell to the22d Marines; the rest of the brigadewas charged with the mission of reach-ing and securing the Final Beachhead

Line where it ran along the Alifan-Taene massif, crossed Maanot Pass, and

reached the high ground leading to Mt.Tenjo. (See Map 26.)

General Shepherd’s plan for the bri-gade operations on W plus 1 called forthe 1st and 3d Battalions of ColonelTanzola’s 305th Infantry to passthrough the left flank of the 4th Ma-rines and attack to seize and hold Maa-not Pass. The 2d Battalion of the305th was to remain in brigade reserve.The 305th was given responsibility for

maintaining contact with the 22d Ma-rines, which was to move out echeloned

to the left rear of the Army regiment,making its main effort on the leftalong the Agat-Sumay Road. The ini-tial objective of the 4th Marines wasthe capture of Mt. Alifan and the seiz-ure of the ridge leading toward Mt.

Taene. Once the regiment secured thiscommanding ground, 3/4 was to drivesouth to take Magpo Point, extendingthe south flank of the beachhead 1,200–1,500 yards beyond Hill 40 and BangiPoint.

By 0740, it became apparent that1/305 and 3/305 would need several

hours to regroup and reorganize afterthe unavoidable delay and disorganiza-tion resulting from their nighttime

landing, Consequently, General Shep-

herd ordered 2,/305 to move forwardand relieve 2/4 in position. The 4thand 22d Marines jumped off at 0900, andthe 305th followed suit an hour later,passing through elements of both 2/305and 2/4 and striking northeast through

Maanot Pass. Colonel Tanzola’s menfound their first tast,e of combat an easy

one to take. Except for scattered op-position by individuals and the sporadicfire of one mortar, the regiment met

little resistance. The 3d Battalion, onthe left, took its part of the day’s ob-jective by 1300, and the 1st Battalion,slowed by thick underbrush and morerugged terrain, came up on line at dusk.Most supporting units of the 305th

RCT, including half-tracks, antitankguns, and tanks, came ashore duringthe day, and the 305th Field Artillerymoved into firing positions and regis-tered its 105mm howitzers.27

The terrain problems posed by theheavily wooded slopes that slowed the

advance of 1/305 were multiplied in thezone of the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines.The day’s objective included the top ofMt. Alifan and the direction of advance

was up. The steep sides of the moun-

tain were covered with dense, thorny

undergrowth, and only a few trailswound their way through the sprawl-ing tree roots and tangled vines. The

mountain itself was a formidable obsta-

cle, but the Japanese made it even moredifficult. On the lower slopes, bunkers,reinforced with coconut logs, and someof the numerous caves contained Japa-nese defenders. These were methodi-

~ Battery B of the 305th had landed late onW-Day but did not move into position andstart firing until 0945 on the 22d. 305th FABn AAR, 21Ju1-10Aug44 (WW II RecsDiv,FRC, Alexandria, Vs.).


tally eliminated by the grenades andrifle fire of assault squads of CompanyC and Company G, attached to 1/4 afterthe 2d Battalion was relieved by the305th Infantry.

At about noon, the climb for themountain peak began, an ascent thatgrew steadily tougher as the Marineswent higher. Fortunately, the Japa-

nese did not contest the last stages ofthe advance when packs and all excessgear were discarded to lessen the bur-den on the sweating climbers. Finally,at 1530, a patrol reached the very top,where it could see the other side of theisland. The peak proved to be inde-fensible, so night positions were dug inon the lower slopes, where 1/4 tied inwith 1/305 on the left. On the right,where the lines of the battalion ex-tended southwest along the ridge lead-ing to Mt. Taene, the flank hung open.

In order to help block this gap, Com-pany E of 2]4 was attached to 3/4 latein the afternoon of the 22d. MajorHoyler’s companies had begun their at-tack at 1100 to extend the beachheadsouth. Resistance was light on allcompany fronts, and naval gunfire, ar-tillery, and mortars helped discourageany Japanese attempt to hold instrength. Company K, advancingacross the low, rolling ground along theshore, was supported by a platoon ofShermans, which knocked out enemymachine gun nests before they could doany damage. Once the battalion hadreached and secured Magpo Point, ex-tending its lines inland, the tanks setup close to the frontlines to bolsternight defenses. There was no signifi-cant number of Japanese in front of3/4, however, to stage a repeat of thewild counterattack on the first night

ashore. The few survivors of 1/38 and3/38 were already assembling behindMt. Tenjo to move north to Ordot.

The pattern of light and scattered re-sistance, which marked the advance ofthe other regiment of the brigade, wasrepeated in the right portion of the 22dMarines zone of action. Moving out at0900, 2/22 had little difficulty in elimi-nating the few Japanese it met; navalgunfire knocked out several pillboxes,which might have meant more seriousopposition. The battalion was held upmore by the extreme difficulty of get-ting supplies up to its assault platoonsthan it was by enemy activity. LVTS,which might have negotiated the bro-ken, trackless ground, were in suchshort supply and so vital to the ship-to-shore movement that General Shepherdforbade their use inland except in emer-gency situations.

Along the shore, where 1/22 attackedastride the Agat-Sumay Road, the sup-ply situation was not a problem butamphibian tractors were still needed.Here the call went out for LVT (A)s toact in lieu of tanks and half tracks.During the morning’s action, mediumsof the 22d Marines Tank Companyhelped clear the way through partiallyabandoned defenses outside Agat,where the enemy had held up the ad-vance on W-Day. Armor had to stopat the Ayuj a River, since the onlybridge over it had been demolished andthe banks were too steep for fording.When the request went back for engi-neers, LVT (A)s were asked for too, anda platoon was ordered up, to come in bysea if necessary, in order to join theadvancing infantry. By late after-noon, Company C of 1/22 had takenRoad Junction 5 (RJ 5) and won its


way about 300 yards beyond, fightingthrough a nest of enemy pillboxes.Company A on the right flank hadcrossed Old Agat Road. At 1800, Lieu-tenant Colonel Fromhold ordered hismen to dig in along a line about 50-100yards back of their farthest advances inorder to set up stronger defensive posi-tions tied in with 2/22.

The second night ashore in the south-ern beachhead was a relatively quietone. There were infiltration attemptsat various points all along the perimeterand occasional fires from Japanese mor-tars and artillery emplaced on OrotePeninsula, but no serious threats to theperimeter. Should another large-scalecounterattack come, however, it wouldbe met by a markedly increased volumeof supporting fires. Most of the menand guns of General del Vane’s IIICorps Artillery had landed during theday; the “Long Toms” of the 7th 155-mm Gun Battalion to support the 3dDivision and the shorter range pieces ofthe 1st and 2d 155mm Howitzer Battal-ions to reinforce the fires of the 1stBrigade and the 77th Division.ZB TheLight Antiaircraft Group of the 9thDefense Battalion had landed on the22d also and sited its .50 caliber ma-chine guns and 20mm and 40mm gunsin positions where they could improvebeach defenses. Lieutenant ColonelArchie E. O’Neill, commanding the 9thDefense Battalion, was placed in chargeof all shore party, LVT, and LVT (A)

= TF 53 OpRpt, p. 12. The 2d 155mmHowitzer Battalion had been detached fromVAC Artillery at Saipan on 14 July and re-assigned to IIIAC to increase available fire-power.

units used to defend the beaches andinland beach area perimeter.~g

On 23 July, General Geiger was pre-pared to send thousands of men andguns of the 77th Division ashore inkeeping with the prelanding scheme ofmaneuver. The corps commander con-ferred with General Bruce early on the22d and authorized the landing of allbut one infantry regiment of the float-ing reserve. The 307th RCT, less itsreinforcing artillery battalion, was tostay on board ship for the time beingwhile the need for its commitment inthe 3d Division beachhead was assessed.General Bruce issued warning ordersfor the landing to all units of his divi-sion at 1400 on the 22d and followedthrough with a request to AdmiralReifsnider that the 306th RCT belanded on White Beach 2 at the earliestpracticable daylight hour on the 23d.The Army regiment, commanded byColonel Aubrey D. Smith, was slated torelieve the 4th Marines in its positionsalong the southern flank of the beach-head.

At 0800 on the 23d, the 22d Marinesand the 305th Infantry attacked toseize an objective line that ran acrossthe neck of Orote Peninsula to ApraHarbor and then southeast to the ridgeleading to Mt. Tenjo and south alongcommanding ground to Maanot Pass.The 305th, with the 1st and 3d Battal-ions in assault, encountered little oppo-sition to its advance and secured itsobjective, part of the FBHL, withoutdifficulty. By the day’s end, ColonelTanzola’s regiment was digging strong

= 9th Def Bn WarDs, Jul–Aug44, hereafter9th DefBn WarDs.


defensive positions along the highground overlooking Orote Peninsula.

General Bruce had intended to re-lieve the 4th Marines with the 306thInfantry by nightfall on the 23d so thatthe Marine regiment could move northto take part in the brigade attack onOrote Peninsula. Since no LVTS orDUKWS could be spared from resupplyruns, the soldiers of the 306th had towade ashore, like those of the 305th be-fore them. Admiral Reifsnider recom-mended that the men come in at halftide at noon, when the water over thereef would be about waist deep. Thistiming precluded the early relief of the4th Marines. The first battalion toland, 3/306, began trudging through thewater at about 1130. Three hourslater, the Army unit, reinforced by acompany of 1/306, began relieving 3/4in place; a platoon of Marine 37mmguns and one of Sherman tanks re-mained in position as a temporarymeasure to strengthen night defenses.The remainder of Colonel Smith’s com-bat team came ashore during the after-noon and went into bivouac behind the4th Marines lines. Colonels Smith andTanzola met with General Bruce in the77th Division advance CP ashore at1400 to receive orders for the next day’saction, when the division would takeover responsibility for most of the bri-gade-held perimeter.

Once it was relieved, the 3d Battal-ion, 4th Marines was ordered to moveto positions near Agat and was attachedto the 22d Marines as a nighttime re-serve. One company of the 4th, F, hadalready been attached to the 22d as areserve during the day, and a platoonof the 4th Marines tanks was also sent

to back up the regiment driving to-wards Orote.

During the morning’s advance, the22d Marines had met only light resist-ance. The Japanese appeared to befalling back before the assault platoonsof 1/22 and 2/22. Colonel Schneider’sregiment keyed its movement on Com-pany I, attached to 1/22, which had re-lieved Company C as the unit chargedwith fighting its way up the Agat-Su-may Road. The attack plan called forthe companies on the right of CompanyI to swing north and west across theneck of the peninsula. By noon, tankswere again available to support the at-tack, since a tank dozer and tankmenarmed with pick and shovels had builta causeway across the Ayu j a.

Prior to the attempt to close off theneck of the peninsula, the attackingMarines paused while an intensive air,artillery, and naval gunfire preparationwas laid on the difficult terrain that layahead. Much of the ground that laybetween the Agat-Sumay and Old AgatRoads was covered with rice paddiesinterspersed with small hillocks andstretches of thick brush. It was ter-rain calculated to spread the attackingtroops thin and to make contact andany concentration of unit strength dif-ficult. The defending Japanese infan-try, presumably from 2/38, had organ-ized the ground effectively, taking goodadvantage of natural obstacles. En-emy supporting artillery and heavymortars on Orote Peninsulaj well regis-tered in the area of Marine advance,frequently timed their fires to coincidewith American preparations, a practicethat led to a rash of reports aboutAmerican fires falling short intofriendly lines.


Once the Marines jumped off, theyfound that the little hills ahead wereinfested with enemy riflemen and ma-chine gunners. When squads of menadvanced into the open paddies, smallarms and light mortar fire pinned themdown in the mud and water. Heavierguns positioned on Orote raked thelines with enfilade fire. Stretcher bear-ers and ammunition carriers attempt-ing to reach the front lines were drivenback by the hail of explosions, only tocome on again with the needed aid.Supporting tanks could not manueverin the soft footing of the paddies, andwhen they tried to use the roads, onewas knocked out by 37mm antitankfire and another was disabled by amine. In a wearying afternoonmarked by repeated but fruitless at-tempts to reach its objective, the 22dMarines suffered over a hundred cas-ualties. As darkness approached, theunits that had been pinned down wereable to shake loose and pull back to bet-ter night defensive positions along theOld Agat Road, giving up about 400yards of untenable ground in the proc-ess.

On the night of 23-24 July, there wasstill a considerable hole between theflank units of the 305th Infantry andthe 22d Marines, but the Japanese tookno advantage of the gap. Instead, atabout 0200, counterattacks by smallunits, attempts at infiltration, and har-assing fires from mortars and artillerywere directed against the Marine posi-tions along Old Agat Road at theboundary between 1/22 and 2/22.The Brigade Artillery Group was quickto respond to requests for supportingfire, and the fire support ships offshorejoined in with increased illumination

and heavy doses of 5-inch high ex-plosive. The flurry of Japanese activ-ity died away quickly beneath thesmother of supporting fires.

General Shepherd and his operationsofficer, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas A.Culhane, Jr., worked out a plan ofattack for the 24th that was designedto outflank the Japanese defensive com-plex encountered on 23 July. Issued atmidnight, the brigade operation ordercalled for two battalions of the 22dMarines to attack in column on a 200-yard front with the left flank restingon the coast. Once through the nar-row corridor between the rice paddiesand the sea, the trailing battalionwould extend to the right, seize enroute the troublesome hill defenses thathad stopped the previous day’s attack,and then drive for the shore of ApraHarbor on a two-battalion front. Inan attack simultaneous with the mainthrust up the Agat-Sumay Road, theremaining battalion of the 22d wouldadvance on a 400-yard front on theright of the regimental zone, jumpingoff from Old Agat Road with an obj ec-tive of seizing and holding the shore ofApra Harbor. The 4th Marines, whenrelieved by the 306th Infantry, wouldassemble in brigade reserve in the vi-cinity of RJ 5. One platoon of the 4thMarines tanks and a platoon ofLVT (A)s would be attached to the22d Marines to beef up the attackalong the coast.

The time of the attack was set for0900 following a lengthy softening-upof the target by air, naval gunfire, andartillery, with corps 155mm howitzersadding their heavier metal to the firesof the brigade 75s. The attack wasdelayed an hour to increase the effect


of cruiser and destroyer bombardmentalong the southern coast of Orote Pen-insula, where suspected and knownJapanese positions could pour fire intothe western flank of the attacking Ma-rines. At 1000, Company C of 1/22led off a column of companies drivingforward from a line of departure atApaca Point. The regimental tankcompany, reinforced by the platoon ofthe 4th Marines Shermans, moved outwith the assault rifle squads.

The enemy reaction to the advanceof 1/22 was immediate; artillery andmortar shells exploded among the lead-ing units and automatic weapons firewhipped across the front. Taking ad-vantage of natural cover and of theshelter provided by the tank armor,riflemen of Company C kept movingforward. When five enemy tanks sud-denly appeared to block the advance,the Marine mediums made quick workof destroying them, and continued for-ward using their 75mm guns and ma-chine guns to blast concrete andcoconut log emplacements.30 As theleading units reached the area beyondthe rice paddies, fire from enemy gunsconcealed in the cliffs of Orote nearNeye Island became so troublesomethat two gunboats were dispatched toknock them out. In a close-in duel,both craft, LCI (G)s 366 and 439, werehit by enemy fire and suffered casual-ties of 5 killed and 26 wounded.31 But

= The day’s tank score was eight. At 120.5,aerial observers discovered three tanks inlandnear Harmon Road at the center of the island.Commander, Support Aircraft ordered themattacked by fighter-bombers; all three weredestroyed.

= LCI (G) Div 15 AR, dtd 17 Aug44 (OAB,NHD) .

their 20mm and 40mm cannonade beatdown the fire of the Japanese guns, anda destroyer came up to add 5-inchinsurance that they would remainsilent.

At 1400, after the ship and shore gunbattle had subsided, the rest of 1/22started moving up on the right ofCompany C. The 3d Battalion (Lieu-tenant Colonel Clair W. Shisler), ech-eloned to the right rear of the lst, nowhad maneuver room to attack and rollup the line of enemy positions that hadheld up the 22d Marines’ attack acrossthe rice paddies on W plus 2. Movingquickly, 3/22 took and demolished thestrongpoint and then turned north to-ward the harbor. Lieutenant ColonelShisler’s companies encountered thesame type of light-to-moderate smallarms, artillery, and mortar fire thatconfronted 1/22 and the going overrugged terrain was slow. By dusk,the 1st Battalion was dug in on itsobjective, but the 3d Battalion had toset up its night defensive perimeterabout 400 yards short of the harborshore. This gap was well covered,however, as a result of the success ofthe attack by 2/22 on the right of theregiment.

Lieutenant Colonel Hart’s battalionwas getting ready to move out fromOld Agat Road at 1000 when lead ele-ments were hit by fire, which appearedto herald an enemy counterattack. Atalmost the same time, fragments fromthe heavy naval shelling in support ofthe Marine attack began hitting alongthe front lines. While the troops werewaiting for this fire to be lifted andmoved farther ahead, they spotted acolumn of about 100 Japanese movingacross the front towards the flank


of 1/22. Mortar and artillery firewas called down on the enemy, scat-tering the group, and the Marine bat-talion prepared for a counterattack,but none came. Once the confusioncaused by the shelling and the abortivecounterattack was straightened out,the attack was rescheduled. At 1300,2/22 moved out with patrols to thefront and overran a succession of smalldumps and abandoned cave positionsalong the road; the latter were searedby flamethrowers to eliminate anystragglers. Only a few Japanese wereencountered in the advance to the har-bor and these were soon killed.

Once 2/22 had reached its objective,it was ordered to continue its advanceeast along the coast and to occupy thehigh ground at the road junction vil-lage of Atantano. In late afternoon,while it was moving into positionthrough the dense underbrush whichblanketed the area, the battalion washarassed by enemy fire. In view of itsexposed position, 2/22 was reinforcedfor the night by Company F of 2/4,which marched into the Atantano peri-meter at about 1850. The remainderof 2/4, attached to the 22d Marines asa nighttime reserve, was moved upafter dark to the Old Agat Road, whereit set up all-around defenses to plug thegap between 3/22 and 2/22.

All units of the 4th Marines wereavailable to back up the 22d by theevening of 24 July as a result of theday’s shifting of troops and reorgani-zation of areas of responsibility withinthe southern beachhead. At 0800, the77th Division assumed control of theentire perimeter east of Old Agat Road,and the 306th Infantry took commandof the defenses formerly held by the

4th Marines. During the morning andearly afternoon, elements of the 306threlieved companies of 1/4 in position.At 1400, while Lieutenant ColonelShapley’s Marines were shifting to abivouac area north of Agat, GeneralBruce opened his CP ashore close to thearea where the 307th Infantry wasassembling after a rough passage toshore.

On the 23d, General Bruce had re-quested that two battalions of the 307thbe landed and placed under his com-mand so that he would have enoughmen to expand the perimeter to theoriginally planned FBHL. GeneralGeiger felt that this expansion, whichinvolved the movement of the southernflank over 3,000 yards south to FacpiPoint, was no longer desirable or neces-sary. The move would also leaveIIIAC with only one uncommitted in-fantry battalion in reserve. The corpscommander did decide, however, thatthe situation now warranted the land-ing of the reserve, to remain undercorps control. The 307th began cross-ing the reef at 1300 on the 24th. Theluckless soldiers had to wade to thebeach, like all 77th Division infantry-men before them. Their ship to shoremovement was complicated by heavyground swells raised by a storm at sea;two men were lost when they fell fromnets while clambering down the sidesof rolling transports into bobbingLCVPS.

The landing of the last majorelement of IIIAC on 24 July found bothbeachheads soundly held and ade-quately supplied. The price of thatsecure hold was high to both sides.The 111 Corps count of enemy deadconsisted of the conservative figure of


623 bodies buried by the 3d Divisionand the 1st Brigade estimate of 1,776Japanese killed. By enemy account ofthe four days’ fighting, the casualtytotals must have been significantlyhigher, particularly on the Asan front.In winning its hold on the heights, the3d Marine Division had had 282 of itsmen killed, 1,626 wounded, and hadcounted 122 missing in action. For thesame period, the 1st Provisional MarineBrigade casualty totals were 137 killed,700 wounded, and 87 missing; the 77thInfantry Division had lost 12 men andhad 20 wounded.

SUPPLY AND EVACUATION 32

By nightfall of W plus 3, most of thelogistical problems that had arisen dur-ing the first days of the assault phasehad been solved. For Guam, the ma-jority of such problems had been antic-ipated and countered by a proper mixof ships, service troops, and equipment.The veteran planners of TF 53 andIIIAC were well aware that the successof an amphibious operation dependedas much upon rapid and effective un-loading and distribution of supplies asit did upon the courage and aggressive-ness of assault troops. Profiting fromlessons learned in earlier campaigns,the task force vessels and shore partieswere able to put an average of 5,000tons of vehicles, supplies, and equip-ment ashore in both beachheads duringeach of the first four days.

The prime obstacle to unloading

= Unless otherwise noted, the material inthis section is derived from: TF 53 OpRpt;ZZZAC SAR; IIIAC C-4 PeriodicRpts, 21Ju1-10 Aug44; 3d MarDiv D–4 Jnl, 21Jul-10Aug44;Ist ProvMarBrig SAR,

progress was the reef which deniedlanding craft access to shore. And theprime weapon in combatting the reefwas the LVT. The HI Corps logisticsofficer observed that without them “theunloading of assault shipping wouldhave proceeded only under greatestdifficulty.” 33 Hampered only by thelimitation that it could not operateeffectively in rough or irregular ter-rain, the DUKW was almost equallyuseful. The amphibious vehicles wereused everywhere on the reef and in theimmediate beach and dump area, and,as most men of the 77th Division dis-covered, proved to be too valuable ascargo carriers to be used to transporttroops after the assault waves landed.As a result of their almost continuousoperation, many of the vehicles weredeadlined by operational mishaps andmechanical failures. Herculean ef-forts by crewmen and mechanics keptthe daily unserviceability rate to about35 percent for amphibian tractors and40 percent for amphibian trucks.Spare parts were at a premium, partic-ularly for the newly acquired DUKWSof III Corps Motor Transport Battal-ion, and vehicles knocked out by enemyguns and others wrecked by surf andreef obstacles were cannibalized tokeep cripples going.

The pontoon barges and cranes atreef edge were a vital part of the un-loading process. In the shallowerwater over the coral shelf off Asan,versatile tractor-mounted cranes couldmaneuver in waist-deep water drag-ging, lifting, and carrying as the loadto be landed required. Where thewater was too deep off both Asan and

‘ZZZAC SAR, Encl D, p. 5.


Agat, the barge-mounted cranes swungbulging cargo nets from boats to vehi-cles and lifted out the heavy drums offuel and water that were often floatedand pushed to the beaches by men ofthe reef transfer battalions.34 Sincefew wheeled vehicles could make shoreunder their own power, tractors andLVTS were used to tow most trucksfrom the ramps of LSTS onto dry land.

By 24 July, nine LST unloadingpoints had been opened on the reef offeach beachhead and landing ships hadbeen about half emptied. The transportsand cargo vessels that had carried theassault units to the island were 90 per-cent unloaded, and those that hadbrought the 77th Division had landed25 percent of their cargo. At 1700,Admiral Conolly reported that 15 of

u On 24 July, the opening of a water pointat springs near Asan brought an end to theneed to land drummed water for the 3d Di-vision. All ships were directed to dump theremainder of such water supplies that theycarried.

the big ships were cleared of landingforce supplies, and preparations weremade to return the first convoy of thoseemptied to Eniwetok on 25 July.

Many of the APAs that had servedas casualty receiving stations duringthe first days of fighting were amongthose that were sent back. The hospi-tal ship, Solace, which arrived accord-ing to plan on 24 July, took on boardsome of the most seriously wounded pa-tients from the transports lying offshore.The transports Rixey and Wharton, bothremaining in the area, loaded thosewalking wounded that would require nomore than two weeks hospitalization.Once the major unit hospitals werefully established ashore, these menwould be landed to recuperate on Guamand rejoin their units. Many of the581 casualties that filled the Solacewhen she sailed on W plus 5 were menloaded directly from the beaches thathad been hit in the heavy fighting on25 and 26 July.

CHAPTER 4

Continuing the offensive

ATTACK AND COUNTERATTACK ‘

General Geiger’s original opera-tion plan for the coordinated IIIACadvance on 25 July called for the 1stProvisional Marine Brigade to begin itsassault on the Japanese defenses ofOrote Peninsula. When it becameobvious on the 24th that the brigadewould not be able to get into positionby nightfall to mount a two-regimentattack, General Shepherd sent a mes-sage to the corps commander statingthat in view of the:

. . . delay in the relief of the 4thMarines which was not completed until1500 today, necessity for moving 4thMarines to assembly areas and relief of22d Marines in line, reorganization andpreparation for attack, strongly recom-mend assault Orote Peninsula be delayeduntil 26 July.’

General Geiger quickly concurred inShepherd’s recommendation and re-

‘ Unless otherwise noted, the material inthis section is derived from: ,?d MarDiv S’AR;3d MarDiv Jnl; 3d MarDiv D–2 PeriodicRptNo. 72, dtd 26Ju144; 77’thInfDiv OpRpt; IstProvMm-B~{g SA R ; Ist ProvMarBrig Jnl;Ist ProvMarBrig URpts; t?d Mar Jnl; 1/3Jnl; 2/3 Jrd; $lth Mar Jnl; 12th Mar Jnl,21Jul–150ct44; 21st May URpts; 3/21 Jnl; 3dTlcBn SAR; 22d. Mar Jnl; I/2Z Jnl;2/22 Jnl; 1/4 WarD: GSDF Study; LtColRobert E. Cushman, “The Fight at Fonte,”Marine Corps Gazette, v. 31, no. 4 (Apr47),

hereafter Cushman, “Fight at Fonte”;Frances, “Battle of Banzai Ridge.”

a1st P~ovMa~B~ig Jnl, entry of 24Ju144.

vised the order, setting forward thetime of the Orote attack to 0700, 26July. In the day gained, the brigadewould attempt to seal the neck of thepeninsula from sea to harbor.

After an uneventful night, markedonly by harassing artillery and mortarfires falling on the lines of 1/22 and3/22, Colonel Schneider’s regiment pre-pared to attack at 0830 on the 25th.Moving out behind a 15-minute ar-tillery preparation by brigade 75s, thetwo assault battalions immediately raninto heavy enemy small arms fire com-ing from covered emplacements in thelow, irregular hills ahead. Again enfi-lade fire from Neye Island and the cliffsnear it raked the front of the advanc-ing Marines. An air strike was calleddown on Neye, naval gunfire and ar-tillery added their firepower, and40mm guns of the 9th Defense Battal-ion pounded the precipitous islandshores from positions near Agat.Along the coast, half-tracks of theregimental weapons company moved topositions from which they could fireacross the narrow stretch of water atthe bend of the peninsula into caves andother likely gun positions which stud-ded the cliffs.

The fury of supporting fires knockedout some but not all of the Japaneseweapons. The attacking Marines, par-ticularly those of Lieutenant ColonelFromhold’s 1st Battalion, which wasadvancing along the coast, were hard

503214-881 0-67. 33


hit. At one point in the morning’sbitter fighting, Fromhold committedhis last reserve platoon, reinforced by20 men from the 4th Marines, to backup Company C, which was driving upthe Agat-Sumay Road. Just beforenoon, five Japanese light tanks, accom-panied by infantry, were spotted aheadof Company C, and Shermans of the22d Marines converged on the enemyarmor. A short, sharp exchange leftthe Japanese tanks broken and aflameand scattered the enemy troops. Notlong afterwards, bazookas and tanks ofthe 22d accounted for at least two moreJapanese tanks that were attackingMarines on the right of the 1/22 zone.3

Although the 1st Battalion encoun-tered the stiffest enemy resistance dur-ing the day’s advance, 3/22 was alsoheavily engaged. As it swung intoline and closed on the harbor shore,Lieutenant Colonel Shisler’s unit metincreasingly stronger Japanese fire.By early afternoon, all evidence indi-cated that the brigade had run upagainst the main defenses of Orote.

To bring fresh strength to bear inthe attack ordered for 26 July, the 4thMarines began taking over the left ofthe brigade lines shortly after noon.Lieutenant Colonel Shapley was givenoral orders to have his lead battalion,1/4, mop up any Japanese resistance itencountered moving forward to relieve1/22. General Shepherd moved hisCP closer to the fighting and set upnear RJ 5, not far from the bivouacarea of the brigade reserve, 2/4. Wellbefore dark, all brigade assault units

s Units accounts of the total bag of Japanesetanks vary, but all accord that at least sevenwere destroyed,

were on the day’s objective, firmly dugin, and ready to jump off the followingmorning. (See Map 28.)

Manning the left half of the newlywon positions was the 1st Battalionj4th Marines, with elements of threecompanies on line and a platoon ofregimental tanks guarding the Agat-Sumay Road where it cut through theAmerican defenses. The 3d Battalion,4th Marines was in position behind 1/4ready to move into the front line as thepeninsula widened and allowed formore maneuver room. On the brigaderight was 3/22, occupying a low risethat overlooked an extensive mangroveswamp along the shore of Apra Harbor.Backing the 3d Battalion was 1/22,which had moved after its relief topositions near the regimental boundaryin the narrowed zone of the 22d Ma-rines. To augment night defenses onthe extreme right flank where the Piti-Sumay Road paralleled the harborshore, Colonel Schneider attached Com-pany E of 2/22 to the 3d Battalion.

During the day’s fighting, the 2dBattalion of the 22d, operating fromAtantano, patrolled extensively andmopped up enemy holdouts in the areabetween the Old Agat Road and thebrigade front lines. Firm contact wasestablished with the left flank of the77th Division, which spent the 25thconsolidating its hold on the FBHL andlanding more of its supplies and equip-ment. Patrols from General Bruce’s in-fantry battalions ranged the hills tothe northeast, east, and south huntingdown Japanese stragglers.

By the 25th, the 77th Division wasalso probing cautiously toward Mt.Tenjo, sending its patrols to scout ap-proaches to the hill mass. The way

CONTINUING THE OFFENSIVE 505

was rugged and the possibility of en-countering enemy defenses in the high,broken ground seemed strong. Al-though the mountain peak was includedwithin the 3d Marine Division FBHLin prelanding plans, the pattern ofJapanese resistance indicated that itmight fall easier to American troopsattacking from the south rather thanthe north. No significant enemy op-position was developed by the Armypatrols as they moved further towardthe Asan beachhead. Their negativefindings matched the experience of pa-trols from the 9th Marines and 2/22,which made contact along the harborshore near Atantano about 1600.

The events of 25 July indicated thatJapanese troops were scarce in the areabordering Apra Harbor, but there wasample evidence that the enemy was stillplentiful and full of fight everywhereelse on the heights confronting the 3dDivision. Unknown to the Marines,the eve of the 29th Division counter-attack had arrived, and the bitter re-sistance met in the day’s close combatby the 3d and 21st Marines had beenfurnished by units that were trying tohold jump-off positions for the night of25–26 July.

General Takashina’s orders to histroops were to concentrate in the gen-eral area from Fonte Plateau to “Mt.Mangan.” The latter name was givenby the Japanese to a 100-foot-high hillabout 1,500 yards southwest of FontePlateau. Mt. Mangan marked thejunction of the Mt. Tenjo Road with atrail that branched off to the head ofthe Fonte River valley. One principalenemy assembly area faced the posi-tions of the 3d Marines, the other wasin front of the lines of the 21st Marines.

The 48th ZMB, with the 10th ZMRattached, was to launch its attack froma line stretching from the east side ofFonte Plateau to the east side of Mt.Mangan. The 18th Infantry was tomove out from a line of departurerunning west from Mt. Mangan alongthe Mt. Tenjo Road. The naval troopsthat had helped hold the approaches toAgana against the 3d Marines were toassemble in the hills east of the FonteRiver and attack toward Adelup Point.Reinforcing the naval infantry, whowere mainly former construction troopsoperating under the headquarters of the54th Keibetai, would be the two com-panies of tanks that had remained hid-den near Ordot since W-Day. (SeeMap VIII, Map Section. )

Many of the veteran Japanese infan-trymen scheduled to spearhead thecounterattack were killed in the bloodyfighting on the 25th. The bitterestcontest was joined along Mt. Tenj oRoad where it crossed Fonte Plateau.Here, the road fell mainly within thezone of action of Lieutenant ColonelCushman’s 2d Battalion, 9th Marines.

Cushman’s outfit was attached to the3d Marines at 0600 on the 25th andordered to relieve 1/3 on the right ofthe regimental front line. By 0930,when the 3d Marines moved out inattack, the relief was completed, and1/3 supported the advance of 2/9 byfire. Once their fire was masked, Ma-jor Aplington’s badly depleted com-panies moved back to division reservepositions behind the 21st Marines andabout 1,000 yards inland from AsanPoint. Again General Turnage hadonly one understrength infantry bat-talion to back up the 3d Division front;the regiments, with all battalions com-


mitted, had no more than a companyas reserve, the battalions frequentlyhad only a platoon.

To both sides in the battle, the bigdifference in the fighting on 25 Julywas the presence of tanks on FontePlateau. Assault units of 3/3 and 2/3blasted and burned their way througha barrier of enemy cave defenses andwon control of the road to the heightswithin an hour after jump-off. Me-dium tanks of Company C, 3d TankBattalion rumbled up the road soonafter the attack began and joined theinfantry in destroying Japanese posi-tions that blocked passage upward.After engineers cleared the roadway ofsome bomb-mines, which temporarilystopped the Shermans, the advance re-sumed with infantry spotters equippedwith hand-held radios (SCR 536s)pointing out targets to the buttoned-uptank gunners. In midafternoon, Gen-eral Turnage authorized Colonel Hall tohold up the attack of 2/3 so that theenemy positions bypassed during theday’s action could be mopped up priorto nightfall. At the same time, the 2dBattalion, 9th Marines, driving towardFonte, was ordered to continue itsattack.

No tanks reached the high groundwhere 2/9 was fighting until late after-noon; enemy fire and mines had slowedtheir arrival. Support for the infan-try attacking the Fonte defenses wasfurnished by naval guns, artillery, andmortars, reinforced by a nearly con-stant fusilade from light and heavymachine guns. The return fire of theJapanese inflicted severe casualties onthe assault troops, but failed to haltthe Marine advance into the brokenterrain of the plateau. The battalion

battled its way across the Mt. TenjoRoad and drove a salient into the enemydefenses of Fonte. At 1700, the re-serve company, G, was committed onthe left flank to lessen a gap which hadopened between 2/3 and 2/9 during theafternoon’s advance.

As darkness approached, there wasno letup in the ferocity of the enemyresistance and the close-in fighting con-tinued to be costly to both sides. Thesituation prompted Lieutenant ColonelCushman to pull back his forward ele-ments on both flanks to secure betterobservation and fields of fire for nightdefense. While Companies E and Gdug in close to the road, Company F inthe center continued to hold a rockyprominence, about 150-200 yards to thefront, that marked the limit of theday’s advance. When four tanks fi-nally arrived at 1825, it was too darkto use them effectively so they wereplaced in supporting positions behindthe lines. At this time, as the battal-ion action report noted: “The enemywas within hand grenade range alongthe entire line to the front and retainedstrong positions in caves to the rightCo’s right rear.” 4

These caves, bypassed during themorning’s advance, were left to theattention of a reserve rifle platoon.The resulting mop-up operation wasonly partially successful, and enemytroops continued to emerge from thecaves for several days afterwards. Al-though these Japanese harassed thecommand post areas repeatedly, theywere not in sufficient strength to have

42/9 SAR, dtd 15Aug44, p. 3, Encl M to3d MarDiv SAR.


a significant effect on the actions of2/9.

In the zone of 2/21, which flankedthat of 2/9, a similar pocket of enemyholdouts was left behind the lines whenthe 21st Marines attacked on 25 July.The Japanese, holed up in cave posi-tions in the eastern draw of the AsanRiver, were wiped out by Company Eduring a morning’s hard fighting; laterover 250 enemy bodies were buried inthis area, which had been the target ofheavy American air strikes on the 24th.Company E, once it had completed themop-up mission, moved back into theattack with the rest of 2/21. Everyfoot of ground that fell to LieutenantColonel Smoak’s Marines was paid forin heavy casualties, and every manavailable was needed in the assault tomaintain the impetus of the advance.When the 2d Battalion dug in justshort of the Mt. Tenjo Road about 1730,all units were fully committed to holda 1,000-yard front. There was no re-serve.

Like 2/21, the 1st Battalion, 21stMarines ended its fifth day of battlewith all companies manning frontlinepositions. The trace of the 1,200yards of foxholes and machine gun em-placements held by 1/21 ran roughlyparallel to the Mt. Tenjo Road whereit looped south from Fonte to Mt. Man-gan. Despite an all-out effort on the25th, which saw assault elements reachand cross the all-important road atmany points, the Marines were not ableto hold most of their gains in the faceof heavy and accurate enemy fire. Inthe morning, the attacking units werestopped and then driven back by theenfilade fire of Japanese artillery, wellhidden in the brush and irregular ter-

rain at the head of the Fonte Rivervalley. In the afternoon, when tanksupport was available for the first time,some hill strongpoints were taken inthe center of the line near a quarrywhich was a focal point of Japaneseresistance.

The freshly arrived tanks, a wel-come sight to the men of 1/21, reachedthe heights by means of a steep andtwisting supply trail, which engineershad constructed through the draw thathad been cleared by Company E of 2/21that morning. Company B of the 3dTank Battalion reported to LieutenantColonel Williams’ CP at 1615, and heimmediately set one platoon of Sher-mans to work hammering enemy de-fenses in the quarry area. A secondplatoon of the mediums spearheaded alimited objective attack on Mt. Man-gan, which was recognized as thelaunching point for many of the Japa-nese night counterattacks that hadplagued the 21st Marines. When thetanks swung behind the hill, a tremen-dous outpouring of fire from the re-verse slope cut down most of theaccompanying infantry. The tanksanswered with cannon and machineguns, closing in on the Japanese posi-tions to fire point blank on any targetsthat showed. When the Shermans re-turned to the Marine lines, the tankcommanders were sure that they hadhurt the enemy badly—and they had.Only about 40 men were left of the321st Independent Infant~y Battalion,which had attempted to defend Mt.Mangan. Many of the luckless sur-vivors of the 38th Regiment, that hadassembled at Mangan to take part inthe counterattack, were also killed.

The enemy casualties inflicted by this


tank thrust into the heart of the Japa-nese defensive complex may well havealtered the course of action later thatnight, for the Japanese were not strongenough to exploit limited penetrationsin the 1/21 sector. The Marines holdingpositions opposite Mt. Mangan were toofew in number to form a continuousdefensive line. Instead, strongpointswere held—natural terrain featuresthat lent strength to the fire of Marinesmall arms. Gaps between squad andplatoon positions were covered by in-fantry supporting weapons, and artil-lery and naval guns were registered onpossible enemy assembly areas androutes of approach.

Along the boundary between 1/21and 3/21 a considerable interval devel-oped during the day because the 1stBattalion was held up by enemy fire,and the 3d Battalion was able to moveout to its objective within an hour afterthe regimental attack started at 0700.In contrast to the rest of the 21st Ma-rines, 3/21 encountered no strong re-sistance on 25 July. All day long,however, sporadic fire from enemy mor-tars and machine guns peppered thebattalion positions. Patrols scouringthe hills in the immediate vicinity ofthe front line were also fired upon, butin general the Japanese hung backfrom close contact.

Despite the relative lack of opposi-tion, Lieutenant Colonel Duplantis’ sit-uation was precarious, because he hadonly two companies to hold 800 yardsof terrain that seemed to be nothingbut ravines and ridges smothered indense vegetation. Not only was therea gap between 1/21 and 3/21, there wasalso an 800-yard open stretch between

the right flank of the 21st Marines andthe left of the 9th Marines, which hadpushed forward well beyond the 21stduring the day. Just before dark, Colo-nel Butler, in an effort to ease the sit-uation on his right flank, released hisonly reserve, Company L, to LieutenantColonel Duplantis. The 3/21 com-mander placed this company in posi-tions that filled a weak spot in thecenter of his line and enabled the com-panies on either flank to tighten uptheir defenses. As a site for his com-mand post, Duplantis chose the reverseslope of a 460-foot hill which stoodsquarely on the regimental boundaryand in the path of any enemy attemptto exploit the yawning space betweenthe 21st and 9th Marines.5

Colonel Craig’s regiment made rapidprogress on the 25th from the time thetwo assault battalions jumped off at0700. By 0845, the regiment was onits day’s objective, a line running gen-erally along the course of the SasaRiver. At 0915, the division orderedthe attack to continue with the aim ofseizing the high ground on the northbank of the Aguada River. The Ma-rines encountered very few Japaneseand moved out almost as fast as therugged terrain would permit. In thehills on the extreme left flank, an out-post of 1/9 reported clashing withsmall groups of the enemy during theday, but the overall intelligence picturein the 9th Marines zone indicated thatfew Japanese were present. Underthe circumstances, Colonel Craigthought that his regiment could haveadvanced easily and made contact with

=Duplantis ltr.


the brigade “at any time,” 6 but con-sidered that such a move would haveserved no useful purpose. By limitingthe advance on the division right to afront that could be held by two battal-ions, General Turnage was able to drawon the 9th Marines for reserves to usein the hard fighting on the left andcenter of the beachhead.

As night fell, the troublesome gapbetween 3/21 and 1/9 was partiallyblocked by small Marine outposts.Lieutenant Colonel Duplantis organ-ized his CP defenses in a small depres-sion on the left rear of Hill 460 and setout a blocking force armed with BARsand bazookas to guard a trail thatskirted the hill on the right and led to-ward the beaches. A 25-man detach-ment of the 3d Division ReconnaissanceCompany held a strongpoint in themidst of the 500-yard open stretch be-tween the hill and the shoulder of theridge defended by the left flank com-pany of the 9th Marines. The recon-naissance unit, composed of elements oftwo platoons, had been attached to the9th since W-Day for the express pur-pose of maintaining contact betweenregiments, but on the night of 25-26July it was simply too weak for thetask at hand.

The start of the Japanese counter-attack was heralded at 2330 by an ar-tillery forward observer’s report thatenemy activity was developing in thegap between the 9th and 21st Marines.Very shortly after midnight, the 3dMarines called for artillery and navalgunfire support to silence enemy artil-lery, mortars, and machine guns that

o LtGen Edward A. Craig Itr to CMC, dtd30 Sep62, hereafter Craig 30Sept52 lbr.

were hitting the left flank. Soon unitsall across the center and left of thebeachhead perimeter were reportingJapanese probing attacks and patrolaction close to the Marine lines. Dark-ness turned to half light as flares wentup all along the front to help spot theJapanese. Cruisers and destroyers in-creased their rate of fire of 5-inch starshell and followed with 5- and 6-inchhigh explosive at the call of shore firecontrol parties. To aid local defenses,60mm mortars of the rifle companieskept flares overhead wherever the frontline was threatened.

The first serious assault on Americanpositions was launched against the iso-lated Reconnaissance Company out-post. An enemy group, estimated at50 men, attacked the Marine unitshortly after midnight, and during abrief, hot firefight killed four men andwounded five, over one-third of theAmerican strength. Convinced thathis position was untenable in the faceof another attack by a superior enemyforce that could hit from any direction,the Reconnaissance Company com-mander withdrew his men to the linesof Company B of 1/9, which held theleft flank of the 9th Marines.7

Japanese troops that drove in the re-connaissance outpost were men of the3d Battaliow, 18th Infantry. The en-emy unit was assigned an objective ofpenetrating the Marine lines in the areaheld by 3/21. Surprisingly, instead of

‘ The Reconnaissance Company commanderfelt that the gap was so wide that theJapanese who hit his perimeter, and lost 35men in the process, “could have bypassed ourposition at many points.” PhibReconCo SAR,dtd 14Aug44, p. 2, Encl C to Encl Q, $dMarDiv SAR.


pouring full strength through the holethat had been left open, most elementsof 3/18 continued to feel out the maindefenses of Lieutenant Colonel Duplan-tis’ battalion. Despite their superiorobservation of the American beachheadfrom positions on the Chachao-Alutom-Tenjo massif,a and the information sup-plied by their patrols, the Japanese didnot really make use of their best oppor-tunity for success.

The pressure of enemy units testingthe Marine defenses along the rest ofthe division front increased as the longnight wore on. Both the 1st and 2dBattalions of the 21st Marines were hitrepeatedly and in gradually increasingstrength. Apparently, the 2d Battal-ion, 18th Znfant~y and the elements ofthe 48th Brigade in the Mt. Manganarea were looking for a weak spot thatwould let them break through to theAsan River draws. The draws in turnwould provide a path to the divisionrear areas. On the Fonte front, mostof the Japanese troops pressing 2/9 werepart of the 2d Battalion, 10th IMR; al-most all of the 3d Battalion had beenkilled during the fighting on the 25th,as had the commander of 2/1 O. Theremainder of the Marine line on the leftflank was harried by other elements ofthe 48th IMB and by naval troops ofthe 54th Keibitai. Throughout theJapanese ranks, the infantry was bol-

8 The Commanding Officer, 9th Marines re-called that when this terrain was finally cap-tured “three huge telescopes of 20 power werefound. Looking through these scopes one couldalmost make out individual features ofMarines below us. Practically every part ofour lines and rear areas, as well as my ownCP, could be seen through these glasses fromthis high ground.” Craig 30Sept52 ltr.

stered by service and support troops, bywalking wounded that could still handlea weapon, and, in short, by everyonethat could be mustered for the assault.

One important aspect of the Japanesecounterattack plans went awry in thedarkness—enemy tanks never reachedthe battle line. When night fell, thearmored vehicles rumbled from theirhiding places near Ordot and headedonto the trails leading to Agana. In-explicably, the tanks got lost. Unableto find their way to the designated as-sembly area, the commanders of the 2dCompany, 9th Tank Regiment and the29th Tank Company led their unitsback to the Ordot area before dawnbroke. Hidden again at daylight fromthe eyes of American artillery and airobservers, the Japanese tanks bidedtheir time for a more effective role inthe fighting.

Undaunted by the absence of expectedarmored support, the 54th Keibitaimoved forward to attack in the earlyhours of 26 July. An intensive prepa-ration fired by mortars and artillerycrashed down on the positions occupiedby 3/3 and 2,/3. Led by the senior en-emy naval officer, Captain Yutaka Sugi-moto, the Japanese sailors launched thefirst of what proved to be a series ofcounterattacks. From Adelup Pointand Chonito Cliff, Marine small armsfire crackled forth from well-dug-in fox-holes and machine gun emplacements.Shells from company and battalion mor-tars exploded amidst those from the105mm Howitzers of 3/12, and drove theonrushing enemy back. Captain Sugi-moto was killed in the first outburst ofdefensive fire; later, his executive offi-cer was felled by a shell burst. Despiterepeated attempts to break through the


Marine lines, the Japanese were unsuc-cessful and most of the attackers weredead by early morning. As day broke,the weary survivors, many of themwounded, fell back toward the low hillswest of Agana.

One of the night’s most bitter strug-gles was waged on Fonte Plateau, whereLieutenant Colonel Cushman’s embat-tled battalion strove to hold its gains ofthe 25th. Local counterattacks flaredall along the front of 2/9 and caused aconstant drain of Marine casualties.At 2200, it was necessary to pull Com-pany F back 50 yards from its salientin the center of the line in order to con-solidate defenses. Because there waslittle letup in the pressure that the 10thIndependent Mixed Regiment applied,the expenditure of ammunition by alltypes of Marine weapons mountedalarmingly. Seven major counter-attacks in succession ate away at theAmerican line, but it held, often onlyby the slimmest of margins. Theheight of the battle was reached in theearly morning hours when the Japaneseseemed to come in unending waves andthe din of weapons firing all at oncemixed with the screams and yells of mencaught up in the frenzy of close-quartercombat.

As “the first faint outline of dawnshowed,” and “ammunition ran danger-ously low “ g in the American positions,Marine tanks were able to play a signi-ficant role in the hard-fought battle.The platoon of Shermans that had spentthe night behind the lines now movedto the front, where their cannon andmachine guns helped break up the lastdesperate enemy thrust. Soon after-

‘ Cushman,“Fight at Fonte,” p. 15.

wards, another platoon of tanks escort-ing trucks loaded with ammunitionpassed through the lines of 3/3 andmade its way up the road to Fonte Pla-teau. While the armor provided cover-ing fire, riflemen and machine gunnersgrabbed belts and bandoleers of .30 cal-iber cartridges and mortar crewsquickly stacked live rounds near theirshell-littered firing sites. With tanksupport and adequate reserve ammuni-tion, the Marines of 2/9 were solidly es-tablished and ready for renewed enemyattacks. Without the shield of dark-ness, the Japanese held off, however, foronly about 100 men of the 10tlt IMRhad survived the night’s fighting.

Not all of the Japanese that died onthe night of 25–26 July were killed infront of the American lines. Some in-filtrated through the widely spacedstrongpoints of the 21st Marines andothers found their way through the gapbetween 3/21 and 1/9. The positionsmanned by 1/21 and 2/21 lay generallyalong a low ridge that paralleled andran north of the Mt. Tenjo Road.From this rise the ground sloped backseveral hundred yards to the edge of thecliffs. Over much of this area Marineswaged a fierce, see-saw battle to con-tain enemy units that had brokenthrough. In the thick of the fight wasCompany B of the 3d Tank Battalion,which was bivouacked behind the linesof the 1st Battalion, 21st Marines. Al-though the tanks were cut off for a timefrom Marine infantry support, theywere able to fend for themselves withtheir machine guns and 75s. Appar-ently the Japanese infiltrators weremore interested in other and easier tar-gets, for only one tank, which had atrack blown and its engine damaged,


was put out of action during the night’scombat.

The coming of daylight brought aquick end to the limited Japanese pene-tration of the lines of 1/21. Fire from60mm mortars sealed off the area wherethe enemy had broken through andripped apart the groups of Japanesethat tried to make a stand. Supportedby tank fire, the Marines of LieutenantColonel Williams’ battalion, reinforcedby a company of engineers, counter-attacked to restore their Iines.l’) Infil-trators were hunted down relentlessly,and by 0800, the enemy had beencleared from the entire area betweenthe edge of the cliffs and the originalfront line of 25 July. Along this seg-ment of the embattled 3d Divisionfront, the weary Marines could relax abit and feel, as one did, that “the fire-works were ovel’. ” 11

Although the fighting on the heightshad subsided by early morning, theconflict was far from settled in thedivision rear areas, particularly in thevicinity of the wooded draws that heldthe Nidual River and the west branchof the Asan. Most Japanese that foundtheir way through the gap between 3/21

‘0 The action of these engineers from Com-pany B, 3d Engineer Battalion was typical ofthose of many supporting units on 26 July.The Executive Officer of 1/21 stated that he“was particularly impressed with the numberof automatic weapons they were able to pro-duce (from o~ganic vehicles). They advancedas a leading company in at least one of ourattacks and performed many infantry dutieswith credit. This is another advantage ofbasic [infantry] training being given to allMarines.” LtCol Ronald R. Van Stockum ltrto Head, HistBr, G–3, dtd 150ct52.

U Frances, “The Battle of Banzai Ridge,”p, 18.

and 1/9, or infiltrated the fire-sweptopenings in the Marine front line endedup following these natural terrain cor-ridors toward the sea. Directly in thepath of the majority of these enemytroops, the elements of .?/18 that hadskirted the right flank of 3/21, was Hill460 and Lieutenant Colonel Duplantis’command post.

After feeling out the positions heldby 3/21, the Japanese attacked in forceabout 0400 all along the battalion frontand drove in a platoon outpost of Com-pany K, which held the right of theline. The intensity and strength of theenemy assault mounted as dawn ap-proached, and the Marines on the frontline had all they could do to hold offthe attackers. Consequently, Duplan-tis believed that he could not call on hisrifle companies for help when the Japa-nese began attacking his command post.In fact, a reinforced rifle squad, theonly reserve available to the com-mander of 3/21, was committed soonafter the Japanese attacked to defendthe area between the ridge positions ofCompany K and Hill 460. Like theMarines that held the trail block Du-plantis had set out earlier that night,the outnumbered squad “went downfighting to a m:~n,” 12 overwhelmed bythe enemy troops, who swept aroundboth sides of the hill.

Perhaps nowhere else within the Ma-rine perimeter was the situation so des-perate as it was in the 3/21 CP asdaylight approached. In most parts ofthe 3d Division beachhead, dawn gavethe Marines a better chance to wipe outthe infiltrators; on Hill 460, in contrast,the increasing light furnished the Jap-

“ .Duplantis ltr.


anese better targets. From positionson the crest of the hill, enemy machineguns raked the rear of Company K andsmall arms and knee mortar fire poureddown on the CP, less than 75 yardsaway. The deadly hail that swept Du-plantis’ position took a heavy toll amongthe corpsmen and communicators, whomade up a large part of the defendingforce. The headquarters group foughtdoggedly, keeping up a steady fireagainst the Japanese, who showed nodisposition to charge the beleagueredMarines.

The task of eliminating the trouble-some enemy strongpoint on Hill 460 fellto the 9th Marines. At 0655, a timewhen most of the division reserve andsupport forces were hotly engaged withinfiltrators, General Turnage orderedColonel Craig to shorten his front linesand pull back to the Sasa River and tosend troops to recapture Hill 460.Craig, in turn, detailed his regimentalreserve, Company L, to take the hill andassigned an officer familiar with theterrain as the temporary commander.Led by Major Harold C. Boehm, execu-tive officer of 1/9, the men of CompanyL advanced toward the hill along thecourse of the Masso River. The ap-proach march over difficult terrain wastime-consuming, but the Japanese on460 did not spot Boehm’s command un-til the Marines were about 250 yardsaway and ready to attack. Aided bycovering machine gun fire fromCompany B, 1/9, shortly before noonCompany L launched an assault thatcarried the enemy position. Twenty-three Japanese were killed on the hilland the remainder were driven towarda firing line set up by Company K of3/21. The few enemy that survived the

attack fled down the Nidual River drawto annihilation at the hands of the Ma-rine units then mopping up the rearareas.

The clash at Hill 460 was one of aseries of hard-fought actions that tookplace behind the 3d Division front.Japanese infiltrators moving down thestream lines leading to the beaches con-tinually harassed the perimeters of Ma-rine units that stood in their paths.Throughout the night, gunners in ar-tille~y and mortar positions had to in-terrupt their supporting fires to beat offtroops.]~ The neighboring commandposts of the 12th Marines and of 3/12were beset by snipers, who had infestedthe high ground above the camp areas.By midmorning, artillerymen acting asinfantry, aided by two Shermans fromthe division tank park nearby, had de-stroyed this nest of enemy.

One of the most serious encountersbehind the lines took place at the divi-sion hospital. At 0600, about 50–70enemy troops opened fire on the hospi-tal tents from the high ground on thewest bank of the Nidual River. Doc-tors and corpsmen immediately beganevacuating patients to the beach whileother hospital personnel and 41 of thewalking wounded formed a defensiveline and returned the Japanese fire.As soon as word reached General Turn-age that the hospital was being at-tacked, he ordered the division reservecommander, Lieutenant Colonel GeorgeO. Van Orden (Division Infantry

“ Many of these enemy troops had infiltratedthe Marine lines on the previous night andlaid in hiding throughout daylight hours onthe 25th with the intent of knocking out theartillery when the counterattack started. BGenJohn S. Letcher ltr to CMC, dtd 12Jun65.

CONTINUING THE OFFENSIVE

Training Officer), to take two compa-nies of pioneers and eliminate thethreat.

Moving quickly, Van Orden’s com-mand reached the hospital area andjoined the battle. After three hours offighting, during which the enemy forcewas eventually surrounded, the pio-neers killed 33 Japanese at a cost ofthree of their own men killed and onewounded. The 3d Medical Battalionhad 20 of its men wounded, includingtwo that later died of wounds, but onlyone patient was hit and he was one ofthe volunteer defenders. By noon, thehospital was back in operation, caringfor the heavy influx of casualties fromall parts of the Marine beachhead.

Even before the fighting was over atthe hospital and at Hill 460, it wasapparent that these two areas held theonly sizeable enemy groups left withinthe perimeter. Any other Japanesestill alive behind the lines were thesubject of intensive searches by combatpatrols of service and support troops.Along the front line, infantry units,often with tank support, scoured thewoods and caves in their immediateareas to flush enemy stragglers. Themop-up and consolidation of defensivepositions continued through the after-noon as Marine commanders made cer-tain that their men were ready to facewhatever the night might bring.While he was inspecting these defen-sive preparations, Lieutenant Colonelde Zayas, commanding 2/3, was shotand killed; the battalion executive offi-cer, Major William A. Culpepper, im-mediately took command and continuedthe defensive buildup.

Conservative intelligence estimatesindicated that the Japanese had lost

515

close to 3,200 men, including 300behind Marine lines, in the counter-attack.1’ The comparable casualty to-tal for the 3d Division and its attachedunits was approximately 600 menkilled, wounded, and missing in ac-tion.15 It appeared to General Turnagethat the enemy was still capable ofmounting another strong counterat-tack, and he directed that all unitsestablish the strongest possible nightdefense.

Early on the 26th, General Turnagehad requested reinforcements from thecorps reserve, and during the after-noon, General Geiger dispatched onebattalion of the reserve, 3/307, over-land to the Piti area to be availableimmediately in case of need. On its ar-rival the Army unit was attached tothe 9th Marines. As a further safe-guard, Turnage directed the organiza-tion under Lieutenant Colonel VanOrden of a provisional division reservecomposed of 1/3, a platoon of tanks,and elements of eight Marine and Sea-bee support battalions. Most of theseunits spent the night of 26-27 Julymanning defensive perimeters or stand-ing by for employment as infantryreinforcements.

Actually, the Japanese commanders

“A careful Japanese accounting of the bat-tle places their casualty total at about “3000persons.” GSDF Study, p. 189.

“ The exact figures are buried somewhere inthe casualty statistics for 25–27 July, sincemany units completed a head count too lateon the 26th to be accurately reflected in thatday’s totals. The cumulative total casualtiesreported as of 1800 on the three days are:25 JuIY–315 KIA, 1,760 WIA, 132 MIA; 26July-333 KIA, 1,869 WIA, 162 MIA; 27 Ju1y-

481 KIA, 2,405 WIA, 166 MIA. 3d MarDivJnl.

516

had no further massive counterattackin mind. To an extent not yet realizedby American intelligence officers, thefruitless assault had broken the back-bone of Japanese resistance on Guam.While there was no disposition to stopfighting on the part of the remnants ofthe 29th Division, the ground within,in front of, and behind the Marine lineswas littered with the bodies of the menand with the weapons, ammunition,and equipment that General Takashinasorely needed to prolong the battle.Undoubtedly the most damaging losseswere those among senior combat unitleaders, whose inspirational examplewas essential to effective operations inthe face of obvious and overwhelmingAmerican superiority in men and ma-terial. General Shigematsu, the Mth

Brigade commander, was killed on 26July when tanks supporting the con-solidation of Marine frontline positionsblasted his CP on Mt. Mangan. Theregimental commander of the 18th Zn-

fant~y was cut down in the forefrontof his counterattacking troops, and

both of the battalion commanders werekilled after having led their menthrough the Marine lines. The body of

one was discovered in the Asan Riverdraw; the other was found in theNidual River area.lG

As the senior Japanese officer onGuam, General Obata had the unplea-sant duty of reporting the failure of thecounterattack to Tokyo. At about

0800 on the 26th, the Thirty-first Army

‘0 Near the body of the commander of 2/18was found a map which showed the Japaneseplan for the counterattack. This informationis included on Map VIII, Map Section.


commander radioed Imperial General

Headquarters, stating:

On the night of the 25th, the army,with its entire force, launched the genexalattack from Fonte and Mt. Mangan to-ward Adelup Point. Commanding officersand all officers and men boldly chargedthe enemy. The fighting continued untildawn but our force failed to achieve thedesired objectives, losing more than 80percent of the personnel, for which Isincerely apologize. I will defend Mt.Mangan to the last by assembling theremaining strength. I feel deeply sym-pathetic for the officers and men who fellin action and their bereaved families.1’

The following day Tokyo acknowl-edged Obata’s message and commendedthe general and his men for theirsacrifice, emphasizing that the con-tinued defense of Guam was “a matterof urgency for the defense of Japan.” lSAfter this, Generals Obata and Taka-shina and the few surviving membersof their staffs concluded that theironly practical course of action wasto wage a campaign of attrition, whosesole purpose would be, in the words ofLieutenant Colonel Takeda, “to inflictlosses on the American forces in theinterior of the island.” The ,Wth Di-

vision operations officer explained thefactors influencing this decision as:

1. The loss of commanders in the coun-terattack of ’25 July, when up to 9570 ofthe officers (commissioned officers) of thesector defense forces died.

2. The personnel of each counterattack-ing unit were greatly decreased, and com-panies were reduced to several men.

3. The large casualties caused a greatdrop in the morale of the survivors.

4. Over 90$6 of the weapons were de-stroyed and combat ability greatly de-creased.

‘7 Quoted in GSDF Study, pp. 188-189.‘“ Ibid., p, 193.


5. The rear echelons of the Americanforces on Agat front landed in successivewaves and advanced. There ~vas littlestrength remaining on that front and thestrength for counterattacks became non-existent.

6. The Orote Peninsula defense forceperished entirely.

7. There was no expectation of supportfrom Japanese naval and air forces out-side the island?

Part of the Japanese estimate of thesituation was based on a lack of knowl-edge of the exact situation on Orote.All communication with the Japanesecommand on the peninsula was lost bythe evening of 25 July, but the lastmessages received indicated that thedefenders were going to take part inthe general counterattack.QO

CAPTURE OF OROTEPENINSULA 21

Commander Asaichi Tamai of the263d Air Group was the senior officerremaining in the Agat defense sectorafter W-Day. The death of ColonelSuenaga elevated Tamai, who had beencharged with the defense of Orote Pen-insula, to the command of all sectordefense forces, including the 2d Battal-ion, 38th Infantry. During the period22–25 July, the Army unit fell back to-ward Orote, fighting a successful delay-ing action against the 22d Marines.

When the 1st Brigade closed off theneck of the peninsula on 25 July, it

‘“ Takeda ltr II.‘o Ibid.2’ Unless otherwise noted the material in

this section is derived from: IIIAC SAR; IstProvMarBrig SAR; 1st ProvMarBrig Jnl; 1stProvMarBrig URpts; 1/4 WarD; 3/.J WarD;1}22 Jnl; 2/22 Jnl; 6th TkBn SAR; Takedaltr II,

sealed the fate of some 2,500 Japanesesoldiers and sailors who were deter-mined to die fighting in its defense.Although more than half of Com-mander Tamai’s troops were lightlyarmed and hastily trained aviationground crewmen and engineers, he hada strong leavening of experiencedground defense units of the 54th Kei-

bitai. Even if many of the Japanesewere not trained in infantry tactics,they were apparently experts in the useof pick and shovel and well able to manthe fixed defenses, which they hadhelped build. Their handiwork, a for-midable belt of field fortifications,stretched across the peninsula just be-yond the marsh and swamp area andgenerally along the O–3 Line, the initialbrigade objective in its attack on 26July. (See Map 28.)

Before the men of the 1st Brigadecould test these hidden defenses—whose presence was suspected but notyet confirmed-they had to deal withthe Japanese troops that took part inthe general counterattack ordered bythe 29th Division. In contrast, thecounterattack on the brigade defenseswas made by about 500 men and theaction was concentrated in a narrowsector near the regimental boundary.The left flank unit of the 22d Marines,Company L, bore the brunt of theJapanese thrust, helped by the wither-ing fire of the right flank platoon ofthe 4th Marines from Company A.

The assembly area for the Japaneseattack force, principally men of 2/.~8,was the mangrove swamp in front ofthe 22d Marines. In apparent prepa-ration for the assault, sake was passedabout freely, and the Marines manningforward foxholes could plainly hear the


resulting riotous clamor as the Japa-nese worked themselves up to feverpitch. Finally, just before midnight, atumultuous banzai charge erupted outof the swamp as a disorganized crowdof yelling, screaming men attacked thepositions held by Company L. Theresulting carnage was almost unbeliev-able, as artillery forward observerscalled down the fire of brigade, 77thDivision, and III Corps artillery on thesurging enemy troops. At one point,the shells of pack howitzers of the 22dMarines were brought to within 35yards of the front lines in order tocheck the Japanese.22 The few scat-tered groups that won their way thoughthe barrier of exploding shells criss-crossed by machine gun fire were killedin frenzied hand-to-hand fighting withMarines of Company L. By 0200, theaction died down, and all supportingweapons resumed normal fires for thenight defense.

Daylight revealed a gruesome scene,for the mangled remains of over 400enemy dead lay sprawled in front of theMarine lines in the impact area whereover 26,000 artillery shells had fallenduring the counterattack. Marine cas-ualties in Company L were light, de-spite the close-quarter combat, andthe flanking platoon of the 4th Marinesdid not lose a man, although it counted256 Japanese bodies in the vicinity of

its position. Any information thatmight reveal the exact cost of thecounterattack to the Japanese, whoevacuated their wounded during thenight, was buried with the Orote gar-

‘“ Col Edwin C. Ferguson comments ondraft of Lodge, Recaptwe of Guam, dtd28 Nov52.

risen. There was no doubt, however,that 2/38 ceased to exist as an effectivefighting force. Save for small groupsof soldiers that continued to fight on,enemy naval troops now had the mainresponsibility for the defense of Orote.

The night’s counterattack had noeffect on General Shepherd’s attackplan for 26 July. A thorough air,naval gunfire, and artillery preparationexploded on enemy-held areas, and at0700, the 4th Marines moved out in acolumn of battalions, 1st in the lead,supported by the regimental tank com-pany. On the right of the brigadefront, the assault elements of 3/22 and2/22 were heavily shelled as they werepreparing to jump off. The Marineswere convinced that their own support-ing ships and artillery were off target,although subsequent investigation indi-cated that Japanese artillery was againtaking advantage of American prepar-atory fires to strike some telling blowswithout detection. Regardless of itssource, the effect of the fire was demor-alizing to the 22d Marines, and it was0815 before the assault units were re-organized and ready to move out.

The delay in the attack of the 22dMarines opened a gap between theregiments, which was bridged by Com-pany L of 3/4. Another 3d Battalioncompany, I, followed in trace of theswiftly advancing tank-infantry spear-heads of 1/4 to mop up any bypassedenemy. Major Green’s 1st Battalionmet only light resistance until it ap-proached the O–3 Line, where heavybrush on the left and the threat ofenemy fire ripping across the more openground on the right slowed the ad-vance. Anxious to maintain the im-petus of the attack and to make more


effective use of the comparatively freshunits of the 4th Marines, General Shep-herd at 1145 ordered a change of regi-mental boundary that would enableLieutenant Colonel Shapley to employall his battalions in assault. All ter-rain east of the road from RJ 15 toSumay went to the 22d Marines, whilethe 4th Marines took responsibility forthe wider zone to the west.

Initial resistance to the 22d Marines,once its attack was launched, wasslight, and 2/22 patrols, wading deepinto the mangrove swamp, encounteredonly snipers. Along the Sumay Road,where there was room to maneuver andfirm ground to support their weight,the regimental tanks moved out with3/22. At 1220, the 3d Battalionreached RJ 15 and discovered that theJapanese had planted an extensive fieldof aerial bomb-mines across the 200-yard corridor between the swamp anda wide marsh lying west of the roadjunction. Unable to advance further,the Shermans set up a firing line alongthe high ground that overlooked thejunction and the minefield beyond.

The mined area was covered by anest of Japanese machine guns, whichthe assault infantry did not discoveruntil a sudden outburst of automaticweapons fire pinned the lead platoon

down in the midst of the mines. Spot-ting the Japanese strongpoint, a clusterof brush-covered bunkers northwest ofthe road junction, the tanks fired lowover the heads of the ground-hugginginfantry to hit gun ports and disruptthe enemy fire. When Japanese mor-tars opened up from defilade positionsbehind the bunkers, the tank companycommander called down high-angle ar-tillery fire to silence them, which also

set afire an ammunition and a supplydump in the area. With the aid of thetanks, the Marines of 3/22 were ableto pull back to relative safety, but toolate in the day for any further attemptto force the minefield.

On the left of the brigade line, tanksalso played a prominent part in theafternoon’s advance. The 4th Ma-rines, maneuvering to get three battal-ions on line, began to move into heavyvegetation as forward elements ap-proached the O–3 Line. The Shermansbroke paths for accompanying infantrywhere the going was toughest andhelped beat down the scattered opposi-tion encountered. In midafternoon,heavy enemy machine gun and mortarfire hit 2/4 as it was moving intothe center of the regimental front.Shortly thereafter, leading elements ofthe 1st Battalion were raked by intensefire from enemy positions in the denseundergrowth ahead. Japanese gun-ners had a clear shot at the Marinesalong well-prepared fire lanes cutthrough low-hanging branches andthick ground cover, often before theAmericans were aware that they wereexposed. It was readily apparent thatan extensive and gun-studded belt ofJapanese defenses had been encoun-tered. At 1730, when brigade passedthe order to dig in, both regiments con-solidated their positions along O-3 ex-cept on the right, where the 22dMarines set up in the swamp, refusingits flank and covering the resulting gapwith artillery and mortar fire.

After a quiet night with no unusualenemy activity, the brigade attacked inthe wake of an extensive air, naval gun-fire, and artillery preparation. Nei-ther this fire nor the night-long pro-


gram of harassment and interdiction byAmerican supporting weapons seemedto have much effect on the dug-in Jap-anese. The 4th Marines had as itsattack objective an unimproved trail,about 700 yards forward of O–3, thatstretched completely across the regi-mental zone. Except along the SumayRoad, the intervening ground was cov-ered with a thick tangle of thornybrush, which effectively concealed ahost of mutually supporting enemy pill-boxes, trenches, and bunkers well sup-plied with machine guns, mortars, andartillery pieces.

In the narrow corridor forward ofRJ 15, 3/4 faced a low ridge beyondthe marsh area, then a grass-chokedgrove of coconut palms, and beyondthat another ridge, which concealed theground sloping toward the old MarineBarracks rifle range and the airfield.On the 22d Marines side of the SumayRoad, the mangrove swamp effectivelylimited maneuver room beyond RJ 15to an open area about 50 yards wide,

The terrain and the enemy disposi-tions gave special effect to the attackof Major Hoyler’s battalion. WithCompanies I and L in the lead, and aplatoon of tanks moving right along

with the assault troops, 3/4 brokethrough the enemy defenses along thefirst low ridge to its front during a

morning of heavy and costly fighting.The tank 75s played the major role inblasting apart the Japanese gun po-

sitions. During the afternoon, thetank-infantry teams made their waythrough the coconut palms at a stiffprice to the unprotected riflemen. By

the time 3/4 had seized and consoli-dated a secure position on its objective,

Company L alone had suffered 70 cas-ualties.

On the far left of Lieutenant ColonelShapley’s zone, the enemy resistancewas lighter than that encountered by3/4, and the 1st Battalion was on itspart of the objective by 1100. Led bypath-making tanks, the 2d Battalionreached the trail about a half hourlater. Both units then set up defensesand waited for the 3d Battalion to fightits way up on the right. At about1500, while he was inspecting disposi-tions in the 1/4 area, the regimentalexecutive officer, Lieutenant ColonelSamuel D. Puller, was killed by asniper.

Shortly after this, when tanks sup-porting Hoyler’s battalion ran out ofammunition, Shermans from the pla-toons that had advanced with the leftand center of the Marine line movedover to cover 3/4 while it was diggingin. From firing positions ahead of theinfantry, these tanks spotted a com-pany of Japanese moving in the openalong a road atop a ridge some 300yards away. Cannon and machinegun fire tore apart the enemy columnand scattered the luckless troops. At1830, their job well done for the day,the tanks returned to their bivouac formaintenance and replenishment.

Armor also played a significant rolein the day’s action on the 22d Marinesfront. Supporting tank fire helpedCompany G, leading the regimental as-sault in the narrow zone betweenswamp and road, to thread its waythrough the minefield that had held upthe advance on the 26th. ~Tnder coverof smoke shells fired by the Shermans,the regimental bomb disposal officer dis-armed enough mines to clear a path


through the field for the tanks to moveup with the lead riflemen. Engineersthen cleared the rest of the mines while2/22 continued its advance, meetingthe same type of determined oppositionthat had slowed 3/4 on its left. Firefrom the barrier of Japanese positions,which confronted the brigade all acrossthe peninsula, took a heavy toll ofMarines, particularly unit leaders.Three of the four company com-manders were hit during the day’sfighting as was the new battalion com-mander, Major John F. Schoettel.zs

At 1415, after 2/22 had won somemaneuver room east of tile road toSumay, the 3d Battalion moved up onthe right to join the battle. Sincemuch of the zone assigned 3/22 wasswamp, there was only room for Com-pany L in assault. This company triedunsuccessfully to outflank the enemydefenses by moving along the coast,but was stopped by vicious automaticweapons fire. Despite the determinedJapanese defense, the 22d Marines keptinching ahead, utilizing tanks to blastbunker firing ports so that accompany-ing infantry could move in with flame-throwers and demolitions.

At 1700, the brigade ordered the22d to dig in on commanding ground

for the night. In an effort to seizethe most defensible terrain, ColonelSchneider stepped up his attack, calling

for increased artillery support and for

carrier air to bomb and strafe theJapanese. The response was prompt,

sustained, and effective. The wing

n Lieutenant Colonel Hart, who was reas-signed as brigade liaison officer with IHAC,was relieved by Major Schoettel at about 1430on 27’ July.

guns of the attacking aircraft sprayedenemy defenses close enough to theAmerican lines for 2/22 to report it as“too close” for safety at 1802, andthankfully as causing “no casualties,but plenty close” at 1810 when theplanes drew off.z’ Whatever the pre-cipitating cause—bombing, strafing,artillery fire, or steady unrelentingtank-infantry pressure-about 1835the enemy troops confronting the 22dMarines suddenly bolted from their de-fenses and ran. Taking swift advan-tage of the unusual Japanese action, arout almost unprecedented in Pacificfighting, the Marines surged forwardclose on the heels of the fleeing enemy.

The approach of darkness stoppedthe attack as the 22d Marines reachedhigh ground overlooking the MarineBarracks area. The precipitate ad-vance opened a 500-yard gap between2/22 and 3/4, which Company C of1/22 closed. Two men of the companywere killed and 18 wounded in a flurryof Japanese mortar fire that struck theMarine unit as it set up defenses in theflare-spotted darkness. The remain-der of the Ist Battalion, which hadmoved from Atantano to reserve posi-tions near RJ 15 during late afternoon,was alerted to back up Company C.There was no further significant enemyreaction, however, anywhere along thefront that night.

The preparation for the brigade at-tack on the 28th included 45 minutesof air strikes, 30 minutes of naval gun-fire, and a final 30 minutes of artilleryfire. Perhaps as a result, when the 22dMarines attacked at 0830, the regiment

swept forward against little opposition.

%.2/2.2Jnl, entry of 27Jun44.


At 1005, Colonel Schneider reported histroops had reached the O–4 Line, andGeneral Shepherd ordered the advanceto continue, “echeloning units to theleft rear as necessary to maintain con-tact with the 4th Marines.”25 MajorSchoettel’s battalion concentrated itsdrive on the capture of the MarineBarracks area, while Lieutenant Colo-nel Shisler’s 3d Battalion entered thebattered ruins of Sumay. Tanks sup-ported the assault troops of both bat-talions, but found the Mitterand rubblein Sumay so rninestrewn that supporthad to be confined to overhead fire untilengineers could clear the streets. Be-fore the armor halted, one Shermanand its crew were completely destroyedwhen it hit a 1,000-pound bomb-mine.In the face of desultory opposition, the22d Marines was able to seize the bar-racks ruins, the whole of Sumay, andthe cliffs along the harbor shore beforedusk. For stronger night defense,3/22 pulled back to high ground eastof the town and dug in at 1750.

In contrast with their weak defenseon the 22d Marines front, the Japanesefacing the 4th Marines were ready and

able to make the Americans pay dearlyfor every foot of ground they won.The enemy defenses were arrayed in

depth, along a 300-yard stretch ofridgeline guarding the approaches tothe rifle range and airfield. Beneath

the thorn bushes and other varieties ofdensely-clustered jungle growth lay al-most 250 emplacements and bunkers,many of them strong pillboxes con-structed of coconut logs, cement, andearth. Minefields were cleverly hid-

5 Ist ProvMa~-Brig SAR, p. 12.

den amidst the brush along all ap-proaches to the enemy positions.

Both 2/4 and 3/4 had run up againstthe outskirts of this defensive complexin the previous day’s fighting. Thedifficulties imposed by the terrain andthe pattern of Japanese defending firesand minefield prevented the Marinesfrom outflanking the enemy position,and left Lieutenant Colonel Shapley nochoice but to order a frontal assault.The extensive preparatory fires for theattack on 28 July appeared to havemade no impression on the Japanese:there was no letup in the volume ofenemy fire. When the regiment ad-vanced, a slugging match ensued inwhich Companies E and I spearheadedthe determined assault. Throughoutthe morning and early afternoon, rifle-men working closely with tanks grad-ually forced their way into the nest ofenemy emplacements. At 1545, about20–30 Japanese charged out of the re-maining key strongpoint in a futile at-tempt to drive the Marines back; everyattacker was quickly killed. Shortlythereafter, in an attack that GeneralShepherd had personally ordered dur-ing a visit to the front lines, two pla-toons of Marine mediums and a platoonof Army light tanks led a 4th Marinesadvance that smashed the last vestigesof the Japanese defenses and swept for-ward to positions just short of the riflerange. Tied in solidly with the 22dMarines at the Sumay Road by night-fall, the regiment was ready to carryout the brigade commander’s order toseize the rest of the peninsula on the29th.

Assigned missions for the attack on29 July gave the 22d Marines responsi-bility for cleaning the Japanese out of


the barracks area, the town of Sumay,and the cliff caves along the coast.The prime objective of the 4th Marineswas Orote airfield. To make sure thatthe attack would succeed, Shepherd ar-ranged for a preparation that includedthe fires of eight cruisers and de-stroyers, six battalions of artillery (in-cluding one from the 12th Marines),and the heaviest air strikes sinceW-Day. To increase direct fire sup-port for the infantry, the Marine com-mander asked General Bruce foranother platoon of Army tanks, whichwould work with the one already as-signed to the brigade, and for a platoonof tank destroyers as well.

When the brigade attacked at 0800,following a thunderous and extendedpreparation, there were few Japaneseleft to contest the advance. By 1000,General Shepherd was reporting toGeneral Geiger: “We have crossed ourO–5 Line and are now rapidly advanc-ing up the airstrip meeting meagerresistance.” 26 An hour later, Shep-herd ordered the 22d Marines to holdup its attack at the O–6 Line and di-rected the 4th Marines to take overthere and capture the rest of the pen-insula.

In moving toward O–6, the 3d Bat-talion, 4th Marines encountered andhandily overcame resistance from astrongpoint located near the ruins ofthe airfield control tower. This provedto be the only significant oppositionthat developed during the day. Therelief of the 22d Marines on O–6 tookplace without incident at 1500; and

Lieutenant Colonel Shapley held up his

advance about 500 yards beyond this

x 1st ProvMarBrig Jnl, entry of 28Ju144.

objective line. At 1600, while the in-fantry dug in, two platoons of riflemenmounted the regimental tanks and areinforcing platoon of Army lights andmade a combat reconnaissance toOrote Point. Only two Japanese weresighted and they were killed. Whenthe tank-infantry patrol reported back,General Shepherd declared the penin-sula secured.

Earlier on the 29th, at 1530, a cere-mony took place at the ruins of theMarine Barracks that had special sig-nificance to all Americans on the islandand on the waters offshore. To theaccompaniment of “To the Colors”blown on a captured Japanese bugle,the American flag was officially raisedon Guam for the first time since 10December 1941 .Z’ Present to witnessthis historic event were AdmiralSpruance and General Holland Smith,ashore on an inspection trip, and Gen-erals Geiger, Larsen, and Shepherd aswell as the brigade regimental com-manders and those few officers and men

that could be spared from the fightingstill going on. Fitting honors for the

occasion were rendered by a platoon of

“ This ceremony, which usually took placein the Central Pacific after an objective wassecured, came as a surprise to the naval of-ficers attending. One officer not present whowas particularly disappointed at this earlyflagraising was Captain Charles J. Moore,Admiral Spruance’s executive officer. Hisfather, Lieutenant Charles B. T. Moore, USN,had raised the flag over Guam on 23 January1899 on the occasion of the take-over of theisland government by the Navy Department.It had been Admiral Spruance’s intention tosuggest to General Geiger that Captain Moorebe accorded the privilege of raising the firstofficial flag over Guam. RAdm Charles J.Moore cmts on draft MS, dtd 6Ju1Y65.


the men that had repossessed the bar-racks for the Marine Corps. In a briefaddress, General Shepherd caught thespirit of the event, saying:

On this hallowed ground, you officersand men of the First Marine Brigadehave avenged the loss of our comradeswho were overcome by a numericallysuperior enemy three days after PearlHarbor. Under our flag this island againstands ready to fulfill its destiny as anAmerican fortress in the Pacific.=

Last-gasp resistance by the scatteredenemy survivors was confined to snip-ing and bitter-end defense of caves anddugout hideaways, principally in thecliffs that bordered Apra Harbor.Many Japanese committed suicide whenAmerican troops approached; otherstried to escape the peninsula by swim-ming to the low-lying ruins of Ft. SantaCruz in the middle of harbor.” Theswimmers were shot, captured, orturned back by a watchdog platoon ofLVT (A)s. On the opposite side of thepeninsula, Neye Island, long a sourceof galling enemy fire, was scouted byan LVT-borne patrol of the 9th DefenseBattalion and found deserted. Bri-gade intelligence officers conservativelyestimated that at least 1,633 enemytroops had been killed on Orote by 30July. The cost of those deaths to thebrigade was 115 Marines killed, 721wounded, and 38 missing in action.

The end of the battle for possessionof the peninsula coincided with a rea-lignment of the IIIAC battle line.

= Quoted in Kaufman, “Attack on Guam,”p. 63.

= On 21 June 1898, the first American flagwas raised over Guam at Ft. Santa Cruz; thisceremony signified the bloodless capture of theisland from the Spanish garrison.

While the brigade had been clearingthe Japanese from Orote, the 3d Divi-sion had fought its way to completecontrol of the Fonte heights, and the77th Division had patrolled all ofsouthern Guam looking for enemytroops. While the two divisions pre-pared to drive north in line abreast andwipe out the remaining Japanese, thebrigade was to take an active role inreserve, guarding the corps rear area,mopping up the peninsula, and huntingdown enemy stragglers in the southernmountains.

Nothing signified the change of own-ership of Orote Peninsula better than

the landing on its airfield of a NavyTBF from the Chenango on 30 July.Touching down first to test the surface

of a 2,000-foot-long strip cleared by sixhours of feverish engineer activity, theplane circled and came down again at1650.’+0 Once the field proved ready,

the escort carriers USS Sangmnon and

Suwmzee each launched two VMO-1observation planes to become the firstelements of what was eventually to

3“This test landing by a Navy plane spoiledthe plans of several Marine officers to havethe first American plane to land on Guam beone from VMO–1, whose craft were poised onthe escort carriers offshore. Col Frederick P.Henderson ltr to CMC, dtd 21 Nov52. Actually,the officer that called down the TBF to landwas a Marine, Colonel Peter F. Schrider, com-manding MAG–21, who was present on thestrip with an advance detachment of his airgroup. Sherrod, Marine Air History, p. 253.As it happened, the first American plane tooperate from Guam was an Army liaison air-craft assigned to the 77th Division Artillery.This plane took off from an improvised air-strip at 1310 on the 30th. 77th InfDiv ArtyAAR, 21Jul–10Aug44 (WW II RecsDiv, FRC,Alexandria, Vs. )


become a powerful American aerialtask force based on Guam.:{l

FOA?TE SECURED ‘2

When the 3d Marine Division re-opened a full-scale attack to secure theFonte heights on 27 July, there waslittle evidence of the Japanese decisionto withdraw to the northern sector ofGuam. The enemy seemed as deter-mined as ever to hold his ground, andthe day’s fighting, focused on the leftcenter of the division front, cost theMarines over a hunclred casualties.Holding out, often to the last man, Jap-anese defenders made effective use ofthe broken terrain which was honey-combed with bunkers, caves, andtrenches.

The twisted and broken remnants ofa powerline, which cut across Fonte

Plateau and ran in front of Mt. Man-gan, became the initial objective of 2/3,2/9, and 2,/21, which bore the brunt ofthe assault. (See Map VIII, Map Sec-

tion. ) The battalions flanking the pla-

teau fought their way forward to theline shortly before noon and then held

up awaiting the advance of 2/9. Lieu-

tenant Colonel Cushrnan’s unit hadbeen strafed and hit by bombs fallingshort during the aerial preparation for

the morning’s attack, ancl the resulting

‘“ CTU 53.7 (Corn CarDiv !22) Rpt of Mari-anas Ops, 12Jun–lAug44, ser. 0047 of 3Au3-44,p. 10 (OAB, NHD).

= Unless otherwise noted the material in thissection is derived from 3d MarDiw SAR; 3dMavDiv J1L144WarD; t9clMnrDiv Jnl; 3d Mar-Div D–2 and D–3 PeriodicRpts, 26–31Ju144;7’7th InfDiv OpRpt; 77th InfDiv Jnl; 9th

Mar Jrd; 2/3 Jnl; GSDF Stlldy; Craig$OSep52 ltr; Cushman, “Fight at Fonte.”

reorganization had held up the assaultcompanies for 80 minutes. About1300, just after it finally came up online with 2/3 and 2/21, 2/9 was hithard by a surging counterattack, whichboilecl up out of the thick brush thatblanketed the plateau. Company G, onthe left of the battalion front, met mostof this thrust by 150–200 Japanesetroops. The tanks working with theinfantry played a large part in the re-pulse of the attack, which finally sub-sided after almost two hours of hot,close-quarter action.

Shortly after this fight died down,Cushman recommended that his battal-ion stop its advance and dig in stronglyfor the night. A formidable strong-point, a large cave-rimmed depression,which appeared to be the key to theremaining Japanese defensive system,lay just ahead in the path of 2/9.When division authorized a halt for thenight, Cushman sent out scouts to findthe best way to attack the strongpoint,issued replenishment supplies, andbuilt up reserve ammunition stocks forthe next day’s drive.

While the fighting on the flanks of2/9 was not so frenzied as it was on theplateau itself, there was ample evidencehere too that the Japanese had not losttheir will to fight. Neither 2/3 nor2/21 could advance much beyond thepowerline without being exposed to en-emy flanking attacks. Toward thecenter of the division line, tank-infan-try teams of 1/21 were heavily engagedall day in cleaning out enemy troopsholed LIP in caves and dugouts in the vi-cinity of some demolished radio towers.Some Japanese still manned defenses inthe quarry area near the center of thebattalion zone, even after three days of


constant attacks with explosives, gun-fire, and flaine. Despite the spiritedenemy resistance, both here and on theplateau, the heavy Japanese losses fore-told the end. The 3d Division attackorder for 28 July called for all threeregiments to seize the FBHL in theirzone.

The 9th Marines was to have thedifficult task of driving south up therugged slopes of Mts. Chachao andAlutom and along the ridge approachesto Mt. Tenj o. The crest of Tenjo wasmade an objective of the 77th InfantryDivision, and the boundary betweendivisions was altered to show thischange from the original landing plan.(See Map 29. ) The axis of the Marineattack was plotted in the zone of 3/21,and, on the 27th, 3/9 moved intopositions behind Lieutenant ColonelDuplantis’ battalion, ready to passthrough on the 28th. The 3d Battal-ion, 307th Infantry, attached to ColonelCraig’s regiment, relieved 3/9 on theright of the Marine line so that MajorHubbard’s men could spearhead the reg-imental assault on the peaks thatloomed ahead.

The III Corps attack on the 28th wassuccessful on all fronts, and the dayended with the Final Beachhead Linefrom Adelup to Magpo Point in Ameri-can hands. At 0800, in a bloodless ad-

vance which culminated a week ofpatrol and mopping-up action in thehills between the two beachheads, acompany of 1/305 seized the peak of Mt.Tenjo. The 2d Battalion of the 307th

Infantry then moved up to occupy themountain and extend its lines north to-

ward the new division boundary. Pa-

trols of the 9th Marines made contact

with 2/307 on the heights during theafternoon.

The 3d Battalion, 9th Marines relieved3/21 on position at 0800, and at 0910began moving forward behind tightlycontrolled artillery and machine gunsupport. The 21st Marines battalionwas attached to the 9th Marines toguard the open left flank behind MajorHubbard’s assault companies. Insideof a half hour, 3/9 was on its initialobjective and abreast of 1/9 and 3/307.An hour later, Colonel Craig ordered ageneral advance of the three battalionstoward the Chachao-Alutom massif.Although Craig had not received theIIIAC map overlay showing the new di-vision boundary, he could plainly see theArmy infantrymen on Mt. Tenjo’sslopes, so he contacted the commanderof 2/307, while both officers were check-ing the flank positions of their units,and arranged a mutually satisfactoryboundary. s’< \lJhen the corps overlayarrived, its boundary was found to co-incide with that worked out by the twocommanders.

The only serious resistance encoun-tered by the 9th Marines was centeredon a strongpoint located on Mt. Cha-chao. Manned by a company of Japa-nese troops, presumably remnants ofthe 187% Infant~y, this complex of ma-chine gun nests and trenches guardedthe trail along the ridge leading to Mt.Tenjo. Once 3/9 had developed thisposition, Major Hubbard called downartillery fire on the defenders to coverthe infantry approach and conceal themovement of tanks to the rear to cutoff the enemy escape route. When the

artillery fire lifted, Companies I and K,

mCraig 22]un65 ltr.


rushing the Japanese, drove steadilyforward along the ridge, destroyedeverything in their path, and chargedthe last emplacements with bayonetsbehind a shower of hand grenades.When the battle was over, 3/9 counted135 Japanese dead in its zone. Thevictory enabled the 9th Marines to se-cure its objective from Apra Harbor tothe 21st Marines boundary near Mt.Mangan.

In its drive to the FBHL, ColonelButler’s regiment overran the 29th Di-vision headquarters caves, located nearthe head of the Fonte River valley closeto the wrecked radio towers, and wipedout the last defenders of Mt. Manganas well. In both actions, tanks were inthe forefront of the fighting and theJapanese tried desperately to knockthem out with grenades and hand-car-ried antitank mines. Well covered byriflemen of 1/21 and 2/21 and their ownmachine gun fire, the tanks escaped un-scathed from numerous fanatic attacksby individuals and small groups. Bythe time the 21st Marines were readyto dig in at dusk, all was quiet aroundthe radio towers. The reverse slopedefenses of Mt. Mangan were finally si-lenced.

The only other area of enemy opposi-tion to the 3d Division advance on 28July was located in the depression onFonte Plateau. Here, Lieutenant Colo-nel Cushrnan’s careful preparationspaid off in a smoothly executed attack.Utilizing tank, machine gun, and ba-zocka firing positions that had beenpinpointed by reconnaissance the pre-vious afternoon, 2/9 cut loose with adeadly crossfire which blanketed everycave entrance in the pit. Under coverof this fire, a picked assault group with

flamethrowers and demolitions workedits way down from the rim and me-thodically destroyed every enemy posi-tion without losing a man. Once thisstrongpoint was reduced, 2/9, workingwith 2/3 and 2/21, was able to clear therest of the plateau area and secure itsshare of the FBHL. Cushman’s battal-ion, in four hectic and wearying daysof hard fighting for control of Fontehad lost 62 men killed and 179 wounded,but it had captured the anchor positionof the enemy defenses.

As night fell across the island on the28th, reports came in from all along thenew Marine positions that scatteredJapanese holdouts, who had purposelyor unknowingly been bypassed duringthe day’s advance, were trying to infil-trate the lines heading north. Thisattempted exodus from the Marinebeachhead by a relative handful of en-emy survivors reflected the orders thathad been passed by the 29th Division

following the unsuccessful counterat-tack of 26 July.

The. able-bodied fighting men weredirected to disengage on the night ofthe 28th and withdraw through Ordotto prepared positions near Barrigadaand Finegayan, there “to engage in de-laying action in the jungle in northernGuam to hold the island as long as pos-sible. ” ‘t~ All sick and wounded com-batants and Japanese civilians not at-tached to fighting imits were startednorth on the night of the 27th, the

division hospital and its patients to aposition behind Mt. Santa Rosa and thecivilians to “a safe area furthernorth.” ‘;S Accompanying this first


echelon was the Thirty -jirst Army com-mander, General Obata, and three ofhis staff officers, who left the Fonteheadquarters at midnight on the 27thto move to Ordot. At the same time,one of General Takashina’s staff wasalso sent to Ordot to marshal all avail-able motor transport and move rationsand supplies to storage areas in thejungle north of Mt. Santa Rosa.

General Takashina and LieutenantColonel Takeda remained behind at theFonte headquarters when the with-drawal began, and as a result were di-rectly involved in the fighting on the28th, when Marine tanks attacked the29th Division cave CP area. At about1100, as it became increasingly appar-ent that the dwindling number of Jap-anese defenders could not stop therampaging tanks, General Takashinadecided to make a break while therewas still a chance to escape north.Then, as Takedo recalled the events,the two Japanese officers:

. . . stole out of the headquarters caveand ran straight between some enemytanks and jumped from a cliff. The U. S.tanks, sighting the two persons, firedvolleys of tracer bullets. Fortunately forthe two, they managed to escape into adead angle of the tank guns. About 1400hours they reached a small stream at thenorthern foot of Mt. Macajna when thedivision commander was shot by machinegun fire from a U. S. tank, and died aheroic death, his heart having been pene-trated by a bullet.%

With Takashina’s death in battle, thetactical command of all Japanese forcesremaining on Guam was assumed by

General Obata. He had only a fewsenior officers remaining to rally the

%Ibid., pp. 195-196.

surviving defenders and organize co-hesive units from the shattered rem-nants of the battalions that had foughtto hold the heights above the Asan-Adelup beaches. All through the nightof 28 July, Japanese troops trudgedalong the paths that led from Fonte toOrdot, finding their way at times by thelight of American flares. At Ordot,two traffic control points guided mentoward Barrigada, where three compos-ite infantry companies were forming,or toward Finegayan, where a force offive composite companies was to manblocking positions. As he fully expectedthe Americans to conduct an aggressivepursuit on the 29th, General Obata or-dered Lieutenant Colonel Takada toorganize a delaying force that wouldhold back the Marines until the with-drawal could be effected.

Contrary to the Japanese com-mander’s expectations, General Geigerhad decided to rest his battle-wearyassault troops before launching a full-scale attack to the north. The sub-stance of his orders to the 3d and 77thDivisions on 29 July was to eliminatethe last vestiges of Japanese resistancewithin the FBHL, to organize the lineof defense, and to patrol in strength tothe front. All during the day, smallbut sharp fights flared up wherever 3dDivision Marines strove to wipe out theisolated pockets of enemy defendersthat still held out within the beachheadperimeter. A very few Japanese sur-rendered, and most of these men weredazed, wounded, and unable to resistfurther. Almost all the enemy diedfighting instead.

Although they made few contactswith retreating Japanese, Marine andArmy patrols began to encounter in-


creasing numbers of Guamanians, whostarted to move toward the Americanlines as the enemy relaxed his watch.Intelligence provided by the nativesconfirmed patrol and aerial observer re-ports that the Japanese were headedfor northern Guam. There was nostrong defensive position within 2,000yards of the FBHL, and there were am-ple signs of a hasty withdrawal. Pa-trols found a wealth of weapons,ammunition dumps, and caves crammedwith supplies of all types in the arearinging the III Corps position. Thediscoveries emphasized the sorry plightof the ill-equipped and ill-fed men, whowere struggling north through the j un-gle, punished by constant harassing andinterdiction fires by Corps Artilleryand the machine guns and bombs ofcarrier air.

The 2d Battalion, 9th Marines wasrelieved on line by 1/3 on the 29th andwas placed in division reserve for ashort and well-earned rest. As the 3dMarines was readied for a new phasein the battle, the regiment received anew commander, Colonel James A. Stu-art, who had been the D–3. As a partof a division-wide shift in individualcommand and staff responsibilities,Colonel Hall was reassigned duties asthe D–4.’T The changes seemed to be

“As a result of the same order, LieutenantColonel Ellsworth N. Murray ( D–4) replacedthe D–2, Lieutenant Colonel Howard J. Tur-ton, who became D–3. Colonel Robert G. Hunt(Division Inspector) was given the additionalduties of Liaison Officer to IIIAC and Lieu-tenant Colonel Ralph M. King (Assistant D–3)was assigned as executive officer of the 9thMarines to replace Lieutenant Colonel JaimeSabater, wounded on 21 July. The order alsoconfirmed the appointment of Major IrvingR. Kriendler as D–1 on 22 July, following the

in keeping with the aura of preparationand reorientation that was prevalentthroughout the IIIAC positions. Ev-erywhere the assault troops and theservice and support units were refur-bishing equipment and stockpiling am-munition and supples for the drive intothe northern jungle.

Although the Japanese were nolonger in close contact with the Ameri-cans, the patrols sent out on the 30thran into scattered enemy fire as soon asthey began to move up from the belt oflowland between Agana and Pago Baysand onto the northern plateau. Allreconnaissance and other intelligenceindicated that the Japanese were readyto defend the road that forked north ofAgana, one branch leading to Finega-yan and the other to Barrigada. (SeeMap 29. )

A BASE OF OPERATIONS ‘“

Before General Geiger was ready tolaunch a drive north on an island-widefront, he needed assurance that his rearwas secure from attack. Equally aswell, he had to be certain that he pos-sessed the supplies and support forcesnecessary to sustain an advance by two

divisions through extremely difficult

country against an opponent that wasbattered but by no means beaten.

To answer one requirement, knowl-

death of Lieutenant Colonel Chevy S. Whitein a shelling of the division message center.

m Unless otherwise noted, the material inthis section is derived from: IZIAC SAR;IIIAC C–4 PeriodicRpts Nos. 144 to 23–44,dtd 21Jul–14Aug44, hereafter IIIA C C–h Rpts;LtCol F. Clay Bridgewater, USA, “Reconnais-sance on Guam,” The Cavalry Journal, v. LIV,no. 3 (May–Jun45) .


edge of the enemy situation in southernGuam, the 77th Division sent infantrypatrols deep into the mountains andjungle in the vicinity of the FBHL.On the 27th, General Bruce ordered the77th Reconnaissance Troop to investi-gate reports that the Japanese mightstill be present in strength, particularlyin the center of the island near Mt.Lamlam. Five small patrols set out,two for objectives on the east coast, twoto the southeast, and one down thesouthwest coast. Although the sick-ness of one member forced the patrol toYlig and Pago Bays to turn back afterit had covered 8,000 yards, the othersstayed out three days checking all signsof the Japanese. Scattered oppositionwas encountered from snipers and smallunits by the patrols when they movedsouth along the mountainous spine ofthe island, but there was no evidenceof enemy resistance in strength. Asthe mission of the patrols was recon-naissance not combat, the soldiersevaded most of the enemy troops theyspotted, noting that the Japanese wereall headed north. Other patrols sentout on the 29th and 30th travelledalong the 77th Division proposed routeof advance to Pago Bay. They gainedvaluable terrain intelligence to aid Gen-eral Bruce in planning the difficultmovement of his regiments east andthen north through the jungle to comeup on line with the 3d Marine Division.

Once General Geiger knew that nosignificant Japanese force was presentin southern Guam, he assigned respon-sibility for its control and pacificationto his smallest major tactical unit, the1st Provisional Marine Brigade. Planswere formulated for General Shepherd’sregiments to relieve elements of the

77th Division when the fighting onOrote ended.

In many ways, the assault phase ofthe Guam operation was partially overwhen IIIAC was ready to launch itsnorthern offensive. Apra Harbor, thekey objective of the dual landing oper-ation, had been secured and was beingconverted into a major anchorage.Seabees and engineers had clearedbeaches that had been battlegroundsand had rebuilt and replaced roads andbridges to handle heavy vehicular traf-fic. Extensive supply dumps, repairfacilities, and other service installa-tions had begun to take on the appear-ance of order and permanence.

On 26 July at 1300, General Geigerhad opened his headquarters ashorenear Agat, and on the following day,the Corps Service Group under Lieuten-ant Colonel Francis M. McAlister hadbegun operations by taking over con-trol of the 5th Field Depot, 53d NavalConstruction Battalion, and the CorpsMedical Battalion. At the same time,the success of combat operations en-abled the Corps Shore Party to beginunloading garrison force supplies overDadi Beach near the foot of Orote Pen-insula. On the eve of the second phaseof the Guam operation, the Corps Serv-ice Group had grown in size and com-plexity to include many of the Seabee,engineer, pioneer, amphibian tractor,

motor transport, and service units thathad originally been part of the brigade

and division shore parties. On hand

and ready to issue in 5th Field Depotand 3d and 77th Division dumps werean average of 13 days’ supply of ra-tions, 15 days’ gasoline and other pe-troleum products, and at least 3 units of


fire for all weapons. Facilities werebeing prepared at Piti for the unload-ing of ships; the first vessel, a cargotype carrying 3,000-man resupplyblocks of all classes, was slated to startdischarging on the 31st.

The cost of the fight thus far hadbeen heavy. From H-Hour until mid-night on 30 July, the III AmphibiousCorps had lost 989 men killed in actionand had had 4,836 wounded; in addi-tion, 302 men were missing and unac-counted for, On the Japanese side of

the grim tally sheet, 6,205 dead hadbeen counted. Several thousand morewere estimated to have been killed,their bodies lying sealed in caves orhidden by folds of ground and thickbrush in the battle area. Only 50 pris-oners had been taken despite the des-perate, hopeless nature of the Japanesesituation. The rugged terrain to thenorth, coupled with the discipline andtenacity of the defenders, promisedfurther heavy casualties to both sidesbefore the battle for Guam would end.

consolidating a foothold

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