iSSN-[0952-049x]

CONTENTS

Editorial 1

Has Sudan's CPA solved the Country's Perennial State of War?Benedetta de Alessi

The Demise of the Railway and an Era of Road and BridgeConstructionMustafa MKhogali

Anglo-French Sudan Boundary Commission, 1922-23Barbara Rees

Problems of Flood Irrigated Agriculture in the Sudan" Thel~or Abu Habl SchemeMohamed Babiker Ibrahim

Book ReviewsSix Months in Sudan" a young doctor in a war-torn villageMohawks on the Nile: ... Canadian 'Voyageurs' 1884-85Sudan in Turmoil: Hasan al-Turabi... 1989-2003

SSSUK Notices24th AGM and Annual Symposium

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EDITORIAL

From now into 2011 will be a difficult and momentous period inthe history of the Sudan with the forthcoming Referendum onthe country's future. There are so many groups and countrieslooking to the resul ts wi th var ious degrees of hope ortrepidation. I am sure that all members of the SSSUK wish theSudan well at this time, trusting that whatever the outcome, civilwar will not rear its ugly head again. Our next Symposium willno doubt be concerned with some of the current political issuesand will be held at SOAS on Saturday, 2 October 2010. Doplease come and take part in some of the debates. Furtherdetails are given elsewhere in this issue of Sudan Studies andwill be on our website nearer the date.

One of the most serious political issues in the Sudan relates tothe difficulties of converting the Southern SPLM/A into ademocratic form of political party and this subject is taken up byBenedetta de Alessi in the first article. Benedetta is apostgraduate researcher at SOAS with field experience inSouthern Sudan as recently as July 2010. Very recently, theGovernment of Sudan has decided to redevelop its rail network.Recent developments relating to transport in the Sudan arediscussed by Mustafa Khogali. Mustafa is on the staff of theInstitute for Disaster Management and Refugees in Khartoum.Barbara Rees's article is particularly interesting as it is abouther father, Captain James, who took part in the Anglo-Frenchdemarcation of the western frontier of Sudan in 1922-23.Perhaps surprisingly Captain James and his French colleaguegot on well together. The fourth article by Mohamed BabikerIbrahim reviews aspects of flood irrigation in Sudan withspecial reference to the Khor Abu Habl Scheme in Kordofan.Mohamed lectures in Geography at Hunter College in NewYork.

This issue also contains three book reviews. The first, byAdrian Thomas, the SSSUK Treasurer, is a book about adoctor's recent experience working in the hospital at Abyei. Thesecond book review, by Richard Stock, is of a detailed accountof the Canadian 'Voyageurs', who worked with Wolseley in theabortive attempt to relieve Gordon at Khartoum in 1885.Richard is an authority on Sudan philately and has made aparticular study of British activity in the Sudan at that time. Thethird review is by Professor Peter Woodward of ReadingUniversity, a noted authority on Sudan politics. The bookconcerned was partly written by the late Robert Collins assistedby Mil lard Burr and is entit led, Hasan al-Turabi and thelslamist State, 1989-2003.

As Editor, it is my hope that readers will enjoy the mixture ofarticles.

SUBSCRIPTIONS

A gentle reminder to members who have notyetpaidfor 2010.Subscriptions were due on 1st January. Please pay NOW if youhave not already done so. Full details can be found on theinside of the front cover.

HAS SUDAN'S COMPREHENSIVE PEACE AGREEMENTSOLVED THE COUNTRY'S PERENNIAL STATE OF WAR?

Benedetta de Alessi

INTRODUCTION

What relationship exists between the objective of the struggle of theSPLM/A and that of the CPA? Can a sustainable peace with democracynow be assured in Sudan? This question is dealt with in this paper. Hasthe CPA changed the situation since Richard Gray wrote this in 1963?

'One would have thought that the1955 disturbance, though regrettable,would play a great role in bringing Northerners and Southernerstogether to face their differences more realistically and to work out asolution acceptable to both sides. This unfortunately has not been thecase and the situation continues to worsen from day to day "I

The case of Sudan is unusual within the broader category of Africanstates. Sudan is the result of Ottoman Egyptian colonialism by a Co-dominium with Britain.2 It is said that the 61ite then formed has primaryresponsibility for the violent conflicts in post-colonial Sudan) The wholecountry has never been united or politically stable, due to a long historyof socio-economic imbalance and where 'too many agreements' overcontested sovereignty have been 'dishonoured'.4 Scholars contend thatthe Sudan's first and second civil wars are similar in some of theircauses, in particular in the Government's failure to honour itsi Richard Gray in the introduction to Oduho J., and Deng W., The problem of the Southern Sudan,London: Oxford University Press, 19632 See Prunier, G., The Sudan: a successfully failed state, in Rotberg, R. (ed.), State failure and StateWeakness in a time of terror, World Peace Foundation, Cambridge M_A, 2003; and Woodward, P., Sudan1980-1989: The Unstable State, London: Lynne Rienner, 19903 Ahmed, A., 'Multiple complexity & prospects for Reconciliation & Unity; the Sudan conundrum', in

Nhema, A & Zeleza, P.T. (eds.), The Roots of African conflicts, 20084 Alier, A., Southern Sudan too many agreements dishonoured, Ithaca Press, 1990

commitment on southern autonomy since independence.5 Truth is thatthe first southern rebellion, Anya-nya, started even before independencein 1955.6 In 1956 Southerners were not granted the special arrangementsthat they had been promised; the first regional government in the Southobtained in 1972 under the Addis Ababa Agreement (AAA) wasunilaterally and unconstitutionally abolished in 1983 by the latePresident Nimeiri. The subsequent 'democratic' government proved evenless keen in negotiating peace with the rebels, then organised under theSPLM/A flag, and both the1986 Koka Dam Declaration and the 1988Sudan Peace Initiative were broken. The Islamic coup of 1989 resulted infurther polarization and spillover into other parts of Sudan and abroad.The conflict was no longer a north-south divide and an identity war only,but it also became a centre/periphery struggle (e.g. Darfur and the East).Besides, the 'Islamisation' of the centre changed the pattern of the warwhich was now fought as a Jihad.7 Finally the discovery of oil - one ofthe reasons for the failure of the AAA - added to the intractability of theconflict.8 The strong unchallenged powerful central authority of thenorthern elite has produced what Prunier called 'a successful failedstate ,.9 For Clapham, that is also 'the virtual impossibility' to govern abig African State. Understanding power relations between the Sudancentral Government and its southern peripheries is crucial to anappreciation of the country's modem political development and thepotential of the CPA to solve the historical issue of sovereignty.1°

5 Rogier, E., No more hills ahead? The Sudan's tortuous ascent to heights ofpeace, Clingendale Securitypaper No.l, August 2005; Woodward, P., 'Sudan: the retreat to military clientelism', in The PoliticalDilemma of Military regimes, Croom Helm, 1985; Woodward, P., Sudan: Political transitions past andp6resent, Sir William Lute Memorial Lecture 2008.Henderson found a link between colonial legacy and probability of civil war in the post-colonies, seeHenderson, E., 'When States implode. Africa's civil wars 1950-92', in Nhema and Zeleza (eds.), Theroots of African conflicts, James Currey, 2008. For an essential account of the Anya-nya struggle seeLagu, J., Sudan: Odyssey Through a State, from Ruin To Hope, Khartoum: Khartoum University Press,20067 Laremont, R.R. (ed), The causes of war and the consequences ofpeacekeeping in Africa, Heinemann,Portsmouth: NH, 20028 Rogier 2005 p.29 Prunier, 200310 For 'conflict and peace' history of Sudan until the signing of the CPA, see; Johnson, D., The Root

Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars, Oxford: James Currey, 2003

AWAKENING POLITICAL CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE SOUTH

In the South there was little sign of political consciousness and nopolitical organization when nationalists in the North began to guide theSudan towards independence in 1956.11 Southern intellectuals wereexpelled in 1960 and were never truly able to operate without northerncontrol. 12 The idea of southern nationalism never really developed, evenless after the division of the South into three regions. After the failure ofthe AAA, the SPLM/A emerged under the leadership of John Garang,then an officer in the Southern Armed Forces (SAF): for the first timethe rebellion in the South was conceived differently.13 The SPLM/A hada clearer political agenda than previous southern rebellions, a moreefficient army, a geo-political horizon and support of the northernopposition, united under the National Democratic Alliance (NDA)umbrella with Eritrean support.14 It was able to incorporate otherstruggles under the vision of a united 'New Sudan': the SPLM/A'sdemands went beyond Southern autonomy as they put forward thequestion of self-determination. That vision however was not understoodand not accepted by all. The SPLM/A leadership imposed itself throughviolent confrontation (both internal and external, e.g. against the Anya-nya 2) and maintained a restricted decision making process organisedaround Dr Garang. Soon, during the struggle contradictions arose aroundits socialist ideology, and the relationship with the southern populationbecame one of subjection and control.15 The Nasir split of 1991, wherethe leadership divided along personality and ethnic lines, in particularagainst the power of the Dinka, brought those contradictions to thesurface. A fierce struggle between the Nuer and the Dinka emerged andthousands of people were massacred within the South. Consequenceswere contained both due to the internal divisions of the new faction andn Markakis J., National and Class conflict in the Horn of Africa, Cambridge University Press, 1987:p.5112 For the condition of Southerner intellectuals at that time see Oduho and Deng, 1963, Lagu, 2006 andAdwok Nyaba P., Politics of liberation in Southern Sudan, an insider's view, Kampala: FountainPublishers, 1997ta For an excellent account of the genesis of the SPLM/A see Adwok, 199714 See Johnson's account in Clapham, C., African Guerrillas, Oxford: James Currey, 1998, and in The

Root causes of Sudan's civil wars, 2003.15 See Adwok, 1997

to the organization of the first 1994 Convention of the SPLM/A.16 TheNew Sudan vision was reinstated, also through the IGAD Declaration ofP r inc ip le o f 1994 and w i th E th iop ian suppor t , t he SPLM/Aadministrative structures in the South were set up."' The charisma of theleader John Garang and the new international geopolitical environmentallowed for the SPLM/A endurance.

With skil led diplomatic moves, in 2002 the SPLM/A entered innegotiations with the Government of Sudan i.e. the National CongressParty (NCP). Parties were aware that the war had exhausted everyoneand the only path for peace was towards a settlement. The importance ofthe contemporary global security context should not be overlooked. Thepost 9/11 environment created bilateral dynamics between Sudan and theUS and the international support for peace talks was massive. The NCPhoped for a reduction in sanctions to maintain and increase its power inthe North, the SPLM/A needed intemational recognition and a strongpatron in view of the Referendum. The legitimacy and seriousness of thegovernment to negotiate the peace - also considering the newly eruptedwar in Darfur - was persistently tested by Garang. As Waihenya reports,the SPLM's cautious pace with the talks, knowing Khartoum's history ofdishonoured agreements, conveniently allowed time to get militarilyorganised.lS The CPA was signed on 9th January 2005 after thirty monthsof intense discussions and with a strong international push, especiallyfrom the United States. The Parties found agreement on most issues atthe core of the conflict, in particular that of sovereignty. The hot'buttons' of religion, self-determination and resource-sharing were left tothe implementation phase: the main objective was to end hostilities.According to Gen. Sumbeiywo, chief mediator of the CPA process forIGAD, the final phase of the settlement was the most difficult.19 Bothparties wanted to extract major concessions in the shortest time possible.Garang capitalized on his increased political stature in Sudan and abroadl~ Ibid, see also Akol, 1997~7 Rolandsen, 2008ts Waihenya, W., The mediator: Gen. Lazaro Sumbeiywo and the Southern Sudan Peace Process, Nairobi,Kenway Publications, 200619 From Waihenya, 2006

to achieve more from the deal, Sumbeiywo admitted.2° It seems howeverthat the Parties had not truly prepared for its actual implementation. Theimplementation modalities were drafted after arduous effort from theIGAD advisors and only at the last minute before the signature. Thetragic death of Dr John Garang, in July 2005, a few days after he hadbeen sworn in as First Vice President of Sudan and President of theGovernment of Southern Sudan, ultimately affected the capacity of theSPLM to implement the CPA and the New Sudan vision. As Silone(1931 ) has expressed it:

'If there is a time in which humanity has to suffer, it is not in war, but,21after war

SPLM/A AND THE COMPREHENSIVE PEACE AGREEMENT

The CPA reflected Garang's idea of transforming Sudan from the centre,of 'conquering Khartoum' - paraphrasing Churchill's description ofKitchener's battle against the Khalifa - by peaceful means. Based on theNew Sudan vision under the slogan 'make the unity attractive', the CPAtransformed the SPLM/A into a national political party i.e. separated theM, movement, from the A, army. It established the foundation of amodem state based on a federal system of government, composed of theGovernment of National Unity (GNU), the Government of SouthernSudan (GoSS) and 25 State Governments. The SPLA became theterritorial army of Southern Sudan. In line with Sudanese history, theCPA includes both an option of autonomy for the South: the Referendumfor self-determination after an interim period of six years; and anintegrative approach to power sharing for the formation of mixedinstitutions, to encourage 'unity' as a viable alternative. Scholars andpractitioners are divided on whether separation is the only means toreduce the likelihood of revived conflict in deeply divided societies,22 or20Ibid2~Silone I., Fontamara, Oscar Mondadori, 193122Kaufman, C., 'Possible and Impossible solutions to ethnic civil wars', in International Security, 20, 4,136-75, Spring, 1996

whether multi-ethnic diversity should be preserved and supported in thename of state sovereignty (as in the case of Bosnia).23 In very rarecircumstances in contemporary peacemaking (so far onlY2Eritrea andEast Timor), an agreement moved international boundaries. Moreover,being a zero-sum game a plebiscite remains a-political hence it rarelydefuses conflict.2s Despite its lack of success, however, it is widelyaccepted that the demand for autonomy and the recognition for alegitimate sovereignty is the most democratic principle and must remainan option in peace settlements. In the case of Sudan, the inclusion of theself-determination option was a sine qua non.

The CPA is unique in being both a power sharing and a territorialagreement. Under its framework, the SPLM/A became simultaneouslythe main opposition party in the GNU (28%), the guarantor of the CPAas part of the Presidency with the NCP, while being the leader of GoSS(with 70%) and in control of the new territorial army, the SPLA. Theimplementation is based on the assumption that such transformationswould happen. That was a huge expectation from a liberation movement,emerged from a stateless society, whose vision of unity was notwidespread, and that based its organisation on a restricted leadership anddecision making process. While the CPA carefully explained thetransformation of the SPLA, it overlooked the transformation of theSPLM into a national political party.26 As such, the implementation ofthe New Sudan vision was necessarily problematic, vis-a-vis a skilfulNCP, in control of national security, military, political and economicapparatus, and with rocky alliances with the traditional northernopposition.

23 Darby, J. and MacGinty, IL, Contemporary Peacemaking. Conflict, violence and peace processes,Palgrave Macmillan, 200324 The Referendum in Eritrea though has legitimized what was already decided on the battlefield. See ReiUy, 2009;also Sisk, T., 'Power sharing after civil wars: matching problems to solutions', in Darby, J. and MacGinty, R.,Contemporary Peacemaking. Conflict, violence and peace processes, Palgrave Macmillan, 200325 See Reilly, C., Peace-Building and Development in Guatemala and Northern Ireland, Palgrave

Macmillan, 200926 Soderberg-Kovacs (2006) sees as one of the most effective features of the Mozambique peace processof 2006 the transformation of RENAMO since the beginning of the negotiations.

The implementation of the CPA was difficult from the beginning. Themutual mistrust between the Parties revealed itself already in the pre-interim period and the SPLM lost some major post-conflict battlesagainst the NCP. The national Cabinet was appointed with difficulty, asthe NCP kept for itself the key Ministries of Finance, Energy andMining, Interior and Defence. The demarcation of the North/Southborder in the pre-interim period did not materialise; the committeeassigned to make a recommendation to the Presidency on the matterbegan its work late, it lacked funding and the southern members of thecommission felt sidelined. The symbolic issue of the National capitalwas resolved contrary to the SPLM's wish and Khartoum remained ruledby the sharia law.

After the agreement, the SPLM formed Northern and Southern sectorsand created the structure for the creation of SPLM branches in all statesof Sudan. As a result of the Yei leadership conference in 2007, and inaccordance with the spirit of the CPA, the SPLM National Secretariatwas moved from Juba to Khartoum. However, the decision making bodyof the SPLM remained the Political Bureau, as at the time of thestruggle, meeting in Juba. Moreover, many former SPLM/A officers whonow occupied positions in the new Southern Sudan institutions, werereluctant to work in the North - also for security reasons - starting fromthe Chairman downwards. As such, instead of strengthening the northernsector to drive the transformation of the movement into a national party,where the ground is more conducive to pol i t ics and peacefu lconfrontations, the movement was run from the South, where theSPLM/A had financial and military advantage. That was not conduciveground for democratisation and openness of a guerrilla movement. TheSPLM maintained the control of GoSS, with an emphasis on security (asthe division of the annual budget can prove) and the division between the'M' and the 'A' was blurring. The effect was twofold: on the one handthe SPLM did not become an effective national political party, whilemaintaining, however, the posit ion within the Presidency. Thatcontradiction emerged in the first elections of the SPLM in the wake ofthe Convention in 2008, when a substantive number of SPLM

representatives were changed by the people; the SPLM had lost itsappeal in its southern constituencies which claimed loudly for separationfrom the North. On the other hand, the power of the NCP in the Northremained untouched, if not strengthened.

The major traditional opposition parties did not endorse the agreementand were lett out of the constitutional revision process and of theNational Assembly. The idea of the CPA was that the SPLM, whichmaintains the 28% of GNU, would lead the opposition alliance in theAssembly to contain the 52% majority of the NCP. In contrast, theSPLM's caucus was never reinforced and was led by unfaithful memberswho were later expelled.27 As such, the SPLM has not been able to affectthe constitutional steps necessary to reach the Referendum stageaccording to the letter of the agreement. In particular, a sound nationalcensus, the legislative transformation of some 60 laws, and the reform ofnational security and law enforcement agencies, in time for the electionwere not completed.28 In the course of the debate on the preparation ofthe Political Parties Act in 2007, the SPLM representative in Khartoumonce meeting the opposition reminded the 'veto power' that the CPAgranted to the NCP and the SPLM. The already shaky relation between

the SPLM and the northern and southern opposition was weakened byindividual statements of that kind. The gap between the decision makingbody of the Party in the South and the northern representatives of theparty was growing; the preparation of the national population censusproved another example. The Presidency took the decision to drop thequestions about religion and ethnicity from the census questionnairetowards the end of 2007. The SPLM contested that decision, but itsappeal was weakened by the fact that a SPLM representative was presentat the time the decision was made.29 Once again, decisions in Khartoumwere made without consultation with the Political Bureau in Juba. Theissue of the census triggered a drastic move of the SPLM; in October27 It is the ease of Aligo Manoja and Gazi Suleiman, who gained power after the departure of Yasir

Arman.2s For details see AEC Mid-term report and UNMIS CPA monitors29 Telar Deng, State Ministry at the Presidency, later on expelled from the Party.

2007, it withdrew from the GNU, reasserting the need for a fullimplementation of the CPA. It rejoined two months later with a cabinetreshuffle and an agreement on a new road map for CPA implementation.The SPLM had reasserted its position as a national partner and theinternational community supported the move. After intense negotiations,some ministerial changes to position loyal SPLM members in the GNUand reassurance from the side of the NCP, the SPLM returned to thegovernment. In the meantime the role of the intemational communitywas minimised and the Parties negotiated in bilateral fora the mainquestions left open at Naivasha, mainly oil, border and citizenship (thethree symbolised in the Abyei issue). Without third parties' control, theNCP easily disregarded the SPLM's claims as the bottlenecks of theCPA remained in the hands of the Presidency where the NCP maintains amajor stake. The SPLM in turn insistently made claims towards theprinciple of self-determination, disregarding the importance of politicaldialogue in the South (e.g. South-South dialogue) and its development asa national party.

Despite the CPA commitment to 'make the Unity attractive', little hasbeen done in that direction in the past five years by both Parties; the lackof CPA dissemination and a national reconciliation and healing process,together with little legislative transformation, has reduced the sense ofownership of the agreement. As the CPA implementation was laggingbehind, the north/south divide became increasingly evident as bothParties invested heavily in security. Politics in Sudan became a war bypolitical means, to paraphrase both Clausewitz and Foucault and thesecurity struggle will in turn solve the issue of sovereignty. As a result ofthe CPA, Sudan is now dominated by two one-party states, in a relationof security control. The CPA call to make the Unity attractive hasbecome weaker alongside the weak national role of the SPLM.

The SPLM/A was the 'incognita' at the time of the negotiations; untilnow its strategy, actors and resources have not been fully deciphered.The agreement affected the transformation of the movement and byignoring that constitutive relation, in return, weakened its own

implementation. The liberal peace agreements that became popular afterthe Cold War, like the CPA, link the idea of peace to an effectivewestern democracy. As such, they are based on the idea that conflictsshall be 'solved', that domestic variables have a surprisingly weakinfluence on democratization, and peace must be brought ex novo.3° Theaim is to end a lasting civil war - too simplistically categorised as'new'31 - and reconstruct war torn societies by promoting 'goodgovernance', human rights, rule of law and developed open markets.32The emphasis goes on technical short term solutions (i.e. the definitionof intricate cease-fire, power sharing and wealth sharing arrangementsand proliferation of commissions/committees). In one influential study,Stedman admitted:

'Priority should be given to demobil isation of soldiers and thedemilitarisation of politics, which is the transformation of soldiers intocivilians and warring armies into political parties. In the absence, civilwars cannot be brought to an end'.33

Until now however the focus remains on the technical implementation ofliberal predicaments (e.g. security reform, market liberalization andelectoralism), relatively less complex than the study of relationship andhuman agencies that the effect of transformation entails. Practitionersread Stedman's call as an invitation to strengthen the reform of thesecurity sector and the 'Ds' of the Demobilization, Disarmament andReintegration (DDR) dogma of liberal peace-building.34 The study ofrebel movements in peace-building thus remains marginal. In general,the understanding of rebellion in Africa, remains limited despite its30 Richards, P. (ed), No peace no war. An anthropology of contemporary armed conflicts, Oxford: JamesCurrey, 200531 Kaldor, M., New and old wars. Organized violence in a global era, 2nd ed., Polity, 200632Richmond, O., The Transformation of Peace, Palgrave MacMillan, 200533Ibid: 334On the limits of DDR, see Berdal, M., Disarmament and demobilization after civil wars: Arms, soldiers,and the termination of conflict, Adelphi paper no. 303, 1996; Giustozzi, A., 'Bureaucratic facade andpolitical realities of disarmament and demobilization in Afghanistan', Conflict, Security and Development,Volume 8,Number 2, June 2008, pp.169-192(24); Marriage, Z., 'Flip-flop rebel, dollar soldier:demobilization in the Democratic Republic of Congo', Conflict, Security and Development, Volume7, Number 2, June 2007, pp. 281-309 (29)

intrinsic relation to an understanding of conflict, peace and ultimatelyAfrican statehood.35 That mechanical implementation of peace howevercreates what Adorno called the 'administered state' in a vacuum.36 Thepolitical is reduced to a routine activity which renders the state invisibleand decisions are taken out of the hands of the 'sovereign'. Moroever, bycreating 'administered society', state sovereignty remains unchallenged.The demands of a global society supersede those of the local society andstate sovereignty at the expense of both. Was the CPA the means torealize the objective of the SPLM/A and the New Sudan vision?

Deng at an early stage of the negotiations realised that the inherentweakness of the CPA was the loose framework for unity with no nationalconsensus.37 In Sudan today, Parties' relations, and military force, will inturn influence the sovereignty issue in 2011. Not differently from othersituations, the call for the Referendum in Sudan became an end in itselfaffecting the course of the agreement implementation at the expense ofsocio-economic transformation and democratisation of Sudan, let aloneUnity and peace. We can reasonably say that a selective implementationof the CPA has legitimised the parties' survival rather than resulting in asustainable peace in the name of Sudan's interests but has not solved thecontested issue of sovereignty. That is a trend common in Other places inAfrica,3s but that is not a reason to accept it.

Liberal peace agreements have been studied in order to see how theymight be strengthened and, especially, how best to conceptualize theperiod after a tentative peace has been negotiated. Instead of 'solving'the conflict, Rothstein contends that the focus should be on the new setof opportunities that the peace agreements can create: 39

35Clapham, 199836Adorno, T. W. Negative Dialectics, New York: The Seabury Press, 197337 Deng 2003:82. The instrumental use of eonstitutionalism is often the backlash to the imposition ofliberal predicaments in the new independent African states.38 Mehler, A. Not always in the People's Interest: Power Sharing Arrangements in African PeaceAgreements, GIGA Working papers, No. 83, 20083 9 . . " . . .Rothstem, R., After thepeace: reststance and reconctltatton, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999

"How can the potential benefits stemming from the process ofpeacemaking be valued, wi thout le t t ing them freeze into newgrievances?'

One of the main criticisms of the effectiveness of peace initiatives in factis that they entrench the process with the participants of the conflictitself, at risk of reinforcing these actors' conflicting roles (e.g. Israel andPalestine). That often reflects international rather than local opinion.4°The idea of success is linked to an effective implementation of theagreement i.e, on the role of international actors for that effect or theimplementation of key steps of the agreement. New grievances areoverlooked and an overoptimistic view of the process prevails, like theemphasis on having the elections even if 'cosmetic' and problematic.41Last elections in Sudan were conducted in a climate of deep mistrustbetween the Parties; the SPLM withdrew from competition in the North,alongside the opposition, leading to an easy, if still contested, NCPvictory. In the meantime, in the South, the SPLM's supreme authorityshivered as a result of the decision of some members to run asindependent candidates. The Political Bureau decision on the list of partycandidates did not find common ground and the party split mainly overpersonalities. The areas where both the SPLM and independentcandidates ran for governorship witnessed major irregularit ies(detentions, arrests, rigging) and the SPLM finally won in all but one ofthe Southern states. Some of the candidates got the favour of thepopulation because they re-asserted the importance of separation fromthe North and eventually this is what the Southerners are aiming at. Itseems that the SPLM's call to 'make the Unity attractive' has become anexcessive ideal, rather than a positive one.

~0 The Bosnia-Herzegovina agreement pleased more the international search for solution and goodwill, aslater Kosovo independence revealed.41 At the extreme is what happened in Rwanda after the Arusha agreement.

CONCLUSION

This study did not wish to judge the political game of the Parties, but toquestion its validity in relation to the CPA premises, on which theReferendum call is based. The aim is to understand whether theReferendum can be transformed into a positive-sum game and avoid thedetrimental cycle of violence and internal splits occurring now both inthe South and in the North. Conflict and peace are inescapablysociological; they do not exist in a vacuum but interact with specifichistorical and social forces.42 Why do men rebel in Africa?43 What is theobjective of their struggle and can it be achieved through a liberal peaceagreement? Those questions have received a level of analytical attentionthat 'remotely corresponds to their importance', as Clapham admitted.44It is generally recognised that rebellion in Africa emerges in relation toState power and mainly in the form of guerrilla warfare. Generallymarginalisation and relative deprivation imposed by a regime is thetrigger and engine; the case of Sudan confirms the theory. If insurgencieshave much to tell about African statehood and government as a whole,however, their relationship to a viable solution to those problems is muchless clear.45 Liberal peace-building in particular ignores that discourseand imposes a de-contextualized idea of peace which has emerged froma liberal democracy. As a result, the majority of conflicts whichterminate through those agreements fail in the first 5 years ofimplementation.

With an appreciation of war and peace as not discrete events, instead,peace agreements should be considered transitional devices to expandthe social contract from the elites to the local population. Transitions infact occur only when rulers will have to negotiate with their citizens for

42Francis, 2008; Richards 2005:443The question is borrowed from Gurr, 197044 Clapham C., African Guerrillas, Cambridge University Press, 1998; Bo/ts, M. and Dunn, K.C. (eds),African Guerrillas. Raging against the machine, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 20074~ Clapham, 1998

the resources to govern.46 What does self-determination means for theNortherners? What for the Southerners? What are the expectations of theNorth over the South and vice versa? What is the meaning of the 'NewSudan vision' today? The Referendum is a right that Southern Sudanesehave fought for in the last 60 years and the opportunity shall not bemissed. Priority in the last months before the Referendum should begiven to dialogue and reconciliation starting from the leaders, totransform the plebiscite into a positive sum-game. The internationalcommunity should help the Parties promote dialogue (e.g. South-Southdialogue, North-North dialogue) to adapt the New Sudan vision to thepost-CPA situation and local reconciliation efforts, with the participationof the very leaders perpetuating insecurity on the ground.4n See Bates, R., Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies,Berkeley, CA: California University Press, 1984

THE DEMISE OF THE RAILWAY ANDAN ERA OF ROAD AND BRIDGE CONSTRUCTION IN

SUDAN(1980-2009)

Mustafa M Khogali

INTRODUCTIONWhilst thinking about and writing this paper, the author recalledthe days when he was a pupil at Wadi Seidna Secondary School,Omdurman, and had to travel from Dongola to Khartoum, bysteamer to Karima and thence by rail to Khartoum. This was a tripthat lasted a complete 8 days from a Wednesday morning until thefollowing Wednesday evening. At times during the rainy seasonwashouts could lengthen the journey up to 13 days. Thanks to roadtransport the journey is now a matter of hours. The failure of therailway network to provide a suitable and timely service led tomuch frustration, but it was not until 1980 that the policy laiddown in 1930, whereby roads were seen as essentially a means oftransport of goods and people to the nearest railway station, wasfinally challenged. It was not until 1986, after a new politicalregime had taken power that a new policy was put into effect.Nevertheless, the rail network was a vital factor in development inthe Sudan and must be examined first.

THE RAILWAY NETWORK (Figure 1; Table 1)For over 70 years railways were the main means of transport in theSudan. Their introduction began with the building of some shortlines connected with the Anglo-Egyptian invasion which led to theestablishment of the Condominium. The first really important linewas the single narrow gauge track (1068mm) from Wadi Halfa toKhartoum North. The last day of the Nineteenth Century saw theofficial inauguration of this line which was mainly for the transportof passengers and equipment. Later on, however, this line and

others such as the ones to Port Sudan (1906) and E10beid (1912)combined both military and economic purposes.

When the Sudan became a self-governing country in 1954 it had askeleton railway system of about 3104km of main line. Thenational government, eager to embark upon a programme ofnational unity and economic development built 3 new lines: ashorter one from Sennar to Roseires/Damazin for the building ofthe Damazin Dam; and 2 longer ones first from Aradaibawestwards to Nyala in Darfur, and second southwards fromBabanousa to Wau. Thus the length of main line was increased to4588km. Table 1 shows the development of the rail network from1898 to 1995. In addition, the railways ran two major river all yearservices in the Sudan, namely from Dongola to Karima and fromKhartoum to Juba with seasonal services to Meshra Er Req and upthe River Sobat. It also ran a river service from Wadi Halfa inSudan to Shellal, south of Aswan, in Egypt.

The impact of this network on the economy, politics and nationalunity was great:

1. It played a vital role in the economic development of the Sudan,for without the rails such development schemes as the Gezira,where about 250,000 feddans of long-staple cotton were cultivatedannually and the crop exported, would not have been possible.Further the railways provided a great incentive to traditionalfarmers of the savanna regions to combine the production ofsubsistence crops with commercial farming

2. The rails as a modem means of transport made the mobility ofpeople comparatively easy, and regions served by the railwaybecame, to some extent, integrated with the centre of the countryand with other parts of the Sudan. However, regions away from therailway, such as Darfur and the South felt isolated, and that was asource of discontent and had adverse political repercussions.

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Figure 1" Sudan Railway Network, 2005[Sennar to Kassala line is currently out of use]

Table 1' Sudan Railways: Date of construction, and length of lines.

1234567891 011121314151 617

Name of the line Date of Length of line,Construction km

Halfa - Abu Hamed 1898 350Abu Hamed - Atbara 1898 244Atbara - KhaCtoum 1899 313Atbara- Port Sudan 1906 474Station No 10 - Karima 1905 222Khartoum - Kosti - E10beid 1912 689Haya - Kassala 1924 347Kassala - Sennar 1928 218Gedarif- Sennar 1929 237Sennar - Damazin 1954 220Aradeiba - Babanousa 1957 359Babanousa - Nyala 1959 335Babanousa - Wau 1965 444

1962 7 0Khashm el Girba - DigheimMuglad - Abu GabraSharif- Oil FieldE10beid - Refinery

19951995 1 01995 1 0

Source Sudan Railways Records

Table 2: Passengers and goods transported by rail.

Period Tons(millions) Passenger(million)

1970/71- 1974 2.96 3.21975/76 - 1979 2.40 2.81980/81 - 1984/85 1.44 2.11985/86 - 1989/90 0.7 1;11990/91 - 1994/95 1.1 0.61990 - 1995 2.1 0.3

Source Mohammed Osman AI Khider

3. The railways played an indirect, though effective, role indelaying the construction of tarmac roads in the days when motortransport began to compete with railways for the transport of goodsand passengers. The railway authorities did not like the emergingcompetition from road transport and succeeded in convincing theSudan Government of the need to curtail this competition. So in1934 an Ordinance was issued by the Governor General in Councilgiving the railways a complete monopoly of traffic from the port tothe inside of the country. In practice, that also applied to trafficfrom inside the country to the port. In effect, the Ordinanceprohibited the building of any tarmac roads. Feeder roads to therailway were not prevented but remained as sand, clay or graveltracks.

4. As a result of their monopoly the railways made reasonableprofits, but later the rail system faced great operation losses.

5. The railways encouraged agricultural production, but as timepassed and especially aider the construction of the railway to Nyalatraffic increased to such an extent that the railway could not copewith the quantities of goods to be transported. The main problemarose from the seasonality of agricultural production which led tosharp peaks in demand especially from November to March.

The railway authorities argued that an increase in capacity andfacilities might solve the peak demand problem, but it would createsurpluses of capacity that would not be used for 6 to 8 months ofthe year and that would lead to considerable financial losses. Thatlogic was not convincing to businessmen who naturally saw thatthe money they put into buying crops was tied up for 4 to 6 monthsof the year as consignments remained at the railway stations or instore during all that time. They also argued that existing railwaypolicy was bound to reduce their ability to compete with otherregions inside, or outside, Sudan producing the same kinds ofcrops. The. same kinds of complaints also came from those

engaged in importing goods. Here there were no peak seasons, butthe railways singly failed to cope with the quantity of goods at anytime of the year, so that goods remained in the port for monthscausing uimecessary losses and congestion. The Government andthe newly formed Railway Authority tried to improve matters butwithout success.

The reasons behind many of the shortcomings could besummarized:

1. Mismanagement: The World Bank, through the consultingfirm SOFREAL, pointed this out as a major factor as far back as1974, but their report was shelved.

2. Lack of maintenance of rolling stock and other equipment

3. Widespread corruption: The railway authorities, seeing thatthere were many business demands upon them, realized that itwas impossible to serve all at one and the same time and to befair to all developed a policy of queues: who came first was tobe served first and registration books were to be kept at thevarious railway stations. In practice there was no system ofaccountability and the door was opened wide for corruption.

4. Frequent strikes: Salaries were low and the trade unionsacting irresponsibly creating many delays.

5. Political problems with the USA: Over 80% of the railwayequipment was of USA origin and when the USA declaredeconomic sanctions against the Sudan, the railways sufferedbadly.

With these fa i lures both the Rai lway Author i ty and theGovernment came under severe pressure. Many scholars thoughtthat the problem of transport could be solved by building roads, not

only to serve the economy, but also because roads were lookedupon as the sign of a modem state.

ROAD BUILDINGDuring the first half of the 20th century tarmac roads were built inKhartoum and in a few other towns; outside such urban centres theroads were sand and grave! tracks following the lines that animalmovements and humans walking had created. When lorries wereintroduced they followed such route lines and in spite of suchshortcomings they were able to compete with the railways. Afterthe Second World War the number of working lorries increasedsignificantly and discussions began. Notably there were papers byMortice in Sudan Notes and Records strongly in favour of roadbuilding. In 1957 the Sudan asked for technical advice from theUnited Nations. This led to the Campbell Report which suggestedthe building of 3,100 miles (c5,600 km) of national and provincialroads. Nothing materialized due to opposition from SudanRailways and because of the economic problems facing the Sudanfrom 1958 to 1961. In 1964 USAID suggested that two highwaysin particular should be built: Khartoum to Port Sudan via WadMedani (to serve the Rahad Scheme); and Khartoum tO E10beidvia Kosti. In the end only two short highways were built:Khartoum to Wad Medani (189km) and Khartoum to Geili (33km).

The failure of the railways led to lorry owners breaking the 1934Ordinance and carrying goods to and from Port Sudan. But plansfor a road network did not start until a new Political Regime tookover in 1986. The first question asked was how to pay for a newroad network? The advent of oil revenues has helped enormously.So far five long highways have been constructed to give the Sudana skeleton network. These are:

1. The highway suggested by USAID from Khartoum to PortSudan via Wad Medani and Kassala.

2 . Tahady Highway from Khartoum to Port Sudan viaAtbara.

3 . The Westem Ingaz Highway from Khartoum to E10beidvia Kost i and s ince extended to Nyala wi th workunderway to reach E1 Fasher. This is now to have a branchfrom Kosti to Malakal.

4 . The Northern Ingaz Highway from Omdurman across theBayuda Desert to Dongola and Merowe

5 . On the easternside of the Nile a highway from Karima toDongola and Old Halfa with a link to the Khartoum-PortSudan Highway

BRIDGE CONSTRUCTIONThe first bridges were constructed for the railways. They werenarrow with side tracks for the use of pedestrians and animals.Later they were made accessible for small cars and l ightcommercial vehicles. The main railway bridges were:

1. Over the River Atbara, 1897;2 . Over the Blue Nile linking Khartoum with Khartoum North,

19083 . Over the White Nile at Kosti, 1911;4 . Over the White Nile linking Khartoum and Omdurman,

1924.

The main new road bridges (outside Greater Khartoum) are:1. The new Atbara Bridge to allow Tahady Highway traffic to

proceed to Port Sudan;2 . A new bridge at Kosti for the Western Ingaz Highway;3 . Hantoub Bridge over the Blue Nile for the Khartoum-Port

Sudan road via Wad Medani and Kassala;And most recently:4. Merowe/Karima, 2007;5. Dongola/Sieim, 2009;6. Hasaheisa/Gunaid, 2009;7. Um At Tayour/Karima, 2009.

Greater Khartoum has had a series of new bridges across bothWhite and Blue Niles. Their main intention has been to allowtraffic to proceed without having to go through the centres ofKhartoum, Khartoum North and Omdurman, thereby reducingcongestion:

1. The Armed Forces bridge, Khartoum to Khartoum North;2. Shambat Bridge linking Khartoum North with Omdurman;3. A1 Fetaihab Bridge linking Khartoum with Omdurman, 1985And more recently:4 . A1 Manshiya Bridge linking Gereif West and villages east of

the Blue Nile with Khartoum, 20085. A1 Mek N imr B r idge l i nk ing Khar toum Nor th w i th

Khartoum, 2009;6 . Gazafi Bridge linking Khartoum and Tuti Island, 2009.Other new bridges are in the pipeline including one to improveaccess to the new airport which is now under construction.

IMPACT OF THE NEW ROAD NETWORK (Tables 2 & 3)So far the length of time since the development of the roadnetwork has been too short for a full evaluation. Nevertheless,some significant effects can be noted. The railways have clearlylost out badly to roads in passenger traffic. Over the 25 years 1970to 1995 the number of passengers carried annually fell from 3.2million to 300,000.

The preference for travelling by road is clear. The modem busesare comfortable, much more comfortable than the railway. Theservices are frequent and booking is not required and they havestops for refreshments. Bus fares are less than for First and SecondClass on the railways and the bus journey time is much less thanthat by train. For example, the train takes 27 to 30 hours fromKhartoum to El Obeid or Khartoum to Port Sudan, whereas busestake only 8 to 9 hours. Similarly, the train takes 5 hours for thejourney from Khartoum to Wad Medani compared with just over 2hours by bus. It is now possible by bus to go as far as Sennar or

Kosti from Khartoum and return the same day. Khartoum toDongola by bus takes only 5 hours these days compared with thesteamer and railway journey of 8 days in the past.

In a similar manner the railways have lost a great deal of freighttraffic. From 2.96 million tons on average for 1971-74 to 0.7million tons average for1985-90. The increase since then seems tobe mainly due to heavy goods connected with oil industrydevelopment. Nevertheless, the railway still plays a significant rolein the transport of bulky low value items. Road hauliers are muchmore interested in high value products, especially where thedistances are relatively short.

Air transport has also suffered from road developments. Airtransport is much more expensive and inconvenient. For example,it costs £S150 to travel by air from Khartoum to Dongolacompared with £49 by bus and you have to report at the airportthree hours before the scheduled time of take-off. It is thereforehardly surprising that Sudan Airways is in increasing financialdifficulties with some of its internal services. The Khartoum toDongola service used to run 3 times a week, but is now reduced toone a week and this flight is rarely full.

Table 3: Percentage of goods transported by rail, trucks, river and air.

Period By railway By trucks By river

1970- 1971 74.0 22.9 3.01988 - 1989 11.6 87.5 0.81990- 1991 10.5 86.3 1.11993 - 1994 23.2 75.6 1.1Source Osman Ibrahim

By air

0.10.10.10.1

The improved network of tarred roads has also had an impact onrural land use. In the past farmers were very hesitant over theproduction of high value crops such as fruit because of fears that itwould be ruined because of the poor quality of the roads and

because of the length of time of getting the commodity to themarket. Farmers are cautious about change and it takes some timefor there to be an impact. Nevertheless, the Khartoum - Port Sudanroad has now been in existence for some time and has had asignificant effect around Kassala. Here the production of fruit andvegetables has increased significantly for the Khartoum and PortSudan markets and some business men have constructed coldstorage facilities to cope with the expanding production, and forsimilar reasons there has been an expansion in poultry production.It should not be assumed that this is an isolated incidence. It isnotable that in the Khartoum markets you can now find fruit,especially mangoes, from the Nuba Mountains and fish from thedam at Merowe. There are also the first glimmerings of return tothe rural areas due to the improved road network as some peoplecan now see that a good living can be made from agriculturalproduction.

The roads have not only increased mobility for social and familyevents but have also led to increased migration particularly tourban areas. So that whereas the Three Towns, comprising thecapital, had only a quarter of a million inhabitants and wasdominated in the 1950s by a limited range of 'Northerners', todayit is truly cosmopolitan with a population of perhaps up to some 8million including large numbers of folk from the east, west andsouth of the Sudan.

THE FUTUREIn 2009, it was stated that government policy is to try to revitalisethe railways as it is plain that rail transport is the best way ofmoving bulky products, often of low value compared with weight,over the long distances involved in the Sudan. Khartoum to Nyalais 1404km, Khartoum to Wau is 1500km and Khartoum to PortSudan is some 900km. One of the reasons given besides theeconomic was political. In November 2009 there was a meeting inKhartoum to discuss a proposal for a rail link from Dakar to Port

Sudan. Th is is remin iscent o f the co lon ia l p lan , wh ich nevermaterialised, to link The Cape to Cairo and Djibouti to Dakar.

So far, the road network is very much a skeleton one. I t is plainthat many areas are still only served by dirt roads of questionablequal i ty with many often unusable during the rainy season. I t isplain that priority needs to be given to road transport serving someof the marginal and often potentially very productive areas such asDarfur, the Nuba Mountains, Ingessana Hil ls and virtual ly thewhole of southern Sudan.

REFERENCES

ABDEL RAHIM MOHAMED ABDEL RAHIM (2003) Modernisation ofSudan Railways, a Conference Paper

BARBOUR, K M (1961) The Republic of the Sudan, London

CAMPBELL, J R (1957) Sudan Roads, Sudan Government Report.

HAMILTON, T A (1935) The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan from Within, London

IBRD (1974) SOFREAL Report to the Sudan Railways.

KHOGALI, M M (1964) The Significance of the Railway to the EconomicDevelopment of the Sudan, with Special Reference to its Western Provinces,M A Dissertation, University of Wales (Swansea).

KHOGALI, M M (2009) 'The Future of Kassala', Sudan Studies 39, 42-50.

MARCH, G F (1948) 'Transport in the Sudan' in TothiU (Ed) (1952)

MOHAMMED OSMAN AL KHIDER (2004) The Historical Developmentof the Sudan Transport Net, a Conference Paper (in Arabic)

MORRICE, H A (1949) 'The Development of Sudan Communications',Sudan Notes and Records 30 (2 parts).

OSMAN IBRAHIM AL SEID (2004) The Problems of Transportation in theSudan, a Conference Paper (in Arabic)

REPUBLIC OF SUDAN (1997) The 5-Year National Plan for Development,1997-2002

REPUBLIC OF SUDAN (1999) Transportation Statistical Bulletin,Khartoum.

SUDAN GOVERNMENT (1911-1935) Annual Reports.

SUDAN RAILWAYS (1926-1934 & 1975-1999) Annual Reports

SUDAN RAILWAYS CORPORATION (1997) The Comprehensive FiveYear Plan, 1998-2002.

TOTHILL, J O (Ed) (1952) Agriculture in the Sudan, London.

ANGLO-FRENCH SUDAN BOUNDARY COMMISSION,1922-23

Barbara Rees

It was only towards the end of the 19th Century that you find theFrench and the British co-operating. When Ferdinand de Lessepswas instrumental in the construction of the Suez Canal, PrimeMinister Disraeli decided to take shares in the project to facilitateBritish trade with her colonies in the East. Britain gained afoothold in Egypt and the Sudan at the same time. Atter the GreatWar, when European minds were drawn to Africa, Britain andFrance, with their holdings in Africa, namely French Chad andUbangi-Shari and the British with the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan,needed to establish the boundary between these countries. This ledto the establishment of the Anglo-French Boundary Commission.The leader was a Frenchman Colonel Boulnoi r wi th anEnglishman, Captain James, as his second-in-command, to surveythis specific area.

Captain AC James was commissioned into the RoyalEngineersThird Field Survey Company in 1917 and towards the end of theFirst World War he commanded the No. 6 Observation Group.Colonel Boulnoir was probably picked from a similar SurveyGroup in the French Army. Captain James wrote two personaldiaries during his active involvement with the Commission from1922-1923. The following extracts are taken from these and givean interesting background to the activities of the whole group asviewed by him.

DIARY No.1The first diary deals with a section of the Sudan-Chad boundary(Figure 1). The Sudan side was Darfur. The frontier to the north ofWadi Howar, based upon latitude and longitude, had already beenagreed. The first trek involved crossing westwards from the Nile

C H A D

Undur' i~ Sendi eBora Wells

./,1 Furawla, /

Kulbus (', . ~ D A R F U R

Bali ~,Ungurra ( KutumBoru "~

Gan t i l l i / ' Mellit

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Toumtouma~,Kereinik Marra

\ eGeneina Fort P/ateauEl Fasher

A d r e I ~ / " Amberri

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2201 24° I 26°E I

F igure 1" Diary No. 1: Sudan/Chad Boundary

area, so on the 2nd January 1922 the Frenchman arrived at Kereinikto meet James and his group and they started work straight away.James took the northern trail while Sgt. Bristow and one Brycetook the south. They appear to have been well supplied. When theyencountered local chieftains throughout the whole time they weretrekking, they were plied with local produce e.g. eggs and milk,except when James found he was in hostile territory. Couriers wererequired to enable the two parties to maintain contact. They rodeon horses accompanied by a policeman if they were sent onmessages. The number of couriers varied and sometimes exceeded70.When it was a question of taking observations they would climba j ebel or fort and set up the instruments. Even though thecountryside was mostly desert the nights were cold and windy.

During the following month, according to James's diary, the groupwas dispersed along an agreed line, and he was the only Europeanin the area. Jebel Bari was infested with baboons and they wereliving among the rocks; this indicates that the land was no longerentirely desert but was sparsely covered with vegetation. Themethod of transport on trek was on camels so the desert stillprevailed.

The indigenous people lived in settlements either permanent ortransitory and were ruled by a Sultan or Sheikh, and they weregenerally very co-operative - clearing a place for a camp whereJames mentions putting up his tent with chair, table and bed(Figure 2). It does not seem from the evidence that any paymentwas given. He was camped in an area (a wadi) half way to Kulbusand working from 6 am to 10 am- then trekking again until 6 pm.Whilst trekking he met the Sultan "a most gorgeous gentleman"who insists on turning him round and is followed by all of hisretinue and he watched them put up his tent. The Sultan was givencoffee and lime juice, and in exchange he donated milk, eggs,chickens, native food and "a great big sheep".

Figure 2: Captain James relaxes after a hard day's surveying

There was however always a shortage of water. James writes thathe had visions of great thirst - after 6 hours of trekking his menfound water at Sendi where there were three wells and quite a bigvillage. "Who said this is a waterless country"- he states but hetook no chances and loaded every container with water. They"found water again at Undur" -and here ostriches abounded.

By 21st June 1922, at Huror, he is in Nas territory which wasFrench. He had to settle many disputes particularly in this areawhere he did not receive any local help. The Nas would notprovide any workmen or sell sheep. James was told to make themsell, but he decided that as it was French territory this was notpossible.

Some night work had to be done as James writes about climbing ajebel at night in order to use a fix from the stars and he andBoulnoir at times had to do much walking over soft sand. Hedescribes some places among the foothills of the Jebel MarraPlateau as green and fertile. In this region the local people declaredthat they were British and to prove it donated a cow - whichimmediately ran away! There were times when food Was scarceand some rice was on the menu. When there was a Mohammedanfestival James says he bought a bull so they could have a feast, buthe only allowed his men half a day's holiday.

When he was proceeding westward the country was labelled dulland desolate but when he was on his way back he saw thingsdifferently. : There is little mention of rain in the first diary, butMellit we are told was a wonderful place, the centre of which wasa large palm grove where he "saw a mirage this morning a greatbig lake of shimmering water". This was the first he had seen sincehe was out there. Kutum he describes as "a veritable paradise ofgreen trees hidden away among a range of high mountains" and"upon a hill which overlooks a wadi just crammed with date

palms "."green grass

In the morethe Stationhe "saw a

When theythem up.Cairo.

unlike the October weather, was all

areas there were Rest Houses. At E10beid inthere was "white bedroom furniture'" and

the first for 9 months"

there was a terrific storm which heldthey took a train and steamer all the way to

DIARY No.2The othera differentSudan border(Figure 3).of waters

in the following October but in the south -and was concerned with part of the

(now Central African Republic)was to identify for the border the parting

the Nile from those to the Congo. Diembananas lemons

U D A N

Startof plot

Apparently atthat poisonedfrom him sogun and shotgazelle -mentionsFrench Conside being

"1 haveCongo anddiscovered thFrenchEast".

At Angaforabeaconfinished, and

one of his African police ate somethingmade him mad - so James took his gun

do no harm to himself. James carried ahe saw - such as a wild goose or a

:ime then he would be on a horse because heone and spraining his finger. He is near thetime plotting the boundary, the whole SudanE1 Ghazal.

from which two khors flow - one to thethe Ni le" - fo l lowed by the entry, " I 'veof a khor which runs to the river Dyvo in theputs the boundary about 15 miles further

;iff arrives but not Boulnoir, but James sees a:s away which indicates that Boulnoir hasarrive the next day and after breakfast theystart calculations and observe again in the

In this area heshoot them butshoot anyKnipi,foot in theshot a buffalo"A northernstarted on thecould up northhuge forest fire

seeing his first elephants and wanted tomade a rule while trekking not to stop andwas bothered by hyenas near the Riverwere after his donkeys. Here he has one

foot in the French Congo. He actuallyin his pathway although it was dangerous.~is - haven't felt really well and fit since 1

- and I can't do nearly as good days as 1other hindrances James encountered a

River Pongo.

At Bid theresuccumbed toacross in thislooking beasts".and the doctor con breechescotton one,

an doctor which was lucky because he hadof fever. Other wildlife that he came

bees and he came across rhino -"fearsomewere bad after being bitten by tse-tse flythis injury too. He also made James put

wearing shorts, and a flannel shirt under aapparel did not prevent him from going

He had to be earned which he

was reallyplace was Yhome,floweringhabitats and sulcer, but hehim thesome of the

with trees covered with creepers. Thehe describes as beautiful - like arrivinggardens, whole roads bordered with

~, in the established places there are goodHere, he had a bad knee, a suspected tropical

again with Syrian doctors who showedbug under the microscope and afterwards

the advanced stage of the disease.

Themap. After allOn the 11thpoint of thebut am herealmost

defined here and they could plot the finalhe reaches the end of the boundary.

entry in the second diary reads, "the final4 Arrived here at lpm more dead than alive,

main point.., six months hard work underand yet we've carried it through.."

Then hecountry to

northwards through Moja and floodedthere was a resident District Officer. He

were to a lish

They succeededthe Sudanbut through allBoulnoir got onApril 1923towards the end

the two very different stretches ofis clear that this was not an easy enterprise

it seems that Captain James and Colonelwell as this extract from a letter of 8wrote to James when both were ill

near Yubo shows:

"The doctor arrdid needgot the strar,the oM needleevery jab.t.t

~terday morning, thank heaven, for I reallyafter seven days continuous fever. He

me five minutes after arrival and jammedhot and very strong - and I welcomed

I am a bit betterin them and I

feel remarkably

but Oh my legs.t I've never had such painat night with it. But for the fever pains, I

thoroughly cheerful .......

sketchin sake

Cheerio -thoroughly

- but don't try to be strenuous or I shall beyou ".

After servicethe Ceylonrejoined theinterpretationwas bom in

Captain James left the army and joined}epartment. He returned to Britain in 1940,

and was engaged in air photographicin 1946. Captain Austin Challice James

died in 1970.

[Not all theidentified,text. Ed]

in the diaries couM be positivelythe maps are not referred to in this

PROBLEMSSUDAN:

~D IRRIGATED AGRICULTURE IN THEOF KHOR ABU HABL SCHEME

lamed Babiker Ibrahim

Agriculture has bbefore thethe Sudanese2005; Ibrahim 20almost half qoil hasreached 94.8% ofextraction and expmodernizationrain-fed

backbone of the Sudanese economy sinceexport of oil in 1999 with more than 80% ofinvolved in agricultural production (Ahmed1999 the share of agriculture to GDP was

to 35.3% in 2007. However, since 1999ificantly to Sudanese exports and by 2007~orts (Bank of Sudan 1999; 2007). Before oil

the Sudanese economy depended largely onof irrigated schemes and mechanized

in the Sudan, including the Khor Abu Habl

Accordingly,crop.

Over the lastcultivation of(Cajanus zajan)with thegrown at Khormarkets of East2010). At the bechanged. Thedirected toareas of theincreased throuallocated

FLOOD

The need toarid

cotton as a cash crop and dura as a food

:ades, besides dura, farmers have added thefood crops such as tomatoes, lubia adasi

,sistence and cash, as well. In recent years and~f transportation, tomatoes and other vegetables

are sold at weekly village markets and townDistrict (Mahaliyat Um Ruwaba) 0brahim

of the millennium, the objective of the Schemeobjective of Khor Abu Habl Scheme is now

security and poverty eradication in ruralresponse, in 2003 the area of cultivation was

of Er Rahad section which has beengrowing of food crops.

AND ITS PROBLEMS

production and alleviate poverty in the semi-countries has encouraged agricultural planners

In. most casessediments brouOn the otheraccumulation of sclevel which, inthe fields (Tesfaisome farmers offields (Niemeijer

In the Sudan,flood water fromthrough canalsirrigation thatBaraka seasonalGash flood water2001). Sincedifficult to buildBaraka's flushflood water which

not use fertilizers because of the nutrient richannual flood water (Tesfai and Sterk 2002).the main problems of spate irrigation is thein the fields that causes the rise of the field

not allow the entrance of the flood water into2002). Accumulation of sediment has forced

Sudan to abandon their increasingly elevated

types of flood irrigation: (1) diversion ofkhor (stream) such as Khor Abu Habl

basins that encompass the farms; (2) flushsuch as those formed by the Gash and

in the northeastern parts of the country. The)lied through canals that irrigate farms (Kirkby

irregular and has no permanent channel, it iscontrol its water (Allan 1948). Therefore,

water is left to spread over land covered byfrom one year to another; and (3) in the

by thecharacterized byflood waters fallin others it comecauses damagethat took place(Ibrahim 2010,

KI-IOR ABU

Khor Abu Habland is one ofLocated30"E and 31°Kordofan 2007).dunes near thebeyond TendeltiDevelopment 20,flood hazards

(Niemeijer 1993). Khor floods are)atial and temporal fluctuation. In some years

needs (Barbour 1961; Wallach 1988) andto the extent that it overflows its banks and

villages and infrastructure such as the floodingHabl in 2007 and in the Gash Delta in 2003

10).

in the Nuba Mountains of Southern Kordofan~st seasonal streams in the Sudan (Figure 1).

12° 15" N and 13° 00" N and longitudes 30°an area of 26,792 m2 (State of North

eastward and drains into the sandy soil andIn exceptionally higher floods it flows

into the White Nile (Yam Consultancy &floods in Khor Abu Habl are associated with

ighbor ing v i l lages and the destruct ion of

flood irrigatedagriculture on theis characterizedmillet (dukhn),cultivation hasproductivity (State

Material for this p~in East Kordofansecondary sourcesHabl farmers. Inof Agriculture at

KHOR

The scheme wasmake use of the sthe localcovered an area oJ

The

by cult ivation of the rainfedsoils). The qoz land adjacent to the Scheme

and land fragmentation. Farmers cultivateand karkadi. In recent years, rainfed

from increased rain variabil i ty and lowKordofan 2007).

collected as part of another study carried out2010. This study depends mainly on

interviews with a number of Khor Abuthe authorpersonally interviewed the Director

Town.

SCHEME

in 1945 by the government of Sudan toflood of Khor Abu Habl to cultivate dura byqoz north of the scheme. At the beginning it

10,000 feddans (Barbour 1960:161; Marchthe tenant and partnership system that

Semeih Section

Semeih Sectionmain canal thatconnected to 13basin ranges(hawashat) inan earth banksince 1949, therethe Semeih

Usually,waters enter theirrigation waterbe kept for twobasin, whichbeforeand other ve

Both closed and

an area of 13,000 feddans. The length of theKhor Abu Habl is 14 kilometres long and is

canals that irrigate the basins. The area of theand 60 feddans, and there are five to 12 farms

L Each basin is separated from other basins bySince Er Rahad section has not functioned

reference is made to "the scheme" it is onlyof North Kordofan 2007).

scheme starts in July until August when floodbasins have banks one metre high that allow

a depth of 70 to 80 centimetres. The water willthen passed to the neighboring basin. The

many hawashat (farms), will be left to drydura, tomatoes, lubia adasi (Cajanus zajan)

(State of North Kordofan 2007).rotations are practiced at Khor Abu Habl

with cotton andthis agreement,(farmers) will boBank, to financecottonremaining profit

As can be seentook place in thenationalproduction. Thiscotton, cleared theweeding and pestilproductivity ofcaused significantthe last two90% of thecities between E1

with crops of the farmers' choice. Based onAssociation of Water Users

from banks, namely Sudan Agriculturalof cotton cultivation only. All costs of

deducted from the sale of cotton. Thejoyed by the farmers.

a remarkable increase in cotton production~04 through 2006. This was the period when a

was initiated to enhance agriculturalprimarily financed the production of

in the canals, and paid for the cost ofprogramme continued until 2007, however,

in that year because the high floodto the canals and the basins of the Scheme. In

lack of credit, farmers cultivated more thanwhich has a favorable sale price in the

and Kosti as well as in all east Kordofan

their staple foodmeals during theand lubia adasithe rehabilitationlack of financeproducing crops

Besides the oldrainwaterearth damsbehind the damsvegetables,the summer

PROBLEMS

Khor Abu Hablenvironmentalhampered itshas resulted in

adasi as an important component of theirof Ramadan. Tomatoes and the surplus of durain the market as a source of income. However,

lasted for three years and, because of theproblems, Er Rahad section ceased

of agricultural production, a new system ofemerged as a result of the construction of 13

in the period 2000-2004 Storage of waterfarmers' income through cultivation of

available for nomadic groups through most ofground water levels 0brahim 2010).

ABU I-IABL SCHEME

is rife with financial, administrative andwhich have adversely affected productivity and

since the early 1990s to the present. ThisA carried out by the State of

system gave thecultivate.

Accordingly,Association ofinstitutions. Theinstitutions suchDistrictcotton. However,variability and

On manycost of productiontheir debt andthem toprison. E "sarand applies tofrom banks andSudan A

freedom to choose the crops they want to

Abu Habl have formed a union called thein order to borrow money from financial

was able to secure loans from lendingAgricultural Bank under the grantee of theRuwaba Farmers' Union primarily to finance

to siltation of the canals, high rainfallsuffer from low productivity.

on the sale of cotton is far less than thereason, many farmers were unable to repaythey either abandoned their farms or rented

~. In some cases, these farmers end up inbecoming increasingly common in the Sudanall kinds of agriculture who borrow money

to repay their debts. For this reason, theand other lending institutions refused to

of the Khoraccompanied byand is lett for 15canals. In thedesiltation andabolishment ofsupport andjob. Therefore,the extent thatreduced sihawashat. Incannot supportmoisture has siSchemeirrigation throu

The Scheme isseida (Cyperus

the hi

the annual flood of Khor Abu Habl isand sediments. When it enters into the basinssilt and sediments settle in these basins andMountains Corporation was responsible for

of the main and subsidiary canals. After the,oration, and because of the lack of financial

Scheme administration was unable to do thesilt has accumulated in the basins and canals toplaces the water storage capacity has beenin others, low flood water cannot enter into the

and retention of flood water in the soilof crops. On the other hand, insufficient soil

reduced crop production. For this reason, theseriously of introducing supplementaryof the khor water into the fields.

from high infestation of weeds, namelybecome a problem to the extent that weeding

cost of farming at Khor Abu Habl Scheme.

CONCLUSION

The rich soil andof NorthNational standard of livingobjectives forbetween thesatisfactorypolicy andagencies thatkinds of aScheme was nofinancial andcrop productivity.

As a result ofScheme, a newthe objective of

flood of Khor Abu Habl in the southern partencouraged both the Condominium and

an agricultural scheme to improve thepeople. The scheme somehow fulfilled its

~d 1945-1992 when the partnership systemSudan Government was implemented in a

the application of liberalization, free marketby the government in 1992, the parastatal

for fmance and administration of allwere abolished and Khor Abu Habl

Hence, the Scheme has suffered fromproblems that hinder cultivation and reduce

experience of the Khor Abu Hablplan of development is required to fulfill

eradication of poverty and increasing

ADGER, W N,(2003)Progress in

AHMED, AAdoption in

A L L A N , / W N (Agricuiture in . . . . . . ...

632 . . ' . .

BANK OF

BANK OF

BARBOUR, KUniversity Press.

REFERENCES

BROWN, K, CONWAY, D & HULME, MClimate Change in the Developing World'.Studies 3 (3): 179-195Impact of Finance and Funding on Technology

of African Development 7(1 ): 20-41

'Irrigation in the Sudan', fin Tothill J D:(E&) Oxford University Press, pp1593=. . , .

19) 39th Annual Report. Khartoum, Sudan.

)7) 47th Annual Report. Khartoum, Sudan.

) The Republic of the Sudan. London: London

BASCOM, J Wages and Profits: Mechanized Schemes

'AgriculturalManagement in1(1):48-65.

IBRAHIM, M BEconomic11(3):125-138.

IBRAHIM, M BAreas of CentralAssociation

Rome( Ita!y, j:.:i "iKI J3y, (:oo... . , J

van STEENBERGEN F (2007)in Ephemeral Rivers: Community

in Eritrea'. African Water Journal

'The Impact of Democracy on the Socio-of the Sudan'. The Arab Worm Geographer

Rainwater Harvesting in Drought-strickenPaper Presented to the Annual Meeting of the

April 14-18, Washington D.C.

to Climate Change thrOugh Support toctions. Comprehensive Report: FinalVersion,

the Gash Delta, 'Sudan~ . Land Degradation, : -

. . . . . . . - . . . .

NARAYANAMURTHY, S, SAMAD, G M, SAM, H & JOHNSON, I II (1997) 'Comparing Theoretical and Actual Feasibility of TransferringManagement of River Lift Irr igation Systems in Sudan'. NaturalResources Forum. Vol. 21(1):13-22.

NIEMEIJER, D (1993) Indigenous Run-off Farming in a HangingEnvironment: The Case of Kassala's Border Area, Sudan.! Vols 1 and 2.Landscape Environment Research Group, University of Amsterdam andDepartment of Irrigation and Soil and Water Conservation, WageningenAgricultural University, The Netherlands.

STATE OF NORTH KORDOFAN (2007) Study of Khor Abu HabilScheme: Present Situation, Problems and Future Prospects. Ministry ofAgriculture, Animal Wealth and Irrigation. E1-Obeid, Sudan.

TESFAI, M (2002) 'A Land Suitability System for Spate IrrigationSchemes in Eritrea'. Soil Use and Management 18:77-78.

TESFAI, M & STROOSNIJDER, L (2001) 'The Er i t rean SpateIrrigation System'. Agricultural Water Management 48:51-60.

TESFAI, M & STERK, G (2002) 'Sedimentation Rate on Spate IrrigatedFields in Sheeb Area, Eastern Eritrea'. Journal of Arid Environment 50:191-203

VAN STEENBERGEN, F (1997) 'Understanding the Sociology ofSpate Irrigation: Cases from Balochistan'. Journal of Arid Environment35:349-365.

WALLACH, B (1988) 'Irr igation in Sudan since Independence'.Geographical Review 78:417-434.

YAM CONSULTANCY & DEVELOPMENT (2003) South KordofanRange Management Strategy Study & Khor Abu Habil CatchmentsBasin Planning and Water Development Study. Volume 2. InterimReport, Khartoum, Sudan.

Table 1: Production of Cotton at Khor Abu Habl Scheme 2001-2009in Kantars

Year Total Production/kantar Average Prod./feddan/kantar

2001

2002

2003damage to canals

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

~ 5,000 3.0

3,000 3.5

No cotton cultivation because high flood caused great

3,500 4.0

7,000 4.7

12,000 6.0

2,500 4.0

No cotton cultivation because there was no credit

No cotton cultivation because there was no credit

Source: State Ministry of Agriculture, Um Ruwaba June 2010

Figure 1: Khor Abu Habl Scheme

ii ":::::'~':'':'3

..:

.... :,..~.~" "~'M E.I

~r .---~__~. ' : ~ LIMITSO~QOZIRRIGATION SCHEME AREAS

RAILWAYMOTOR ROAD

DRY WEATHER ROADCANAL

Source: Barbour (1961 )

BOOK REVIEW

James Maskalyk, Six months in Sudan: a young doctor in a war-torn village, Canongate, Edinburgh 2009, 340 pages

ISBN 978 1 84767 276 6

Abyei. It is not a place many people have visited, but this vividaccount by James Maskalyk, a young Canadian doctor who workedfor six months at the hospital in Abyei, brings the town and itsproblems vividly to life.

The hospital was run by M6decins sans Fronti6res (MSF), anorganisation which specialises in providing medical services inhazardous and challenging situations. The overseas staff of MSFsent to Abyei - administrators and nurses as well as doctors -mostly stayed for six months or less. Only the Sudanese doctor andnurses provided continuity. In James Maskalyk's book the hospitallurches from crisis to crisis - a measles epidemic, TB cases, trafficaccidents and the occasional invasion by angry and demandingtroops. There are inevitable tensions with the local community,which always expects more than the hospital can provide, butsomehow the staff cope and there are even small improvements.The book g ives a good ins ight in to how an NGO l ike MSFoperates. The structure is fragile but when the field staff reallybegin to feel overwhelmed MSF's training and managementsupport systems do hold things together.

James Maskalyk wrote a blog to try to convey to friends andrelations what his life in Abyei was like. Writing was one of theways in which he coped with the difficulties of life there. Parts ofthe blog are included but most of the book is freshly written. It stillhas a real immediacy - one is very conscious of the staff's emotionsas the hospital copes with each crisis. It is very hot, the tukl whereJames lives is full of insects, his bed is uncomfortable, the food ismonotonous, there is no alcohol and only the occasional cigarette tohelp him relax. And yet, amidst the suffering and poverty there aremoments - watching children playing in the light of the setting sun

or seeing a new mother's smile - when he feels a sense of peaceand fulfilment.

James Maskalyk works hard to make his text reflect the realities ofhis assignment. There are echoes of Hemingway in his shortsentences and laconic, down-to-earth style. Sometimes he becomesdisjointed, mimicking his own state of mind; he is still not surewhat really matters to him in life. His success in capturing theflavour of MSF's work in Abyei has been widely recognised andhis book is one of five shortlisted for the prestigious 2010 JohnLlewellyn Rhys prize, awarded for a new publication by an authorunder thirty-five years old.

This is not a book to read if you want to know more about thepolitics of Abyei. James Maskalyk had only six months there andhe had to work fiat out as a doctor. He admits that he had little timeto find out about the social and economic background of hispatients. He regrets not learning more about local customs, but insome ways his ignorance is a good thing, helping him to stick to theMSF policy of not judging or taking sides.

When James returns to Canada you realise that the book is as muchabout his responses as it is about Abyei itself. He had alreadyworked in South America, Cambodia and Southern Africa, butAbyei was the most demanding and searing of his postings. Thechallenge for him was to see if he could cope and use his skillseffectively in circumstances so different from those in Canada. Hefinds it difficult to readjust when he gets home, and to explain to hisCanadian friends his feelings about war-tom, impoverished Abyei,and the people he met there. He dreams about a time when Abyeimoves to the other end of the spectrum, and obesity becomes aproblem there as it is in the west, but he knows how unlikely that is.

Although so much of the book is about the author's own feelings,and about how MSF operates, James Maskalyk does have animportant message. Even in today's interconnected world he feelsthat it is all too easy to regard places like Abyei as being almost ona different planet. He insists that the suffering people there are no

di fferent f rom the rest of us; they are ent i t led to the sameconsideration as those who are more fortunate, whether in Sudan orelsewhere, and the same efforts to bring them safety and justice aswell as medical care. We can only hope that these hopes will berealised over the next few years, and that Abyei is not destined forcontinuing conflict because it is situated so close to a contestedborder.

Adrian Thomas

Carl Benn,Voyageurs inPress, Toronto,notes, biblio,

ISBN 9]

Published in

During theto relieveabsorbed in theNile. The succebeing able tonecessary todistances up the

BOOK REVIEW

the Nile: Natives Among the CanadianNatural Heritage Books, Dundurn

Canada 2009, 278 pages including appendices,

available from Amazon at $27.26 in hardback.

his appointment to command the expeditionbesieged in Khartoum, Lord Wolseley was

planning needed to ensure a rapid ascent of theoperation depended upon a self reliant forcetimetable. To achieve this objective it was

supplies and munitions by boat for longdifficult navigational conditions caused by

bold venturenarrow subjectthe expeditionhistory.

;ds because the author's narrative places awithin the overall 'Voyageur' contribution toin context with Sudanese and First Nation

The structure ofthe terminology usof standardlonger inspelling used by

is clear and logical. The introduction sets outthe text and the author explains the use

and the replacement of certain words noEgyptian and Sudanese names follow theArchive at Durham University.

Five chapters ofdevoted to thethe expedition andcontingent ofresponse of theSubsequentthe expedition,

114 pages comprise the first section. It isand analysis of the Mohawks' part in

with the initial request from London for ato be formed for service on the Nile, the

and the despatch of the Contingent.a detailed description of their work during

to Canada, an analysis of the Mohawks as

copies of Jacksonlibraries, whilstcopies probablytexts on the role'Voyageurs' withdistances inchronology

are rare, being confined to archives andprivately printed for him and fewer original

appendices consist of additional primary~Voyageurs', an annotated roll of the Mohawk

information, the strength of the contingent,Sudan relevant to the expedition and a useful

A comprehensiveidentify thebibliographyau tho r. HeBrackenbury,excellent Sudan

is included enabling the reader to readilyin the text. This is followed by an extensive

the depth of research undertaken by theall the established texts Stacey, McLaren,

Grant, also the Canadian Archives and theUniversity Library.

The index isnote about theContemporary

carefully prepared with a concise explanatoryand symbols used in the l istings.

are chiefly taken from photographs inArchives

BOOK REVIEW

J Millard Burral-Turabi andPubs,

O Collins, Sudan inTurmoih HasanState, 1989-2003, Markus Wiener

About theCalifornia at S'didn't want tocutting grasson researching.In this booknumber of hisfor Operationearlier one2003 by Brilland waspaperback,widely availab

~fficially retired from the University ofBob Collins remarked to me that he

: he was to spend his later years neitherit grow under his feet. In fact, Bob wentand teaching right up to his recent death.

,ined by his long time collaborator on a~, Millard Burr, a former relief coordinator

Sudan. This book is a follow up to anRevolutionary Sudan, published in

Netherlands, which had a short print runocket of many readers. Now published in

the content of the earlier one morealso has an additional chapter taking the

Peace Agreement (CPA) of

Bob's historyand ideologyhistoricalmoving andbook is trueconcernedinternallysecurity,it could reachto be thegovernmentsbe the startregimes,perspective,Laden and

,s less concerned with political thoughttheory than with deeply researchedwith vim and vigour to create a fast-

account of the unfolding events and thistradition. The first two chapters are

with the regime consolidating its powerInternally that involved initially

on as many of its potential opponents asa new Peoples Defence Force. It was

most repressive record by any of thesince independence. Externally it was to

relations with an array of dubiouspersonalities, at least from a Westernthe very contrasting figures of Osama bin

Jackal.

Under Turabiunfold throu

influence the Islamist project was toof the 1990s, and it is his role in these

up the bulk of the book. The

President MubDelphiconly isolatedneighbours,At the sameregime in theother Asianand risk keptoil exportsBeshir fromparliament,(Turabi hasme that it Was

Addis Ababa in 1995 which Turabi'sto justify. Sudan then stood not

so threatened as anti-Islamist Africanthe USA, gave sustenance to the SPLA.was a new temptation for many in the

with the willingness of China andto invest in Sudan's oil while sanctionsmajors at bay. In the same year in whichflow, 1999, Turabi sought to challenge

new position as Leader of thehis hand called and end up in prison.

out of prison for decades and once toldthat he had time to read.)

Collins andbut perhaps thehe was backNational2010 suggest

that was essentially the end for Turabi,still out. Once released from prison again

and eventually leading the Popularthe elections of 2010. Events so far in

South will vote for separation in 2011,historians will see Turabi as one of

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