consti law 2 cases prelims

8/9/2019 Consti Law 2 Cases Prelims

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Marcos vs COMELEC (1995)

Facts:

March 8, 1995 – Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Leytewith the Provincial Election Supervisor.

March 23, 1995 – Montejo, incumbent of and candidate for the same position, filed a petition for cancellation anddisqualification with the COMELEC, alleging that Marcos did not meet the residency requirement.

March 29, 1995 – Marcos filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy in the COMELEC‘s head office inIntramuros claiming that her error in the first certificate was the result of an !honest misrepresentation" and that she hasalways !maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence.

April 24, 1995 – COMELEC Second Division by a vote of 2-1 came up with a Resolution that found Montejo‘s petition fordisqualification meritorious, Marcos‘ corrected certificate of candidacy void, and her original certificate cancelled.

May 7, 1995 – COMELEC en banc denied Marcos‘ Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution drafted on April 24.

May 11, 1995 – COMELEC issued another Resolution allowing Marcos‘ proclamation to the office should the results of thecanvass show that she obtained the highest number of votes. However, this was reversed and instead directed that the

proclamation would be suspended even if she did win.

May 25, 1995 – In a supplemental petitition, Marcos declared that she was the winner of the said Congressional election.

Issues/ Held/Ratio: (1) WON plaintiff had established legal residency required to be a voter, and thus candidate, of the first district of Leyte.

Yes. It is the fact if residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which out to be decisive in determining whether

or not an individual has satisfied the constitution‘s residency qualification requirement (as intended by the framer‘s of theconstitution)2. The confusion of the !honest mistake" made when filed her Certificate of Candidacy can be attributed tothe fact that the entry for residence is immediately followed by the entry for the number of years and months in theresidence where the candidate seeks to hold office immediately after the elections. This honest mistake should not beallowed to negate the fact of residence in the First District. The instances (i.e. when Marcos lived in Manila and Ilocos aftermarrying her husband) used by the COMELEC to disqualify Marcos were only actual residences incurred during theirmarriage; and as such, she was required to change residences and apply for voter‘s registration in these cited locations.When she got married to the late dictator, it cannot be argued that she lost her domicile of origin by operation of law stated

in Article 110 of the CC3 and further contemplated in Article 1094 of the same code. It is the husband‘s right to transfer

residences to wherever he might see fit to raise a family. Thus, the relocation does not mean or intend to lose the wife‘sdomicile of origin. After the death of her husband, her choice of domicle was Tacloban, Leyte as expressed when shewrote the PCGG chairman seeking permission to rehabilitate their ancestral house in Tacloban and their farm in Olot,Leyte.

(2) WON COMELEC the proper jurisdiction in disqualifying the plaintiff under Article 78 of the Omnibus Election Code hadalready lapsed, thereby transmitting jurisdiction to the House of Representatives.

Yes. The mischief in petitioner‘s contention lies in the fact that our courts and other quasi-judicial bodies would then refuseto render judgments merely on the ground of having failed to reach a decision within a given or prescribed period. In anyevent, Sections 62 As discussed during the deliberations of the 1987 Constitution by Mr. Nolledo and Mr. Davide, and Mrs. Rosario and Mr.De Los Reyes in the RECORD OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVETION July 22, 1986.3 The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the wife from living with the husband if he

should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic.4 The husband and wife are obligated to live together, observe mutual respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and

support.and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to Sec. 78 of B.P. 881, it is evident that the respondent Commission does not lose

jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending disqualification case under Sec. 78 of B.P. 881 even after the elections.

(3) WON the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) had jurisdiction over the question of the petitioner‘squalifications after the elections.

No. The HRET‘s jurisdiction of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of members of Congress

begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House of Representatives.

Ligot vs Mathay (1974)

FACTS:

Benjamin Ligot served as a member of the House of Representatives of theCongress of the Philippines for threeconsecutive four-year terms covering a twelve-year span from December 30, 1957 to December 30, 1969. During his



second term in office (1961-1965), Republic Act No. 4134 “fixing the salaries of constitutional officials and certain otherofficials of the national government ” was enacted into law and took effect on July 1, 1964. The salaries of membersof Congress (senators and congressmen) were increased under said Act from 7,200.00 to 32,000.00 per annum, but the

Act expressly provided that said increases “shall take effect in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution .”

Ligot’s term expired on December 30, 1969, so he filed a claim for retirement under Commonwealth Act No. 186, section

12 (c) as amended by Republic Act No. 4968 which provided for retirement gratuity of any official or employee, appointiveor elective, with a total of at least twenty years of service, the last three years of which are continuous on the basis thereinprovided “in case of employees based on the highest rate received and in case of elected officials on the rates of pay as

provided by law .” The House of Representatives granted his petition however, Jose Velasco, the thenCongress Auditorrefused to so issue certification. The Auditor General then, Ismael Mathay, also disallowed the same.

The thrust of Ligot’s appeal is that his claim for retirement gratuity computed on the basis of the increased salary ofP32,000.00 per annum for members of Congress (which was not applied to him during his incumbency which endedDecember 30, 1969, while the Court held in Philconsa vs. Mathay that such increases would become operative only for

members ofCongress elected to serve therein commencing December 30, 1969) should not have been disallowed,because at the time of his retirement, the increased salary for members of Congress “as provided by law” (under Republic

Act 4134) was already P32,000.00 per annum.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ligot is entitled to such retirement benefit.

HELD: No. To allow Ligot a retirement gratuity computed on the basis of P32,000.00 per annum would be a subtle way ofincreasing his compensation during his term of office and of achieving indirectly what he could not obtain directly. Ligot’sclaim cannot be sustained as far as he and other members ofCongress similarly situated whose term of office ended onDecember 30, 1969 are concerned for the simple reason that a retirement gratuity or benefit is a form of compensation

within the purview of the Constitutional provision limiting their compensation and “other emoluments” to their salary asprovided by law. To grant retirement gratuity to members of Congress whose terms expired on December 30, 1969computed on the basis of an increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum (which they were prohibited by the Constitutionfrom receiving during their term of office) would be to pay them prohibited emoluments which in effect increase the salarybeyond that which they were permitted by the Constitution to receive during their incumbency. As stressed by the Auditor-General in his decision in the similar case of Ligot’s colleague, ex-Congressman Melanio Singson, “Such a scheme wouldcontravene the Constitution for it would lead to the same prohibited result by enabling administrative authorities to doindirectly what cannot be done directly .”

Coquilla vs COMELEC (2002)

FACTS: Coquilla was born on 1938 of Filipino parents in Oras, Eastern Samar. He grew up and resided there until 1965, when he

was subsequently naturalized as a U.S. citizen after joining the US Navy. In 1998, he came to the Philippines and took out

a residence certificate, although he continued making several trips to the United States.

Coquilla eventually applied for repatriation under R.A. No. 8171 which was approved. On November 10, 2000, he took hisoath as a citizen of the Philippines.

On November 21, 2000, he applied for registration as a voter of Butunga, Oras, Eastern Samar which was approved in2001. On February 27, 2001, he filed his certificate of candidacy stating that he had been a resident of Oras, Eastern

Samar for 2 years.

Incumbent mayor Alvarez, who was running for re-election sought to cancel Coquilla’s certificate of candidacy on theground that his statement as to the two year residency in Oras was a material misrepresentation as he only residedtherein for 6 months after his oath as a citizen.

Before the COMELEC could render a decision, elections commenced and Coquilla was proclaimed the winner. On July19, 2001, COMELEC granted Alvarez’ petition and ordered the cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy.

ISSUE: Whether or not Coquilla had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar at least on year before the elections held on May 14,2001 as what he represented in his COC.

RULING: No. The statement in petitioner’s certificate of candidacy that he had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for “twoyears” at the time he filed such certificate is not true. The question is whether the COMELEC was justified in ordering thecancellation of his certificate of candidacy for this reason. Petitioner made a false representation of a material fact in his

certificate of candidacy, thus rendering such certificate liable to cancellation. In the case at bar, what is involved is a falsestatement concerning a candidate’s qualification for an office for which he filed the certificate of candidacy. This is amisrepresentation of a material fact justifying the cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy. The cancellation ofpetitioner’s certificate of candidacy in this case is thus fully justified.

People vs Jalosjos (2000)

FACTS:



The accused-appellant, Romeo G. Jalosjos is a full-fledged member of Congress who is now confined at the nationalpenitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness on six counts is pendingappeal. The accused-appellant filed this motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman,including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the firstinstance of a non-bailable offense.

ISSUE:Whether or not being a Congressman is a substantial differentiation which removes the accused-appellant as a prisonerfrom the same class as all persons validly confined under law by reason of the “mandate of the sovereign will”.

RULING:NO. While the Constitution guarantees: “x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of laws.”, this simplymeans that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. The

duties imposed by the “mandate of the people” are multifarious. The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. Thenecessities imposed by public welfare may justify exercise of government authority to regulate even if thereby certaingroups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded. Here, election to the position of Congressman is not areasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctionswhich lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrestand confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class. Hence, theperformance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly inprison.

AQUINO vs COMELEC (1995)

Relevant Provisions:Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 ConstitutionNo person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and,

on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-listrepresentatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not lessthan one year immediately preceding the day of the election.

Facts:On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino, the petitioner, filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representativefor the new (remember: newly created) Second Legislative District of Makati City. In his certificate of candidacy, Aquinostated that he was a resident of the aforementioned district (284 Amapola Cor. Adalla Sts., Palm Village, Makati) for 10

months.

Move Makati, a registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Barangay Cembo,Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify Aquino on the ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as acandidate for congressman which under Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, should be for a period not less thanone year preceding the (May 8, 1995) day of the election.Faced with a petition for disqualification, Aquino amended the entry on his residency in his certificate of candidacy to 1year and 13 days. The Commission on Elections passed a resolution that dismissed the petition on May 6 and allowed

Aquino to run in the election of 8 May. Aquino, with 38,547 votes, won against Augusto Syjuco with 35,910 votes.

Move Makati filed a motion of reconsideration with the Comelec, to which, on May 15, the latter acted with an ordersuspending the proclamation of Aquino until the Commission resolved the issue. On 2 June, the Commission on Electionsfound Aquino ineligible and disqualified for the elective office for lack of constitutional qualification of residence.

Aquino then filed a Petition of Certiorari assailing the May 15 and June 2 orders.

Issue:1. Whether “residency” in the certificate of candidacy actually connotes “domicile” to warrant the disqualification of Aquino

from the position in the electoral district.2. WON it is proven that Aquino has established domicile of choice and not just residence (not in the sense of the COC)in

the district he was running in.

Held:1. Yes, The term “residence” has always been understood as synonymous with “domicile” not only under the previousconstitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution. The Court cited the deliberations of the Constitutional Commissionwherein this principle was applied.Mr. Nolledo:I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt to require residence in the place not less

than one year immediately preceding the day of elections.# What is the Committee’s concept of residence for the legislature? Is it actual residence or is it the concept of domicile orconstructive residence?Mr. Davide:This is in the district, for a period of not less than one year preceding the day of election. This was in effect lifted from the1973 constituition, the interpretation given to it was domicile.Mrs. Braid:



On section 7, page2, Noledo has raised the same point that resident has been interpreted at times as a matter of intentionrather than actual residence.# Mr. De los ReyesSo we have to stick to the original concept that it should be by domicile and not physical and actual residence.

Therefore, the framers intended the word “residence” to have the same meaning of domicile.The place “where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home,” where he, no matter where he may be foundat any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when itspeaks of residence for the purposes of election law.The purpose is to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of the community from takingadvantage of favorable circumstances existing in that community for electoral gain.While there is nothing wrong with the purpose of establishing residence in a given area for meeting election lawrequirements, this defeats the essence of representation, which is to place through assent of voters those most cognizant

and sensitive to the needs of a particular district, if a candidate falls short of the period of residency mandated by law forhim to qualify.Which brings us to the second issue.

2. No, Aquino has not established domicile of choice in the district he was running in.The SC agreed with the Comelec’s contention that Aquino should prove that he established a domicile of choice and not

just residence.The Constitution requires a person running for a post in the HR one year of residency prior to the elections in the district in

which he seeks election to . Aquino’s certificate of candidacy in a previous (May 11, 1992) election indicates that he was a resident and a registered

voter of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac for more than 52 years prior to that election. His birth certificate indicated thatConception as his birthplace and his COC also showed him to be a registered voter of the same district. Thus his domicileof origin (obviously, choice as well) up to the filing of his COC was in Conception, Tarlac.

Aquino’s connection to the new Second District of Makati City is an alleged lease agreement of a condominium unit in thearea. The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit insteadof buying one. The short length of time he claims to be a resident of Makati (and the fact of his stated domicile in Tarlac

and his claims of other residences in Metro Manila) indicate that his sole purpose in transferring his physical residence isnot to acquire a new, residence or domicile but only to qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District ofMakati City.

Aquino’s assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati is a bare assertion which is hardly supportedby the facts in the case at bench. To successfully effect a change of domicile, petitioner must prove an actual removal oran actual change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a newone and definite acts which correspond with the purpose.

Aquino was thus rightfully disqualified by the Commission on Elections due to his lack of one year residence in the district.

DecisionInstant petition dismissed. Order restraining respondent Comelec from proclaiming the candidate garnering the nexthighest number of votes in the congressional elections of Second district of Makati City made permanent.Dicta:I. Aquino’s petition of certiorari contents were:

A. The Comelec’s lack of jurisdiction to determine the disqualification issue involving congressional candidates after theMay 8, 1995 elections, such determination reserved with the house of representatives electional tribunalB. Even if the Comelec has jurisdiction, the jurisdiction ceased in the instant case after the elections and the remedy to theadverse parties lies in another forum which is the HR Electoral Tribunal consistent with Section 17, Article VI of the 1987

Constitution.C. The COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it proceeded to promulagate its questioned decision despiteits own recognition that a threshold issue of jurisdiction has to be judiciously reviewed again, assuming arguendo that theComelec has jurisdictionD. The Comelec’s finding of non-compliance with the residency requirement of one year against the petitioner is contraryto evidence and to applicable laws and jurisprudence.

E. The Comelec erred in failing to appreciate the legal impossibility of enforcing the one year residency requirement ofCongressional candidates in newly created political districts which were only existing for less than a year at the time of the

election and barely four months in the case of petitioner’s district in Makati.F. The Comelec committed serious error amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it ordered the board of canvassers todetermine and proclaim the winner out of the remaining qualified candidates after the erroneous disqualification of thepetitioner in disregard of the doctrine that a second place candidate or a person who was repudiated by the electorate is aloser and cannot be proclaimed as substitute winner.II. Modern day carpetbaggers can’t be allowed to take advantage of the creation of new political districts by suddenlytransplanting themselves in such new districts, prejudicing their genuine residents in the process of taking advantage ofexisting conditions in these areas.

III. according to COMELEC: The lease agreement was executed mainly to support the one year residence requirement asa qualification for a candidate of the HR, by establishing a commencement date of his residence. If a oerfectly valid leaseagreement cannot, by itself establish a domicile of choice, this particular lease agreement cannot be better.

Guingona vs Gonzales (1993)

FACTS: After the May 11, 1992 elections, the senate was composed of 15 LDP senators, 5 NPC senators, 3 LAKAS-NUCD senators, and 1 LP-PDP-LABAN senator. To suffice the requirement that each house must have 12



representatives in the CoA, the parties agreed to use the traditional formula: (No. of Senators of a political party) x 12seats) ÷ Total No. of Senators elected. The results of such a formula would produce 7.5 members for LDP, 2.5 membersfor NPC, 1.5 members for LAKAS-NUCD, and 0.5 member for LP-PDP-LABAN. Romulo, as the majority floor leader,nominated 8 senators from their party because he rounded off 7.5 to 8 and that Ta$ada from LP-PDP-LABAN shouldrepresent the same party to the CoA. This is also pursuant to the proposition compromise by Sen Tolentino who proposed

that the elected members of the CoA should consist of eight LDP, one LP-PDP-LABAN, two NPC and one LAKAS-NUCD.Guingona, a member of LAKAS-NUCD, opposed the said compromise. He alleged that the compromise is againstproportional representation.

ISSUE: Whether or not rounding off is allowed in determining a party’s representation in the CoA.

HELD: It is a fact accepted by all such parties that each of them is entitled to a fractional membership on the basis of therule on proportional representation of each of the political parties. A literal interpretation of Section 18 of Article VI of the

Constitution leads to no other manner of application. The problem is what to do with the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to which eachof the parties is entitled. The LDP majority in the Senate converted a fractional half membership into a whole membershipof one senator by adding one half or .5 to 7.5 to be able to elect Romulo. In so doing one other party’s fractionalmembership was correspondingly reduced leaving the latter’s representation in the Commission on Appointments to lessthan their proportional representation in the Senate. This is clearly a violation of Section 18 because it is no longer incompliance with its mandate that membership in the Commission be based on the proportional representation of thepolitical parties. The election of Senator Romulo gave more representation to the LDP and reduced the representation ofone political party either the LAKAS NUCD or the NPC. A party should have at least 1 seat for every 2 duly elected

senators-members in the CoA. Where there are more than 2 parties in Senate, a party which has only one membersenator cannot constitutionally claim a seat. In order to resolve such, the parties may coalesce with each other in order to

come up with proportional representation especially since one party may have affiliations with the other party.

Reyes vs COMELEC (2013)

Amigable vs Cuenca (1972)

Facts: Victoria Amigable is the registered owner of a particular lot. At the back of her Transfer Certificate of Title (1924),there was no annotation in favor of the government of any right or interest in the property. Without prior expropriation ornegotiated sale, the government used a portion of the lot for the construction of the Mango and Gorordo Avenues. On1958, Amigable’s counsel wrote the President of the Philippines, requesting payment of the portion of the said lot. It wasdisallowed by the Auditor General in his 9th Endorsement. Petitioner then filed in the court a quo a complaint against theRepublic of the Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca, in his capacity as Commissioner of Public Highways for the recovery of

ownership and possession of the lot. According to the defendants, the action was premature because it was not filed first

at the Office of the Auditor General. According to them, the right of action for the recovery of any amount had alreadyprescribed, that the Government had not given its consent to be sued, and that plaintiff had no cause of action against thedefendants.

Issue: Whether or Not, under the facts of the case, appellant may properly sue the government.

Held: In the case of Ministerio v. Court of First Instance of Cebu, it was held that when the government takes away

property from a private landowner for public use without going through the legal process of expropriation or negotiatedsale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the government without violating the doctrine ofgovernmental immunity from suit without its consent. In the case at bar, since no annotation in favour of the governmentappears at the back of the certificate of title and plaintiff has not executed any deed of conveyance of any portion of the lotto the government, then she remains the owner of the lot. She could then bring an action to recover possession of the landanytime, because possession is one of the attributes of ownership. However, since such action is not feasible at this timesince the lot has been used for other purposes, the only relief left is for the government to make due compensation—priceor value of the lot at the time of the taking.

Sema vs COMELEC (2008)

FACTS: The Province of Maguindanao is part of ARMM. Cotabato City is part of the province of Maguindanao but it is notpart or ARMM because Cotabato City voted against its inclusion in a plebiscite held in 1989. Maguindanao has twolegislative districts. The 1st legislative district comprises of Cotabato City and 8 other municipalities.

A law (RA 9054) was passed amending ARMM’s Organic Act and vesting it with power to create provinces, municipalities,cities and barangays. Pursuant to this law, the ARMM Regional Assembly created Shariff Kabunsuan (Muslim Mindanao

Autonomy Act 201) which comprised of the municipalities of the 1st district of Maguindanao with the exception of CotabatoCity.

For the purposes of the 2007 elections, COMELEC initially stated that the 1st district is now only made of Cotabato City(because of MMA 201). But it later amended this stating that status quo should be retained however just for the purposesof the elections, the first district should be called Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City – this is also while awaiting adecisive declaration from Congress as to Cotabato’s status as a legislative district (or part of any).



Sema was a congressional candidate for the legislative district of S. Kabunsuan with Cotabato (1st district). Later, Semawas contending that Cotabato City should be a separate legislative district and that votes therefrom should be excluded inthe voting (probably because her rival Dilangalen was from there and D was winning – in fact he won). She contended thatunder the Constitution, upon creation of a province (S. Kabunsuan), that province automatically gains legislativerepresentation and since S. Kabunsuan excludes Cotabato City – so in effect Cotabato is being deprived of a

representative in the HOR.

COMELEC maintained that the legislative district is still there and that regardless of S. Kabunsuan being created, thelegislative district is not affected and so is its representation.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9054 is unconstitutional. Whether or not ARMM can create validly LGUs.

HELD: RA 9054 is unconstitutional. The creation of local government units is governed by Section 10, Article X of the

Constitution, which provides:

Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundarysubstantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject toapproval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.

Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units province, city, municipality or barangay must comply with threeconditions. First, the creation of a local government unit must follow the criteria fixed in the Local Government Code.

Second, such creation must not conflict with any provision of the Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in thepolitical units affected.

There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution for Congress to delegate toregional or local legislative bodies the power to create local government units. However, under its plenary legislativepowers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create local government units, subject toreasonable standards and provided no conflict arises with any provision of the Constitution. In fact, Congress hasdelegated to provincial boards, and city and municipal councils, the power to create barangays within their jurisdiction,

subject to compliance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and the plebiscite requirement inSection 10, Article X of the Constitution. Hence, ARMM cannot validly create Shariff Kabunsuan province.

Note that in order to create a city there must be at least a population of at least 250k, and that a province, once created,should have at least one representative in the HOR. Note further that in order to have a legislative district, there must atleast be 250k (population) in said district. Cotabato City did not meet the population requirement so Sema’s contention isuntenable. On the other hand, ARMM cannot validly create the province of S. Kabunsuan without first creating a legislativedistrict. But this can never be legally possible because the creation of legislative districts is vested solely in Congress. At

most, what ARMM can create are barangays not cities and provinces.

Pimentel, Jr. vs HRET (2002)

Facts: On 3 March 1995, the Party-List System Act took effect. On 11 May 1998, in accordance with the Party-ListSystem Act, national elections were held which included, for the first time, the election through popular vote of party-listgroups and organizations whose nominees would become members of the House. Proclaimed winners were 14 party-list

representatives from 13 organizations, including Melvyn D. Eballe, Leonardo Q. Montemayor, Cresente C. Paez, Loretta Ann P. Rosales and Patricia M. Sarenas from party-list groups Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives[5] (APEC), Alyansang Bayanihan ng mga Magsasaka, Manggagawang Bukid at Mangingisda (ABA), NATCO Network Party (COOP-NATCCO), Akbayan! Citizens Action Party (AKBAYAN), and Abanse! Pinay (ABANSE). Due to the votes it garnered,

APEC was able to send 2 representatives to the House, while the 12 other party-list groups had one representative each. Also elected were district representatives belonging to various political parties. Subsequently, the House constituted itsHRET and CA contingent by electing its representatives to these two constitutional bodies. In practice, the procedure

involves the nomination by the political parties of House members who are to occupy seats in the House ofRepresentatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and the Commission on Appointments (CA). From available records, it does

not appear that after the 11 May 1998 elections the party-list groups in the House nominated any of their representativesto the HRET or the CA. As of the date of filing of the present petitions for prohibition and mandamus with prayer for writ ofpreliminary injunction, the House contingents to the HRET and the CA were composed solely of district representativesbelonging to the different political parties. On 18 January 2000, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. wrote two lettersaddressed to then Senate President Blas F. Ople, as Chairman of the CA, and to Associate Justice of the Supreme CourtJose A. R. Melo (now retired), as Chairman of the HRET. The letters requested Senate President Ople and Justice Meloto cause the restructuring of the CA and the HRET, respectively, to include party-list representatives to conform toSections 17 and 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. In its meeting of 20 January 2000, the HRET resolved to direct the

Secretary of the Tribunal to refer Senator Pimentel’s letter to the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives. Onthe same day, HRET Secretary Daisy B. Panga-Vega, in an Indorsement of even date, referred the letter to House ofRepresentatives Secretary General Roberto P. Nazareno. On 2 February 2000, Eballe, et al. filed with this Court theirPetitions for Prohibition, Mandamus and Preliminary Injunction (with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order) against theHRET, its Chairman and Members, and against the CA, its Chairman and Members. They contend that, under theConstitution and the Party-List System Act, party-list representatives should have 1.2 or at least 1 seat in the HRET, and2.4 seats in the CA. They charge that the HRET, CA, et al. committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to actpositively on the letter of Senator Pimentel. In its Resolution of 8 February 2000, the Court en banc directed the

consolidation of GR 141490 with GR 141489. On 11 February 2000, Eballe et al. filed in both cases a motion to amend



their petitions to implead then Speaker Manuel B. Villar, Jr. as an additional respondent, in his capacity as Speaker of theHouse and as one of the members of the CA. The Court granted both motions and admitted the amended petitions.Senator Pimentel filed the present petitions on the strength of his oath to protect, defend and uphold the Constitution andin his capacity as taxpayer ‘and as a member of the CA. He was joined by 5 party-list representatives from APEC, ABA,

ABANSE, AKBAYAN and COOP-NATCCO as co-petitioners.

Issue:

[1] Whether the present composition of the House Electoral Tribunal violates the constitutional requirement of proportionalrepresentation because there are no party-list representatives in the hret.

[2]: Whether the refusal of the HRET and the CA to reconstitute themselves to include party-list representativesconstitutes grave abuse of discretion.

Held:

[1] NO. The Constitution expressly grants to the House of Representatives the prerogative, within constitutionally definedlimits, to choose from among its district and party-list representatives those who may occupy the seats allotted to theHouse in the HRET and the CA. Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution explicitly confers on the Senate and on theHouse the authority to elect among their members those who would fill the 12 seats for Senators and 12 seats for Housemembers in the Commission on Appointments. Under Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution, each chamber of

Congress exercises the power to choose, within constitutionally defined limits, who among their members would occupythe allotted 6 seats of each chamber’s respective electoral tribunal. These constitutional provisions are reiterated in Rules

3 and 4 (a) of the 1998 Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. The discretion of the House to chooseits members to the HRET and the CA is not absolute, being subject to the mandatory constitutional rule on proportionalrepresentation.[26] However, under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not interfere with the exercise bythe House of this constitutionally mandated duty, absent a clear violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretionamounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[27] Otherwise, ‘the doctrine of separation of powers calls for each branch ofgovernment to be left alone to discharge its duties as it sees fit.[28] Neither can the Court speculate on what action the

House may take if party-list representatives are duly nominated for membership in the HRET and the CA. The petitionsare bereft of any allegation that respondents prevented the party-list groups in the House from participating in the electionof members of the HRET and the CA. Neither does it appear that after the 11 May 1998 elections, the House barred theparty-list representatives from seeking membership in the HRET or the CA. Rather, it appears from the available facts thatthe party-list groups in the House at that time simply refrained from participating in the election process. The party-listrepresentatives did not designate their nominees even up to the time they filed the petitions, with the predictable resultthat the House did not consider any party-list representative for election to the HRET or the CA. As the primary recourseof the party-list representatives lies with the House of Representatives, ‘the Court cannot resolve the issues presented by

petitioners at this time.

[2]: There is no grave abuse in the action or lack of action by the HRET and the CA in response to the letters of SenatorPimentel. Under Sections 17 and 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and their internal rules, the HRET and the CAare bereft of any power to

Atong Paglaum vs COMELEC (2013)

FACTS: This case partially abandoned the rulings in Ang Bagong Bayani vs COMELEC and BANAT vs COMELEC.

Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties were disqualified by the Commission on Elections in the May 2013 party-list

elections for various reasons but primarily for not being qualified as representatives for marginalized or underrepresentedsectors.

Atong Paglaum et al then filed a petition for certiorari against COMELEC alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part ofCOMELEC in disqualifying them.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying the said party-lists.

HELD: No. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT. However,the Supreme Court remanded the cases back to the COMELEC as the Supreme Court now provides for new guidelineswhich abandoned some principles established in the two aforestated cases. The new guidelines are as follows:

I. Parameters. In qualifying party-lists, the COMELEC must use the following parameters:

1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2) regional partiesor organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.

2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines anddo not need to represent any “marginalized and underrepresented” sector.

3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list system and do not fieldcandidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district



elections can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.

4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized and underrepresented” or lacking in “well-defined politicalconstituencies.” It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The

sectors that are “marginalized and underrepresented” include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous culturalcommunities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack “well-defined political constituencies”include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.

5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the “marginalized and underrepresented”must belong to the “marginalized and underrepresented” sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members ofsectoral parties or organizations that lack “well-defined political constituencies” must belong to the sector they represent.The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the “marginalized and underrepresented,” or that

represent those who lack “well-defined political constituencies,” either must belong to their respective sectors, or musthave a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties ororganizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations.

6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees aredisqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.

II. In the BANAT case, major political parties are disallowed, as has always been the practice, from participating in the

party-list elections. But, since there’s really no constitutional prohibition nor a statutory prohibition, major political partiescan now participate in the party-list system provided that they do so through their bona fide sectoral wing (see parameter 3

above).

Allowing major political parties to participate, albeit indirectly, in the party-list elections will encourage them to workassiduously in extending their constituencies to the “marginalized and underrepresented” and to those who “lack well-defined political constituencies.”

Ultimately, the Supreme Court gave weight to the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission when they were draftingthe party-list system provision of the Constitution. The Commissioners deliberated that it was their intention to include allparties into the party-list elections in order to develop a political system which is pluralistic and multiparty. (In the BANATcase, Justice Puno emphasized that the will of the people should defeat the intent of the framers; and that the intent of thepeople, in ratifying the 1987 Constitution, is that the party-list system should be reserved for the marginalized sectors.)

III. The Supreme Court also emphasized that the party-list system is NOT RESERVED for the “marginalized andunderrepresented” or for parties who lack “well-defined political constituencies”. It is also for national or regional parties. It

is also for small ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who lack “well-defined political constituencies”. The commondenominator however is that all of them cannot, they do not have the machinery – unlike major political parties, to field orsponsor candidates in the legislative districts but they can acquire the needed votes in a national election system like theparty-list system of elections.

If the party-list system is only reserved for marginalized representation, then the system itself unduly excludes othercause-oriented groups from running for a seat in the lower house.

As explained by the Supreme Court, party-list representation should not be understood to include only labor, peasant,

fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors thatby their nature are economically at the margins of society. It should be noted that Section 5 of Republic Act 7941 includes,among others, in its provision for sectoral representation groups of professionals, which are not per se economicallymarginalized but are still qualified as “marginalized, underrepresented, and do not have well-defined politicalconstituencies” as they are ideologically marginalized.

Bengzon vs HRET (2002)

FACTS: The citizenship of respondent Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the constitutional requirement that “noperson shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen.”

Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in Tarlac in 1960 of Filipino parents. In 1985, however,Cruz enlisted in the US Marine Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath ofallegiance to the USA. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under CA No. 63 [(An Act Providing for theWays in Which Philippine Citizenship May Be Lost or Reacquired (1936)] section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose hiscitizenship by, among other, “rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country.”

Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by his naturalization as a U.S.

citizen in 1990, in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine Corps.

In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under RA 2630 [(An Act Providing for Reacquisitionof Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who Lost Such Citizenship by Rendering Service To, or Accepting Commission In,the Armed Forces of the United States (1960)]. He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the 2nd District ofPangasinan in the 1998 elections. He won over petitioner Bengson who was then running for reelection.



Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent HRET claiming that Cruz was notqualified to become a member of the HOR since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI, section 6 ofthe Constitution.HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo warranto and declaring Cruz the duly elected Representative in

the said election.

ISSUE: WON Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipinoupon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.

HELD: petition dismissed

YES

Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner provided by law. C.A. No.63 enumerates the 3 modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen:1. by naturalization,2. by repatriation, and3. by direct act of Congress.**

Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to:1. desertion of the armed forces;

2. services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II;3. service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time,4. marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and5. political economic necessity

Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship

will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-borncitizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.

R.A. No. 2630 provides:Sec 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the ArmedForces of the United States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United Statescitizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines andregistering the same with Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said

oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other citizenship.

Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in the Civil Registry ofMagantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, Cruz is deemed to have recovered his originalstatus as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing thatthe act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.

Bolinao Electronics Corp vs Valencia (1964)

FACTS: Bolinao Electronics Corporation was the co-owner and a co-petitioner of Chronicle Broadcasting Network, Inc.(CBN) and Montserrat Broadcasting System Inc. They operate and own television (channel 9) and radio stations in thePhilippines. They were summoned by Brigido Valencia, then Secretary of Communications, for operating even after theirpermit has expired. Valencia claimed that because of CBN’s continued operation sans license and their continuingoperation had caused damages to his department.

ISSUE: Whether or not Valencia is entitled to claim for damages.

HELD: The SC ruled in the negative. Valencia failed to show that any right of his has been violated by the refusal of CBNto cease operation. Further, the SC noted that as the records show, the appropriation to operate the PhilippineBroadcasting Service as approved by Congress and incorporated in the 1962-1963 Budget of the Republic of thePhilippines does not allow appropriations for TV stations particularly in Luzon. Hence, since there was no appropriationallotted then there can be no damage; and if there are expenditures made by Valencia’s department they are in fact inviolation of the law and they cannot claim damages therefrom. And even if it is shown that the then president vetoed thisprovision of the Budget Act, such veto is illegal because he may not legally veto a condition attached to an appropriation

or item in the appropriation bill.

Note: This ruling, that the executive’s veto power does not carry with it the power to strike out conditions or restrictions,has been adhered to in subsequent cases. If the veto is unconstitutional, it follows that the same produced no effectwhatsoever; and the restriction imposed by the appropriation bill, therefore, remains.

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