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Contestations and Peace Building Between The State and Autonomous Islam 53

Part II

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54 Building Bridges, Crossing Boundaries

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2

Contestations and Peace Building BetweenThe State and Autonomous Islam

Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid

Introduction

It has been customary to view post-colonial Malaysian politics ashaving been dominated by an ethnic-orientated communalism. Only inthe 1990s, with economic growth reaching unprecedented heights, havevoices calling for approaches transcending ethnic politics emerged, forexample, the Bangsa Malaysia discourse started by Prime Minister Dr.Mahathir Mohamads Vision 2020 in February 1991 (Mahathir Mohamad1991: 22). By the end of the decade, and despite the prevailing economicuncertainty, analysts were projecting a new politics in Malaysia, whichsaw, in 1999, electoral programmes of political parties coalescing arounduniversal issues such as justice, human rights, good governance, ghtagainst corruption and promotion of democratic values (Loh 2003). Thisdevelopment was no doubt helped by the Reformasi outcry following theunceremonious dismissal and inhumane treatment of Anwar Ibrahim, Dr.Mahathirs erstwhile deputy in both the government and the ruling UnitedMalays National Organisation (UMNO) party. The Anwar Ibrahim sagagave birth to Parti Keadilan Nasional (National Justice Party) which,while dominated by Malays sympathetic to Anwar, professed a multi-racial platform and had prominent non-Malays among its leadership.

While the politics of ethnicity is viewed with concern by the of cialcorridors of power, as expressed in the incessant calls for national unityin mainstream life, skeptics would argue that efforts in forging closer

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relationships among ethnic communities do not go so far as to signi cantly

bridge the communal gap. Regime maintenance in Malaysia rests on theethnic elites capacity to maintain grassroots communities faith in theelites as their representatives in formal or informal negotiations for thedistribution of political power and economic clout. In other words, ethnic political elites have a vested interest in maintaining ethnic politics.

Consociationalism prescribes overarching elite cooperation and stablenon-elite support for the elites as pre-requisites for success (Lijphart1977: 53-54). Elite cooperation and non-elite support may diminish asa result of a reduction of communal fear. Fear that the majority Malays,

who comprise the bulk of the native Bumiputera population, would beoverwhelmed by the countrys economically active non-Malays, hadalways provided a rationale behind calls for Malay unity. Such fearwas constantly played out in the mainstream Malay media, and furtherimplanted in Malay students minds via orientation courses conducted bythe National Civics Bureau (BTN: Biro Tatanegara )1. The message givento the Malay population was simple and direct: unite behind your UMNOleaders who have maintained Malay hegemony in the face of non-Malaychallenges. To stray from this path was detrimental to long term interestsof Malays. Even if UMNO was seen as cooperating politically with non-Malay partners, this was to pacify the non-Malays such that they demandnot more than what they deserve as stipulated by the Federal Constitution.UMNO was seen as the sole path of salvation for Malays. Transgressorsof this injunction were shunned by the mainstream Malay politicalestablishment as evil perpetrators of disunity.

Malay Unity and Islamic Revivalism

Following the May 1969 racial riots, the New Economic Policy (NEP) wasenunciated with the twin purpose of eradicating poverty and restructuringsociety so as to reduce the identi cation of race with economic function. NEP-driven reconstruction was primarily designed to uplift the economicstatus of the Malays. The NEP further boosted Islam via the states of cial patronage of Islamic institutions and events, and its sponsorship of Malaystudents to local and overseas tertiary institutions. At home, Islam becamean effective outlet to express grievances in the wake of the post-NEP gag placed upon discussions of sensitive issues. Abroad, the students were

1 This was experienced by the present author himself when attending, in 1987, BTNcourses specially designed for state-sponsored Malay students on the eve of theirdeparture for higher education overseas.

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galvanised by the religious resurgence affecting their Muslim brethren

(Hussin Mutalib 1990: 53-67, Ahmad Fauzi 2002: 95-101).It was not long before a competition for legitimacy among the Malay

masses evolved between of cial Islam as sponsored by the state andautonomous Islam as propagated by the various independent Islamicrevival groups that emerged in the 1970s. It was important that the statemaintained an Islam-friendly image among the resurgent Malays. Thestate had to shake off its secular nationalist image, hence the launchingof a conscious policy of Islamisation most readily identi ed with the premiership of Dr. Mahathir Mohamad (1981-2003). Yet, seeking also

non-Malay electoral support, the state could not be seen to be excessively promoting Islam per se . The state had to perennially maintain balance between a self-de ned religious zeal intended to win over the newgeneration of Islamically-inclined Malays, and a conscious rejectionof religious extremism which was a real cause of worry for warynon-Muslims.

Emerging from an obsessive desire of Malay ruling elites to wardoff any signs of Malay disunity in the wake of maintaining the delicate political balance between Muslims and non-Muslims, the state developedan Islamic administrative structure which overruled diversity betweenIslamic traditions and organisations. As such, today, constitutionalfreedom of religion applies only with respect to Islamvis--vis otherreligions, but not among different interpretations of Islam. The Malaysianstate, as represented by its religious bureaucracy, considers its version ofreligious orthodoxy as infallibly applicable upon the Malay population,although legitimate evidence might indicate that contravening positionshad been tolerated within the framework of acceptable differences ofopinion in the Islamic intellectual tradition.

Since 1997, the voice of of cial Islam in Malaysia has been the

Department of Islamic Advancement of Malaysia (JAKIM: Jabatan Kemajuan Islam Malaysia ) - an enlarged version of the Islamic Centre( Pusat Islam ) which, since its founding in 1970, had been operating as adivision of the Prime Ministers Department.2 Since the issuance of fatwa(Islamic legal ruling) in Malaysia is constitutionally under the jurisdictionof the different states forming the federation of Malaysia, JAKIM plays

2 Of cially, the Islamic Centre was successively known as the National Committee of Islamic Affairs (1970-74), Religious Division of the Prime Ministers Department(1974-85) and the Islamic Affairs Division of the Prime Ministers Department(1985-96). Each change of name was accompanied by a structural reorganisationand an expansion of personnel and functions. For the history of JAKIM, seewww.islam.gov.my/sejarah.html (accessed on 16 Feb 2005).

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a coordinating role and streamlines administration at the national level.

It serves as a reference centre and sets up policy to guide the states.JAKIM plans the future direction of Islam in Malaysia (www.islam.gov.my/fungsi.html accessed 16 February 2005). It symbolises Muslim unity.Under JAKIM, there is a research division which conducts studies ofdeviant teachings (ajaran sesat ). Those found guilty of subscribing to anddisseminating such heterodoxy would be sent to a special rehabilitationcentre in Jelebu, Negeri Sembilan, forming part of the activities ofJAKIMs Dakwah Division (www.islam.gov.my/ppaj/pro l.html accessed16 February 2005).

In combating deviant teachings, JAKIM stresses that propagatorsof deviant teachings threaten society and the nation. The propensity offollowers of deviant teachings to commit violence jeopardises security andthe sanctity of Islam (www.islam.gov.my/ppi/ajaransesat.html accessed 16February 2005). Families break up as the brainwashed followers sacri cea considerable amount of time and money towards their false cause. Bothmainstream Muslims and non-Muslims are made to believe that peacein the country could only prevail by taking punitive measures on thoseallegedly deviant Islamic groups.

Prior to the Islamic revival, Malayness and Islamicity mutuallyreinforced each other. In fact, Islam was manipulated for the purpose ofachieving the political unity of Malays. Even the so-called Islamic Party ofMalaysia (PAS: Parti Islam SeMalaysia ) enjoyed strong Malay nationalistcredentials (Ahmad Fauzi 2003a: 80-81). Under the leadership of Dr.Burhanuddin Al-Helmy (President 1956-69), PASs challenge was de ned by the twin creeds of Islam and Malay nationalism. Dr. Burhanuddinsown political principles incorporated nationalist-socialist elements insofaras they conformed to the Islamic ideological framework (Sa e Ibrahim1981: chapters X-XI). He was portrayed as a Malay nationalist rst and

an Islamic reformist second, and as a nationalist who converted to Islamicreformism in the light of post-War political expediency, culminating in hiselection as president of PAS in 1956 (cf. Funston 1980: 120; Means 1969:278).

Nationalism in PAS survived the era of Mohamad Asri Mudasleadership (1969-82), during which Malay unity was conspicuouslydemonstrated by the brief participation of PAS in the ruling National Front(BN: Barisan Nasional ) coalition government (1973-77) (Kamarul ZamanHaji Yusoff 2004). Until 1982, both UMNO and PAS used Islam without

hesitation. They recognised that religion and royalty were the foremostsymbols of Malay unity (Kamarulnizam Abdullah 2003: 220-221). But for

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Islam to be a unifying factor, Malays had to be made to accept the states

version of Islam in vogue in Malaysia. The Islamic revival that sweptMalaysia in the 1970s transformed such a docile perception. Both UMNOand PAS, willingly or unwillingly, had to accept revivalist Islam as a forceto be reckoned with in national politics. UMNO adopted a conscious policy of Islamisation, while PAS, under a new breed ofulama (religiousscholars) leadership, repudiated all forms of nationalism, as emphasisedin Haji Yusof Rawas celebrated presidential address, MenggempurPemikiran Assabiyah (Combating Tribalist Thought) at the 1984 PASGeneral Assembly (Yusof Rawa and Fadzil Mohd. Noor 1995: 43-78).

Attacking the NEP as unjust and UMNOs Islamisation as cosmetic,PAS instead proclaimed an un inching ideological commitment to a juridical Islamic state ala-Iran. Such a drastic turnabout and offensiveapproach would attract to it cohorts of young Malays in search of aneffective outlet to unleash their newly discovered Islamic energies andaspirations (Ahmad Fauzi 2003a: 82).

In the post-Islamic revival era, the relationship between Malay asa nation and Islam appeared as tenuous as ever. Becoming increasinglyIslamic was no more necessarily tantamount to being more Malay-centric.Tensions and contradictions developed in the relationship betweenMalayness and Islamicity (Hussin Mutalib 1990: 159). Malays whoembraced Islamic revivalism reformulated their conception of Islam intoone which was holistic and global, not circumscribed by its ethno-culturalrole as a Malay identity marker. As the terms of Islamic understanding between revivalist Malay-Muslims and nationalist Malay-Muslims grewwider, Islam exhibited a worrying potential of breaking up Malay unity(Hussin Mutalib 1990: 158; Kamarulnizam Abdullah 2003: 230).

Malay disunity, in turn, threatened national security insofar as itdestabilised Malay communalism which had been the operating basis of

Malaysias multi-ethnic political con guration. In Malaysia, nationalsecurity does not have a clear-cut de nition which cuts across ethnic boundaries. What is regarded as national security might better beregarded as state security or regime security, wherein the objects indanger are the government and ruling elites (Kamarulnizam Abdullah2003: 224-225). While no direct and systemic link has emerged betweenthe notions of Malay unity and national security (KamarulnizamAbdullah 1999: 277, Kamarulnizam Abdullah 2003: 227), theirinseparability is carefully implanted in the minds of the Malay masses.

Malays being the de nitive ethnic group in Malaysia, a threat to Malayunity is simultaneously a threat to national security, and vice-versa.

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Threat to Malay Unity: The Ka r-Mengka r Issue

Ka r-mengka r refers to the trading of accusations of one anothersin delity between different groups of Malay-Muslims. The issue had its beginnings in PASs animosity towards UMNOs cooperation with non-Muslim BN partners, the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) andthe Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC). By forming a multi-religiousadministration, UMNO was alleged to have committed the forbidden actof appointing non-Muslim leaders to rule over Muslims. Such a stancehad arisen since the mid-1960s, but was temporarily suspended duringPASs brief stint in the ruling BN (1973-77) (Kamarulnizam Abdullah1999: 268).

Ka r-mengka r resurfaced with the emergence of the MiddleEastern-in uenced Young Turks in PAS a development culminatingin the deposition of Mohamad Asri Muda as PAS leader in 1982. Ka r-mengka r was crystallised as a national issue by the controversialspeech delivered in April 1981 by Haji Abdul Hadi Awang (then PASState Commissioner for Terengganu and PAS President since September2003), in Banggol Peradong, Terengganu. This speech, infamously called

Amanat Haji Hadi , outlined three major principles which governed PASsght against UMNO. First, PAS opposed UMNO because it had retained

the colonial or in del constitution that they inherited. Second, sincethe struggle, speeches and nancial contribution of PAS members wereall jihad , their deaths in the course of ghting UMNO members wereas honourable martyrs. Third, one need not of cially convert to other religions to become aka r , instead, one could be thrown into in delity by simply separating between religion and politics (Kamarul zaman HajiYusoff 2004: 385).

Amanat Haji Hadi seriously polarised Malay society into hostile PAS

and UMNO camps. In the rural Malay heartlands of Kelantan, Terengganuand Kedah, families broke up, marriages were dissolved, religious feastswere boycotted, annual zakat (almsgiving) were paid not through of cialchannels, and rival congregations offered the same prayers separately,sometimes in different mosques (Kamarulnizam Abdullah 2003: 193-94). 3 Burgeoning audiences at PAS-organised lectures promptedthe government to step up security measures against it. In 1984, thegovernment issued a White Paper entitled The Threat to Muslim Unity

3 cf. Fundamentalism on trial, Far Eastern Economic Review , 8 May 1986; AmanatHaji Hadi bawa padah, Mingguan Malaysia , 13 June 1999; Prayers held in twomosques, New Straits Times , 8 December 2004.

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and National Security following the detentions of three PAS Youth

leaders under the Internal Security Act (ISA). This document implicatedPAS members in the subversive activities of extremist Islamic groups, andcreated the spectre of the communists manipulating PAS-inspired rifts toachieve their anti-democratic aims (Kamarulnizam Abdullah, 2003: 195-196, Gunn, 1986: 40). A year later, in Memali village in Kedah, policestormed a community of PAS villagers who were reportedly armed whenthey resisted the arrest of their leader, Ibrahim Mahmood popularlyknown as Ibrahim Libya, who was accused of abusing Islam and incitingrebellion against the state. In the ensuing showdown, four policemen

and fourteen villagers including Ibrahim lost their lives (KamarulnizamAbdullah 2003: 196-98).There have been continuous polemic surrounding events of the

Memali tragedy. The of cial explanation of the Memali tragedydirectly linked the violence with Amanat Haji Hadi s advocacy ofmilitant jihad against UMNO members (Government of Malaysia 1986:5, appendix B; JAKIM 2002: 7, 24-30). Physical confrontation againstthe state was said to be passionately pursued by the PAS members, whoearnestly believed they were ghting an in del government. Althoughthe resort towards violence in Memali was probably due to prevailingconditions there, for example Ibrahim Libyas personal instructions to thevillagers to resist, rather than a result of one or another party policy, itsrelation to theka r-mengka r issue was more than accidental. ThroughoutJanuary to February 2002, the countrys premier television channel, RadioTelevisyen Malaysia (RTM), repeatedly played video clips of the Memalitragedy in an attempt to convey to the public that PAS is supportive ofviolence and terrorism. 4 The taped confession of Muhamad Yusof Husin,a PAS activist detained following the Memali violence, has been themedias favourite evidence. 5 PAS, on the other hand, has been consistently

commemorating, to the governments displeasure, the day of the Memalitragedy as Martyrdom Day. It has also openly disagreed with the of cial

fatwa that Ibrahim Libya and his companions who perished in Memaliwere not martyrs, but rather were treacherous rebels (bughah ) (PAS2002: viii, 41-45). PAS has also claimed that Muhamad Yusof Husinsconfession following the Memali tragedy was extracted under torture(PAS 2002: 18).

4 cf. Siar Amanat Haji Hadi elak umat Islam bermusuhan,Utusan Malaysia , 27March 2003.

5 For Muhamad Yusofs statements to the authorities, see Government of Malaysia(1986: 3, 5-6, 13-15, 17, 19), also quoted in Kamarulnizam Abdullah (2003: 197).

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PAS has not unequivocally retracted its diehard position on Amanat

Haji Hadi . Perhaps this intransigence is related to the in uence of MiddleEastern Islamist trends among the PAS leaders. Among others, thosein uenced have developed strong tendencies to excommunicate fellowMuslims who are willing to compromise with unIslamic rulership.6

At any rate, PAS successfully capitalised on the Reformasi euphoriaengul ng the disgruntled Malays following the Anwar Ibrahim saga in1998. Consequently, PAS registered massive gains in the November 1999general elections. For the rst time, it led the Opposition in Parliament.At the state level, PAS retained Kelantan, captured Terengganu, and made

signi cant inroads into Kedah, Perlis, Pahang, Perak and Selangor.With UMNOs legitimacy questioned by the Malay electorate, whilePAS experiencd resurgence among upwardly mobile young Malays, 7

Malay unity again became the focal issue of national politics in 2000-2001. PAS was put on the defensive for failing to disavow Amanat

Haji Hadi , which bore the blame for creating ssures within the Malaycommunity. While PAS claimed that there was never any clear-cut promulgation of Amanat Haji Hadi s deviation from Islamic teachings,the UMNO-led state insisted otherwise.8 In response to doubts of PASssincerity in planning to open its door to non-Muslims for associatemembership and electoral candidacy, 9 PASs Musryid al-Am (GeneralGuide)-cum-Chief Minister of Kelantan, Nik Aziz Nik Mat, retorted thatthe PAS leadership had never adopted the practice ofka r-mengka r ;instead, it had been instigated by extremist camps within the party.10 Inhis defence, Haji Hadi Awang pleaded that Amanat Haji Hadi not be citedin parts, and the sensitive parts duly taken out of context. When read asa whole, Amanat Haji Hadi , he claimed, was a document outlining the

boundaries between faith and in delity, without pin-pointing any groupor individuals as ka rs. 11 Moreover, PAS argued that Amanat Haji Hadi

6 For an example of an attempt to establish such an intellectual linkage, see AstoraJabat, Pergolakan negara Arab jadi ilham: Pas tidak pernah sunyi daripadamengka rkan UMNO, Mingguan Malaysia , 13 June 1999.

7 See the special report by Sangwon Suh and Santha Oorjitham, Battle for Islam:UMNO and PAS are locked in a struggle for the Malay soul. The outcome mayirrevocably change Malaysian society, Asiaweek , 16 June 2000.

8 Saya tidak perlu bertaubat Hadi, Utusan Malaysia , .3 August 2000; MajlisFatwa putuskan Amanat Haji Hadi bercanggah Hamid, Utusan Malaysia ,5 August 2000; Amanat Hadi diwartakan menyalahi ajaran Islam, MingguanMalaysia , 22 April 2001.

9 PAS mahu letak calon bukan Islam, Berita Harian , 31 May 1999.10 Bukan gimik politik Nik Aziz, Utusan Malaysia , 3 June 1999.11 See the interview with Haji Hadi Awang, Bukan saya ka rkan UMNO - Hadi

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was Islamically justi able and the party was not guilty of causing Malay

disunity. Public calls upon PAS leaders to repudiate Amanat Haji Hadi fellon deaf ears.12 As in 1985, a plannedmuzakarah (discussion) to resolvethe UMNO-PAS dispute did not materialise, despite initial promisingefforts by moderating organisations. 13

In the event, PAS suffered electoral reversals in the 2004 elections dueto a combination of two factors: internal weaknesses of the oppositionfront and the BNs astute capitalisation of Abdullah Badawis replacementof Mahathir at the UMNO helm (Ahmad Fauzi 2006). A majority ofMalays were also attracted to Abdullahs projection of Islam Hadhari .14

Although PAS had lost control of the Terengganu state government,and its representation in the federal Parliament and other state legislatureshad been reduced, PAS continued to reject any Islamic conception ornotion introduced by the UMNO-led government. This included Islam

Hadhari .15 PASs uncompromising repudiation of Islam Hadhari is best exempli ed by Haji Abdul Hadi Awang himself, who, in his book Hadharah Islamiyyah bukan Islam Hadhari (Islamic Civilisation, not

Awang jelaskan isu perpecahan akibat amanatnya, Mingguan Malaysia , 13 August2000.

12

cf. Pas perlu tolak Amanat Hadi -- Buat secara rasmi sebagai tanda ikhlas tidak pernah ka rkan ahli UMNO Najib, Utusan Malaysia , 26 March 2001; Pas pertahan Amanat Hadi -- Fadzil: Buktikan kandungan ucapannya bercanggah ajaranIslam, Utusan Malaysia , 27 March 2001; Hadi tidak mahu tarik balik, UtusanMalaysia, 28 March 2001; Hadi akan terus ceramah amanatnya,Utusan Malaysia ,16 April 2001.

13 Muzakarah `Amanat Haji Hadi dibatal,Utusan Malaysia , 3 May 2001.14 Of cially translated as civilisational Islam, Islam Hadhari may be understood as

a progressive form of Islam which espouses a healthy balance between spiritualand material development. In his inaugural presidential address at the 55th UMNOGeneral Assembly on 23 September 2004, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi outlined

ten fundamental principles of Islam Hadhari , viz. faith and piety in God, a justand trustworthy government, free and independent people, a vigorous masteryof knowledge, a balanced and comprehensive economic development, a goodquality of life, protection of the rights of minority groups and women, cultural andmoral integrity, conservation of the environment and strong defence capabilities.See Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, Menuju kecemerlangan, Utusan Malaysia , 24September 2004. The states of cial conception of Islam Hadhari has adopted key points of Abdullahs speech, see http://www.islam.gov.my/islamhadhari/bm/konsep.html (accessed on 5 January 2005).

15 cf. Astora Jabat, Hadi bersangka buruk kerana politik,Mingguan Malaysia , 7February 2005; Astora Jabat, Istilah Islam Hadhari cerdik pandai Arab,MingguanMalaysia , 13 February 2005; Islam: Pas tolak apa saja usaha UMNO,MingguanMalaysia , 13 February 2005; Pas lupa sejarah, kesilapan masa lalu, Berita Harianeditorial, 15 February 2005.

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Civilisational Islam), rebukes Islam Hadhari as a hybrid religion which

allows the practice of a compartmentalised Islam alongside unIslamicelements, and therefore a bidah (religious innovation) with deviationist potential (Abdul Hadi Awang 2005: 24-34, 50, 90, 130, 196). Hadharah Islamiyyah bukan Islam Hadhari has been put under scrutiny by JAKIMfor fear of its leading to public confusion over the Islam Hadhariconcept, 16 but has as yet escaped a ban despite calls to that effect fromUMNO politicians. Kelantan chief minister Nik Aziz Nik Mat, on theother hand, defends Hadharah Islamiyyah bukan Islam Hadhari as a moreauthentic explication of Islam than the states of cial explanation of Islam

Hadhari .17

Such unquali ed disavowal of state Islam, when the majority of Malays seemed to be prepared to give the new Abdullah administrationthe chance to prove itself, has merely reinforced the image of PASas dogmatic religious champions whose interpretation of Islam was,however, deleterious towards Malay-Muslim unity. Peace building between the state and PAS has been obstructed by the failure of both sidesto come to terms with their religious differences. Hence, Nik Aziz NikMats plea in 2005, that UMNO and PAS engage in mutual dialogue inan effort to unite Malays, was disdainfully rebuffed by UMNO leaders asa chicanery. 18 As far as the UMNO leaders are concerned, the recalcitrant party is PAS; it has refused to withdraw the Amanat Haji Hadi and toregret the ka r-mengka r exchanges that it caused. In fact, of cial Islamhas continued to pronounce the Amanat Haji Hadi as contradictory toIslamic faith and law (Wan Zahidi Wan Teh 2003: 36-54).

Threat to Islamic Orthodoxy: The Darul Arqam Issue

Meanwhile another con ict between Darul Arqam, an Islamic revivalist

movement founded in 1968 by Ustaz Ashaari Muhammad, and thestate developed beginning from the late 1970s, reaching a crescendo in1994. Early criticisms of Darul Arqam focused on its attempts to reviveelementary Islamic practices in the segregated environment of self-contained villages. Based initially in a settlement in Sungai Penchala in

16 JPM edar buku Islam Hadhari melalui JAKIM, Berita Minggu , 13 March 2005.17 Pandangan berbeza tentang Hadharah Islamiah , Utusan Malaysia , 16 April 2005.18 Pas-UMNO perlu bersemuka cari penyelesaian perpecahan, Utusan Malaysia ,

11 February 2005; `Cadangan Nik Aziz Pas-UMNO bersemuka demi perpaduanMelayu satu helah, Utusan Malaysia , 12 February 2005.

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the rural outskirts of Kuala Lumpur founded in 1973, Darul Arqam was

treated as fostering anti-progressive attitudes at a time when Malayssuffered material backwardness. In the 1980s, Darul Arqams missionary,economic and educational projects began to make a signi cant impressionamong Malays, who, apparently, regarded the anti-developmentcaricature of Darul Arqam as misleading. The expansion of DarulArqams in uence, especially among the new Malay middle class, sawthe states treatment of Darul Arqam move from provisional toleration toovert hostility. 19

At the centre of the dispute were aspects of religious teachings,

embraced by Darul Arqam, which were considered to be theologicallydeviant and deviationist ( sesat lagi menyesatkan ). Most seriously,Darul Arqam was alleged to have subscribed to atariqah (spiritual or suorder) called Aurad Muhammadiah whose genealogy was invalid as itclaimed its origins to a direct communication in a state of consciousness( yaqazah ) between the deceased Prophet Muhammad and its founder,Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah Al-Suhaimi. Further, Darul Arqam wasaccused of believing in the messianic return of Aurad Muhammadiah s progenitor from occultation despite evidence of his death and funeral,of falsely making additions to the Islamic testament of faith, of adoptingthe polytheistic practice of tawassul (invoking intermediaries whenmaking supplication to God), of wrongly interpreting the Quran, and ofencouraging a personality cult of Ustaz Ashaari. According to critics,Ashaaris followers had attributed to him divine powers, miraculous featsand a Bani Tamim ancestry, supposedly indicating his promised roleas a future leader commanding reins of power in Malaysia.20 Socially,Darul Arqam was accused of creating widespread dissension within theMalay community by purposely going against state Islamic enactments,challenging the authority of the of cial ulama , exploiting child labour,

cajoling novices to leave their families and sacri cing their wealth for themovement, unethically practising polygamous marriages and encouragingfamily break-ups. Among the Malay community, a newly recruited DarulArqam member was portrayed as rebellious to his or her parents if he or

19 For information on Darul Arqam in its formative phase and successive stages of itsdevelopment, see Darul Arqam (1992a, 1992b, 1993a), Mohd. Rom Al Hodri (1992),Muhammad Syukri Salleh (1992: chapter 4). On the states shifting treatment ofDarul Arqam, see Muhammad Syukri Salleh (1995).

20 For debates and competing perspectives on the heterodoxy allegedly practised byDarul Arqam, see Ashaari Muhammad (1986, 1989), BAHEIS (1986, 1993), AhmadFauzi (2005).

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she was unmarried, or neglectful of family life if he or she was married.21

Notwithstanding the pressure applied by the state on Darul Arqamon theological and social grounds, it was only in the 1990s, after DarulArqam was seen to have crossed political boundaries, that thecoupde grace was delivered to it. There was concern that Darul Arqamseconomic prowess, which had been built independently of the state, wasdemonstrating an alarming political potential. Evidence indicated thatDarul Arqam had penetrated in uentially into mainstream Malay socio- political circles and was drawing crucial middle class support away fromUMNO. Darul Arqam itself openly claimed friendship with UMNO

stalwarts at both federal and state levels.22

Its publications in the 1990sexplored such politically explicit themes as Islamic internationalism,the applicability of Islamic law, the Islamic concept of justice, andthe principles of government and administration in Islam. Included inthe discourses were assessments of the contemporary political scene,critiques of the ruling establishment and direct responses to the allegedsocial and security risks posed by Darul Arqam (cf. Abdul HalimAbbas 1991, Ashaari Muhammad 1992, 1993b, 1993c, 1993d). Of cialcriticisms gradually increased in intensity and explicitness, goaded by popular journalists who were provocatively lauding the achievements ofDarul Arqam and speculating prime ministerial material in Ustaz Ashaari(Mohd. Sayuti Omar 1990: 156-62; Alattas 1992: chapter 8, 246-47; NikMahadi Nik Hassan 1992).

Darul Arqams view of politics had hitherto been based strongly onthe notion that Malaysias transformation into an Islamic state would beeffected gradually by the missionary process of dakwah rather than viaelectoral politics (Ashaari Muhammad 1990: 36-40, 101-02; MohamadMahir Saidi 1992). Darul Arqams newly discovered boldness wasuncharacteristic, and pointed to a possibility that a shift in tactics and

methods was in the making in order to realise Darul Arqams Islamic polity, as envisioned by its messianic interpretation of Islamic scriptures(Darul Arqam 1992c, 1993b; Ashaari Muhammad 1993a). If this weretrue, the authorities had justi able cause to worry as the ruling eliteswould almost certainly be out of place in such a political make-up. Whenit arrived, the states clampdown on Darul Arqam was decisive. This

21 For examples of allegations that Darul Arqam had caused social unrest and brokenacceptable ethical norms, see Kedah Religious Affairs Department (1994: 12-15).

22 Radical Chic: Islamic fringe groups gain in uence among the elite, Far Eastern Economic Review , 26 May 1994; Mahathir opens high-risk crusade against Islamicsect, Financial Times , 6-7 August 1994; A Ban Against The Messiah,Time , 22August 1994.

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proscription of Darul Arqam went through three stages: in 1988, on its

publications said to contain its deviant su doctrines; in 1991, on itsactivities involving government bodies; and in 1994 on the Darul Arqamorganisation itself (Ahmad Fauzi 1999b: 10-14). The threat to nationalsecurity, rather than theological deviationism and socio-religious discord,

became the immediate pretext to launch the states assault. Speci cally,Darul Arqam was charged with harbouring designs to seize political power through magic and violence, and the evidence provided, althoughultimately unproven, was Darul Arqams alleged operation of a 313-men suicide squad called the Badr army in Bangkok.23 During June

to August 1994, there occurred constant barraging of Darul Arqam inthe mainstream media, to which Darul Arqam retaliated via statementsand interviews in the foreign media. So drastic did Darul Arqam comeout from its media aloofness that it dared challenge Prime Minister Dr.Mahathir to a popularity referendum.24

Finally, on 5 August 1994, the National Fatwa Council (NFC)declared a sweeping ban on Darul Arqams schools, businesses, activities,teachings, settlements, literature, audio-visual materials and paraphernalia bearing its symbols. State-incited persecution on a nationwide scalefollowed, such as security raids on villages, mass arrests includingof women and children, con scation of property, job and scholarshipsuspension, social boycott and ban on overseas travel. On 2 September1994, Ustaz Ashaari and a group of followers were apprehended by Thai police in Lampang, northern Thailand. Their passports invalidated, theywere then repatriated to Malaysia. Eight Darul Arqam notables includingUstaz Ashaari were consequently detained under the ISA. On 20 October1994, in a closed but later televised dialogue session with members of the NFC held at the National Mosque, the eight ISA detainees confessed totheir mistakes, repented and urged followers to return to the true path of

23 Al-Arqam tubuh pasukan bersenjata, Utusan Malaysia , 13 June 1994; Arqam jadi gerakan militan Hamid, Utusan Malaysia , 14 June 1994; Al-Arqam punyaicita-cita politik ekstrem Mohamed, Utusan Malaysia , 14 June 1994; PM: Arqamancam keselamatan negara, Utusan Malaysia , 18 June 1994; Interior denies reportof Muslim terrorist training, Thailand Times , 26 June 1994; Surapong Posayanond,Thailands stand on Al-Arqam movement, letter to the editor of New Straits Times ,23 June 1994; Pengakuan bekas anggota Tentera Badar, Utusan Malaysia , 28June 1994; Imtiaz Arif, Mud-smearing campaign against Al Arqam, letter to theeditor of Thailand Times , 5 July 1994; Tentera Badar tidak dapat dikesan Hamid,Utusan Malaysia, 7 July 1994; IGP: No proof of Al Arqam suicide army,The Star ,12 July 1994.

24 Al-Arqam leader hits out at corrupt Kuala Lumpur,The Nation , 2 July 1994;Islamic leader wants to oppose Mahathir,Thailand Times , 24 July 1994.

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Islam. On 28 October 1994, Ustaz Ashaari and ve other ISA detainees

were conditionally released under the Restricted Residence Act.25 Inhis subsequent tours to former Darul Arqam settlements throughout thecountry, Ustaz Ashaari, in the constant company of police Special Branchof cers, asserted that Darul Arqam no longer existed and that he was nolonger its leader. Its former members were urged to rebuild new livesaccording to true Islamic principles.26 Ustaz Ashaari himself eventuallysettled down with his immediate family in Bandar Country Homes, aChinese-majority new township near Rawang, Selangor, until February2002, when he was forcibly transported by the authorities to Labuan

island, a federal territory off the coast of Sabah in Borneo island.27

Ustaz Ashaaris enforced removal to Labuan indicated the rulingelites dissatisfaction of the Islamic bureaucracys efforts to rehabilitatehim and his hardcore followers. Throughout the period 1994-2002, thestate claimed to have detected and thwarted intermittent attempts torevive Darul Arqam.28 This included having to resort to a second roundof ISA arrests from May to August 1996, involving the detention ofeighteen former Darul Arqam notables, including a wife, a son, a brotherand a son-in-law of Ustaz Ashaari (Ahmad Fauzi 2000: 52-3, 2001: 126-27). Every time an alleged Darul Arqam revival was foiled, former DarulArqam spokesmen would deny that such an effort in revival ever existed;instead, they claimed that their business remobilisation had been unfairlymisconstrued as mechanisms to veil prohibited religious practices.29

25 Under this Act, detainees were given a limited area, usually an assigned districtwith well-recognised boundaries, in which they could move around. Presenceoutside the area was an offence, except with express permission from the police, towhom they were obliged to report weekly. They were also prohibited from leavingtheir residence from 6 pm. until the next morning. Ustaz Ashaari was given theGombak and Selayang districts in the state of Selangor as his area of residence. See

Conditional release for Ashaari, New Straits Times , 29 October 1994; 3 pemimpinAl-Arqam dibuang daerah, Utusan Malaysia , 7 February 1995.

26 Ashaari tells ex-followers he is no longer their leader, New Sunday Times , 30October 1994; Al-Arqam dibubar, Utusan Malaysia , 1 November 1994; Asaariulangi seruan tinggalkan amalan bercanggah, Mingguan Malaysia , 13 November1994.

27 Asaari Muhammad dipindah ke Labuan, Berita Harian 7 February 2002.28 Usah cuba pulih Arqam: Rahim, Berita Harian , 28 May 1996; Cubaan pulih

Arqam, Berita Minggu , 18 April 1999; Al-Arqam kini dihidupkan semula,Utusan Malaysia , 12 July 2000; Bekas ahli Al-Arqam guna premis niaga,UtusanMalaysia , 29 August 2001; Negeri mesti bertindak: Cubaan hidup semula AuradMuhammadiah, Berita Harian , 18 February 2002.

29 No plans to revive Arqam,Sunday Star , 9 June 1996; JAKIM akan berundingdengan Asaari, Berita Harian , 18 May 1999; Rufaqa na ada kaitan Al-Arqam,

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While such swift action demonstrated the ef cacy of the national security

apparatus, they also indicated the sluggishness and failure of the Islamic bureaucracy in bringing the former Darul Arqam members in line withmainstream Islam, as de ned and enjoined by the state. The persistentneed of state monitoring of former Darul Arqam members contradictedJAKIMs recurrent proclamations of having successfully rehabilitatedthem. At times, JAKIM was at pains to deny that the rehabilitation programme of former Darul Arqam members had been to no avail.30

Rufaqa: Darul Arqam Revisited and Recon gured

Since April 1997, the most active remobilisation of former Darul Arqammembers had taken place under the aegis of Rufaqa Corporation, a private limited company with Ustaz Ashaari as its executive chairmanand Bandar Country Homes, Rawang as its headquarters. Starting withthe manufacturing and distribution of herbal-based health products,Rufaqa, bene ting from Darul Arqams well-known enterprise spiritand close-knit networks, quickly captured national and Southeast Asianmarkets. 31 Rufaqa townships, where juxtaposed business premises wererented or bought en bloc and given a avour of Rufaqa via conspicuoussignboards and continuous presence of company personnel, sproutedthroughout Malaysia in 2001-2002. The range of its businesses widenedto such diverse sectors as grocery stores, cafeterias and restaurants, foodcatering, bakeries, polyclinics, computer training and cyber cafes, bookand magazine publication and printing, mechanical and vehicle repairworkshops, boutiques, laundry services, nurseries and kindergartens,organisation of motivational courses and Islamic cultural events, andtourism (Muhammad Syukri Salleh 2003: 156-57). 32 Ustaz Ashaaris

Berita Harian , 13 July 2000; Rufaqa tidak terbabit cuba hidup Al-Arqam, Berita Harian , 25 February 2002.

30 Kes Arqam: KDN salahkan Pusat Islam, Berita Harian , 3 June 1996; Al Arqamnot a threat anymore, says Hamid,The Star , 29 July 1996; BAHEIS pulihkan 211 bekas ahli Arqam, Berita Harian , 28 August 1996; Kerajaan berjaya pulih akidah bekas ahli al-Arqam, Berita Harian , 4 February 1998; JAKIM perlu berterusterang, Utusan Malaysia , 13 July 2000; JAKIM na gagal pulih bekas anggota Al-Arqam, Berita Harian , 21 February 2002.

31 Zumala tinjau pasaran baru di Asia Barat, Berita Harian , 4 February 2000;Rufaqa terkenal di seberang laut, Utusan Malaysia 8 February 2000; Former Al-Arqam rede nes itself, New Sunday Times , 30 April 2000; Setelah abuya memilihtobat, Gatra , nos. 2-3, 6 December 2003.

32 See also the of cial website of Rufaqa Corporation at www.rufaqa.com and mediareports on the diversity of Rufaqas business activities: Business interest that

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enforced removal to Labuan, rather than slowing down Rufaqas business

wings, actually broadened its markets. It also enhanced Ustaz Ashaarisin uence. So successful was his post-Darul Arqam business venturesthat Ustaz Ashaari was touted to have reached millionaire status, whilehis close followers among family members and company directors andexecutives were rumoured to be leading luxurious lifestyles.33

It is ironical that the earliest problem that Ustaz Ashaari encounteredwith the state back in the 1970s revolved around Darul Arqams allegedanti-progressive and isolationist attitude. Despite Ustaz Ashaari havingnow developed into a self-styled corporate magnate, the state was

neither prepared to cede moral ground to him, nor to compliment hisachievements in engineering Malay-Muslim advancement, which wasin line with NEP goals. During Ustaz Ashaaris stay in Labuan, JAKIMcontinually insisted that behind Rufaqa, there somehow existed a plot torevive Darul Arqam. 34 JAKIMs expose was conventionally accompanied by warnings issued by the police, and followed by the usual denials byRufaqa. 35 Statements by ruling politicians would rely on evidence andarguments provided by JAKIM and security of cials. 36 Yet, the publichad for eight years been fed with similar accusations of revival plotsand ensuing denials. The more frequent JAKIM raised the matter, thegreater was the chance that JAKIM would be seen to be ineffective inits Darul Arqam rehabilitation programme. Already there were calls for

span ve industries, New Sunday Times , 30 April 2000; Asaari pengasas RufaqaCorporation, Utusan Malaysia , 13 July 2000; Banned Al-Arqam cult thrivingunder business umbrella, Straits Times (Singapore), 9 Feb 2002.

33 Kini Asaari digelar jutawan: setelah 7 tahun pengharaman Al-Arqam, BuletinUtama , 29 April-5 May 2001; Tarmizi Mohd. Jam and Ann Wan Seng, Ashaaridan Rufaqa Corporation: Taikun Baru Selepas 7 Tahun Arqam Diharam, Geletek ,June 2001; Ashari Kembang Pengaruh di Labuan, Buletin Utama , 21-24 April

2002; Penduduk rayu penempatan Asaari dikaji semula, Berita Harian , 5September 2002; Gaya hidup pengikut al-Arqam perlu dipantau, Berita Harian , 28 November 2002; Apa ruginya Asyaari kaya?, http://www.harakahdaily.net/print. php?sid=3510 (accessed on 14 December 2002).

34 Cubaan Al-Arqam hidupkan semula ajaran dikesan, Berita Harian , 10 August2002; Al-Arqam cuba dihidup kembali, Harian Metro , 23 April 2003; Kerajaan pantau rapi pergerakan Asaari, Utusan Malaysia , 7 May 2003; Al-Arqam dipantaulebih kerap, Berita Harian , 10 May 2003.

35 Amaran keras kepada bekas ahli Arqam,Mingguan Malaysia , 25 August 2002;Kalimah Syahadah Ustaz Ashaari: Na Rufaqa tiru Al-Arqam, Bacaria , 28December 2002.

36 For example, Deputy Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawis statement; seeTindakan tegas jika cuba hidupkan semula Aurad Muhammadiyah, UtusanMalaysia , 13 March 2002.

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JAKIM to review its approach in handling Darul Arqam and to appreciate

Darul Arqams positive contributions to the Malay-Muslim economyand culture. 37 By prolonging the Darul Arqam issue, the state wasinadvertently questioning its own credibility.

One reason for the states continual dissatisfaction of the former DarulArqam members rehabilitation appears to be their adamancy in schoolingtheir children in a separate educational system. To Rufaqa Corporation(2003: 1), education forms the pulse of a nation. After ve years of theclosure of Darul Arqam schools, in July 1999, Rufaqa sponsored theestablishment of At-Tahalli secondary school in Bandar Country Homes,

Rawang. Operating on a temporary permit from the Selangor IslamicAffairs Department (JAIS: Jabatan Agama Islam Selangor ), the schooltargeted students among offsprings of former Darul Arqam parents, whohitherto had to send their children to state schools against their ownwill. As an incentive, At-Tahalli offered free education for children ofRufaqa employees and the poor.38 It was not long before the school gotinto trouble with the authorities for allegedly being a vehicle to inculcateDarul Arqam teachings among its students, thus planting seeds for afuture revival. 39 Such an impression was evident from the emergenceof nasyeed (Islamic song) groups whose membership composed of at-Tahalli students. 40 The chiefnasyeed group, Qathrunnada, quickly gained popularity by producing albums and performing in major Islamic concertsaround Malaysia, bringing back memories of stylish Darul Arqamcultural performances a decade earlier. 41 Denials by the At-Tahalli school

37 Gempur benih ajaran sesat, editorial, Utusan Malaysia , 26 August 2002; RamliMohd. Yunus, Lihat Al-Arqam dari aspek positif: Dato Abdul Hamid tak perlumelatah, Buletin Demokrasi , 30 August 5 September 2002.

38 Rufaqa tawar pendidikan percuma kepada pelajar miskin, Mangga , bil. 62, May

2000.39 Pemilik Sekolah At Tahalli na terbabit pertubuhan haram, Utusan Malaysia , 13

July 2000.40 There is wide acceptance that Darul Arqam, via its mainnasyeed groups Nada

Murni and The Zikr, was chie y responsible for popularising nasyeed as a modernmusical genre in Malaysia since the mid-1980s. Darul Arqam cultural performanceswere distinctive for integrating contemporary musical elements, such as the use of percussion and modern instruments, with the classical nasyeed melody as inheritedfrom its su origins. All three most popular nasyeed groups in contemporaryMalaysia, viz. Raihan, Rabbani and Hijjaz, trace their origins to Darul Arqamsmultiple cultural troupes. See for example, Kumpulan nasyid perlu elak lirik galakmaksiat, Berita Harian , 8 January 2004.

41 Qathrunnada dilarang baca surat cinta, Pancaindera (Mingguan Malaysia ), 14May 2000; 4 anak Ustaz Asaari jadi penyanyi,Mangga , bil. 62, May 2000; MAS

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management of any association with Darul Arqam were inadequate to

persuade JAIS to keep it open, and from December 2000, the temporaryoperational licence was revoked and police help was sought to make surethe school closed down.42 With the closing down of At-Tahalli, Rufaqaof cially bowed to the authorities demands to operate all of its activitieslegally. Following Ustaz Ashaaris banishment to Labuan in February2002, remaining attempts by former Darul Arqam members to educatetheir children outside the mainstream educational system were beatenoff. 43 Such attempts involved taking over private religious schools byformer Darul Arqam teachers who may or may not be linked to Rufaqa.44

The states decision to withdraw grants to independent Peoples ReligiousSchools (SAR: Sekolah Agama Rakyat ) in 2002 further tightened itsstranglehold over private religious education, which had attracted manyrural Malay parents disenchanted with state education.

However, such regulatory measures were not regarded as impedimentsto Rufaqas educational initiatives. Observations throughout the variousRufaqas townships, for instance in Bandar Country Homes, Rawang, andBandar Baru PERDA, Bukit Mertajam, Penang,45 show that Rufaqa hasdevised its own independent hostel system to regulate their offspring whohave now re-entered the state educational system. As related to the presentauthor by Sholehuddin Abdullah, Penangs director of Rufaqa, 46 a Rufaqatownship will typically have four hostels to house their children: malesecondary, male primary, female secondary, female primary. After classesin state schools, the students are trained, according to their levels, in fard ain (personal religious obligations) and spiritual sciences to make upfor the weaknesses of the state system. The spiritual sciences, composedof novel interpretations of tawhid (theology), qh (jurisprudence) andtasawwuf (su sm) were made relevant to contemporary undertakingsand integrated into the formal education system from the primary to

sambut Maal Hijrah membawa mesej Cinta Agung, Buletin Utama , 8-14 May2000; Lebih 5000 penonton menitis airmata semasa konsert teater muzikal Islam diUKM, Buletin Utama , 4-10 September 2000.

42 JAIS buat aduan terhadap sekolah At-Tahalli,Utusan Malaysia , 15 February 2001.43 Negeri mesti bertindak, Berita Harian , 18 February 2002; Tutup sekolah agama

hidupkan fahaman bertentangan Islam, Utusan Malaysia , 18 February 2002;Semua negeri pantau Aurad Muhammadiah, Berita Harian , 19 February 2002.

44 Johor arah sekolah agama Al-Ruhama ditutup, Berita Harian , 21 February 2002;JAJ halang usaha bekas ahli Al-Arqam, Berita Harian , 16 March 2002.

45

Fieldwork October 2004 March 2005.46 Information from Sholehuddin was gathered from a series of meetings with him(December 2004 March 2005).

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tertiary levels. The mainstream educational system, by relegating fard

ain knowledge to the level of personal domain and leaving the massesto seek it themselves, in fact reversed the ways of the Messengers,whose main mission was to bring theummah to God. As part of theirco-curricular activity, Muslim students are given practical training inRufaqas economic projects. In this way, they develop company loyalty,camaraderie, independent survival spirit and the capacity to relate Islamicknowledge with real life experience in the entrepreneurial world. Suchtraining a practical realisation of fard kifayah (congregational religiousobligations), are conducted in a manner which arouses God-consciousness

in the hearts and minds of both students and teachers. Rufaqa was notthe least worried that it could be misunderstood for creating a sub-systemwithin the formal educational system, for they were not breaking any law.Indeed, in spite of Rufaqas independent hostels having received negativemedia attention, 47 none has been ordered to shut down.

Rufaqa and Non-Muslims: A New Paradigm of Relationship

A stumbling block against the convergence of Islamic visions of thestate and of Darul Arqam was the concern that Darul Arqams teachings

promoted an exclusively Muslim polity, as re ected in the administrationof and lifestyle in its settlements. This arguably went against the states philosophy of harmonious power-sharing between the various communalgroups in the country.48 Although there was indication that the DarulArqam leadership appreciated Malaysias multi-ethnic character,meaningful interaction between Darul Arqam members and non-Muslimcommunities, was thin (cf. Muhammad Syukri Salleh 1992: 254-55).On the likely implementation of hudud (Islamic criminal punishments)in an Islamic state, Darul Arqam pleaded to non-Muslims not to harbour

misconceptions about hudud and to give Islamic law a chance to prove itsutility in restoring justice and morality in Malaysia, just as they had giventhe chance to Western laws, which were similarly not invented by them(Ashaari Muhammad 1992: 152-58).

In Rufaqa, greater avenues exist for a better working relationship withnon-Muslims. The philosophy underpinning the establishment of Rufaqais love of God a perennial su theme. This love runs concurrentlywith fear of God, forming feelings of Godliness (rasa berTuhan ) and

47

JAIP kesan asrama persendirian cuba hidupkan Al-Arqam, Berita Harian (utara ),7 April 2004.48 Arqams teachings against power sharing, The Star , 24 June 1996.

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servility (rasa kehambaan ), which together form the essence oftaqwa .

Taqwa refers primarily to ones strength and conviction in ones spiritualrelationship with God, but the attainment of taqwa does not necessarilydeny the improvement of ones mental and physical faculties.49 On thecontrary, spiritual nourishment leads not only to mental agility, butalso towards the ful llment of ones material necessities of life. Thecompany pro le of Rufaqa states that, Rufaqa Corporation Sdn. Bhd.is established with its unique goal of making business enterprises asan access of gaining intimacy with God. Worldly pro t is not the mainconcern. (Rufaqa Corporation Sdn. Bhd. n.d.). Rufaqa Corporations

motto: serene and reassuring balances the need of a devout spiritualitywith service to humanity, regardless of ethnicity and religion. As the pro le explains, serenity and calmness of the soul are achieved whenthe feeling of being with God and humbleness are deeply instilled inthe heart, while reassuring results are accomplished when the Rules(shariah) of God are implemented in life . The motto captures Rufaqasbelief and conviction in promoting all the services and products offered (Rufaqa Corporation Sdn. Bhd. n.d.) The ful llment of ones soul in hisrelationship with God is balanced by ones burning desire to ful ll socialobligations. Such ful llment invites divine intervention in ones individualand family undertakings, such that a cooperative civilisation based on auniversal love of God and care for fellow humans takes effect.

In Rufaqa, su sm is blended with integral aspects of life. Su smneither leads to one leading the life of a recluse, nor does it divestone from legal and social responsibilities. Su sm here refers not toritualistic incantations or speci c spiritual exercises, as was the casewith Aurad Muhammadiah as practised by Darul Arqam, but rather to aholistic process of human development ( pembangunan insan ), whichnecessitates a close adherence to physical requirements of the religion

(Shuib Sulaiman 2004). Su sms emphasis on love of God also leads to prosperity, care of fellow Muslims and a harmonious accommodation withand tolerance of non-Muslims so that they nd it a privilege to live under Muslim rule. Thus, Rufaqas su sm goes hand in hand with a harmoniousrelationship with non-Muslims in the context of Malaysias plural society.By promoting a universal love of God and preferring the Malay termTuhan (God) instead of the Arabic Allah in its public pronouncements (cf.

49 On Ustaz Ashaaris taqwa -based model of development and references to taqwain his pre-Rufaqa writings, see Ahmad Fauzi (2003b). Ustaz Ashaaris variegatedthoughts and views on taqwa have been recently systematised by a member ofRufaqas board of directors, Major (Retired) Abu Dzar in hisTaqwa Menurut Ustaz

Hj Asaari Mohamad (2005).

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Abu Dzar 2005a: 170-171), Rufaqa avoids alienating non-Muslims, many

of whom have been sceptical of enforced Islamisation in the country.Rufaqas theme nasyeed , as always sung by its performing artists inRufaqas programmes, is entitled Tuhan Cinta Agung (God the SupremeLove).

At the practical level, active interaction between Rufaqa and non-Muslims has been promoted via business and proximity of residence.Bandar Country Homes, where Ustaz Ashaari was banished in 1994-2002,is populated by a majority (sixty percent) of non-Muslims, mainly ofChinese ethnicity (Muhammad Syukri Salleh 2003: 175). What may have

started off as accidental interaction in the marketplace and neighbourhooddeveloped into a cordial relationship between Rufaqa and non-Muslims,as acknowledged by Lim Kwee Eng, former President of Bandar CountryHomes Residents Association:

Islamic-oriented business here has attracted many visitors who wishto know further about it. It is not an exaggeration to say that BandarCountry Homes has achieved fame via Ashaaris businesses. In terms ofhuman relations, Rufaqa employees can be made an example by the localcommunity because they exhibit highly regarded morals and respect forothers. They also give assistance and cooperation in ensuring that the localcommunitys plans are successful. The products they sell are undeniablycheaper than other goods sold here. They also have a clinic and a maternityhospital which are not too particular about prices in order to perform socialobligations. Malays in Country Homes should be proud in having anentrepreneur who has successfully raised Islamic economic developmentin tune with the sophistication of the times. Generally, all residents ofCountry Homes are fond of Ashaari and his employees. He is said to begenerous and helpful to the surrounding community. ( Buletin Utama 29April 5 May 2001, authors translation).

The present author, during his eldwork, had the opportunity of meetingwith two Chinese friends of Rufaqa, viz. Lee Yau Hui and Chee KimMeng. 50 Both former businessmen were hopeful that Rufaqa and UstazAshaari would one day be given a signi cant role in national affairs,as his brand of Islamic development offered solutions to Malaysias problems such as corruption and extravagance. In Labuan, where UstazAshaari served his remaining term of restricted residence (2002-04),Rufaqa operated a range of business enterprises and restaurant chains,using the licences of local Chinese businessmen willing to cooperate as

50 The meeting took place in Lees residence in Kelana Jaya, Selangor, in November2004.

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Rufaqas business partners (Ahmad Fauzi 2003b: 148). In the Chinese-

majority state of Penang, at the north of Peninsular Malaysia, Rufaqa hasestablished one of its most successful economic bases since expandingits wings here in 2001 (Ahmad Fauzi 2004, Rufaqa Pulau Pinang 2003).Rufaqas efforts in galvanising the Malay-Muslim economy, in a statewhere the Malays are economically backward,51 has been acknowledged by the states UMNO leaders.52 In order to express appreciation of itsnon-Muslim suppliers, customers and business partners, Rufaqas Penang branch organised a dinner function attended by almost one-hundred non-Muslim friends, and of ciated by P.K. Subbaiyah, a non-Muslim Indian

state assemblyman and Penang state executive councilor for the portfolioof health, welfare and caring society.53

Rufaqas conformity to a state-de ned Islam was pivotal towards peace building between the state and former Darul Arqam leaders still bound by the Restricted Residence Act. Such an Islam had to conform toacceptable religio-nationalist visions of a Malaysian identity, which DarulArqam was accused of subverting by proposing their own messianic polity (cf. Ahmad Fauzi 1999a). For the remaining tenure of Dr. MahathirMohamads Premiership, the state was contented to keep close tabson Rufaqa such that it did not transgress the limits of being a purely business entity. Such a reminder was delivered in person to Ustaz Ashaariwhen he was summoned to the Prime Minsters of ce for a brief meetingin June 2001. Ustaz Ashaari was reportedly offered the option of joining

51 The economic marginalisation of Penang Malays has long been a subject of concernamong Malay politicians and academics, see for instance Amir H. Baharuddin(1982), the more recent interview with Professor Amir Hussin Baharuddin, NasibMelayu bila jadi minoriti - Orang Melayu Pulau Pinang sudah macam bangsaPalestin, Mingguan Malaysia , 1 September 2002; the report by Associate ProfessorAminah Ayob, Nasib Melayu bila malas belajar - Isu dominasi bidang profesional

di Pulau Pinang menyedihkan, Mingguan Malaysia , 15 September 2002; and theheadline news, Melayu P. Pinang terpinggir - Nasib seperti Melayu Singapura jikakerajaan negeri amal sikap tidak peduli, Utusan Malaysia , 26 August 2002; andMelayu P. Pinang perlu nilai diri semula PM, Utusan Malaysia , 27 August 2002.

52 For instance, Dr. Hilmy Yahaya had an audience with Rufaqas state leaders athis Deputy Chief Ministers of ce in Kompleks Tun Abdul Razak (KOMTAR),Penang, on 20 March 2003. Photographs of the meeting were shown to the author by Penangs Rufaqa executive committee member, Ismail Mohd. Noor. In the2004 general elections, Dr. Hilmy moved from the state seat of Telok Bahang tothe federal seat of Balik Pulau. Upon winning the seat, he was appointed as the parliamentary secretary of the Finance Ministry, which is headed by the PrimeMinister.

53 See report of the function, Bumiputera perlu berurus niaga dengan bangsa lain, Berita Harian (utara), 30 July 2004.

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UMNO in an effort to counterweight PAS in the next elections, but Ustaz

Ashaari declined and chose instead to remain in the corporate world.54 Hissnubbing of Dr. Mahathirs offer very possibly prolonged his detention,not to mention past grudges going back to 1994, when Ustaz Ashaariopenly confronted Dr. Mahathir in the foreign media and a Darul Arqamsenior leader, Shuib Sulaiman, provocatively predicted Dr. Mahathirsdownfall at the hands of Ustaz Ashaari (Shuib Sulaiman 1994). It wasimportant that Rufaqa maintained a high business pro le, in order toconvince the authorities that not only was Ustaz Ashaari uninterestedto meddle in political affairs, but he also no longer harboured religio-

political ideals whose vision ran contrary to that of the state.

Rufaqa and Peace Building with the Post-Mahathir State

The resignation of Dr. Mahathir on 31 October 2003, followed byan orderly transfer of power to his deputy, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, paved the way for Ustaz Ashaaris freedom. This became reality on 25October 2004. 55 Heated speculation had been spreading for around twomonths prior to the release,56 especially since the momentous decision by the Federal Court to quash the conviction on former Deputy PrimeMinister Anwar Ibrahim for sodomy, thereby granting him freedom aftersix years of incarceration. Despite the governments insistence that the judiciary had come to its decision independently, the Malaysian publicwidely saw the executives liberal hands in in uencing the court. 57 Bothhistoric decisions raised the credibility of Prime Minister AbdullahAhmad Badawi, who, since assuming power, had made a gallant effort toestablish good governance and a people-friendly image as hallmarks ofhis administration (Khoo 2004: 8-10).

Since obtaining freedom, Ustaz Ashaari has refrained from making

public statements. His health deteriorated sharply under detention and

54 The meeting managed to escape media attention, and was reported only by anobscure tabloid, Semasa , bil. 26, 21-31 July 2001 under the headline Hj. Ashaaridimintai sertai UMNO.

55 Ex-leader of Al Arqam can now move freely, New Straits Times , 27 October 2004;Former leader of Islamic sect freed,Straits Times (Singapore), 28 October 2004.

56 Pengikut yakin Ashaari akan dibebaskan, Kosmo 8 September 2004; Abu YaAshaari bebas!, Buletin Demokrasi , 28 September 2004; Jakim serah kepada KDNtempoh tahanan terhad Asaari, Utusan Malaysia , 12 December 2004.

57 Was there a deal?,Straits Times (Singapore), 4 September 2004; Time forHealing: In a stunning decision, Malaysias highest court allows Anwar Ibrahim togo free. Can he be a political force again?Time , 13 September 2004.

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he now suffers from lockjaw a disease which has severely affected

his speech. Since his release and return to Peninsular Malaysia fromLabuan, he has been busy visiting Rufaqas projects around the country,

but ghting failing health, spends most of his time in his sumptuous bungalow in Pinggiran Taman Tun Dr. Ismail, Kuala Lumpur.58 He hassteered Rufaqa into the direction of cooperative ventures with the state,especially in promoting Islam Hadhari and combating social ills ( gejala

sosial ) a prime concern of Malay community leaders in recent years. 59

In a book containing collection of poems directed at former DarulArqam leaders who have disavowed and castigated him, Ustaz Ashaari

expresses pride and gratitude in being able to help the government insuch causes (Asaari Mohamad 2005: 60, 68, 76, 111, 125, 144). Duringthe launching and discussion session of a book outlining Ustaz Ashaaristhoughts and ideas on Islam Hadhari ,60 Rufaqa spokespersons declaredhis concurrence with Islam Hadhari , whose realisation was his ambition.In appreciation of Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawis open regime policy, they quoted his calls for the acceptance of creative ideas from all parties and for the building of towering Malay personalities.61 Denyingany hidden agenda of reviving Darul Arqam, they were grateful that with

Islam Hadhari , they could at last see eye to eye with the state.62

58 cf. Former Al Arqam leader back from the cold, New Straits Times , 28 January2005. Upon Ustaz Ashaaris visit to Rufaqas projects in northern Malaysia, lateOctober to early November 2004, Rufaqa of cials arranged meetings betweenthe present author and him at the Holiday Villa Hotel in Alor Star, Kedah, and theEquatorial Hotel in Bukit Jambul, Penang. However, due to his unclear speech,communication with him had to use the medium of an interpreter his wife,Khatijah Aam. Glimpses of his early movements upon release were caught by themedia, see for instance, Ashaari pulang ke kampung isteri pertama di Kodiang,Utusan Malaysia , 29 October 2004. He has, however, until today, declined to be

of cially interviewed.59 Such concerns have been expressed openly; see for instance Pembabitan remajaMelayu paling ketara, Utusan Malaysia , 21 January 2002, and Remaja Melayuterbabit gejala sosial meningkat, Utusan Malaysia , 23 August 2004.

60 The book by Major (Retired) Abu Dzar, Islam Hadhari Menurut Ust. Hj AshaariMuhammad (2005), was given a sympathetic pre-launch review in the mainstream press; see Perincian Islam Hadhari, Berita Harian , 27 January 2005.

61 See for instance the report Ailing Ashaari gives book launch a miss,The MalayMail , 29 January 2005, and FakhrulRazi Hj. Ashaaris introduction in RufaqaCorporation Sdn Bhd. (2005): the souvenir programme booklet accompanying the book discussion session at the Putra World Trade Centre on 20 February 2005.

For the exact statements of Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, see the headline reports:Pelanggan bukan bola PM, Utusan Malaysia , 21 January 2005, and BinaMelayu unggul PM, Mingguan Malaysia , 6 February 2005.

62 Na hidupkan semula Al-Arqam, Berita Harian , 29 January 2005.

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Observers who had in the past written negatively on Darul Arqam

commended the changes that had taken place among its formermembers under Rufaqa, proving their commitment to contribute tomainstream Islam within prescribed limits. 63 Among other things,Rufaqa demonstrated a more liberal view of women by discarding theface covering veil and dark clothing which had been so characteristicof Darul Arqam women. Rufaqas programmes are now glittered withcultural performances by an all-female nasyeed group, Mawaddah, whohave produced albums featuring popular theme songs on Islam Hadhariand on the Asian tsunami disaster of 26 December 2004 as a message

from God.64

In the wake of the tsunami catastrophe, Ustaz Ashaari alsoauthored a book which praised the governments disaster relief effortsin Aceh as evidence of Islam Hadhari in practice, thus con rmingMalaysias reputation as a model Islamic state. He further congratulatedAbdullah Badawi for replacing New Year entertainment events withreligious programmes as a mark of respect for tsunami victims (AsaariMohamad and Khatijah Aam 2005: 20, 103-06).

In terms of combating social ills, Rufaqa had published anddistributed books to that effect even before Ustaz Ashaaris release (cf.Murshidah Mustaffa and Maryam Sha e 2002, Abu Dzar 2004). Rufaqawas one of the organisations invited by the Internal Security Ministry to jointly participate in its mobile Enam Jahanam (Six Damned Ones) streetcarnival, which was meant to be a war against drug addiction and abuse.65

63 cf Astora Jabat, Islam Hadhari versi Rufaqa,Mingguan Malaysia , 30 January2005.

64 For a high-pro le report on Mawaddah, see All-girl nasyid group spreading itswings, New Straits Times , 6 November 2004. Their widely distributed albums,the most recent of which are entitled Islam Hadhari and Tsunami Pembawa Mesejdari Tuhan , have reached such enormous popularity that Mawaddah has been

invited to perform on national television and in many state functions; see the pro le, Mawaddah (2004) and website at www.mawaddah.com.my . Mawaddahhas, however, encountered problems in penetrating Kelantan, whose PAS-rungovernment retains the conservative view of female entertainment performances as publicly prohibited, except to an all-female audience; see Kenapa Haram NasyidKami?, Warta Seni , 32, 1-31 May 2004.

65 Seventy NGOs were summoned to the Internal Security Ministry on 17 February2005 to discuss ways of combating the drug menace and to seek their contributionto the Ministrys Enam Jahanam street carnival. Rufaqa was represented in themeeting by Ustaz Ashaaris wife, Ustazah Khatijah Aam. For topical discussions onthe governments participatory strategy in its latest war on drugs, see for examplePolis, artis jayakan kempen dadah `6 Jahanam, Utusan Malaysia , 21 February2005; Kerajaan ajak rakyat perangi dadah, Berita Harian , 1 March 2005, andMemarangi dadah hingga ke akar umbi, Berita Harian , 6 March 2005.

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In the inaugural event along Jalan Masjid India, Kuala Lumpur, from

23 to 27 February 2005, Rufaqa was given the opportunity to presentmotivational talks on giving up drug addiction the Islamic way, andto set up stalls promoting anti-drugs paraphernalia as well as its Kelab

Remaja Hadhari Bebas Dadah (Drug-free Youth Club). As one of theenlisted carnival artists, Mawaddah was allowed to perform on the openstage show every day and night, including during the opening ceremonyof ciated by the Prime Minister. At the end of the carnival, Rufaqas andMawaddahs contributions were personally acknowledged in the form ofsouvenirs presented by Noh Omar, Deputy Internal Security Minister.66

Conclusion

This chapter has chronicled two cases of intra-Malay con ict involvingcontestations between the Malaysian state on the one hand andautonomous Islam as represented by PAS, and Darul Arqam and Rufaqaon the other. Politically conditioned by the expediency to maintain a picture of Malay unity, and thereby preserve communal harmony betweenthe different ethnic groups, the state has utilised JAKIM as its arm to

ensure no non-conformist trends emerge in the religious practice ofMalay-Muslims. JAKIM has been given the authority, based supposedlyon its scholarly research, to pronounce on whether a particular religious belief and practice of Muslims in Malaysia has strayed from orthodoxIslam or not. Its decisions have conventionally been accepted by othercomponents of the state establishment as equivalent to a religious edict.Whether the ruling elite and the security apparatus will or will not actupon a Muslim group perceived to have deviated from orthodox Islamdepend on JAKIMs rulings and recommendations.

Admittedly, the ruling elite may have ulterior motives in suppressinga movement, for example in its persecution of Darul Arqam in order toneutralise its in uence that had drawn a rising number of Malay-Muslimsaway from UMNO. But in defeating such a challenge, it of cially stillwaited for the religious bureaucracys decree. By acting in such a formalmanner, any punitive measure applied on Malay-Muslim groups caneasily be classi ed as religious, regardless of the states actual reasons.In Malaysia, therefore, any peace building effort to reconcile the stateand autonomous Islam will have to take account of the views of JAKIM,

66 Personal observations during eldwork at the Enam Jahanam street carnival inKuala Lumpur (2327 February 2005).

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and the school of thought which dominates JAKIM of cials Islamic

orientation at one particular time. The Malay mark of respect to Islamhas been practically translated as deference to state Islam as interpreted by its religious bureaucracy. This bureaucracy, in turn, may possiblyact according to their political masters interests. The understanding ofsuch interests, however, will have to come via informal or unpublicisedchannels, as evidence of formal communication will damage the integrityof both the ruling elite and the religious bureaucracy.

The two cases of intra-Malay con ict discussed in this paper representtwo poles in the opposite direction. On the one hand, efforts at peace

building between PAS and the Malaysian state have failed because neither party wishes to accommodate the views of the other. The con ict has beensigni cantly represented since the early 1980s by the divergent treatmentof Amanat Haji Hadi . PAS regards the Amanat as Islamically valid, whilethe state rejects it as a heresy. PAS is reluctant to disown Amanat Haji

Hadi , while the state regards the Amanat s circulation as blatant resistanceto of cial fatwa , and thereby, to orthodox Islam. When the state comes upwith a new approach to Islam in Islam Hadhari , PAS pours scorn on it asan innovation and effectively a new religion. One has the impression thatanything offered by the state with respect to Islam will be looked downupon by PAS, regardless of scholarly justi cations backing the statesversion of Islam. The UMNO versus PAS political rivalry has dominatedcontestations between state Islam and PASs Islam. The dominance ofthe government versus opposition mentality in such contestations hasimpeded the room for rational discussion.67

On the other hand, having experienced being at the receiving end of themight of the state juggernaut, Darul Arqam members opted to tone downtheir perceived rigidity which had previously obstructed peace building between Darul Arqam and the state. They have tried their best to retain

principles of their struggle while abandoning elements that might inviteunwelcome suspicion from the peering eyes of JAKIM. Ustaz Ashaari hasinsisted that his loyal followers continue to pursue together their Islamic

67 In its 33rd General Assembly in 1987, then PAS President, Haji Yusof Rawa, putforward a programme of Tajdid Hadhari (civilisational reformation) towardsrealising a Hadharah Islamiah (Islamic civilisation) the term PAS today proposesin lieu of Islam Hadhari ; see Yusof Rawa and Fadzil Mohd Noor (1995: 161-91).If PAS had once accepted the termTajdid Hadhari , one wonders of the credibilityof PASs arguments in atly opposing the term Islam Hadhari . Even if the statechanged the name of its new vision of Islam to Hadharah Islamiah instead of

Islam Hadhari to accommodate PAS, there is strong likelihood that PAS would stilloppose it, by virtue of it being state-manufactured.

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ambitions within the prescribed rules and regulations as outlined by the

state. 68 Hence, for instance, whereas Darul Arqam was never registered,Rufaqa is a legally registered business corporation. While Darul Arqamsvillagisation strategy lent it the hostile tag of being isolationist andembracing a siege mentality of over-suspicion of outsiders (cf. Nagata1984: 105, Hussin Mutalib 1990: viii, 87-88), Rufaqa reaches out to thewider society by operating its businesses in urban areas. Although the juxtaposed positions of its business premises give the whole area an airof a self-styled Rufaqa township, the Rufaqa community maintainsgood relations with the neighbourhood via participation in community

programmes and services. Unlike Darul Arqam, Rufaqa employeesagree to educate their children in state schools after their endeavour fora separate educational system incurred the displeasure of the authorities.They insist, however, on maintaining separate hostels where their childrenare given additional religious knowledge and business training.

In contrast with Darul Arqams reputation of being ethnocentric (cf. Nagata 1984: 112, Hussin Mutalib 1990: 89), Rufaqa interacts withnon-Muslims, to the extent of forming business linkages with them andorganising multi-ethnic social gatherings. Rufaqas new communal-friendly emphasis has been spelt out intellectually in two of UstazAshaaris lengthy poems, outlining the consistency of Islam Hadhari witha plural society, and the need for communal integration based on multi-faith love and fear of God (Abu Dzar 2005a: 156-61, 167-71). To thedelight of critics of Darul Arqams social etiquette, Rufaqa has adopteda more liberal approach with respect to dressing and female participationin public affairs. A Rufaqa township has the environment of a thrivingmodern Malay business community, rather than the closed and sombreArabic-like surrounding of a Darul Arqam settlement. To the Rufaqaleadership, the changes above are on technical matters, which are liable to

alterations, in order to safeguard fundamental tenets of the struggle.Peace between the state and Rufaqa will be maintained so long as the

state accepts in good faith that Rufaqa has disowned aspects of DarulArqams teaching and lifestyle that are abhorrent to the state, for whateverreason the state thinks. The state has to be convinced that Rufaqa is notentering mainstream life as part of a calculated strategy to hoodwink theauthorities and to penetrate the masses, simultaneously harbouring anddisseminating missions and visions similar to the ones which had madeDarul Arqam an abomination. At least for the moment, the room for

manoeuvre given by the state to Rufaqa to conduct their activities, leaves

68 See his poetic advice to his friends in Asaari Mohamad (2005: 56).

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one with the outward impression that the state and Rufaqa have struck a

new modus vivendi one based on conditional trust and understanding.Only the Rufaqa leadership probably realises the extent to which theirconformity to the state is genuine, or merely a temporary sacri ce untilsuch a time comes when it feels comfortable enough to assert its trulyautonomous vision and programme.

The newly found equilibrium in the state Rufaqa relationship wasapparently threatened when Rufaqas representatives were summonedto JAKIMs of ce on 21 March 2005. 69 As related to the author, JAKIMdemanded explanations for traces of messianism that it had allegedly

detected in the recent publications of Rufaqa (cf. Abu Dzar 2005a: 75,Asaari Mohamad and Khatijah Aam 2005: 58, 81, chapter 9). JAKIMalso expressed discomfort that despite the general concurrence of UstazAshaari and Rufaqa with Islam Hadhari , there allegedly existed veiledcriticisms of the present political order and establishment in the book

Islam Hadhari Menurut Ust. Hj Ashaari Muhammad . Among thedisputed matters were the books conception that an Islamic ruler wasGods representative and not the peoples representative, and a statementthat laws which authorise detention without trial such as the ISA had nofoundation in Islam (cf. Abu Dzar 2005a: 74, 149). Prior to the JAKIM- Rufaqa meeting, the Minister at the Prime Ministers Department,Abdullah Md. Zin, revealed that the book Islam Hadhari Menurut Ust.

Hj Ashaari Muhammad was being monitored, for fear that the publicwould confuse its debatable conceptions with the states version of

Islam Hadhari .70 But when the issue of the book was asked directly toPrime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi after the JAKIM - Rufaqameeting, rather than censuring the book and Rufaqa, he merely repliedthat JAKIM and he himself would look closely into the book, lest DarulArqam teachings were resurrected. 71

Until the time of writing, it seems that the state is as yet willing totolerate Rufaqas belief that Malaysia is destined to lead Islamicresurgence in the early fteenth Islamic century, as long as the personalityof the leader and the timing of the messianic triumph, as portrayed byRufaqa, are denied speci c characteristics and qualities. Needless to say,

69 Amazingly, Rufaqa was represented in the meeting by two women, viz. UstazahKhatijah Aam - Ustaz Ashaaris wife, and Murshidah Mustaffa Ustaz Ashaarisdaughter-in-law (personal communication during eldwork, October 2004 March2005). This is further testament to the de nitive role of women in Rufaqa asigni cant change from the male-dominated Darul Arqam.

70 JPM edar buku Islam Hadhari melalui JAKIM, Berita Minggu , 13 March 2005.71 Penjelasan konsep Islam Hadhari diteruskan, Utusan Malaysia , 23 March 2005.

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if such a general vision were embraced by the Malay-Muslim masses,

the ruling elite would bene t handsomely as it could claim to deserve themantle of true Islamic leader. As admitted to the author, Ustaz Ashaariis himself very satis ed with the unprecedented level of cooperationRufaqa has struck with the state, such that he has termed the presentstate of affairs as extremely comfortable in his more than thirty years ofinvolvement with the Islamic struggle.72

References

Books and Articles :

Abdul Hadi Awang (2005), Hadharah Islamiyyah bukan Islam Hadhari , KualaLumpur: Nufair Street.

Abdul Halim Abbas (1991), Panduan Membina Empayar Islam di Asia Tenggara ,Kuala Lumpur: Penerbitan Hikmah.

Abu Dzar, Mejar (B) (2004),Menangani Penyalahgunaan dan Penagihan DadahMenurut Islam , Rawang: Penerbitan Minda Ikhwan.

Abu Dzar, Mejar (B) (2005a), Islam Hadhari Menurut Ust. Hj AshaariMuhammad , Rawang: Penerbitan Minda Ikhwan.

_____ (2005b), Taqwa Menurut Ustaz Hj Asaari Mohamad , Rawang: PenerbitanMinda Ikhwan.

Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid (1999a), Malaysia Daulah Pemuda Bani Tamim: Rahsia Keagungan Ummah , Kuala Lumpur: Abuku Hebat.

_____ (1999b), New Trends of Islamic Resurgence in Contemporary Malaysia:Su -Revivalism, Messianism and Economic Activism, Studia Islamika:

Indonesian Journal for Islamic Studies , 6(3): 1-74. _____ (2000), Political Dimensions of Religious Con ict in Malaysia: State

Response to an Islamic Movement, Indonesia and the Malay World , 28(80):32-65.

_____ (2001), Pemerintah dan Gerakan Islam di Malaysia, Pemikir , 23:111-158.

_____ (2002), The Formative Years of The Dakwah Movement: Origins, Causesand Manifestations of Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia, IKIM Journal , 10(2):87-124.

_____ (2003a), The Maturation of Dakwah in Malaysia: Divergence andConvergence in the Methods of Islamic Movements in the 1980s, IKIM

Journal , 11(2): 59-97.

72 Ustaz Ashaari Muhammad, personal communication during eldwork (October 2004 March 2005).

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contestatiom and peace building between the state and autonomous islam

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