continuous variables quantum cryptography
TRANSCRIPT
Intro. Cont. Var. Information Theory CVQKD XP Next
Continuous VariableQuantum Cryptography
Towards High Speed Quantum Cryptography
Frédéric Grosshans
CNRS / ENS Cachan
Palacký University, Olomouc, 2011
Intro. Cont. Var. Information Theory CVQKD XP Next
1 IntroductionPrefect Secrecy and Quantum CryptographyVarious Secure Systems
2 Continuous variablesField quadraturesHomodyne Detection : Theory
3 Information TheoryXXth century CVQKDWhere are the bits ?
4 Continuous Variable Quantum Key DistributionSpyingProtocols
5 Experimental systems1st and 2nd generation demonstratorsKey-RatesIntegration with classical cryptography
6 Open problems
Intro. Cont. Var. Information Theory CVQKD XP Next
Conditions for Perfect Secrecy
Alice sends a secret message to Bob
through a channel observed by Eve.
She encrypts the message with a secret keyas long as the message.
Intro. Cont. Var. Information Theory CVQKD XP Next
Conditions for Perfect Secrecy
Alice sends a secret message to Bobthrough a channel observed by Eve.
She encrypts the message with a secret keyas long as the message.
Intro. Cont. Var. Information Theory CVQKD XP Next
Conditions for Perfect Secrecy
Alice sends a secret message to Bobthrough a channel observed by Eve.
She encrypts the message with a secret key
as long as the message.
Intro. Cont. Var. Information Theory CVQKD XP Next
Conditions for Perfect Secrecy
Alice sends a secret message to Bobthrough a channel observed by Eve.
She encrypts the message with a secret keyas long as the message.
Intro. Cont. Var. Information Theory CVQKD XP Next
Quantum Key Distribution
Alice sends quantum objects to Bob
Eve’s Measurenents⇒measurable perturbations⇒ secret key generation
Intro. Cont. Var. Information Theory CVQKD XP Next
Quantum Key Distribution
Alice sends quantum objects to Bob
Eve’s Measurenents
⇒measurable perturbations⇒ secret key generation
Intro. Cont. Var. Information Theory CVQKD XP Next
Quantum Key Distribution
Alice sends quantum objects to Bob
Eve’s Measurenents⇒measurable perturbations⇒ secret key generation
Intro. Cont. Var. Information Theory CVQKD XP Next
Unconditionnally Secure Systems . . .
Single Photon QKD
I Long Range (∼ 100 km)I Low rate (kbit/s)
maybe a few Mbit/s in the long run
Classical One-Time-PadI Very Long Range (Paris–Olomouc)I Not so small rate :
1 CD / year = 180 bits/s1 iPod (160 GB)/ year = 40 kbit/s
I But the data has to stay here
Intro. Cont. Var. Information Theory CVQKD XP Next
Unconditionnally Secure Systems . . .
Single Photon QKD
I Long Range (∼ 100 km)I Low rate (kbit/s) maybe a few Mbit/s in the long run
Classical One-Time-PadI Very Long Range (Paris–Olomouc)I Not so small rate :
1 CD / year = 180 bits/s1 iPod (160 GB)/ year = 40 kbit/s
I But the data has to stay here
Intro. Cont. Var. Information Theory CVQKD XP Next
Unconditionnally Secure Systems . . .
Single Photon QKD
I Long Range (∼ 100 km)I Low rate (kbit/s) maybe a few Mbit/s in the long run
Classical One-Time-PadI Very Long Range (Paris–Olomouc)I Not so small rate :
1 CD / year = 180 bits/s1 iPod (160 GB)/ year = 40 kbit/s
I But the data has to stay here
Intro. Cont. Var. Information Theory CVQKD XP Next
Unconditionnally Secure Systems . . .
Single Photon QKD
I Long Range (∼ 100 km)I Low rate (kbit/s) maybe a few Mbit/s in the long run
Classical One-Time-PadI Very Long Range (Paris–Olomouc)I Not so small rate :
1 CD / year = 180 bits/s
1 iPod (160 GB)/ year = 40 kbit/s
I But the data has to stay here
Intro. Cont. Var. Information Theory CVQKD XP Next
Unconditionnally Secure Systems . . .
Single Photon QKD
I Long Range (∼ 100 km)I Low rate (kbit/s) maybe a few Mbit/s in the long run
Classical One-Time-PadI Very Long Range (Paris–Olomouc)I Not so small rate :
1 CD / year = 180 bits/s1 iPod (160 GB)/ year = 40 kbit/s
I But the data has to stay here
Intro. Cont. Var. Information Theory CVQKD XP Next
Unconditionnally Secure Systems . . .
Single Photon QKD
I Long Range (∼ 100 km)I Low rate (kbit/s) maybe a few Mbit/s in the long run
Classical One-Time-PadI Very Long Range (Paris–Olomouc)I Not so small rate :
1 CD / year = 180 bits/s1 iPod (160 GB)/ year = 40 kbit/s
I But the data has to stay here
Intro. Cont. Var. Information Theory CVQKD XP Next
. . . and Continuous Variable
I Medium Range :∼ 25 km
; 80 km soon ?
I Medium Rate :∼ a few kbit/s
; Mbits/s soon ?I Much less mature
⇒ Much room for improvements
Intro. Cont. Var. Information Theory CVQKD XP Next
. . . and Continuous Variable
I Medium Range :∼ 25 km
; 80 km soon ?
I Medium Rate :∼ a few kbit/s
; Mbits/s soon ?
I Much less mature
⇒ Much room for improvements
Intro. Cont. Var. Information Theory CVQKD XP Next
. . . and Continuous Variable
I Medium Range :∼ 25 km ; 80 km soon ?I Medium Rate :∼ a few kbit/s ; Mbits/s soon ?I Much less mature⇒ Much room for improvements
Intro. Cont. Var. Information Theory CVQKD XP Next
1 IntroductionPrefect Secrecy and Quantum CryptographyVarious Secure Systems
2 Continuous variablesField quadraturesHomodyne Detection : Theory
3 Information TheoryXXth century CVQKDWhere are the bits ?
4 Continuous Variable Quantum Key DistributionSpyingProtocols
5 Experimental systems1st and 2nd generation demonstratorsKey-RatesIntegration with classical cryptography
6 Open problems
Intro. Cont. Var. Information Theory CVQKD XP Next
Field quadratures
Classical fieldElectromagnetic fielddescribed by QA and PAE(t) = QA cosωt + PA sinωt
Quantum descriptionQ and P do not commute:
[Q,P] ∝ i~.Add a
“quantum noise”:Q = QA + BQ et P = PA + BP
Heisenberg =⇒ ∆BQ∆BP ≥ 1
Intro. Cont. Var. Information Theory CVQKD XP Next
Field quadratures
Classical fieldElectromagnetic fielddescribed by QA and PAE(t) = QA cosωt + PA sinωt
Quantum descriptionQ and P do not commute:
[Q,P] ∝ i~.Add a
“quantum noise”:Q = QA + BQ et P = PA + BP
Heisenberg =⇒ ∆BQ∆BP ≥ 1
Intro. Cont. Var. Information Theory CVQKD XP Next
Homodyne Detection : Theory
Photocurrents:
i± ∝ (Eosc.(t) ± Esignal(t))2
∝ Eosc.(t)2± 2Eosc.(t)Esignal(t)
after substraction:
δi ∝ Eosc.(t)Esignal(t)
∝ Eosc.(Qsignal cosϕ + Psignal sinϕ)
Intro. Cont. Var. Information Theory CVQKD XP Next
1 IntroductionPrefect Secrecy and Quantum CryptographyVarious Secure Systems
2 Continuous variablesField quadraturesHomodyne Detection : Theory
3 Information TheoryXXth century CVQKDWhere are the bits ?
4 Continuous Variable Quantum Key DistributionSpyingProtocols
5 Experimental systems1st and 2nd generation demonstratorsKey-RatesIntegration with classical cryptography
6 Open problems
Intro. Cont. Var. Information Theory CVQKD XP Next
XXth century CVQKD
At the end of XXth century it was obvious that ageneralization of QKD to continuous variables could beinteresting.Problem : discrete bits , continuous variable
Intro. Cont. Var. Information Theory CVQKD XP Next
XXth century CVQKD
At the end of XXth century it was obvious that ageneralization of QKD to continuous variables could beinteresting.Problem : discrete bits , continuous variable
Adapting BB84?Mark Hillery, “Quantum Cryptography withSqueezed States”,arXiv:quant-ph/9909006/PRA 61 022309
Intro. Cont. Var. Information Theory CVQKD XP Next
XXth century CVQKD
At the end of XXth century it was obvious that ageneralization of QKD to continuous variables could beinteresting.Problem : discrete bits , continuous variable
Natural modulation + information theory!Nicolas J. Cerf, Marc Lévy, Gilles VanAssche : “Quantum distribution of Gaussiankeys using squeezed states”,arXiv:quant-ph/0008058/PRL 63 052311
Intro. Cont. Var. Information Theory CVQKD XP Next
Where are the bits ?
Quite frequent discussion with discrete quantumcryptographers :
DQC : How do you encode a 0 or a 1 in CVQKD?Me : I don’t care, C. E. Shannon tells me
“∀ε > 0,∃ code of rate I − ε.”
Computation of the ideal code performance is easy !
Intro. Cont. Var. Information Theory CVQKD XP Next
Where are the bits ?
Quite frequent discussion with discrete quantumcryptographers :
DQC : How do you encode a 0 or a 1 in CVQKD?Me : Gilles/Jérôme/Anthony/Sébastien developed
a really efficient code, using slicedreconciliation/LDPC matrices/R8 rotations andoctonions. Only he knows how it works.
Computation of the ideal code performance is easy !
Intro. Cont. Var. Information Theory CVQKD XP Next
Where are the bits ?
Quite frequent discussion with discrete quantumcryptographers :
DQC : How do you encode a 0 or a 1 in CVQKD?Me : Gilles/Jérôme/Anthony/Sébastien developed
a really efficient code, using slicedreconciliation/LDPC matrices/R8 rotations andoctonions. Only he knows how it works.
Computation of the ideal code performance is easy !
Intro. Cont. Var. Information Theory CVQKD XP Next
They’re hidden
Availaible informationin a continuous signal
with noise ?
Differential entropy
H(X) = −∑P(x) dx logP(x) dx
'
∫dxP(x) logP(x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
H(X)
− log dx︸︷︷︸constante
Intro. Cont. Var. Information Theory CVQKD XP Next
They’re hidden
Availaible informationin a continuous signal
with noise ?
Differential entropy
H(X) = −∑P(x) dx logP(x) dx
'
∫dxP(x) logP(x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
H(X)
− log dx︸︷︷︸constante
Intro. Cont. Var. Information Theory CVQKD XP Next
They’re hidden
Availaible informationin a continuous signalwith noise ?
Differential entropy
H(X) = −∑P(x) dx logP(x) dx
'
∫dxP(x) logP(x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
H(X)
− log dx︸︷︷︸constante
H(X) = log ∆X + constante
Intro. Cont. Var. Information Theory CVQKD XP Next
They’re hidden
Availaible informationin a continuous signalwith noise ?
Differential entropy
H(X) = −∑P(x) dx logP(x) dx
'
∫dxP(x) logP(x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
H(X)
− log dx︸︷︷︸constante
Mutual information
I(X : Y) = H(Y) −H(Y|X)= H(Y) −H(Y|X)
= 12 log
∆Y2
∆Y2|X
Intro. Cont. Var. Information Theory CVQKD XP Next
1 IntroductionPrefect Secrecy and Quantum CryptographyVarious Secure Systems
2 Continuous variablesField quadraturesHomodyne Detection : Theory
3 Information TheoryXXth century CVQKDWhere are the bits ?
4 Continuous Variable Quantum Key DistributionSpyingProtocols
5 Experimental systems1st and 2nd generation demonstratorsKey-RatesIntegration with classical cryptography
6 Open problems
Intro. Cont. Var. Information Theory CVQKD XP Next
The spy’s power
Heisenberg :∆BEve∆BBob ≥ 1
⇒ ∆BBob gives I IEve
I IBob
Intro. Cont. Var. Information Theory CVQKD XP Next
The spy’s power
Heisenberg :∆BEve∆BBob ≥ 1
⇒ ∆BBob gives I IEve
I IBob
Intro. Cont. Var. Information Theory CVQKD XP Next
Quantum Key Distribution Protocols
Channel Evauation (noise measure)
Alice&Bob evaluate IEve
Reconciliation (error correction)
Alice&Bob share IBob identical bits.Ève knows IEve.
Privacy AmplificationAlice&Bob share IBob − IEve identical bits.
Ève knows ∼ 0.
Intro. Cont. Var. Information Theory CVQKD XP Next
Quantum Key Distribution Protocols
Channel Evauation (noise measure)
Alice&Bob evaluate IEve
Reconciliation (error correction)
Alice&Bob share IBob identical bits.Ève knows IEve.
Privacy AmplificationAlice&Bob share IBob − IEve identical bits.
Ève knows ∼ 0.
Intro. Cont. Var. Information Theory CVQKD XP Next
Quantum Key Distribution Protocols
Channel Evauation (noise measure)
Alice&Bob evaluate IEve
Reconciliation (error correction)
Alice&Bob share IBob identical bits.Ève knows IEve.
Privacy AmplificationAlice&Bob share IBob − IEve identical bits.
Ève knows ∼ 0.
Intro. Cont. Var. Information Theory CVQKD XP Next
Theoretical Progresses in the last 10 years
We went from a protocolI using squeezed states,I insecure beyond 50% losses (15 km),I proved secure against Gaussian individual attack
to a protocol
I using coherent statesI with no fundamental range limitI proved secure against collective attacksI likely secure against coherent attacksI and experimentally working
Intro. Cont. Var. Information Theory CVQKD XP Next
Theoretical Progresses in the last 10 years
We went from a protocolI using squeezed states,I insecure beyond 50% losses (15 km),I proved secure against Gaussian individual attack
to a protocolI using coherent states
I with no fundamental range limitI proved secure against collective attacksI likely secure against coherent attacksI and experimentally working
Intro. Cont. Var. Information Theory CVQKD XP Next
Theoretical Progresses in the last 10 years
We went from a protocolI using squeezed states,I insecure beyond 50% losses (15 km),I proved secure against Gaussian individual attack
to a protocolI using coherent statesI with no fundamental range limitI proved secure against collective attacks
I likely secure against coherent attacksI and experimentally working
Intro. Cont. Var. Information Theory CVQKD XP Next
Theoretical Progresses in the last 10 years
We went from a protocolI using squeezed states,I insecure beyond 50% losses (15 km),I proved secure against Gaussian individual attack
to a protocolI using coherent statesI with no fundamental range limitI proved secure against collective attacksI likely secure against coherent attacks
I and experimentally working
Intro. Cont. Var. Information Theory CVQKD XP Next
Theoretical Progresses in the last 10 years
We went from a protocolI using squeezed states,I insecure beyond 50% losses (15 km),I proved secure against Gaussian individual attack
to a protocolI using coherent statesI with no fundamental range limitI proved secure against collective attacksI likely secure against coherent attacksI and experimentally working
Intro. Cont. Var. Information Theory CVQKD XP Next
1 IntroductionPrefect Secrecy and Quantum CryptographyVarious Secure Systems
2 Continuous variablesField quadraturesHomodyne Detection : Theory
3 Information TheoryXXth century CVQKDWhere are the bits ?
4 Continuous Variable Quantum Key DistributionSpyingProtocols
5 Experimental systems1st and 2nd generation demonstratorsKey-RatesIntegration with classical cryptography
6 Open problems
Intro. Cont. Var. Information Theory CVQKD XP Next
1st generation demonstratorF. Grosshans et. al., Nature (2003) & Brevet US
m
Key rate I 75 kbit/s 3.1 dB (51%) lossesI 1.7 Mbit/s without losses
Intro. Cont. Var. Information Theory CVQKD XP Next
Integrated system
Intro. Cont. Var. Information Theory CVQKD XP Next
Integrated system
Intro. Cont. Var. Information Theory CVQKD XP Next
Integrated system
Intro. Cont. Var. Information Theory CVQKD XP Next
Key-Rates
Intro. Cont. Var. Information Theory CVQKD XP Next
Key-Rates
Losses onlyExcess noise95% efficient code
90% efficient codeSlow code
100 kb/s
10 kb/s
1 kb/s 0 km
10 km
20 km
30 km
40 km
50 km
SECOQC Performance(2008)
Intro. Cont. Var. Information Theory CVQKD XP Next
Key-Rates
Intro. Cont. Var. Information Theory CVQKD XP Next
Key-Rates
Losses onlyExcess noise95% efficient code
90% efficient codeSlow code
100 kb/s
10 kb/s
1 kb/s 0 km
10 km
20 km
30 km
40 km
50 km
SECOQC Performance(2008)
use GPUsIncr
ease
s m
odul
atio
n ra
te :
×10
easy
, ×10
0 do
able
use modern codes :ocotonion based protocol+multi-edge LDPC codes
+ repetition codes
Intro. Cont. Var. Information Theory CVQKD XP Next
Integration with classical cryptography
Intro. Cont. Var. Information Theory CVQKD XP Next
Integration with classical cryptography
Intro. Cont. Var. Information Theory CVQKD XP Next
1 IntroductionPrefect Secrecy and Quantum CryptographyVarious Secure Systems
2 Continuous variablesField quadraturesHomodyne Detection : Theory
3 Information TheoryXXth century CVQKDWhere are the bits ?
4 Continuous Variable Quantum Key DistributionSpyingProtocols
5 Experimental systems1st and 2nd generation demonstratorsKey-RatesIntegration with classical cryptography
6 Open problems
Intro. Cont. Var. Information Theory CVQKD XP Next
Open Problems
I Finite size effectsI Link with post-selection based protocols (.de, .au)I Side-channels and quantum hackingI Other cryptographic applications