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Consultation of Non-State ActorsUnder the New

ACP-EU Partnership Agreement

Empirical Survey of 17 Countriesin Sub-Saharan Africa

ByRudolf Traub-Merz and Arne Schildberg

Bonn, August 2003Africa Department

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About the authors:

Dr. Rudolf Traub-Merz is the former head of the FEScountry offices in Nigeria (1987-90), Zimbabwe(1993-98) and in The Philippines (1999-2002). Heis currently working in the Africa Referat of the FES,Bonn.([email protected])

Arne Schildberg is a PhD student at the Institute forAfrican Studies, University of Leipzig.

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Foreword by Werner Puschra 5

I. The Cotonou Agreement 7

1. ACP-EU Relations in a Historical Perspective 7

2. The Cotonou Agreement: Some Principles and Objectives 8

3. Participation of Non-State Actors 9

II. The Empirical Study 11

Introduction 11

1. The Design of the Study 12

1.1. Studying the Quality of Consultation: Result or Process? 12

1.2. Focus on CSS / NIP 13

1.3. Consultation: Which Dimensions Have to be Assessed? 14

1.4. How Did We Get to an Overall-Ranking of Countries?

Building a Three-Dimensional Consultation Index 15

2. The Findings of the Survey 16

2.1. Representation: Who Participated in CSS/NIP-Consultation? 16

2.2. Time-factor: In Which Phase Did Consultation Take Place? 21

2.3. Which Form of Consultation: More Informal or More

Institutionalised? 23

2.4. The Over-All Ranking of Countries 27

2.5. Regional Disparities in Consultation 30

Contents

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III. Summary and Recommendations 33

List of Tables

Table 1: Status of Country Strategy Papers (CSP) / National Indicative

Programmes (NIP) According to Countries 14

Table 2: Representation in Consultation According to Groups and Countries 19

Table 3: Time-Factor in Consultation According to Countries 22

Table 4: Form of Consultation According to Countries 25

Table 5: Construction of Quality Standards 27

Table 6: The Over-All Index: Quality of Consultation According to Countries 29

Table 7: Differences in Consultation According to Regions 31

Table 8: Differences in Representation According to Regions and Countries 32

Appendix

A: The Cotonou Treaty: Extracts on the Participation of Non-State Actors 39

B: Country Survey: The FES-Questionnaire 41

C: Country Survey: List of Authors of Country Reports 46

D: Country Survey: List of Non-State Actors Consulted for Programming 47

E: List of FES Country Offices in Sub-Saharan Africa 53

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Foreword

ACP-EU cooperation has been the main sub-ject of many activities of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) over the last decades. There ishardly any branch office of the FES’s Africannetwork which has not focused in one way orthe other on development issues under variousLomé agreements. The transition from Lométo Cotonou became a rather dynamic periodfor the FES, as we made it a particular concernto raise public awareness on the rather difficultnegotiations for a new partnership agreementand to open the debate to new stakeholders.

The Cotonou agreement, signed in June 2000,is in some ways a radical break with the past.It opens development cooperation to a politicaldialogue on democracy and security and callson non-State actors to share as consultants inthe formulation of policies and programmes.This new dispensation comes with new chal-lenges for FES. In May 2002, FES held a com-bined in-house training and planning sessionwith the heads of all branch offices in sub-Saharan Africa to adjust its strategy towardsthe Cotonou process. The meeting showed that

there is a need to concentrate on the emergentconsultation of non-State actors. Which actorsshould be involved? Who should do the se-lection? Should there be a standing procedure?How should participants prepare themselves?Lots of more questions came up which couldnot be answered through a mere reading ofthe Cotonou treaty.

The FES’s African department took chargeof organising an empirical survey on the actualimplementation of consultation of non-Stateactors during the first phase of the new EU-ACP-cooperation scheme. The survey, whichis presented here, is possibly the first of itskind. Its findings show some remarkable re-sults. We are convinced that a careful reviewof the study may be relevant to any future ‘fine-tuning’ of the process of consultation under theCotonou cooperation.

Dr. Werner PuschraHead, Africa DepartmentAugust 2003

F O R E W O R D

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The ACP-EU partnership agreement, in shortthe Cotonou agreement, is a comprehensivetrade and aid agreement concluded betweenthe EU and 77 African, Caribbean and Pacificcountries. It was concluded for a twenty-yearperiod (2000-2020) and signed in June 2000in Cotonou, Benin. At the same time the agree-ment is a financial protocol which is dividedinto 5 year periods. The financial means areprovided under the corresponding EuropeanDevelopment Fund (EDF). EDF9 for the period2002-2007 contains 13,5 billion Euro to whichabout 10 billion Euro unused funds from pre-vious EDFs may be added.

1. ACP-EU Relations in a HistoricalPerspective

The Cotonou agreement may be treated asthe fourth phase of development cooperationbetween ACP-countries and the EU. At thebeginning European development policy wasshaped to a large extent by the European com-munity’ member countries’ colonial history withFrance pressing for special relations with theirformer colonies. The first two agreements fo-cussed on French speaking Africa (Yaounde I1963-69 and Yaounde II 1969-75). The secondphase started when the United Kingdom (UK)joined the EU in 1973 and requested similarprivileges for Commonwealth countries. Thecommunity reacted with a more balanced geo-graphical spread. Lomé I (1975-80) included47 ACP countries, a figure which rose to 77 underthe latest agreement. While the development

I. The Cotonou Agreement

T H E C O T O N O U A G R E E M E N T

strategy was reformulated every five years andnew elements, like Stabex and Sysmin, wereintroduced Lomé I-II remained primarily a pro-gramme on economic cooperation.

Lomé III and IV may be seen as the thirdphase of ACP-EU relations, as they gainedmomentum in a radically changing economicand political environment. The ‘neo-liberal age’of the 1980ies and the end of the bipolar worldof the east-west-confrontation changed theframe-work of EU-ACP-relations in severalways:● Trade preferences to ACP countries eroded

irreversibly due to progressive lowering ofEU-tariffs under GATT/WTO as well as toEUpreferential agreements to other regions;

● Political pressure increased to make Loméagreements compatible with WTO-rules;

● The focus of EU aid shifted from ACP count-ries to Central & Eastern Europe (CEE). Whileit was still increasing slightly in absolutefigures ACP share in EU aid fell in relativeterms from 61% in 1990 to 30% in 1998;

● For the first time Lomé IV introduced ‘poli-tical conditionalities’ and it linked some aidto structural adjustment and the observanceof human rights.

When Lomé IV expired the environment for theEuropean development aid had changed dra-matically. A new treaty had to be reformulatedagainst the background of:● the future EU enlargement to Eastern Europe;● the decreased geo-strategic importance of ACP

states in comparison to the Mediterraneanand Latin American states;

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● the WTO trade regime which contradicts theLomé rules of trade privileges by demandingreciprocity and most favoured nation treatment(occasionally experienced in the banana dis-pute between USA and the European Union);

● the worsening of economic and social con-ditions in many parts of Africa. Despite pre-ferential access the ACP-share in EU marketshad fallen from 6,7% (1976) to 3% (1998).

Within the EU demands emerged to completelyabandon any cooperation regime while moststatements of ACP Governments expressed theneed to continue with the Lomé regime. In theend, a compromise was found which, in someways, re-invents principles of Lomé while, inothers, it is a radical turning away from it.

2. The Cotonou Agreement:Some Principles and Objectives

The EU-ACP relations, as outlined in the Co-tonou agreement1, can – for the purpose of thisstudy – be subdivided into three major areas:a political dialogue between ACP-countries andthe EU; the development of a new trade regime,called Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs),and the development aid cooperation. All threeareas are open to the participation of non-Stateactors.

(a) Political Dialogue Between ACP and EUThe Cotonou agreement establishes three

joint ACP-EU institutions that engage them-selves in political dialogue and managementof cooperation. The ACP-EU Council of Minis-ters includes one representative of each ACPmember country, the Council of the EU anddelegates from the European Commission.

The ACP-EU Committee of Ambassadors mo-

nitors the implementation of the Cotonou agree-ment and plays the role of an advisor of theCouncil of Ministers. The Joint ParliamentaryAssembly has plenary sessions twice a year. Itcan break into regional and sub-regional meet-ings and it gives recommendations to theCouncil of Ministers on any duties with whichit feels competent.

The joint ACP-EU institutions shall engagethemselves in dialogues on human rights, de-mocracy, rule of law, migration, arms trade,peace and security and so on. Thus it is establish-ed that issues concerning political democracyand peace & security become an integral partof development cooperation.

A distinction is made between fundamentaland essential elements. Essential elements, theviolation of which may lead to aid suspension,include human rights, democracy and the ruleof law while fundamental elements, whichconstitute no ground for aid suspension, focuson good governance, including the participa-tion of new actors.

There is no doubt that the political dialogueis embedded into the conflicting principles ofsovereignty vs. externally set conditionalities.Furthermore it is obvious that the differentia-tion between ‘essential elements’ and ‘funda-mental elements’ leaves much space for inter-pretation.

So far, the mechanism of aid suspension hasbeen used in the case of Zimbabwe where theformulation of the Country Strategy Paper(CSP)and the National Indicative Programme (NIP) wasblocked by the EU due to its political development.

(b) Towards Regional Integration and a NewTrade Regime Compatible with WTO-RulesThe Cotonou agreement contains a time-table

towards establishing a new trade regime:


1 The European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) has put together a dossier which provides good introductionsand overviews on the various sections of the agreement. The Cotonou Infokit is available in English, French and Portuguese andcan be downloaded from www.ecdpm.org

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● Until Dec. 31st 2007, all current ACP tariffpreferences shall be maintained;

● From 2008 onwards, the least developedcountries (LDCs) of the ACP group may stillreceive non-reciprocal trade preferences,while other developing countries (non-LDCs)should have concluded Economic Partner-ship Agreements (EPA) with the EU whichinstall reciprocal preferences (EU-ACP freetrade agreements) and which are compatiblewith WTO rules;

● The EPAs shall promote regional integrationand thus they shall be concluded with re-gions instead of national economies;

● EU-ACP negotiations started effectively in2002. It was agreed that the first year willbe used to formulate the basic principlesfor EPAs while, by the end of 2003, negotia-tions on regional EPAs should take off andbe concluded latest until 2007.

(c) Development Aid Cooperation –National and RegionalWhile Lomé IV had 10 different instruments

cooperation is rationalised under Cotonou andbased on only 2 instruments: A country supportstrategy (CSS) covers all grants and runs for aperiod of five years. Investments are treateddifferently and they are operated under a spe-cial investment facility.

Programming of development aid takes placefor regional or national projects. In both casesthe sequence of programming consists of threesteps:

Country or Regional Support Strategy (CSS,RSS): Based on a situation analysis of a countryor a region development strategies are outlin-ed. The EU responds to these by identifyingits sector focus and by reflecting developmentactivities of other donors like World bank or bi-lateral EU member countries’ programmes ina coherent plan.

National or Regional Indicative Programme(NIP, RIP): Following a country or regional sup-port strategy, a national or regional indicativeprogramme is drawn up for five years. It islisting individual concrete proposals for fund-ing.

Review: The indicative programme will havean annual review, to check on operation and im-plementation, and a mid-term review as wellas an end-term review for giving a perform-ance test.

3. Participation of Non-State Actors

One of the most radical innovations of theCotonou agreement is the introduction of a newparticipatory approach. For the first time, theACP and the EU legally have committed them-selves to involve new actors. Article 2 of theagreement defines participation as a funda-mental principle of the cooperation betweenthe EU and the ACP countries. The principle ofparticipative development has been promotedto involve a wide range of actors.

“ Article 2: Fundamental Principles[…] Participation: apart from central go-vernment as the main partner, the part-nership shall be open to different kindsof other actors in order to encourage theintegration of all sections of society, in-cluding the private sector and civil societyorganisations, into the mainstream ofpolitical, economic and social life; […]”

Article 6 defines the actors of cooperation.On the State’s side, local, regional and natio-nal government bodies are listed. On the non-State’s side the agreement mentions againthree categories of participants, that is ‘privatesector’, ‘economic and social partners, including


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trade union organisations’ and ‘civil society inall its forms according to national characteris-tics’. From hereon, the latter group is often re-ferred to as non-State actors.

There are additional selection criteria to cutdown non-State actors ‘in all its forms’ to a moremanageable size. The Cotonou agreement ment-ions three such qualifying criteria:

“Article 6.2Recognition by the parties of non-govern-mental actors shall depend on the extentto which they address the needs of the po-pulation, on their specific competenciesand whether they are organized and ma-naged democratically and transparently”

We are discussing the strength and weak-nesses of such qualifying criteria later on inthis study (see chapter II.2.1.). It is sufficientto note here, that the way of defining doesn’tmake the selection of actors to a simple andunchallenging affair.

There is not one chapter, in the Cotonouagreement, containing all ‘participatory rights’of the new actors in a comprehensive manner.Article 4 outlines the general approach, butthe information is spread through many partsof the document and, due to the changingcontext, the meaning sometimes changes aswell. Three areas seem to be existing, wherecentral governments should allow participationof new actors:(a) Policy formulation and drawing-up pro-

grammes: The rights are limited to informa-tion and consultation while voting and finaldecision-making is left to State actors. Theareas of information and consultation includepolitical dialogue, Economic PartnershipAgreements (EPAs) and the aid programmeunder CSS/NIP and RSS/RIP;

(b) Project implementation: Two issues are of ma-jor importance. The private sector shouldbe involved strongly in terms of consulting

as well as with regards to taking contracts;in addition NGOs, and groups organizing so-cio-economic interests , may receive financ-ial resources for capacity building to im-prove their participation;

(c) Programme review and evaluation: Monitor-ing the programme’s implementation andreviewing the outcome will become a majorpoint in quality management. While therea-pears to be an implicit understanding thatnon-State actors should get involved, thetreaty contains no provision about any kindof procedure.

For the purpose of our study two more aspectsshould be mentioned here:● The participation of new actors is not treat-

ed as an essential element, but as a funda-mental element whose violation constitutesno ground for aid suspension. If a nationalgovernment, however, does exclude non-State actors from participation, the EU hasthe possibility to sanction bad governanceby reducing its funding in the aftermaththrough the review process. Whether theEU will sanction a country or not is, however,not made clear in the treaty and seems to de-pend on the merit of the individual case.It can even be argued that the agreement isvery ‘soft’ and that it is already caring for thedefence line of an ‘erring State’. Article 4,which introduces participation, continuesby stating that non-State actors shall just beinvolved “where appropriate”. Consequentlythis passage can be interpreted as a legalargument for limiting participation.

● The agreement keeps silent on any institut-ional procedure how the involvement of non-State actors should look like. A formalizedprocess like the establishment of consultat-ion committees or minimum requirementsfor procedures are not mentioned at all. Itis completely left to State actors to set up amechanism for consulting non-State actors.


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we opted for a comparative analysis of the mostpossible number of countries. This had clearimplications for the study design since termsof references and the questionnaire had tofocus on issues which could be made compar-able. The sample of countries for the surveywas pre-determined by the existing FES-net-work of offices. With the exception of SouthAfrica – the country is not part of the Cotonouagreement – all 19 FES branch offices in sub-Saharan Africa were charged with the duty ofdata collection. In most cases local experts withknowledge of the Cotonou agreement were com-missioned to do the country study (see Appen-dix C).

The country studies differed substantiallyin quality. These discrepancies were due to thequalification of the authors, to their access tothe main players in their respective country aswell as to the frankness of those players duringinterviews. In some country reports we foundquestions left unanswered while in others datawas not usable for further processing. It tooka lot of energy and many email exchanges tofill gaps and to raise the quality of the data 2.

The deadline for returning the reports wasoriginally fixed for September 15th, but theanalysis could not be started until the end ofNovember. Two of the original 19 countries couldnot be included into the study. These twocountries were Zimbabwe, where the EU stopped

E M P I R I C A L S T U D Y

II. Empirical Study

Introduction

The participation of non-State actors in go-vernment business is always a difficult and de-licate matter. Governments usually do not seethemselves sitting at an eye-level with organi-sations, which represent sectional and particu-laristic interests within a society, while theyclaim for themselves to represent the wholeelectorate. Even where State actors are willingto call on cooperation from non-State actors,high barriers have to be surmonted. There areno universal consulting models available fromwhere a variant could be picked out for natio-nal use. The Cotonou treaty is again not veryhelpful in outlining the path to be taken. Never-theless the agreement does open space for in-volvement by non-State actors in various sect-ions, but remains vague or altogether silent asto what procedure should be applied to makeit relevant. While consultation of non-Stateactors in EU-ACP-business is thus a big de-parture from the past its relevance depends toa large extent on the very procedures whichare only invented during its application.

In June 2002, FES decided to carry out anempirical study to assess how consultation ofnon-State actors had been put to practise underthe first phase of Cotonou. In contrast to acountry study, which could dive into the par-ticularities of an individual case in all length,

2 Preliminary results of this survey were presented to a workshop in Brussels, on July 1st 2003, which was attended by EU officials andrepresentatives of NGOs. Because of differing views on consultation in Cameroon, caused by workshop participants, we re-validated our country report and consequently we made some amendments.)

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the programming of a national indicative pro-gramme half-way through for political purposes(election rigging), and Nigeria whose data re-port could not be elevated to a standard as toallow its inclusion.

The data processing was done betweenNovember 2002 and February 2003. The writ-ing of the final report was delayed due to thefact that FES is first and foremost a politicaleducational foundation so that research ca-pacities are only available in addition to its re-gular business.

1. The Design of the Study

1.1. Studying the Quality of Consultation:Result or Process?

For an empirical survey, on the relevanceof consultation under the Cotonou agreement,we first had to decide which approach, of twodifferent ones, would be more appropriate:Either we could focus on the outcome of a po-litical process, finding out whether a documentor policy recommendation did change overtime and whether these amendments were dueto the impact of consultation?. Or we could di-rect the study towards the method of consul-tation and establish if the process was insti-tutionalised properly, if procedures were fairand if the whole framework provided a basefor meaningful consultation?.

While both roads are complementary andshould be used together to establish a com-prehensive empirical picture on the relevanceof consultation, it immediately turned out thata study to measure the results was impossible.An input-output-analysis of the different stagesin the making of a document and a comparisonof the various drafts with the demands and re-

commendations, coming from non-State actors,would have been only feasible if the whole un-dertaking had been documented properly, ifall proposals had been ‘fixed on paper’ and ifthese papers would have been accessible for acontent analysis. A documentation of variousstages and the adjustments of drafts, however,was not available. This is not very surprising,considering the environment of a politicalculture which still depends, to a large extent,on oral dialogues. Gearing only towards theanalysis of a final adopted policy paper maynot have been very useful either and may nothave allowed us any conclusions about the re-levance of the input from non-State actors. Itwas therefore immediately clear that the onlyapproach, our survey could take, was to focuson processes and procedures of consultation.

There is, however, few information avail-able as to the impact of consultation on thefinal document. The EU commission is circu-lating a report3 on the implementation of theCotonou agreement. The preliminary analysisconsiders 63 draft Country Strategy Paperswhich were approved or signed by March 2003and which concludes:

“In 36 countries out of 63 modificationsre-sulting from the consultation processwere integrated in the country strategydocument. In the other 27 countries it ap-pears that: In some of these countries noconsultation has taken place. In othercountries consultation of NSAs started atan advanced stage of the CSP and conse-quently no possibility for changes to theCSP was available. In other countries to-tal co-incidence of the strategy views ofthe Government and NSAs was identified.Finally in a number of countries lack ofcapacity of NSAs to put forward concreteand coherent proposals was noted” (p.10).


3 European Commission, DG Development, Implementation of the Cotonou Agreement: Involvement of non-State actors in theprogramming process. A preliminary assessment, 12.III.2003).

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While this analysis indicates that consultat-ion does indeed have an impact on the finaloutcome, the study does not inform about howmodifications in the Country Strategy Paperswere identified. As long as we do not know whatkind of modifications took place, whether theywere of strategical, sectional or monetary signi-ficance or of relevance concerning the sectors,whether amendments within such classes wereminor, major or fundamental, in short, as longas we do not know how modifications are clas-sified, operationalised and measured, the quest-ion concerning the relevance of consultation isnot really answered yet.

The same can be said about the group ofcountries where no modification has takenplace. The absence of any amendments in theCountry Strategy Papers can indeed be resultof (a) a consensus approach with an early in-volvement of non-State actors, (b) an unwillinggovernment blocking all changes, or (c) the lackof requests from non-State actors for amend-ments due to their being unprepared for con-sultation or due to any other reason. Whateveris the case, it can not be established throughan analysis of policy recommendations alone,but it must be accompanied by a study of theconsultation process itself.

1.2. Focus on CSS / NIP

The ACP-EU partnership agreement estab-lishes the right to consult in three major areas:(a) the planning and programming of EU de-velopment aid at regional and national level,(b) the political dialogue between ACP and EUcountries including a dialogue within the na-tional context and (c) negotiations of a new traderegime under the so-called Economic Partner-ship Agreements (EPA). Consequently, ourquestionnaire was directed towards all thesefronts.

From 2000 to 2002, during the first phaseof the Cotonou agreement, the planning and pro-gramming of development aid overshadowed

all other ACP-EU activities and it was more pro-minent in public debate. At the national level,the formulation of Country Support Strategies(CSS) resulted in Country Strategy Papers (CSP)followed by National Indicative Programmes(NIP) which contain the implementation ofindividual projects. What was originally be-lieved to be two separate steps (documents) wasmerged into one effort in most cases. At regio-nal level, the planning stages were called Re-gional Support Strategies (RSS) which weresummarized in Regional Strategy Papers (RSP)followed by Regional Indicative Programmes(RIPS). The two other arenas for consultation didnot yet fully go on stage. The debate on EconomicPartnership Agreements (EPA) was still ownedby bureaucracies; and the instrument of po-litical dialogue was used erratically and it wasnot institutionalised yet in a manner to alloweasy lobbying and consultation for non-Stateactors.

Our survey confirmed this picture. Only theprogramming of development aid showed anamount of NSA-participation sufficient enoughfor an empirical evaluation. To some extent, thisresult may have been produced by the very wayour questionnaire was administered. By usingthe FES branch offices in the various countriesas the entry point for collecting data, we hadeasier access to national structures of consulta-tion than to regional set-ups. This, for example,was proved to be the case with the collection ofdata on the RSS / RIP-process which was verytime-consuming and which partly did not pro-vide substantive information. In addition, wedid not focus on events in Brussels or on count-ries where FES does not maintain an office.Due to this leaning towards national structuresin countries with FES presence, we may haveprevented the study from showing the full in-tensity of consultation in other fields.

The study, presented here, only deals withconsultation under the CSS/NIP-process. Table1 shows that, by the end of our data collection,all countries in our sample had signed a NIP-


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programme with the EU or were close to doingso. The only exemptions were Kenya and Se-negal. The table also lists all countries whichallowed consultation to take place before theCSP/NIP-draft returned to the EU for adoption.

Somehow, surprisingly, not a single countryrefused civil society involvement. All govern-ments, it appears, seem to have accepted thenew dispensation. By focussing on CSP/NIP ourstudy could reflect upon a process which hadbeen nearly completed and where participationof new actors had indeed been put into pract-ice. This practice will now be scrutinized.

1.3. Consultation:Which Dimensions Have to be Assessed?

Consultation is a form of participation whichmeans very different things to different people.Some may insist that consultation is a form ofco-determination in decision-making and aspecial way of negotiating and compromising.Those, who share this argument, find them-selves opposed by those, who insist on the factthat final decision-making is a legitimate busi-ness only for governments and parliaments.Therefore, the right to consultation is only a right


Countries CSP / NIP Signed CSP/NIP Unsigned Consultation of

as of 19.05.03 Non-State actors

Cameroon 16.07.2001 yes

Mozambique 18.02.2002 yes

Mauritius 21.02.2002 yes

Ethiopia 27.02.2002 yes

Tanzania 08.03.2002 yes

Botswana 12.04.2002 yes

Uganda 30.05.2002 yes

Namibia 07.06.2002 yes

Cote d’Ivoire 02.07.2002 yes

Zambia 11.07.2002 yes

Nigeria 16.07.2002 yes

Madagascar 18.07.2002 yes

Benin 09.10.2002 yes

Ghana 22.10.2002 yes

Angola 28.01.2003 yes

Mali Date unclear yes

Kenya Status unclear yes

Senegal Status unclear yes

Zimbabwe Blocked by EU yes

Source: EU-website http://europa.eu.int/comm/development/index 19.5.2003; FES Country Survey 2002.

Table 1: Status of Country Strategy Papers (CSP) / National Indicative Programmes (NIP)According to Countries

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to speak and to be heard and for that reason itdoes not come along with any obligations forgovernments to consider proposals. From another angle it could be argued that consultationcan only be a legitimate process if participationis open in the widest possible sense, while otherswould see no harm in limiting consultation toa narrow group. Consultation and lobbying areoften used inter-changeable, the argumentswitches from raising quality in managementto building a political support base. Intensityand form of consultation are further points ofdeparture. Some may consider consultation asan informal one-off affair, while others will pointto the need, that it should be institutionalisedand rights, like access to funds and indepen-dent expertise, should be granted.

The FES-study did not intend to open a dis-cussion on how to define consultation ap-propriately and on its ideal model. We wantedto be guided, as much as possible, by the em-pirical manifestation of the process but, at thesame time, we wanted to avoid to be drawn intothe peculiarities of each and every aspect in acountry. We selected some features of consulta-tion, considering them to be of major relevance,which allowed us to compare countries and toshow similarities as well as differences in theirindividual approaches. Following these select-ed features, we then arranged countries withina ranking order which, in the end, allowed usto distinguish between good performers andbad performers.

To prepare our ‘research object’ for the em-pirical comparison the study took the followingapproach: Three formal dimensions are rele-vant to any model of consultation. The datacollection was primarily directed towards thesefactors. These three dimensions are:● Representation: Which non-State actors were

consulted in the programming of the CSS /NIP?

● Time-factor: At what stage of formulatingthe CSS / NIP did consultation set in? Howlong did it last? And when did it end?

● Format: In which form did consultation takeplace?

It goes without saying that other dimensionscould have been included. Issues which couldhave been included are: “Who selected the non-State actors?” or “How did participants preparefor consultation?” or “How was consultationfinanced?”. By selecting our three dimensions,we kept in mind that consultation, under theCotonou agreement, was at its infant stage. Inthe early phase, any procedure was likely tocome along with serious deficits to be improvedlater on. We had to focus on such dimensionswhich were elementary from the beginning. Andwe had to direct our questions to such issueswhere ‘the establishing of facts’ did not bringup too many methodological problems. Adequateinformation, as e.g. who controls the selectingprocedure, is difficult to get by a questionnairesince those, who actually sent out the invitat-ions, may not have been those, who decidedabout attendance and composition.

1.4. How Did We Get to an Overall-Rankingof Countries? Building aThree-Dimensional Consultation Index

One of the most challenging things, of orquantitative study, was to operationalize thethree dimensions of our survey and to make themmeasurable in such a way that we were ableto compare the countries for ranking purposes.This was done in four steps:(a) Each of the three dimensions of consultation

was broken into major components. We wouldhave preferred to reach much deeper thenthe way we did and to differentiate thesecomponents into smaller and more detailedaspects. But we stayed with our, rather broad,components to avoid problems with data col-lection.

(b) Up to this point, the study was still quali-tative and it did not allow a ranking of thecountries. In order ‘to transform quality intoquantity’, and to put countries into a hierarch-


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ical order, we had to develop indices. Eachcomponents was given a quantitative ex-pression of relevance. By doing so, we couldadd up the individual values to get a totalfigure value for each of the three dimensions.Then we could finally bring these marks intoa ranking order.

(c) To reach an overall ranking of the countrieswe repeated the same procedure by build-ing a three-dimensional overall index of con-sultation. An individual value of importancewas added to each dimension and the threedimensions were then connected by a mathe-matical operation. At the end, we received anoverall mark for each country which was usedto compare the quality of consultation directly.

(d) The final step was then ‘purely political’.While a unified index allows the ranking ofcountries into a continuous gradation of betterand worse, it does not determine the border-lines between different quality classes. Toovercome this ‘transfer problem’ from a meregradation into a differentiation of ‘qualitystandards’, we had to look at each compo-nents of the index and then we had to de-termine what we considered as ‘minimumstandard’, as ‘good standard’ or as ‘belowstandard’. This exercise is nothing else than‘transforming quantity back into quality’.

What should have become clear to the readeris the fact that, at each junction of building anindex, we had to make decisions about howimportant single aspects were. Giving a quanti-tative mark to a certain aspect is not an ob-jective undertaking, but it is derived from ourown valuation. Each reader may come to a dif-ferent assessment, and thus attribute differentmarks which, in the end, will lead to a differentranking of the countries. Therefore we thoughtit was our moral and political duty to makethe whole procedure, of how we arrived at ourresults, completely transparent and to provide,by our tables in the appendix, the reader withall the raw data which would be needed to re-

built the indices with different marks and as-sumptions.

2. The Findings of the Survy

2.1. Representation: Who Participated inCSS/NIP-Consultation?

The Cotonou agreement mentions threegroups of non-State actors to whom partner-ship, in form of consultation shall be opened:(a) ‘Private sector’; (b) ‘Economic and socialpartners, including trade union organisations’;(c) ‘Civil society in all its form according to na-tional characteristics’ (Article 6.1). In a furthersubsection the same article adds three criteriafor groups to qualify for consultation:

“Recognition… of non-governmental actorsshall depend on the extent to which theyaddress the needs of the population, ontheir specific competencies and whetherthey are organized and managed demo-cratically and transparently” (Article 6).

There is no doubt that the text remains fairlygeneral and does not provide full guidance howthe recognition clause should be applied. Firstof all, it remain open if all three criteria applysimultaneously or if ownership of a single com-petence is already an entry ticket for partici-pation. Secondly, none of the three criteria areoperationalised in a manner to be able to putits interpretation beyond doubts. ‘Addressingthe needs of the population’ may have a sub-stantive or a formal meaning: it may refer toan organisation with a manifesto for povertyalleviation or it may just imply, that an organi-sation has membership from socially margi-nalized groups.

The same is valid for “specific competenc-ies”. Competence could mean management ca-pacities for the implementation of a project, like


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the existence of a secretariat, or it could meanthe availability of expertise. Expertise and le-gitimacy do not always go hand in hand witheach other, and that they may even sometimescontradict each other is common knowledgefor those working with weak civil societies.There is the common case of NGOs led by highlyqualified experts which function close to con-sultancy firms and do not have any furtherlinkage to wider parts of society. And there isthe grass-root organisation claiming for legiti-macy from its broad-based membership whileits leadership falls short of relevant skills inmost policy fields.

Similar concerns can be raised about the thirdrecognition criteria. Membership organisationsmay have statutes on elections of their leader-ship, the power of the chair or rules on properfinancial accounting. But whether they are‘managed democratically and transparently’cannot be established that easily from outside.Deficits in democracy might not show on themacro-organisational level in all its facilities,but they may be virulent on lower-tier affairs.If we insist on the EU recognition criteria beingcumulative and on the applicants having to passall three tests, we may indeed erect hurdles of amagnitude which could stop the majority oforganisations, if not even all, from ‘passing theexams’.

The third objection may be raised in regardto the selection process. The text remains silenton who is in charge with selecting participantsand what procedure should be used therefore.If governments are put into the driving seat,they may just prefer the easy route of invitingonly friendly organisations. Consultation, leav-ing out opposition forces, is likely to lead todifferent results than a procedure which triesto embrace all relevant groups of society.

Shortcomings in selecting participants willcreate confusion when put to practice. But, atthe same time, it has to be noted that a treatyof the Cotonou agreement’s calibre, covering

77 ACP and 15 EU countries, cannot dare toventure into the specification of each and everydefinition. Leaving statements at a rather ge-neral level is sometimes the prize one has topay to get all parties together to sign a contract.Furthermore, any framework agreement mustturn away from becoming an operation manualfor all cases. While we agree, that the guidingprinciples must remain general enough andflexible to be adjustable to the needs of nationalcircumstances, we would have neverthelesspreferred, to get more directions from the treatyconcerning how to solve our research problemto identify appropriate representation.

How did we operationalize ‘representation’?Out of the three groups of non-State actors,listed in the Cotonou agreement, we consideredonly two (‘Economic and social partners’, ‘CivilSociety’) as relevant components for ‘repre-sentation’. The private sector, which usuallymeans individual companies, was excluded astheir ‘collective interest’ has already beentaken care of through employers organisationsand business chambers. We added two struct-ures which, in a narrow sense, are not fullynon-State; the ‘Research Institutes’ and ‘LocalGovernments’. We included them since theyusually have a good degree of autonomy fromthe Central Government, and because they arelikely to raise concerns and forward opinionsthat differ from the main agent of the State’sinterest. The Cotonou agreement is outspokenparticularly on the need to involve the lower tierof administration, as in most States electedlocal authorities have emerged as distinct levelof government with their own specific identity.

Representation is thus split into the follow-ing components:● Employers Organisation/Business Chambers● Trade Unions● Civil Society Organisations/Non Government-

al Organisations● Research Institutes● Local Governments (associations)


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If organisations of all these categories were in-volved in consultation, we would call it ‘maxi-mum representation’ for the purpose of thisstudy. This view of representation refers to sectorcovering. Our sectors are defined rather broadly.The group ‘Employers Organisation/ BusinessChambers’ could be further broken up into em-ployers’ interests, concentrating on industrialrelations and employment issues in manycountries, and into business interests whichdeals more with investment, production andtaxes. Further sub-divisions into manufact-uring sector, small scale industries and importand export trade, would give us an even moredetailed picture on the representation structure.However, we did not venture into these sub-divisions as there is no uniform culture of orga-nizing business interests in our survey countries.

Furthermore, in a plural society, diversifiedstructures are likely to exist within a sector.Trade unions and employers groups are usuallybuilt into two- or three-tiers hierarchies withnational centres on their top and branch orcompany structures at their bottom. But whilethese socio-economic interest groups may haveestablished an unified system of representationin some countries, in others there may existcompetitive representation with rival organi-sations. How did we treat a situation where, forexample, a certain trade union was consultedwhile others, being larger in membership andbelonging to a rival national centre, did notparticipate? The solution for such a case is sim-ple in principle. The plurality of interest repre-sentation within the same sector can be captur-ed by a comprehensive list of all organisations,from where a participation index could be builtreflecting the size of the various groups. Con-ceptually this looks easy, but however, it turnedout to be impractical since such an actors map-ping is not available for most of the countries.

Similar problems arise with the category ‘civilsociety’. The majority of organisations which wegrouped as ‘Civil Society/NGOs’, come from thefollowing structures:

● professional associations like economic so-cieties and lawyer associations;

● women groups;● confession-bound organisations;● humanitarian relief societies;● consumer protection councils;● human rights groups;● environmental groups;● NGO-networks.The variety of actors in this sector, including thedifferent roles they play under different cir-cumstances, produces even greater problems inmeasuring an adequate presence in consultat-ion. Certain groups, like confessional-boundorganisations, may be major actors in somecountries while they may be irrelevant or evennon-existing in other countries. It is thereforeimpossible to propose an ideal composition ofcivil society’s representation which cuts acrosscountries and it is impossible to measure na-tional profiles as deviations from this ideal.

In order to get a more complete picture onadequate sector representation we tried a dif-ferent approach. We asked our local experts,who were in charge of collecting data to giveus their personal point of views and to list upall those organisations which they deemed tobe significant but which were left out fromconsultation. Surprisingly, this procedure didnot produce much information. Either govern-ments did indeed invite all major actors fromthe respective sectors, or our country reportauthors did not venture deep enough into thisquestion. In those few cases, where the exclus-ion of relevant actors has been reported, suchnon-inclusive representation is reflected in the‘scoring’ with a deduction. Nevertheless, we haveto be frank: As long as we do not have a com-prehensive actors’ mapping for each sector, fromwhere an index can be built about the most rele-vant groups, no further differentiation on a fairsub-sectional composition is possible.

By building a quantity profile for represent-ation we marked the importance of the varioussectors as follows:


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● Employers Organisations /Business Chambers: 20%

● Trade Unions 20%● Civil Society Organisations 40%● Research Institutes 10%● Local Governments (associations) 10%

This ‘weighing’ of the various actors is basedon practical considerations and it roughly re-presents our understanding of the various groups’relative importance for the political dialogue.Since the reader may not share this point of viewhe or she is invited to do his or her own personalmodelling.

Table 2 shows the range of actors involvedin consultation:


Table 2: Representation in Consultation According to Groups and Countries1

1 Data does not include Zimbabwe and Nigeria. Consultation in Zimbabwe was blocked half-way through by EU. Data on Nigeriawas of unsatisfactory quality;

2 including NGOs set up by Government (GONGOS);

3 Ethiopia got deductions for leaving out Addis Ababa Chambers of Commerce and the Centre for Local Capacity Building –Madagascar got deductions for consulting only rural structures and only in the south.

Trade Unions Employers Org. / Civil Society Research Local Govern- Total Points Business Chambers Org. / NGOs Institutes ment Assoc.

(weight 0,2) (weight 0,2) (weight 0,4) (weight 0,1) (weight 0,1)

Namibia X X X X X 1,0

Ghana X X X X 0,9

Mauritius X X X X 0,9

Mozambique X X X X 0,9

Benin X X X 0,8

Mali X X X 0,8

Angola X X X 0,7

Cameroon X X X 0,7

Tanzania X X X 0,7

Botswana X X 0,6

Cote d’Ivoire X X 0,6

Ethiopia3 X X (50%) X2 (50%) X 0,6

Senegal X X 0,6

Uganda X X 0,6

Zambia X X 0,6

Madagascar X (50%) X (50%) X (50%) 0,35

Kenya X X 0,3

Average 41% 94% 88% 47% 15% (0,69)

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The major findings of the survey can besummarized as follows:● There was not a single country which did

not invite one sort of non-State actor or theother for consultation. This was actually asurprise as there has been no clear decla-ration in the Cotonou-agreement what wouldhave happened if a country had refusedinvolvement of non-State structures. Whilethe threat or mere the possibility of beingsidelined by the EU may have been an ‘in-centive’ to broaden participation, CentralGovernments seem to have accepted thatthe future of ACP-EU-relations will not re-main an exclusive resort for State players;

● Those, in charge of inviting participants, didnot observe representation in terms of broadsector covering. There was only one country(Namibia) where consultation did take placewith a full set of representation. For 16 outof 17 countries, neglecting one or the otherstructure was the normal practice;

● There were remarkable differences betweenthe groups which were left out. ‘Civil SocietyOrganisations’ and ‘Employers Organisations/Business Chambers’ were the most promi-nent participants in the CSS/NIP-process.Their attendance came close to full coverage.On the other side, trade unions and researchinstitutes were ‘forgotten’ or excluded on pur-pose in more than every second case.

● The intention of the ACP-EU agreement, togive Local Governments a strong voice in con-sultation, failed in most countries during theNIP programming. Only in Namibia and Ca-meroon ‘association of local authorities’ werecalled in. Angola invited some provincialgovernors and Benin brought in the ‘mis-sion of decentralisation’, but since these donot reflect genuine local structures theywere not accepted under this category. Ma-dagascar reduced their Local Governmentparticipation to the attendance of some elect-ed mayors (see below).

● Special case Ethiopia: Consultation, as a con-cept of participation, makes only sense if thosewho call for advise and those who shouldbe consulted are autonomous from eachothers. Ethiopia may be a doubtful casesince the NGO-sector included organisationswhich are set-up by Government, so-calledGONGOs (Government organized NGOs). Atthe same time, some autonomous organi-sations which may have been relevant actors,like the ‘Addis Ababa Chamber of Commerce’or the ‘Centre for Local Capacity Building’,were excluded. For leaving-out relevant act-ors deductions were applied from the scoreboard. But even in the case of Ethiopia wefind several organisations, for example thosewith links to churches, which are autonom-ous from the State. Even though they maynot articulate views radically opposed tothose of the Central Government, they cannot be considered as mere extension of theState.

● Special case Madagascar: Madagascar hadan invitation policy which followed logicallythe route of project implementation. The go-vernment seems to have taken the viewthat, due to the rural focus of the NIP asproposed by the EU, there is no need to in-vite groups caring for urban constituencies.Consultation was limited to groups relevantfor rural development. For the business sectorit was the ‘Congrès Malgache de la Route’(CMR), which associates companies concern-ing the transport sector and road construct-ion. In addition, the State-organized ‘Groupesde Travail sur le Développement Rural’(GTDR) were invited. They assemble repre-sentatives from local administration, privatesectors, NGOs and peasant associations aswell as Local Government officials. Further-more there was a geographical restrictionsince only GTDRs from the South were con-sulted.


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● Special case Cote d’Ivoire: During the con-stituent meeting for consultation the EU in-formed the trade unions that their partici-pation was not wanted anymore. Thereaftergovernment sat down with the remaininggroups in several working sessions to pro-duce the first draft. Cote d’Ivoire is the onlycase reported where a group, that was in-volved in the beginning, was kicked-out bythe EU from further participation.

2.2. The Time-Factor: In Which Phase DidConsultation Take Place?

The timing of information, the flow and itsmaterial content are essential factors in con-sultation. Putting all stakeholders into a properpicture at an early stage may give them addit-ional space for preparing their debate, in ac-cessing expertise or in consulting their con-stituencies. Releasing information lately, orkeeping ‘the other side’ unaware up to the lastmoment, are tempting strategies for govern-ments if they want to head towards low-impactconsultation. For most cases, it may be correctto state that the quality of consultation correlat-es positively with the amount of time madeavailable before a final decision is taken.

It is not only the amount of time, but as wellthe phasing of decision-making, which matters.There is usually a path dependency in that eachnew round of debate tries to take off whereearlier stages have stopped. Those, in chargeof directing the process, are never keen to goin circles, starting everything again, just be-cause somebody has not been around from thebeginning. Decision-making moves forwardthroughout coalition building processes and‘in-between-agreements’ which cannot be setaside easily because of new actors entering thegame lately. Consultation may likely be of moreimportance if it sets in at an early stage.

This hypothesis has to be modified in thatcontinuity is another crucial factor. Being in-volved only in the initial phase and left out onlater stages, when new compromises are foundand the fine-tuning takes place, may pre-emptthe chance of having one’s position adequatelyreflected in the final outcome. Therefore wecan assume that the impact of consultation willincrease if it starts at an early stage, but there-after it continues through all stages of decision-making.

Consultation must always take place beforea final decision has been made. Beyond thisprinciple the quality of consultation is affectedby factors such as: How early does it start, howlong does it last, when and where does it end.For the purpose of this study we constructedfour categories to identify differences in thetime factor of consultation:● Initial Phase: Consultation is limited to the

start of the CSP/NIP-process and ends im-mediately after the initial phase;

● First Draft: Consultation sets in after thefirst draft has been prepared and it is limit-ed to a debate and to proposals on the firstdraft;

● End-of-Process: Consultation sets in on a draftwhich the government considers to be a finaldraft;

● All-through: Consultation takes place through-out all drafts.

The length of consultation and the early phasewere used for ranking the four categories. Thehighest score of 2 was given to the category ‘all-through’. Here, non-State actors were involvedfrom the first policy draft all through to the end.They were, however, excluded from setting theparameters which directed the first draft. Alower mark (score 1) was reserved, if consul-tation was limited to the ‘initial phase’ or for the‘first draft only’. The ‘End-of-process’ receivedthe lowest mark (score 0,5) since central govern-ment had already gone through various drafts,

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was less open to further amendments and mayview consultation only as a formal affair.

The categories are not fully exclusive and anational procedures may combine differentphases of consultation. Our ‘ideal practice’ was

reserved for a situation where consultation setin before the presentation of the first draft(‘initial phase’) and from thereon it became apermanent feature at all stages (‘all-through’).

Table 3 shows the findings of our survey.

Initial Phase After first Draft End-of-Process All-through/1st Total Points

draft till end(weight: 1,0) (weight: 1,0) (weight: 0,5) (weight: 2,0) (max: 3,0)

Botswana X (X) (X) X 3

Ghana X (X) (X) X 3

Senegal X (X) (X) X 3

Kenya (X) (X) X 2

Mauritius (X) (X) X 2

Cote d’Ivoire X X 2

Cameroon X X 1,5

Namibia X X 1,5

Angola X 1

Madagascar X 1

Mali X 1

Mozambique X 1

Tanzania X 1

Uganda X 1

Zambia X 1

Ethiopia X 0,5

Benin X 0,5

Average 24% 88% 41% 29% 51% (1,53)

Notes: ‘All-through’ includes ‘first draft’ and ‘end-of-process’. (x) means: the phase is implicit in ‘all-through’

and put in brackets to avoid double-counting.

Table 3: The Time-Factor in Consultation According to Countries

The major findings can be summarized asfollows:● Only three countries (Botswana, Ghana, Se-

negal) set up a procedure where non-Stateactors were fully involved from the begin-ning to the end. Just in these cases our studytalks of ‘maximum participation’. There werefive more cases (Kenya, Mauritius, Cameroon,

Cote d’Ivoire and Namibia) where consul-tation covered more than just one segmentof the whole programming process. All othercountries limited consultation to a singlephase and amended policy drafts and pro-grammes during stages in which no privateactor was involved;

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● One dominant practice (8 of 17) was callingnon-State actors for discussions, after a firstdocument had already been drafted, where-by participation was limited to this phase.This, in fact, meant that consultation wasnot used in the initial formulation of the ob-jectives, and it was not considered to be im-portant in later phases when drafts werefurther amended and made ready for adopt-ion;

● Special case Benin: Benin is one of the twocountries which called on non-State actorsjust at the end. This country is a particularcase because the EU and the Central Govern-ment considered the earlier consultation ofcivil society, within the framework of thePRSP (Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper),as sufficient and therefore they stoppedconsultation on NIP and CSP. The trade mi-nistry organized two seminars, in cooperat-ion with FES, to inform about the final NIPand to debate about the future role of non-State actors under Cotonou. While the coun-try seems to belong to those, having a posi-tive approach towards non-State actors ingeneral, the NIP-case was a relapse into oldhabits. Two government players decided thatthere is no need for further consultation.Consequently they stopped the process with-out consent from non-State players.

● Special case Ethiopia: Ethiopia organized abig conference where the ‘final draft’ was pre-sented to a large crowd of NGOs and GONGOs(Government organised NGOs). Relevant de-bates were difficult due to the number of par-ticipants which was further blown-up by thepresence of diplomatic staff from eight em-bassies and representatives of 16 interna-tional and multilateral organisations. We donot know whether, in such a crowd and atsuch a late phase, the meeting still led toany modifications in the policy document.But from a fundamental point of view thequestion may be allowed if the country’s go-vernment did not confuse a ceremonial

gathering with consultation (see as well re-marks on ‘representation’).

● Special case Cote d’Ivoire: In addition to ex-cluding trade unions from further consult-ation (see ‘representation’) the country hada second unique feature. When governmentforwarded the first draft to the EU, the de-legation modified the quantitative (monet-ary) terms of the CSP/NIP without furtherconsultation and ‘made it final’. The civil so-ciety groups protested against the proced-ure of changing the document without furt-her consultation. Cote d’Ivoire is the only casereported where groups, which were involv-ed in an early stage, publicly criticised theprocedure of amending the CSP/NIP-docu-ment at a later stage without entering againinto a new consultation round.

2.3. Which Form of Consultation:More Informal or More Institutionalised?

The form of consultation is the third di-mension in our simple model. By looking at theform we can assess the degree to which consult-ation is institutionalised. There are differentinstitutional aspects which may be relevant.Access to consultation could be ruled by regis-tration procedures, quota or other limitingfactors; membership, in a consultative forum,could include some control on handling the dis-cussion agenda, a right to call for additionalmeetings or it could include some autonomyin fixing the calendar of events; debate maybe supported by secretarial assistance and bythe possibility to invite independent experts;members may be provided with funds to carefor their transport and accommodation expens-es and they may get means and opportunity tocall for breaks in order to consult with theirconstituency back home.

Many of these ‘rights’ do not get much at-tention at an early experimental stage of con-sultation. Therefore we did not make it to anobject of our studies. We only considered more

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basic components and their differential use bythe countries. These components were:

Committee of Consultation: The existence ofa committee is an indicator for some control onprocedures being not vested in government any-more, but being handed over to the committeeand thus being brought under the influence ofits membership. While not each and every mem-ber will be able to use such an autonomy forhis or her own end, non-State actors collective-ly are likely to insert more influence comparedto a procedure where control is still fully ownedby Central Government.

Consultation in Written Form: Strength andweakness of written proposals have to be as-sessed in relation to advantages and disadvant-ages of its alternative, the oral form. Writtenproposals allow wider consultation and can becirculated easily beyond a consultation forum. Itcarries more weight since authors will give moreprudence to their statement and may be morewilling to consult additional opinion makers oftheir constituency. And it may produce state-ments of higher expertise because more timecan be invested to prepare for consultation;

Consultation in Oral Form / Dialog Only: Anoral consultation is likely to speed up decisionmaking. More members will attend without apre-fixed position, will be prepared less and theywill feel less ashamed of agreeing to others’ pointof views. The smaller audience makes winnersand losers less obvious and the discussion maybe less antagonistic and directed more towardsa compromise;

Passive/Information Only: In the narrow sense,‘being briefed’ is not a component of consultat-ion as it implies ‘the right of information’, butnot ‘the right to be heard’. However, even a mere‘briefing’ on the CSS/NIP-process, if it comesearly enough, may produce an additional mo-mentum. Groups may still be challenged to de-velop own ideas, go into public and finally toexert pressure on government.

In assessing the relative significance we gavethe highest score of 2 to a consultation proced-

ure vested in a committee. Consultation in ‘Writ-ten Form’ and in ‘Oral Form’ were given thesame mark of 1, while ‘Passive Only’ was treat-ed as least relevant with 0,5. Combinations ofdifferent components were possible. The ‘high-est score 3’ was reserved for a committee inwhich non-State actors used the instrumentsof written proposals in addition to oral debates.Table 4 summarizes the findings.

The major findings can be summarized asfollows:● Only five countries (Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius,

Namibia, Senegal) forwarded the consultat-ion exercise to a committee. These commit-tees were usually not created for the NIP-exercise, but since they already existed theywere just given the new or additional taskto deal with Cotonou issues. However, in thisgroup of countries consultation was not al-ways confined to the committee alone. Gha-na and Namibia organized additional hear-ings with non-State actors without member-ship in the committee;

● The large majority (11 of 17) did not see theneed to assign powers on procedures to acommittee, but they opted for a conference-type of consultation which left governmentstaff, as organizers and agenda-setters, inthe driving seat;

● There was only one country which did notgrant any opportunity to articulate criticismand present amendments (Benin, see com-ment under ‘Time Factor’).

● Statements in writing were an exception in-stead of the rule. Only three cases (Came-roon, Mauritius, Tanzania) were reportedwhere non-State actors put down their viewsin writing. For all other countries consul-tation took the form of ‘talking only’. Min-istries or other state institutions invited toconferences or workshops, presented draftproposals and without loosing much timefor ‘digesting’ they requested comments andrecommendations for changes.


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Passive/Info. Written Input Oral Comittee1/ Total Points

only Dialogue institution(weight: 0,5) (weight: 1,0) (weight: 1,0) (weight: 2,0)

Ghana1 X X2 3

Mauritius X (X) X 3

Namibia X X3 3

Cameroon5 X X X 2,5

Kenya (X) X4 2

Senegal (X) X 2

Tanzania X X 2

Botswana X X 1,5

Angola X 1

Cote d’Ivoire X 1

Ethiopia X 1

Madagascar X 1

Mali X 1

Mozambique X 1

Uganda X 1

Zambia X 1

Benin X 0,5

Average 18% 18% 94% 29% 54% (1,62)

1 Committee includes oral dialogue but excludes written input. (x) means: the phase is implicit in ‘Committee’

and put into brackets to avoid double-counting. Ghana and Namibia have double-track consultation withcommittee plus additional conference with other participants;

2 Ghana: inter-institutional committee on multilateral trade negotiations-subcommittee on ACP-EU

negotiations with membership for TWN-Africa and Integrated Social Development Centre (ISODEC);

3 Namibia: Task Team on EPA in Ministry of Trade & Industry;

4 Kenya: National Committee on Cotonou agreement;

5 Cameroon invited NGOs for a briefing and written proposals and only GICAM for dialogue;

All-through’ includes ‘first draft’ and ‘end-of-process’. (x) means: the phase is implicit in ‘all-through’

and put in brackets to avoid double-counting.

Table 4: Forms of Consultation According to Countries

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● Special case Ghana: It may be worthwhileto look at the consultation process of the win-ning country more detailed. Long before thesigning of the Cotonou agreement, Ghanahad already established an inter-institutio-nal committee on multilateral trade nego-tiations. A specialised sub-committee, witha mandate for debates on ACP-EU trade re-lations, had non-State actors being repre-sented by ‘Third World Network’ (TWN-Africa) and the ‘Integrated Social Develop-ment Centre’ (ISODEC). When the CSP/NIP-consultation exercise set in the institutionalprocess was already available and there wasno need to first think about a consultationformat. In addition to the routine procedurewithin the standing sub-committee, an one-off event in form of a conference was organi-zed to include organisations, like tradeunions, which had no committee member-ship.

● Special Case Mauritius: The country reporton Mauritius noted, that civil society in-volvement was rather weak and passivewhile the private sector participated strong-ly. This unbalanced participation is relatedto different learning curves. The businesssector has substantial experience from ear-lier lobby activities like those on the sugarprotocol and on the multifibre agreement.When business was called for consultationunder Cotonou it could activate its own in-ternal machinery for consultation, and itcould come up with written statements andconcrete proposals, while those groups,having less experience with former lobbyactivities, were unprepared and remainedpassive during consultation.

● Special Case Cameroon: Cameroon received‘more investment’ than others from the EUto make consultation a success4. A pre-fea-

sibility study in Feb. 2001 tried to identifyconsensus areas for development aims andrelevant non-State actors. Four informationworkshops on the principles of the Cotonouagreement were organized by a consultant.With several workshops the HIPC-Initiative(highly indebted poor countries) was inte-grated into the CSP/NIP-approach to avoidduplication in the focus on poverty alle-viation. In July 2001 the CSP/NIP-draft waspresented to about 40 NGOs in a briefingsession. Thereafter, non-State actors wereinvited to send in (writings of) their point ofviews. Sending-in written proposals wasnot left as an option, but was made to theonly channel of communicating demands.Only very few proposals were actually sentto the EU and even less were incorporatedinto the draft. Thereafter no debate was or-ganized, but non-State actors attended asecond (ceremonial) conference when EUcommissioner Poul Nielson signed the NIPwhile visiting Cameroon. In addition to thismainstream process there was a secondform of consultation when business interest,represented through GICAM, got a separatehearing on the draft.

The whole process deserves applause on twophases (Phase I: preparation of a road map, in-formation and training; Phase II: Briefing ondraft, invitation for written proposals) but cri-ticism on the third one. The selection of propos-als during Phase III was done secretly. Therewas no feed-back on the selection criteria thathad been applied and those, whose demandswere rejected, were not allowed to ‘upgrade’ theirproposals. Such non-transparent proceduresare likely to create feelings of being fooled forsome participants. The same can be said aboutseparating consultation into business and non-business interest. While such an approach is


4 Footnote 4: European Commission, Implementation … op.cit., p. 11; Commisson of the European Communities, Participationof non-State Actors in EC Development Policy, Brussels 7.11. 2002, COM (2002) 598 final, Annex 1, p.23.Source: Europa.eu.int/eur-lex/encom/cnc/2002/com 2002_0598en01.pdf.

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often the advisable road to more efficiency, afinal joint assembly is important where proced-ures and results are presented and explained.

2.4. The Over-All Ranking of Countries

To come to an overall index on the qualityof consultation and to put the countries into aranking order we linked the three dimensionsthrough a mathematical equation:

Quality = Representativeness x (Time + Form)

This equation is based on the assumptionthat ‘Representation’ carries more weight thanthe other two factors. We wanted to care speci-fically for a situation in which consultation isset up within a framework that provides anideal set of procedures and in which intensivedebates can take place on all stages of the pro-cess, but the selection of participants remains‘very inappropriate’ and relevant non-Stateactors are still excluded. The stronger weighton deficiencies in ‘representation’ is a ‘politicalstatement’. The equation assures that weaknes-

ses in the participation structure have a strong-er impact on the final result and will thereforelead to a lower overall score than similar defi-cits in the other two dimensions.

The same purpose could be served by otherequations, such as e.g. Quality = Representa-tion2 (Time x Form). This version would evenbe more appropriate since consultation can notexist outside of ‘Time’ or ‘Form’, but our equationaccepts a zero-score for any of the two factorsand the overall-result is still positive. In viewof the fact, that empirically a zero-case cannotexist, we nevertheless opted for the mathe-matically ‘lighter’ version hoping that it makesit easier to follow the indexing procedure.

Our index allows a simple linear ranking ofcountries in terms of more over-all points or less.It does not disclose the separation line between‘good quality’ or ‘bad quality’ consultation. Suchquality categories are not inherent to the rank-ing procedure and must be ‘brought in fromoutside’. In order to get such classes we had toturn quantity back into quality by valuing thestatements on all three dimensions of our model.Our approach is documented in Table 5.


Table 5: Construction of Quality Standards

Class / Standard Overall Points Representation Time Form

High 4,8 - 6,0 0,8 - 1,0 3,0 3,0

Satisfactory 2,8 - 4,7 0,7 2,0 - 2,5 2,0 - 2,5

Minimum 1,2 - 2,7 0,6 1,0 - 1,5 1,0 - 1,5

Disqualified <1,2 or single factor < 0,6 0,5 0,5

disqualification

Trade Unions: 0,2 Initial Phase: 1,0 Info. Only: 0,5

Employers: 0,2 After 1st. Draft: 1,0 Written Form: 1,0

Civil Society: 0,4 End-of-Process: 0,5 Oral Dialogue: 1,0

Research Institutes: 0,1 All through: 2,0 Committee based: 2,0

Loc.Governments: 0,1

28


Each dimension of our model was lookedat in terms of four classes: ‘High Standard’,‘Satisfactory’, ‘Minimum Standard’ and ‘BelowMinimum Standard/Disqualified’. ‘Representa-tion’ belonged to the category ‘high standard’if it reached at least 0.8 points. This would be thecase if any two groups combined participated inconsultation: (1) trade unions, employers/busi-ness chambers and civil society organisations;or (2) all groups with the only exception of eithertrade unions or employer organisations (butnot both). ‘Representation’ received a lowerstandard with the number of absent groupsincreasing. We finally grouped ‘representation’into the category ‘disqualified’ if the score fellbelow 0.6. This was the case when either thewhole block of civil society or both, trade unionsand employer organisations, were absent. Sucha consultation should be called ‘Below Mini-mum Standard’.

With table 5 the reader can easily find outthe ratings for the other two dimensions, the‘Time-factor’ and the ‘Form’ of consultation.While calculating the overall-points for the fourclasses, it should be kept in mind that countriesusually did not receive same quality marks forall three dimensions. Different quality levels wereoften combined and some were good performersin one aspect and at the same time bad perfor-mers in another one. However, if they reachedthe lowest mark of 0,5 in any dimension, thisled to their over-all ‘disqualification’. In the end,a ‘good practice’ in selecting participants is asmeaningless, if no adequate procedure is pro-vided, as a committee, where critical voices donot have any access.

Table 6 shows the ranking of countries ac-cording to this over-all index. The major find-ings can be summarized as follows:● On average the survey’s countries received

2,21 points out of a maximum of 6. This re-presents an achievement rate of just 37%,or to put it otherwise, a failure rate of 63%.

● There is only one single country (Ghana) whichperformed a ‘High Standard’. Only four cas-es were ‘Satisfactory’, a level where we wouldhave liked to see the ‘average case’ positioned;

● About half of the countries (8 out of 17) findthemselves in the low end category ‘Mini-mum Standard’. This result may still be seenas a success if it is taken into considerationthat the CSP/NIP was just the first round ofconsultation under the Cotonou agreementand therefore it may demonstrate that mostCentral Governments are ready to accept thenovelty of involving non-State actors; if how-ever, looked at it from a point of organisatio-nal and procedural weaknesses, consulta-tion appears not to have had any significantimpact on NIP-programming and it may betreated as a disappointing exercise;

● There were four countries where consulta-tion proofed to be a complete failure. WhileBenin, Madagascar and Ethiopia were poorperformers in all aspects, Kenya did partlywell and it just failed on a single aspect thatled to its downgrading.

If we look at consultation from a wider angleof the political regime, we can assume that au-tocratic or authoritarian styles of Governanceare less compatible, with the participation ofnon-State actors in policy decision, than de-mocracies based on pluralism and free elect-ions. It has already been noted that not a sin-gle country refused consultation entirely. There-fore we expect to find substantial discrepanciesbetween different political regimes concerninghow consultation was applied. A Government,based on free elections and challenged by civilsociety to improve on democratic practices, islikely to have ‘encountered’ consultation eventsin many other fields. It may feel less threatenedwith calls for consultation from critical or op-positional groups, and it may use former posit-ive experiments to come up with a more sub-stantial approach to consultation. An autocratic

29


Table 6: The Over-All Index: Quality of Consultation According to Countries(Quality = Representation (Time + Form)

regime, on the other hand, which is used to go-vern by decrees, may give in to external pres-sure from the EU, but it is more likely to arrangeconsultation in a manner that does not matter.

If we take the Freedom House index on de-mocracy, which looks at political rights and civilliberties and which groups countries as ‘free’,‘partly free’ and ‘not free’, the results are mostlyconsistent with our survey. A majority of count-ries, classified by Freedom House as ‘politicalfree’, are on the high end of our ranking list forconsultation while at the same time manycountries, grouped as ‘not free’, are also badperformers under Cotonou. However, there are

some notable exceptions which don’t fit intothis picture. Cameroon e.g. is an autocraticcountry, but it opened its doors for consultationunder Cotonou; on the other hand Benin andMadagascar are examples where freedom rightshave been established, but they are bad per-formers in our survey.

Nevertheless there is still no need to workwith a hypothesis, that autocratic regimes areconsultation-friendly while pluralistic regimesclose doors towards participation from non-State actors. In the cases mentioned not thegovernment but the EU seems to have been thedominant force in laying out the pattern of con-

Representation(max: 1,0)

Time(max: 3,0)

Form(max: 3,0)

Index Quality(max: 6,0)

Quality inConsultation

Freedom Housedemocracy index1

Ghana

Mauritius

Namibia

Senegal

Cameroon

Botswana

Tanzania

Cote d’Ivoire

Mozambique

Mali

Angola

Uganda

Zambia

Kenya

Ethiopia

Benin

Madagascar

0,0

0,9

1,0

0,6

0,7

0,6

0,7

0,6

0,9

0,8

0,7

0,6

0,6

0,3

0,6

0,8

0,35

3

2

1,5

3

1,5

3

1

2

1

1

1

1

1

2

0,5

0,5

1

69% (0,69) 51% (1,53)

3

3

3

2

2,5

1,5

2

1

1

1

1

1

1

2

1

0,5

1

54% (1,62)

5,4

4,5

4,5

3

2,8

2,7

2,1

1,8

1,8

1,6

1,4

1,2

1,2

1,2

0,9

0,8

0,7

37% (2,21)

High

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Minimum

Minimum

Minimum

Minimum

Minimum

Minimum

Minimum

Minimum

Disqualified

Disqualified

Disqualified

Disqualified

2,3 (free)

1,2 (free)

2,3 (free)

3,4 (partly free)

6,6 (not free)

2,2 (free)

4,4 (partly free)

5,4 (partly free)

3,4 (partly free)

2,3 (free)

6,6 (not free)

6,5 (not free)

5,4 (partly free)

5,4 (not free)

5,5 (partly free)

2,3 (free)

2,4 (free)

4,04

1 The Freedom House index uses the following ‘borderlines’: Free 1,0-2,5; partly free 3,0-5,5; not free 6-7.

MinimumAll Average

30

sultation. In Benin, the EU-delegation ‘blocked’NIP-consultation; in Madagascar, the EU agreedto, or even proposed, the one-sided selectionof participants; and in Cameroon, where anautocratic regime keeps civil society under sur-veillance, the EU invested heavily to make con-sultation a success.

A warning should be expressed here. Came-roon should not be taken as an example thatconsultation will be successful if only the EUapplies sufficient pressure and/or invests suf-ficient money into the process. The currentcountry’s HIPC-programme (heavily indebtedpoor countries) shows clearly the flexible adap-tation of an autocratic government to externalpressure for involving civil society. Instead ofblocking consultation in programming for HIPCthe regime seems to stop unwanted program-mes at the latest moment, when they are al-ready approved and only the release of moneyis needed for their implementation.

2.5. Regional Disparities in Consultation

Up to this point, differences in consultationhave been treated as differences betweencountries. At the same time sub-Saharan Africais grouped into regions which, to some extent,stem from the different modes of colonisationand decolonisation or which are due to its ownendeavours towards regional integration. To-day, the whole continent is grouped into a va-riety of regional cooperation models reachingfrom monetary unions to common trade zoneson the economic side. On the political side,unionism with regional parliaments or peaceand security treaties become ever more im-portant dimensions of inter-state relations. TheEU with its approach to ‘Regional EconomicPartnership Agreements’ is in particular keento foster regional integration.

The negotiation of regional EPAs is open forthe participation of non-State actors. It wouldhave been interesting to group our survey count-

ries according to these regional negotiatingblocks. While writing this report, however, theregional set-ups for the ACP-EU negotiationswere not clear yet. With only seven out of the48 sub-Saharan African countries belonging toonly one regional agreement and all the othersbelonging to two (26 countries) or three (15countries) or in one case (Democratic Republicof Congo) even to four regional economic group-ings, overlapping membership is a severetumbling block to which structure should fi-nally get the mandate for negotiations. Insteadof using ECOWAS, UEMOA, IGAD, COMESA, EACand SADC, we have simply grouped our surveycountries into geographical regions. Table 7shows the findings for ‘West Africa’, ‘East Africa’and ‘Southern Africa’.

The major findings of the table can be sum-marized as follows:● The overall-shortcomings in consultation

are substantial for all three regions as noneof the regions qualified for an over-all ‘Satis-factory’ (2,8 points) and all received the ‘Mini-mum Standard’;

● Nevertheless there are considerable regio-nal differences. West Africa and SouthernAfrica just missed the ‘satisfactory class’ byan edge while East Africa is way behind andcould just barely avoid the ‘disqualificationstamp’;

● West Africa and Southern Africa had largeinner-regional differences. We may speak ofan inner ‘dichotomy’ in both regions. In Sou-thern Africa Namibia, Mauritius and Bots-wana were the better performers while Ma-dagascar, Zambia and Angola were at thelower end of our ranking. At the same timeGhana and Senegal were the ‘shining’ examp-les in West Africa while Cote d’Ivoire, Beninand Mali had to be labelled as very weakcases;

● East Africa, while trading behind, was themost homogeneous region of the three interms of both, inner-regional differences and


31


differences between the various dimensionsof consultation. With Ethiopia and Kenyagetting ‘disqualified’ and Uganda just mis-sing out on that the region earned the label‘uniformity in bad performance’.

While the regions showed substantial disparit-ies in all aspects of consultation, the biggestdifferences were recorded for ‘representation’.Table 8 discloses details of regional differencesin representation.

The major findings can be summarized asfollows:● There is no regional difference in the way go-

vernments look at the business sector and atNGOs. These two groups are the dominantplayers on the side of non-State actors;

● The regions again have a uniform policy to-wards Local Government, but in a negativesense. All regions vastly refused the consul-tation of the lowest tier of state administrat-ion. The intention of the ACP-EU agreement,to give this sector a strong voice, did notmaterialise in any region;

Table 7: Differences in Consultation According to Regions

Representation(max: 1,0)

Time(max: 3,0)

Form(max: 3,0)

Index Quality(max: 6,0)

Quality inConsultation

Freedom Housedemocracy index1

2001-02

55% (0,55)


West Africa

Ghana

Senegal

Cameroon

Cote d’Ivoire

Mali

Benin

East Africa

Tanzania

Uganda

Kenya

Ethiopia

Southern Africa

Mauritius

Namibia

Botswana

Mozambique

Angola

Zambia

Madagascar

All Average

72% (0,72)

69% (0,69)

61% (1,83)

38% (1,13)

50% (1,50)

51% (1,53)

56% (1,67)

50% (1,50)

0,9

0,6

0,7

0,6

0,8

0,8

0,7

0,6

0,3

0,6

0,9

1,0

0,6

0,9

0,7

0,6

0,35

3

2

1,5

2

1

0,5

1

1

2

0,5

2

1,5

3

1

1

1

1

3

2

2,5

1

1

0,5

2

1

2

1

3

3

1,5

1

1

1

1

55% (1,64)

54% (1,62)

43% (2,57)

23% (1,35)

40% (2,40)

37% (2,21)

5,4

3

2,8

1,8

1,6

0,8

2,1

1,2

1,2

0,9

4,5

4,5

2,7

1,8

1,4

1,2

0,7

3,7 (partly free)

2,3 (free)

3,4 (partly free)

6,6 (not free)

5,4 (partly free)

2,3 (free)

2,3 (free)

5,7 (not free)

4,4 (partly free)

6,5 (not free)

6,5 (not free)

5,5 (partly free)

3,4 (partly free)

1,2 (free)

2,3 (free)

2,2 (free)

3,4 (partly free)

6,6 (free)

5,4 (partly free)

2,4 (free)

4,04

Minimum

High

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Minimum

Minimum

Disqualified

Minimum

Minimum

Minimum

Disqualified

Disqualified

Minimum

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Minimum

Minimum

Minimum

Minimum

Disqualified

Minimum


73% (0,73)

32


● The dominant disparities between the regionsare towards trade unions and research in-stitutes. West Africa ignores research insti-tutes, but gives some considerations to tradeunions; East Africa ignores trade unions butallows, to some extent, research institutes tocome forward with proposals for develop-ment policies;

Table 8: Differences in Representation According to Regions and Countries

● Southern Africa is more balanced and showsa significant participation of both, tradeunions and research institutes. But it showsinternally a clear dichotomy: those countrieswhich call on trade unions are inviting as wellexperts from research institutes while thosewhich ignore workers’ representatives arenot keen either to look for scientific advice.

Trade Unions

(weight 0,2)

Employers Org. /Business Chamber

(weight 0,2)

Civil SocietyOrg./NGOs(weight 0,4)

ResearchInstitutes

(weight 0,1)

Local Govern-ment Assoc.(weight 0,1)

Total Points

1 including NGOs set up by Government (GONGOs)

55% (1,64)

50%

25%

43%

41%

100%

87,5%

93%

94%

100%

62,5%

93%

88%

17%

75%

57%

47%

17%

0%

21%

15%

(0,73)

(0,55)

(072)

(069)

West Africa

Ghana

Benin

Mali

Cameroon

Cote d’Ivoire

Senegal

East Africa

Tanzania

Ethiopia

Uganda

Kenya

Southern Africa

Namibia

Mauritius

Mozambique

Angola

Botswana

Zambia

Madagascar

All Africa

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X (50%)

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X (50%)

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X1 (50%)

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X (50%)

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X (50%)

0,9

0,8

0,8

0,7

0,6

0,6

0,7

0,6

0,6

0,3

1

0,9

0,9

0,7

0,6

0,6

0,35

33

S U M M A R Y A N D R E C O M M E N D A T I O N S

➞ Between June and November 2002, the FESdid an empirical survey of 17 countries insub-Saharan Africa to throw more light onone of the novelties of the newly signed ACP-EU-partnership agreement (Cotonou agree-ment), the consultation of non-State actorsin the policy-making process. While ‘theright to consultation’ has been granted atseveral ‘policy fronts’, only the planning andprogramming of EU development aid featur-ed prominently during the phase of our datacollection. Thus the study focussed on theparticipation of non-State actors during theprocess of drafting the so-called ‘nationalindicative programmes’ (NIPs).

➞ To be able to compare 17 disparate nationalcases, a simple ‘model’ was constructedwhich defined “Quality of consultation = Re-presentation x (Time + Format)”. The threeconstituent dimensions were operationalisedand quantified in such a way that an over-all assessment for consultation became pos-sible which allowed the ranking of countriesaccording to quality groups.

➞ There was not a single country which didnot invite one sort of non-State actor or theother for consultation. This came as a posi-tive surprise as there is no clear declarationin the Cotonou agreement what might hap-pen, if a country refuses any involvementof non-State structures entirely. While thethreat or mere the possibility of being side-lined by the EU may have been an ‘incent-

ive’ to broaden participation, central govern-ments at least seem to have accepted thatthe future of ACP-EU relations will not re-main an exclusive resort for State players.

➞ ‘Representation’ was tested along partici-pation of five sectors, the ‘trade unions’, ‘em-ployer associations/business chambers’,‘civil society groups/NGOs’, ‘research insti-tutes’ and ‘local government associations’.Those in charge of inviting non-State actorsfor consultation usually accepted the at-tendance of the business sector (94%) andof the civil society/NGOs (88%) while tradeunions (41%) and experts of research insti-tutes (47%) were excluded in more than halfof the countries. The intention of the ACP-EU agreement, to give Local Governments astrong voice in consultation, failed complet-ely insofar as only two cases (Namibia, Ca-meroon) existed where an ‘association oflocal authorities’ was invited to share theirviews on the policy document.

➞ The ‘time factor’ was operationalised alongthe length of consultation and its phasing.Only three countries were classified as ‘HighStandard’ by having consultation right fromthe initial phase, when parameters were set,through the next phases, when drafts werediscussed and amended, up to the final stage,from where on the NIP-draft was forwardedto the EU for adoption.The majority group consisted of those count-ries which ignored non-State actors in the

III. Summary and Recommendations

34

initial phase, called on their reactions to thefirst draft and, thereafter, continued pro-gramming behind closed doors. Thus con-sultation was a single-phase-event, and policydrafts as well as programmes were changedand amended during the stages in whichno private actor was involved.Extreme negative cases were two countries(Benin, Ethiopia) which called on non-Stateactors, at a time when the policy documentwas already finalized. Such a late participat-ion derails consultation and led to the dis-qualification of these countries.

➞ The ‘form of consultation’ was operationalis-ed by indicators which reflect on the partici-pants’ procedural rights and on their inten-sity to prepare for meetings and to consultwith one’s own constituency. Only five count-ries institutionalised consultation in formof a committee. These committees usuallyhad existed even before the NIP-processstarted so that they were given an additio-nal mandate to care for Cotonou. However,representation in these standing commit-tees was quite narrow. In addition to theroutine procedure in the existing sub-com-mittee, some countries organized an one-offevent to include organisations which werenot part of any regular meetings. This, infact, led to a ‘double track approach’, witha narrow representation in a firmly insti-tutionalised committee, and to a wider parti-cipation for a shorter and more unstructuredconsultation outside the committee.In most cases consultation took the form ofan ‘oral dialogue’. Indeed there were onlythree countries which reported on the exist-ence of written proposals and comments.This neglect of writing indicates low res-ponsiveness and a low level of expertise.Written proposals allow wider circulation– a special aspect when it comes to embraceopinions from one’s own constituency – and

they are likely to improve the quality of pro-posals since authors will give more pru-dence to their statements and since they willtry to include external expertises. Oral con-sultation, on the other side, may speed updecision-making as positions are less ce-mented and since winners and losers areless obvious. Therefore an ‘oral dialogue only’may be less antagonistic and more opentowards compromises. The fact, however,that the overwhelming practice was ‘talkingonly’ points out to a general low level ofpreparation on the side of the non-Stateactors.

➞ The over-all quality of consultation, whichwas received by linking the individual com-ponents through a mathematical equationinto an index, shows the following results:In our survey only one country (Ghana) re-ceived a well-done-compliment for ‘HighStandard’ consultation and only four addi-tional cases (Mauritius, Namibia, Senegal,Cameroon) could be grouped under ‘Satis-factory’, a level we would have liked to re-serve for the average country. Eight ACP-members, however, had to be classified at‘Minimum Standard’ while four countries(Benin, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar) wereeven ‘Disqualified’ due to deficits of such amagnitude that the whole consultationexercise was rendered meaningless.

➞ There were remarkable regional similaritiesand differences. West Africa and SouthernAfrica were amazingly equal on the overallperformance as well as on their score forindividual components. Both also show aninner-regional difference which allows usto speak of an inner ‘dichotomy’. In SouthernAfrica Namibia, Mauritius and Botswanawere the better performers while Madagas-car, Zambia and Angola were on the lowerend of ranking; Ghana and Senegal were


35


the ‘shining’ examples in West Africa whileCote d’Ivoire, Benin and Mali had to be la-belled as weak cases for consultation.East Africa, on the other side, was a case ofits own on nearly all aspects. It traded solidlybehind the other two regions in terms of theover-all score as well as in terms of the per-formance on the various components. EastAfrica was also a case of its own insofar, asit turned out to be a homogenous region.However, with Ethiopia and Kenya getting‘disqualified’ and Uganda just missing outon that, the region earned the label ‘unifor-mity in bad performance’.Regional similarities and differences canalso be seen on the ‘participation index’. Allthree regions gave preferential treatmentto the business sector and to NGOs and theyall ignored ‘Local Government’ structures.The dominant disparities between the re-gions are towards trade unions and researchInstitutes. West Africa ignores research in-stitutes, but considers trade unions to someextent; East Africa ignores trade unions, butallowssome research institutes to participatein consultation. Southern Africa is more ba-lanced and shows a significant participationof trade unions as well as of research in-stitutes.

Recommendations

➞ The direction of improving consultation, tomake it more meaningful, is quite clear: Ithas to take place at all levels. There is a needfor a more comprehensive representation ofparticipants by adding more sectors and car-ing for the plurality of organisations andinstitutions within each sector; there is aneed to strengthen responsive representa-tion, and not just formal or ‘window’ repre-sentation, by allowing leaders to consultwith their constituencies; further on thereis a need to include consultation in the initial

phases of programming and not only at theend when most decision are already pre-fixed and when consultation becomes morea commentary on project implementation;there is a need to invest more time in pre-paring meetings and in looking for externaladvise; and there is a need to encouragethe writing of proposals and to move beyond‘talking-only’.

➞ There are substantial problems concerningthe selection of participants. There may bea need for an actors’ mapping which out-lines structures, size and relevance of non-State society, which explains selection cri-teria for participation and which comes upwith a suggestion who should be invited.Such lists should be debated in public fortheir accurateness and fairness. Deviationin the actual invitation policy from such listsshould be explained publicly.

➞ Devolution of consultation to standing com-mittees may improve quality of contribut-ions and it may increase the impact of com-mittee members on the final policy outcome.However, ‘specialisation’ may lead to an in-ner circle of ‘isolated consultants’. A double-track approach, with a strong involvementof non-State actors in permanent commit-tees and occasional public hearings, mayallow to take advantage of both: efficiencythrough specialisation and transparencythrough public access.

➞ In many countries consultation processesmay be more efficient if they are not orga-nized in full assembly mode, but when theyare departmentalised. Debating separatelywith different groups is likely to have a posi-tive impact on the quality of individual con-tributions, but creates ‘worries’ as to whatwill happen when the different views are‘pulled together’. It is important that, in the

36

beginning, the terms of consultation are laidout and brought to everybody’s attention.The same is valid for ‘the end’. While con-sultation does not imply a right, to have one’spoint of views and proposals considered,there is a need, for the sake of accountabilityand transparency, to explain what has hap-pened with all the suggestions and propos-als. Segmented consultation should be re-as-sembled at the end by a ‘report-back’ phase.

➞ Organisations with a large membershipshould be decisive players in consultationand they need capacity building especiallyat three fronts: Training programmes forleadership, internal communication betweenofficials and membership; research capacityfor data collection and processing and forpreparation of project and policy proposals.The Cotonou agreement provides a fundingplatform and there is an indication that closeto 5% or 170 Million Euros of the develop-ment envelope (altogether about 3,5 BillionEuros), may be used for such purposes5.There should be no doubt that capacitybuilding and support programmes from theinternational development aid communityhave already led to a mushrooming of NGOswhich have contributed to the externalisa-tion of expertise from State and universities.It would be naive to believe that such supportprogrammes, despite all its well-meaning,would not pose a danger when it comes tosocio-economic interest groups like tradeunions. Competent leadership in such orga-nisations is a scarce commodity and a focuson Cotonou affairs is likely to lead to lessleadership attention to other, maybe moreimportant, business. If this ‘crowding-out’is driven through generous incentives, liketravel allowance, per diems, honoraria orother perks provided by donors, the organi-sational cost of participating in consultation


may go beyond the pure neglect of otherbusiness. In addition cracks in the leader-ship may arise about who is qualified forattendance of programmes. Splinter organi-sations may be a ‘market reaction’ to strongfinance for capacity-building. Avoidingfragmentation and ‘splinter effects’, shouldbe conditions of any externally funded sup-port programmes and guidelines shouldensure that capacity building is promotingorganisational unity.

➞ The same argument applies when capacitybuilding programmes are geared towardsbuilding representative structures wherethere have been none before. This may bethe case when donor funds are provided toregionally dispersed grass root structuresto built national groups and alliances. Theestablishment of central bodies, while beingan important element in effective represent-ation and in many cases welcomed by do-nors to ease their own communication andadministration problems, should not be onthe agenda of capacity building projects. Ad-ditional organisational layers in a verticalsense should spring up from an internal re-source base. The motto always applies: Fund-ing provides the means of control and, wherethere is no financial dependency on its mem-bership, the top layer of an organisation isnot likely to listen to the calls from below.

➞ There is a need to establish a monitoring sys-tem for consultation which evaluates thepro-gress and which gives recommendationas to how participation of non-State actorscan be strengthened. It is obvious, that suchmonitoring cannot be done by the EU, thenational Central Government or the non-State actors involved in consultation, but itshould be independent from any of the ‘in-terested parties’.

5 European Commission, Implementation of the Cotonou Agreement …. op.cit., p.15.

37

Appendix

39

A P P E N D I X A

39

1. Participation in Negotiations on EconomicPartnership Agreements

ARTICLE 37Procedures

“1. Economic partnership agreements shallbe negotiated during the preparatory periodwhich shall end by 31 December 2007 at thelatest. Formal negotiations of the new tradingarrangements shall start in September 2002and the new trading arrangements shall enterinto force by 1 January 2008, unless earlier datesare agreed between the Parties.

2. All the necessary measures shall be takenso as to ensure that the negotiations are success-fully concluded within the preparatory period.To this end, the period up to the start of the for-mal negotiations of the new trading arrange-ments shall be actively used to make initialpreparations for these negotiations.

3. The preparatory period shall also be usedfor capacity-building in the public and privatesectors of ACP countries, including measuresto enhance competitiveness, for strengtheningof regional organisations and for support toregional trade integration initiatives, whereappropriate with assistance to budgetary ad-justment and fiscal reform, as well as for infra-structure upgrading and development, and forinvestment promotion.

4. The Parties will regularly review the pro-gress of the preparations and negotiations and,will in 2006 carry out a formal and compre-hensive review of the arrangements plannedfor all countries to ensure that no further timeis needed for preparations or negotiations.

5. Negotiations of the economic partnershipagreements will be undertaken with ACP count-ries which consider themselves in a position

Appendix A

The Cotonou Treaty: Extracts on the Participation of Non-State Actors

to do so, at the level they consider appropriateand in accordance with the procedures agreedby the ACP Group, taking into account regio-nal integration process within the ACP.

6. In 2004, the Community will assess thesituation of the non-LDC which, after consul-tations with the Community decide that they arenot in a position to enter into economic partner-ship agreements and will examine all alterna-tive possibilities, in order to provide these count-ries with a new framework for trade which isequivalent to their existing situation and inconformity with WTO rules”.

2. Participation in Political Dialogue

ARTICLE 8Political dialogue

“1. The Parties shall regularly engage in acomprehensive, balanced and deep politicaldialogue leading to commitments on both sides.

2. The objective of this dialogue shall be toexchange information, to foster mutual under-standing, and to facilitate the establishment ofagreed priorities and shared agendas, in par-ticular by recognising existing links between thedifferent aspects of the relations between theParties and the various areas of cooperation aslaid down in this Agreement. The dialogue shallfacilitate consultations between the Parties withininternational fora. The objectives of the dialogueshall also include preventing situa-tions arisingin which one Party might deem it necessary tohave recourse to the non-execution clause.

3. The dialogue shall cover all the aims andobjectives laid down in this Agreement as wellas all questions of common, general, regionalor sub-regional interest. Through dialogue, theParties shall contribute to peace, security and

40

A P P E N D I X A

stability and promote a stable and democraticpolitical environment. It shall encompass co-operation strategies as well as global and sec-toral policies, including environment, gender,migration and questions related to the culturalheritage.

4. The dialogue shall focus, inter alia, on spe-cific political issues of mutual concern or of gene-ral significance for the attainment of the object-ives of this Agreement, such as the arms trade,excessive military expenditure, drugs and orga-nised crime, or ethnic, religious or racial discri-mination. The dialogue shall also encompass aregular assessment of the developments con-cerning the respect for human rights, democraticprinciples, the rule of law and good governance.

5. Broadly based policies to promote peaceand to prevent, manage and resolve violent con-nflicts shall play a prominent role in this dialogue,as shall the need to take full account of the ob-jective of peace and democratic stability in thedefinition of priority areas of cooperation.

6. The dialogue shall be conducted in a flex-ible manner. Dialogue shall be formal or infor-mal according to the need, and conducted with-in and outside the institutional framework, inthe appropriate format, and at the appropriatelevel including regional, sub-regional or natio-nal level”

3. Participation in the Programming ofEU-Development Aid on National Level(Country Support Strategy – Country StrategyPaper – National Indicative Pogramme)

ARTICLE 19Principles and objectives

“[..] 3. Governments and non-State actorsin each ACP country shall initiate consultationson country development strategies and com-munity support thereto.”

ARTICLE 33Institutional development and capacity building

“[..] 5. Cooperation shall span all areas andsectors of cooperation to foster the emergence

of non-State actors and the development oftheir capacities; and to strengthen structuresfor information, dialogue and consultation be-tween them and the national authorities, in-cluding at regional level.”

ARTICLE 57Guidelines

“[..] 3. Without prejudice to the provisionsabove, eligible non-State actors may also be res-ponsible for proposing and implementing pro-grammes and projects in areas concerning them.”

ARTICLE 81Procedures

“Management procedures shall be transpa-rent, easy to apply and shall enable the decentra-lisation of tasks and responsibilities to the field.The implementation of ACP-EU development co-operation shall be open to non-State actors inareas that concern them. The detailed proceduralprovisions for programming, preparation, im-plementation and the management of financialand technical cooperation are laid down in An-nex IV on Implementation and Management Pro-cedures. The Council of Ministers may review,revise and amend these provisions on the basisof a recommendation from the ACP-EC Develop-ment Finance Cooperation Committee”.

4. Participation in the Programming ofEU-Development Aid on Regional Level(Regional Strategy Paper – Regional IndicativeProgramme)

ARTICLE 8 (Annex IV)Regional programming

“Programming shall take place at the levelof each region. The programming shall be a re-sult of an exchange of views between the Com-mission and the duly mandated regional orga-nisation(s) concerned, and in the absence of sucha mandate, the National Authorising Officers ofthe countries in that region. Where appropriate,programming may include a consultation witheligible non-State actors.”

40

41

A P P E N D I X B

Country surveys on the capacities of politicaland social actors to shape and implementthe provisions of the Cotonou Agreementbetween the European Union and the ACP-Group of States: Terms of Reference (ToR)

1. Scope of Survey

1.1. BackgroundThe Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung has decided to

elaborate a project strategy with the aim tosupport its African partners to enhance theircapacity to make a significant contribution tothe implementation of the provisions of theCotonou Agreement between the EU and theACP. In order to develop such a strategy theFES embarks on a country as well as a projectspecific problem analysis. Part of such an ana-lysis is the assessment of the present capacitiesof political and social actors to articulate theirinterests with respect to and bring them to barein the on-folding relation between Europe andAfrica under the Cotonou agreement.

According to the ACP General Secretariatthere are in this respect four areas in whichthe ACP countries are facing challenges: the newprovisions on political dialogue, the involvementof non-state actors in application of the Cotonou-Treaty, the establishment of a new trade regimeand the reviewed mechanisms and new pro-visions for financial co-operation and develop-ment assistance.

During a recent conference of the Africa de-partment of the FES there was a general con-sensus that the Foundation should particularlyseek to develop a strategy towards the threefirst areas mentioned by the ACP-General Se-

cretariat i.e.:Political dialogue, Involvement ofnon state actors, Development of a new traderegime.

1.2. Who is to Be Assessed?The country surveys should identify existing

capacities of the relevant social and politicalactors in this respect. Given the fact that whatconstitutes relevant social and political actorsvaries from country to country it is left to eachcountry office of the FES to provide more spe-cific guidance on this matter. However in everycountry the assessment should include the fol-lowing general categories of social and politicalactors:

Categories of non-State actorsa) National trade union organisationsb) National Employers organisations/ business

associationsc) Civil society networks (if there are none than

the major groupings in civil society)d) Women organisationse) Universities and research institutionsf) Local government authoritiesg) Other specific partner organisations of the

FES where relevantCategories of State actors

a) Presidency, Ministries and other organs ofcentral government administration

b) The Parliament and in particular relevantcommittees

c) Regional organisations (where present)

1.3. What is to Be Assessed?For each of the three identified focus areas

there are specific issues linked to articles of theCotonou agreement that should be assessed.

41

Appendix B

Country Survey: The FES-Questionnaire

4242

A P P E N D I X B

They have been chosen because they constitutethe legal basis for certain rights and benefitsACP actors can derive from the agreement. Inother words these articles provide concreteopportunities for African political and socialactors to articulate their interests in the re-lationship with the European Union. In order

to ensure comparability between the manycountry surveys it is imperative that a commonstructure be followed. The structure for thesurvey and the questions to be answered areas follows. Please provide an answer to allquestions even if it is in the negative.

2. Questionnaire – Structure of Country Report

2.1: General Data (0,5 Page)

Name of your country:

Geographical size of your country:

Size of population:

Membership in Regional Organizations, such asUEMOA, ECOWAS, SADC, COMESA, EAC etc:

Political system of your country:

Devolution of powers, i.e. existence of decentralizedregional and/or local government authorities:

Calendar for the next coming elections up to 2008,i.e. presidential, parliamentary, regional, local:

Classification of your country according toWorld Freedom House:

Ranking No. according to World Bank

Ranking No according to Human Development Index:

Ranking No according to Transparency International:

Status of your country as a LDC or a non-LDC:

2.2: Current State of Ratification of theCotonou Treaty (0,5 Page)

Has the Parliament of your country alreadyratified the Cotonou-Treaty?

If yes: date of ratification, date of publicationin the official law gazette

If no: when is the ratification to be expected?Please quote briefly the reasons for the delay:

2.3: Current State of Consultation andNegotiations

Give an overview of the current situationin your country with regard to the issues listed.

Introductory remarks (if need be):

2.3.1. Country Strategy Paper (2-5 Pages)In which stage is the CSP? Is it ready?Who prepared it?How long did the process take?What publicity existed in the country?

Who were the national actors, that participat-ed:

● State actors?● Non-State Actors?

How did the non-State-Actors participate?● invited / selected by whom?● Presented position paper / attended which

meetings?● Consulted in early stage or only to comment

on final draft?

4343

A P P E N D I X B

Timetable of events (Summary of the pre-vious)!

List of relevant Documents (Docs to be at-tached)!

Other issues, not mentioned above, but im-portant for understanding the state of affairs !

2.3.2. National Indicative Programme (1-2 Pages)Same questions as under 2.3.1.

2.3.3. Regional Strategy Paper (1-2 Pages)Same questions as under 2.3.1.

2.3.4. Regional Indicative Programme (1-2 Pages)Same questions as under 2.3.1.

2.3.5. Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA)(1-2 Pages)

Same questions as under 2.3.1.

2.4. Social and Political Actors:Identification and CharacterisationPlease refer to the general categories of so-

cial and political actors as listed under 1.2.!Introductory remarks (if need be)

2.4.1. Non-State Actors: (2-3 Pages)The Cotonou agreement lists three criteria

for selecting Non-State Actors: Must representneeds of population; must have competencies;must be organized democratically.

2.4.1.1. Which among the non state actorsare the relevant organisations and should par-ticipate in the Cotonou process? Pls. list themindividually according to the sectoral listingabove. Briefly characterise their organisationalprofile.

● Trade Unions● National Employers organisations/busi-

ness associations● Etc (follow classification under 1.2.)2.4.1.2. Which among the Non-State actors

have already participated but their relevancymay be doubted? Which organisations shouldparticipate but their participation is doubtful?Which would like to participate but are facedwith barriers?

● Do/Did participate but are not important:● Should participate but are reluctant to do

so:● Want to participate but are faced with bar-

riers:

2.4.2. State Actors (1 Page)Under the general categories of social and

political actors stated above which among thestate actors are the relevant departments, in-stitutions and governmental agencies in respectof the relation between the European Unionand the ACP States? Briefly characterise theirorganisational profile.

● Departments, Agencies etc.● Parliament

2.5. Participation of Non-State Actors:Type of Involvement (1-3 Pages)Of those Non-State Actors, involved in the

Cotonou process since the signing of the Coto-nou agreement: What was their contribution?Introductory remarks (if need be)

a) Trade Unionsa1): What is/was their involvement in formu-

lating the country support strategy (CSS)a2): What is/was their involvement in the

implementation of co-operation programmes?Did they introduce own proposals?

a3): Briefly assess the willingness and ca-pacity of them to fulfil the provisions of art. 4of the agreement?

b) Employers Organisations/Business associations

b1): What is/was their involvement in for-mulating the country support strategy (CSS)

b2): What is/was their involvement in theimplementation of co-operation programmes?Did they introduce own proposals?

b3) Briefly assess the willingness and ca-pacity of them to fulfil the provisions of art. 4of the agreement?

c) etc (follow classification under 1.2.)(Under Section 1 you listed the presence of

social and political actors in the process. Here,you should assess the quality and relevancy oftheir participation). Pls. use the same classifi-

4444

A P P E N D I X B

cation as above. If whole sector does/did notparticipate, just state: ‘no participation’. Ifassessment of participation is not possible, juststate: ‘no assessment possible’.

2.6.Definition and Selection of Non-StateActors (0,5 Page)Art 6 provides a definition of non state actors

and lays the basis for a criteria of selection. Howdoes this appear in comparison to the situationin your country? How are the criteria operatio-nalized (if at all)? Who selects? How fair is theselection?

2.7.Arrangements for Participation ofNon-State Actors (0,5 Page)

Art. 7 stresses the particular importance ofcommunity organisations as well as non-profitnon-governmental organisations and stipulatesthe establishment of specific arrangements toallow them to effectively take part in the design,implementation and evaluation of developmentstrategies of ACP States. Is such an arrangementin place in your country/region? If so, how doesit work (pls. describe in detail)?

2.8.Political Dialogue (1-2 Page)Art 8.7 stipulates that representatives of

civil society organizations shall be involved inthe political dialogue between the EU and ACPStates.

2.8.1. What kind of political dialogue didso far take place between national State actorsand the EU according to Art. 8.2., 8.3., 8.4.,8.5. and which issues have been discussed ?

2.8.2. Which Non State actor in your count-ry have so far been associated to the politicaldialogue?

2.8.3. How were they involved?2.8.4. What was their contribution?2.8.5. Briefly assess the capacity of the so-

cial and political actors to fulfil this clause!2.8.6. Have the Art. 96 and 97 been evoked

in your country since ratification of the Cotonoutreaty?

If yes, please describe under which circums-tances?

2.9. New Trade Relationship (2-3 Pages)Art. 37 constitutes the legal basis for the

establishment of a new trading arrangementbetween the EU and the ACP States. This re-lation is to be defined in the process of nego-tiations. Negotiations are to commence by 2002.

2.9.1. Which of the social and political actorshave made a contribution to defining a nego-tiation stance?

2.9.2. What are the issues being raised?2.9.3. What is the impact on the official nego-

tiation position of your country/region?Art. 37.6 leaves it to the individual ACP

States of non-LDC Staus to decide by 2004 whe-ther they want or not to enter into a economicpartnership agreement.

2.9.4. Which social and political actors inyour country/region are debating this matter?

2.9.5. What are the issues raised?2.9.6. What is the general tendency?Art. 37.5 gives ACP States the right to decide

whether they want to engage in a new trade ar-rangement on an individual basis or in the con-text of a regional grouping.

2.9.7. Which social and political actors inyour country/region are debating this matter?

2.9.8. What are the issues raised?2.9.9. What is the general tendency (ma-

jority position)?

3. Concluding Remarks (0,5 Page)

What is the summary of your findings in termsof the awareness of the Cotonou-Treaty and itsimplication among state and non-state actors;

the existing capacity of social and politicalactors to play an active and effective role in theshaping and implementation of the Cotonouagreement;

the established mechanisms for dialogue,consultation and participation of the variousactors?

Which are the major problems/challengesyou see for the forthcoming negotiations?

4545

A P P E N D I X B

NotesReference made in the questions to ‘country/

region’ is intended for those country that arehost to regional organisations or networks ofnon-state actors. They should be mentioned se-parately from national institutions or organi-sations.

Any information which has not been direct-ly obtained by the survey has to be quoted bythe source and the date of its validity.

The survey shall not exceed 25 pages. Pleasestick to the number of pages as indicated for

each section. The concluding remarks shouldnot exceed half a page.

The text of the survey shall be produced withWord for Windows Version 7 or later; with Type:Times Roman 12; space of 1.5 lines; bordersof 3 cm above, below, left and right.

Timing and datelinesThe survey shall be concluded and delivered

to FES-Bonn via the FES country-offices ashardcopy and text-file not later than 15 Sep-tember 2002 !

4646

A P P E N D I X C

Appendix C

Country Survey: List of Authors of Country Reports

Region / Country Author Organisation

West Africa

Benin Antoine S. Agbadome Minstère de l’Industrie, du Commerce etde la Promotion l’Emploi de Benin

Cameroon Emmanuel Noubissié Ngankam Association des Journalistes économiquedu Cameroun (AJEC)

Cote d’Ivoire Gabin Kponhassia Consultant

Ghana Dr. Kwasi Anyemedu Third World Network (TWN)

Mali Diarra, Fadio Consultant

Nigeria 7 Consultants Nigeria Institute for International Affairs (NIIA)

Senegal Amath Ba REZO Communication

East Africa

Ethiopia Abebe Teferi, ConsultantAdmit Zerihun Consultant

Kenya Oduor Ongwen; Director ECONEWS;Dr. Odek-Otieno; ConsultantMorara Ongwenyi. Consultant

Madagascar Dominique Rakotomala FES-MadagascarDr. K.-P. Treydte FES-Madagascar

Mauritius Pynee Chellapermal CEDREFIDr. K.-P. Treydte FES-Madagascar

Tanzania Peter Häussler, FES TanzaniaDr. Francis Matambalya University of Dar es SalaamSylvia Hangen-Riad Private Consultant

Uganda Robert Ekongot Development Alternatives (DEALS U),Kampala Uganda

Southern Africa

Angola Dr. Mário Alberto Adauta de Sousa Angola–Pesquisa Económica e Social,Director

Botswana Tiro Kayawe Bistwana Institute for DevelopmentPolicy Analysis (BIDPA)

Namibia Cristoph Stork NEPRU

Zambia Michael Schultheiss FES –Sambia

South Africa No Report No Report

Zimbabwe Dr. Dan Ndlela ZIMCONSULT

4747

A P P E N D I X D

Appendix D

Coun

try

Surv

ey: L

ist o

f Non

-Sta

te A

ctor

s Co

nsul

ted

for P

rogr

amm

ing

of C

ount

ry S

trat

egy

Pape

rs/ N

atio

nal I

ndic

ativ

e Pr

ogra

mm

es

Coun

trie

sTr

ade

Uni

ons

Empl

oyer

s A

ssoc

iati

ons/

Busi

ness

Ass

ocia

tion

s &

Cham

bers

Org

anis

atio

ns o

f Civ

il So

ciet

yRe

sear

ch In

stit

utes

Regi

onal

/ Lo

cal

Gov

ernm

ent

Adm

inis

trat

ion:

Ass

ocia

tion

s /

Repr

esen

tati

ves

Oth

ers

and

Rem

arks

Beni

nCS

A-Bé

nin

– Co

nféd

érat

ion

des

Synd

icats

aut

onom

es d

uBé

nin;

CGT

B –

Conf

édér

atio

ngé

néra

le d

es tr

avai

lleur

s du

Béni

n; C

SPIB

– C

entra

le d

essy

ndica

ts d

es se

cteu

r priv

é et

info

rmel

du

Béni

n; C

STB

–Co

nféd

érat

ion

des

synd

icats

des

trava

illeu

r du

Béni

n;UN

STB

– Un

ion

natio

nale

des

synd

icats

des

trav

aille

urs

duBé

nin;

CO

SI –

Con

fédé

ratio

nde

s or

gani

satio

ns s

yndi

cale

sin

dépe

ndan

tes.

Cham

bre

du C

omm

erce

et

d’In

dust

rie d

u Be

nin;

Con

seil

Nat

iona

l pou

r l’E

xpor

tatio

n;As

socia

tion

de D

ével

oppe

men

tde

s Ex

porta

tions

.

FOSA

C; C

onso

rtium

Ala

fia␣;

ROBS

␣; R

EDAD

␣;RA

CB␣;

G/Pi

FED␣

; GNT

ENF;

Inst

itut K

iliman

jaro

;G

NT/

P2CD

; Rés

eau

JEB;

WIL

DAF/

BEN

IN.

(Miss

ion

deDe

cent

ralis

atio

n)Be

caus

e th

e EU

and

the

Gove

rn-

men

t of B

enin

con

sider

ed th

eco

nsul

tatio

n of

civil

socie

ty w

ithin

the

fram

ewor

k of

the

PRSP

(Pov

erty

Red

uctio

n St

rate

gyPa

per)

as s

uffic

ient

, no

furth

erco

nsul

tatio

n to

ok p

lace

on

NIP

and

CSP

. The

gro

ups l

isted

her

epa

rticip

ated

in tw

o se

min

ars o

r-ga

nise

d by

the

trade

min

istry

(in

coop

erat

ion

with

FES

) on

info

r-m

atio

n ab

out t

he C

oton

ou c

on-

tract

and

the

futu

re in

volve

men

tof

non

-Sta

te a

ctor

s. N

o de

bate

on th

e CS

P/N

IP d

raft

took

pla

ce.

Fédé

ratio

n N

atio

nale

du

Patro

nat

Ivoi

rien␣

; Féd

érat

ion

Nat

iona

leIn

dust

riels

et S

ervi

ces

de C

ote

’Ivoi

re;␣A

ssoc

iatio

ns d

es P

rofe

s-sio

nnel

s de

l’Ex

porta

tion

de C

ote

d’Iv

oire

; Féd

érat

ion

Nat

iona

le d

esCo

opér

ativ

es d

’Epa

rgne

et d

eCr

édit;

le P

ROM

EXA;

Ass

ocia

tion

Ivoi

rienn

e de

s Se

rvice

s de

Fina

ncem

ent D

écen

tralis

é;Fé

déra

tion

Ivoi

rienn

e de

s Pe

tites

et M

oyen

nes

Entre

prise

s; Fé

dé-

ratio

n de

s Fe

mm

es E

ntre

pren

eurs

pour

le D

ével

oppe

men

t Eco

-no

miq

ue e

t Soc

ial.

ASAP

SU (h

ealth

); RI

OF

Rése

au Iv

oirie

nd’

Org

anisa

tions

non

gou

vern

emen

tale

sfé

min

ines

; For

um/F

NSE

N; C

FRAR

; Col

lect

ifde

s O

rgan

isatio

ns N

on-G

ouve

rnem

enta

les

activ

es e

n Co

te d

’Ivoi

re; L

IDHO

Lig

ueIv

oirie

nne

des

Droi

ts d

e l’H

omm

e; O

NEF

(pro

mot

ion

de l’

éduc

atio

n de

la p

etite

fille

);G

ERDD

ES (p

rom

otio

n de

la d

émoc

ratie

).

Cons

titue

nt m

eetin

g fo

r con

-su

ltatio

n on

7 Ja

n. 2

002.

EU

told

Trad

e Un

ions

that

from

this

poin

t, th

eir p

artic

ipat

ion

is no

mor

e po

ssib

le.

Oth

er g

roup

spa

rticip

ated

in th

e m

akin

g of

the

first

CW

SP/ N

IP-d

raft.

Firs

t dra

ftw

as fo

rwar

ded

by G

over

nmen

tto

EU

whi

ch a

men

ded

draf

t.Ch

ange

s by

EU

did

not a

ffect

sect

or o

r pro

ject

focu

s bu

t the

budg

et s

ide.

The

new

CSP

/NIP

was

not

pre

sent

ed fo

r fur

ther

deba

te b

ut a

s fin

al d

ocum

ent.

Gro

ups,

who

par

ticip

ated

inco

nsul

tatio

n pr

otes

ted

this

proc

edur

e.

Cote

d’Iv

oire

Unio

n G

énér

ale

des

Trav

aille

urs

de C

ôte

d’Iv

oire

␣(U

GTC

I); F

édér

atio

n de

sSy

ndica

ts A

uton

omes

de

Côte

d’Iv

oire

(FES

ACI).

Trad

e Un

ions

par

ticip

ated

only

in th

e fir

st c

onst

ituen

tm

eetin

g. Th

erea

fter,

EUre

fuse

d pa

rticip

atio

n fro

mtra

de U

nion

s.

Coun

trie

s

Wes

t Afr

ica

4848

A P P E N D I X D

Gha

naUn

iver

sity

of G

hana

– IS

SER;

Inst

itute

of E

cono

mic

Affa

irs;

Cent

re fo

r Pol

icy A

nalys

is.

AGI –

Ass

ocia

tion

of G

hana

Indu

strie

s; PE

F –

Priva

te E

nter

prise

Foun

datio

n; C

ham

ber o

fCo

mm

erce

.

ISO

DEC;

TW

N-T

hird

Wor

ld N

etw

ork;

Aid

toAr

tisan

s (G

hana

); Ac

tion

Aid;

Wor

ld V

ision

.G

hana

has

est

ablis

hed

the

ACP-

EU c

omm

ittee

as

a su

b-co

mm

ittee

to th

e in

ter-

inst

itutio

nal c

omm

ittee

on

mul

tilat

eral

trad

e ne

gotia

tions

.Th

e co

mm

ittee

mee

ts re

gula

rly(la

test

: 29

Mar

ch 2

003)

. Civ

ilso

ciety

hol

ds m

embe

rshi

p in

the

com

mitt

ee th

roug

h TW

N-A

frica

and

Inte

grat

ed S

ocia

l Dev

elop

-m

ent C

ente

r (IS

ODE

C).

TUC

– Tr

ades

Uni

onCo

ngre

ss; G

NAT

– G

hana

Nat

iona

l Ass

ocia

tion

ofTe

ache

rs; G

RNA

– G

hana

Regi

ster

ed N

urse

sAs

socia

tion.

Cam

eroo

n

Mal

i

UCVC

– U

nion

de

Com

mun

es e

t de

Ville

sdu

Cam

erou

; AM

AC–

Asso

ciatio

n de

mai

res e

nAf

rique

Cen

trale

.

GIC

AM-G

roup

e In

ter P

atro

nal d

uCa

mer

oun.

ADAF

␣; ADE

BA; A

frica

n Fo

rest

Act

ion

Netw

ork;

Arch

idio

cèse

de

Doua

la; A

PDHA

C –

Asso

ciatio

n po

ur la

pro

mot

ion

de D

roits

de l’

Hom

me

en A

friqu

e Ce

ntra

le; A

PICA

-As

socia

tion

pour

la p

rom

otio

n de

s In

itiat

ves

Com

mun

auta

ires A

frica

ines

; ASS

EJA;

Asso

ciatio

n Ca

mer

ouna

ise d

e fe

mm

es ju

riste

s;AS

SODE

MAK

; CAF

OR;

CAF

RAD;

CAM

NAF

AW; C

ANAD

EL; C

APER

OD

CIPC

RE–

Cerc

le In

tern

atio

nal p

our l

a cr

éatio

n de

lapr

omot

ion;

Cen

tre p

our l

e De

velo

pmen

tau

toce

ntre

; CO

IC –

Cam

erou

n O

portu

nitie

sIn

dust

rializ

atio

n Ce

ntre

; CO

NG

AC –

Con

-fé

déra

tion␣

ON

G A

friqu

e Ce

ntra

le;

CRAD

IF;

CRDP

H –

ASSO

AL c

entre

de

Ress

ourc

es p

our

le D

ével

oppe

men

t; Do

ual’A

rt; F

AFCA

M –

Fede

ratio

n de

s Ass

ocia

tions

de

Fem

mes

au

Cam

erou

n; F

ON

GEC

– F

éder

atio

n de

sO

rgan

isatio

ns N

on G

ouve

rnm

enta

les

del’E

nviro

nnem

ent a

u Ca

mer

oun;

IDF;

INAD

ES F

orm

atio

n; JA

DE C

amer

oon

–SY

FIA-

Inte

rnat

iona

l; JE

DY; J

UNAC

EM;

Obs

erva

toire

Inte

rnat

iona

l de

Priso

ns;

ODE

COLD

; OFS

AD; P

an A

frica

n In

stitu

te fo

rDe

velo

pmen

t – W

est A

frica

; PRT

ÉGÉ

QV;

Rése

au In

tern

atio

nal A

gricu

lture

Pay

sann

eet

Mod

erni

satio

n en

Afri

que;

SAI

LD –

Serv

ice d

’app

ui a

ux in

itiat

ives

loca

les

dedé

velo

ppem

ent;

SERC

AADS

; Se

rvice

Oec

umén

ique

pou

r la

paix

at l

a pr

omot

ion

hum

aine

.

It is

not f

ully

clear

, whe

ther

list

of N

GO

s co

ntai

ns th

ose

invi

ted

and/

or th

ose

in a

ttend

ance

at

the

CSP/

NIP

-brie

fing

sess

ion

inJu

ly 20

01.

Fede

ratio

n N

atio

nal d

esEm

ploy

eurs

; Cha

mbr

e de

Com

-m

erce

et d

’Indu

strie

du

Mal

i.

Nam

es o

f Org

anisa

tions

wer

e no

t ava

ilabl

e.Co

nfed

erat

ion

Synd

icale

des T

rava

illeu

rs.

4949

A P P E N D I X D

n.a.

n.a.

Coun

try R

epor

t rej

ecte

d du

e to

poor

qua

lity

of d

ata.

n.a.

n.a.

Nig

eria

n.a.

CNES

– C

onfe

dera

tion

Nat

iona

lde

s Em

ploy

eurs

au

Sene

gal;

UNAC

OIS

– U

nion

Nat

iona

le d

esCo

mm

erca

nts

et In

dust

riels

duSe

nega

l; SC

IMPE

X-Sy

ndica

t des

Com

mer

cant

s, Im

porta

teur

,Pr

esta

taire

s de

s Se

rvice

s et

Expo

rtate

ur d

u Sé

néga

l.

Foru

m c

ivil;

End

a Ti

ers

Mon

de; R

ADDH

O –

Renc

ontre

afri

cain

e po

ur la

Def

ense

des

Dro

itsde

L’Ho

mm

e; A

SBEF

.

Sene

gal

Ethi

opia

n Ec

onom

ic As

socia

tion

(EEA

);Fo

rum

for S

ocia

l Scie

nces

(FSS

); (c

lose

togo

vern

men

t); W

omen

Law

yers

Ass

ocia

tion;

Inte

r Afri

ca G

roup

(not

inde

pend

ent);

Ethi

opia

n Hu

man

Rig

hts

Coun

cil (E

HRCO

);Ch

urch

es: E

thio

pian

Orth

odox

Chu

rch;

Islam

ic Ch

urch

of E

thio

pia;

Cat

holic

Chu

rch;

Prot

esta

nt C

hurc

h;Re

gion

al G

ON

GO

s: Re

lief S

ocie

ty o

f Tig

ray;

Amha

ra R

elie

f Org

anisa

tion;

Oro

mo

Self

Help

Org

anisa

tion;

Tigr

ay D

evel

opm

ent

Org

anisa

tion;

Oro

miya

Dev

elop

men

t; SN

NPR

Deve

lopm

ent A

ssoc

iatio

n Aw

asa.

Not

invi

ted/

no p

artic

ipan

Cen

tre fo

r Loc

alCa

pacit

y Bu

ildin

g.

Ethi

opia

Conf

eder

atio

n of

Eth

iopi

anTr

ade

Unio

ns (C

ETU)

.Et

hiop

ian

Cons

ulta

nts A

ssoc

iatio

n;Et

hiop

ian

Cont

ract

ors A

ssoc

iatio

n;As

socia

tion

of P

rivat

e In

dust

ries;

Ethi

opia

n Ch

ambe

r of C

omm

erce

;Et

hiop

ian

Wom

en E

ntre

pren

eurs

’As

socia

tion

(on

pape

r onl

y);

Asso

ciatio

n of

Priv

ate

Bank

s.

Not

invi

ted/

no p

artic

ipan

t: Ad

dis

Abab

a Ch

ambe

rs o

f Com

mer

ce.

Ethi

opia

n In

stitu

te o

f Pea

ce a

ndDe

velo

pmen

t; Et

hiop

ian

Econ

omic

Polic

y Re

sear

chIn

stitu

te.

Emba

ssie

s:Ita

ly, N

ethe

rland

s, Sp

ain,

UK,

Nor

way

, Can

ada,

Japa

n,Sw

itzer

land

;

Inte

rnat

iona

l/Mul

tilat

eral

Org

anisa

tions

:Ag

ence

Fra

ncai

se d

eDe

velo

pmen

t; US

AID;

FES

;AD

P; IM

F; Th

e W

orld

Ban

k;UN

DP; I

LO; I

OM

; FAO

;UN

ICEF

; UN

HCR;

WFP

;W

HO; I

FC; E

U-De

lega

tion.

Keny

aKe

nya A

ssoc

iatio

n of

Man

ufac

ture

rs;

Keny

a Fl

ower

Cou

ncil.

Keny

a In

stitu

te o

f Pol

icyRe

sear

ch a

nd A

nalys

is.

Mad

agas

car

CMR-

Cong

rès

Mal

agac

he d

e la

Rout

e␣(a

ssoc

iatio

n of

com

pani

es in

the

trans

port

sect

or a

nd ro

adco

nstru

ctio

n)

GTD

R-G

roup

es d

e Tr

avai

l sur

leDé

velo

ppem

ent R

ural

.G

TDR-

mem

bers

hip:

Rep

rese

ntat

ives

of l

ocal

adm

inist

ratio

n, lo

cal e

lect

ed g

over

nmen

t,pr

ivate

sect

or, f

arm

ers’

peas

ant o

rgan

izatio

ns,

NG

Os.

Via

GTD

RM

adac

gasc

ar is

t div

ided

into

20 s

tate

-org

anize

d G

TDRs

for r

ural

dev

elop

men

t.O

nly

GTD

Rs fr

om th

e So

uth

wer

e co

nsul

ted.

No

invit

atio

nfo

r gro

ups

with

urb

anco

nstit

uenc

ies.

Mau

riti

usM

aurit

ius L

abou

r Con

gres

s(M

LC);

Gen

eral

Ser

vice

Asso

ciatio

n (G

SA).

Cham

ber o

f Com

mer

ce;

Cham

ber o

f Agr

icultu

re;

Join

t Eco

nom

ic Co

uncil

(trip

artit

e)

MAC

OSS

-Mau

ritiu

s Cou

ncil o

f Soc

ial S

ervic

es.

CEDR

EFI

Big

ente

rpris

es;

East

Afr

ica

50

I N T E R N A T I O N A L L A B O U R S T A N D A R D S

50

A P P E N D I X D

Tanza

nia

Tanza

nia

Priva

te S

ecto

r Fo

undat

ion;

TCC

IA-T

ansa

nia

Cham

ber

of

Com

mer

ce; C

onfe

der

ati

on o

fTa

nza

nia

n Indust

ry.

TAC

OSO

DE –

Tansa

nia

Counci

l of

Soci

al

Dev

elopm

ent; T

AN

GO

– T

anza

nia

Ass

oci

atio

nof N

GO

’s; T

anza

nia

Ass

oci

atio

n of C

ons

ulta

nts;

TAH

EA

– T

anza

nia

Hom

e Eco

nom

ics

Ass

o-

ciat

ion; T

EDG

– T

anza

nia

Ecu

men

ical

Dia

logue

Gro

up; W

RD

P – W

omen

Res

earc

h an

d D

evel

op-

men

t Pro

gra

mm

e; E

OTF

– E

qual

Opport

unitie

sfo

r A

ll; V

ibin

do S

oci

ety;

Pove

rty

Afr

ica.

Univ

ersi

ty o

f D

ar

Es

Sala

m,

Facu

lty

of

Com

mer

ce a

nd

Man

agem

ent; E

SRF

– E

conom

ican

d S

oci

al R

esea

rch F

oundat

ion.

Pre

ss: M

ajira

; Dai

ly N

ews;

Guar

dia

n.

SNV

– N

ether

land D

evel

opm

ent

Org

anis

atio

n; T

ATE

DO

– T

anza

nia

Tradit

ional Ener

gy

Dev

elopm

ent

and E

nvi

ronm

enta

l Org

anis

atio

n,

Pre

siden

t’s

Off

ice.

Uganda D

ebt

Net

work

; Uganda G

ender

Res

ourc

e C

entr

e; D

evle

opm

ent

Net

work

of

Indig

enous

Volu

nta

ry A

ssoci

ati

ons.

So

uth

ern

Afr

ica

Ug

and

aSe

ctor W

ork

ing G

roups

set up u

nder

the

so c

alle

d P

EA

P-P

roce

ss.

Ang

ola

UN

TA –

Uniã

o N

aci

onal dos

Trabalh

adore

s A

ngola

nos;

CG

SILA

– C

onfe

der

açã

o G

eral dos

Sindic

ato

s Li

vres

Angola

nos;

SIN

PR

OF

– S

indic

ato

Naci

onal dos

Pro

fess

ore

; AIA

– A

ssoci

açã

oIn

dust

rial d

e A

ngol

a; C

CIA

– C

âmar

ade

Com

érci

o e

Indúst

rias

de

Angola

;IN

APEM

– Inst

ituto

Naci

onal de

Apoio

as

Pequen

as

e M

édia

sEm

pres

as; U

NA

CA

– U

nião

Nac

iona

ldas

Ass

oci

açõ

es d

e C

am

pones

e;O

AA

– O

rdem

dos

Advo

gados

de

Angola

; OEA

– O

rdem

dos

Engen

hei

ros

de

Angola

; OM

A –

Ord

em d

os

Méd

icos

de

Angola

; UEA

– U

niã

o d

os

Esc

rito

res

Angola

nos;

UN

AC

– U

nião

dos

Art

ista

s Pl

ástic

os;

FAC

E –

Fóru

mde

Ausc

ult

açã

o e

Conce

rtaçã

oEm

pre

sari

al;

Epungo.

AEA

– A

ssoci

açã

o d

os

Eco

nom

ista

sA

ngol

anos

; FO

NG

A –

Fór

um d

as O

rgan

izaç

ões

Não G

ove

rnam

enta

is A

ngola

nas;

AD

RA

–A

cção p

ara

o D

esen

volv

imen

to R

ura

l e

Am

bie

nte

; AD

RA

– A

cVão A

ngola

na p

ara

oD

esen

volv

imen

to; A

AA

I– A

ssoc

iaçã

o A

ngol

ana

de

Am

izad

e par

a In

fânci

a; A

AM

J-A

ssoci

aVão

Angola

na d

as

Mulh

eres

Juri

stas;

AA

PI –

Ass

oci

açã

o d

e A

poio

à P

opula

ção Idosa

;A

DA

-Ass

oci

açã

o d

os

Des

empre

gados

de

Angola

; AD

AC

– A

ssoci

açã

o p

ara

oD

esen

volv

imen

to e

Aju

da à

s C

om

unid

ades

;A

DA

M –

Ass

oci

ação

par

a o D

esen

volv

imen

toe

Aju

da M

útu

a; A

DA

S –

Ass

oci

açã

o p

ara

oD

esen

volv

imen

to e

Ass

istê

nci

a So

cial

; AD

EMA

– A

ssoci

açã

o A

juda e

Des

envo

lvim

ento

da

Mulh

er e

Cri

ança

s; A

DESM

A –

Ass

oci

açã

odos

Des

mobili

zados

de

Angola

; AD

MER

A –

Acç

ão A

ngola

na D

esen

volv

imen

to d

o M

eio

Rura

l e

Am

bie

nte

; C

EG

IA –

Cen

tro p

ara

Educa

ção,

Ges

tão e

Inve

stim

ento

em

Angola

;O

AD

EC

– O

rganiz

açã

o p

ara

Aju

da a

odes

envo

lvim

ento

Com

unit

ári

o; O

MA

–O

rganiz

açã

o d

as

Mulh

eres

Angola

nas;

PPP-

Pão p

ara

o P

róxi

mo; C

VA

– C

ruz

verm

elha

de

Angola

; DA

CC

O –

Org

aniz

ação

Angola

na

de

Apoio

à C

riança

Des

am

para

da; F

ISH

–Fr

ate

rnid

ade

para

Infâ

nci

a, S

olid

ari

edade

eH

um

anis

mo; G

AA

SID

A –

Fundaçã

o A

juda e

Des

envo

lvim

ento

Gru

po d

e A

ctiv

ista

s A

nti

-

UA

N –

Univ

ersi

dade

Agost

inho

Net

o; U

LA –

Univ

ersi

dade

Lusí

ada d

e A

ngola

; UC

AN

–U

niv

ersi

dad

e C

atólic

a de

Angola

;U

NA

NG

OLA

– U

niv

ersi

dade

Nova

de

Angola

; Univ

ersi

dade

Pia

get

de

Angola

; ISP

RA

–In

stit

uto

Super

ior

de

Ciê

nci

as

Méd

icas.

(Pro

vinci

al G

ove

rnors

:N

ot

gro

uped

as

Loca

lG

ove

rnm

ent)

Pre

ss:

Jorn

al d

e A

ngola

(st

ate

ow

ned

);Jo

rnal

Agora

; Jo

rnal

Angole

nse

;Jo

rnal Fo

lha 8

; Jo

rnal A

ctual;

Jorn

al In

dep

enden

te;

Rádio

Naci

onal de

Angola

(st

ate

ow

ned

); Lu

anda A

nte

na

Com

erci

al, L

AC

; R

ádio

Ecl

ésia

;Rád

io L

uand

a; T

elev

isão

Púb

lica

de

Angola

(st

ate

ow

ned

);Im

pre

nsa

Naci

onal.

Foundati

ons:

Fundaç

ão E

duar

do d

os

Santo

s;Fu

ndaçã

o S

agra

da E

sper

ança

;Fu

ndo L

win

i para

oD

esen

volv

imen

to;

Frie

dri

ch E

ber

t St

iftu

ng.

Donors

and a

gen

cies

of

the

UN

Sys

tem

:Fu

ndo d

e A

poio

Soci

al;

Noru

ega; E

stados

Unid

os

da

Am

éric

a; C

anada; U

SAID

;B

anco

Mundia

l; FM

I; PN

UD

;U

NIC

EF;

PA

M; FA

O; U

NESC

O;

FNU

AP

Am

bass

adors

of

the

EU

Sta

te m

ember

s:

51


51

A P P E N D I X D

Sida

e D

oenV

as Tr

ansm

issív

eis;

INID

ES –

Inst

ituto

de

Inve

stig

ação

e D

esen

volv

imen

toSo

cial;

LAAS

P –

Liga

Ang

olan

a de

Am

izade

e So

lidar

ieda

de c

om o

s Po

vos;

LARD

EF –

Liga

de

Apoi

o à

Rein

serç

ão d

os d

efici

ente

s;AJ

AMAC

– A

ssoc

iaçã

o An

gola

ana

de A

poio

à Ju

vent

ude

Cam

pone

sa; A

NEM

– A

ssoc

iaçã

oN

acio

nal A

poio

no

Ensin

o e

Inst

ruçã

o de

Men

ores

; APS

– A

ssoc

iaçã

o pa

ra a

Pro

moç

ãoSo

cial;

ANDA

– A

ssoc

iaçã

o N

acio

nal d

osDe

ficie

ntes

Ang

olan

os; A

P –

Auro

ra d

oPr

ogre

sso;

ASS

C –

Acçã

o de

Sol

idar

ieda

dee

Saúd

e Co

mun

itária

; CO

FDES

– C

onju

nto

Frat

erno

par

a o

Dese

nvol

vim

ento

da

Socie

dade

; AIP

; Red

e M

aiom

bi; R

ede

Mul

her;

Jubi

leu

2000

.

Chur

ches

and

ass

ocia

tions

of r

elig

ious

faith

:Co

nselh

o da

s Igr

ejas C

ristã

s de A

ngol

a; C

EAST

;CI

CA –

Con

selh

o de

Igre

jas C

ristã

s de A

ngol

a; Ig

reja

Cat

ólica

; ICEA

– Ig

reja

Cris

tã E

vang

élica

de A

ngol

a; A

CI –

Ass

ocia

ção

Crist

ã pa

raIn

fânc

ia;

ACJ –

Ass

ocia

ção

Crist

ã de

Jove

nsde

Ang

ola;

ACR

S –

Asso

ciaçã

o Cr

istã

deRe

inse

rção

Soc

ial;

AEDS

– A

ssoc

iaçã

oEv

angé

lica

para

o d

esen

volv

imen

to S

ocia

l;M

IFRO

– M

issão

Sem

Fro

ntei

ras A

cção

Rur

alCr

istã

em A

ngol

a; O

FRAC

RIST

Ã –

Orga

niza

ção

Frat

erna

Cris

tã e

Ben

efici

ência

; SCA

M –

Solid

arie

dade

Cris

tã e

Aju

d M

útua

; USO

DEC-

Uniã

o So

cial C

ristã

ppa

ra o

Des

envo

lvim

ento

com

unitá

rio; I

MUB

– Ig

reja

Met

odist

a Un

ida

de Jo

ão B

aptis

ta;

AJUD

E –

Asso

ciaçã

o Cr

istã

de A

juda

à Ju

vent

ude

Desf

avor

ecid

a; A

MA

– Al

ianç

a M

ulVu

man

a de

Ang

ola.

Head

of t

he E

U De

lega

tion;

Swed

en; F

ranc

e; G

erm

any;

Italy;

Portu

gal;

Belg

ium

; Uni

ted

Kind

om; H

olla

nd; S

pain

;De

nmar

k

Bots

wan

aBO

CCIM

-Bot

swan

aCo

nfed

erat

ion

of c

omm

erce

Indu

stry

and

man

pow

er.

OCO

NG

O-B

otsw

ana

Coun

cil o

f NG

Os.

52


52

A P P E N D I X D

Moz

ambi

que

OTM

– C

entra

l Sin

dica

l(C

entra

l Tra

de U

nion

Org

anisa

tion)

;UG

C; Tr

ade

Unio

nCo

nfed

eraç

ao d

os S

indi

cato

sliv

res

e in

denp

ende

ntes

–CO

NSI

LMO

Colig

ação

Just

iça E

cono

mica

–(B

usin

ess A

ssoc

iatio

n)AT

AP (B

usin

ess A

ssoc

iatio

n)

ORA

M (C

ivil

netw

ork)

; Fun

daçã

o N

atur

eza

em P

erig

o (E

nviro

nmen

tal O

rgan

izatio

n);

KULI

MA

(Mem

bers

hip

Org

anisa

tion)

;M

ON

ASO

(Civ

il so

ciety

net

wor

k/re

sear

chor

gani

satio

n); A

MO

DER

(Civ

il So

ciety

netw

ork)

; CVM

(Hum

anita

rian

Org

aniza

tion)

;AD

HD (H

uman

Rig

hts

Org

anisa

tion)

;O

rdem

dos

Adv

ogad

os (L

aw a

ssoc

iatio

n):

PROG

RESS

O; A

DEM

O (C

ivil s

ocie

ty n

et w

ork)

;AP

OSE

MO

(Civ

il so

ciety

net

wor

k);

Gru

po d

a Di

vida

(Civ

il So

ciety

net

wor

k).

Chur

ch re

pres

enta

tives

:Co

nfer

encia

Epi

scop

al; C

arita

s Moc

ambi

cana

;CC

M; F

unda

cao

Aga

Khan

ISRI

; Cen

tro d

e Es

tudo

s Afri

cano

s(U

EM);

Polít

ica d

e Es

tudo

sSo

ciais

Agên

cia L

usa;

Met

ical;

OIK

OS;

Cam

panh

ade

Terra

.

Nam

ibia

Nam

ibia

n Fa

rm W

orke

rsUn

ion;

Nam

ibia

Nat

iona

lTe

ache

rs U

nion

; Nam

ibia

Nat

iona

l Tea

cher

s Un

ion

Rund

u; N

amib

ia F

ood

and

Allie

d W

orke

rs U

nion

;N

amib

ia A

gricu

ltura

l Uni

on;

Teac

hers

Uni

on o

f Nam

ibia

.

Join

t Con

sulta

tive

Com

mitt

ee;

Nam

ibia

n Em

ploy

ers

Fede

ratio

n;N

amib

ia C

ham

ber o

f Com

mer

cean

d In

dust

ry; N

amib

ia N

atio

nal

Asso

ciatio

n of

Wom

en in

Bus

ines

s‘O

shak

ati’;

Kav

ango

Sm

all b

usin

ess

Asso

ciatio

n; P

ahuk

a Tr

aini

ngPr

ogra

mm

e.

Jour

nalis

t ass

ocia

tion

of N

amib

ia; U

rban

trust

of N

amib

ia;,

Nat

iona

l Soc

iety

for

Hum

an R

ight

s;G

ende

r: W

omen

’s Ac

tion

for D

evel

opm

ent;

Sist

er N

amib

ia; N

amib

ia N

atio

nal W

omen

’sO

rgan

isatio

n; W

omen

’s As

socia

tion

ofKe

etm

anss

hoop

; Ero

ngo

Wom

en V

oice

Com

mun

ity A

ctio

n G

roup

; Goo

d Ho

peW

omen

’s De

velo

pmen

t For

um.

NEP

RU –

Nam

ibia

Inst

itute

for

Dem

ocra

cy; N

amib

ia In

stitu

te fo

rDe

moc

racy

.

Asso

ciatio

n of

Loc

alAu

thor

ities

in N

amib

ia,

400

NSA

wer

e in

terv

iew

edby

NEP

RU o

n be

half

of th

ego

vern

men

t; da

ta b

ank

avai

labl

ew

ith N

EPRU

.

Zam

bia

ZACC

I-Zam

bia

Asso

ciatio

n of

Cham

bers

of T

rade

and

Indu

stry

;ZA

M-Z

ambi

a As

socia

tion

ofM

anuf

actu

rers

; Zam

bia

Expo

rtG

row

ers A

ssoc

iatio

n.

JCTR

– Je

suit

Cent

re fo

r The

olog

ical R

efle

ctio

n;FO

DEP

– Fo

unda

tion

for D

emoc

ratic

Pro

cess

;N

GO

CC –

NG

O C

o-or

dina

tion

Com

mitt

ee fo

rG

ende

r Iss

ues.

(Zim

babw

e)Bl

ocke

d by

EU h

alf-w

ay.

ZCTU

-Zim

babw

e Co

ngre

ssof

Trad

e Un

ions

.CZ

I – C

onfe

dera

tion

of Z

imba

bwe

Indu

strie

s; ZN

CC –

Zim

babw

eN

atio

nal C

ham

ber o

f Com

mer

ce;

ZFU

– Zi

mba

bwe

Farm

ers

Unio

n.

NSA

F (N

on S

tate

Act

ors

Foru

m)-M

itglie

der:

Zim

babw

e W

omen

Law

yers

Ass

ocia

tion;

Nat

iona

l Ass

ocia

tion

of N

on-G

over

nmen

tal

Org

anisa

tion;

Insiz

a Di

stric

t Dev

elop

men

tAs

socia

tion;

CCZ

– C

onfe

dera

tion

ofCo

nsum

er C

ounc

ils o

f Zim

babw

e;ZC

C –

Zim

babw

e Co

ngre

ss o

f Chu

rche

s.

CASS

-Cen

tre fo

r App

lied

Socia

lSc

ienc

es; R

esea

rch

and

Teac

hing

Asso

ciatio

ns, D

ept.

of E

cono

mics

– Un

iver

sity

of Z

imba

bwe.

ARDC

-Ass

ocia

tion

ofRu

ral D

istric

t Cou

ncils

;UC

AZ-U

rban

Cou

ncils

Asso

ciatio

n of

Zim

babw

e; U

rban

coun

cils C

ity o

f Mas

vingo

53


53

A P P E N D I X E

Appendix E

List of FES Country Offices in Sub-Saharan Africa

Country Representative (as of Dec. 31th, 2002

West Africa

Senegal Mirko Hempel

Cote d’Ivoire Jens Hettmann

Ghana Jörg Bergstermann

Benin Annette Schlicht

Nigeria Dr. Harald Bammel

Mali Schubert Regine

Cameroon Dr. Reinhold Plate

East Africa

Madagascar Dr. Klaus-Peter Treydtte

Mauritius Dr. Klaus-Peter Treydtte

Tanzania Peter Häußler

Kenya Dr. Roland Schwarz

Ethiopia Dr. Peter Österdieckhoff

Uganda Fritz Koppsieker

Southern Africa

Angola Dr. Sabine Fandrych

Namibia Jürgen Peters

Mocambique Astrid Becker

South Africa Dr. Ulrich Golaszinsky

Zimbabwe Sven Schwersensky

Botswana Michael Meier

Sambia Michael Schultheiss

Note: FES groups its offices in Madagascar and Mauritius for internal administrative reason with East Africa

55

ISBN 3–89892–200–6

© Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, August 2003

First published by: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung

Africa Department

Godesberger Allee 149

D-53170 Bonn

Germany

Tel. ++49 228 883-580

Fax ++49 228 883-623

www.fes.de

Authors: Dr. Rudolf Traub-Merz

Arne Schildberg

Photo: FES

Production: Gerd Ernst, FES

Layout: Pellens Kommunikationsdesign GmbH, Bonn

Printed by: Toennes Satz + Medien GmbH, Erkrath

Printed in Germany 2003