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Introduction
The examination of intra-group relationships in the context of ethnic conflict,
peace processes, and peace accords, remains under-studied in comparison with
inter-group relationships (Gormley-Heenan & MacGinty, 2008: 43). The relative
neglect of intra-group dynamics misses a crucial variable in the perpetuation and
resolution of ethnic conflict. A potentially problematic in-group mechanism for
peacemaking is that of ethnic outbidding. Ethnic outbidding occurs in the context
of competitive electoral politics when parties identified with the same ethnic
group compete for support, neither having reason (depending on the incentives) to
cultivate the support of other ethnicities. Each ethnic party seeks to demonstrate it
is more nationalistic than its intra-ethnic counterparts by raising its ‘bid’,
protecting itself from claims by the other that it is ‘soft’ on ethnic issues
(Brubaker & Laitin, 1998: 434). Once this auction-like scenario begins the ethnic
outbidding thesis predicts a contagion of extremist politics which destabilises and
ultimately prevents conflict regulation within a democratic framework (Mitchell,
Evans & O’Leary, 2009: 397).
The ethnic outbidding puzzle
The destructive force of ethnic outbidding is demonstrated in the cases of Israel,
Sri Lanka, and Sudan, among others (DeVotta, 2005; Horowitz, 1985). The
consequences of outbidding can range from modifications of peace processes to
the outbreak of civil war. Despite this seemingly inexorable process in divided
societies, it is not often explicitly acknowledged that ethnic outbidding does not
always succeed. Contrary to conventional wisdom we see cases of ‘outbidding
failure’ in Croatia, India, and Serbia (Hislope, 1996; Chandra, 2005; Gagnon Jr,
1994). Why is ethnic outbidding not always successful for ethnic parties in ethnic
party systems? The source of this research stems from this puzzle for political
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CHAPTER ONE
theorists and policymakers. The research is important, because if the conditions in
which outbidding is “more or less likely to pay off” are better understood then its
chances of success can be diminished, and its most devastating consequences
when it does succeed managed (Brubaker & Laitin, 1998: 434). To this end, this
dissertation hypothesises that ethnic outbidding is particularly successful when
ethnic parties are able to exploit the fears of their ethnic group over inter-ethnic
compromise, without taking extreme positions on practical issues that would
undermine the gains of rapprochement and scare away voters. This proposed
explanation is applied to the cases of the Democratic Unionist Party’s (DUP)
successful outbidding of the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) in Northern Ireland after
the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, and the European Party’s (EUROKO) as yet
unsuccessful attempts to outbid Democratic Rally (DISY) in post-Annan Plan
Cyprus. This dissertation also considers a number of possible alternative
hypotheses for the outbidding outcomes produced in each case.
The effects of outbidding are generally under-conceptualised in the context of
inter-ethnic compromise, as the process is usually associated with conflict
escalation phase of civil war (Gormley-Heenan & MacGinty, 2008: 44). The lack
of conceptual clarity provides potential hazards for comparative research, but also
a promising opportunity for this dissertation. Whether outbidding succeeds or
fails is particularly important in these contexts, not only for the fate of the
compromise itself, but because moderate, peace-making parties become
increasingly vulnerable to outbidding by their nationalistic intra-ethnic rivals
(Horowitz, 1985: 354). The hypothesis draws from elite framing, socialisation,
and rational choice theories (Gray, 2004; Sandal & Loizides, 2009; Horowitz,
1985; 1989; Brubaker & Laitin, 1998). It is hypothesised that effective outbidders
are the ones who simultaneously exploit ethnic grievances without eliminating
prospects for mutually advantageous inter-ethnic cooperation. In other words,
these parties should not only define grievances but also identify appropriate
strategies and opportunities for redressing the current situation. By extension,
effective outbidders should adapt to external incentives and disincentives and
maintain a network of relationships with influential actors during the negotiations.
Eventually, these parties may also be socialised on compromise, though only
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partially, resulting in an often contradictory balance of weak cooperation and
intransigence on issues of mainly symbolic importance.
Themes and methodology
This dissertation explores the variation in outbidding puzzle in the context of
recent research which has refined earlier theory (Horowitz, 1985; Rabushka &
Shepsle, 1972) by stressing the role of party adaptation in outbidding strategies
(Gormley-Heenan & MacGinty, 2008: 45; Mitchell, Evans & O’Leary, 2009).
Theoretical and comparative works on this topic are rare, which is where this
dissertation makes its contribution. This dissertation engages with several
interrelated conceptual, analytical, and empirical themes:
The dynamics of intra-ethnic political competition in divided
societies
The difficulties for vulnerable peace processes caused by this
competition
Institutional and electoral design choices in divided societies e.g.
the use of institutional and electoral incentives to engineer party
behaviour, and party responses and adaption to these environments
The role of identity in ethnic conflicts, and how these issues are
framed by ethnic entrepreneurs
The methodological choices were influenced by the nature of the puzzle and
themes. The comparative method allows for contrast between the ‘positive’
(outbidding success in Northern Ireland) and ‘negative’ (failure in Cyprus) to
understand the causes of the dependent variable, in this instance outbidding
outcomes (King, Keohane & Verba, 1994: 129-130). Although this research
utilised a mainly deductive approach to arrive at the aforementioned tentative
hypothesis, case-oriented qualitative analysis also allows for the development of
causal inferences and partial generalisations to bolster its explanatory potential,
even beyond the cases under examination here (Ragin, 1997). The smaller
number of cases or ‘small-N’ contributes to the development of “thick theory”, in
which greater understandings are taken from these cases (Lijphart, 1975: 170-
171). The cases are highly favourable for comparison, demonstrating remarkable
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similarities in terms of both being divided islands, self-determination disputes,
ethnic party systems, as well as containing religious and motherland identity
dimensions. The parties also exhibit cross-case similarities, particularly the UUP
and DISY as centre-right peacemakers, agreeing to inter-ethnic compromises
despite conventional expectations that they would say ‘no’ (Sandal & Loizides,
2009). The similar characteristics of each case allow for a degree of control,
making the contrast in outbidding outcomes especially illustrative of the
arguments and themes this dissertation contends with.
This dissertation employs several sources for its research. It uses academic
literature on ethnic outbidding to theoretically ground its hypothesis, literature on
Unionist and Greek Cypriot party politics, electoral datasets highlighting patterns
in outbidding party support, and interviews. The use of interviews is a salient
aspect of the qualitative focus of the dissertation, as first-hand accounts with the
principal players and leading academics corroborate other sources and establish
what certain actors think regarding these research themes and questions (Tansey,
2007: 766).
Structure of dissertation
This dissertation proceeds to detail the hypothesis and review the academic
literature that contributed to its formation in more depth (Chapter Two), as well as
critically engaging with these texts.
This hypothesis is then tested by the case of the DUP’s outbidding success in
Northern Ireland (Chapter Three). The chapter establishes the background to
Unionist party competition before evaluating the hypothesis. Other variables are
analysed as potential alternative hypotheses, with their implications considered.
The following chapter on Cyprus (Chapter Four) mirrors this structure; only in
this instance a case of outbidding failure, allowing contrast with the previous case
to be explored.
The concluding chapter (Chapter Five) engages with the key themes from this
research, as well as the theoretical and policy implications of this piece. It
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summarises the main findings of the research and validity of the hypothesis, with
more explicit emphasis on the comparison between the cases.
5
Ethnic Outbidding in Divided Societies
The opening chapter to this dissertation established what it considered to be ‘the
ethnic outbidding puzzle’, namely, why such a prevalent and potentially
devastating process in divided societies does not always succeed. To understand
this variation and prevent the occurrence of its worst outcomes when it does
succeed, this dissertation aims to clarify the conditions that lead to its success. It
hypothesises the following: ethnic outbidding is particularly successful when
ethnic parties are able to exploit the fears of their ethnic group over inter-ethnic
compromise, without taking extreme positions on practical issues that would
undermine the gains of rapprochement and scare away voters1. This chapter aims
to establish a theoretical and contextual grounding for its hypothesis, before its
application in the following empirically-based chapters. Firstly, the literature on
the assumptions of the ethnic outbidding thesis that founded the hypothesis is
outlined. The chapter engages with the seminal political science works on the
topic; Alvin Rabushka and Kenneth A. Shepsle’s Politics in Plural Societies: A
Theory of Democratic Instability (1972) and Donald Horowitz’s Ethnic Groups in
Conflict (1985), whilst also using articles and sources that refine and critique these
outbidding theories. The chapter then proceeds to analyse each aspect of the
hypothesis, ascertaining the theoretical and contextual basis of its claims. This
dissertation takes a novel approach by introducing concepts and ideas into its
hypothesis, which have hitherto not been applied to ethnic outbidding.
Ethnic outbidding in literature2
1 For clarity, successful ethnic outbidding is measured in terms of electoral victory for radical ethnic parties. For some ethnic parties, undermining the peace process or peace initiative may constitute success; however it is difficult in these cases to establish the extent that the ethnic party was responsible2 An assumption underlying the literature summarised here is the negative influence of ethnicity in party systems. This is not a universally held view (Birnir, 2007; Chandra, 2005; Gagnon, Jr. 1994; Ishiyama, 2009)
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CHAPTER TWO
Despite its frequency in ethnic conflict literature (Horowitz, 1985; Rabushka &
Shepsle, 1972; Rothschild, 1981), ethnic outbidding lacks any precise or
ubiquitously used definition, a problem for comparative analysis (Rose, 1991).
This dissertation is sympathetic to the formulation forwarded by Cathy Gormley-
Heenan and Roger MacGinty (2008: 44), in which ethnic outbidding is defined as
the process “through which parties within the same ethno-national bloc seek to
portray themselves as the true defenders of the group position while
simultaneously undercutting the legitimacy of in-group rivals”. The impact of
such imprecision is fortunately mitigated through the models provided by
Horowitz (1985: 347 and 359) and Rabushka and Shepsle (1972: 66-92). This
chapter adapts these ethnic outbidding models to demonstrative the assumptions
that underlie its hypothesis.
Key:
: Direction of party bids
: Direction of electoral competition
As ethnic outbidding primarily occurs in ethnic party systems, its effects are best
exhibited through contrast with non-ethnic party systems. In non-ethnic party
systems (see Figure a), parties attempt to garner as broad a base of support as
possible in order to maximise their power or influence. There are incentives for
non-ethnic parties A and B to moderate their policy platforms from the “extreme”
preferences on a certain issue (points A and B). Electoral competition is
centripetal, with parties moving to positions which they think the majority of
7
Centripetal
A B
A B
Figure a: Electoral competition in a non-ethnic party system
voters lie, usually the centre-ground. For example, such incentives are said to
have influenced the rebranding of Labour Party in the United Kingdom, from a
party previously associated with ‘leftist’ policies to a centrist “New Labour” party
(Leggett, 2007: 347).
Whether engendered by ambitious ethnic politicians or by the make-up of society,
ethnicity is the most salient cleavage in ethnic party systems, making other
cleavages redundant (Horowitz, 1985: 340). Ethnic parties represent the interests
of, and receive support solely from, their ethnic group rather than competing for a
plurality of votes in the centre-ground. This ‘either/or’ nature of support contrasts
with the graduated ‘more/less’ nature of party support in non-ethnic party systems
(ibid: 291 and 345). Operating in a segmented electoral market, an ethnic party
X1 representing ethnic X will compete intra-ethnically with parties (X2) also
claiming to represent ethnic X, rather than ethnic parties representing another
ethnicity, Y (see Figure b). According to Rabushka and Shepsle (1972) political
preferences are distributed along a Downsian uni-dimensional issue space, with
members of each ethnic group clustered at opposite ends (X and Y here) of a linear
scale (Giuliano, 2000: 297). Ethnic parties thus have few incentives to cultivate
support from the ethnic ‘other’ (Mitchell & Evans, 2009: 148). This lack of
incentives may also be supplemented by institutional structures or majority-
minority group demographics, where ethnic parties that represent the majority are
often guaranteed representation without having to appeal to minority groups. For
Horowitz (1985: 342), the conflict-promoting character of ethnic party systems
stems from the absence of inter-ethnic competition. It is this above all else which
leads to ethnic outbidding.
The only way for ethnic parties X1 and Y1 to gain votes is to outbid their intra-
ethnic rivals, X2 and Y2 in an auction-like scenario (DeVotta, 2005: 141).
According to both Horowitz and Rabushka and Shepsle, ethnic outbidding occurs
when it is the most rational and electorally profitable choice, yet ethnic party
systems have an innate propensity to produce competitive incentives to outbid.
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Parties play the ‘ethnic card’ in an attempt to portray themselves as the most
authentic defenders of the ethnic group’s interests and security, raising their bids
to trump intra-ethnic rivals (Hislope, 1996). Intra-ethnic competition is very
intense, with intransigent rhetoric resonating due to the cohabitation of the same
socio-cultural space (Gormley-Heenan & MacGinty, 2008: 47-48). Furthermore,
the inability for ethnic parties to diversify their support means ethnic leaders see
such competition as a genuine threat to the survival of the party.
For Horowitz (1985: 345), the costs of being outbid are so high that parties X2 and
Y2 are incentivised to raise their bids (they may do so pre-emptively) in order to
cover their ‘flanks’ from competitors X1 and Y1, knowing they cannot rely on
support from other ethnic groups to compensate their losses. The Croatian
Democratic Union (HDZ) did both, protecting its flank from the Croatian Party of
Rights (HSP) whilst outbidding the moderate Coalition of People’s Accord (KNS)
(Hislope, 1996). The process repeats itself, as ethnic parties X1 and Y1 counter
this with a higher bid, pushing electoral competition centrifugally from the
moderate centre towards the extremes in stark contrast to the logic of the non-
ethnic party system (Chandra, 2005: 237; Reilly, 2001: 9). This shift worsens
both intra- and inter-ethnic relations. Movement to the ‘extremes’ is often
replicated in the other ethnic groups, fearing ‘their’ moderate parties will not be
able to defend their interests from the extremist ethnic party of the ethnic other.
9
Centrifugal
X2 Y2
Figure b: Electoral competition in an ethnic party system
Y1X1
X Y
The cases in Table 1 reveal that ethnic outbidding is not simply a theoretical
construct, but an empirically based dilemma for peacemakers and political
scientists alike. Outbidding can escalate and exacerbate ethnic conflict. The
centrifugal character of competition radicalises ethnic groups, undermines multi-
ethnic alliances, and leads to violent outcomes. Of particular concern here is the
effect of outbidding on already vulnerable inter-ethnic compromises. This
dissertation largely agrees with the assumptions of the ethnic outbidding thesis.
However, Table 1 also demonstrates that ethnic outbidding is not always
successful. Horowitz and Rabushka and Shepsle do not explicitly specify the
variation in outcomes, and are thus overly pessimistic about outbidding’s
consequences. Indeed, Elise Giuliano (2000: 296) is critical of the outbidding
thesis for this reason, stating that “a convincing theory of ethnic mobilization
should be able to account for variation in outcomes, for cases of frustrated as well
as successful mobilization along ethnic lines”. Variation in the outcomes of
ethnic outbidding is the source of the puzzle and the accompanying hypothesis’s
contribution to the answer.
Inter-ethnic compromise
Although the target of outbidding strategies will vary from case to case, the
hypothesis argues that ethnic outbidding is particularly successful when ethnic
parties exploit the fears of their ethnic group over inter-ethnic compromise.
Indeed, it is hard to ascertain whether bids on compromise are a genuine reflection
of an ethnic group’s grievances, a tool by opportunistic elites to incite mass
hostility, or a stick to beat their peace-making intra-ethnic rivals. The reality is
usually a combination. In any negotiations there are ‘winners and losers’, and
outbidding parties consider themselves ‘losers’ e.g. they may have a vested
interest in the perpetuation of ethnic conflict, or are ‘outside’ the peace-making
process (Kaufman, 2001). Outbidding parties are thus a type of ‘spoiler’ aiming
Country / Group
Intra-group competitors
(outbidders in bold)
Was the outbidding group successful?
Azerbaijan / Azerbaijani
Azerbaijani Popular Front (APF) and the
Communist Party
Unclear – The APF ousted the Communist party in June 1992 after the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict had escalated into full scale-war, yet APF
10
support dramatically dropped soon after
Croatia / Croat HSP and HDZ
HDZ and KNS and SKH-SDP
No – HSP won only 5% of seats in the Sabor in the 1992 elections
Yes – KNS won only 3% and multi-ethnic SKH-SDP 20% in 1990 elections. Franco Tudjman’s nationalistic policies helped HDZ win 40%
India / Hindu Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and Congress
party (INC)
No – BJP attempted to outbid INC on pro-Hindu, anti-Muslim positions. However, when it assumed power in 1998 it did so through moderation
Iraq / Sunni Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and Islamic Army in Iraq
(IAI)
Unclear – Armed groups have attempted to outbid each other within their own group through suicide bombing or ‘suicide outbidding’, though precise estimations of support are elusive
Israel / Jewish Yisrael Beiteinu and Likud
Unclear – Yisrael Beiteinu emerged over disagreement of concessions granted by Likud to the Palestinian Authority in the 1997 Wye River Memorandum. Yisrael Beiteinu’s involvement in the failure to implement the Memorandum is questionable, however it is now the third largest party in the Knesset
Malaysia / Malay PAS and the Alliance Party
Yes – PAS outbid on language and education issues, demanding Malay be made the sole and official language. PAS increased their electoral share in the 1959 general election from one seat in Parliament to control of two state governments
Northern Ireland / Irish-Catholic
Sinn Féin and the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP)
Yes – Sinn Féin were able to portray the SDLP as ‘soft’ towards Unionists (especially with the rise of the DUP) and ineffective in the Nationalist drive for a United Ireland. Sinn Féin overtook the SDLP in 2001 (by a 0.7% margin) and has subsequently increased its support
Serbia / Serb Serbian Radical Party (SRS), the Serbian Renewal Movement
(SPO) and the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS)
Unclear – Slobodan Milošević’s SPS won the 1990 election with 65% (16% SPO and 2% SRS). Nevertheless, the ultra-right SRS was seen as enough of a threat that the SPS established a coalition with it after the 1992 elections. This broke down in 1993 and the SRS was ultimately repressed by Milošević
South Africa / White
DP (Democratic Party) and NNP (New National
Party)
Yes – DP’s 1999 election campaign “Fight Back”, was interpreted as an assault on post-apartheid SA. In a case of ‘racial outbidding’, it prompted seismic shifts in white allegiances, in which the NNP lost 70% of NP’s 1994 result
Table 1: Case studies of ethnic outbidding and its varying outcomesSources: Chandra (2005), Hislope (1996), Horowitz (1985)
to derail the compromise (Stedman, 1997: 7). Ethnic parties will often exploit the
fears of their group over compromise usually through framing. Collective fears of
the future often drive ethnic conflict (Lake & Rothchild, 1996: 41), and they can
also impede its resolution. In the zero-sum framework of ethnic conflict, fears of
11
compromise stem from several sources, such as the security dilemma,
commitment problems, and the impact on ethnic identity (Posen, 1993; Fearon,
2004). Exploitative ethnic entrepreneurs often reflect and stimulate these fears by
framing compromise issues in worst-case scenario terms (Kaufman, 1996: 109;
Lake & Rothchild, 1996: 54; Rothschild, 1981: 195).
Though moderation is rewarded in non-ethnic party systems, in ethnic party
systems the “rhetoric of cooperation and mutual trust sounds painfully weak […]
it is strategically vulnerable to flame fanning and the politics of outbidding”
(Rabushka & Shepsle, 1972: 86). Compromising parties are accused of ‘selling
out’, ‘treachery’ and ‘betrayal’ of the ethnic group’s interests e.g. in Sri Lanka, the
United National Party (UNP) leader Dudley Senanayake accused the rival
Sinhalese Sri Lankan Freedom Party (SLFP) leader, S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike of
an “act of treachery” by signing the 1957 Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam (B-C)
pact with the leader of the Tamil Federal Party (DeVotta, 2005: 150). Combined
with the aforementioned fears, ethnic groups are more likely to support parties
who promise to defend their interests more robustly. The “elongated and
convoluted nature” of peacemaking processes provides multiple opportunities for
these ethnic auctions (Gormley-Heenan & MacGinty, 2008: 48). Ethnic
outbidding thus creates a “bankruptcy of moderation”, where moderate ethnic
parties are compelled to adopt a less compromising stance to avoid defeat
(Rabushka & Shepsle, 1972: 86). The logic of centrifugalism is antithetical to
compromise that requires inter-ethnic elite cooperation and moderation; instead its
competitive incentives promote uncompromising views (Caspersen, 2004: 570;
Mitchell, Evans & O’Leary, 2009: 400).
The consequences of outbidding on compromise range from modification of peace
deals to their collapse, presenting a significant problem to policymakers
(Gormley-Heenan & MacGinty, 2008: 45). The hypothesis argues that given the
heightened resonance and occurrence of ethnic outbidding in instances of inter-
ethnic compromise, the chances of successful outbidding are improved if ethnic
parties can exploit the fears of their ethnic groups in these contexts.
Identity and framing issues
12
Seldom considered within the ethnic outbidding literature is the content of
outbidding appeals. In the last section we discussed how attacks on inter-ethnic
compromise may prove fruitful for outbidding parties, but on what basis are these
appeals made? This dissertation argues that successful outbidding appeals are
usually those that contain identity-based and symbolic relevance to the target
ethnic group. Using identity-based issues for outbidding is a low-cost tool for
popular mobilisation, given their relevancy in ethnic conflict and because
attachments to ethnic identity ensure such messages are easily understood (Brown
& MacGinty, 2003: 86). Symbols are used in conflict to assert superiority,
legitimacy and add moral weight to a group’s claims (Horowitz, 1985: 217). They
can also be used in outbidding. For example in Moldova, moderate nationalist
Petru Lucinschi was outflanked by the Mircea Druc in 1990, the Moldovan
Popular Front leader, over the Moldovan language issue, which had been
‘degraded’ by Russophones (Kaufman, 1996: 122-123). Outbidding on identity is
especially effective during periods of political stress such as compromise, where
identity issues become more acute (Brown & MacGinty, 2003: 87). The
primordialist approach utilised by Horowitz and Rabushka and Shepsle is
criticised by constructivists for assuming that ethnic groups’ identities are fixed,
and that their political preferences on symbolic issues are polarised along a single
dimension defined by ethnicity (Chandra, 2005: 236; Giuliano, 2000: 296).
Responses to outbidding on symbolism are likely to be diverse rather than uniform
(Brown & MacGinty, 2003: 87). While Chapters Three and Four emphasise this
multifaceted nature of ethnic identities and cleavages, the hypothesis maintains
that identity issues are a valuable resource for successful outbidding.
Literature on ‘framing’, a process where actors jointly interpret, define and
redefine states of affairs, is relevant here (Loizides, 2009a: 281). Frames build on
pre-existing cultural stock drawn from the symbolic politics of a community.
They involve agency in the construction of the shared meanings of a situation,
whether a problem exists and what solutions are possible (Gray, 2004: 167).
Successful outbidding appeals are those that are framed effectively not only in
terms of grievances but also in terms of appropriate solutions. Parties use
‘diagnostic frames’ which identify the source of a problematic situation and
13
attribute blame, in an attempt to exploit the group’s fears of compromise. In
addition to a diagnostic frame, what is often missing among ethnic outbidders is a
'prognostic frame' establishing that an alternative source of action is viable and
effective. In other words, party frames should be shaped by political learning and
their response to incentives including the identification of appropriate
opportunities and strategies for redressing the problem as well as an assessment
of the degree of efficacy of alternative strategies (Benford & Snow, 1988; Kovras
& Loizides, 2009). For Rabushka and Shepsle (1972: 69), ethnicity provides a
‘perceptual consensus’, where alternatives are viewed according to a frame
common to all actors. However, Giuliano (2000: 299) argues that voters’
preferences are instead constructed through multilayered interactions among
politicians’ framings of issues rather than any standardised understanding, a
position this dissertation largely agrees with. In the chapters that follow we see
how ethnic entrepreneurs employ frames in outbidding appeals, particularly on
identity and symbolic issues.
Party adaption and outbidding strategies
The hypothesis further diverges from the ethnic outbidding thesis by making a
seemingly counter-intuitive suggestion that successful ethnic outbidding appeals
are those that feature a degree of moderation. Outbidding parties moderate on
practical issues, such as governance or resource allocation, in order not to
undermine the gains of inter-ethnic rapprochement and scare away potential
voters. Given the centrifugal nature of political competition this seems a
paradoxical proposal but one grounded in recent refinements of the outbidding
thesis (Gormley-Heenan & MacGinty, 2008; Mitchell, Evans & O’Leary, 2009).
The nuances of outbidding strategies allow for this contradictory mixture of
moderating on practical issues while remaining intransigent on identity-based
issues.
Why do parties adapt their outbidding strategies in this way? Sandal and Loizides
(2009) suggest that parties are socialised through interaction with peace-
promoting elites and allies, moderating on issues with international-level
importance, such as inter-ethnic compromise. However, socialisation is
14
‘punctuated’ so that outbidding parties remain obdurate on other issues. This
dissertation applies this partial socialisation to outbidding strategies so that
intransigence on identity-based issues in the context of peace processes is
combined with, and can compensate conservative constituencies for, moderation
on practical issues. Ethnic parties may also adapt if rational cost-benefit
calculations on the electoral viability of such shifts permit it.
Contrary to the assumptions of the outbidding thesis, increased social polarisation
is not always a given (Lake & Rothchild, 1996: 54). The hypothesis builds on
Mitchell, Evans and O’Leary’s (2009: 403) proposition, whereby each community
wants its strongest voice (their ‘ethnic tribune’) to represent it, but they want this
ethnic champion to act in a more cooperative fashion. The hypothesis argues that
ethnic parties must adapt to these realities in order not to scare away potential
voters and undermine the gains of compromise, which vary case to case.
Depending on the electoral system, potential voters may even come from another
ethnicity e.g. in Malaysia, moderate behaviour by the United Malays National
Organization (UMNO) appealed to the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) and
its voters (Horowitz, 1989: 28). Voting for ethnic tribune parties implies some
intransigence in advocating the ethnic group’s core identity interests but does not
necessarily entail increased overall social polarisation (Mitchell, Evans &
O’Leary, 2009: 417). That ethnic parties adapt undermines the assumptions of
these parties as somehow ‘anti-modern’ or outdated (Gormley-Heenan &
MacGinty, 2008: 53). While too much moderation will leave ethnic parties
vulnerable to their flanks, the hypothesis aims to demonstrate that ethnic
outbidding is not “necessarily a blunt instrument of total opposition” (ibid: 44).
The hypothesis suggests that while outbidding’s centrifugal tendencies are likely
to push ethnic groups further apart; degrees of moderation mean the resultant
position will not be at the ‘extreme’ ends of the issues axis.
Alternative hypotheses
So far this chapter has outlined the foundation of its hypothesis, but there are also
alternative explanations for the success of ethnic outbidding with causal value to
15
be considered. Whether electoral systems and institutions can facilitate or
perpetuate ethnic divisions is analysed the following chapters. As elections can
shape norms of political behaviour, political engineers often hope to induce
cooperation and moderation from parties in divided societies, yet poor electoral
design can encourage centrifugal behaviour (Coakley, 2008; Reilly, 2001).
Horowitz (2002a) rejects proportional representation for this reason, advocating
the ‘alternative vote’ method. Institutions can also be created to incentivise or
prohibit outbidding behaviour. For example, Chandra (2005: 246) uses India to
argue that institutions that enshrine cross-cutting cleavages and multiple
dimensions of ethnic identity discourage outbidding and force parties to moderate
their positions to attain support from other groups. A criticism often levelled at
power-sharing and consociationalism is that its institutions reify one dimension of
ethnic identity. Furthermore, power-sharing arrangements may only allow for
cooperation if parties can protect themselves from flanking (Mitchell & Evans,
2009: 151). In additional to these alternative explanations, political parties have
their own ‘bounded rationality’. The ability of parties to exploit issues within
existing schemes “is therefore a product of the party leaders and the endogenous
constraints of party organisation, constituency ties and reputation” (Marks &
Wilson, 2000: 434). The chapters look at these factors: organisation, leadership
and reputation to ascertain their potential influence over outbidding processes
(Gormley-Heenan & MacGinty, 2008).
Summary
Although the proceeding sections dealt with aspects of the hypothesis separately,
it is the combination of these aspects that increases the probability of successful
ethnic outbidding. Outbidding on inter-ethnic compromise without some degree
of moderation is likely to fail, as the outbidding party will suffer from accusations
it is simply a spoiler with no viable alternatives. The hypothesis contains both
elements of non-rational (fear, identity, symbols) and rational (anti-compromise,
adaption, moderation) in its explanations. This chapter aimed to establish a
theoretical and contextual basis for the hypothesis and its subsequent application
to empirical cases. This dissertation agrees with much of the core tenets of
Horowitz and Rabushka and Shepsle’s assertions, namely that outbidding
16
incentivises uncompromising behaviour, can poison intra- and inter-relations, and
can have potentially severe consequences in divided societies. However, it also
acknowledges several valid criticisms of the thesis. As Table 1 demonstrates,
outbidding is not an inherently successful strategy. Lack of attention to this fact
means ethnic outbidding sometimes receives an overly-fatalistic representation of
outbidding in the literature e.g. Rabushka and Shepsle (1972: 217) conclude that
pluralism can not be contained in a democratic framework. It is the goal of this
dissertation to explain the variation of outbidding outcomes believing that it is an
important puzzle for political scientists and policymakers. Having established the
basis of the puzzle in theory, the following chapters test the hypothesis and
alternative explanations in the cases of Northern Ireland and Cyprus.
Playing the Popular Engines: the Success of Ethnic Outbidding for the Democratic Unionist Party in
17
Northern Ireland
In the 2003 Northern Ireland Assembly election the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP)
lost its position as the leader of the unionist community to its main intra-ethnic
rival, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP). The DUP has since solidified this
dominant position in subsequent elections, leading to suggestions of realignment
within Unionism (Tonge, 2005: 60). The DUP’s success provides an excellent
case study for ‘the ethnic outbidding puzzle’. Varying outcomes in other cases
suggest ethnic outbidding is not a uniformly successful strategy, so what explains
its success in this case? This chapter applies the hypothesis discussed in the
previous chapter, arguing that successful ethnic outbidding occurred because the
DUP were able to exploit Unionist fears and disappointment with the Good Friday
Agreement, without taking extreme positions on practical issues which would
undermine the gains of the peace process and scare away Unionist voters. The
chapter begins by examining the intra-Unionist cleavages and party competition in
order to provide a context for the DUP’s outbidding success in the post-agreement
environment. Then the chapter assesses this hypothesis before exploring
alternative explanations for the success of the DUP’s outbidding. The chapter
concludes with its findings and the implications for the conditions of successful
outbidding from this case.
Unionist party competition and ethnic outbidding
The Northern Ireland problem has been described variously as an ethno-
nationalist, ethnic, and a religious conflict (Farrington, 2001: 50). The region is
divided between the majority Unionist community, primarily but not exclusively
Protestant (53.13%)3, who wish to defend Northern Ireland’s current status within
the union as part of the United Kingdom, and the minority Nationalist community,
primarily but not exclusively Catholic (43.76%), who wish to revise the partition
of the island of Ireland in 1921 and reunify the Northern Ireland with the Republic
of Ireland. These conflicting self-determination pursuits, coupled with Nationalist
3 2001 census results from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/northern_ireland/2590023.stm
18
CHAPTER THREE
exclusion and discrimination from a Unionist-dominated government, led to inter-
communal violence from 1969 until the 1990s, known as ‘the Troubles’. During
this period, Northern Ireland’s government was suspended (from 1972 until
1998); with the province governed by direct rule from Westminster, the
parliament of the United Kingdom. The Belfast Agreement of April 19984
restored devolved government, with power-sharing institutional arrangements
between Nationalists and Unionists. The present-day party system that emerged
from this period of conflict is a typical ethnic party system. This chapter focuses
on Unionist party competition, examining the main protagonists, the UUP and the
DUP.
Intra-Unionist competition features numerous cleavages on questions of ideology,
identity and attitudes towards inter-ethnic compromise. Since its beginnings in
1905 from the Ulster Unionist Council, the UUP has been a centre-right party. In
contrast, the DUP is considered right-wing in terms of social issues, but leftist in
its economic policies (Evans & Duffy, 1997: 53). Identity is not ‘fixed’, although
both the UUP and the DUP are staunchly pro-union and derive cultural resonance
from the ‘motherland’. The DUP does tend to place more emphasis on the
‘Northern Irish’ aspect of identity (Sandal & Loizides, 2009). This sense of
motherland nationalism is shared by Greek Cypriots, examined in the next
chapter. Interlinked with identity is the religious cleavage, again also prominent
in the Cyprus case. This is less salient intra-ethnically, though since its
establishment in 1971 the DUP has maintained strong links with the minority
Protestant Free Presbyterian church, which then leader Ian Paisley himself
founded. While the UUP were not affiliated with any particular church (the party
wished to encompass most shades of Unionism), the party did have a strong
association with the Orange Order, an exclusively Protestant cultural-religious
organisation (Evans & Tonge, 2005: 320).
The aforementioned cleavages demonstrate the parties are not polar opposites on
all issues. The parties are however more readily differentiated on ‘ethnic’ and
‘civic’ strands of unionism with the DUP associated with the ethno-religious and
4 Unionists generally refer to the 1998 peace agreement as the ‘Belfast Agreement’, whereas Nationalists tend to use ‘Good Friday Agreement’
19
cultural former, and the UUP with the latter, based on rights and citizenship5.
Significantly for the ethnic outbidding puzzle they are also distinguished in their
approaches to compromise and more specifically the Good Friday Agreement (see
Figure c). The defensive siege mentality within Unionism, attributed to feelings
that Northern Ireland’s status within the union is under threat, created
unwillingness to compromise. As Graham Walker (2004: 221) surmises:
The problem facing anyone from the Unionist side who sought to
de-tribalise Ulster politics was the strength of the perception in that
community of this being a weakening of the collective will to
preserve the union
This suggests a vulnerability to ethnic outbidding, and Unionism’s political
leaders have proved adept at what John Wilkes called ‘playing the popular
engines’ (Arthur & Jeffrey, 1996: 38). Since the UUP began to advocate
devolution instead of integration (a source of fissure in the party6), the UUP and
the DUP have been divided over the best means to achieve it, either through
pragmatism or dogmatism (Farrington, 2001: 56-57). The DUP acquired a
reputation as hardliners, the party that “most eloquently articulates the siege
mentality of absolute opposition to a united Ireland under all circumstances”
(Mitchell in Evans & Duffy, 1997: 57). The DUP and particularly Paisley have
always attempted to outbid the UUP e.g. denouncing then-leader Brian Faulkner’s
‘betrayal’ by signing up to the Sunningdale Agreement 1973 with Nationalists
(Sandal & Loizides, 2009). The UUP were comparatively moderate, though they
could also be intransigent. Indeed, a large section of the party were anti-
Sunningdale themselves, polling 10.5% in the 1973 Assembly election. The party
was able to protect its flank from the DUP challenge in the 1980s and early 1990s
and maintain its electoral superiority largely by not risking inter-ethnic
compromise and appearing more rational than their hardline counterparts
(Cochrane, 2001: 323).
5 Interview with Graham Walker, a leading academic on the politics of Unionism, 20106 ibid
20
Figure c: Cleavages over status in Unionist politics
The UUP and DUP briefly put aside intra-ethnic party competition to show unity
in opposition to the Anglo-Irish Agreement 1985, which granted the Irish
government a greater say in Northern Irish affairs. However, the ‘Ulster Says No’
campaign stunted DUP growth, with the 1987 Westminster election a particularly
poor showing (Walker, 2004: 234-239). Nevertheless, the 1990s saw DUP
outbidding and hardline positioning resume over the UUP’s involvement in the
‘peace process’7 e.g. Paisley said UUP leader David Trimble was going to ‘sell
out the union’ (Cochrane, 2001: 371). The UUP had elected Trimble in what was
seen as the party moving in a more uncompromising direction to fend off this
competition (Sandal & Loizides, 2009). The agreement that emerged from the
peace process fundamentally altered the dynamics of Unionist rivalry as
evidenced in Figure c, providing a new cleavage on the Northern Ireland question,
between the anti-agreement DUP and the pro-agreement, UUP. According to
Evans and Tonge (2005: 324), the agreement witnessed the concretisation of
intra-Unionist rivalry, with the parties now clearly divided.
Election Type
Year UUP (%) Change since last result
DUP (%) Change since last result
7 Used in Northern Ireland to refer specifically to the series of attempts to achieve an end to the conflict and produce a political settlement. From: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/sum.htm
21
Softline
Anti - GFA
UUP
DUP
PUP
TUV
Hardline
Pro - GFA
Assembly 1973 25.3 __ 10.8 __
1982 29.7 +4.4 23.0 +12.2
1998 21.25 -8.45 18.14 -4.86
2003 22.7 +1.45 25.6 +7.46
2007 14.9 -7.8 30.1 +4.5
Westminster 1974 I 36.5 __ 8.5 __
1979 36.6 +0.1 10.2 +1.7
1983 34.0 -1.6 20.0 +9.8
1987 37.8 +3.8 11.7 -8.3
1992 34.5 -3.3 13.1 +1.4
1997 32.7 -1.8 13.6 +0.5
2001 26.8 -5.9 22.5 +8.9
2005 17.7 -9.1 33.7 +11.2
2010 II 15.2 -2.5 25.0 -8.7
European 1979 10.0 __ 29.8 __
1984 21.5 +11.5 33.6 +3.8
1989 22.2 +0.7 29.9 -3.7
1994 23.8 +1.6 29.2 -0.7
1999 17.6 -6.2 28.4 -0.8
2004 16.6 -1.0 32.0 +3.6
2009 III 17.1 +0.5 18.2 -13.8
Table 2: Selected Unionist election results in Northern IrelandNotes: I UUP and DUP in United Ulster Unionist Council, a body of Unionists opposing the Sunningdale Agreement; II UUP in electoral alliance with UK Conservative Party; DUP backed two Unionist independent candidates to avoid splitting Unionist vote; III Ex-DUP MEP Jim Allister, leader of Traditional Unionist Voice (TUV) won 13.7%, significantly reducing the DUP’s totalSource: http://www.ark.ac.uk/elections/
Years of outbidding had only delivered modest growth for the DUP as
demonstrated by the electoral trends in Table 2, yet in the post-1998 the party’s
outbidding allowed it to surge past the UUP with 18% of UUP voters switching to
the DUP in the 1998 to 2003 period (Mitchell, Evans & O’Leary, 2009: 407).
Why did ethnic outbidding yield success for the DUP?
22
As discussed in Chapter Two inter-ethnic compromise can render political parties
vulnerable to counter-mobilisations from intransigent intra-ethnic competitors.
This fate that befell the UUP once it signed up to the Good Friday Agreement.
The agreement provided a catalyst for ethnic outbidding, with DUP representative
Clive McFarland suggesting in an interview with the author that without the UUP
signing up to the agreement it would have been more difficult for the DUP to
achieve the electoral success it subsequently did8. Although inter-ethnic
compromise often undergirds successful ethnic outbidding, it is not the only
factor. This chapter argues that the DUP was able to exploit the fears and
disappointments of the Unionist community with the agreement, but also without
taking an extreme position on practical issues which would undermine the gains of
the peace process and scare away voters.
The 1998 referendum on the agreement demonstrated Unionist apprehension, with
a slim 55% Protestant majority backing the agreement, that was to become a
minority only three years later as confidence eroded (MacGinty, 2004: 90).
Indeed, Unionist fears and disappointments with the agreement were multiple:
confronted with a document that put Sinn Féin9 in government
with no guarantee of decommissioning, with prisoners being
released, doubts about the future of the RUC10, a new relationship
with Dublin, with Nationalism holding a veto in the Assembly over
major issues […] it was not surprising they had difficulties
(Powell, 2008: 104)
As the main pro-agreement force in Unionism, the UUP took the responsibility for
these problems. By rejecting the agreement, the DUP could outbid the UUP on
these issues and exploit Unionist fears, especially among Unionists who gave a
‘soft’ yes in 199811. The DUP argued that the agreement signalled the end of the
union, a diagnostic frame to shape Unionist perceptions on the acceptability of
this compromise. Unionists were also facing a psychological problem, whereby 8 Interview with Clive McFarland, DUP Representative, 20109 Hardline Nationalist party with links to the Irish Republican Army, a paramilitary/“terrorist” organisation responsible for 1,709 deaths from 1969-2001. From: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/sutton/tables/Organisation_Responsible.html 10 The Royal Ulster Constabulary, formerly Northern Ireland’s police force 11 Interview with Graham Walker, 2010
23
the agreement legitimated a change of in the status of Northern Ireland if a
majority wished this to be the case12. This despite many apparent “victories” for
Unionism e.g. Nationalist ‘de facto’ acceptance of the legitimacy of the Northern
Irish state. Nevertheless, Paisley’s denounced the UUP for their compromise, as
“office seekers who are prepared to sell their souls for office” (Farrington, 2001:
51). This classic ethnic outbidding discourse of betrayal resonated with Unionist
fears over the agreement at the UUP’s expense.
The DUP were able to exploit Unionist fears over compromise by outbidding on
identity-based issues. Through punctuated socialisation, actors can feel
comfortable stressing traditional positions on issues that are not significant parts
of intercommunity agreements on an international level (Sandal & Loizides,
2009). It has been argued that political conflict in Northern Ireland can, to some
extent, be seen as having come to be displaced onto a symbolic one (Hill & White,
2008: 44). For Unionists, symbols bestow legitimacy on Northern Ireland’s
current status as part of the union. Alteration of these symbols were the source of
many of the most deeply felt Unionist grievances surrounding the agreement
(MacGinty, 2004: 88). The controversy over policing reform is one such
example. Unionists had always considered the police ‘their’ force, with
Nationalists largely distrustful due to its majority Protestant membership and
accusations of bias and brutality (McGarry, 2000). The agreement provided for a
commission to look into reforms necessary to create a police force for both
communities. Unionists were incensed by the recommendations of the subsequent
Patten Report of 1999, with the focus of their ire on symbolic reforms; the
emblem and name change from the RUC to the Police Service of Northern Ireland
(PSNI), rather than its overall impact on police operations (ibid: 180). The DUP’s
Ian Paisley Jr. said:
All those things [RUC symbols] are now considered not acceptable
and we have the complete ruination of anything British or anything
which links the police service to the British connection (BBC,
2001)
12 Interview with David Officer and Yioulli Taki, of Index Cyprus, 2010
24
By exploiting Unionist fears, the DUP could portray itself as Unionist’s ‘ethnic
tribune’. Even 40% of UUP supporters perceived the DUP to be the more
effective defenders of Unionism’s interests (Mitchell, Evans & O’Leary, 2009:
412). Appearing more robust than intra-ethnic rivals is crucial to successful
ethnic outbidding. Although the UUP were also intransigent on policing, the
DUP’s more vigorous opposition resonated with Unionist fears. Ian Paisley Snr
went so far as to claim that “Patten’s programme is that Protestants have to be
ethnically cleansed” (Farrington, 2001: 52). Even four years after the report, 58%
Protestants believed reform had gone too far.13 The 2001 Westminster election
saw the UUP losing support due to police reform as the DUP were able to
associate the UUP with responsibility for the report as part of the wider agreement
package (Mitchell, O’Leary & Evans, 2001: 730).
Crucially to the DUP’s successful outbidding was that it exploited Unionist fears
without taking an extreme position on practical issues which would undermine the
gains of the peace process and scare away voters. Outbidding had only produced
modest electoral growth pre-1998. The party adapted its hardline positioning to
the post-1998 environment, cannily pointing to the agreement’s most sensitive
issues yet participating in the executive, thereby offering a viable alternative and
demonstrating they were not wholly rejectionist14. This adaption was most
evident on power-sharing with Sinn Féin, in which the party’s position changed
from one of total resistance (DUP, 1998); to laying out conditions Sinn Féin
would have to meet to form government (DUP, 2005), which the party did under
the St. Andrews Agreement 2006. Indeed, the party’s position on policing
moderated, accepting the PSNI and most recently the devolution of policing
powers under the Hillsborough Agreement 2010. This adaption led to accusations
that it had ‘stolen the clothes’ from the UUP. The party’s post-1998 moderation
stemmed from its desire not to undermine the gains of the peace process and scare
off Unionists disaffected with the UUP and aspects of the agreement. Local
politicians had gained control of Northern Ireland’s own affairs after 26 years,
Unionism was experiencing international credibility, and inter-communal violence
had substantially decreased (McGarry & O’Leary, 2009: 51). Furthermore, 13 2003 NI Life and Times Survey, available from: http://www.ark.ac.uk/nilt/2003/Political_Attitudes/REFORMOK.html 14 Interview with Clive McFarland, 2010; Graham Walker, 2010
25
despite the unpopularity of some aspects of the agreement, social polarisation
predicted by the outbidding thesis did not occur. The devolved institutions were
generally popular, with support for the establishment of the Assembly rising from
57% to 70% amongst DUP own supporters between 1998 and 2003, and only 13%
of Protestants rejecting power-sharing in 2007 (Garry, 2009: 461; McGarry &
O’Leary, 2009: 56). Unionists wanted their ethnic tribune but they wanted the
DUP to act in a more conciliatory way, thus had incentives not to undermine these
gains (Mitchell, Evans & O’Leary, 2009).
The DUP’s success demonstrates that party agency is important to outbidding.
Unionists were disappointed with the agreement and the DUP was able to in
McFarland’s words, “tap into the mood, and press the case against the
agreement”15. This chapter argues that its success stemmed from exploiting
Unionist fears by outbidding the UUP, crucially without taking an extreme
position on practical issues which would undermine the gains of the peace process
and scare away voters.
Alternative hypotheses
Literature on the DUP’s success, and on ethnic outbidding more generally, offer
alternative explanations to that proposed here. Electoral systems, institutional
conditions, and party organisation are suggested as factors that may have
facilitated ethnic outbidding and its success in this case.
From Chapter Two we explored how the ethnic party system encourages
centrifugal behaviour, with few incentives to encourage moderation and cultivate
cross-ethnic support (Horowitz, 1985; Rabushka & Shepsle, 1972). Some
electoral systems may mitigate this problem more than others (Reilly, 2001).
Horowitz (2002a: 26) has been particularly critical of the party-list system of
proportional representation used in Northern Ireland, advocating instead the ‘vote-
pooling’ alternative vote. As in the Cyprus case, it is argued PR’s low quota
requirements mean parties can attain seats through mobilisation of their core
supporters, with the party most associated with communal defence benefitting
15Interview with Clive McFarland, 2010
26
electorally (Tilly, Evans & Mitchell, 2008: 701). Previously, the majority
plurality system of first-past-the-post offered a powerful incentive to maintain
Unionist bloc unity. John Coakley (2008: 769) argues that the introduction of PR
in 1973 lowered the costs of intra-ethnic competition and established new
incentives for outbidding. The electoral system thus facilitated the DUP’s
successful outbidding.
However, proponents of PR in divided societies argue that not only is it essential
for group representation, but it may actually incentivise moderation by directly
translating electoral strength to representation in government, causing parties to
position themselves more competitively, and thus more moderately, in order to
attain the most support (Garry, 2009: 459). However, this may have only acted as
an incentive once the DUP had achieved electoral success over the UUP, limiting
its centripetal influence (Gormley-Heenan & MacGinty, 2008: 58). Whatever the
case, PR does not fully explain the DUP’s success. Northern Ireland experienced
PR for years without the DUP overtaking the UUP, and the agreement did not
change this electoral system. Moreover, as the Cyprus case will demonstrate, the
presence of PR did not produce a similar outbidding outcome, undermining the
argument that it facilitated outbidding in these cases.
The role of institutions in ethnic conflict is part of a classic and ongoing debate
within political science between integrationists and consociationalists (Horowitz,
2002a: 19-25; Lijphart, 2002: 40-45). The agreement, as with the proposed
Annan plan in Cyprus, falls firmly within the latter category, and both have been
used as examples by proponents and opponents of consociationalism to justify
their arguments (Oberschall & Palmer, 2005; McGarry & O’Leary, 2009;
Yakinthou, 2009). Horowitz (2002a: 30) labels the Belfast Agreement
“exceptional” due to the circumstances that allowed it to overcome obstacles other
consociations face. However, the one obstacle not overcome was the problems
Unionist intra-group competition could pose to stability. Indeed, integrationists
criticise the agreement for institutionalising ‘bloc politics’. Institutional
arrangements are explicitly based on one dimension of ethnic identity, reinforcing
the primary ethno-national cleavage and prohibiting the emergence of other
political cleavages (Chandra, 2005; Tilly, Evans & Mitchell, 2008: 699). In such
27
circumstances, there are few incentives to moderate and party competition
becomes subject to ethnic outbidding (Garry, 2009: 458). Furthermore Orit Kedar
(2005: 185) argues that voters are more likely to vote for ‘extremes’ in power-
sharing institutions in order to compensate for expected ‘dilution’ of their vote in
post-election inter-ethnic bargaining. This provides an institutional incentive for
parties to portray themselves as the most intransigent, achieved via ethnic
outbidding.
However, changing institutional structures often require a revision of ideology,
and action against what is perceived to be a worsening status quo or a mutually
hurting stalemate (Sandal & Loizides, 2009). The perception that the union was
eroding spurred the UUP into agreement, and the DUP’s adaption. Such
progressive learning and socialisation may have encouraged ‘weak’ cooperation
with the institutions rather than total rejectionist outbidding. The assertion that
institutional incentives encouraged centrifugal behaviour and facilitated
outbidding is questionable. McFarland suggests that there was a belief post-1998
that the DUP had to go beyond opposing the agreement and articulate a more
refined position on where they stood on the institutions16. Well-designed power-
sharing institutions can provide incentives for moderation. Proponents of
consociationalism argue that power and statesmanship create strong incentives to
compromise and participate in coalitions (Lijphart, 2002: 43-44). In the DUP’s
case, the prospect of a DUP First Minister, and 4 out of 10 ministerial seats in the
Executive after the 2007 election (Garry, 2009: 460), encouraged moderation on
practical issues. Institutions are not necessarily binary, centrifugal or centripetal.
The institutional argument has merit, because although power-sharing may have
incentivised outbidding it also encouraged moderation on practical issues that
ultimately contributed to the DUP’s success. Yet this is not the argument
forwarded by integrationists and critics of consociationalism, and therefore not
satisfactory in explaining its success in this case.
The aforementioned alternative hypotheses could be considered exogenous to the
parties in question. An endogenous explanation is the role of party organisation,
leadership and reputation. Gormley-Heenan and MacGinty (2008) argue that 16 ibid
28
modernisation of the party greatly contributed to the success of the DUP’s
outbidding, providing discipline and unity best delivered through a centralised
structure. The DUP has been described as ‘Paisley’s fan club’ due to the high
degree of central office autonomy and highly disciplined membership. In
contrast, the UUP’s organisation made the party ‘a difficult vehicle to steer’ for
Trimble17. Its decentralised structure, in which the party executive, the
constituency associations, the Orange Order (until 2005), and the Ulster Unionist
Council wielded a lot of influence (Evans & Tonge, 2005: 321-322). Its ambition
to accommodate the diverse strands of Unionism has meant it is more
representative of a movement than a political party (Tonge, 2005: 77). This
structure has been unable to prevent, and to some extent facilitated, fragmentation
within the party. Trimble himself was well aware of the problem:
The Ulster Unionist Party is a broad church, but our interests are
not served by a church so broad that it has several competing
choirs and self-appointed preachers each with their own different
gospels (in Cochrane, 2001: 370)
Divisions in the UUP over the agreement added to Unionist anxieties. The
leadership under Trimble was pro-agreement but large sections of the party and its
affiliated organisations were opposed. The anti-agreement wing undermined the
party leadership and played into DUP hands (Walker, 2004: 262). Particularly
damaging to the party were the defections of high-profile members to the DUP,
including Jeffrey Donaldson and Arlene Foster. The defections were symbolic
shifts in intra-Unionist competition, with the DUP a growing political force at the
UUP’s expense. Despite some apprehension over the St. Andrew’s Agreement,
the DUP were comparatively more committed, unified and able to deliver on
power-sharing in 2007 than the UUP were between 1999 and 2002 (McGarry &
O’Leary, 2009: 58). Within the party and the wider community, the UUP lacked a
monopoly of intra-group support before compromising, increasing their
vulnerability to ethnic outbidding (Horowitz, 2002b: 216).
17 Interview with Graham Walker, 2010
29
The degree of centralisation in the DUP would not have been maintained were it
not for the charismatic leadership of Ian Paisley, who became ‘the voice of
unionism’18. No other Unionist leaders could match his uncompromising religion-
infused oratory, or his ability to tap into Protestant fears. His personal vote in the
European elections is testament to his abilities (Table 2). Importantly, the party
was able to spread out to other figures, such as current-leader Peter Robinson and
Nigel Dodds. Paisley’s persona contrasted with Trimble who had poor people
skills and managed his party badly (Powell, 2008: 141). Trimble could not keep
the UUP on-message. Additionally, Trimble was prepared to move as long as he
received ‘50%+1’ from the Council, storing problems for the future. The DUP
‘learnt a lesson’ from Trimble, ensuring there was a significant majority of
support within the party and Unionist confidence before entering government19.
Indeed, there is some wariness in the DUP of the need to protect its flank from the
newly emerged TUV. Nonetheless, the TUV performed poorly at the 2010
Westminster election, with the party expected to do well given recent scandals
involving Peter Robinson.
Although party organisation, leadership and reputation had an impact on
outbidding, the UUP arguably better placed than the DUP on these terms. The
UUP dominated Unionist politics from its emergence in 1905, and the party was
effectively organised around state institutions from 1921 as the leading party of
government until 1972. The UUP had a reputation as ‘the’ party of Unionism,
with history, tradition, support from churches and civil society organisations
(Evans & Tonge, 2005). During the agreement referendum campaign the party
was able to count on support from civil society groups, the Alliance party and the
Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition. In the 2010 Westminster elections, the
party also had organisational support from the Conservative Party in the United
Kingdom. The DUP were thus challenging the party of the establishment. Given
these advantages the UUP should have been able to protect its flanks from the
DUP challenge. That it was unable to may indicate that party organisation and
leadership are ‘ex post facto’ explanations, which while important to outbidding,
are not as significant as the political choices made by the parties.
18 ibid19 Interview with Clive McFarland, 2010
30
Summary
This chapter’s bottom-line regarding the success of ethnic outbidding in this case
is that the DUP exploited the fears and disappointment of the Unionist community
with the Good Friday Agreement, without taking an extreme position on practical
issues which would undermine the gains of the peace process and scare away
voters. The DUP were able to exploit Unionist fears through adversarial framing.
Outbidding on identity issues also contributed to its image as Unionism’s most
staunch defenders. This strategy was combined with moderation on practical
issues, most evidently in power-sharing with Sinn Féin. So much has been the
degree of moderation that calls for ‘Unionist unity’ between the DUP and the
UUP are more feasible than at any time in recent political history. The DUP’s
pathway demonstrates both socialisation and that “political actors are identity-
retainers as much as adaptors to change” (Sandal & Loizides, 2009). This adapted
outbidding strategy was in response to the post-1998 environment, in which
Unionists wanted their strongest representatives, but did not want the gains of the
peace process to be undermined (Mitchell, Evans & O’Leary, 2009). Both the
hypothesis and alternative explanations will be applied in the case of Cyprus in
the next chapter before any definitive conclusions are drawn. Nevertheless, this
case contributes to understanding the ethnic outbidding puzzle, by suggesting that
successful ethnic outbidding is heavily influenced by the presence of inter-ethnic
compromise, and the development of a more nuanced outbidding strategy. The
alternative hypotheses advanced for the DUP’s success have merit yet are not
entirely convincing, with more emphasis on exogenous constraints than party
agency. Party organisation, though endogenous and clearly a factor, may be a
lower order causal factor in successful outbidding.
After Annan: The European Party’s failure to outbid Democratic Rally in Cyprus
31
CHAPTER FOUR
Having explored successful ethnic outbidding in Northern Ireland, this chapter
examines the unsuccessful attempt by the European Party (Europaiko Komma,
EUROKO) to outbid Democratic Rally (Demokratikos Sinagermos, DISY) in
Cyprus. This failure poses a dilemma given DISY’s support for the Annan Plan in
the 24 April 2004 referendum which was rejected by 76% of Greek Cypriots, and
EUROKO’s staunch denunciation of this inter-ethnic compromise (Christophorou,
2005: 85). This anomalous outcome is aggravated by the success of the DUP and
the significance of inter-ethnic compromise to ethnic outbidding. Once more
taking the hypothesis from Chapter Two, the proposed explanation for
EUROKO’s failure is that the party has been unable to exploit the apprehensions
of Greek Cypriots towards Annan, taking extremist positions on practical issues
and scaring away potential voters that fear EUROKO’s positions may lead to the
entrenchment of partition, the worst possible outcome for Greek Cypriots. This
chapter follows the same structure as the previous chapter, discussing the context
of Greek Cypriot party competition in the Republic of Cyprus, before analysing
the failure of ethnic outbidding in this case. Alternative hypotheses are addressed
with the conclusion evaluating the explanation in light of the findings of the
chapter. The case of failed outbidding in Cyprus provides necessary contrast to
this comparative study and the ethnic outbidding puzzle, further elucidating the
importance of certain variables to varying outbidding outcomes.
Greek Cypriot competition and ethnic outbidding
As discussed in Chapter One, Cyprus bears remarkable similarities to the Northern
Irish case, both featuring competing ethno-national claims on status ever since
their respective islands were granted independence from British colonial rule, in
this case in 1960 after the London-Zurich Agreements. Pre- and post-
independence, the Greek Cypriot majority (77%)20 pursued enosis (union with
Greece) for Cyprus, whilst in response the minority Turkish Cypriots (18%)
wanted taksim, the division of the island into Greek and Turkish Cypriot sections
(Yakinthou, 2009: 46-48). The 1960 constitutional provisions for power-sharing
between Greek and Turkish Cypriots established separate electoral rolls and an
20 2001 estimates from: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cy.html
32
essentially ethnic party system. It lasted only three years (though the ethnic party
system remained), when Turkish Cypriots vacated their positions after Greek
Cypriot President Archbishop Makarios proposed amendments to the constitution
that Turkish Cypriots feared would allow their demographically superior Greek
Cypriot counter-parts to dominate them (Fisher, 2001: 310; Papadakis, 1998:
151). This occurred amidst the backdrop of increasing inter-communal violence
between EOKA and TMT21. In July 1974, after several more years of inter-
communal fighting, the military regime in Greece with the support of the Greek
Cypriot paramilitary group EOKA-B attempted a coup against Makarios. In
response, Turkey sent troops to Cyprus, occupying the northern part of the island.
Cyprus was divided into two de facto sections, the Republic of Cyprus in the
south and the self-designated Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (Loizides,
2009b: 163). Since 1974, Greek Cypriots dropped the enosis aim, seeking a
reunified independent Cyprus (Loizides, 2007: 177). Both sides have met several
times since in efforts to reach new constitutional arrangements, culminating most
recently in the Annan Plan and its iterations from 2002-2004 (Fisher, 2001: 312).
Greek Cypriot politics features numerous interlinked cleavages of identity,
ideology, attitudes to reunification and positions toward the Annan plan, again
demonstrating fluid rather than fixed notions of ethnic identity (Guiliano, 2000;
Loizides, 2009b: 164). By independence, there was only a limited sense of
‘Cypriot’ identity, with Greek motherland identity, its myths and symbols, and the
Greek Orthodox Church more significant (Fisher, 2001: 309). However,
ideological dependency on motherland nationalism decreased after 1974, with
divisions over Greek involvement of the attempted coup, and the ‘Greek Cypriot’
component of identity increasingly stressed. Nevertheless the influence of
Hellenism persists, with both DISY and EUROKO asserting ‘Greek/European’
heritage (Papadakis, 1998). Cyprus’s accession to the European Union in 2004
has created a new dimension to identity, with both parties emphasising their pro-
European credentials. The left-right cleavage is also salient, signified by the
defeat of DIKO’s centre-right incumbent Tassos Papadopoulos by communist
AKEL’s Demetris Christofias for the Presidency in 2008. Both EUROKO and 21 EOKA (National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters) were a Greek Cypriot paramilitary group that pursued enosis, often through violent means. TMT (Turkish Resistance Organisation) were the Turkish Cypriot organisation formed in response
33
DISY compete on the right of the ideological spectrum, with the former more
hard-right having emerged from the nationalist wing of DISY in 2005. Since its
establishment in 1976 by Glafcos Clerides DISY has been a centre-right party,
although it draws support from all segments of society, including nationalists with
sympathies for EOKA, the enosis movement, and liberals supporting compromise
(Sandal & Loizdies, 2009). The pro- or anti-Makarios’ legacy cleavage represents
another fault-line in Greek Cypriot politics, with DISY mainly anti- and
EUROKO definitively anti-Makarios’ legacy (Loizides, 2009b: 164). DISY’s
absorption of EOKA-B sympathisers marginalised the party in its formative years,
with the pro-Makarios Progressive Party of Working People (Anorthotiko Komma
Ergazomenou Laou, AKEL), the United Democratic Union of the Centre (Eniea
Demokratiki Enosis Kentrou, EDEK) and the Democratic Party (Demokratiko
Komma, DIKO) establishing an alliance to exclude DISY (Christophorou, 2006:
517).
DISY did emerge as a viable alternative to the pro-Makarios alliance, becoming
the largest party in the 1985 parliamentary elections. Significantly, DISY had
been capable of emphasising either of its “two faces”, both nationalist and
moderate with Clerides playing the nationalist card in his Presidential victories in
1993, in his criticism of UN Secretary Boutros Ghali’s ‘Set of Ideas’, and his
tough line on defence issues in 1998 (Sandal & Loizides, 2009). Despite this,
DISY has transformed in recent years taking a pro-reconciliation, progressive
line22. The party has been identified as softline in its attitudes to reunification, a
position that has at times caused rifts within the party. In their attitudes to
reunification EUROKO and DISY are at polar opposites (see Figure d).
EUROKO are seen as hardliners, one of the few anti-federal parties in the south of
Cyprus, whereas DISY have supported the ‘bi-zonal, bi-communal federation’ and
power-sharing with Turkish Cypriots proposed under the Annan plans
(Kasoulides, 1999; Trimikliniotis, 2006: 21). DISY’s more compromising
approach may have contributed to Clerides’ downfall in the 2003 Presidential
election, where Papadopoulos was seen as tougher on the Annan plan negotiations
and the Cyprus Problem (Christophorou, 2005: 89).
22 Neophytos G. Loizides interview with Keti Clerides, DISY Representative, 2009. Used with permission of author
34
Figure d: Cleavages over the Cyprus Problem in Greek Cypriot politics
Indeed, the impact of the Annan plan on Greek Cypriot party competition was
profound, creating a new cleavage and complicating the existing ones (Vural &
Peristianis, 2008: 39-40). The left-wing has usually been considered more
conciliatory yet AKEL delivered a ‘soft no’ to the plan. Although its right-wing
rivals had reverted to type, DISY undermined traditional perceptions of the right-
wing attitude to compromise by endorsing the plan. DISY’s decision caused splits
within and from the party, with hardliners defecting to form EUROKO under ex-
DISY parliamentary spokesperson Demetis Syllouris’ leadership. EUROKO also
features members from New Horizons (Neoi Orizontes, NEO) and some of
European Democracy’s founders (Evropaiki Dimokratia, EURODI). The fears of
Greek Cypriots surrounding inter-ethnic compromise were emphatically
demonstrated by the 76% rejection in the 2004 referendum. DISY’s endorsement
of Annan seemed to position EUROKO perfectly to engage in ethnic outbidding.
However, EUROKO have thus far been unable to exploit Greek Cypriot fears of
the plan. Table 3 shows that while DISY have been seemingly losing ground in
Election Type
Year DISY (%) Change since last
result
EUROKO (%)
Change since last
result
35
Pro -Annan
SoftlineHardline
Anti - Annan
DISY
AKEL
EUROKO
DIKO
EDEK
Parliamentary 1976 26 __ n/a n/a
1981 31.92 +5.92 n/a n/a
1985 33.56 +1.64 n/a n/a
1991 35.8 +2.24 n/a n/a
1996 34.5 -1.3 n/a n/a
2001 34 -0.5 3 n/a
2006 30.3 -3.7 5.8* +2.8
Presidential
1st/2nd round
1993 36.74 /
50.31
__ n/a n/a
1998 40.1 /
50.8
+3.36 I 0.91* n/a
2003 38.8 / II -1.3 2.12* +1.21
2008 33.51 /
46.63
-5.29 n/a n/a
European 2004 28.23 n/a 1.65* ; 10.8** n/a
2009 35.7 +7.47 4.1 -8.35
Table 3: Selected election results in the Republic of Cyprus
Notes: I First round % change only; II Papadopoulos won 51.5% in the first round with support of AKEL; * NEO’s results; **EURODI resultSources: http://psephos.adam-carr.net/countries/c/cyprus/ and http://www.kypros.org/Elections/index.html
recent elections there have been mitigating factors. The 2008 presidential election
featured a three-way split with DIKO and AKEL, with the latter entering
candidate for the first time. The loss of 3.7% of their 2001 vote in the 2006
parliamentary elections was actually seen as a victory for the party given divisions
and the referendum outcome (Christophorou, 2007: 121-122). Although
EUROKO’s polling of 5.8% in 2006 is respectable for a year old party, the 2009
European elections were more damning. DISY increased its vote by 7.47%,
winning the most votes of any parties. In contrast, EUROKO lost 8.35% from the
combined EURODI and NEO total in 2004. The Cyprus case is counter-intuitive
to the predictions of ethnic outbidding theory, in which engaging in inter-ethnic
compromise increases the risk to the ethnic party (Horowitz, 1985; Rabushka &
Shepsle, 1972), and in light of the outcomes of the last case, in which the UUP
won the 1998 referendum but lost support to the DUP, whereas DISY lost the
2004 referendum but has held off the EUROKO challenge.
36
Why has EUROKO’s outbidding of DISY been unsuccessful?
This chapter hypothesises that EUROKO has been unsuccessful in its attempts to
outbid DISY due to its inability to exploit Greek Cypriot fears over Annan.
Furthermore, Greek Cypriots fear that EUROKO’s extreme positions on practical
issues would further entrench partition.
That Greek Cypriots were apprehensive about the Annan plan is born out by the
76% rejection in 2004 (Christophorou, 2005: 85). In hindsight, DISY’s decision
to say ‘yes’ was electorally risky, yet polls preceding the referendum
demonstrated little public sympathy for the plan. Similarly to Northern Ireland,
negotiations were elite-led, with Greek Cypriots feeling their concerns were not
being addressed23. Greek Cypriots were concerned that there were not enough
security guarantees dealing with the Turkish troop presence, and that refugee
return and property issues were insufficiently addressed. The Όχι’ (No) campaign
had support from large sections of the media, bishops, civil society and President
Papadopoulos himself (Yakinthou, 2009: 152-154). Amidst the climate of
hysteria during the campaign, there was also a belief that compromise was
unnecessary, since Cyprus’ accession to the EU was guaranteed (Loizides &
Keskiner, 2004: 159). Nevertheless, DISY voted ‘yes’ by a 78% margin at its
party congress in a tense atmosphere between opposing factions. 65% of DISY
supporters would ultimately vote against the party (Christophorou, 2005: 91 and
96). Much like Trimble, DISY leader Nicos Anastasiades favoured solution but
did not secure a comfortable majority24. The level of opposition to the plan would
seemingly make Greek Cypriots more receptive to outbidding appeals. EUROKO
were thus established in environment conducive to taking disenchanted DISY
voters.
However, EUROKO has largely been unable to exploit the fears of Greek
Cypriots over Annan which EUROKO recently described as a “nightmare”
(Simsek, 2009). Chief among which was that unlike the UUP, DISY did not have
23 Interview with Alexandros Sinka, DISY’s International Secretary, 2010. Mr. Sinka wished for it to be acknowledged that his views were personal, rather than the party’s views 24 Interview with David Officer and Yioulli Taki, 2010
37
to deal with the implementation difficulties of inter-ethnic compromise25.
Furthermore, whilst Greek Cypriots were clearly apprehensive of Annan, they do
not totally endorse EUROKO’s rejectionist positions, or diagnostic frames,
towards compromise and reunification. EUROKO did not moderate their position
on practical issues, maintaining an anti-federalist position (Trimikliniotis, 2006:
21), which has scared off Greek Cypriot voters. DISY representative Keti
Clerides argues that the party respected the no vote, whereas the rejectionists may
have been undermined by the negativity of their arguments26. The federal issue
itself is a complicated one. Whilst a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation is not the
optimal solution for Greek Cypriots, it is deemed both acceptable and realistic.
Federalism is seen as a ‘historic compromise’, transcending both a majority-
minority relationship and the current partition. The ‘no’ vote was not necessarily
a ‘no to federation’ (Trimikliniotis, 2009: 114). A 65% majority have deemed the
bi-zonal, bi-communal federation ‘tolerable’ or ‘satisfactory’27, thus EUROKO’s
anti-federalist position is a minority one. In a sense, DISY may have won this
‘battle of ideas’ over the reunification of Cyprus28. DISY has covered its flanks
by effectively framing the argument that continuation of the island’s current
status, as EUROKO’s rejectionist stances would ensure, would lead to the worst
possible outcome, the entrenchment of partition29. The continued influx of
Turkish settlers and Greek Cypriot international isolation after the referendum has
strengthened the argument. Additionally, EUROKO’s prognostic framing, the
vague ‘European solution’ to the Cyprus problem and undermines the outbidding
party as an alternative (Christophorou, 2007: 117). In contrast, the DUP’s
prognostic frames and operation of the agreement’s institutions offered a viable
alternative to the UUP.
The last case demonstrated how identity issues may be important to successful
outbidding in order to appear as a group’s ‘ethnic tribune’ party (Mitchell, Evans
& O’Leary, 2009). Appearing more robust contributes to a party’s ability to
exploit the ethnic community’s fears over inter-ethnic compromise. Both Cyprus
25 ibid26 Loizides interview with Keti Clerides, 200927 From UNFICYP Survey (2007): http://www.cypruspolls.org/SurveyUNFICYP.pdf 28 Interview with Alexandros Sinka, 201029 63% deemed continuation of this status quo as ‘entirely unacceptable’ in 2009 survey. Available from: http://www.cyprus2015.org/
38
and Northern Ireland have emerged from periods of violent struggle into an
environment where cultural and symbolic issues have become much more
strategically important in prosecuting these conflicts. In an interview with the
author, David Officer compared Nicosia and Belfast in terms of this cultural
battle30. EUROKO has attempted to outbid DISY on identity issues e.g.
EUROKO deputy Nicos Koutsou accused DISY deputy Christos Pourgourides of
“providing ammunition to the enemies of Hellenism” by signing the PACE
agreement which looked into alleged abuses of Muslim human rights on Greek
islands (Cyprus Mail, 2009). However, DISY has been able to protect its flank on
identity issues through framing, compensating for its socialised moderation on
issues with international-level importance by maintaining stringent positions on
identity-based issues. The party regularly asserts that “Cyprus is Greek”, and
during the Annan negotiations it suggested the Greek flag should be the official
one of the Greek Cypriot constituent state (Sandal & Loizides, 2009). Moreover,
Marc Beissinger (2002) argues that communal groups are sensitive to domestic
constraints, state policies and external challenges when expressing identity.
Accession to Europe, the referendum, international isolation after 2004 affected
both framing and identity issues with DISY much more capable of adapting to this
post-referendum environment than EUROKO. EUROKO’s outbidding appeals
have not sufficiently adapted to the degree the DUP were able to.
Apprehension, then over inter-ethnic compromise is advantageous to successful
outbidding yet it is not a sufficient condition. Despite 31.5% of DISY supporters
in the 2006 elections rejecting a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation, EUROKO
have failed to make headway in this prime constituency31. While most of
EUROKO’s support came from former NEO and DISY voters, direct vote
switching is low given the monumental nature of inter-ethnic compromise
(Christophorou, 2007: 122). Indeed, in the second round of voting in the 2008
election, 85-89% of EUROKO voters opted for DISY candidate Ioannis
Kassoulides (Christophorou, 2008: 229). In 2006 DISY secured approximately 2/3
of its voters who voted ‘no’ in the referendum (Christophorou, 2007: 126). The
continued support for DISY seems paradoxical considering the referendum 30 Interview with David Officer and Yioulli Taki, 201031 ‘Greek Cypriots and Federalism’. Available from: http://www.cypruspolicycenter.org/haber_oku.asp?haber=57
39
outcome. The explanation stemming from the hypothesis is that EUROKO has
failed in its attempts so far to outbid DISY by exploiting Greek Cypriot
apprehensions of inter-ethnic compromise, with its anti-federalist and
uncompromising stances scaring off voters fearful that these positions could lead
to permanent partition.
Alternative hypotheses
The chapter now turns to alternative hypotheses for outbidding success in an
attempt to increase understanding of the outbidding puzzle and account for
EUROKO’s outbidding failure. One such explanation is the role of the electoral
system. The 1960 constitution provided for a House of Representatives elected in
separate votes by the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities, with seats divided
70:30. Since 1995 parliamentary elections have operated by PR, with Greek
Cypriots electing 56 members. The 24 Turkish Cypriot seats remain vacant
(Christophorou, 2007: 113). The Presidential elections feature a two-round
majority system unless a candidate secures ‘50%+1’ in the first round. As no
single party has enough support without an alliance, the system encourages
moderation to attract the support of other parties (Christophorou, 2008: 223).
Nonetheless, like Northern Ireland, it is argued that PR has fragmented Greek
Cypriot politics (Christophorou, 2006: 539). The low seat quota (1/56 of valid
votes) has facilitated this and incentivised ethnic outbidding. The low quota
rewards outbidding parties as they only need to mobilise an extreme core of
support to attain seats in the legislature, as EUROKO did in 2006, winning 3
seats. Whilst too early to expect EUROKO to overhaul DISY, given the post-
Annan electoral environment it would have been expected to make more gains at
DISY’s expense. The contrast in outbidding outcomes given similar electoral
environments in both cases (although PR was in place for longer in Northern
Ireland) makes the electoral system an insufficient alternative explanation.
Another alternative explanation resides in the role of institutions, whether they
incentivise or undermine outbidding behaviour. The integrationist and
consociational debates explored in this last chapter are once more relevant.
Critics of consociationalism point to the 1960 constitution as an example of
40
consociational failure, in which “the inherited bicommunal system of governance
has had adverse political effects […] not least of which was the homogenisation of
ethnic groups” (Constantinou, 2007). Integrationists argue that this
institutionalisation of bloc politics encourages centrifugal behaviour and
outbidding (Tilly, Evans & Mitchell, 2008). Despite the power-sharing emphasis,
guaranteed group representation ensures intra- rather than inter-group
competition. The problem is compounded in Cyprus where Turkish Cypriot
withdrawal has meant party competition is solely intra-ethnic. These
arrangements created a tendency in the political system to treat differences of
opinion regarding a solution to the Cyprus issue as “national treachery”
(Trimikliniotis, 2006: 7). Ethnic outbidding seems a viable political strategy in
such an environment especially when inter-ethnic compromise is being discussed
e.g. EUROKO accused Anastasiades of working for the ‘Turkish side’ for merely
supporting Christofias in the resumption of talks with Turkish Cypriots (Cyprus
Mail, 2008).
Cyprus would have re-introduced power-sharing under different consociational
institutions had the referendum not been rejected. This has not prevented a
plethora of academic debates over the functionality of Annan (Loizides &
Keskiner, 2004; Trimikliniotis, 2009; Yakinthou, 2009). However, if we accept
that institutions in the south of Cyprus have encouraged centrifugal behaviour,
then EUROKO’s failure to outbid DISY seems anomalous. Furthermore, DISY
also undermined the traditional sense of unity and consensus amongst Greek
Cypriots that the President and National Council are meant to ensure32. Unlike
other ethnic party systems such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, India, and Northern
Ireland, day-to-day political bargaining is solely intra- rather than inter-ethnic,
thus reducing outbidding opportunities that occur elsewhere on potentially
controversial policies. This case demonstrates that whilst certain institutional
architectures can perhaps incentivise outbidding behaviour, it is unsatisfactory in
itself to determine the success or otherwise of ethnic outbidding.
The role of party organisation, leadership and reputation, offers a further
alternative explanation (Marks & Wilson, 2000). The cultural differences 32 Interview with David Officer and Yioulli Taki, 2010
41
between the party systems in each case are distinct, with a replication of the
UUP’s difficulties hard to imagine in Cyprus. DISY access to power, patronage,
and widespread nepotism in the Cypriot political system ensured divisions and
dissent were not as damaging to the party as defections to the DUP were for the
UUP33. Indeed, DISY has been able to effectively manage splits within the party
over Annan34, as well as from the party, such as the establishment of the Free
Citizen’s Movement in 2004 by ex-DISY minister Efthymios Efthymiou, four ex-
deputies establishing EURODI, and of course EUROKO. EUROKO does not
have the benefit of the institutional and organisational linkages that DISY has.
Furthermore, DISY has also modernised and become better organised35. Part of
this modernisation was to strengthen constituency ties which the party achieved
through the creation of electoral assemblies to elect local and district officials in
1995 (Christophorou, 2006: 524). Indeed, DISY’s party organisation compares
favourably with the antiquated structure of the UUP, allowing the party to protect
its flanks from EUROKO’s outbidding strategies. The importance of personal
relationships and personalities is also significant in Cypriot politics. Clerides and
his presidencies enhanced the party’s reputation internationally, in a similar way
Trimble had with the UUP yet this did protect the party from DUP outbidding. In
contrast, Anastasiades is seen as one of the least popular party leaders (Sandal &
Loizides, 2009). EUROKO has been unable to capitalise because Syllouris has
had less time to develop his and EUROKO’s reputation. Paisley and the DUP
took several years to build their respective reputations, and to be seen as a genuine
alternative to which UUP voters and supporters could opt for.
A well-organised and disciplined party will be better equipped to outbid and
protect its flanks, however, party organisation and leadership are insufficient in
themselves to explain the failure of ethnic outbidding. As discussed previously,
this could be considered a ‘post facto’ explanation, where party choices are more
important. EUROKO is facing similar obstacles to the DUP in overhauling DISY,
yet whilst the DUP’s cause was aided by some of the UUP’s decisions36, DISY
has not been similarly charitable to EUROKO.
33 ibid34 Loizides interview with Keti Clerides, 200935 Interview with Alexandros Sinka, 201036 Interview with Clive McFarland, 2010
42
Summary
To understand when ethnic outbidding is successful it is necessary to examine an
instance of outbidding failure, in this case EUROKO and its intra-ethnic
competitor DISY. This chapter argues that EUROKO’s failure to outbid DISY
thus far can be explained if we invert the hypothesis. EUROKO has been unable
to exploit the fears of Greek Cypriots regarding the Annan plan, not only because
it hasn’t been implemented, but because it’s extreme positions on practical issues
have scared away voters. Greek Cypriots fear that EUROKO’s uncompromising
attitude to reunification could entrench partition rather than reverse it, a fear DISY
has framed effectively, in essence portraying EUROKO as a spoiler. DISY’s
decision to endorse Annan can be explained in part by political learning and
socialisation processes (with international elites particularly prominent), arguing
through prognostic framing that it was the best possible deal for Greek Cypriots.
Additionally, DISY has been able to protect its flank in terms of identity-based
issues. Aspects of the alternative hypotheses certainly have merit, with the
institutional explanation having more prominence in this case, yet the contrasts
with Northern Ireland reduces their explanatory appeal. The use of the term ‘thus
far’ to describe its outbidding failure is deliberate given that EUROKO could
successfully outbid DISY in the future. However recent surveys show that the
popularity of EUROKO’s positions is dwindling and the party is unlikely to make
an electoral breakthrough soon37. This case provides an interesting contrast with
the DUP, a better organised and recognised party, indicating the probable
importance of these attributes to successful outbidding. Furthermore, EUROKO’s
lack of success given DISY’s endorsement of an unpopular inter-ethnic
compromise is a valid question for analysis. The following chapter will now
explore the comparison with the previous case more explicitly in order to try to
explain the ethnic outbidding puzzle, and discuss the implications of this
dissertation’s findings for the academic and policy fields.
37 Only 22% of Greek Cypriots are committed ‘no’ voters if a referendum was held again. Also, the vast majority could live with a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation. Available from: http://www.cyprus2015.org/
43
Conclusion
The introduction to this dissertation outlined the source of its research, the ‘ethnic
outbidding puzzle’. Chiefly, how do cases of ethnic outbidding become successes
or failures, an important question since outbidding can be destructive in divided
societies, especially to vulnerable peace processes. Inspired by the call from
Brubaker and Laitin (1998: 434) to specify the conditions in which ethnic
outbidding was “more or less likely to pay off”, this dissertation hypothesised that
44
CHAPTER FIVE
ethnic outbidding is particularly successful when ethnic parties are able to exploit
the fears of their ethnic group over inter-ethnic compromise, without taking
extreme positions on practical issues that would undermine the gains of
rapprochement and scare away voters. This hypothesis and alternative
explanations were then applied to the contrasting cases of outbidding in Northern
Ireland and Cyprus. It was found that these cases largely corroborated with the
‘successful ethnic outbidding’ hypothesis, rather than the alternative explanations.
In this concluding chapter the comparisons between the cases on the basis of the
hypothesis and alternative explanations are summarised. The chapter then
discusses the implications of this research for the academic field and public
policy.
Contrasting fortunes: Ethnic outbidding in Northern Ireland and Cyprus
The differing fates of the UUP and DISY after signing their respective peace
agreements were chosen to address the outbidding puzzle. The similarities of the
cases provided a degree of control and suitable opportunity to discover the most
crucial variables and explanations. Critics of this research could rightly argue that
the alternative explanations considered are not an exhaustive list of possible
variables, which could have included how the actions of an inter-ethnic group can
influence the outcomes of ethnic outbidding intra-ethnically, or the role of
external actors. The ‘many variables, small-N problem’ meant a restricted focus
to key variables to prevent over-determined answers (Goldthorpe, 1997; Lijphart,
1975: 159). Nevertheless, this restricted focus allowed for a more parsimonious
comparison on the basis of the hypothesis and alternative explanations that were
chosen, seen in Tables 4 and 5.
Table 4 shows each aspect of the hypothesis as outlined in Chapter Two applied to
both cases. Inter-ethnic compromise undoubtedly provoked new rounds of ethnic
outbidding in both cases, and an opportunity to exploit each ethnic group’s fears
and grievances with effective framing. DISY’s decision to endorse the Annan
Plan, resoundingly rejected by Greek Cypriots, was responsible for the formation
of EUROKO and formed the basis for many of its outbidding appeals. With a
slim (and decreasing) Protestant majority supporting the Belfast Agreement it is
45
unlikely the DUP would have witnessed the surge in electoral growth it did38. The
problems the agreement created for the UUP afforded the DUP plenty of scope to
exploit Unionist fears. Nevertheless, the 1998 and 2004 referendums meant
compromise was only fully realised in the Northern Irish case. The overall effect
Aspects of the hypothesis
Northern Ireland
Cyprus Effect on ethnic outbidding
Was inter-ethnic compromise present?
Yes Yes The Good Friday Agreement and the Annan Plan provided catalysts for outbidding in both cases, for the DUP’s success and for the formation of EUROKO and its attempts to outbid DISY
Was the flanking party able to outbid on identity-based issues?
Yes No DUP seen as the more robust defenders of British-Protestant ethnic identity through outbidding on identity-based issues of agreement like policing reform. DISY have been able to protect their flanks by emphasising ‘Greekness’ on issues like flags and education policy
Did outbidding parties moderate on practical issues?
Yes No The DUP combined criticism with operation of the agreement’s institutions, signalling possible compromise in the future39. EUROKO opposition to solutions have aroused Greek Cypriots fears of entrenching partition
Table 4: Summary of hypothesis in Northern Ireland and Cyprus
was that unlike DISY, the UUP had to deal with its problematic implementation,
leaving the party vulnerable on its flanks40. However, placing too much emphasis
on implementation unfairly downplays the role of party agency in outbidding and
their ability to exploit the fears of their ethnic group. Nevertheless, inter-ethnic
compromise alone is not ultimately responsible for outbidding success or failure,
even though it often provides the spark.
Outbidding appeals are rarely limited to one facet of ethnic division; nonetheless
identity does provide a particularly useful outbidding resource (especially pre- and
post-compromise) when these issues are framed effectively, allowing parties to
assume the ethnic tribune role. The UUP was unable to portray itself as the more
robust defenders of Unionist identity, with the DUP’s adversarial framing
38 Interview with Clive McFarland, 201039 Interview with Graham Walker, 201040 Interview with David Officer and Yioulli Taki, 2010
46
particularly effective. In contrast, EUROKO’s accusations that DISY was ‘aiding
the enemies of Hellenism’ was an example of ineffectual framing, with DISY able
to protect its flank by stressing the importance of Greek identity. Outbidding on
identity can also compensate for the last aspect of the hypothesis, where ethnic
parties moderate on practical issues (Sandal & Loizides, 2009), such as power-
sharing or resource allocation so as not to scare away voters and undermine the
gains of compromise. EUROKO remains on the political fringes in spite of its
seemingly populous position a la Annan, because they did not offer Greek
Cypriots a viable alternative, or prognostic frames, like the DUP were offering to
Unionists disappointed with the agreement. EUROKO’s anti-federalist and
uncompromising stances have scared off potential voters and allowed DISY to
argue that the rejectionist’s position would entrench the status quo. The DUP’s
adaption to the post-agreement environment through moderation on practical
issues, allowed the party to attain respectability and voters that previously
neglected the party41. Indeed, ethnic parties’ ability to adapt dispels the idea that
outbidding is simply a blunt instrument of total opposition and that they are
somehow ‘pre-modern’ entities (Gormley-Heenan & MacGinty, 2008: 44 and 53).
The alternative hypotheses that were considered by this research are outlined in
Table 5. A theme throughout this research has been ‘design choices’ and the role
of competitive incentives in divided societies. Electoral systems can heavily
influence party behaviour. PR is criticised in both cases for causing in-group
fragmentation, as low seat quotas allow extreme parties some measure of
representation. PR may have encouraged the formation of new parties and
outbidding, yet differing outcomes in each case suggest that PR as the cause of
successful ethnic outbidding is an unconvincing argument. Another design choice
facing policymakers wishing to exert exogenous influences on party behaviour is
that of institutional architecture. The institutionalisation of ethnic identity,
through separate electoral rolls in Cyprus and ethnic designations under power-
sharing in Northern Ireland, is criticised because it reifies ethnicity cleavages and
thus encourages outbidding. However, the differing outcomes again suggest
caution on the salience of institutions in explanations of outbidding success,
though poorly designed certain institutions can certainly encourage centrifugal 41 Interview with Clive McFarland, 2010
47
behaviour. Furthermore, the DUP’s moderation on practical issues stems in part
from institutional incentives.
Alternative hypotheses
Northern Ireland
Cyprus Effect on ethnic outbidding
Did the electoral system facilitate outbidding?
No No The presence of PR (in legislative elections) may have fragmented intra-ethnic competition, but it did not produce similar outbidding outcomes. PR was in place for 30 years before the DUP overtook the UUP
Did institutions facilitate outbidding?
Unclear No Inter-ethnic bargaining under power-sharing opened the UUP’s flanks to outbidding in a way DISY did not experience. However, the institutions also had a moderating influence on the DUP
Did party organisation, leadership and reputation affect the success outbidding?
Yes Yes DISY were comparatively better-organised than the UUP, which didn’t handle dissent within the party. Leaderships factored in both cases, particularly with David Trimble, Ian Paisley and Glafcos Clerides. The DUP’s reputation meant it was a viable alternative for Unionists, unlike EUROKO
Table 5: Summary of alternative hypotheses in Northern Ireland and Cyprus
The parties themselves were examined in terms of organisation, leadership and
reputation. Both cases demonstrated that these factors do play a part in the
success of ethnic outbidding which the hypothesis does not sufficiently take into
account, even if they may be secondary causes. This is most evident in the
comparative abilities of the UUP and DISY to manage dissention and
fragmentation once they agreed to compromise. Although DISY had to face ex-
members under new party labels it did so whilst retaining its support, something
the UUP was unable to do, despite its reputation and linkages to Northern Irish
institutions.
Despite the corroboration of the above findings with the hypothesis, my research
did illuminate some caveats. Overtaking intra-ethnic rivals electorally may be too
a stringent condition for successful ethnic outbidding, especially when applied to a
newly formed party like EUROKO. Unfortunately, there are few alternative
48
criteria, with the link between a party’s stated goals and its responsibility in their
achievement an imprecise one. Another caveat is the usage of ‘particularly’.
Successful outbidding can occur without these conditions, or may not occur even
with these conditions present. The cases in Table 1 indicate as much. The
hypothesis is thus more modest, suggesting that the probability of successful
ethnic outbidding increases in cases where there is inter-ethnic compromise and
where ethnic parties do not take extreme positions on practical issues that
undermine the gains of rapprochement. A legitimate methodological critique of
this research may be that the hypothesis has not been applied to enough cases, or
even ‘severe’ cases, where outbidding has led to violent consequences. Critics
may argue that selection bias, in which the cases were selected to fit the
hypothesis and provide “empirical” support, invalidate this research’s findings
(Lustick, 1996). However, the contrasting fortunes of the UUP and DISY were
deliberately selected as deviant cases. According to Lijphart (1968: 2) these
‘outlier’ cases that contradict conventional wisdom have theoretical significance
by shedding light on the causes of successful outbidding. As outliers these cases
could be studied in more depth than studies with numerous cases.
To meet case selection concerns the hypothesis is applied, admittedly in less
depth, to the Sri Lankan case briefly discussed earlier. Outbidding between the
SLFP and UNP has been spurred by the Sinhalese swabasha (self-language)
movement in an attempt to make Sinhala the only official language, to the anger
of the minority Tamils. Nevertheless, amidst spiralling bids there have been
instances of inter-ethnic compromise with the Tamils, such as the 1957 B-C pact.
Unsurprisingly the UNP and Sinhalese extremists used the identity-based
language issue, as well as Sinhalese fears of Tamil attempts to ‘dismember’ the
state, to attack this compromise (Horowitz, 1985: 380). However rational logic
justified both ethnic outbidding on the road to capturing power and the
accommodation the Tamils even as a ‘Sinhala-only’ policy was implemented
(DeVotta, 2005: 150). Although DeVotta emphasises an institutionalist
explanation of outbidding, the rational logic he identifies echoes the hypothesis,
with outbidding on compromise, identity, and moderation on practical issues all
present. After Bandaranaike’s assassination in 1959, the SLFP became more
overtly anti-Tamil in their policies (DeVotta, 2002: 88). The SLFP’s extremist
49
positions influenced UNP moderation not to ‘scare away’ Tamil voters in order to
achieve a majority via coalition, and yet remain pro-Sinhalese, culminating in
their election victory in 1965 and formation of a multi-ethnic Sinhalese-Tamil
government (Horowitz, 1985: 384). The difference in this case from Northern
Ireland and Cyprus was that moderate appeals were aimed inter- rather than intra-
ethnically. Nevertheless, the moderate and adaptive aspects have arguably
diminished in significance or have been non-existent; with ethnic outbidding
culpable in the failure to resolve the civil war with the Tamils through peaceful
negotiations (Podder, 2006: 592). The Sri Lankan case does exhibit elements of
the hypothesis but without further research it would be overstating its validity to
suggest it was definitely applicable.
The implications of research
The brief discussion of the Sri Lanka does however indicate the capability of
applying the hypothesis to other cases, a promising avenue for further research.
Indeed, systematic use of the hypothesis would mitigate case selection issues.
The hypothesis may be applied to contemporary cases, such as the influence of
outbidding in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, or historical cases, such as the
rise of ethnic entrepreneurs in post-communist Eastern Europe, guiding future
policy to alleviate the worst outbidding consequences. The implication of this
dissertation’s findings for theory suggest that any further comparative studies on
ethnic outbidding must grapple with themes such as framing and socialisation, as
well as building upon recent refinements of outbidding theory that stress adaptive
and flexible outbidding strategies, in order to better understand the conditions of
successful ethnic outbidding (Gormley-Heenan & MacGinty, 2008; Mitchell,
Evans & O’Leary, 2009). The hypothesis is best-suited to in-depth comparative
analysis of a ‘small-N’ to enrich its explanatory potential, rather than in large-
scale quantitative studies (Ragin, 1997).
For policymakers, the findings of this research indicate that particular attention
ought to be paid to intra-ethnic dynamics in the periods pre- and post-
implementation of compromise, suggesting these dynamics can be as equally
volatile. This research has also found that preventing or curtailing episodes of
50
ethnic outbidding is difficult, as while democracy offers the requisite structural
mechanisms to promote accommodation, its attendant electoral politics may
encourage opportunistic elites to exploit ethnic cleavages (DeVotta, 2002: 96-97).
Policymakers need to strike a balance between in-group cohesion that prevents
fragmentation and centrifugalism, and in-group cohesion that reifies ethnic
identities and stands groups in opposition to one another. They must also be wary
of competitive incentives that promote uncompromising behaviour. Electoral and
institutional design choices in both cases may not have necessarily promoted
outbidding, but they did not overtly encourage moderation either. In post-conflict
situations, emphasis should not be exclusively on electoral and institutional
factors but maintain incentives and disincentives to avoid ethnic outbidding, or to
make it more benign as witnessed in Northern Ireland. Given that inter-ethnic
compromise is desirable, and reducing the salience of ethnic identity unfeasible in
the short-term, this research suggests that explicitly incentivising moderation on
practical issues provides the best way of curbing the severity of outbidding
consequences.
In summary then, I believe the hypothesis is a valid one, outlining certain
conditions under which ethnic outbidding is particularly successful and providing
explanations for the outcomes in the cases of Northern Ireland and Cyprus. No
single aspect or explanation accounts for successful outbidding, rather a
combination is required. The alternative explanations examined; the role of
electoral systems, power-sharing institutions, and party organisation, leadership
and reputation, contributed to the hypothesis yet were found to be incomplete
explanations for variance in ethnic outbidding outcomes. From this research’s
findings, outbidding has less to do with the type of electoral system or institutional
structure, and more to do with how parties interact within the political system of a
post-conflict society. In Northern Ireland, the DUP were able to combine
exploitation of Unionist fears over inter-ethnic compromise, framing on identity-
based issues, and moderation on practical issues to achieve success outbidding. In
Cyprus, EUROKO’s outbidding failure stems largely from its inability to outbid
DISY on identity-based issues or sufficiently moderate to attract wavering Greek
Cypriot voters. I believe that this research has went some way to answering
Brubaker and Laitin’s ‘more or less likely to pay off’ question, but more work
51
needs to done in specifying and refining the conditions of ethnic outbidding
success, to inform theorists and policymakers of how to minimise its risk to
already vulnerable peace processes.
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