contributions of phenomenology to psychotherapeutic theory and practice

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 38:67-86 (1978)

CONTRIBUTIONS OF PHENOMENOLOGY TO PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC THEORY AND PRACTICE

Julius E. Heuscher

The scope of this paper is the clarification of basic existential or phenomenologic concepts that are relevant to psychotherapy. At first these concepts may appear obscure and abstract. There are several reasons for this. Our everyday world view is predominantly shaped by the implication or bias of the natural sciences to the effect that only what is measurable is to be considered real. This implication, when applied to psychology, leads to an extreme limitation of admissible data. Phenomenology, as developed by the mathematician-philosopher Edmund Husserl, tries to focus upon the presuppositions or prejudices that underlie our conventional world view (Husserl's "natural attitude"), to give proper credit to their usefulness in various fields of human endeavor, and to open up vistas that are obscured by them. 1° Yet, since language itself is molded by a civilization's basic world views, this opening up of vistas obscured by our prejudices often fails to find verbal formulations that are both accurate and understandable. Different authors are likely to use different expressions for essentially identical views, or different translators of a foreign author may choose different terms to convey some of his concepts. All this can create considerable confusion. Furthermore, any genuine questioning of culturally accepted presuppositions or prejudices is always more than a mere intellectual feat, since it may change the person's entire orientation in the world, his feelings, perceptions, thoughts, and actions. Such changes are associated with an initial experience that one's identity is weakening or threatened, and thus there is commonly a strong reluctance to accept the relativity of one's presuppositions.

To present the philosophical justification of the existential or phenomenologic concepts we.are taking under consideration would exceed the scope of this paper. However, these concepts may prove of essential value in providing the backdrop against which divergent, and often seemingly contradictory, forms of psychotherapy can be gauged. Because most psychotherapeutic systems, schools, techniques, and fads are rooted in a poorly defined, narrow world view, we find that the evaluations of their benefits are quite myopic and largely useless.

Julius E. Heuscher, M.D., is Associate Clinical Professor, Stanford University, Palo Alto, California.

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68 JULIUS E. HFUSCHER

What if psychoanalysis elucidates all kinds of "unconscious" problems, yet leaves the patient devoid of deeply felt values? What if behavior modification manages to dispell phobias, improve performance, and avoid antisocial traits, if it contributes simultaneously to a general philosophy that we are nothing but poorly or well-programmed computers? What if growth-enhancing, "experiential," or "existential" approaches lead a person to wallow in his ever-expanding greatness and uniqueness at the expense of his family, friends, and society?

Most psychotherapeutic approaches are potentially valuable, but I believe that their value, their specific effectiveness, can be enhanced and made understandable only against a broad enough comprehension of man's "being-in-the-world."

In the attempt to achieve the broadest possible view of man's "being-in- the-world," phenomenologists and existential philosophers have emphasized a n umber of concepts that can be of great value for psychotherapists. In fact, some of these concepts have already filtered down clandestinely into various current, "innovative" psychotherapies or growth movements. Yet, they lose their effectiveness when, taken out of their widest philosophic context, they become a one-sided, unintegrated, and all too slogan-like application of a few ideas or procedures. Expressions such as "encounter," "being in touch with the body," ,'owning one's feelings," "sensory awareness," "doing one's own thing," "living in the now," "being open to one's potential," "being hung-up," "being up-tight," "being in a good space," and many other s can be linked to central philosophic insights that would establish both their relevance and their limits. They fail to reveal their exact importance unless their significance as basic dimensions of human existence is grasped. The main philosophical concepts we must try to understand in this regard are the following: (1) transcendental realm, (2) empirical realm, (3) transcendental ego, (4) empirical ego, (5) transcendental categories, (6) constitution (or structuring), (7) deconstitution (or unstructuring, or divestiture), (8) intersubjective relationships, (9) interobjective relationships, (10) world- design ( = empirical ego plus empirical world)

A better understanding of these and related terms will, I trust, make evident and enhance the existential aspects that are inherent in any effective psychotherapy. Thus I also believe that the expression "existential psychotherapy" should never refer to a specific method or school. At best it would indicate the therapist's desire to be cognizant of the existential as well as of the specific technical aspects of his relationship with a patient.

During a number of seminars for psychology students and for psychiatric residents, the main emphasis has been on the clarification of the above philosophic concepts and of their role in psychopathology and psychotherapy. An explanatory diagram proved to be helpful to this effect.

PHENOMENOLOGY AND PSYCHOTHERAPY 69

The comments in this paper evolved largely from the discussions concerning its various features.

Figure 1 attempts to structure and clarify data containing nonspatial aspects. Its concrete, spatial design can then be related to various meaningful concepts. The diagram presented here aims to visualize the relationships between: transcendental realm and transcendental ego, transcendental ego and world-design ( = empirical ego plus empirical world), empirical realm and empirical ego, world-design and empirical ego, individual transcendental egos, individual empirical egos.

Axi.' Inte Rel,

Figure 1 Empirical Ego

As 1i all s~

70 JULIUS E. HEUSCHER

These relationships will also throw light on how a person's world-design originates and how it evolves during an ongoing alternation of structuring and unstructuring (constitution and deconstitution).

The sphere, as it appears in the diagram, is supposed to portray the transcendence of all space. One cou Id liken it to the seemingly spherical l im its of the universe that surrounds us. We adopt for it the term "transcendental realm." (Kierkegaard's conception of"a power that posited the self," Teilhard de Chardin's "Point Omega," or--more broadly--most theologians' concept of "God," refer to this all-encompassing region.)

This transcendental realm--in religious terms we might name it "God's all-embracing consciousness of the u niverse"--not on ly envelops and constitutes space (or the spatial aspects of our empirical world), it also forms the backdrop for all the other possible existential dimensions such as "causality," "materiality," "temporality," and others. Yet, because of the unavoidable spatial nature of the diagram, our comments will tend to be biased toward the relationship between the transcendental realm and the measurable aspects of the objective or empirical world.

A human being's consciousness cannot grasp all of creation. Yet the human being is able to encompass with his mind whatever aspects of creation become accessible to him. If, then, whatever contents lay within the sphere are defined as the totality of creation (empirical realm), then each circle drawn around the sphere can be viewed as the encompassing mind of one human being, capable of recognizing, experiencing, and responding to his own particular perspectives of the world. There are infinite possible circles or circumferences around the sphere, each one representing what we now term the "transcendental horizon," or the transcendental ego of a human being. Thus the diagram's circles portray what Ortega y Gasser 17 so magnificently described as the necessary one-sidedness, but not arbitrariness, of man's views, while the sphere would represent God's view which combines the limited views of all the human beings.

It is on account of this enveloping, or embracing, all that is spatial, as well as all aspects of any other existential category, that the sphere and circle present themselves as appropriate metaphors. Indeed symbols such as the yin and yang, the golden ball in the Grimms' Frog Prince fairy tale, the round man- dalas, also make use of spheric and circular images to convey analogous ideas.

Since we face here the transcendence of all spatiality, the circles, and especially the sphere, can be viewed as portraying a nonspatial realm. This transcendence of space has been viewed as the transition to a temporal realm long before modern physics provided new perspectives for the relationship between space the time. The sphere and circle indicate, furthermore, a


"l imit" beyond which any existent or existence is inconceivable or meaningless.

It should be noted, however, that the above distinction of a transcendental realm and transcendental ego is not universally accepted. Much of Oriental thought has equated the two. Thus the goal of transcending one's illusions of a separate identity as well as of a variegated world would be reached when everything merges again in Vishnu, of whom the world manifesting itself as his feminine counterpart, Maia, is but a colorful reflection. The goal is reached when every last remnant of individual consciousness is recognized as illusion and thus dissolves in Nirvana (transcendental realm). In contrast, in Western civilization the greatest philosophers, religions, and poets have emphasized the distinction between God and man created in God's image (Genesis), between God as vital center and the Heavenly Rose of Saints arranged around Him (Dante), between God and the godliness of the "new ego" (Goethe), between the power that posits the self and the self (Kier- kegaard), between Christ-Omega and the individual (Teilhard de Chardin), or between God and self (Jung11). The discussion of the diagram will thus reveal theoretical and practical aspects of this distinction. Rather than seeing human existence as an ephemeral illusion that must long for its extinction, we are led by this distinction to view each individual as progressing between a transcendental and an empirical pole.

The pole of the transcendental ego stands over against an empirical world and empirical ego, that is over against the world-design which it fashioned, a Yet it would be erroneous to conclude that the transcendental ego is the true and only self, at the exclusion of the pole of the empirical world and ego. It is the true and only self only because of this ongoing activity of creating, sustaining, and modifying the individual's world-design. Applying the philosophers' thoughts to clinical psychiatry, Binswanger explains how each one of these individual world-designs is structured or constituted by qualitatively specific features (which he calls "transcendental categories") relating to the experience of time, space, matter, causation, etc. 16

Figure 1 shows the spatial characteristics of a specific world-design constituted by one particular transcendental ego (T.E. II) and schematized as two- dimensional. Yet, since our concrete spatial world is three-dimensional, it follows that the actual circumstances would call for a design that has at least one dimension in addition to those that could be portrayed in a diagram. With some intuitive skill one can vaguely surmise how this diagram would look, were it possible to draw it as a four-dimensional schema. In such a schematic design each individual transcendental ego would no longer be represented by a circumference or circle, but by a sphere that encompasses all the empirical worlds and empirical egos within its creative potential. The transcendental


realm would then be four-dimensional and contain an unlimited number of possible spheres in the same manner as the sphere of our diagram has an unlimited number of possible circumferences.

In spite of such flagrant inadequacies, the diagram enables usto underscore several highly interesting and significant existential concerns:

1. World-Design: The above-mentioned dynamic relationship between each transcendental ego ("self," "new ego," "Dasein, ''~ or "l-Process ''3) and the corresponding empirical ego with its empirical wor ld (world-design) explains the changeable characteristics of ourselves and our world. They encompass variable cultural, sociological, and family patterns, all aspects of normal human change or growth, as well as the full range of what is commonly considered psychopathological. Each person manifests different de- grees and qualities of versatility. Normal changes and growth can be viewed as originating in the individuals' ability to step back, again and again, from the empirical pole of his existence toward his transcendental ego, thus becoming aware of alternate ways of structuring their world-design. Alternate world- designs can be sought, recognized, and affirmed by deliberately stepping back from pne's situation. More frequently they announce themselves spon- taneously in dreams, daydreams, artistic expressions, and impulsive actions, or--more surreptitiously--in one's psychologic and psychosomatic symptoms: always challenging us to choose, to make new commitments.

An example of dramatic, spontaneous manifestations of alternate or op- tional world-designs is the patient with "multiple personalities." Here the sudden, involuntary stepping back toward the transcendental pole leads to the creation of a succession of sharply differing world-designs. These are as far apart from each other as are, for example, a person's potential world-designs revealed in his dreams from his world-design of everyday life (see below).

2. Intersubjective Relationship: Under ordinary circumstances we are in- clined to define our identity in terms of the empirical ego and empirical world ( = world-design). Yet the more exclusive this definition of our identity becomes, the more we experience ourselves imprisoned in a deterministic or arbitrary world, and the more we view our relationship to other human beings as one between interacting or contending objects. We continue, however, to sense that there must be a potential for freedom and that human relationships can be more than complex, mechanical, and biological interactions between two organisms. What Buber 2 describes as the "l-Thou" relationship that transcends the "l-It" or "It-It" relationships, or what we shall call intersubjective relationships in contrast with interobjective relationships, is well- illustrated in the diagram: It shows clearly that any two human beings have the potential for developing the awareness of their intersubjective relationship, of the relationship between their transcendental egos. Indeed any two circumferences of the sphere are bound to intersect in a line (or diameter)


between two points. We designate this line as "axis of intersubjective relationship." If the diagram could be drawn on a four-dimensional scale, we would have, in place of this line, a two-dimensional "field of intersubjective relationship."

3. Transcendental Realm and Intersubjective Relationships: Whereas any one of the circumferences clearly defines a circular plane, we find that any two circumferences in Figure 1 establish, by extrapolation, the entire sphere. More simply, one could state that once we have two equal circles intersecting in one of their diameters, the logical geometrical figure to encompass both is the sphere. The diagram thus suggests that the genuine intersubjective relationship of two-human beings introduces the awareness of a new realm that has an added dimension. While we used the term "transcendental realm" to designate it, monotheistic theology would view it as '!God." The awareness of this transcendence in intersubjective relationships is expressed variously with "love," "agape," "peak experience," or with the beautiful religious formula- tion to the effect that God--or Christ--is present whenever two persons meet in a genuine encounter. Whereas interobjective relationships are experienced as occurring in the individual's empirical world that is part of the empirical realm, intersubjective relationships disclose a transcendental world that belongs to the transcendental realm.

We mentioned that the number of possible transcendental egos is theoreti- cally unlimited, and that this is illustrated by the infinite number of possible circumferences upon the sphere in Figure 1 representing the transcendental realm. Those familiar with Teilhard de Chardin's views may specu late to what extent this corresponds to his magnificent concept of the Noosphere~l: As human beings become more aware of the self or transcendental ego, they approach what he describes as the loving union of the selves and omega at a time when this noosphere has fully developed. Kierkegaard 13 expresses a somewhat analogous insight by stating that, "the Self that is related to its own Self and is wil l ing to be this Self, is transparently grounded in the power that posited it" (or, to use our term, in the transcendental realm which, as a profoundly religious individual, he identifies with God).

Few human beings are always and fully aware that their innermost self is sustained or "posited" in the transcendental realm; yet many are more or less convinced that their faith in a higher power supports them. Even where such experiences or convictions lack, most people can experience meaningful bonds with others: inalienable intersubjective relationships that affirm and guarantee their ongoing identity during periods of radical changes in their surroundings or within themselves. Thus the experience of, and confidence in, our ongoing identity rests on two supports. One is our rather fragile empirical ego with its empirical world--namely our world-design; the other is the love joining us with others, manifested in the intersubjective aspects o f


our relationships. This love that desires above all the "other's" satisfaction and security is neither conditional nor controlling: ideally it is absolute, unconditional, positive regard 18. Thus the experience of our ongoing identity that is generated and maintained by this love enables us to step back safely and without undue terror from our world-design that we habitually identify with, and to modify (or reconstitute) it over and over again. This ongoing deconstitution and reconstitution not only makes it possible to deal effectively with a changing world, but also leads to genuine personal growth. On the other hand, a person lacking entirely the experience of being lovingly related to other human beings or to God finds himself immutably stuck in his own empirical world.

Someone might object that the above comments concerning the potential intersubjective relationships hold true only if all the circles representing various transcendental egos correspond to the (maximal) circumference of the diagram's sphere. Indeed, not all circles would intersect if their radii differed. Note, however, the transcendental ego's essential characteristic of beingall-encompassing! Indeed, the lowliest individual is as totally human as the exalted; indeed the numinous world of primitive civilizations is as enor- mous as ours, though it manifests itself in different images and words. To be a human being is not so much a more-or-less than an either-or proposition; and thus each person is, in the deepest sense, equal to every other person.

Goethe referred to the transcendental ego with his term "new ego," and even more specifically with the term "entelechy" (having fullness or com- pleteness). He conceived of Entelechies having different perfection or strength. This need not conflict with the above remarks concerning the essential characteristic of transcendental egos.

4. Empirical Realm: Whereas in the (four-dimensional) transcendental realm, space is transcended and thus superabundant, we find that the empirical ego with its empirical world (namely the individual's world-design) is cast within the three-dimensional empirical realm wherein each "thing" or "being" occupies a space or territory that tends to impinge upon the space or territory of others. Thus a rigidly constituted empirical ego finds itself vulner- able in its dealings with the surrounding world and other human beings. Each individual's world-design is bound to compete for some common space. Therefore each wil l ing or forced concession is likely to be experienced as a sacrifice, as a loss, or as a threat to one's own identity. Relationships on the empirical level are thus more or less manipulative and, often, exploitative. For the person who identifies exclusively with his world-design, existence tends to become confining or dreadful:

Joseph K in Kafka's The TriaP 2 represents such a person caught in an empirical world which turns narrow and deadly, since he is forever incapable, or unwilling, of stepping back toward the transcendental pole of his


being. Only such detachment would enable him to reconstitute a new, livable, empirical world. For this he would need a genuine, loving-- intersubjective--relatedness to "another," safeguarding his identity while he relinquishes empirical structures that have become stifling; but he has none. About to die in a large pit, Joseph K retains only a vague inkling of the freeing potential of a loving relationship, when he sees, in the distance of the night, a person outlined in a small, lighted window. 7

To the contrary, there is no, nor can there be, any such threat of being smothered in the transcendental realm. Here relationships do not impinge upon each other and can thus become mutually enhancing.

A simple, common example of the difficulties experienced in exclusively interobjective relations is given by couples who seemingly love each other but fail to reach satisfactory agreements in almost everything. He may want to go to the movies and she wants to watch television; he wants to practice the guitar when she wishes to invite her parents, etc. They may eventually compromise, but usually with the feeling of having had to give up something, of being constrained by their relationship. It appears difficult, in these situations, to step back, to honestly rate the pros and cons of one's own prefer- ences, and to add them to those of the beloved partner. However, the more one becomes capable of this, the more one feels greatly enriched by the satisfaction or pleasure of the other: this enrichment now exceeds for each partner the rating of satisfaction or pleasure of their original choice, regardless whose original preference prevailed. Joyousness replaces anxious or angry feelings of constraint.

Elaborating on the above, we may now compare the oedipal and the transcendental triangle portrayed in the diagram. The oedipal triangle belongs to the empirical realm, and thus the relationships tend to be experienced as exclusive. The one-to-one relationships in it can be positive and are then seen as supplying needs. Yet any "third" person is viewed suspiciously as a potential threat to the relationship and must, if possible, be eliminated. The ability, then, to sense that two "others" (for example mother and father) can have a meaningful relationship that does not threaten one's relationship with either one of them always reflects some degree of freedom to step back from the empirical toward the transcendental realm, where there can be no competition for shared space.

In the empirical realm, where relationships focus on personal needs, love easily becomesa form of mutual exploitation, easily threatened by any third party and devoid of any genuine commitment: This is essentially Sartre's 19 position, logically reached as a result of his rejection of the notions of transcendental ego and transcendental realm inherent in Husserl's, 1°,15 Heidegger's, 6 Tillich's, 22 and Buber's, 2 philosophy. Following Descartes' thought, he arrives at a radical separation between the measurable world (res

76 JULIUS E, HEUSCHER

extensa) and human subjectivity (res cogitans). Yet, as an avowed atheist, he no longer is sustained, like Descartes, by the conviction that God must have created this measurable world in harmony with our subjective experience. Thus the world becomes a meaningless nothingness, arbitrarily shaped by the utterly free individual. In this creative effort, the human being realizes that he transcends himself ever again. But he is never able to grasp the "other's" transcendence and thus reduces him ever again to an object, not unlike Medusa's look that turns the beholder to stone. "Man is a useless passion !,,19

Though his ideas are partly based on Husserl and Heidegger, Sartre ignores their deep insights into the relationship between world and self. Yet Sartre deserves full cred it for having val iantly--may be too val iantly--shattered the mechanistic, unfree model of man that resulted from the reverse interpretation of Descartes' dichotomy, interpretation which would emphasize the exclusive reality of the measurable world, of the res extensa, and would, like Skinner 2° view the res cogitans as a meaningless epiphenomenon.

5. Commitment: The "enveloping" quality of the transcendental realm elucidates, and is elucidated by, a vital feature of human existence--that is by the phenomenon of commitment. Clearly an essential aspect of the latter is its temporal dimension which raises it beyond the scope of the exclusively spatial, empirical realm; and the additional connotations of commitment, namely freedom, choice, and awareness of the needs of "others," further point to the transcendental realm. It is the transspatial--or temporal--quality of this realm that sustains the self and provides the basis for any genuine human commitment. This accords with Heidegger's profound insights into the temporal nature of the self (or dasein): note that temporality, here, refers primarily to all the nonmeasurable, qualitative features of time.

These views concerning commitment are substantiated by observations in developmental psychology stressing that in the infant, temporal precedes spatial awareness. 4 Indeed, traumatic experiences in early childhood may severely impair a person's temporal consciousness and consequently his "sense of self" (somewhat analogous to Erickson's "basic trust"). Restricted in his experience to his empirical ego, such an individual cannot step back from the empirical world. Arbitrarily moved about by the forces of this world, he is incapable of any true commitment. His relationships with another human being are technical, exploitative and, at best, contractual rather than committed.

True commitment in an intersubjective relationship has the connotation of ongoingness: "for better or for worse." The more genuine the commitment, the more freely the individuals involved can shift their experience of identity from the empirical realm to the transcendental realm. Here additional persons are no longer a potential threat to established human bonds. Anyone entering a relationship with a person I love and to whom I truly committed myself will


enhance rather than diminish the strength and depth of my relationship to that person: his identity is sustained by, and sustains, the person whom I love, who in turn sustains me and is sustained by me. This, indeed, is the goal toward which any truly human community strives. Thus mutual respect, love, and affirmation must become the main goal of the most common human community, the family. This is exactly what the successful resolution of the so-called "oedipal situation" entails: the transcendence of empirical, controlling, competitive relationships to the point where, for example, the son accepts the relationship of his parents as enriching, and no longer sees it as a threat to his basically exploitative relationship to mother. Yet when parents have barely begun to resolve their own oedipal, competitive strivings, they cannot assist their child in his struggle with the oedipus complex.

Any genuine commitment provides the individual with greater inner security that comes from the deepened experience of his transcendental ego. Nothing can now be taken from him, and he becomes capable of enjoying and accepting fully the relationship between people he loves. He knows that their relationship can in no way break the continuity of his commitments, but will rather enhance them, since love has become a form of giving that is simultaneously a form of receiving. Eros has become Agape. Loneliness is no longer an ever-present threat, because in the transcendental realm all selves are related without impinging upon one another. Even when "the other" abandons us in the empirical realm, we may retain the experience of our committedness to him.

This in no way implies that the ultimate human goal must be the abandon- ment of all empirical human relationships. On the contrary, they are a polar counterpart of the intersubjective relationships, Yet the increasing development of the "sense of self" and of our sense of potential relatedness to all human beings nourishes our trust, even when we are alone or abandoned, that new empirical relationships will enrich our lives.

6. Individual Uniqueness: What is the essence of an individual's uniqueness? It is quite customary to see it as residing in some specific features or qualities. Yet, when we focus upon the transcendental egos (or selves) we discover that this uniqueness consists primarily in their exclusive self-identity and only secondarily in the specific differences of the world-designs constituted by them. This unique quality of the self of being, unexchangeably, this very self is the very core of authenticity. Kierkegaard saw this clearly when he described two forms of "despair" (or inauthenticity) as, "not wanting to be the self one is," and "wanting to be another."

7. Polarity of Identity: Yet, if we begin to grasp that our identity resides primarily and quite simply in the exclusive identity of our transcendental ego, this must not induce, or seduce, us to seek refuge, and remain, in the blissful, strife-free atmosphere of the transcendental realm. Indeed, a basic charac-


teristic of the transcendental ego is the constituting of an empirical ego and empirical world, just as the transcendental realm is creating an empirical realm.

Many reflections of this problem are found in Western and Eastern mythologies. In India we find numerous grandiose narrations of the creation of worlds that, again and again, in enormously long cycles of time, dissolve in utter nothingness from which ever new worlds emerge in endless succession. Small epochal cycles are contained in larger ones that are measured in terms of trillions of years: ever seeking Nirvana, ever pushing forth new, albeit illusory worlds.

Thus the diagram underscores the profound significance of the relationship between the empirical and the transcendental ego. The empirical ego with its empirical world ( = world-design) is constituted in the empirical realm which offers the opportunity for effective action. It stands over against the transcendental realm which allows serene self-absorption.

In the Romance of the Godess 24 Shiva alternates between intense involvement in the world of Maia and quiet meditation on a peak of the Himalayas . . . . In another Indian legend, Indra ambitiously strives to build an all too grandiose palace. But the higher gods send him a powerful omen of the utterly illusory character of all worldly things and achievements. Shamed and contrite, Indra now decides to relinquish all the transitory riches. His wife, however, full of life and joy, manages to find a wise man who manages to convince Indra that his riches may be enjoyed with moderation, even if their illusory nature is evident 23.

We read in Genesis I that of all the creatures only man is created in the image of God. It follows that, insofar as the prime and greatest attribute of God is that of being the Creator, man's essence must also consist in his creative abilities. Contrary to all animals whose world is biologically fixed and rigidly ordered, man is able to shape his world in many different ways. Animals are caught completely in the empirical realm, with little flexibility of instinctuality and territoriality. The human being, in contrast, shares in the transcendental realm through his transcendental ego or self. Thus he has the potential of moving away from the empirical pole of his existence, backtracking along the lines of the constitutive forces towards the transcendental pole from where--modest ly--he may share in God's work of creating (or constituting) himself and his world. The more flexible he becomes in this "commuting" between the empirical and transcendental realms, the more he experiences his freedom and responsibility in reconstituting himself and his world by availing himself of ever new potentials.

If his appreciation of this flexibility wanes, if he shuns the empirical world, if he becomes fascinated with and caught in the transcendental realm, a man will be overwhelmed by seeing infinite possibilities that render him powerless


and ineffective. Yet, if this flexibility is lost and leaves him stuck in the empirical realm's rigid context, an unfree "object" among "objects," en- trapped by "others" and by "circumstances," he loses all freedom and dignity, all chances for psychological growth, and spends his entire life, like Grimms' Fisherman and his Wife s in a pot.

This tale illustrates excellently the two possible losses of flexibility described by Kierkegaard 13 as "despair of possibility because of lack of necessity", and "despair of necessity because of lack of possibility2

8. Relationship Between World-Designs: Challenging questions arise from a scrutiny of the relationship between various empirical egos or between the empirical worlds associated with them. For the sake of clarity, Figu re 1 shows the empirical ego plus empirical world ( = world-design) constituted by only one of the three circumferential transcendental egos. Had we drawn all three corresponding world-designs, we would usually find them intersecting on what we designated as the "axis of intersubjective relationship" that exists between any two transcendental egos.

The respective intersecting segment of two world-designs (see diagram below) would then be termed "axis of interobjective (or empirical) relationship" which, if we step up the diagram by one dimension, becomes an "interobjective (or empirical) field" between contiguous or interpenetrating (overlapping) three-dimensional world-designs. It is the field within which agreement, mutual understanding, joint action, meaningful competition as well as dissension and strife become possible.

At first this derivation of a "field of interobjective relationship" seems to conflict radically with what we observe in everyday life. While agreeing that in the diagram any two circular surfaces intersect in a line that leaves each surface independent and intact, we remonstrate that two three-dimensional objects sharing a common area would not intersect in a surface but interpenetrate each other. Either one or the other or both would have to yield a part of their space.

Methodical consideration reveals the flaw in this criticism and leads to important insights concerning interobjective and intersubjective relationships. Let us clarify this by comparing successively a one-dimensional, two- dimensional, three-dimensional and four-dimensional world:

In a hypothetical one-dimensional world any two lines (A-B and C-D) that have anything in common would be seen as overlapping (or interpenetrating) each other. Thus they would compete for some of the available, unidimen- sional space:

A B

C D


Yet, once we picture the two lines (A-B and C-D) in a two dimensional realm, their overlapping becomes an infinitely unlikely occurrence, and the usual situation will be their having a point of intersection in common. Thus there is no longer any competition for shared or overlapping space:

C

In a hypothetical two-dimensional world any two surfaces (ABCD and EFGH) that have anything in common would be seen as overlapping (or interpenetrating) each other. Again they would compete for some of the available, two-dimensional, space.

jB A

w

R

Yet in a three-dimensional realm practically all surfaces that have something in common will be on different planes, thus intersecting in a line. Thereby none of the spatial features of either one of the above two surfaces will be violated.

A ~ --F

H ~ 6

Finally we find that three-dimensional objects within a three-dimensional world who have anything in common must also overlap, or interpenetrate each other, thus again competing for the shared (three-dimensional) space. This indeed accounts for many of the above-mentioned characteristics of human existence confined to the empirical (three-dimensional) realm.

PHENOMENOLOGY A N D PSYCHOTHERAPY 81

- D I M E N S . R E A L M

Let us now picture these two three-dimensional objects in a four-dimensional realm, while remembering that two lines intersect in a point when placed in a two-dimensional realm, and that tw~ surfaces intersect in a line when placed in a three-dimensional realm. We then recognize that three-dimensional objects sharing space in a three-dimensional realm will practically never overlap when placed in a four-dimensional realm, but will instead intersect in a surface. When the objects are two individuals' world-designs competing or negotiating for space in the empirical realm, they suddenly find themselves unobstructed, free and sharing in the interobjective field when they experience their selves in the four-dimensional, transcendental realm. Restricted to the empirical realm, love easily becomes a violation of the "other" through explicit or implicit contracts demanding conformity. However, members of a group may experience intimacy without feeling that, reluctantly, they must sacrifice anything of crucial importance. They feel enriched when they willingly modify needs or goals that would conflict with more crucial needs or goals of others. Clearly, we are always only on the way toward this ideal family or community.

Genuine physical expressions of love are to be viewed as metaphors within three-dimensional space of what is attainable in the four-dimensional realm. Holding hands, embracing, and genital relationships portray ways of physical interpenetration or merging in which the other's space is not violated. The Hebrews recognized this deeper meaning of sexual love and used for it the term "knowing." Yet, for persons seeking to transcend the mere instinctuality of sex while doubtful of their lovability or ability to love, the metaphorical meaning of physical relations may, again and again, turn into fear lest their identity be violated. This fear may find expression in impotence and frigidity.

In all effective--namely growth-enhancing and satisfying--human relationships, focusing not only upon the empirical but also on the intersubjective

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aspects is most significant (See Figure 2). Whereas Figure 2A represents the most common type of human relationship, Figures 2B and C are portrayals of situations where the world-designs of two persons in no way intersect. We note, furthermore, that world-design I in Figure 2B is in such a position that the world-designs of many other individuals can never intersect with it; thus it portrays excellently the predicament of schizophrenic patients. Whether the failure of intersection is due to severe psychopathology (Figure 2B), to extreme cultural differences, or to two individuals' radically divergent views (Figure 2C), both Figures~2B and C represent situations where a relationship is impossible on the empirical plane, though it may still be activated and experienced on the intersubjective, transcendental level. The emphasis upon the intersubjective relationship can then enable one or both participants to modify their world-designs so as to make a meeting on the empirical plane feasible. This, indeed, is an essential requirement in any effective treatment of schizophrenic patients, in successful encounter groups with racially or culturally divergent participants, as well as in the overcoming of any severe impasse in a human relationship.

9. Identity, World-Design, and Human Relationships: Though each person constitutes or defines an empirical ego within his world-design, it is equally true that there is an intimate link between a person's entire world- design and his experience of identity. Any alteration of this world-design thus causes some alteration in the experience of identity. The diagram, in fact, indicates that the empirical relationship between two persons is not--or is only exceptionally--between their constituted, empirical egos, but rather between their individual world-designs. The latter have a much wider scope and are thus more likely to intersect on the "axis of interobjective relationship." In other words, in observing or in dealing with other human beings, we experience not so much their empirical egos, as those aspects of their Empiri- cal World that are constituted in analogy to our own.

10. Multiple World-Designs: Whereas most of the above considerations would bear much elaboration, a final question can be answered only in the most sketchy way. It deals with the previously mentioned possibility of multiple world-designs by an individual, and would extend into an analysis of all the varieties of psychopathology and of normal variations of human behavior.

Best known and most spectacular are the above-mentioned accounts of multiple personalities in some persons suffering from the dissociative type of hysteria (cf. The three Faces of Eve or Sybil). Here the seemingly most appropriate empirical ego often ignores the existence of the other, secondary, empirical egos. However, phenomenologic Gestalts such as "parent," "adult," and "chi ld" in Transactional Analysis, such as momentary "acting out of character," or such as our extremely varied behaviors in dreams, are


equally examples of multiple world-designs. At times they must be viewed as alternative constitutions of several empirical egos that cannot be reconciled or integrated, at times the nonhabitual world-designs manifested in dreams, daydreams, artistic creations and odd behaviors should be envisioned as potentials that long to become part of the habitual world-design. Almost always there is some overlap of these two possibilities.

Psychological defenses may then be viewed as endeavors to protect the habitual world-design and to prevent its contamination by alternative world- designs. Premature attempts to integrate the latter cause excessive anxiety, guilt, and confusion, whereas refusal to own them at all leads to progressive psychopathology or to spiritual narrowness and rigidity. The defense system can be viewed as a superordinate structure (or more basic world-design) responsible not only for the continuation of the habitual world-design, but also for the manner in which latent potentialities are allowed limited expression.

The shifting between multiple world-designs is possible by stepping back momentarily toward this superordinate structure located between the empirical and transcendental realm, from where a number of alternate world- designs can be constituted. Such shifts can be periodic and physiologic (for example, in dreams); they may be occasioned by unusual stresses (and lead to "acting our of character"); they may be chemically induced (by febrile conditions and drugs); they may be more-or-less deliberate (in the production of art); while in the notorious cases of"multiple personalities" they are clearly pathological. Here as elsewhere it is the therapist's ability to relate to the patient on an intersubjective level, his safeguarding the patient's identity by unconditional acceptance, that can further the gradual integration of separate and conflicting world-designs. Inasmuch as the transcendental ego offers ever new potentials that long for realization, this process of healing, integration and growth is probably open-ended.

In summary, the persistent challenges of various psychotherapeutic orien- tations and growth movements to the effect that we must individuate, become whole, mature, and realize ever new potentials increase the need for a wide view of human existence capable of throwing light upon the specific usefulness of seemingly very disparate approaches. Phenomenology and existential philosophy can provide such a framework. In addition, they point to basic meanings in human life without the experience of which the above challenges become rather empty. This paper attempts to correlate and to show the relevance for psychotherapy of some fundamental phenomenologic and existential concepts. These enable us to view human development and growth with a minimum of presuppositions, to evaluate the appropriateness of the most varied techniques, and to fully appreciate the role of the psychotherapeutic relationship. The relationship between world and self


disclosed by existent ial ph i losophy places divergent psychotherapeut ic theories into a broader, existent ial perspective, and enl ivens in the therapist the exper ience of l i fe's meaningfulness wh ich w i l l contr ibute to an atmosphere benef ic ial for his patients' progress.

Footnote

aThe term "world-design" can be defined as the totality of a person's dealing with, experiencing, and seeing the world from his own vantage point. This vantage point obscures some aspects of the world while others are emphasized and brought into the foreground. The vantage point, furthermore, origi hates the structuring, the constitution of the world by means of a set of presuppositions (also termed "meaning matrix," "pattern," "existential a priori," or "transcendental category": 8:16). Though limiting, the world-design provides the individual with a foothold for effective living. Obviously, the world-designs of individuals within a particular cu Iture will share more characteristics than the world-designs of individuals of different culturesJ

Within his world-design the individual then designates or perceives various physical, psychologic, and spiritual features as "myself." Yet the specific features of the body, emotions, thoughts and actions that are experienced as "myself" vary from individual to individual. Thus one person may experience his body quite decidedly as "myself," whereas another views his body as a mere "physical appendage" to "myself." Thus a conceited individual may tend to identify with whatever meritorious feelings he harbors; one with a negative self-image will see only his stupidity, his errors, his mistakes and his uglier emotions as "myself." We designate as empirical ego this experience of "myself," while the remainder of a person's world-design is termed empirical world.

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contributions of phenomenology to psychotherapeutic theory and practice

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