5th Marines from the Kansas Linefor additional offensive operationseast of the Punchbowl. Except forthe 8th ROK Division on Thomas'right flank, the rest of X Corpswould seize another hill mass sooncalled "Heartbreak Ridge." Byersexpected the Marines to resumethe attack on 11 September.

With only 48 hours to mount anattack, Thomas had little alterna-tive but to look again to the 7thMarines to lead the advance onKanmuhong Ridge, the hill massdirectly north of Yoke Ridge andthe division's next objective. Theconcept of the operation envi-sioned a two-phase operation thatwould begin with the 7th Marinesseizing the two most dominantpeaks at the eastern edge of theridge, Hills 673 and 749. To elimi-nate a transverse ridge spur (Hill680), a secondary attack wouldstrike directly north from the HaysLine on Yoke Ridge. This missionwent to 3d Battalion, 7th Marines,commanded by Lieutenant ColonelBernard T. Kelly, with the mainattack to 1st Battalion, 7th Marines,under Lieutenant Colonel James G.Kelly, relatively untouched by thefight for Yoke Ridge. When the 7thMarines had secured the Hill 673-Hill 749 area, the 1st Marineswould come forward and continuethe attack up Kanmubong's longaxis, "ridge-running," to capture aseries of peaks designated (east towest) Hills 812, 980, 1052, and1030. The scheme of maneuverwould allow tanks to fire acrossthe front of the advancing troopsand artillery fire (even naval gun-fire) to converge in concentrationsfrom the firing positions to thesouth and southeast. The advanceshad to be supported by hundredsof "chiggy bearers" since therewere no roads of any kind to bringthe ammunition, food, and waterforward in any other way.

Fighting from cleverly-con-

cealed and strongly-built bunkersand trench systems, the NorthKoreans made the 7th Marines (allthree battalions) pay dearly inthree days of fighting, 34 dead and321 wounded. The assault compa-nies that crossed the line of depar-ture in the morning fog of 11September did not expect a walk-over. Despite the hour of intenseartillery preparation, the NorthKorean defenders fought withunflagging tenacity until killed.Each bunker system came ringedwith mines and booby-traps, andKorean mortar shells and grenadesshowered crippling fragmentsacross every contested position.Long-range heavy machine gunfire from higher up KanmubongRidge took its toll among theMarine assault units that struggledforward with flamethrowers andsatchel charges.

Once again dark memories ofIwo Jima and Okinawa came to theveterans. More heirs of theJapanese military tradition than theSoviet, the North Koreans showedno hesitation in launching counter-attacks large and small and atunexpected times and from unex-pected directions. Although theenemy did not overrun any Marinepositions, only quick shooting andquick thinking broke the backs ofthe attacks with bullets andartillery shells. Although the 3dBattalion took its objective with noassistance, Colonel Nickerson hadto commit his 2d Battalion to aidthe 1st Battalion on 12 September.Only a converging two-battalionattack—the companies in col-umn—finally seized Hill 673, andthe subsequent 2d Battalion attackon Hill 749 fought itself out farshort of the crest. In all the fightingtank fire proved decisive when thebunkers could be identified andfired upon, line-of-sight. Manybunkers, however, could havebeen reached by close air support,

457

conspicuously absent. The keyground maneuver came from acompany of the 1st Battalion thatmade an undetected night marchto reach a poorly-defended entrantto Hill 673, then assaulting througha breach in the North Koreandefenses. Nevertheless, the 2dBattalion's attack on Hill 749stalled with the three rifle compa-nies reduced, scattered, and bat-tling back small counterattacks inthe dark before a battalion of the1st Marines replaced them on 13September. So hard-pressed andscattered were the Marines of 2dBattalion, 7th Marines, that the bat-talion misreported its location andgave Nickerson the impression thathis regiment had taken Hill 749,which it had not. Moreover, theapproaches to the hill were stillheld by some very combativeNorth Koreans. Assuming opera-tional control of the 2d Battalion,the 1st Marines, under ColonelThomas A. Wornham, picked upthe responsibility for occupyingHill 749. Only a helicopter recon-naissance proved that Hill 749would have to be taken first.

The logistical burden of sup-porting five committed infantrybattalions (the situation on 13September) proved too much forthe "chiggy bearers" of the KoreanService Corps 103d Division, butthe Marines now had an alternativefor the emergency resupply ofammunition and medical goodsand the evacuation of the serious-ly-wounded: the Marine Corpshelicopter. Although the light heli-copters of Marine ObservationSquadron 6 (VMO-6) had been afixture in operations since August1950, the battle for KanmubongRidge opened a new era in MarineCorps history, the combat employ-ment of helicopters as an integralpart of Marine air-ground opera-tions. General Thomas andColonel Krulak had both played

key roles in developing the COn­cept of vertical envelopment andfighting for funds to procure andtest helicopters in HMX-l, theexperimental helicopter squadroncreated at Marine Corps Air Station,Quantico, Virginia. HMX-l gavebirth in January 1951 to MarineTransport Helicopter Squadron 161(HMR-161), commanded by a heli­copter pioneer, Lieutenant ColonelGeorge W. Herring. Herringbrought HMR-161 to Korea inAugust 1951 ready to make itscombat debut under the sharp eyeof Krulak, who had made verticalenvelopment his latest magnificentobsession. Herring's squadron of

300 Marines and 15 Sikorsky HRS­1 transport helicopters arrived atthe airstrip (X-83) near the divisioncommand post at Sohwa-ri andmoved in with VMO-6. Anticipat­ing some employment in theweeks ahead, Krulak and Herringprepared the squadron for opera­tions in combat landing zones anddeclared it ready for commitmenton 12 September. Thomas toldHMR-161 to carry supplies to theembattled Marines near Hill 793.

Operation Windmill I on 13September lasted only about threehours, but its impact stretched intothe future by years. In the shortterm it made sure that 2d Battalion,

1st Marines, commanded byLieutenant Colonel Franklin B.Nihart, faced another day's battlewith plenty of ammunition, water,and rations and without the bur­den of casualties. The first liftbrought in a helicopter supportteam from the 2d Battalion to runthe landing zone, and the remain­ing 27 flights delivered nine tons ofcargo and evacuated 74 casualties.Not one helicopter was lost toground fire or accident. A similarresupply mission would haverequired almost 400 Korean bear­ers and a full day to accomplish.Unlike an earlier parachute resup­ply mission to the Korean Marines,

Second Lieutenant George H. Ramer

Born in ]92""':.11 k)'ersdale, Penns ·Ivania. heenlisted in the :\a\)' in 19'1 l. After the war, heentered Bucknell l ni\ er it)'. from which he grad­

uated in 19'50 with a degree in Political Science andIlistory. hill' attending Bucknell, he enrolled in thei\larine Corps Hesel'\'e Platoon Leader's program and\vas commissioned in the "larine Corps Re el'\·e. I Ietaught high school civic,; and history in Lewisburg,Penn"ylvania, hefore being called to acti\'e duty inJanuary 1951 at his own requesl.

s a platoon leader with Company J. 3d Ballalion, 7th"larines, in Korea, his bravery in covering the with­(\rawal of his platoon on Kanmubong Ridge on 12S 'ptember 19'5J was recognized by the posthumousaward of th > Iedal of Ilonol'. llis citation reads, in pan:

Second Lieuten:.llll Ramer fearlessl . led his men upthe steep slopes and, although he and the majori­t of his unit wcr' wounded during the asccnr,boldly continued 10 spearhead the assault. ... hestaunchl), carried the allack to the top, person:.llly:.Innihilated one enemy hunker \yith grenade andc:.lrhine fire and captured the objeClive \\ ith hisremaining eight men.Lnahle to hold the position :.lgainst :.In immediate.o\'el'\yhelming hostile coulllerallack, he orderedhis group to withdr;1\\ and single-handedly foughtthe enemy to furnish cover for his men and for theevacuation of three fatally wounded i\brines.,everdy wounded a second time, ,econdLieutenant Ramer ... courageously manned hispost until the hostile tr p' overran his positionand he fell 111011ally wounded.

458

DCP:lrlllll'lll of I)CIcIl'C PhOlO (LS\ICl A IH02';

In 1963, a f:.lcility for physical conditioning at ~larine

orps Base Quantico, Virginia, was named in his mem­Iy.-Captain John . h:.lpin. L"'i\1 ,R (Ret)

Whirlybirdsen Marine Transport Helicopter Squadron

(HMR) 161 deployed to Korea, the squadrontook with it an aircraft that pushed the techni-

cal state-of-the-art in helicopter design into a new fron-tier. Designated the HRS-1, the Sikorsky-designed andbuilt helicopter had endured the inevitable ups anddowns that characterized the introduction of any pio-neering aircraft. Without government contracts, theSikorsky Aircraft Division of the Vought-SikorskyCorporation, Stratford, Connecticut, produced an aircraftdesignated the S-55, first flown in 1949. Initially market-ing the aircraft as a commercial utility helicopter, IgorSikorsky hoped the S-55 could compete with the PiaseckiH-21 (or PD-22), which had been adopted by the U.S. AirForce for its air rescue service. The Navy, however, wasin the hunt for a general-purpose helicopter that could beadopted for shipboard use. Naval aviators liked the S-55because of its economical design, modest size, and ser-viceability.

Redesignated the HO4S-1 in its naval model, the S-55represented at least two major engineering advances: theaddition of a tail rotor for greater stability in flight and afront-mounted Pratt & Whitney R-1340-57 engine thatcould generate a respectable 600 horsepower. The engineplacement helped solve a nagging problem of weight-dis-tribution and flight characteristics. Prior helicopter mod-els placed the engine directly under the rotor-blades, adesign that gravely limited any so-designed helicopter to

very light loads and insured flight instability. The front-mounted engine dramatically increased the helicopter'scarrying capacity and simplified maintenance since theHRS-1 hadl clam-shaped nose doors that provided easyaccess to the engine for the ground crew mechanics. Thenew design also improved vertical flight stability.

In the earliest stage of evaluation, 1948-1949, Navy andMarine Corps officers, encouraged by Sikorsky, saw capa-bilities the helicopter did not yet have, even under opti-mum weather and altitude conditions. The originalrequirement the naval aviators placed on the helicopterwas a 10-man load (225 pounds per Marine) to be carried150 miles. The requirements shrank, as it became moreand more obvious that the HRS-1 was not going to be atwo-ton-plus lifter. All the helicopter's other characteris-tics, however, made it the aircraft of choice for theBureau of Aeronautics, and the Marine Corps joined theprogram in August 1950, with an initial order of 40 air-craft.

The HRS-ls that went to Korea came into service witha gross weight rating (7,000 pounds at sea level) about1,000 pounds slighter than originally designed with apayload reduced to 1,420 pounds under optimal flightconditions. Its troop load dropped from 10 to four to six.The helicopter's maximum speed remained at 90 knots,but its range had dropped by half to 70-mile round trips.Nevertheless, the HRS-1 was not a "whirlybird" of dlisap-pointment, but promise.

459

National Archives Photo (USN) 80-G-433347

none of the cargo drifted off toplaces and users unknown. Theuse of externally-slung, quick-release loads in cargo nets madeeasy. For the corpsmen andwounded Marines, helicopter evac-uation meant that a hard-hit casu-alty could be transported to a med-ical clearing station ("battalionmed") in 30 minutes, not doomedto a day-long stretcher ride. Evenwithout accumulated statistics,medical personnel could alreadytell that medical evacuation heli-copters would save lives and boostmorale.

The plan for the 1st Marines toattack up Kanmubong Ridge con-tinued to unravel despite the heli-copter resupply and the commit-ment of two battalions, the 2dBattalion to take Hill 749 and the

3d Battalion to seize the ridgelineacross the Soyang on Nihart's rightflank. Nihart's battalion finallycleared Hill 749 after sharp fightingone company at a time with only aplatoon in battle by the evening of14 September. Before Nihart couldmount another attack the next day,the North Koreans deluged hisMarines with heavy artillery andmortar fire, pinning them to theirHill 749 positions. The NorthKorean regiment with accompany-ing artillery tried to throw the 2dBattalion off Hill 749 for four hoursduring the night of 15-16September and left almost 200bodies and many blood trailsbehind when it withdrew, but thebattle cost the 2d Battalion almost200 casualties and limited it as anoffensive threat. Two Korean

deserters reported that their regi-ment had 1,200 casualties.

Wornharn now had to commithis reserve 1st Battalion to ensurethat the complete Hill 673-Hill 749complex was secure, leavingThomas only one unhloodied regi-ment (the 5th Marines) to assaultthe heights of Kanmuhong Ridge.At the cost of more than 800 casu-alties in the 7th and 1st Marines,the 1st Marine Division had onlyseized the ground identified fivedays before as the departure pointfor the more demanding advanceup the spine of the ridge. Now itwas the turn of Colonel Richard G.Weede's 5th Marines to continuethe attack.

The battle of Kanmuhong Ridgecontinued for four more days (16-20 September) and ended with the5th Marines reduced by some 250casualties and only Hill 812 secure-ly under Marine control. The com-manders of Weede's two assaultbattalions believed they could alsohave taken Hill 980, hut it wouldhave been difficult to hold with thepeak (Hill 1052) still under NorthKorean control. The problems ofCommunist enfilade fire from thenorth simply got worse as theMarines worked their way to thewest along the ridge. TheLieutenant Colonel Donald R.

Kennedy's 3d Battalion in the leftzone of action had its flank pro-tected by Yoke Ridge and by tankfire, but the 2d Battalion workingalong the opposite slope enjoyedno advantages in cover and friend-ly fire, except close air support—which did not arrive. Staggered byits mounting casualties, the 2dBattalion stormed Hill 812 on theevening of 17 September. Withoutphysical contact, the two battalionswent into perimeter defenses,expecting North Korean counterat-tacks from the heights to their frontor, in the case of the 2d Battalion,from the broken ground to the

A wounded squad leader of the 5th Marines ensures that a North Koreanemplacement no longer threatens the advance along Kanmubong Ridge. TheSeptember attacks into the ridge mass north of the Punchbowl produced the mostintense combat since the Chinese Ffth Offensive of April and May.

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A156867

460

Sergeant Frederick W Mausert IIIof almost 24 hours, the Marinesfinally chased off the last of theKorean raiders. The Marine victorsfound 60 dead North Koreans scat­tered among the shattered rocks,but the victory cost the 5th Marinesfive dead and almost 50 wounded.Major Gerald P. Averill, the battal­ion operations officer, watchedMarines shoot fleeing Koreansfrom the off-hand position whileone Marine took photographs ofthe Korean corpses.

The battle for "The Rock"seemed almost symbolic since ithad been a no-quarters fight for apiece of ground of little tactical sig­nificance. It also was the last partof the battle for Kanmubong Ridge,for General Van Fleet on 20September ordered Byers to stopthe offensive. The simultaneousbattle of Heartbreak Ridge to thewest of the Punchbowl had pro­duced few results except soaringcasualties in the 2d InfantryDivision, and Van Fleet wanted allof X Corps fire support committedto that struggle. In addition, heapproved of Byers' plan to shift the8th ROK Division since the divi­sion-one of the better units in theSouth Korean army-had taken itsobjectives east of the Soyang River,though at prohibitive cost. Only indisgruntled retrospect did theMarines realize that they hadfought in their last division offen­sive in Korea. The relief of the 8thROK Division simply meant thatthe South Koreans would shiftfrom the eastern to the westernflank of X Corps.

The change meant that the 1stMarine Division assumed aboutfive miles more of front in a sectoralready 15 miles in length. Withthe 1st KMC Regiment still holdingthe northern lip of the Punchbowland the 5th Marines defending partof Kanmubong Ridge and theSoyang River valley, the 1stMarines assumed the mission of

Ikp"rtllll'nt of Dde'N.' PholO (I :~~IC) \ ,6'ro

hard-pressed 2d Battalion to con­solidate its hold on Hill 812 and tofind the 3d Battalion on its left.Even with the 5th Marines' linesmore or less connected, the NorthKoreans made life miserable forthe troops by sniping with long­range, high velocity antitankartillery guns and by attacking anypatrols or outposts pushed forwardof the main line of resistance. Twocompanies of the 2d Battalionbecame embattled for two daysover control of "The Rock," a gran­ite knob about 700 yards west ofHill 812. In a close-quarters melee

Sergeant Mausert unhesitatinglyI'ft his covered position and ranthrough a heavily mined andfire-sw pt area to bring backtwo critically wounded men to the comparative safety of the lines.taunchly refusing evacuation despite a painful head wound ... [he]

I >d his men in a furious hayon L charge against the fir t of a literal­ly impregnahle series of hunkers. Stunned and knocked to theground when another hulleL sLruck his helmet, he regained his feetand resumed his drive, personally silencing the machine-gun andleading his men in elimination several other emplacemenLs in thearea. Promptly reorganizing his unit for a renewed fight to the finalohjective on top of the ridge, Sergeant Mausert ... still refused aidand continued spearheading the assault to the topmost machine-gunnest and bunkers, the last hulwark of the fanatic aggres~ors. Leapinginto the wall of fire, he destroyed another machin -gun withgrenades before he was mortally wounded by bursting grenades andmachine-gun fire.-eaprain John . hapin, USM R (Ret)

Born in 1930 in Camhridge,le\\ York, he enlisted in

th> Marine Corps in 19'+8.Following recruit training at ParrisIsland, outh arolina, he was sta­Lioned at Cheny Point and CampLejeune, orth Carolina. beforegoing to Korea, where he partici­pated in campaigns in South andCentral Korea. Serving as a squadleader with Company fl, 1stBattalion, 7th Marines. he waswounded on 10 ,eptember 1951.Two days later at ,ongnap-yong(Punchbowl), he was killed in a'ourageous action for which he

was awarded the Meal of Honor.I lis citation reads, in part:

north and east. Acutely aware ofhis danger and reduced supply cir­cumstances, the 2d Battalion com­mander, Lieutenant ColonelHouston "Tex" Stiff, asked for heli­copter resupply. In Windmill II, thehelicopters of HMR-161 deliveredsix tons of scarce ammunition andengineering supplies in less thanan hour on the afternoon of 19September.

Just to hold his line across theridge line, Colonel Weede had tobring up his uncommitted 1stBattalion, which fell in on Stiffsright and rear and allowed the

461

and to establish a patrol base there as well as replace the South Koreans. On 21 September, HMR- 161 carried the first fully opera- tional combat unit into a potential battle. Despite poor landing sites and marginal weather, the heli- copters delivered 224 Marines and almost nine tons on supplies and equipment in four hours. The troops disenlbarlted by "hot rope," a rappelling technique that does not require a snap-ring hook-up; the Marines and accompanying load slung from each aircraft could be delivered in 90 seconds after an eight minute flight from X-83, 15 miles away. General Thomas and Colonel Krulak complinlented all hands with glowing messages. Van Fleet and Byers sent their own congratulations, fully realizing the potential of helicopter operations. The next operations, Blacltbird on 27 September and Bumblebee on 11 October, produced mixed results, but Blackbird proved that H ~ ~ - 1 6 1 could do limited night- work, and Bumblebee demonstrat- ed that HMR-161 could move an entire battalion into a non-hostile landing zone. A helicopter-mobile

N:~tional Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A157221 briefing hecame a standard stop, A r!fleman of the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, disenzbarks from a Sikorsky HRS-1 helicopter of Marine Helicopter Transport Squadron 161 during Operation dictated by Van Fleet, for VIPs,

Bumblebee. The operation allowed two Marine infantry battalio?zs to exchange which included the Chairman of

positions on Hill 702 by airl@, not overland march. the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Omar N. Bradley, USA. After his 1

occupying the sector east of the river since the 7th Marines were the corps reserve. To talte posses- sion of its sector the 1st Marines had to control Hill 854 and Hill 884. Lieutenant Colonel Foster C. LaHue's 3d Battalion found to its dismay that the 21st ROK Regiment occupied the summit of Hill 854, but that the North Koreans still held almost all the northern face. For two days the battalion attacked and ran the survivors off, but the Marines lost 11 Inen to uncharted South Korean minefields and 50 Inore casualties in the fighting.

LaHue's requests for essential air strikes were answered too late or not at all, again bringing the close air support issue to a boiling point with Thomas and Krulak.

Marine helicopters, however, provided one of the bright spots in the sector extension. To buy some time for another 1st Marines battal- ion to move to Hill 884 and to explore the possible routes to the hill-and any enemy ambushes or friendly minefields-Thomas or- dered the division's Reconnais- sance Company to move by heli- copter to the summit of Hill 884

October briefing, Bradley, no fan of the Marine Corps, admitted to his staff and accolnpanying jour- nalists that the Marines might have discovered an operational tech- nique that might change the con- duct of land warfare. The Septem- ber fighting that might not have been Iwo Jima I1 for the 1st Marine Division, but Bradley's faint praise gave a little Inore meaning to the battle for Yoke Ridge and Kanmubong Ridge. The surviving Marines felt that strange mixture of grief, guilt, relief, and satisfilction of veterans. They had upheld the

-Captain John C. Chapin. US]\ICH (Het)

Private First Class Edward Gomez

Line. For the Marines the frontbecame the Kansas Line bent,twisted, and renamed to includethe terrain captured on the Yokeand Kanmubong Ridges. The signsof approaching winter were many.The distribution of cold weatherclothing and equipment went onthroughout the division, and theMarines' bunkers started to includestoves and makeshift furniture

Born in 1932 in Omaha,'ehrasl a. he attendedmaha lligh 'chool

hefore enlisting in the ~1arine

Corps Resen'e in 19'19. In Korea.he participated in three opera­rion~ and \\as wounded in June1951. With a strong premonitionof death, he \\'fote his mother in'eptember: "I am writing rhi~ onrhe pos<,ihiliry rhat 1 may die inrhb nexr a~sault .... I am norsorry I died. be 'ause I died fight­ing for my country and thar's the

umher One thing in everyone'slife. to keep his home and coun­try from being won over hy ~uch

things a' communi~m ... .TellDad [ died lik' the man he want­ed me to be."

On l'i Septemher, he was killedon Kanmubong Ridge, while s'lving as an ammunition bearer withCompany E, 2d Battalion, l~t Marines. and saving th<.: live.s of four of hissquad members. Hi~ Medal of llonor citation reads. in pan:

Boldly advancing with hi- ~quad in support of a group of rillemenassaulting a series of strongl, fOltified and bitterly defended h()~tile

positions on llill 719. Pri\'ate First las~ Gomez consbtently expo~ed

him. elf to the withering barrage to keep his machine-gun supplied""ith ammunition during the dri\'l" forward to seize the ohj<.:cti\e. ~

his. quad deployed to meet an immin<.:nt counterallack. he \'( lun­tarily mO\'ed down an abandoned trench (() ~earch for a ne\\ loca­tion for the gun and. \\ hen a ho~tile grenade landed het\\'een him­self and hi~ weapon, shouted a \\ arning to those around him as hegra~ped the activated charge in his hand. Determined to save hi~

comrades. he unhesitatingly cho~e to sacrifice himself and, divinginto rhe ditch \\ ith rhe deadly mi~sile, ahsorhed the shattering vio­lence of the explosion in his own hody.

After rhe war, a plaque wa~ dedicate I in his honor at the Omaha Boysluh.

ALong Winter and a Longer War

winds of winter on the Hays­Kansas Line.

While battles still raged to thewestern zones of I and IX Corpsand most of X Corps focused onthe capture of Heartbreak Ridge,the 1st Marine Division secured itsown portion of the new Minnesota

reputation of the 1st MarineDivision and X Corps for nevershirking the most dangerous andonerous missions.

With the 1st Marine Division inplace in its part of the Hays-KansasLine, the division could assess itslatest month of Korean combat.First, the North Korean army hadproved more skilled and deter­mined than the Chinese, but notimmortal. The division intelligencesection estimated that the Marineshad inflicted about 10,000 casual­ties on Jhe enemy. The number ofenemy bodies actually countednumbered 2,799, and the Marineshad taken 557 prisoners. Measuredagainst its most taxing battles inWorld War II, Peleliu andOkinawa, the 1st Marine Divisionlosses, compared with the casual­ties inflicted, appeared acceptable:227 killed in action, and 2,125wounded in action for a total of2,452 casualties. Almost all thecasualties occurred in the fourinfantry regiments and their attach­ments. The single most costly 24­hour period (39 killed and 463wounded) was 13-14 September inthe first phase of the attack onKanmubong Ridge, which in­volved two battalions each of boththe 1st and 7th Marines.

What gave the battles for YokeRidge and Kanmubong Ridge aspecial quality was the discourag­ing impact of the geography. Ifone stands along the DemilitarizedZone today-as the author did in1994 and 1998--in the sectors inwhich the Marines fought aroundthe Punchbowl, the mountainranges stretch off without visibleend into North Korea. It is difficultnot to feel that there must be a bet­ter way to conduct war than tomount one attack after anotheragainst those forbidding (and stillfortified) mountains. Surely thesame thoughts came to the Marinesof 1951 as they felt the first chill

463

Corporal JosephVittori

Born in Beverly. Mass­achusetts, in 1929. he attend­>d high school and \vorked

on his father's f~IrIn beror enlistingfor thre > years in the Marine Corpsin 19'16. Arter being discharged. hejoined the Marine Corps Reserve in19')0 for an indefinite tour of acti eduty. rIe trained at Camp Lejeune,North arolina, until January 19':;1,\vhen he joined Company F. 2dBattalion. 1st Marines, in Korea.Ilaving been wounded in June nearYanggu, he was killed in the fightfor IliJl 749 in the Punchbowl on 15September 195] and became thesecond larine of 2d Battalion. bt1arines, within a 18-hour period to

receive the Medal of Ilonor. Hiscitation reads. in part:

Corporal Villori boldlyrushed through the With­drawing troops with twoother volulllcers from hisreserve platoon andplunged directly into themidst of the enemy.Overwhelming them in afierc hand-to-hand strug-

Ik'p.lrtll1l'nt 01 Dd"n,l' I'hOlO (('S\I(;) \ 16lp 1

gle. he enabled his compa­ny to consolidate its posi­tions ... he assumed posi­tion under the deva'tatingbarrage and. fighting a sin­gle-hand battle. leaped fromone nank to the other. CO\'­

ering each roxhol> in turnas casualties continued tomount, manning a machine­gun when the gunner wasstruck down ... With thesituation becoming ex­tremely critical ... and fox­holes left practically void bydead and \vounded for adistance of 100 yards,

orporal Vittori continuedhi.' valiant stand. refusing togive ground as the enemypenetrated to within feet ofhis position. . . . JVlorLallywounded by en ~my ma­chine-gun and rine bulletswhile persisting in his mag­nificent defense of the sec­tor, where approximately200 en 'my dead werefound the following morn­ing, Corpor;.d Vittori . . 'undoubtedly prevented theentire battalion positionfrom collapsing.

Tn 1986 there was a parade andmemorial service in his honor, \"itha park named after him in his home­town of Beverly, 1a ·sachusetts.

Corporal Jack A.Davenport

An ardent athlete and aGolden Gloves champion, hewas I rn in 1931 in Kansas

ity. Missouri, and enlisted in theMarine Corps in .lull' 1950, Sent toKorea that December, he rook partin four successive operations. Then,as a squad leader with Company G,3d Battalion. 5th Marines, he died ina valorous acti )Il at the Punchbowlon 21September 19')1. Ilis citation for the

464

Ikpannwnl "I Ikil'n'" PhOlll II ~~I(:) \ IIl01~

Medal of IlonaI' read. in pan:

\;' hile expertly directing thedefense of his position dur­ing a probing attack by hos­tile forces allempring toinfiltrate the area, CorporalDavenpon, acting quicklywhen an enemy grenadefell illlo the foxhole whichhe was occupying \vithanother r.larine, skillfull,located the deadly projectilein the dark and. undeterredby the per~onal riskinvoked. heroically thre\\himself over the live missile,rhereby sa\'ing his compan­ion from serious injllly orpossible dearh. Ilis 001 andresourceful leadership werecontributing facrors in thesuccessful repulse of rheenemy attack.

The man in that same 1'0 holewas Private First lass Walter L.Barfoot, and, due to Davenpolt'sheroic self-sacrifice, he survive I the\\'ar. Later, a gymnasium at CampPendletOn, alifornia, was named inhonor of Corporal I avenpo11.-Captain John . Chapin, U MCR(Ret)

made from ammunition and equip-ment boxes. American fightingmen make their lives as comfort-able as possible; the Marines hadno desire for a Valley Forge in theTaebaek Mountains. They also fol-lowed their instructions to makethe Minnesota Line defensiblewithout unnecessary casualties orthe commitment of reserve forces.For the first time division staff offi-cers reported how many sandbagsthe troops filled and placed andhow many yards of barbed wirethey strung in front of their posi-tions.

Even without some progress inthe armistice negotiations—andthe plenary sessions did notresume until 25 October at a vil-lage along the Kaesong-Masanroad called Panmunjom—the onsetof winter alone would have givenurgency to the 1st Marine

Division's energetic developmentof its defensive area, some 14 milesacross and 30 miles deep. The divi-sion could hardly afford to take itsdefensive mission lightly. On itsleft the 11th ROK Division showedsome reluctance to either man theboundary or patrol it very careful-ly, which concerned the divisionstaff. The U.s. 7th Infantry Divisionin the ridges west of thePunchbowl did better. The onlyadvantage to the west was that theterrain and corridors offered lessopportunity for the North Koreans.The division had few troops tospare since Byers decreed that oneof the American Marine regimentswould be the corps reserve andoccupy positions 17 miles to therear, but at least the reserve (ini-tially the 7th Marines) could con-duct rear area security patrols.After trying several combinations,

Thomas committed six battalionson the main line of resistance andheld three battalions in either regi-mental and/or division reserve.The division reserve battalion hadthe mission of patrolling theKansas Line and protecting themain supply routes.

The principal objective of theoperations along the MinnesotaLine was to drive the NorthKoreans away from their observa-tion posts, combat outposts, andforward slope bunker defenses,and the Marines made majoradvances in this terrain cleansingin October and November 1951.The 11th Marines, occasionallyreinforced by corps artillery, pro-vided the umbrella of counterbat-tery fire that kept the Communistartillery in its caves. Their fire sup-port burden eased with the arrivalin January 1952 of an artillery bat-talion (four firing batteries) ofKorean Marines; the U.S. Marineartillery advisors who had trainedthe battalion accompanied it to thefront. The war on the bunkers,however, required much morethan saturation shelling, given thestrength of the Korean positions.The Marines went after thebunkers with 90mm tank guns,75mm recoilless rifles, rocketlaunchers, and flamethrowers, sup-plemented by snipers with .50-cal-iber machine guns and scopedrifles. Some of the operations didnot require close combat, but inother cases only heavy combatpatrols, sometimes with tanks,would suffice. Such actions—nightor day— cost some American lives.The Marines killed many moreKoreans.

Some of the raids took theMarines time and again back to ter-rain they had learned to hate inSeptember. Hill 1052 onKanmubong (a North Koreanstrong point and observation post)became a favorite target, and "The

MajGen Gerald C. Thomas talks with MajGen Clovis E. Byers, USA, X Coips com-mander, center, and Gen Omar N. Bradley, USA, during the Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staffs visit to Marine frontlines. Among the tactics and problemsdiscussec Gen Bradley made note of the Marines' unique use of the helicopter inbattle.

National Archives Photo (USMG) 127-N-A132072

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The Year of the Boot

Jn the autumn of 1951, the 1st Marine Divisionreceived a new piece of cold weather clothing: theboot, combat, rubber, insulated or Insulated Rubber

Boot. No one called it anything else but "Mickey MouseBoots" since their outsized shape and black color gavethe wearer some podiatric similarity to Hollywood'sfamous rodent. Other names for the hoots were lesscomplimentary, but compared with the "shoe-pacs" theyreplaced, the Mickey Mouse boots quickly proved theirvalue in preventing frozen feet.

The U.S. Army had conducted experiments with acold weather boot during and after World War II, but by1949 it had abandoned the effort since all the experi-mental prototypes did not meet Army standards forlong-distance marching. Less concerned about themarching requirement, the Navy and Marine Corps con-ducted their own boot tests, 1948-1951, and concludedthat one boot had merit. The field tests included wearin all Sorts of cold weather and terrain conditions, andthe Marines hiked in the boot and found it at leastacceptable as winter footwear since no one marchedvery fast or far in inclimate conditions anyway. TheMickey Mouse boots arrived in Korea in August 1951.

The design of the insulated rubber hoot was basedon the concept that body-heat from the feet could bestored as a vapor barrier between two layers of felt-lined rubber. The airtight boot allowed the wearer tokeep his feet warm with captive air, created by thewearer's own movement. The vapor barrier principleand the boot's all-rubber construction meant that coldand moisture from outside the boot would be defeatedbefore they reached a Marine's precious feet. Only aboot puncture by shrapnel or some sharp object couldruin the boot's airtight integrity, and the boot, like earlyautomobile tires, came with a patching kit.

Mickey Mouse boots, however, could turn theunwary and careless Marine into a frostbite casualty.The boots trapped more than heat. They also trapped

sweat, and even if the feet remained warm, the mois-ture—with its ability to transfer heat four times morerapidly than dry air—accumulated, too. If a Marine didnot stay on the move, the feet cooled, and the moresweat-soaked one's socks, the faster one's feet froze.One hour of inactivity could bring on an attack of frost-bite. The standing operating procedure, therefore, forMickey Mouse bootwear included a provision that eachMarine had to dry his feet and change to dry socks atleast once a clay and preferably more often.

The next worse thing to having frozen feet, howev-er, was preventing frozen feet. Changing socks and diy-ing feet in the open air of a Korean winter tested thestaunchest Marines. Units tried to establish a warmingtent of some sort where the machocistic ritual could heperformed with a hint of comfort and adequate time.Fortunately, the static winter war of 1951-1952 allowedsuch luxuries and cases of frozen feet in the 1st MarineDivision dropped dramatically. The Mickey Mouseboots had come to stay.

Department of Defense Photo (USMc) A167955

Rock" received a new name thatsuggested the permanency of itsfinal residents, "Luke the Gook'sCastle." Marine patrols prowled theunoccupied terrain at night to dis-courage infiltrating Koreans. Thefrontline battalions had no monop-oly on armed nighttime strolls. Therear areas of the 1st MarineDivision (like those throughoutKorea) were not safe from guerril-las, who preyed on road transport.The greater threat was teams of

Communist artillery observers whoinfiltrated the 11th Marines posi-tions and called in counterbatteryfire of considerable accuracy, if notheavy weight of shell. Marine gunbatteries lost both men and fieldpieces in such shoots. The reararea patrols used one capability toadvantage: helicopter transporta-tion. With every mission, the workof HMR-161 became more routine,and only the lift of entire battalionsto and from the main line of resis-

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tance now justified codenames andspecial publicity. The squadronalso received an aggressive newcommander, Colonel Keith B. Mc-Cutcheon, whose work in aerialinnovation had made him a leg-endary figure in the Corps.

None of the virtuoso campaignagainst the North Korean hunkersystem could reach the growingCommunist in-depth system of for-tifications, all duly observed andphotographed by aerial observers.

Naval gunfire—8- and 16-inchshells from cruisers and the battle-ship New Jersey (BB 62)—con-tributed to the bunker-busting, butnot enough. The missing ingredi-ent was close air support. TwoMarine aircraft groups operatedfighter-bombers within an hour'sflight from the front, but they sel-dom came when called, and theirAir Force and Navy comradesseemed even less available as theyflew off to bomb railroads, tunnels,and roads off a target list dictatedby Fifth Air Force.

General Thomas had grownever unhappier with the lack ofclose air support. When he learnedthat Van Fleet had told Byers on 28September that X Corps requestedtoo much air, he ordered his staffto do a study on the lack of closeair support in the September bat-tles. His anger grew with his divi-sion's casualties. As a veteran ofWorld War I, Thomas had his hearthardened early, but he never mea-sured success by counting his ownlosses. He knew that the fights for

Yoke Ridge and Kanmubong Ridgewould have been much easier withMarine air on call. His own angerwas fueled by deaths that touchedhim personally. One was the lossof his G-1, Colonel Wesley M."Cutie" Platt, on 27 September. Themost senior Marine officer to die inKorea, Platt had earned a specialplace in the Corps' history as oneof the heroes of the defense ofWake Island. Now a shell ended adistinguished career and a specialperson. Thomas also knew that hisdivision included as many as 20sons of Marine generals andcolonels, all eager to prove theirown mettle. He wrote his wife thathe worried about these "juniors"constantly, but could hardly ruintheir careers and lives by protect-ing them. When one of the"juniors," First Lieutenant John C.Breckinridge died in combat,Thomas immediately pulled FirstLieutenant James Breckinridge outof his infantry battalion and did sowithout regret since he wanted thefamily line of Major General James

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C. Breckinridge to survive Korea.The September battles had alsoturned Thomas into a critic of theTruman Administration, and hewrote his brother that the conceptof "limited war" was ridiculous.China should be ruined as aCommunist revolutionary power,and it would be easier to do itnow, not later. The administration'sconcept of limited war offendedhim because "the wounds andworse acquired by Americans herehad a real one hundred percentappearance . . our guys are offbase in D.C. and plenty."

Against this emotional back-ground, Thomas again challengedthe U.S. Air Force. Thomas firedthe first shot in the new war with aletter asserting that his Septembercasualties could have been re-duced with timely close air sup-port. He forwarded a study doneby his staff that showed how muchair he had requested and how littlehe had received. The 1st MarineDivision had made 271 requestsand had only 187 granted. More

ing October, while tank-infantry raids in company strength,

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A157015

Marine foot patrols ranged farther into enemy territory dur- supported by air and artillery, were launched at everyopportunity.

Corporal Jack Davis: Veteran

After an ocean voyage to California, three or fourdays of out-processing, and an air flight toTennessee, Corporal Jack Davis, U.S. Marine

Corps Reserve, returned to Nashville in March 1952. Hehad been gone almost two years, and he was not quite20 years old. In his well-tailored green service uniform,bearing ribbons for his two Purple Hearts, a PresidentialUnit Citation, and a row of Korean service ribbons, Jackmarched across the tarmac towards his waiting parentsand older brother. They did not recognize him. He hadbeen the only Marine in uniform on the plane. He alsohad lost 30 pounds and still sported "a Joe Stalin" mus-tache. Jack walked past his mother and father, thenturned back to them: "You don't know your own son?"As Jack recalled, "mild bedlam ensued for a fewmoments."

After three or four days at home, however, Jack real-ized that he was having serious difficulty adjusting to lifeoutside a combat zone. His brother went off to classesat Vanderbilt, and his parents both had full-time jobs.He even felt strange driving a new Nash Rambler aftermonths of driving a Marine truck on Korean countryroads. After about a week, he went out and found a jobdriving a big truck for a local construction company,and for the first time he felt mildly comfortable, earning75 cents an hour, and enjoying the company of hardmen doing hard work. He did not miss being shelled.His parents found his job puzzling and worried abouthis sanity, but his new job started Jack on the road tonormalcy. "The Marine Corps does a marvelous jobmaking civilians into warriors, but then to turn thosepersons back to civilian life approximately thirty daysafter leaving a combat zone, with no decompressionperiod stateside, acclimatizing back to a quasi-politeenvironment, leaves a bit to be desired."

With his usual enthusiasm, Vince Davis tried to helphis brother reenter Nashville—actually Vanderbilt—social life, but the well-intentioned effort on Jack'sbehalf did not go well. Jack found little in common withVince's friends in Vanderbilt's senior class, and he con-cluded they would find his service stories meaningless.Besides, Jack hardly trusted his ability to carry on a

social conversation without lapsing into standard Marinelanguage, which would have set all of Davidson Countyon fire. "I was so unsure of my polite verbal utterancesthat I was barely better than a mute. And for a while Ipreferred not to go out in polite society until I had re-acquired some social skills."

In the autumn of 1952, Jack Davis entered VanderbiltUniversity, his education partially funded by a disabilitypension and the GI Bill. When he graduated with adegree in geology in 1956, he also had a new wife, JoanFortune of Lafayette, Georgia. Even with a Master's ofScience in geology (1959) Jack found the life of a petro-leum geologist too uncertain for a family man (twosons), and he shifted into sales management in the oiland pharmaceutical industries until his semi-retirementand return to Tennessee in 1971. A small advertisingbusiness he and some local friends created keep himbusy enough—along with church and civic activities inhis new hometown of Winchester, Tennessee—until thepartners sold the business to a larger Texas-based com-pany in 1998. Jack and Joan now have more time toenjoy their hobbies and extended family.

Jack has never returned to Korea, but he is proud tohave been the teenage rifleman of 1951 who found him-self in Korea with "Bloody George" Company, 3dBattalion, 1st Marines.

serious to operations, only 32 hadarrived within 30 minutes, theMarine Corps standard. During var-ious conferences in October,Thomas had an opportunity to dis-cuss the issues with General J.Lawton Collins, USA, the ArmyChief of Staff, and GeneralRidgway. Although Byers appreci-ated his aggressiveness, Van Fleet

and Everest did not. Thomasthought Collins and Ridgway likedhis letter, "a stick to beat the AirForce with." Ridgway said hewanted Van Fleet and Everest tolook at the Joint Operations Centersystem and see if it could beadjusted, at least to give the 1stMarine Division 40 sorties a day.Van Fleet, however, argued that X

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Corps got too much air supportalready. Thomas and Byers decid-ed to push the issue; Byers' out-rage was fueled by another prob-lem, the unwillingness of the Armyto send its best officers and non-commissioned officers to combatassignments in Korea. Byers alsobridled at Van Fleet's suggestionthat his faltering generalship

Marine position on close air support.

explained the losses of the 2dInfantry Division on HeartbreakRidge. Byers put his staff to workon studies like those underway inthe 1st Marine Division. Byers andThomas also raised the relatedissue of dictated artillery shellexpenditures, which they claimedproduced predictable shortageswhen real fighting occurred. VanFleet was not happy with the twosenior generals of X Corps.

Byers and Thomas musteredmore evidence in November thatthe Joint Operations Center hadwillfully prevented X Corps fromreceiving effective close air sup-port. The 1st Marine Divisionclaimed that it had made 188requests for air support andreceived only 53 strikes in re-sponse. In the case of 86 requests,

Fifth Air Force said it had no air-craft available, and poor weatherhad affected most of the otherrequests. The 1st Marine Division'sstatistics provided an even moredamning picture. During the 30days of November, the divisionhad requested air support on 26days and received no response atall on 12 of those days. On thedays that the Joint OperationsCenter responded, it approvedonly 52 of 125 close air supportrequests. In terms of aircraft andordnance, only four missions wereflown as requested, and only onearrived in less than an hour fromthe original request. The only mis-sion that went as planned occurredon 10 November when 89 aircraftfrom the 1st Marine Aircraft Wingcelebrated the Marine Corps'

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Birthday with a heavy strike northof Kanmubong Ridge. The X Corpsstudy, directed by LieutenantColonel Ellis W. Williamson, a pio-neer in Army aviation and airmobility operations, produced sim-ilar results. For 1-20 November, theentire corps had made 224requests and had 145 requestsfilled in some way. Forty-sixrequests took more than two hoursto fill, and Williamson, X Corps G-3, judged that 42 of these strikescame too late to have the antici-pated results.

The X Corps' analyses, like stud-ies submitted earlier in the year byGeneral Almond, changed nothing.Van Fleet and Ridgway saw noimmediate advantage in pressingthe issue, whatever their personalviews. The major influence ontheir commitment to the JointOperations Center-status quo wasthe news from Panmunjom. Thenegotiators had accepted theUnited Nations position that thearmistice line should be the line oftroops when the armistice wassigned, not the 38th Parallel. Eachbelligerent coalition would with-draw four kilometers from thepoint of contact and thus establisha neutral zone between the armies.Van Fleet had anticipated theagreement on 14 November andordered that no operations by abattalion or larger formation couldbe mounted without the approvalof the corps commander. When thenegotiators signed an agreementon 25 November on the line-of-contact solution, Eighth Armyinterpreted the agreement as anomen of an early ceasefire. Theword went forth throughout thefront to hold down casualties, con-serve ammunition, defend the cur-rent positions, and even to limitpatrols to those areas where earli-er patrols had made contact withthe enemy. These rules of engage-ment would be in effect for at least

National Archives Photo (USA) 11 1-sc382827

Gen Matthew B. Ridgway, left to right, GenJ. Lawton Collins, US. Army Chief ofStaff Genjaines A. Van Flee(, US. Eighth Army commandei and MajGen ('lovisE. Byers, commanding general qf US. X Corps study the situation map duringGen Collins' tour of the frontlines in Korea. Within a month of ('ollins' visit,Ridgway relieved a stunned Byers for what some believed was his support for the

30 days. The instructions had "aconsiderably inhibitory effect onthe operations of the division."They also meant that a change inthe system of air support had beenovertaken by events.

An examination of the fightingby the 1st Marine Division inOctober and November 1951 sug-gests how large an opportunitycost the ground forces paid for theAir Force interdiction campaign.The aggressive ground operationsand use of artillery and naval gun-fire demonstrated that even with-out close air support, the 1stMarine Division (and probablymost of the U.S. Army divisions inKorea) could still inflict substantialcasualties on the enemy. TheChinese might have unlimitedmanpower to throw into the battle,but the North Koreans did not. Intwo months of operations that canonly he characterized as "defen-sive," the 1st Marine Division killed1,117 North Koreans and captured575 more at a cost of 87 dead ormissing Marines (both American

and South Korean) and 573wounded. The 1st Marine Divisionorder-of-battle analysts estimatedthat the division and air strikes hadcaused as many as 12,000 morecasualties in the three NorthKorean divisions that faced theMarines. Even if wildly optimistic,the estimates were probably notcompletely illusory. If, for exam-ple, the Marines had killed orwounded only one-third of theenemy estimated, they still wouldhave accounted for more than6,000 enemy casualties at a cost of660 losses of their own. Anexchange ratio of 10:1—given therules of engagement—is an opera-tional achievement in any war, butthe Eighth Army missed the lesson.

As the pace of the war con-gealed with the coming of winterand the hope of an armistice, the1st Marine Division passed throughanother set of organizational mile-stones. It celebrated the MarineCorps' 176th birthday with the tra-ditional ceremonies of readingJohn A. Lejeune's birthday message

and cake-cutting; General Thomasadded a special wrinkle, a one-round salute at noon 10 Novemberfrom every weapon in position,which the commanding generalfound "very satisfying." Thomasthen hosted Byers and X Corpsstaff for lunch.

Thomas also drew satisfactionfrom an extensive study done by XCorps for the Department ofDefense. Sensitive to Army carpingabout Marine tactics and casualties,Thomas could point to irrefutablestatistics: in both raw number andpercentages the 1st MarineDivision in 1951 had one of thethree lowest loss rates in. theEighth Army. Within X Corps itslosses in combat were half those ofthe U.S. 2d Infantry Division inpercentage terms and 50 percentlower in raw numbers. Between 1June and 15 October, the Armydivision suffered 6,247 casualties,the Marine division, less the 1stKMC Regiment, 4,241. During thefirst 10 months of 1951, the 1stMarine Division had rotated 11,637Marines out of Korea and received13,097 replacements, which didnot quite cover the losses from allsources. In the autumn of 1951there were still almost 5,000Marines in the division who hadjoined the division in 1950, hut byChristmas these veterans (the vastmajority technical specialists) hadall gone home. By the end ofDecember, one-third of the divi-sion's Marines had come to Koreasince early September, but the divi-sion showed no signed of reducedeffectiveness. The 14th Replace-ment Draft (2,756 officers andmen) closed the gap, but the 11th("Home for Christmas") RotationDraft opened it again.

From the perspective ofHeadquarters Marine Corps andthe Commanding General, FleetMarine Forces, Pacific, the 1stMarine Division had done a splen-

A r,fle platoon celebrates the traditional Marine Corps Birthday, 10 November,with a no-frills cake cutting on the reverse slope of battle-scared KanmubongRidge.

Department of Defense l'hoto (LT5Mc) A159434

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did job in 1951 as a fighting orga-nization and as a source of favor-able publicity. Both Generals Gatesand Shepherd visited Thomas inthe last two months of 1951 andcongratulated him on his success-ful command. By November,Shepherd knew that he wouldreplace Gates as Gommandant andhe told Thomas and Krulak that hewanted both of them back inWashington to run the staff ofHeadquarters Marine Gorps.Thomas' successor pleased theincumbent division commander:Major General John Taylor Selden,an accomplished officer who hadcommanded the 5th Marines onGape Gloucester and served as thedivision chief of staff on Peleliu. AVirginian of "First Family" roots aswell as another "mustang" of theWorld War I era, Selden had adeserved reputation for gettingalong well with the Army withoutcompromising Marine Gorps inter-ests.

The change of command for XGorps showed none of the goodfeeling that accompanied Thomas'departure in early January 1952.On his latest visit to Korea inNovember, J. Lawton Gollins askedVan Fleet how Byers was doing asa corps commander and whetherhe met the World War II standardsof the Army in Europe. Van Fleetresponded that Byers did notmatch the best corps commandersof Eisenhower's army, whichmeant that Byers was not Gollins,Ridgway, or Van Fleet. Withoutwarning, Byers learned from VanFleet on 24 November at a cere-mony presenting a PresidentialUnit Gitation to the 2d InfantryDivision that Byers would be reas-signed as commanding general,XVI Gorps, the theater reserveforce just constituted in Japan.Without ceremony or any chanceto visit his subordinate comman-ders, Byers flew to Japan as

ordered four days later, his distin-guished career in eclipse. Hisreplacement, Major GeneralWilliston B. Palmer, was aEuropeanist and a Gollins intimate.General Thomas remained con-vinced that Byers had been toofriendly with the Marines forGollins' and Ridgway's taste andtoo assertive in demandingchanges in the close air supportsystem.

The best way to deal with theother armed forces, whether thebattlefield was in Washington orthe entire Pacific theater, hadalways been obvious to Gates,Shepherd, Thomas, and Shep-herd's successor in Hawaii,Lieutenant General Franklin A.

Hart. The answer was to attack andwithdraw at the same time. Hart'smission was to support the 1st

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Marine Division and 1st MarineAircraft Wing, but he had a secondresponsibility, which was to pre-pare a new 3d Marine Brigade andsupporting aviation elements forpossible use (including amphibi-ous operations) in the Pacific.Pending legislation in Gongresssuggested that in 1952 the MarineGorps would add a third divisionand aircraft wing to the FleetMarine Force. The Marine Gorpsalso was investigating arming itselfwith tactical nuclear weapons.With Golonels Wornham, Hay-ward, and Nickerson on Hart'sstaff, the interests of the 1st MarineDivision would not be ignored, butas a Service the Marine Gorps wasnot inclined to pursue the close airsupport issue when the interser-vice relations landscape lookedgood for the moment and the

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A159279

With a resumption of the armistice talks, a lull set in along the 1st MarineDivision 's front in December. While patrols were sent out to maintain pressureon the enemy, work continued on winterizing bunkers and improving defensiveinstallations, such as this machine gun position.

future of operations in Korea souncertain. Another factor was sim-ply that Fleet Marine Force, Pacific,and its Navy superiors, includingAdmiral Arthur H. Radford,Commander in Chief, Pacific, pro-posed that the 1st Marine Divisionand 1st Marine Aircraft Wing bewithdrawn from Korea and placedin strategic reserve. When GeneralHart made his first command tourof Korea and Japan, he found thesenior commanders in Korea andJapan convinced that Eighth Army

would waste its Marines. The divi-sion and aircraft wing should beplaced in Japan and brought to apeak state of readiness for battlesthat mattered.

Nothing that occurred inDecember 1951 along the Minne-sota Line gave any clues that thewar would either end or be foughtwith any rational purpose, as seenfrom the 1st Marine Division. Thedivision's defensive posture facedno serious menace from the NorthKoreans, although the Communist

troops became progressively moreaggressive with their patrolling anduse of artillery fire. A summary ofone day's operations (8 December1951) catches the winter war alongthe Minnesota Line. A 5th Marinespatrol exchanged gunfire with aKorean patrol without knownresults; the regiment called in 117rounds of naval gunfire on abunker system and did acceptabledamage to seven bunkers. The 7thMarines sent out a patrol toretrieve the body of a dead Marineand engaged in a firefight with anenemy patrol. The Korean Marinessent out two patrols, which werefired upon by machine guns inhidden bunkers, but took no casu-alties. The 11th Marines fired 14observed missions on hunkers orin patrol-support. The followingdays were no different. OnChristmas Day, the North Koreanstried to disrupt the division's hotholiday meal and a visit byCardinal Francis J. Spelirnan hutonly drew smothering artillery andnaval gunfire on the NKPA combatpatrols. The next day a heavysnow slowed the action evenmore, and on 27 December EighthArmy announced that even thoughno truce agreement had beensigned, the restrictive rules ofengagement remained in effect.

The dawn of a new year did notchange the pattern of warfare forthe 1st Marine Division. Such nov-elties as psychological warfareunits—the masters of the surrenderleaflet and the insinuating broad-cast—became regular fixtures atthe front, first a source of amuse-ment and later an object of con-tempt. Army searchlight batteriesadded little light to the operations.An epidemic of boredom and care-lessness spread throughout EighthArmy. To give at least a hint of bat-tle, Van Fleet's staff dreamed upOperation Clam-Up, 9-15 February1952, as a way to draw the Chinese

Cpl KevinJ. Griffin receives a blessing from Cardinal Francis Spellman duringthe cardinal's Christmas visit to the 1st Marine Division.

National Archives Photo (USN) 80-G-436954

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and North Koreans into an above-ground killing zone throughdeception. The basic concept wasthat the frontline battalions wouldeither go underground or appearto withdraw from the front; alliedartillery would reduce their firingto almost nothing; and the usualpatrols would not go out.Presumably, the collective impres-sion would be that the UnitedNations forces had fallen back tothe Kansas Line. Van Fleet's granddeception did not fool theCommunists—at least not much. Inthe 1st Marine Division sector—especially on Yoke andKanmubong Ridges—the NorthKoreans sent out only patrols,which set off a series of small bat-tles. The North Koreans also del-uged the main line of resistancewith artillery fire, a sure sign thatthey had not been fooled. For allthe sound and fury the casualtiesshowed how insignificant Clam-Uphad been. For February theMarines lost 23 killed and 102missing; they killed by count 174Koreans and took 63 prisoners.Whether they had actually inflictedan additional estimated 1,000 morecasualties was guess work.

In other aspects of the division'soperations, the order-of-the-daybecame doing less with less. Thehelicopters of HMR-161 developedstress fractures in their tail assem-blies, so Colonel McCutcheongrounded his squadron until thedefects could be corrected. Thelack of helicopters slowed themodest counter-guerrilla campaignin the rear areas. Certainly theNorth Korean lines had becomeimpenetrable. The G-2 estimatedthat 21 infantry battalions and nineartillery battalions, all embedded inthe ridges to the north of the mainline of resistance, faced the divi-sion. Although the Marines did notyet know what great plans EighthArmy held for them, their cam-

paign in east-central Korean wasending not with a bang, but ashrug.

In Retrospect

From its initiation in battle aspart of the U.S. Eighth Army inJanuary 1951 until its eventualmovement to an entirely new zoneof action in western Korea in early1952, the 1st Marine Divisionfought with as much distinction asits 1950 edition, the division thatlanded at Inchon, liberated Seoul,chased the North Korean armyaway from Korea's northeast coast,and blunted the first appearance ofthe Chinese army in the battle ofSudong. The advance to the

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Chosin (Changjin) Reservoir and"the attack in another direction" toHungnam added more honors tothe 1st Marine Division and creat-ed a tradition of valor and profes-sionalism that shares pride of placein the memory of Marines withTarawa and Iwo Jima.

Yet the 1st Marine Division in1951 added a new and equallyuseful tradition of valor: that aMarine division in war of diminish-ing rewards, fought under unpleas-ant physical conditions anduneven Army leadership, couldmaintain the Corps' highest stan-dards even without the constantstroking of admiring reporters andcamera crews. To be sure, the divi-sion suffered more casualties in all

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A159378

Oblivious to the wet snow and North Korean harassing fires, Marines line up fora Christmas dinner with all the trimmings.

categories per month of combat in1950 (1,557) than it did in 1951(747) or 1952 (712), but there is noconvincing evidence that the divi-sion inflicted more casualties uponthe enemy in 1950 (per month ofcombat) than it did in 1951, onlythat its battles had been more dra-matic and photogenic.

In an official sense, the 1stMarine Division in 1951 receivedthe same recognition as its 1950-predecessor, the award of aPresidential Unit Citation "forextraordinary heroism in actionagainst enemy aggressor forces inKorea." There are, however, nobattles in the citation, no identifiedgeographic locations like Hill 902or Taeu-san and Taeam-san

Mountains or Yoke Ridge orKanmubong Ridge. The only geo-graphic location mentioned is thePunchbowl and some vague ter-rain "north of the HwachonReservoir." The citation gives onlythree sets of dates: 21-26 April, 16May-30 June, and 11-25 September1951. There is no book likeAndrew Geer's The New Breed tohonor the 1951 Marines, no collec-tion of memorable photographs byDavid Douglas Duncan to freezethe fatigue and horror of war onthe faces of young men turned oldin a matter of days in December1950. The same faces could havebeen found on Hill 924 or Hill 812if anyone had looked.

In addition to adding to the her-

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itage of heroism in the second yearof the Korean War, the 1st MarineDivision and the 1st Marine AircraftWing made history for its introduc-tion of the transport helicopter toAmerican ground operations. InJanuary 1951, the Landing ForceTactics and Techniques Board,Marine Landing Force Develop-ment Center, approved the firstdoctrinal study of vertical envelop-ment in Employment of AssaultTransport Helicopters. When thefirst operational squadron, HMR-161, was formed, its original namewas "Marine Assault HelicopterSquadron 161" until Marine avia-tion bureaucrats protested thatthey and the Navy thought themore comprehensive designator of

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A159018

Marine TSgt John Pierce gives some North Korean soldiers phosphorus grenade into the bunker's entrance.hiding in a bunker a warm reception as he throws a white

"transport" was more appropriate.The name mattered less than themission. When the squadronbegan operations with Windmill I(13 September 1951) until the tailsection fractures grounded thehelicopters on 28 February 1952,HMR-161 conducted six majoroperations and many hundreds ofother less dramatic flights withtroops, weapons, and supplies. Aconcept developed for amphibiousassaults received its first test

among the mountains of Korea, anirony that bothered no one amongthe community of Marine heli-copter pioneers. The future arrivedto the sound of flailing rotors andstorms of ground-effect dirt on abit of ground on the lower slopesof Hill 749, Kanmubong Ridge.Today the site is somewhere with-in the Demilitarized Zone.

What make the fighting qualitiesof the 1st Marine Division, aidedwithout stint by VMO-6 and HMR-

161, even more remarkable was thegrowing difficulty in obtaining closeair support and the suspicion afterJuly 1951 that there would be a sub-stitute for victory. As the 1st MarineDivision proved in September 1951,the young riflemen and platooncommanders might not be ready tokill and die for a stalemate, but theywere more than willing to kill anddie for each other, and that waswhat was important to them then.And it still is.

An alert Marine rifleman, framed in the doorway, provides forced all Marine units to mount security patrols and tocover while another Marine searches through an aban- defend their positions.doned Korean farmhouse. Guerrilla and infiltrator attacks

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A159239

475

Essayon ource

The archival sources on the 1 tMarine Division, X orp~, and th.. Eighth rmy for the campaign of

19'51-1952 are voluminous, but theplace to ,tart is the monthly organi­zational hi torical I' potts, usuallyontaining annexes of other r 'pott.

and studies, llbmitted to the s'rviceheadquarter' for permanent I' ten­tion and I' ~ rence u~ . For the 1st

larine Division, I II ed the monthlyhistorical report for April 1951through February 1952, suppl ment-

d by similar monthly historicalrep rt made by Headquatters, FleetMarine Force. Pacific (FMFPac), forthe same p riod. Both 1st MarineDivi~ion and FMFPac rep rts includ­ed invaluable appendices. Of specialuse for this study were two Type C

pe ial Report ':"Employment ofAssault H licopters," "! etober and15 ovem-ber 1951; and "1st KJV1Regiment and IL'> Relation:hip to th1 't Marin Division, eptember 1950­May 1952," 13 June 1952. TheFMFPac hi'torical reports includem 'moranda for the record of theweeki taff conferen es and thetravel report for Generals Lemuel C.

hepherd, Jr., and Franklin H. Hartfor their visit to Kor a and Japan.The original report are in theRe ords of Marine orp. Field

ommands, Record Gr up 127, inthe ational Archives, but copiesmay often be found at the Marine

orps Historical C nt r, ashington.D.., and the Marine orp Re'earchC nter, Quantico, Virginia.

The Corps Command Repoltsfor April 19~1- FebrualY 1952 may befound in onlITIand Repol1s, 1919­1951, Records of rmy FieldCommands, Record Gr up '107, butthese records- which include suchthings as the "Commanding General'sDi<.uy." which i s hedule and com­mentary as maintained I y hi' aides­can also be ~ und in duplicate formin key rmy educational andre earch repositories like theArmy Center of MilitalY HistolY, Ft.Leslie J. Mc air, Washington, D.C.and the .. Army Military I IistolY

In. titute, Carli Ie Barracks,Pennsylvania. Like their MarineCorps counterparts, the monthly.. om-mand Reports" include specialstudies, which for ' orps includedanalye of clo'e air 'upport and per­sonnel matters.

The senior Army and Marine com­manders in Korea, 1951-1952. main­tained extensiv pel"onaJ files thaLare open to researchers, and 1 u edthe e im'aluable '>ource'> extensively.

eneral 1atthe' B. Ridgwa,Command'r, United ationsCommand, and ommandingGeneral, Far East Command duringthis study, kept extensive correspon­dence and memoranda file. ,1atthe,,' 13. Ridg" ay Papers,rmy lilitary lIi'tof) In titute (MHO.

His successor as ommandingGeneral, .,. Eighth Army. General.lames A. Van Fleet, maintained a per­sonal journal and conducred anextensive c rre 'pondcnce with hismilitary and civilian contemporaries,all pres I ed in the .lames A. VanFleet Pap rs, e rge C. MarshallLibralY, Lexington. Virginia. anFleet, like Ridgway, kept essentialdata, srudies, maps, memoranda ofstaff meetings, and orders in truc­tion , but unlike Ridgway. he neverwrote a b k about the war. Hi'papers are e~pe ially important oninterservice and intercoalition com­mand relarions.

Lieutenant Generals Edward M.Imond and lovis E. Byers saved

exten ive fj] s for their periods fcommand f the .., Corps,,, hichincluded all but m'o months of theperiod covered in thi study.Especially important is Ileadquar­tee, Corps, "Battle of the oyangRiver," June 1951, a special reponwith exrensive intelligence studiesand fire UppOIt studies. Almond'spaper are ess ntial sources on theconduct of th Korean War. Almonddid an e p cially good job at creatingsubject file', m'o f the most impor­tant containing material on clo e airsupport and anillclY employment.Like Van Fleet, lmond kept exten-iv p rsonal nOles. After hi retire­

ment Almond became a subj ct of

476

e. tensive interviewing, the mo'texhaustive by Lieutenant ColonelThoma. Ferguson, US (Imond's~on-in-law). Professor D. layton.lames, and John Toland, and rhesetrans'ripts are attached to the

Imond Papers and th DouglasMaCArthur Papers, the eneralDouglas Mac rthur Library andMemorial, rfolk, irginia.Throughout his rerir ment lmondcontinued to olleet d cuments andadd them to his collection. 'om­plementary vie\\ of X Corp~ ma befound in the ral memoir of GeneralFrank T. Mildren, the corps G-3 in19"1, Senior Officers Oral llistoryProject, 1980, MllI. The Clovis E.Byers Papers are held at the libralYof the 1100\'cr Institution on ~'ar,

Revolution and Peace, :tanford,alifornia, and include his copies of

the corps repon.'> and slLIdies and his.. ommander's Diary." Byers alsocorresponded "'ith many of his Armycontemporaries and friends in otherservices. Ile kepr a personal diarythat includes the touching story ofhis "reassignment." Byers' commentson the, outh Korean divisions in hiscorps are important in gi\'ing a fuJIpicture of corps operations.

General Gerald C. Thomas did notmaintain the vast corrc,>pondencefiles or intimate diaries of hi" I'm)'contemporaries. I ut he wrote hiswife, his brother, and his oldest sonand son-in-law, both Marine officersand both 19-2 members of the lstlarine Division. The Thomas family

allo"'ed me to read this rrespon­dence "hile I diu rc earch on 111Mall)' a trife: Gelleral Gerald C.Thomas ane! the U. . ,Horille C01j)S,

/917-1956 (Annapolis: avalIn rinlle Pres', 1993). eneralThomas also left multiple, extensiv'oral histories, 1966-1979, and assolt­'d files, now part of the Oral HistolYollection and Per'onal Papersollection at the Historical Center

and Res 'arch Center. Other personalollections and oral historie, from

important ources are the lateGeneral Lemuel C. ,'hepherd. Jr.,l',' IC; Lieutenant General Ilerman

icker. on, SMC (Het); Lieutenant