Chapter 20: Rights of the AccusedCriminal Due Process: Article III, Section 1 deals with due process and covers substantive and procedural due process. Applies to both criminal and administrative proceedings Section 14 (1) restricted to criminal cases and only procedural requirements. Requisites of Criminal Due Process: Accused be tried by an impartial and competent court In accordance with the procedure prescribed by law With proper observance of all the rights accorded him under the Constitution and applicable statutes. Example: a denial of the right to preliminary investigation constitutes a denial of due process (but this right is purely statutory)Salonga vs. Pao: Facts: A rash of bombings occurred in the Metro Manila area in the months of August, September and October of 1980. On September 1980, one Victor Burns Lovely, Jr., a Philippine-born American citizen from Los Angeles, California, almost killed himself and injured his younger brother, Romeo, as a result of the explosion of a small bomb inside his room at the YMCA building in Manila. Found in Lovely's possession by police and military authorities were several pictures taken sometime in May 1980 at the birthday party of former Congressman Raul Daza held at the latter's residence in a Los Angeles suburb. Jovito R. Salonga and his wife were among those whose likenesses appeared in the group pictures together with other guests, including Lovely. As a result of the serious injuries he suffered, Lovely was brought by military and police authorities to the AFP Medical Center (V. Luna Hospital)where he was place in the custody and detention of Col. Roman P. Madella, under the over-all direction of General Fabian Ver, head of the National Intelligence and Security Authority (NISA). Shortly afterwards, Mr. Lovely and his two brothers, Romeo and Baltazar Lovely where charged with subversion, illegal possession of explosives, and damage to property. Bombs once again exploded in Metro Manila including one which resulted in the death of an American lady who was shopping at Rustan's Supermarket in Makati and others which caused injuries to a number of persons. The President's anniversary television radio press conference was broadcast. The younger brother of Victor Lovely, Romeo, was presented during the conference. The next day, newspapers came out with almost identical headlines stating in effect that Salonga had been linked to the various bombings in Metro Manila. Meanwhile, Lovely was taken out of the hospital's intensive care unit and transferred to the office of Col. Madella where he was held incommunicado for some time. More bombs were reported to have exploded at 3 big hotels in Metro Manila. The bombs injured 9 people. A meeting of the General Military Council was called for 6 October 1980. Minutes after the President had finished delivering his speech before the International Conference of the American Society of Travel Agents at the Philippine International Convention Center, as mall bomb exploded. Within the next 24 hours, arrest, search, and seizure orders (ASSOs) were issued against persons, including Salonga, who were apparently implicated by Victor Lovely in the series of bombings in Metro Manila. Elements of the military went to the hospital room of Salonga at the Manila Medical Center where he was confined due to his recurrent and chronic ailment of bronchial asthma and placed him under arrest. The arresting officer showed Salonga the ASSO form which however did not specify the charge or charges against him.Issue: Whether the Court may still elaborate on a decision when the lower courts have dropped the case against petitioner Salonga? Ruling: The setting aside or declaring void, in proper cases, of intrusions of State authority into areas reserved by the Bill of Rights for the individual as constitutionally protected spheres where even the awesome powers of Government may not enter at will is not the totality of the Court's functions. The Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts,doctrines, or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating bench and bar on the extent of protection given by constitutional guarantees. In dela Camara v. Enage (41 SCRA 1), the petitioner who questioned a P1,195,200.00 bail bond as excessive and,therefore, constitutionally void, escaped from the provincial jail while his petition was pending. The petition became moot because of his escape but we nonetheless rendered a decision. In Gonzales v. Marcos (65 SCRA 624) whether or not the Cultural Center of the Philippines could validly be created through an executive order was mooted by Presidential Decree 15, the Center's new charter pursuant to the President's legislative powers under martial law. Still, the Court discussed the constitutional mandate on the preservation and development of Filipino culture for national identity. In the habeas corpus case of Aquino, Jr., v. Enrile (59 SCRA183), during the pendency of the case, 26 petitioners were released from custody and one withdrew his petition. The sole remaining petitioner was facing charges of murder, subversion, and illegal possession of firearms. The fact that the petition was moot and academic did not prevent the Court in the exercise of its symbolic function from promulgating one of the most voluminous decision sever printed in the Reports. Herein, the prosecution evidence miserably fails to establish a prima facie case against Salonga, either as a co-conspirator of a destabilization plan to overthrow the government or as an officer or leader of any subversive organization. The respondents have taken the initiative of dropping the charges against Salonga. The Court reiterates the rule, however, that the Court will not validate the filing of information based on the kind of evidence against Salonga found in the records.Galman vs. SandiganbayanFacts:Assassination of former Senator Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino, Jr. He was killed from his plane that had just landed at the Manila International Airport. His brain was smashed by a bullet fired point-blank into the back of his head by an assassin. The military investigators reported within a span of three hours that the man who shot Aquino (whose identity was then supposed to be unknown and was revealed only days later as Rolando Galman) was a communist-hired gunman, and that the military escorts gunned him down in turn.President was constrained to create a Fact Finding Board to investigate due to large masses of people who joined in the ten-day period of national mourning yearning for the truth, justice and freedom.The fact is that both majority and minority reports were one in rejecting the military version stating that "the evidence shows to the contrary that Rolando Galman had no subversive affiliations. Only the soldiers in the staircase with Sen. Aquino could have shot him; that Ninoy's assassination was the product of a military conspiracy, not a communist plot. Only difference between the two reports is that the majority report found all the twenty-six private respondents above-named in the title of the case involved in the military conspiracy; " while the chairman's minority report would exclude nineteen of them.Then Pres. Marcos stated that evidence shows that Galman was the killer.Petitioners pray for issuance of a TRO enjoining respondent court from rendering a decision in the two criminal cases before it, the Court resolved by nine-to-two votes 11 to issue the restraining order prayed for. The Court also granted petitioners a five-day period to file a reply to respondents' separate comments and respondent Tanodbayan a three-day period to submit a copy of his 84-page memorandum for the prosecution.But ten days later, the Court by the same nine-to-two-vote ratio in reverse, resolved to dismiss the petition and to lift the TRO issued ten days earlier enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision. The same Court majority denied petitioners' motion for a new 5-day period counted from receipt of respondent Tanodbayan's memorandum for the prosecution (which apparently was not served on them).Thus, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the dismissal did not indicate the legal ground for such action and urging that the case be set for a full hearing on the merits that the people are entitled to due process.However, respondent Sandiganbayan issued its decision acquitting all the accused of the crime charged, declaring them innocent and totally absolving them of any civil liability. Respondents submitted that with the Sandiganbayan's verdict of acquittal, the instant case had become moot and academic. Thereafter, same Court majority denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.Hence, petitioners filed their motion to admit their second motion for reconsideration alleging that respondents committed serious irregularities constituting mistrial and resulting in miscarriage of justice and gross violation of the constitutional rights of the petitioners and the sovereign people of the Philippines to due process of law.Issues:1. Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his rights as an accused? 2. Whether or not there was a violation of the double jeopardy clause?Ruling:Petitioners' second motion for reconsideration is granted and ordering a re-trial of the said cases which should be conducted with deliberate dispatch and with careful regard for the requirements of due process.Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera (made his expose 15 months later when former Pres. was no longer around) affirmed the allegations in the second motion for reconsideration that he revealed that the Sandiganbayan Justices and Tanodbayan prosecutors were ordered by Marcos to whitewash the Aquino-Galman murder case. Malacaang wanted dismissal to the extent that a prepared resolution was sent to the Investigating Panel. Malacaang Conference planned a scenario of trial where the former President ordered then that the resolution be revised by categorizing the participation of each respondent; decided that the presiding justice, Justice Pamaran, (First Division) would personally handle the trial. A conference was held in an inner room of the Palace. Only the First Lady and Presidential Legal Assistant Justice Lazaro were with the President. The conferees were told to take the back door in going to the room where the meeting was held, presumably to escape notice by the visitors in the reception hall waiting to see the President. During the conference, and after an agreement was reached, Pres. Marcos told them 'Okay, mag moro-moro na lamang kayo;' and that on their way out of the room Pres. Marcos expressed his thanks to the group and uttered 'I know how to reciprocate'.The Court then said that the then President (code-named Olympus) had stage-managed in and from Malacaang Palace "a scripted and predetermined manner of handling and disposing of the Aquino-Galman murder case;" and that "the prosecution in the Aquino-Galman case and the Justices who tried and decided the same acted under the compulsion of some pressure which proved to be beyond their capacity to resist. Also predetermined the final outcome of the case" of total absolution of the twenty-six respondents-accused of all criminal and civil liability. Pres. Marcos came up with a public statement aired over television that Senator Aquino was killed not by his military escorts, but by a communist hired gun. It was, therefore, not a source of wonder that President Marcos would want the case disposed of in a manner consistent with his announced theory thereof which, at the same time, would clear his name and his administration of any suspected guilty participation in the assassination. such a procedure would be a better arrangement because, if the accused are charged in court and subsequently acquitted, they may claim the benefit of the doctrine of double jeopardy and thereby avoid another prosecution if some other witnesses shall appear when President Marcos is no longer in office.More so was there suppression of vital evidence and harassment of witnesses. The disappearance of witnesses two weeks after Ninoy's assassination. According to J. Herrera, "nobody was looking for these persons because they said Marcos was in power. The assignment of the case to Presiding Justice Pamaran; no evidence at all that the assignment was indeed by virtue of a regular raffle, except the uncorroborated testimony of Justice Pamaran himself. The custody of the accused and their confinement in a military camp, instead of in a civilian jail. The monitoring of proceedings and developments from Malacaang and by Malacaang personnel. The partiality of Sandiganbayan betrayed by its decision: That President Marcos had wanted all of the twenty-six accused to be acquitted may not be denied. In rendering its decision, the Sandiganbayan overdid itself in favoring the presidential directive. Its bias and partiality in favor of the accused was clearly obvious. The evidence presented by the prosecution was totally ignored and disregarded.The record shows that the then President misused the overwhelming resources of the government and his authoritarian powers to corrupt and make a mockery of the judicial process in the Aquino-Galman murder cases. "This is the evil of one-man rule at its very worst." Our Penal Code penalizes "any executive officer who shall address any order or suggestion to any judicial authority with respect to any case or business coming within the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of justice."Impartial court is the very essence of due process of law. This criminal collusion as to the handling and treatment of the cases by public respondents at the secret Malacaang conference (and revealed only after fifteen months by Justice Manuel Herrera) completely disqualified respondent Sandiganbayan and voided ab initio its verdict. The courts would have no reason to exist if they were allowed to be used as mere tools of injustice, deception and duplicity to subvert and suppress the truth. More so, in the case at bar where the people and the world are entitled to know the truth, and the integrity of our judicial system is at stake.There was no double jeopardy. Courts' Resolution of acquittal was a void judgment for having been issued without jurisdiction. No double jeopardy attaches, therefore. A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all. By it no rights are divested. It neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts and all claims flowing out of it are void.Motion to Disqualify/Inhibit should have been resolved ahead. In this case, petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the abrupt dismissal of their petition and lifting of the TRO enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision had been taken cognizance of by the Court which had required the respondents', including the Sandiganbayan's, comments. Although no restraining order was issued anew, respondent Sandiganbayan should not have precipitately issued its decision of total absolution of all the accused pending the final action of this Court. All of the acts of the respondent judge manifest grave abuse of discretion on his part amounting to lack of jurisdiction which substantively prejudiced the petitioner.With the declaration of nullity of the proceedings, the cases must now be tried before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor. Respondents accused must now face trial for the crimes charged against them before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor with all due process.The function of the appointing authority with the mandate of the people, under our system of government, is to fill the public posts. Justices and judges must ever realize that they have no constituency, serve no majority nor minority but serve only the public interest as they see it in accordance with their oath of office, guided only the Constitution and their own conscience and honor.A mistrial may be declared if it is shown that the proceedings were held under such circumstances as would prevent the accused from freely making his defense or the judge from freely arriving at his decision. Rochin vs. California: Facts: On July 1, 1949, threeLos Angeles Countydeputy sheriffs entered the Rochin's residence without a search warrant and forcibly entered Rochin's room on the second floor.Upon entering the room, the deputies noticed two capsules on the night stand. Rochin immediately swallowed the capsules after Deputy Jack Jones asked him, "Whose stuff is this?" Jones then grabbed and squeezed Rochin by the neck, as well as shoving his fingers in Rochin's mouth as he attempted to eject the capsules.[1]The deputies, unable to obtain the capsules, handcuffed and took Rochin to Angeles Emergency Hospital where he was strapped to an operating table and had a tube forcibly placed in his mouth and into his stomach and given an emetic solution, whereupon he vomited the capsules into a bucket. The deputies then retrieved the capsules and tested them to bemorphine.[2]Subsequently, this was submitted as evidence, and Rochin was found guilty of violatingCalifornia Health and Safety Code 11500 as having an unlawful possession of morphine.Rochin appealed his case on the basis that his rights, guaranteed to him by Amendments V and XIV of the United States Constitution and by Article I(1)(13)(19) of the California Constitution rendered the evidence inadmissible, and that the forced stomach pumping was unconstitutionally compelled self-incrimination. The appeals court denied his defense arguing that the evidence was admissible, despite the egregious behavior of the officers, as it was "competent evidence," and the courts are not allowed to question the means in which it was obtained. As the court wrote, "illegally obtained evidence is admissible on a criminal charge in this state."[2]Ruling: The court voted in an 62 decision (Minton abstained), to overturn the decision. Justice Frankfurter wrote the majority opinion which struck down the conviction arguing that the brutality of the means used to extract the evidence from Rochin, "shocks the conscience," and clearly violates the due process of law as guaranteed by theFourteenth Amendment. Frankfurter also admitted the term "due process" was nebulous; he asserted that it existed in order to preserve the fairness and integrity of the system and that society expects judges to act impartially and to take into account precedence and social context. The court quoted from the decision of the California Supreme Court, in which two justices dissented, saying,. . . a conviction which rests upon evidence of incriminating objects obtained from the body of the accused by physical abuse is as invalid as a conviction which rests upon a verbal confession extracted from him by such abuse. . . . Had the evidence forced from defendant's lips consisted of an oral confession that he illegally possessed a drug . . . , he would have the protection of the rule of law which excludes coerced confessions from evidence. But because the evidence forced from his lips consisted of real objects, the People of this state are permitted to base a conviction upon it. [We] find no valid ground of distinction between a verbal confession extracted by physical abuse and a confession wrested from defendant's body by physical abuse.[4]

Justice Douglas and Black both wrote concurring opinions in which they argued that the lower court's decision should have been overturned based on theFifth Amendmentliberty from self incrimination. Both justices believed that the 14th Amendment's guarantee of "due process" incorporated that right. The justices' opinions also offered much criticism of Frankfurter's opinion for the court.Douglas rebuked the court for suddenly declaring that the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence, which had not been an issue up until then, suddenly violated the "decencies of civilized conduct."[5]Black disagreed with the logic in the majority as being contradictory. He argued the opinion enabled the court to nullify the California state law of using illegal evidence based on due process because its application, "shocks the conscience," but then admonishes judges to be impartial and use the society's standards in judgment.Breithanpat vs Abram: a doctor extracted a small amount of blood from a person while he was unconscious to determine whether or not he was intoxicated at the time of a vehicular accident in which he was involved, it was held that the said act and the subsequent use of the results of the blood test as evidence against him did not violate due process. Martelino vs. Alejandro (digest case) Due process is also denied where a person is impleaded for violation of a law, administrative regulation or municipal ordinance not previously published as he would not know what acts he must do or avoid preventing prosecution. Where appeal is permitted by the Constitution or by statute, denial thereof will also militate against due process. Pesigan vs. Angeles:Facts: Anselmo and Marcelo Pesigan transported in the evening of April 2, 1982 twenty-six carabaos and a calf from Camarines Sur with Batangas as their destination. They were provided with three certificates:1. A health certificate from the provincial veterinarian,2. Permit to transfer/transport from the provincial commander; and3. Three certificates of inspections.In spite of the papers, the carabaos were confiscated by the provincial veterinarian and the towns police station commander while passing through Camarines Norte. The confiscation was based on EO No. 626-A which prohibits the transportation of carabaos and carabeef from one province to another.

Issue: Whether or not EO No. 626-A, providing for the confiscation and forfeiture by the government of carabaos transported from one province to another, dated October 25, 1980 is enforceable before publication in the Official Gazette on June 14, 1982Ruling: No. The said order is not enforceable against the Pesigans on April 2. 1982 because it is a penal regulation published more than two months later in the OG. It became effective only fifteen days thereafter as provided in Article 2 of the Civil Code and Sec-11 of the Revised Administrative Code.The word laws in article 2 includes circulars and regulations which prescribe penalties. Publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of the regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby.Commonwealth Act No. 638 requires that all Presidential executive orders having general applicability should be published in the Official Gazette. It provides that every order or document which shall prescribe a penalty shall be deemed to have general applicability and legal effect. This applies to a violation of EO No. 626-A because its confiscation and forfeiture provision or sanction makes it a penal statute. It results that they have cause of action for the recovery of the carabaos. The summary confiscation was not in order. The recipients of thecarabaos should return them to the Pesigans. However, they cannot transport the carabaos to Batangas because they are now bound by the said executive order. Neither can they recover damages. Doctor Miranda and Zenerosa acted in good faith in ordering the forfeiture and dispersal of the carabaos.Ruling: Order of dismissal and confiscation and dispersal of the carabaos, reversed and set aside. Respondents were ordered to restore carabaos, with the requisite documents, to petitioners for their own disposal in Basud or Sipocot, Camarines Sur. No costs.Important point: Publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of the regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected hereby. Justice and fairness dictate that the public must be informed of that provision by means of the publication on the Gazette.Right against Self-IncriminationSection 17: No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. The right is available in criminal prosecutions, government proceedings both civil and administrative or legislative investigations. It may be claimed not only by the person accused of an offense but by any witness to whom an incriminating question is addressed. (1) Scope As long as the question will tend to incriminate, the witness is entitled to the privilege. A witness CANNOT refuse to answer when: The question is relevant and allowed. It relates to past criminality where he can no longer be prosecuted (crime has prescribed, when there is a conviction, or when the witness has been acquitted of a crime) Previously granted immunity under a validly enacted statute. The kernel of the right is against testimonial compulsion only. US vs Tan TengFacts:The defendant herein raped Oliva Pacomio, a seven-year-old girl. Tan Teng was gambling near the house of the victim and it was alleged that he entered her home and threw the victim on the floor and place his private parts over hers. Several days later, Pacomio was suffering from a disease called gonorrhea. Pacomio told her sister about what had happened and reported it to the police.Tan Teng was called to appear in a police line-up and the victim identified him. He was then stripped of his clothing and was examined by a policeman. He was found to have the same symptoms of gonorrhea. The policeman took a portion of the substance emitting from the body of the defendant and turned it over to the Bureau of Science. The results showed that the defendant was suffering from gonorrhea.The lower court held that the results show that the disease that the victim had acquired came from the defendant herein. Such disease was transferred by the unlawful act of carnal knowledge by the latter. The defendant alleged that the said evidence should be inadmissible because it was taken in violation of his right against self-incrimination.Issue:Whether or Not the physical examination conducted was a violation of the defendants rights against self-incrimination.Ruling:The court held that the taking of a substance from his body was not a violation of the said right. He was neither compelled to make any admissions or to answer any questions. The substance was taken from his body without his objection and was examined by competent medical authority. The prohibition of self-incrimination in the Bill of Rights is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, and not an exclusion of his body as evidence, when it may be material. It would be the same as if the offender apprehended was a thief and the object stolen by him may be used as evidence against him.Holt vs United States: The prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material. The prohibition applies to the compulsion for the production of documents, papers and chattels that may be used as evidence against the witness, except where the State has a right to inspect the same, such as the books of accounts of corporations, under police power. The privilege also protects the accused against any attempt to compel him to furnish a specimen of his handwriting in connection with his prosecution for falsification. Beltran vs. SamsonFacts:Beltran, as adefendantfor the crime of Falsification, refused to writea sampleof his handwriting as ordered by the respondent Judge. The petitioner in this case contended that such order would be aviolation ofhisconstitutional rightagainst self-incrimination because such examination would give theprosecutionevidence against him, which the lattershould havegotten in the first place. He also argued that such an act will make himfurnishevidence against himself.

Issue:Whether or not thewritingfrom the fiscal's dictation by the petitioner for the purpose of comparing the latter's handwriting and determining whether he wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified, constitutes evidence against himself within the scope andmeaning of theconstitutional provision under examination.

Ruling:The court ordered the respondents and those under their orders desist and abstain absolutely and forever from compelling the petitioner to take down dictation in his handwriting for the purpose of submitting the latter for comparison.Writingis something more than moving the body, or the hands, or the fingers;writingis not a purely mechanical act, because it requires the application of intelligence and attention; and in the case at barwritingmeans that the petitioner herein is tofurnisha means to determine whether or not he is the falsifier, as the petition of the respondent fiscal clearly states. Except that it is more serious, we believe the present case is similar to that of producing documents or chattels in one's possession. We say that, for the purposes of the constitutional privilege, there is a similarity between one who is compelled to produce a document, and one who is compelled tofurnisha specimen of his handwriting, for in both cases, the witness is required tofurnishevidence against himself. It cannot be contended in the present case that if permission to obtain a specimen of the petitioner's handwriting is not granted, the crime would go unpunished. Considering the circumstance that the petitioner is a municipal treasurer, it should not be a difficult matter for the fiscal to obtained genuine specimens of his handwriting. But even supposing it is impossible to obtain specimen or specimens without resorting to the means complained herein, that is no reason fortramplingupon a personal right guaranteed bythe constitution. It might be true that in some cases criminals may succeed in evading the hand of justice, but such cases are accidental and do not constitute the raison d' etre of the privilege. This constitutional privilege exists for theprotectionof innocent persons.(1) When Available As a rule, the right may be invoked only when and as the incriminating question is asked, since the witness has no way of knowing the nature or effect of the question to be put to him. True only to the ordinary witness. The ACCUSED can refuse at the outset and altogether to take the stand as a witness for the prosecution, on the reasonable assumption that the purpose of his interrogation will be to incriminate him. Chavez vs CAFacts: Judgment of conviction was for qualified theft of a motor vehicle(thunderbird car together with accessories). An information was filed against the accused together with other accused,that they conspired, with intent to gain and abuse of confidence without theconsent of owner Dy Lim, took the vehicle.All the accused plead not guilty. During the trial, the fiscal grecia (prosecution) asked roger Chavez to be thefirst witness. Counsel of the accused opposed. Fiscal Grecia contends that the accused (Chavez) will only be an ordinary witness not an state witness. Counsel of accused answer that it will only incriminate his client. But the jugde ruled in favor of the fiscal.Petitioner was convicted.Issue: Whether or not constitutional right of Chavez against self incrimination had been violated to warrant writ of HC?Ruling: YES.Petitioner was forced to testify to incriminate himself, in full breach of his constitutional right to remain silent. It cannot be said now that he has waived his right. He did not volunteer to take the stand and in his own defense; he did not offer himself as a witness;Juxtaposed with the circumstances of the case heretofore adverted to, make waiver a shaky defense. It cannot stand. If, by his own admission, defendant proved his guilt, still, his original claim remains valid. For the privilege, we say again, is a rampart that gives protection even to the guiltyHabeas corpus is a high prerogative writ. It is traditionally considered as an exceptional remedy to release a person whose liberty is illegally restrained such as when the accuseds constitutional rights are disregarded. Such defect results in the absence or loss of jurisdiction and therefore invalidates the trial and the consequent conviction of the accused whose fundamental right was violated. That void judgment of conviction may be challenged by collateral attack, which precisely is the function of habeas corpus.This writ may issue even if another remedy which is less effective may be availed of by the defendant. Thus, failure by the accused to perfect his appeal before the Court of Appeals does not preclude a recourse to the writ. The writ may be granted upon a judgment already final. For, as explained in Johnson vs. Zerbst, the writ of habeas corpus as an extraordinary remedy must be liberally given effect so as to protect well a person whose liberty is at stake. The propriety of the writ was given the nod in that case, involving a violation of another constitutional right, in this wise:A courts jurisdiction at the beginning of trial may be lost in the course of the proceedings due to failure to complete the court as the Sixth Amendment requires by providing Counsel for an accused who is unable to obtain Counsel, who has not intelligently waived this constitutional guaranty, and whose life or liberty is at stake. If this requirement of the Sixth Amendment is not complied with, the court no longer has jurisdiction to proceed. The judgment of conviction pronounced by a court without jurisdiction is void, and one imprisoned thereunder may obtain release of habeas corpus.Under our own Rules of Court, to grant the remedy to the accused Roger Chavez whose case presents a clear picture of disregard of a constitutional right is absolutely proper. Section 1 of Rule 102 extends the writ, unless otherwise expressly provided by law, to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.(2) Waiver The right against self-incrimination may be waived, either directly or by a failure to invoke it, provided that the waiver is certain and unequivocal and intelligently, understandingly and willingly made. Custodial InvestigationArticle III, Section 12. Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited. Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this Section as well as compensation to the rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families. Custodial Investigation means any questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. RA 7438: custodial investigation shall include the practice of issuing an invitation to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed, without prejudice to the liability of the inviting officer for any violation of law. People vs. Ramos1. Remedial Law; Evidence; Constitutional Law; Due Process; HearsayEvidence; Admissibility of affidavit;Affidavit of a person pointing to accused as the seller of marijuana leaves, not admissible, for being hearsay as affiant was not presented in court; Nature of affidavit.-The lower court erred in admitting as evidence the written sworn affidavit of Malcon Olevere. It can be gleaned from the records that Malcon Olevere executed the written sworn statement declaring that appellant Ramos sold to him the marijuana leaves for P10.00. This piece of evidence is a mere scrap of paper because Malcon Olevere was not produced in court for cross-examination. An affidavit being taken ex-parte is often incomplete and inaccurate. Such kind of evidence is considered hearsay. The constitutional right to meet the witnesses face to face in order not to deprive persons of their lives and properties without due process of law is well-protected in our jurisprudence.2. Remedial Law; Evidence; Constitutional Law; Due Process; Hearsay Evidence; Non admissibility of sworn affidavit, grounds for.-For the court to admit the sworn statement of Malcon Olevere without giving the adverse party the right to cross-examine him would easily facilitate the fabrication of evidence and the perpetration of fraud. The inadmissibility of this sort of evidence is based, not only on the lack of opportunity on the part of the adverse party to cross-examine the affiant, but also on the commonly known fact that, generally, an affidavit is not prepared by the affiant himself but by another who uses his own language in writing the affiants statements which may either be omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them.3. Remedial Law; Evidence;Proof that marijuana leaves was recovered from a person does not necessarily prove that the accused had been selling marijuana leaves, including the recovered marijuana from the person; Case at bar.-It is not disputed that the marijuana leaves recovered and tested by witness Vequilia came from Malcon Olevere and not from appellant. It would be absurd and manifestly unjust to conclude that appellant had been selling marijuana stuff just because what were recovered from Olevere were real marijuana. Proof of one does not necessarily prove another. Nowhere can it be found on the record that appellant was caught in possession or in the act of selling the prohibited marijuana leaves.4. Remedial Law; Evidence; Witnesses; Credibility; Hearsay;Oral testimony of prosecution witnesses not being based on personal knowledge are considered hearsay.-The oral testimonies given by the witnesses for the prosecution prove nothing material and culpable against the accused. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, not anyone of the three witnesses presented testified on the basis of their personal knowledge that the appellant sold the marijuana leaves to Malcon Olevere. Under Rule 130, Sec. 30 of the Revised Rules of Court, a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his own knowledge, that is, a witness, therefore, may not testify as to what he merely learned from others, either because he was told or having read or heard the same. Such testimony is considered hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of what he has learned. Since Malcon Olevere was not presented as a witness, the testimonies offered by the witnesses for the prosecution are regarded as hearsay, insofar as they impute to the appellant the commission of the offense charged.5. Remedial Law; Evidence; Witnesses; Acquittal;Eight to silence and to counsel; Extrajudicial Admissions; Apprisal of accused of his constitutional rights to silence and to counsel at custodial investigation, not sufficient, as said rights must be fully explained, especially where accused not adequately educated; Verbal admissions of accused at custodial investigation, not admissible; Reason.-The lower court, in convicting appellant of the crime charged, partly relied on the verbal admission made by appellant himself before Lt. Mediavillo and Sgt. Linga during the custodial investigation. Although the records prove that the appellant has been duly apprised of his constitutional rights to silence and to counsel, We are not fully convinced that this apprisal was sufficiently manifested and intelligently understood and accepted by the appellant. This is fatal to the admissibility of appellants verbal admission. We have repeatedly emphasized that care should be taken in accepting extrajudicial admissions, especially when taken during custodial investigation. x x x Appellant has only finished Grade VI, which means that he is not adequately educated to understand fairly and fully the significance of his constitutional rights to silence and to counsel. As mandated, it is not enough that the police investigator merely informs him of his constitutional rights to silence and to counsel, and then taking his statements down, the interrogating officer must have patience in explaining these rights to him. The records do not reveal that these requirements have been fully complied with, nor was there any showing that appellant has been represented by counsel during custodial investigation. In consonance with Section 20 of the Bill of Rights which states that any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence. We hold that the verbal admissions of appellant during custodial investigation may not be taken in evidence against him.People vs. GalitThe case ofPeople v.Galitlaid down the guidelines to be observed by police officers in making an arrest, as follows:At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be used against him. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means by telephone if possible, or by letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.The Constitution gave more teeth to the foregoing principle and furtherprovided:Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right, to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must beprovidedwith one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.People vs BarrosFacts: Bonifacio Barros was charged and convicted of violating Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425. Barros was coming from Chackchakan, Bontoc, Mountain Province, to Nacagang, Sabangan, Mountain Province to Baguio City where he carried four (4) kilos of dried marijuana which the accused intended for distribution and sale. M/Sgt. Francis Yag-as and S/Sgt. James Ayan, both members of the P.C. Mountain Province Command, rode the Dangwa Bus. Barros carrying a carton boarded the bus and seated himself and put the carton under his seat.After alighting at their station, Sgt. Ayan ordered C2C Bongyao to inspect the carton and found out it contained marijuana. As both P.C. officers Yag-as and Ayan Bonifacio Barros carrying that same carton when he boarded the bus at Chackchakan, Bonifacio was arrested and subsequently convicted. Barros now appeals from the judgment of conviction and claims that his right to due process was violated when he was searched without the mandatory warrant.Issues:1. WON Bonifacios non-objection to the search madein the moving vehicle, resulting to his warrantless arrest, constitutes a waiver?2. WON Bonifacio was denied due process when he was searched and arrested without warrant?Ruling:Judgment reversedRATIO:The general rule is that a search and seizure must be carried out through or with a judicial warrant; otherwise such search and seizure becomes unreasonable within the meaning of Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The fruits of the search and seizure will be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. Exception:1)Peace officers may conduct searches of moving vehicles,it not being practicable to secure a judicial warrant before searching a vehicle, since such vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought,however only visual inspection.The accused is not to be presumed to have waived the unlawful search conducted on the occasion of his warrantless arrest simply because he failed to object. To constitute a waiver, it must appear first that the right exists; secondly, that the person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such a right; and lastly, that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.People vs MacamFacts:Accused was charged and prosecuted for robbery with homicide as guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Defense assails the court decision contending the constitutional rights of the accused were violated for subjecting them to a police lineup at the hospital where they were identified by the victims without the presence of their counsel and without any warrant.Issue:Whether or not the constitutional rights of the accused were violated.

Ruling:Although the accused were arrested without a warrant such defect was cured during the proceeding when the defense failed to object on the issue during the initial proceedings before the court. Having failed to assail the issue beforehand the accused is estopped to assail the validity of their arrest as they further voluntarily submitted their self before the court by entering the plea of not guilty instead of moving to quash the information before the court on ground of an invalid arrest. It is also held that any identification of an uncounseled accused made in a police line-up is inadmissible. HOWEVER, the prosecution did not present evidence regarding appellants identification at the line-up. The witnesses identified the accused again in open court. Also, accused did not object to the in-court identification as being tainted by illegal line-up. The witnesses and victims positively identified the accused thereby further affirming the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. SC affirmed the decision of the lower court.Gamboa vs CruzFacts:Petitioner was arrested for vagrancy without a warrant. During a line-up of 5 detainees including petitioner, he was identified by a complainant to be a companion in a robbery, thereafter he was charged. Petitioner filed a Motion to Acquit on the ground that the conduct of the line-up, without notice and in the absence of his counsel violated hisconstitutional rightsto counsel and todue process.The courtdenied said motion.Hearingwas set, hence the petition.

Issue:Whether or Not petitionersright to counselanddue processviolated.

Ruling:No.The policeline-up was not part of the custodial inquest, hence, petitioner was not yet entitled, at such stage, to counsel. He had not been held yet to answer for acriminaloffense. The moment there is a move or even an urge of said investigators to elicitadmissionsor confessions or even plaininformationwhich may appear innocent or innocuous at the time, from said suspect, he should then and there be assisted by counsel, unless he waives the right, but the waiver shall be made in writing and in the presence of counsel.On the right todue process, petitioner was not, in any way, deprived of this substantive and constitutional right, as he was duly represented by a counsel. He was accorded all the opportunities to be heard and to present evidence to substantiate his defense; only that he chose not to, and instead opted to file a Motion to acquit after the prosecution had rested its case. Whatdue processabhors is the absolute lack of opportunity to be heard.People vs CompilFacts: The accused was upon his arrest in Quezon, where he fled, subjected by the police to informal inculpatory interrogation that continued during their trip back to Manila, where his formal investigation was conducted at the police station. He was not assisted by counsel, who arrived the following day. Issue: Whether or not his right to counsel was violated?Ruling: The SC held that his right to counsel began when the interrogation started in Quezon. The operative act, according to Justice Bellosillo is when the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect who has been taken into custody by the police to carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to eliciting incriminatory statements. People vs LuceroFacts:Accused-appellant was convictedforrobbery with homicide. While he was incustodial investigation the accused cannot afford a lawyer thus one was provided for him in the person of Atty. Peralta as his counsel. Counsel explained to the accused his constitutional rights but Atty. Peralta observed no reaction from the accused. He left to attend the wake of afriendand the police authorities started to take statements from the accused. Apparently during the custodial investigation no counsel was around while accused gave hisextrajudicialconfession which was used against him as evidence in court andmerithis conviction.Issue:Whether or not theextrajudicialconfession of the accused may be admissible during the trial.Ruling:Appellant's conviction cannot be based on hisextrajudicialconfession.

The constitution requires that a person under investigation for the commission of a crime should be provided with acounsel. This is a constitutional guarantee to protect the accused against the hostility and duress from the authorities during custodial investigation. Any confession orstatementmade without the presence of a counsel during the investigation is deemed to be inadmissible as evidence in court. It appears that when the accused was taken with his statements his counsel was not around. Therefore hisextrajudicialconfession cannot be used as evidence against the accused during his trial. The court erred in admitting it as evidence and as a basis of conviction therefore the accused is acquitted.People vs SuarezFacts: On or about the 8th day of December, 1987 in the Municipality of Pasig, Estrelita Guzman was robbed and was killed in her own house.

Suarez wanted his aunt killed so that he and his wife, Marivic Suarez, also the victims adopted daughter, could get at once any property that Marivic might inherit from Estrellita upon the latter's death. In exchange for the job, Suarez would allow the other accused to steal what they wanted from the house, in addition to giving them P100,000.00 after one month from the killing of Estrellita.

Two of the accused, Reyes and Lara, gave their sworn statement detailing what transpired from the planning until the execution of the crime.

Relying on the extrajudicial confessions of the accused and on the circumstantial evidence adduced by the prosecution, the trial court found Suarez, Reyes and Lara guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide.

While Suarez and Reyes have already accepted the trial court's verdict, Lara now questions the lower court's decision by challenging the admissibility of their extrajudicial declarations. He claims that their extrajudicial confessions were obtained through force and intimidation and without the benefit of an effective counsel.

Issue: WON accused Laras extrajudicial confessions were freely and voluntary given and without the benefit of an effective counsel.Ruling: After a thorough review of the records of the case, we agree with the lower court's factual finding and conclusion that the extrajudicial confessions of accused Reyes and appellant Lara were freely and voluntarily given and that their retraction and claims of violence and coercion were merely belated contrivances and efforts at exculpation. Their claim that they were forced to sign their respective statements was sufficiently refuted by the witnesses for the prosecution who were present on the day and time the duo gave and signed their sworn statements.

We find no merit in herein appellant's contention that Atty. Saunar was not Reyes' own choice as counsel for the interrogation. While the initial choice of the lawyer in cases where a person under custodial investigation cannot afford the services of a lawyer is naturally lodged in the police investigators, the accused really has the final choice as he may reject the counsel chosen for him and ask for another one. A lawyer provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by the accused where he never raised any objection against the former's appointment during the course of the investigation and the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of his statement before the swearing officer. 37

Here, while the lawyers of the accused were provided by the NBI, the accused never signified their desire to have a lawyer of their own choice. Thus, we also disagree with appellant's claim that the lawyer who assisted him in his waiver came in only after he had executed his waiver. His own statements show that he waived his rights in the presence and with the advice of Atty. Rodolfo Dahiroc.People vs Bonola (digest case) People vs AndanFacts: Pablito Andan alias "Bobby" was accused of the crime of rape with homicide.The offense was committed on February 19,1994 in Baliuag, Bulacan; the victim being Marianne Guevarra, 22 and a 2nd year student at the Fatima School of Nursing. On said day, victim left her home for her school dormitory in Valenzuela.While on her way, appellant invited her to his house. He used the pretext that the bloodpressure of his wife's grandmothershould be taken. Marianne agreed to do soas the old woman was her distant relative. She did not know that nobody was inside the house. Appellant then punched her in the abdomen, brought her to the kitchen and raped her. Bynight time, Marianne, who was still unconscious,was dragged by appellant to their backyard that was adjacent to a vacant lot. Appellant was to transfer Marianne to the vacant lot when she moved,prompting appellant to hit her head with a piece of concrete block.No longer moving, he dragged her to the lot and abandoned her.At 11amher body was discovered. The autopsy revealed that she died of"traumatic injuries."Marianne's gruesome death drew public attention and prompted Baliuag Mayor Cornelio Trinidad to form an investigation team. The investigation pointedto the appellant.Appellant's nearby house was searched but he wasnot there.On February 24, police team led by Mayor Trinidad traced appellant in his parents' house. They took him and brought him to the police headquarters where he was interrogated.Initially, he denied any knowledge of Marianne's death.However, when the policeconfronted him with evidence, appellant relented but implicated two of his neighbours, and that he was merely a lookout.Larin and Dizon were likewise brought there by the police.The following day a physical examination conducted on thesuspects revealed that appellant has multiple scratches on the neck, chest and back. By that time, people and media representatives were alreadyat the police headquarters awaiting the results of the investigation.Mayor Trinidad arrived.Upon seeing the mayor, appellant approached himand whispered thatthey talk privately. The mayor led him to the office of the Chief of Police and there, he broke down and said "Mayor, patawarin mo ako!I will tell you the truth.I am the one who killed Marianne."The mayor opened the door of the room to let the public and media representatives witness the confession.Since no lawyer was available he orderedthe proceedings photographed andvideotaped.In the presence of the mayor, the police, representatives of the media and appellant's own wife and son, appellant confessed his guilt.He asked for forgiveness from Larin and Dizonwhom he falsely implicated saying he did itbecause of ill-feelings against them.He also said that the devil entered his mind because of the pornographicmagazines and tabloid he read almost every day.After his confession, appellant hugged his wife and son and asked themayor to help him.His confession was captured on videotape and covered by the media nationwide. On arraignment, however, appellant entered a plea of "not guilty."He testified that on said date he was at his parents house for the birthday party of his nephew.He, his wife and son went home after 5pm, slept at 8pm, and woke up at 6am the next day.Appellant claimed that after he was picked up by the police on February 24, he was coerced to confess that he raped and killed Marianne.Fearing for his life, appellant did as he wastold. The trial court convicted the appellant and sentenced himto death.He was found guilty of the crime charged in the Information (Rape withHomicide) and penalized accordingly.Hence, theautomatic review.Issue: W/N the appellants confession not being assisted by a counsel is inviolation of the constitution, and is therefore inadmissible as evidence against him.Ruling: Under these circumstances, it cannot be successfully claimed that appellant's confession before the mayor is inadmissible. It is true that a municipal mayor has "operational supervision and control" overthe local police and may arguably be deemed a law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution.However, appellant's confession to the mayor was not made in response to any interrogation by thelatter.In fact, the mayor did not question appellant at all.No police authority ordered appellant to talk to the mayor.It was appellant himself who spontaneously, freely and voluntarily sought the mayor for a privatemeeting.The mayor did notknow that appellantwas going to confess his guiltto him.When appellant talked with the mayor as a confidant and not as a law enforcement officer, his uncounseled confession to him did not violate his constitutional rights.Thus, it has been held that the constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby appellant orally admitted having committed the crime.What the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions.The rights under Section 12 are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the state as wouldlead the accused to admit something false, not to prevent him from freely and voluntarily tellingthe truth.Hence we hold that appellants confession to the mayor was correctly admitted by the trial court. Appellants confessions to the media were likewise properly admitted.The confessions were made in response to questions by news reporters, not by the police or any other investigating officer.We have held that statements spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters ona televised interview are deemed voluntary and are admissible in evidence. The Court therefore held accused-appellant Pablito Andan guilty ofthe special complex crime of rape with homicide. People vs SerzoFacts: Appellant Mario Serzo was convicted of murder by the lower court for the stabbing/killing of Alfredo Casabal after the latter rescued minors being held by the former. Pre-trial was waived and the case proceeded to trial on the merits. The accused alleged that he was denied the right to counsel. During the arraignment he appeared without counsel, so the court appointed a counsel de officio. Thereafter, he moved that the arraignment be reset so he can engage the services of his own counsel however, during the arraignment, he still appeared without one. The arraignment proceeded with him being assisted by the counsel de officio. During the trial, the same counsel appeared and cross-examined for the accused.Issue: Whether or not the accused was denied of his right to counselRuling: NO. Herein, the accused was provided with acounsel de officiowho assisted him in all stages of the proceedings. The option to hire ones counsel cannot be used to sanction reprehensible dilatory tactics, trifle with the Rules or prejudice the equally important right of the State and the offended party to speedy and adequate justice.The right to counsel is guaranteed by the Constitution to minimize the imbalance in the adversarial system where an accused is pitted against the awesome prosecution machinery of the state. It is also recognition of the accused not having the skill to protect him before a tribunal which has the power to take his life or liberty.The right covers the period from custodial investigation until judgment is rendered, even on appeal. RA 7438 provides that any person arrested or detained or under custodial investigation shall at all times be assisted by counsel. The right is however not absolute and is waivable; The state must balance the private against the state's and offended party's equally important right to speedy and adequate justice, and The right is waivable as long as the waiver is unequivocal, knowing, and intelligently made.Guazon vs De VillaFacts: This is a petition for prohibition w/ preliminary inunction. to prohibit the military and police officers represented by public respondents from conducting "areal target zonings" or "saturation drives" in MM. The 41 petitioners state that they are all of legal age, bona fideresidents of MM and Taxpayers and leaders in their respective communities. Accdg. to the petitioners, the "areal target zonings" or "saturation drives" are in critical areas pinpointed by the military and police as places where the subversives are hiding. Petitioners claim that the saturation drives follow a common pattern of human rights abuses. Respondents stress 2 points. First, the resps. have legal authority to conduct saturation drives. And, second, they allege that the accusations of the petitioners about a deliberate disregard for human rights, are total lies. Resps. cite Art. VII, Sec. 17 of the Const.:"The Pres. shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws are faithfully executed." They also cite sec. 18.:"The Pres. shall be the Commander-in-chief of all AFP and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. Ruling: The Court believes it is highly probable that some violations were actually committed. This is so in spite of the alleged pleas of barangay officials for the thousands of residents to submit themselves voluntarily for character and personal verification." However, the remedy is not to stop all police actions, including the essential and legitimate ones. We see nothing wrong in police making their presence visibly felt in troubled areas. Police cannot respond to riots or violent demonstration if they do not move in sufficient numbers. A show of force is sometimes necessary as long as the rights of the people are protected and not violated.A blanket prohibition such as that sought by the petitioners would limit all police actions to one on one confrontation where search warrants and warrants of arrest against specific individuals are easily procured. Anarchy may reign if the military and the police decide to sit down in their offices because all concerted drives where a show of force is present are totally prohibited. The remedy is not an original action for prohibition brought through a TP''s suit. Where not one victim complains, and not one violator is properly charged, the problem is not initially for the SC. It is basically one for the executive departments and for the trial courts. Under the circumstances of this TP''s suit, there is no erring soldier or policeman whom we can order prosecuted. In the absence of clear facts ascertained through an orderly procedure, no permanent relief can be given at this time. Further investigation of the petitioners'' charges and a hard look by admin officials at the policy implications of the prayed for blanket prohibition are also warranted. In the meantime, and in the face of a prima facieshowing that some abuses were probably committed and could be committed during future police actions, we have to temporarily restrain the alleged baning on walls, the kicking in of doors, the herding of half-naked men to assembly areas for examination of tattoo marks, the violation of residences even if these are humble shanties of squatters.Right to BailArticle III, Section 13.All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required. Bail is the security given for the release of a person in custody of law, furnished by him or a bondsman, conditioned upon his appearance before any court as may be required. Only persons under detention may petition for bail. The purpose of bail is provisional release. It follows that one who is not in the custody of the law cannot ask for bail; however bail cannot be denied simply because the person detained has not yet been formally charged in court but is still under investigation for the commission of an offense. Rule 114 of the Rules of Court states that any person in custody who is not yet charged in court may apply for bail with any court in the province, city or municipality where he is held. Section 13 reversed Garcia-Padilla vs. Enrile by preserving the right to bail even if the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has been suspended. Garcia-Padilla vs. EnrileFacts: In July 1982, Sabino Padilla, together w/ 8 others who were having a conference in a house in Bayombong, NV, were arrested by members of the PC. The raid of the house was authorized by a search warrant issued by Judge Sayo. Josefina, mother of Sabino, opposed the arrest averring that no warrant of arrest was issued but rather it was just a warrant of arrest hence the arrest of her son and the others was w/o just cause. Sabino and companions together with 4 others were later transferred to a facility only the PCs know. Josefina petitioned the court for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.Issue:Whether or not the arrests done against Sabino et al is valid.Ruling:In a complete about face, the SC decision in theLansang Casewas reversed and the ruling in theBarcelon Case& theMontenegro Casewas again reinstated. The questioned power of the president to suspend the privilege of the WoHCwas once again held as discretionary in the president. The SC again reiterated that the suspension of the writ was a political question to be resolved solely by the president. It was also noted that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus must, indeed, carry with it the suspension of the right to bail, if the governments campaign to suppress the rebellion is to be enhanced and rendered effective. If the right to bail may be demanded during the continuance of the rebellion, and those arrested, captured and detained in the course thereof will be released, they would, without the least doubt, rejoin their comrades in the field thereby jeopardizing the success of government efforts to bring to an end the invasion, rebellion or insurrection.NOTE:This ruling was abrogated by Sec 18, Art 7 of the 1987 Constitution which expressly constitutionalized theLansang Doctrine. Note as well that under Art 3 (Sec 13) of the Constitution it is stated that the right to bail shall not be impaired even if the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. The exception applies to any offense which under the law existing at the time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail may be punished by reclusion perpetua, or death, even if a lesser penalty may be imposed upon conviction owing to mitigating circumstances that may be disclosed later. Enrile vs SalazarFacts: In February 1990, Sen Enrile was arrested. He was charged together with Mr. & Mrs. Panlilio, and Honasan for the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder which allegedly occurred during their failed coup attempt. Enrile was then brought to Camp Karingal. Enrile later filed for the habeas corpus alleging that the crime being charged against him is nonexistent. That he was charged with a criminal offense in information for which no complaint was initially filed or preliminary investigation was conducted, hence was denied due process; denied his right to bail; and arrested and detained on the strength of a warrant issued without the judge who issued it first having personally determined the existence of probable cause.Issue:Whether or not the court should affirm theHernandezruling.Ruling:Enrile filed for habeas corpus because he was denied bail although ordinarily a charge of rebellion would entitle one for bail. The crime of rebellion charged against him however is complexed with murder and multiple frustrated murders the intention of the prosecution was to make rebellion in its most serious form so as to make the penalty thereof in the maximum. The SC ruled that there is no such crime as Rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder. What Enrile et al can be charged of would be Simple Rebellion because other crimes such as murder or all those that may be necessary to the commission of rebellion is absorbed hence he should be entitiled for bail. The SC however noted that a petition for habeas corpus was not the proper remedy so as to avail of bail. The proper step that should have been taken was for Enrile to file a petition to be admitted for bail. He should have exhausted all other efforts before petitioning for habeas corpus. The Hernandez ruling is still valid. All other crimes committed in carrying out rebellion are deemed absorbed. The SC noted, however, that there may be a need to modify the rebellion law. Considering that the essence of rebellion has been lost and that it is being used by a lot of opportunists to attempt to grab power. The arrested invoked People vs. Hernandez which held that the crime of rebellion could not be complexed with murder. Simple rebellion is punished only with prision mayor and a P20, 000.00 fine and is therefore bailable. The Court, after giving the petitioners provisional liberty pending the resolution of the case finally ruled that based on the doctrine enunciated in People vs. Hernandez, the questioned information filed against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio must be read as charging simple rebellion only; hence, said petitioners are entitled to bail, before final conviction, as a matter of right. A new provision in the Revised Rules of Court now states that all person in custody shall be entitled to bail as a matter of right except those: Charged with a capital offense or an offense which, under the law at the time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail, is punishable by reclusion perpetua, when the evidence of guilt is strong. Even if the crime imputed to the accused is punishable by reclusion perpetua, he is still entitled to bail if the evidence of guilt is not strong. Does not have to be established by him. Prosecution must prove the contrary, although not necessary to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. People vs. Cortez The SC directed that where the accused is convicted of a capital offense or of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, his bail shall be canceled and he shall be placed in confinement pending the resolution of his appeal. Hearing on the petition for bail is required to satisfy due process, but this may be summary in nature or held in the course of the trial itself. A separate hearing is not dispensable. The mere probability of escape does not warrant the denial of the right to bail. The remedy is to increase the bail provided that it is not excessive. Rule 114, Section 9 of the Rules of Court: Amount of bail;guidelines. The judge who issued the warrant or granted the application shall fix a reasonable amount of bail considering primarily, but not limited to, the following factors:(a) Financial ability of the accused to give bail;(b) Nature and circumstances of the offense;(c) Penalty for the offense charged;(d) Character and reputation of the accused;(e) Age and health of the accused;(f) Weight of the evidence against the accused;(g) Probability of the accused appearing at the trial;(h) Forfeiture of other bail;(i) The fact that accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and(j) Pendency of other cases where the accused is on bail. These guidelines must be observed to prevent violation of the prohibition against excessive bail. De la Camara vs. Enage (digest case) Yap vs CAFacts: The right against excessive bail, and the liberty of abode and travel, are being invoked to set aside two resolutions of the Court of Appeals which fixed bail at P5,500,000.00 and imposed conditions on change of residence and travel abroad. For misappropriating amounts equivalent to P5,500,000.00, petitioner was convicted of estafa and was sentenced to four years and two months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight years of prision mayor as maximum, in addition to one (1) year for each additional P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00 but in no case shall it exceed twenty (20) years. He filed a notice of appeal, and moved to be allowed provisional liberty under the cash bond he had filed earlier in the proceedings.

Issue: Was the condition imposed by the CA on accuseds bail bond violative the liberty of abode and right to travel?Ruling: Imposing bail in an excessive amount could render meaningless the right to bail. Under the circumstances of this case, we find that appropriate conditions have been imposed in the bail bond to ensure against the risk of flight, particularly, the combination of the hold-departure order and the requirement that petitioner inform the court of any change of residence and of his whereabouts. Although an increase in the amount of bail while the case is on appeal may be meritorious, we find that the setting of the amount at P5,500,000.00 is unreasonable, excessive, and constitutes an effective denial of petitioners right to bail.Presumption of InnocenceArticle III, Section 14. No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused: Provided, that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable. Conviction will not depend on the weakness of the defense but on the strength of the prosecution. People vs. Malilay (digest case)People vs. Sunga (digest case) Dumlao Case (digest) People vs Tempongko (Digest) The constitutional presumption of innocence may be overcome by contrary presumptions based on the experience of human conduct. People vs Mirantes (Digest)Joseph vs. Villaluz (Digest)People vs Regulacion (Digest) On the right to be silent, the SC said that no inference of guilt may be drawn against an accused for his failure to make a statement of any sort. The neglect or refusal of the accused shall not in any manner prejudice or be used against him. However, while the accused has the right to be silent, they run the risk of an inference from non-production of evidence. Failure or refusal of the accused to testify may prejudice him if the prosecution has already established a prima facie case against him. The duty to apprise the accused of the right to be silent rests not with the court but with the defense of the counsel. Right to be Heard Such right is indispensable in any criminal prosecution where the stakes are the liberty of even the life of the accused, who must for this reason be given a chance to defend himself. People vs Lumague: the SC set aside the conviction of three co-accused after finding that they were denied due process because they had not been given a chance to testify and to present additional evidence on their behalf. The trial court was directed to receive such additional evidence and to allow the defendants to present sur-rebuttal evidence in case the prosecution should present rebuttal evidence. Assistance of Counsel Right to counsel begins from the time a person is taken into custody and placed under investigation for the commission of a crime. It becomes more important when he is already on trial and confronted by a skilled and experienced prosecutor. The right of the accused to counsel in a criminal proceeding has never been considered subject to waiver. People vs. HolgadoFacts:Appellant FriscoHolgadowas chargedin the courtof First Instance of Romblon with slight illegal detention because according to the information, being a private person, he did "feloniously and without justifiable motive, kidnap and detain one Artemia Fabreag inthe houseof AnteroHolgadofor about eight hours thereby depriving said Artemia Fabreag of her personalliberty. He pleaded guilty (without acounsel) and said that he was just instructed by Mr. Ocampo, which noevidencewas presented to indict the latter.

Issue:Whether or Not there was any irregularity in the proceedings in the trial court.

Ruling:Yes. Rule 112, section 3 of ROC that : If the defendant appears withoutattorney, he must be informed by the court that it is his right to haveattorneybeing arraigned., and must be asked if he desires the aid ofattorney, the Court must assignattorneyde oficio to defend him. A reasonable time must be allowed for procuringattorney. This was violated. Moreso the guarantees of our Constitution that "no person shall be held to answer for acriminal offensewithout due process of law", and that all accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself andcounsel." Incriminal casesthere can be no fairhearingunlessthe accusedbe given the opportunity to be heard bycounsel.The trial court failed to inquire as to the true import of the qualified plea of accused. The record does not show whether the supposed instructions of Mr. Ocampo was real and whether it had reference to the commission of the offense or to the making of the plea guilty. No investigation was opened by the court on this matter in the presence ofthe accusedand there is now no way of determining whether the supposed instruction is a good defense or may vitiate the voluntariness of the confession. Apparently the court became satisfied with the fiscal's information that he had investigated Mr. Ocampo and found that the same had nothing to do with this case. Such attitude of the court was wrong for the simple reason that a merestatementof the fiscal was not sufficient to overcome a qualified plea ofthe accused. But above all, the court should have seen to it thatthe accusedbe assisted bycounselespecially because of the qualified plea given by him and the seriousness of the offense found to be capital by the court. A counsel de oficio should still be appointed despite the objection of the accused. The duty of the court extends to overseeing whether or not the counsel does his duty to the defendant. People vs. Magsi (Digest)People vs MalunsingFacts: Manuel Villegas together with Malunsing et al were charged for murder. At the opening of the trial, Manuel Villegas was appointed a counsel de oficio, Atty. Geronimo Pajarito. Villegas however intimated to Geronimo and the trial court that he has his own lawyer. However, the court proceeded without giving Villegas the opportunity to present his own lawyer. The court then asked Atty. Pajarito if he wants to confer with his client but Pajarito replied I think I know the case. Thereafter, trial began where the prosecution presented evidence against Villegas. No evidence was presented in behalf of Villegas and he was not even called to the witness stand to prove his innocence. Consequently, Villegas was convicted of the crime charged.Now, Atty. Pablito Pielago [presumably Villegas true lawyer and supposed lawyer from the onset?] questioned the conviction as he presented the above irregularities. He said that Villegas is an unlettered man and he does not know the intricacies of court proceedings hence Pajarito should have been vigilant in representing him in court. Pielago now wants the reversal of the conviction.Issue:Whether or not the conviction should be reversed.Ruling:Yes, for there is a gross violation of Villegas constitutional rights. The Supreme Court noted that it is not enough that a counselde oficiowas appointed, especially so as here, where the accused had indicated that he wanted a lawyer of his choice, a decision prompted moreover by the fact that he had lost confidence in the member of the bar thus designated. Nor is it to manifest respect for this right if the counselde oficiothus named, instead of conferring with the accused, would just blithely inform the judge that he was already fully prepared for his exacting responsibility. It was unintended, of course, but the result could not rightly be distinguished from pure travesty. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction but considering the gravity of the offense charged, it ordered a new trial.Nature and Cause of Accusation The defendant is entitled to know the nature and cause of the accusation against him so he can adequately prepare for his defense. Rules of Court provides that whenever possible, a complaint or information should state the designation given to the offense by the statute, besides the statement of the acts or omissions constituting the same, and if there is no such designation reference should be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it. The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense must be stated in ordinary and concise language without repetition, not necessarily in the terms of the statute defining the offense, but in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. The description and not designation of the offense is controlling. Even if there be an erroneous designation, the accused may be validly convicted of the crime described in the information. Soriano vs SandiganbayanFacts:Tanwas accused of qualified theft. The petitioner, who was an Asst. Fiscal, was assigned toinvestigate. Inthe courseofthe investigation, petitioner demanded Php.4000 fromTanas price for dismissing the case.Tanreported it to the NBI which set up an entrapment.Tanwas given a Php.2000, markedbill, and he had suppliedthe other half. The entrapment succeeded and an information was filed with the Sandiganbayan. After trial, the Sandiganbayan rendered adecisionfinding the petitioner guilty as a principal in violating the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A.3019). A motion for reconsideration was denied by the Sandiganbayan, hence this instant petition.Issue:Whether or Notthe investigationconducted by the petitioner can be regarded ascontractor transaction within the purview of .RA.3019.

Ruling:R.A. 3019 Sec.3. Corrupt practices ofpublicofficers - In addition to acts or omissions ofpublicofficers already penalized by existing laws, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of anypublicofficer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: xxx b. Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share percentage or benefit, for himself or for other person, in connection with anycontractor transaction between the Govt. and any other party wherein thepublicofficer in his official capacity has to intervene under the law.

The petitioner stated that the facts make out a case of direct bribery under Art.210 of the RPC and not a violation of R.A. 3019 sec.3 (b). The offense of direct bribery is not the offense charged and is not included in the offense charged which is violation of R.A.3019 sec.3 (b).The respondent claimed that, transaction as used hereof, is not limited to commercial orbusiness transaction, but includes all kinds of transaction whether commercial, civil, or administrative in nature.The court agrees with the petitioner. It is obvious thatthe investigationconducted by the petitioner was neither acontractnor transaction. A transaction like acontractis one which involves some consideration as incredit transactions. And this element is absent in the investigationconducted by the petitioner. Judgment modified. Petitioner is guilty of direct bribery under Art.210 of the RPC.People vs RamirezFacts:In the late afternoon, Ramirez, the accused fired his pistol at Alo Zaragoza four times in various parts of the body. Zaragoza died two hours later. It was not disputed that the shooting was preceded by a conversation between Ramirez and Zaragoza in a restaurant in Tayug. Seated at same table were Ramirezs companion, Espero, Mamenta, Carbonel and Castulo. At another table were two other acquaintances, Robosa and Arestado, who both could see the group through the doorway. The conversation was about the setting up of jueteng gambling operation in the town although it was unclear who was precisely making the proposal. Soon after the conversation, Zaragoza became agitated and stood up, angrily uttering some words and pounding the table with his hand. Ramirez also stood up and walked away from the table, towards the comfort room. A few minutes later, Zaragoza also walked out of the room. From this point, two different versions were offered by the prosecution and the defense.Prosecution side: After leaving the room, Zaragoza stopped between two tables in the main eating area to drink beer from the mug he was holding. While he was standing and drinking, Ramirez suddenly appeared and fired three shots at Zaragoza. Alarmed, Robosa grabbed Ramirez to prevent him from firing more shots, but Ramirez was able to squeeze another shot at Zaragoza before losing his balance. The pistol slipped from Ramirez hand, but accused was able to recover it immediately. Ramirez fired a shot at Robosa but missed. Soon after, Ramirez fled from the restaurant.Defense side: According to Ramirez, it was Zaragoza who suggested the jueteng operation. When he refused, Zaragoza became agitated and cursed him for not accepting the proposal. Moreover, he claimed that Zaragoza threatened to kill him when the latter tried to borrow a gun from his companion. In order to avoid trouble, he quickly went to the toilet. On his way out, Carbonel told him that he should go home directly as Zaragoza was very angry. Accused claimed that he shoved Carbonel and walked towards the main room. On his way to the main room, he saw Zaragoza cursing him and saying I am going to kill you. Because of Zaragozas previous threat, he quickly drew his pistol and fired at Zaragoza while fleeing the restaurant. Accused claimed that he was merely acting on self-defense.The Regional Trial Court found the accused guilty.Issue:Whether the Regional Trial Court erred in finding the defendant guilty of murder and in disregarding the evidence of self-defenseRuling:Defendant is guilty. The consideration of self-defense is out of question. Regional Trial Courts decision is affirmed.The Court struck out the possibility of unlawful aggression on the part of Zaragoza because evidence obtained from both sides, point to the fact that Zaragoza had no gun or weapon of any other sort when he emerged from the main room. The evidence was that Zaragoza was merely holding a glass of beer. Ramirezs contention that Zaragoza threatened to kill him was untenable because there is nothing but defendants uncorroborated testimony to establish this. Even assuming that Ramirezs testimony was true, he should have quickly seen that Zaragoza bore no arms and was launching nothing more perilous than a verbal onslaught. Clearly, there was no well-grounded fear of imminent danger to defendants life by reason of any real or perceived unlawful aggression on the part of Zaragoza. Thus, without the unlawful aggression element, self-defense should be removed from the equation.People vs Abino (digest)People vs Montes (digest)People vs Ortega (digest)Gallego vs Sandiganbayan (digest)Estrada vs Sandiganbayan (digest)People vs Crisologo (digest; deaf mute)People vs Parazo (deaf mute also; digest) The Trial Public, speedy, and impartialIgnacio vs VillaluzFacts: The respondent judge had previously convicted the petitioner of arson, holding that the motive for the crime was to conceal the acts of malversation committed by the accused. When he was subsequently prosecuted for malversation before the same judge, the petitioner moved for the latters disqualification on the ground that he could not be expected to be objective and impartial in the trial of this case. The judge denied the motion, and the petitioner went on certiorari to the SC where he was sustained. People vs Opida: The conviction reversed after the court