CITIZENSHIP

Tecson vs. Commission on Elections[GR 151434, 3 March 2004]

Facts: On 31 December 2003, Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ), filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the 2004 national elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila. Victorino X. Fornier, (GR 161824) initiated, on 9 January 2004, a petition (SPA 04-003) before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, Fornier asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Fornier based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of FPJ on two assertions: (1) Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, (2) even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of FPJ. On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA 04-003 for lack of merit. 3 days later, or on 26 January 2004, Fornier filed his motion for reconsideration. The motion was denied on 6 February 2004 by the COMELEC en banc. On 10 February 2004, Fornier assailed the decision of the COMELEC before the Supreme Court conformably with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition likewise prayed for a temporary restraining order, a writ of preliminary injunction or any other resolution that would stay the finality and/or execution of the COMELEC resolutions. The other petitions, later consolidated with GR 161824, would include GR 161434 and GR 161634, both challenging the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and asserting that, under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court had original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the case.

Issue: Whether FPJ was a natural born citizen, so as to be allowed to run for the offcie of the President of the Philippines.

Held: Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses that "No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election." The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship." Herein, the date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939 during the regime of the 1935 Constitution. Through its history, four modes of acquiring citizenship - naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis – had been in vogue. Only two, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a person to being a “natural-born” citizen of the Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs. Collector of Customs (1912), did not last long. With the adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor (1947), jus sanguinis or blood relationship would now become the primary basis of citizenship by birth. Considering the reservations made by the parties on the veracity of some of the entries on the birth certificate of FPJ and the marriage certificate of his parents, the only conclusions that could be drawn with some degree of certainty from the documents would be that (1) The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley; (2) FPJ was born to them on 20 August

1939; (3) Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16 September, 1940; (4) The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and (5) At the time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, the birth certificate of FPJ, and the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou are documents of public record in the custody of a public officer. The documents have been submitted in evidence by both contending parties during the proceedings before the COMELEC. But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code. Fornier has utterly failed to substantiate his case before the Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to present their position and evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been material misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC, must not only be material, but also deliberate and willful. The petitions were dismissed.

ANTONIO Y. CO, petitioner, vs. ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE ONG, JR., respondents.

En BancDoctrine: citizenshipDate: July 30, 1991Ponente: Justice Gutierrez Jr.

Facts: The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and reversal of a decision of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes. On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar was held. Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second legislative district of Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr. Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of Northern Samar. The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent premised on the following grounds:  1)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and 2)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar. The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found for the private respondent. A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners on November 12, 1989. This was, however, denied by the HRET in its resolution dated February 22, 1989. Hence, these petitions for certiorari.

Issue: WON Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born citizen of the Philippines.

Held: Yes. Petitions are dismissed.

Ratio: The records show that in the year 1895, Ong Te (Jose Ong's grandfather), arrived in the Philippines from China. Ong Te established his residence in the municipality of Laoang, Samar on land which he bought from the fruits of hard work. As a resident of Laoang, Ong Te was able to obtain a certificate of residence from the then Spanish colonial administration. The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905. He was brought by Ong Te to Samar in the year 1915. Jose Ong Chuan spent his childhood in the province of Samar. As Jose Ong Chuan grew older in the rural and seaside community of Laoang, he absorbed Filipino cultural values and practices. He was baptized into Christianity. As the years passed, Jose Ong Chuan met a natural born-Filipino, Agripina Lao. The two fell in love and, thereafter, got married in 1932 according to Catholic faith and practice. The couple bore eight children, one of whom is the Jose Ong who was born in 1948. Jose Ong Chuan never emigrated from this country. He decided to put up a hardware store and shared and survived the vicissitudes of life in Samar. The business prospered. Expansion became inevitable. As a result, a branch was set-up in Binondo, Manila. In the meantime, Jose Ong Chuan, unsure of his legal status and in an unequivocal affirmation of where he cast his life and family, filed with the Court of First Instance of Samar an application for naturalization on February 15, 1954. On April 28, 1955, the CFI of Samar, after trial, declared Jose Ong Chuan a Filipino citizen. On May 15, 1957, the Court of First Instance of Samar issued an order declaring the decision of April 28, 1955 as final and executory and that Jose Ong Chuan may already take his Oath of Allegiance. Pursuant to said order, Jose Ong Chuan took his Oath of Allegiance; correspondingly, a certificate of naturalization was issued to him. During this time, Jose Ong (private respondent) was 9 years old, finishing his elementary education in the province of Samar.

There is nothing in the records to differentiate him from other Filipinos insofar as the customs and practices of the local populace were concerned. After completing his elementary education, the private respondent, in search for better education, went to Manila in order to acquire his secondary and college education. Jose Ong graduated from college, and thereafter took and passed the CPA Board Examinations. Since employment opportunities were better in Manila, the respondent looked for work here. He found a job in the Central Bank of the Philippines as an examiner. Later, however, he worked in the hardware business of his family in Manila.  In 1971, his elder brother, Emil, was elected as a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention. His status as a natural born citizen was challenged. Parenthetically, the Convention which in drafting the Constitution removed the unequal treatment given to derived citizenship on the basis of the mother's citizenship formally and solemnly declared Emil Ong, respondent's full brother, as a natural born Filipino. The Constitutional Convention had to be aware of the meaning of natural born citizenship since it was precisely amending the article on this subject. The pertinent portions of the Constitution found in Article IV read:

SECTION 1, the following are citizens of the Philippines:

1.             Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the Constitution;2.             Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;3.             Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching

the age of majority; and4.             Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

SECTION 2, Natural-born Citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph 3 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.

The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as applying not only to those who elect Philippine citizenship after February 2, 1987 but also to those who, having been born of Filipino mothers, elected citizenship before that date. The provision in question was enacted to correct the anomalous situation where one born of a Filipino father and an alien mother was automatically granted the status of a natural-born citizen while one born of a Filipino mother and an alien father would still have to elect Philippine citizenship. If one so elected, he was not, under earlier laws, conferred the status of a natural-born Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution accords natural born status to children born of Filipino mothers before January 17, 1973, if they elect citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when he came of age is to ask for the unnatural and unnecessary. He was already a citizen. Not only was his mother a natural born citizen but his father had been naturalized when the respondent was only nine (9) years old. He could not have divined when he came of age that in 1973 and 1987 the Constitution would be amended to require him to have filed a sworn statement in 1969 electing citizenship inspite of his already having been a citizen since 1957. In 1969, election through a sworn statement would have been an unusual and unnecessary procedure for one who had been a citizen since he was nine years old In Re: Florencio Mallare:  the Court held that the exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his life here in the Philippines. Petitioners alleged that Jose Ong Chuan was not validly a naturalized citizen because of his premature taking of the oath of citizenship. SC: The Court cannot go into the collateral procedure of stripping respondent’s father of his citizenship after his death. An attack on a person’s citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its nullity, therefore, to ask the Court to declare the grant of Philippine citizenship to respondent’s father as null and void would run against the principle of due process because he has already been laid to rest

Frivaldo vs. ComelecG.R. No. 120295 (June 28, 1996)

Facts: Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on 22 January 1988, and assumed office in due time. On 27 October 1988, the league of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter represented by its President, Salvador Estuye, who was also suing in his personal capacity, filed with the Comelec a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo‘s election and proclamation on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States on 20 January 1983. Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the United States as alleged but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he had sought American citizenship only to protect himself against President Marcos. His naturalization, he said, was ―merely forced upon himself as a means of survival against the unrelenting persecution by the Martial Law Dictator‘s agents abroad.‖ He also argued that the challenge to his title should be dismissed, being in reality a quo warranto petition that should have been filed within 10 days from his

proclamation, in accordance with Section 253 of the Omhibus Election Code.

Issue: Whether Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election on 18 January 1988, as provincial governor of Sorsogon.

Held: The Commission on Elections has the primary jurisdiction over the question as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the Congress and elective provincial and city officials. However, the decision on Frivaldo‘s citizenship has already been made by the COMELEC through its counsel, the Solicitor General, who categorically claims that Frivaldo is a foreigner. The Solicitor‘s stance is assumed to have bben taken by him after consultation with COMELEC and with its approval. It therefore represents the decision of the COMELEC itself that the Supreme Court may review. In the certificate of candidacy filed on 19 November 1987, Frivaldo described himself as a ―natural-born‖ citizen of the Philippines, omitting mention of any subsequent loss of such status. The evidence shows, however, that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983 per the certification from the United States District Court, Northern District of California, as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. There were many other Filipinos in the United States similarly situated as Frivaldo, and some of them subject to greater risk than he, who did not find it necessary — nor do they claim to have been coerced — to abandon their cherished status as Filipinos. Still, if he really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and reacquire Philippine citizenship, Frivaldo should have done so in accordance with the laws of our country. Under CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation. He failed to take such categorical acts. Rhe anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor in this country while owing exclusive allegiance to another country cannot be permitted. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibilityQualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer‘s entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. Frivaldo is disqualified from serving as governor of Sorsogon.

LABO VS. COMELEC, digestedPosted by Pius Morados on November 9, 2011

GR No. 86564, August 1, 1989 (Constitutional Law – Loss of Citizenship)FACTS: Herein petitioner, claiming for recognition as a Philippine citizen is a mayor-elect who, through his marriage with an Australian national, was naturalized and took an oath of allegiance as an Australian citizen. Said marriage was found to be bigamous and therefore was annulled. Petitioner claims that his naturalization made him only a dual national and did not divest him of his Philippine citizenship.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was divested of his Philippine citizenship.

HELD: Yes, because Commonwealth Act No. 63 clearly stated that Philippine citizenship may be lost through naturalization in a foreign country; express renunciation of citizenship; and by oath of allegiance to a foreign country, all of which are applicable to the petitioner.

Aznar vs .COMELECPost under case digests, Political Law at Saturday, February 04, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind

Facts: Aznar filed a petition for certiorari to review COMELEC resolution proclaiming Osmena as the Cebu Governor. He alleged that Osmena is an American thus disqualified to run in the 1988 election. He presented evidence. Osmena claimed that he is aFilipino.

Issue: Whether or not Osmena is an American thus disqualified torun in the elections

Held: No . No substantial & convincing evidence presented to prove Osmena is no longer a Filipino citizen & disqualified from running.Filipino citizenship is lost by naturalization in a foreign country or by express renunciation of citizenship or by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support another country’s constitution or laws (CA No. 63). No proof Osmena did any of those. Aznar assumed that the ACR & permit to re-enter were proof of such. However, only RP courts are allowed to determine whether one is a Filipino citizen or not, regardless of whether that person is considered an American under US laws. His father is Filipino thus, without proof to the contrary, the presumption that he is a Filipino remains.

Mercado vs. ManzanoG.R. No. 135083, May 26, 1999

Dual allegiance. vs. Dual citizenship Effect of filing certificate of candidacy: repudiation of other citizenship

FACTS:

Manzano and Mercado are vice-mayoral candidates Makati City in the May 11, 1998 elections. Manzano got the highestnumber votes while Mercado bagged the second place.

However, Manzano’s proclamation was suspended in view of a pending petition for disqualification on the ground that he is an American citizen.

In his answer, Manzano admitted that he is registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration and alleged that he is a Filipino citizen because he was born in 1955 of a Filipino father and a Filipino mother. He was born in the United States (San Francisco, CA) on Sept. 14, 1955 and is considered an American citizen under US laws (jus soli). But notwithstanding his registration as an American citizen, he did not lose his Filipino citizenship.

The Second Division of the COMELEC granted the petition and cancelled Manzano’s certificate of candidacy on the ground that he is a dual citizen. Under the Local Government Code (sec. 40), dual citizens are disqualified from running for any position.

The COMELEC en banc reversed the division’s ruling. In its resolution, it said that Manzano was both a US citizen and aFilipino citizen. It further ruled that although he was registered as an alien with the Philippine Bureau of Immigration and was using an American passport, this did not result in the loss of his Philippine citizenship, as he did not renounce Philippine citizenship and did not take an oath of allegiance to the US. Moreover, the COMELEC found that when respondent attained the age of majority, he registered himself as a Philippine voter and voted as such, which effectively renounced his US citizenship under American law. Under Philippine law, he no longer had US citizenship.

Hence, this petition for certiorari.

ISSUES: Whether or not Manzano was no longer a US citizen Whether or not Manzano is qualified to run for and hold elective office

HELD:

DUAL CITIZENSHIP AS A GROUND FOR DISQUALIFICATION

Dual Citizenship vs. Dual Allegiance

To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship:

1. Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli;

2. Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers’ country such children are citizens of that country;

3. Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter’s country the former are considered citizens, unless by theiract or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship.

There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without performing any act, be also a citizen of another state; but the above cases are clearly possible given the constitutional provisions on citizenship.

Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual’s volition.

LGC prohibits “Dual Allegiance” not “Dual Citizenship”

The phrase “dual citizenship” in the LGC must be understood as referring to “dual allegiance.” Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it would suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states.

By Electing Philippine Citizenship, the Candidate forswear Allegiance to the Other Country

By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the other country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment.

Bar Matter No. 914, October 1, 1999Re: Application for Admission to the Philippine Barvs.Vicente D. Ching, petitioner

Facts: Vicente D. Ching, a legitimate child of a Filipino mother and an alien Chinese father, was born on April 11, 1964 in Tubao La Union, under the 1935 Constitution. He has resided in the Philippines

He completed his Bachelor of Laws at SLU in Baguio on July 1998, filed an application to take the 1998 Bar Examination.The Resolution in this Court, he was allowed to take the bar if he submit to the Court the following documents as proof of his Philippine Citizenship: 1. Certification  issued by the PRC Board of Accountancy that Ching is a certified accountant; 2. Voter Certification issued COMELEC in Tubao La Union showing that Ching is a registered voter of his place; and 3. Certification showing that Ching was elected as member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao, La UnionOn April 5, 1999, Ching was one of the bar passers. The oath taking ceremony was scheduled on May 5, 1999.

Because of his questionable status of Ching's citizenship, he was not allowed to take oath.He was required to submit further proof of his citizenship.The Office of the Solicitor General  was required to file a comment on Ching's petition for admission to the Philippine Bar.In his report:1. Ching, under the 1935 Constitution, was a Chinese citizen and continue to be so, unless upon reaching the age of majority he elected Philippine citizenship, under the compliance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 265 "an act providing for the manner in which the option to elect Philippine citizenship shall be declared by a person whose mother is a Filipino citizen"2. He pointed out the Ching has not formally elected Philippine citizenship, and if ever he does, it would already be beyond the "reasonable time" allowed by the present jurisprudence.

Issue:Whether or not he has elected Philippine citizenship within "a reasonable time".

Rulings:1. No. Ching, despite the special circumstances, failed to elect Philippine citizenship within a reasonable time. The reasonable time means that the election should be made within 3 years from  "upon reaching the age of majority", which is 21 years old. Instead, he elected Philippine citizenship 14 years after reaching the age of majority which the court considered not within the reasonable time. Ching offered no reason why he delayed his election of Philippine citizenship, as procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is required is an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and file the same with the nearest civil registry.

Bengson III v.Cruz and HRETFacts:

Teodoro Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in SanClemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicablewas the 1935 Constitution. On November 5, 1985, however, Cruz enlisted in the United StatesMarine Corps and, without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As a consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for underCommonwealth Act No. 63, Section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, amongothers, "rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country.Cruz was thereafter naturalized as a US citizen on June 5, 1990 in connection with his service inthe U.S. Marine Corps.On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship throughrepatriation under Republic Act No. 2630. He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won by a convincing marginof 26,671 votes over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for reelection.Bengson then filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent HRET claiming thatrespondent Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the House of

Representatives sincehe is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI, Section 6 of the Constitution.On March 2, 2000, the HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo warrantoand declaring respondent Cruz the duly elected Representative of the 2nd District of Pangasinanin the May 1998 elections. Bengson’s MR was likewise denied.

Issue:Whether respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.

Held:Yes. There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by naturalization. These ways of acquiring citizenship correspond to the two kinds of citizens: the natural-borncitizen, and the naturalized citizen. A person who at the time of his birth is a citizen of aparticular country, is a natural-born citizen thereof.As defined in the same Constitution, natural-born citizens "are those citizens of thePhilippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippinecitizenship."On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizensthrough naturalization, generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as theRevised Naturalization Law, which repealed the former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), andby Republic Act No. 530. To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses all thequalifications and none of the disqualifications provided by law to become a Filipino citizen. Thedecision granting Philippine citizenship becomes executory only after two (2) years from itspromulgation when the court is satisfied that during the intervening period, the applicant has (1)not left the Philippines; (2) has dedicated himself to a lawful calling or profession; (3) has notbeen convicted of any offense or violation of Government promulgated rules; or (4) committedany act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to any Government announcedpolicies.Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in themanner provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. 63 (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three modesby which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2)by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.Naturalization is a mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. Asa mode of initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed by Commonwealth

Act No. 473, as amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode for reacquiring Philippinecitizenship is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 63. Under this law, a former Filipino citizenwho wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certain qualifications and none of the disqualifications mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473. Repatriation, on the other hand, may behad under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armedforces; (2) service in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II; (3) service in theArmed Forces of the United States at any other time; (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to analien; and (5) political and economic necessity.As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering said oath inthe Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided.As a rule, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that anaturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalizedFilipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost hisPhilippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino. The ruleapplies to Cruz’s case. Being a natural-born citizen, Cruz reacquired this status upon hisrepatriation.

SOCIAL JUSTICE & HUMAN RIGHTS

Right to Strike

SSS Employees Association v Court of AppealsChester Cabalza recommends his visitors to please read the original & full text of the case cited. Xie xie!

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (SSSEA), DIONISION T. BAYLON, RAMON MODESTO, JUANITO MADURA, REUBEN ZAMORA, VIRGILIO DE ALDAY, SERGIO ARANETA, PLACIDO AGUSTIN, VIRGILIO MAGPAYO, petitioner, vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS, SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM (SSS), HON. CEZAR C. PERALEJO, RTC, BRANCH 98, QUEZON CITY, respondents.

G.R. No. 85279 July 28, 1989

Facts:

On June 11, 1987, the SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners, alleging that on June 9, 1987, the officers and members of SSSEA staged an illegal strike and baricaded the entrances to the SSS Building, preventing non-striking employees from reporting for work and SSS members from transacting business with the SSS; that the strike was reported to the Public Sector Labor - Management Council, which ordered the strikers to return to work; that the strikers refused to return to work; and that the SSS suffered damages as a result of the strike. The complaint prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin the strike and that the strikers be ordered to return to work; that the defendants (petitioners herein) be ordered to pay damages; and that the strike be declared illegal.

It appears that the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act on the union's demands, which included: implementation of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on check-off of union dues; payment of accrued overtime pay, night differential pay and holiday pay; conversion of temporary or contractual employees with six (6) months or more of service into regular and permanent employees and their entitlement to the same salaries, allowances and benefits given to other regular employees of the SSS; and payment of the children's allowance of P30.00, and after the SSS deducted certain amounts from the salaries of the employees and allegedly committed acts of discrimination and unfair labor practices.

Issue:

Whether or not employees of the Social Security System (SSS) have the right to strike.

Held:

The 1987 Constitution, in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights, provides that the State "shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law" [Art. XIII, Sec. 31].Resort to the intent of the framers of the organic law becomes helpful in understanding the meaning of these provisions. A reading of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987 Constitution would show that in recognizing the right of government employees to organize, the commissioners intended to limit the right to the formation of unions or associations only, without including the right to strike.

Considering that under the 1987 Constitution "the civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters" [Art. IX(B), Sec. .2(l) see also Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 where the employees in the civil service are denominated as "government employees"] and that the SSS is one such government-controlled corporation with an original charter, having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil service [NASECO v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 69870 & 70295, November 24,1988] and are covered by the Civil Service Commission's memorandum prohibiting strikes. This being the case, the strike staged by the employees of the SSS was illegal.

Agrarian Reform

Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines vs. Honorable Secretary of Agrarian Reform

G.R. No. 78742                        July 14, 1989

Petitioner: Association of Small Landowners in the PhilippinesRespondent: Honorable Secretary of Agrarian Reform

Facts: These are consolidated cases which involve common legal, including serious challenges to the constitutionality of the several measures such as P.D. No. 27, E.O. No. 228, Presidential Proclamation No. 131, E.O. No. 229, and R.A. No. 6657.

G.R. No. 79777The petitioners are questioning P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 on grounds inter alia of separation of powers, due process, equal protection and the constitutional limitation that no private property shall be taken for public use without just compensation. G.R. No. 79310

G.R. No. 79310This petition seeks to prohibit the implementation of Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229. They contend that taking must be simultaneous with payment of just compensation as it is traditionally understood, i.e., with money and in full, but no such payment is contemplated in Section 5 of the E.O. No. 229.

G.R. No. 79744The petitioner argues that E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are violative of the constitutional provision that no private property shall be taken without due process or just compensation.

G.R. No. 78742Petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of retention because the Department of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the implementing rules required under the above-quoted decree.

Issue:  Whether agrarian reform is an exercise of police power or eminent domain

Ruling: There are traditional distinctions between the police power and the power of eminent domain that logically preclude the application of both powers at the same time on the same subject. Property condemned under the police power is noxious or intended for a noxious purpose, such as a building on the verge of collapse, which should be demolished for the public safety, or obscene materials, which should be destroyed in the interest of public morals. The confiscation of such property is not compensable, unlike the taking of property under the power of expropriation, which requires the payment of just compensation to the owner.

The cases before us present no knotty complication insofar as the question of compensable taking is concerned. To the extent that the measures under challenge merely prescribe retention limits for landowners, there is an exercise of the police power for the regulation of private property in accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, it becomes necessary to deprive such owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title to and the physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an exercise not of the police power but of the power of eminent domain

Human Rights

Cariño v. CHR, 204 SCRA 483 (1991)

FACTS:  On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day, some 800 public school teacher, among them the 8 herein private respondents who were members of the Manila Public School Teachers Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook “mass concerted actions” to “dramatize and highlight” their plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again been brought to the latter’s attention.

The respondents were preventively suspended by the Secretary of Education. They complained to CHR.

ISSUE: WON CHR has the power to adjudicate alleged human rights violations

RULING: No.

The Commission evidently intends to itself adjudicate, that is to say, determine with the character of finality and definiteness, the same issues which have been passed upon and decided by the Secretary of Education and subject to appeal to CSC, this Court having in fact, as aforementioned, declared that the teachers affected may take appeals to the CSC on said matter, if still timely.

The threshold question is whether or not the CHR has the power under the constitution to do so; whether or not, like a court of justice or even a quasi-judicial agency, it has jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or the power to try and decide, or dear and determine, certain specific type of cases, like alleged human rights violations involving civil or political rights.

The Court declares that the CHR to have no such power, and it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e. receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi judicial agency or official.  The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitely, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.

Hence it is that the CHR having merely the power to “investigate,” cannot and not “try and resolve on the merits” (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to do; and cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had been transgressed. 

EPZA vs. Commission on Human Rights Case DigestEPZA vs. Commission on Human Rights

G.R. No. 101476 April 14, 1992 

Facts: EPZA (petitioner) purchase a parcel of land from Filoil Refinery Corporation, and before petitioner could take possession of the area, several individuals had entered the premises and planted agricultural products therein without permission from EPZA or its predecessor, Filoil. EPZA paid a P10,000-financial-assistance to those who accepted the same and signed quitclaims. Among them were private respondents (TERESITA VALLES, LORETO ALEDIA). Ten years later, respondent Teresita, Loreto and Pedro, filed in the respondent Commission on Human Rights (CHR) a joint complaint praying for "justice and other reliefs and remedies". Alleged in their complaint was the information that EPZA bulldozed the area with acts in violation of their human rights. CHR issued an Order of injunction commanding EPZA to desist from committing such acts . Two weeks later, EPZA again bulldozed the area. They allegedly handcuffed private respondent Teresita Valles, pointed their firearms at the other respondents, and fired a shot in the air. CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista issued another injunction Order reiterating her first order and expanded it to include the Secretary of Public Works and Highways, the contractors, and their subordinates. 

EPZA filed in the CHR a motion to lift the Order of Injunction for lack of authority to issue injunctive writs and temporary restraining orders, but same was denied by the Commission (CHR). 

Hence, EPZA, filed in SC this special civil action of certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a restraining order and/or preliminary injunction, alleging that the CHR acted in excess of its jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion. A temporary restraining order (TRO) was issued ordering the CHR to cease and desist from enforcing and/or implementing the questioned injunction orders. 

In its comment on the petition, the CHR asked for the immediate lifting of the restraining order. The CHR contends that it’s principal function under Section 18, Art. 13 of the 1987 Constitution, "is not limited to mere investigation" because it is mandated, among others to provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the under privileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection. 

Issue: WON CHR have jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction or restraining order against supposed violators of human rights, to compel them to cease and desist from continuing the acts complained of. 

Held: Petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. The orders of injunction issued by the respondent Commission on Human Right are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and the TRO which this Court issued is made PERMANENT. 

In Hon. Isidro Cariño, et al. vs. Commission on Human Rights, et al., we held that the CHR is not a court of justice nor even a quasi-judicial body. 

“The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitely, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.” 

The constitutional provision directing the CHR to "provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection" may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of injunction for, if that were the intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so. "Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by law". It is never derived by implication. 

The "preventive measures and legal aid services" mentioned in the Constitution refer to extrajudicial and judicial remedies (including a preliminary writ of injunction) which the CHR may seek from the proper courts on behalf of the victims of human rights violations. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued "by the judge of any court in which the action is pending [within his district], or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of the Supreme Court. It may also be granted by the judge of a Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] in any action pending in an inferior court within his district." (Sec. 2, Rule 58, Rules of Court). A writ of preliminary injunction is an ancillary remedy. It is available only in a pending principal action, for the preservation or protection of the rights and interest of a party thereto, and for no other purpose.

CITIZENSHIP

Tecson, et al. v. Commission on Elections (GR No. 161434, March 3, 2004)Co v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HNET) (199 SCRA 292 [1991])Yu v. Defensor-Santiago (169 SCRA 364 [1989])Frivaldo v. Comelec (174 SCRA 245 [1989])Republic of the Philippines v. Judge de la Rosa (232 SCRA 785 [1994])Labo v. Comelec (176 SCRA 1 [1989])Aznar v. Comelec (185 SCRA 703 [1990])Mercado vs. Manzano & Comelec (307 SCRA 630; May 26, 1999)In re Ching, Bar Matter No. 914 [316 SCRA 1 [October 1, 1999])Bengzon III vs. HRET and Cruz (May 7, 2001, G.R. No. 142840)

SOCIAL JUSTICE & HUMAN RIGHTS

Right to Strike

Social Security System Employees v. Court of Appeals (175 SCRA 686 [1989])Republic v. Court of Appeals (180 SCRA 428 [1989])

Agrarian Reform

Association of Small Landowners v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform (175 SCRA 343 [1989])Maddumba v. GSIS (182 SCRA 281 [1990])

Urban Land and Housing Reform

People v. Leachon (G.R. No. 108725, Sept. 25, 1998)Filstream Int’I Inc. v. Court of Appeals (284 SCRA 716)

Del Rosario v. Bengzon (G.R. No. 88265, Dec. 21, 1989)

Human Rights

Carino v. Commission on Human Rights (G.R. No. 96681, Dec. 2, 1991)Epzia v. CHR (208 SCRA 125)Simon v. CHR (229 SCRA 117)