[contributions to phenomenology] encyclopedia of phenomenology volume 18 || k
TRANSCRIPT
IMMANUEL KANT Two points of view on
Kant ha ve served as catalysts for the critica) reconstruc
tion of his philosophy in phenomenology. Both oper
ate with Kant's transcendentalism, which is knowledge
concerned not with objects, but with our a priori mode
of knowledge of objects. One serves as the catalyst for
EDMUND HUSSERL's critica! considerations of Kant, the
other as the catalyst for MARTIN HEIDEGGER 's. In the first,
the focus is on the grounding of NATURAL SCIENCE; in the
second, the focus is on the grounding of metaphysics,
not in the knowledge of the sensible world, but in the realm of free rational agency.
Husserl contends that without phenomenological re
construction, Kant's transcendentalism remains stringently bound to the conditions ofscientific knowledge.
He then broadens transcendentalism phenomenologically to include prescientific experience and the sub
ject's own intentiona) awareness, whose reasonable
ness is sustained in and by perception. Heidegger maintains that without reconstruction, Kant's grounding of
metaphysics is tethered too strongly to subjectivistic formulations and hence mistakenly identifies that
which enables what we caii experience. He seeks to
transform transcendentalism by referring to the Lich
tung ( clearing) that enables anything-object, the subject, and his or her representationallvolitional activities
- to be disclosed as conditions at ali. The "clearing"
is a non-representational horizon enabling both expe
rience and its conditions to appear "for a time."
Ali this reflects Husserl 's and Heidegger's concern
with the Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1781/1787). To
some extent, their phenomenological reconstructions
converge. But ultimately, they produce influential Kant
interpretations that diverge from each other. The rest
ofthe "phenomenological movement" takes its cues on
Kant from their approaches. Their interpretations also
Jet them oppose the varieties of neo-Kantianism. For
Husserl, neo-Kantianism rehabilitates transcendental
ism in the face ofpsychologism, which reduces Kant's
transcendentalism to the "facts of consciousness" and
not to the subject's a priori conditions of experience.
In other words, psychologism reduces the a priori el
ements of experience to the psychical mechanism of
the human species and subjects it to scientific observa
tion. On the other hand, neo-Kantianism concentrates
on the a priori presuppositions of mathematical natural
science, but denies that they are intrinsic to conscious
ness. Rather, they are logically pertinent to the con
struction of objects in thought. So both psychologism and neo-Kantianism disavow that there are subjective
sources that bear the a priori presuppositions of expe
rience. It is Husserl 's doctrine of INTENTIONALITY that en
ables access to those "subjective sources" by steering
between the Scylla ofpsychologism and the Charybdis
of neo-Kantianism. According to this doctrine, con
sciousness is not representational, but essentially directed toward objects, objects that thus stand in a tran
scendent rather than immanent relation to it. Furthermore, acts of consciousness are directed toward objects
via correlative ideal MEANINGS. Those acts are temporal,
but their meaning-correlates ha ve the capacity ofbeing
identified and reidentified over time. Ultimately these
ideal meanings are accomplishments whose "origin"
or "genesis" !ies in intentionallife. Husserl avoids the rocks of psychologism because
he maintains that intentionality cannot be registered
naturalistically as an item among other items in the
causal order of nature. The method of EPOCHE AND RE
DUCTION shows consciousness tobe a "region" indepen
dent of the "region" of "nature." In contrast, natural
istically driven psychologism reduces consciousness
either to nature or some part thereof and holds that
consciousness is subject to causal laws. Husserl also
bypasses Neo-Kantian constructivism. Intentiona! ob
jects are not logically constructed by consciousness in
thought, but instead are rendered present to conscious
ness by virtue of intentionality. Intentionality enables
meanings or intentiona) objects to be given as intel
ligible and essential structures within the conscious
experience. For example, a perceptual act would be es
sentially identified by its passive character; the object
perceived would be essentially given as something out
there in the world and indistinct from its sense. In con
trast, a propositional act would be essentially charac
terized by its expressible quality; the object expressed
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, lase Huertas·lourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna 3 77 Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner ( eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology. ' © 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
378 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
(the meaning) and the object that the proposition is
about would be rendered distinct in such an act.
Intentionality as noetic-noematic correlation and as
constitution signals Husserl 's fidelity to Kant's tran
scendentalism and "Copernican turn." ARON GURWITSCH
claims that Kant fa ils to recognize intentionality. How
ever, others contend that Kant either operated with or
anticipated a doctrine of directedness toward objects.
Husserl himself believed Kant could anticipate inten
tionality as both correlation and constitution, but was
unable to give it express philosophical treatment. In
Erste Philosophie [ 1923/24], he understands Kant's
"Copernican turn" to consist in the determination of
the sense of objectivity on the basis of the "correla
tion between subjectivity and objective content," but
believes Kant did not go deep enough in his analysis
ofthis correlation.
Regarding prescientific nature, Husserl challenges
Kant's failure to formulate more sharply an account of
consciousness "naively" heeding what is already tacitly
organized, experientially significant, and contextually
"sedimented" in the LIFEWORl.D and for PERCFPTION. He
maintains that prescientific nature operates only "la
tently" in Kant and thus it requires reconstruction. In
Die Krisis der europdischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phdnomenologie ( 1936), he takes his
point of departure from Kant's 1781 "Transcenden
tal Deduction." To show a theory of constitution and
of prescientific nature in Kant, Husserl combines two readings of the "Deduction," each with two distinct
proofs. One reading contends that the "Deduction"
contains both "an objective deduction and a subjec
tive one"; the other states that the deduction includes a
proof"from above" and a proof"from below." The for
mer regards the "objective deduction" as establishing
the objective validity ofthe categories and the "subjec
tive deduction" as establishing the manner in which the
categories achieve that validity in relation to our cog
nitive capacities. The latter reading offers two demon
strations of how the relation between the categories
and sensible intuitions can be established - either
from apperception through imagination to sensibility
or from sensibility through imagination to appercep
tion. On this reading, the imagination both coordinates
the employment of the categories and facilitates the
direction ofthat employment.
No Kant scholar before or since combines both of
these readings. By combining them, however, Husserl
is able to reconstruct a hierarchical sequence of con
stitution in Kant. The "objective and subjective deductions" enable Husserl to reconstruct the two functions
of the understanding as two levels of intentiona! ac
complishment. The "deduction from above and from
below" allows him to re late these levels hierarchically,
so that the scientific view, resulting from the under
standing's functioning at the objective level, is shown
to arise from the understanding operating passively,
constituting the already organized and always devel
oping sense ofthe lifeworld.
Husserl recognizes that the "lifeworldly" structures
cannot be expressly part of Kant's own theoretical en
terprise for two reasons. First, his own notion of tran
scendental subjectivity is registered in his discussion of
constitution, and not in the metaphysically paralogistic
orientation of pure reason. It is not entangled in some
kind of double-world account, nor is it involved in jus
tifying the objective validity of the a priori conditions
of empirica! knowledge. Rather, it entails the spectrum
of intentionality through which ali levels of meanings - from higher-order idealizations of intellectual ac
tivity to lower-order vague typicalities of lifeworld1y
experience- are thematized. Unlike Kant's, Husserl 's
notion of transcendental subjectivity is notat odds with
empirica! subjectivity; rather, it is at one with it insofar
as empirica! subjectivity is its unreflective yet inten
tiona! life. The second reason has to do with Kant's concept
of "formal intuition," i.e., an intuitive representation
in which mathematical concepts can be constructed.
Since a priori concepts of the understanding are not
mathematical and hence not the result of idealization,
they cannot be constructed or exhibited in a formal
intuition. But they can be schematized. In that case, a
formal intuition as a schema is an intuitive setting for making possible the temporal determination of sensi
ble objects or empirica! intuitions in accordance with a
priori concepts. It is a representation oftime that serves
as an a priori condition for intuitively construing phe
nomena as categorially objective, public phenomena
in the spatiotemporal world and not as ad hoc psycho
logical arrangements of mental states in an individ
ual mind. But this non-mathematical yet objective and
public world, of which Kant sought the conditions of
knowledge, would not be equivalent to Husserl 's "life-
IMMANUEL KANT 379
world," since it would not be either the pre-objective
aisthetic world of perceptual experience or the indeter
minate yet ubiquitous horizon within which ali other
worlds, scientific and prescientific, objective and pre
objective, are disclosed. GERHARD FUNKE, ARON GUR
WITSCH, ISO KERN, PAUL RICCEUR, and THOMAS M. SEEBOHM
ha ve explored these and other aspects of Husserl 's re
lation to Kant.
Despite his criticism of Kant's sharp distinction
between sensibility (receptivity) and understanding
(spontaneity), Husserl views his own doctrine ofinten
tionality as generally compatible with Kant's "Coperni
can turn." In Husserl 's order of constitution, receptivity
and spontaneity "dovetail" in a concrete colligation of
intentionality, whcrein each stands with its correlate
and refers beyond the temporal horizon of its corre
late's mode of givenness to the temporal background
of the modes of givenness of other correlates. The re
suit, Husserl believes, enables him to account for the
sense-history of theoretical knowledge or judgments.
Unlike Husserl's, Heidegger's interpretation of
Kant, especially in Kant und das Problem der Meta
physik ( 1929), falls squarely on the "Schematism,"
whose argument presupposes the Kantian distinction
between sensibility and understanding. This focus
scrves the purpose of reconstructing Kant not as an
incipient theorist of intentionality as constitution, but
as an incipient theorist of"ecstatic temporality."
In Sein und Zeit ( 1927), Heidegger argues that TIME
does not consist of a stream of"nows" and is not itself
an entity that is objectively there in the present. Rather,
it is a horizon of the understanding of Being in which
past, present, and future are the temporalizations of
DASEIN. Heidegger's phenomenological ontology con
strues the meaning of Being in terms of Oase in 's un
derstanding ofBeing. Temporality in general is futural
and can only be understood in terms of the situation
in which Dasein confronts (a) the range of choices re
gard ing the way it wants to carry out or to be its being
and (b) the fact that Oase in has to carry out or be its
being as its being is given to it.
In Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, Heideg
ger again approaches time from the stance of Dasein,
and in so doing, interprets the Kritik der reinen Ver
nunft as Kant's unwitting or incipient identification of
time and the unity of apperception. As a consequence,
human subjectivity is shown to be fundamentally tem-
poral. Sin ce the "Schematism" offers the "sensible con
ditions under which alone pure concepts of the under
standing can be employed," it signals the place where
Kant explains the results ofthe transcendental synthe
sis of the imagination, whereby time is related to the
objects of experience. Heidegger thus contends that a
schema, or what Kant calls a "transcendental determi
nation of time," is the horizon of constant presence in
which an object is revealed as present.
Although this places the objective character of ob
jects in direct and essential connection with the finitude
ofthe subject, the "Schematism" still does not charac
terize temporality in what Heidegger believes is its
more primordial sense. Heidegger maintains that tran
scendental imagination is, for Kant, the concealed root
of both sensibility and the understanding. lf Kant had
followed this insight and explicitly identified transcen
dental imagination with temporality, then temporality
would be the condition on which the appearance of ob
jects continually comes to pass as having been in the
offing. Furthermore, as temporal, the finite subject is
one whose being affected by the appearance of objects
is always already in the offing.
Heidegger concedes that his reconstruction concen
trates on the 1781 or "A" edition of the Kritik and that
such a reconstruction of the 1787 or "B" edition is
nigh impossible. Since the 1787 version of the "De
duction" seems to deny any paramount distinction be
tween the imagination and the understanding, referring
to the imagination as an "action of the understanding
on the sensibility" oras belonging to "o ne and the same
spontaneity" of the understanding, the primacy of the
imagination, Heidegger believes, is surrendered there
in fa vor of the understanding. Hen ce the source of ali
synthetic activity is no longer the imagination, but the
understanding. This represents, according to Heideg
ger, Kant's "shrinking back" or "recoiling" from the
"power of the imagination" in discursive thought, a
power that rcnders discursive thought radically tempo
ral and finite and that serves as the essential ground for
Kant's "metaphysics of experience."
But just as Heidegger reformulates the 1781 Kritik
as an incipient precursor to Sein und Zeit, it is also pos
sible to do likewise for the claims about the imagination
according to the "two-steps-in-one proof structure" of
the 1787 vers ion. Instead of claiming that the unity of
apperception logically implies the unity of time, we
380 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
can argue from thc determination or objectification of the unity oftime to the unity ofapperception. Since the
determination of time is a result of the transcendental synthesis of the imagination, it must conform to the categories. If it did not, it could not be objectified as a unity. Since the categories are the necessary condi
tions ofthe unity ofapperception (according to the first step ), the transcendental synthesis of the imagination necessarily conforms to the categories. However, since time is a formal a priori condition of ali appearances whatsoever, the items of the sensible manifold can be
objectified together anly ta the extent that they are connected to o ne another in a single time. Thus they can be
conceptualized together in a single consciousness anly when they are given as connected in a single time (according to the second step ). The unity of time thereby becomes a necessary condition of the possibility of human experience. But it is a condition established outside of apperception, although exacted upon apper
ception, and hence serves to "restrict" it. This would be the kind of conclusion Heidegger would seek.
Heidegger !ater proceeds with his interpretation of Kant in the context ofhis renowned Kehre. Although
he continues to read Kant in terms of the grounding of metaphysics, there is a shift whereby his measure is no longer the meaning of Being as a protoexistentially impending issue for Dasein, but rather the meaning of Being as the "clearing." Die Frage nach dem Ding. Zu Kants Lehre van den transzendentalen Grundsătzen ( 1962) and "Kants These liber das Sein" ( 1963) are representative, though these are writ
ten drafts oflectures originally given in the 1930s. Heidegger's "Briefe liber den Humanismus" (1947) offi.
cially signals the appearance ofthe Kehre; however, the shift actually takes place in his writings ofthe 1930s, albeit without the !ater more "poetic" cast. The same is not true for his posthumous Die Grundprobleme der Phănamenalagie [ 1927] and Phănamenologische !nte1pretation van Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft [ 1927 /28], which are pre-Kehre works.
Prior to the Kehre, Heidegger's FUNDAMENTAL ON
TOLOGY attempts to disclose the meaning of Being through an analysis of the structures or "existential ia"
of Dasein. Subsequent to it, he asks how the meaning of Being is revealed by virtue of the way in which it
is thought in the ancient, medieval, and modern metaphysics of the "West." When Heidegger's Kant inter-
pretation is placed in this post-Kehre context, !here is less interest in reconstructing the first Kritik in terms of Dasein's temporality. As part of modern thought, this work is under the sway of"Western" metaphysics,
because the "clearing" remains "unthought" in it and it understands Being as something subject to represen
tational thought. In Die Frage nach dem Ding, the supreme principle
ofKant's metaphysics of experience- "the conditions of the possibility of experience in general are likewise conditions of the possibility of the ohjects of experience" -- is for Heidegger Being as constant presence and as representational because what counts for things
being objects of experience is their being known or represented. To be represented requires being present to and for the subject engaged in representing or knowing. Thus according to Heidegger, Kant conceives objectivity as the Being of ali things that can be experienced, known, or represented by the subject. He regards Kant
as exclusively concerned with the ro le of pure concepts in the mathematical character of natural bodies present in space, and not with time as the condition of their application to ali appearances whatsoever.
In "Kants These liber das Sein," Heidegger argues
that Kant's thesis about Being, which normally appears episodically throughout his work, is actually a guiding idea ofthe first Kritik. Heidegger interprets Kant's first claim - "'Being' is obviously not a real predicate, i.e., it is not a concept of something which could be added to the concept of a thing"- as distinguishing "reality" from "existence," "actuality," and "being." If "Being" were a real predicate, then it would serve as a determination belonging to the substantive or real content of a thing and could be attributed to that content in ajudgment. But since the real or substantive content of a thing can be thought in a concept without the thing existing before us, the thing's reality is not the thing's being or existence.
Heidegger interprets Kant's second claim- "['Being'] is purely the positing of a thing, or of certain
determinations in and of themselves" - as asserting
that, as a predicate nonetheless, Being does not predi
cate substantivally what a thing is; it rather predicates
modally that a thing is. The meaning of Being for Kant, according to Heidegger, is not real predication.
It is positing modally. Positing, Heidegger says, is for Kant the establishment of something as existing by
JMMANUEL KANT 381
virtue of a subject engaged in representation. In setting
up something as possibly, actually, or necessarily ex
isting, Being as positing essentially stands for Kant in
relation to the representational capacities of the sub
ject. (Again Heidegger draws the conclusion that Kant
endorses the thesis of Being as representational, but
he does so without explicitly considering how Kant
could or did explain the role oftime in Being's pasit
ing, especially in terms of the very strong connection
Kant initiates between the schema of modality and the
"Postulates of Empirica! Thought.")
Temporality is thus criterial for Heidegger in in
terpreting the kind and degree of success or failure
the first Kritik has in addressing the meaning of Se
ing and the grounding of metaphysics. In Kant und
das Problem der Metaphysik, he finds in Kant the ele
ments for a successful inquiry. In !ater works, he thinks
Kant's pathway is closed. What makes the difference
for Heidegger between Kant's success and failure is his
openness to temporality. This openness is signalled by
the possibility of giving greater emphasis to the self
affection of human reason through the integral unity
of the modalities of time than to the self-reflection of
human reason through conceptual or representational
thought. IfKant's analysis ofhuman experience is read
as giving greater weight to the conceptual dimension
ofthat experience, then he is approaching it, Heidegger
believes, in a way that allows the meaning ofBeing to
be "forgotten" in the history of Western metaphysics.
Heidegger points human reason to a level of experi
ence whereby the impact of sensibility, affection, and
intuition on it, through time's integral unity, enables
the meaning of Being to be an issue "taken to heart"
by it in a distinctly non-representational manner.
On this point, Heideggerian phenomenology is of a
piece with Husserlian phenomenology. Husserl sees in
Kant an incipient phenomenologist whose analysis of
human experience could have moved in the direction
of thematizing the non-representational or lifeworldly
dimension. Kant is measured against this phenomen
ological ability in both Heidegger's and Husserl's in
terpretations, and this is reflected in the work of phe
nomenologists as diverse as MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY
with his emphasis on the a priori of BODILY intention
ality and MAX SCHELER with his critique of Kantian
formalism in ethics.
Ultimately, however, there is a major difference be-
tween Husserl and Heidegger with respect to the non
representational domain. Husserl 's phenomenology
leads to the reflective incorporation of that domain.
He believes that this evinces his deep affinity with
Kant's "Copernican turn" and transcendentalism. Hei
degger 's phenomenology, on the other hand, abi des by
what it discloses, viz., the affective incorporation of
Dasein into that domain, what Heidegger carne to call
the fourfold ( Geviert).
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Allison, Henry E. "The Critique o/Pure Reason as Transcendental Phenomcnology." In Dialogues in Phenomenology. Eds. Don Ihde and Richard Zaner. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975, 136--55.
~. "Gurwitsch's Interpretation of Kant." Kant-Studien 83 ( 1992), 208-2 I.
Carr, David. "Kant, Husserl and the Non-Empirica! Ego." Journal of Philosoph.v 74 (1977), 682-90.
Cassirer, Emst. "Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik. Bermerkungen zu Martin Heideggers KantInterpretation." Kant-Studien 36 ( 1931 ), 1~36; "Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics: Remarks on Martin Heidegger's Interpretation of Kant." In Kant: Disputed QuestiollS. Ed. and trans. Moltke Gram. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1967, 131-57.
Dufrenne, Michel. "Heidegger et Kant." Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale 54 ( 1949), 1-20.
Fink, Eugen. "Die phănomenologischc Philosophie Edmund Husscrls in der Gegenwărtigen Kritik" [ 1933). In his Studien ::ur Phănomenologie. 1930--1939. The Hague: Marlinus Nijhoff, 1966, 79-156: "Husserl's Phenomenology and Contemporary Criticism." In The Phenomenology of Husserl. Ed. and trans. R. O. Elveton. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970, 73-14 7.
~. "Die Idee der Transzendentalphilosophie bei Kant und in der Phănomenologie." In his Năhe und Distanz. Phiinomenologische Vortrăge und Auf~ătze. Ed. FranzAnton Schwarz. Freiburg: Karl Alber, I 976, 7--44.
Gadamer, Hans-Georg. "Kant und die philosophische Hermenutik." Kant-Studien 66 ( 1975), 395--403; "Kant and the Hermenutical Turn." In his Heidegger:~ Ways. Ed. and trans. John Stanley. Albany, NY: State University Press of New York, 1994, 49--59.
-. "A new epoch in the history of the world begins here and now." Trans. John Donovan. In The Philosophy of Immanuel Kant. Ed. R. Kennington. Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1985, 1-14.
Gurwitsch, Aron. "The Kantian and Husserlian Conceptions of Consciousness." In his Studies in Phenomenology and Psychology. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1966, 148-74.
-. Kant.~ Theorie des Verstandes. Ed. Thomas Seebohm. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990.
Henrich, Dieter. "Uber die Einheit der Subjektivităt." Philosophische Rundschau 3 ( 1955), 28--69.
382 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
Kern, Iso. Husserl und Kant. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964.
Kirkland, Frank M. "Husserl and Kant: The Problem ofPreScientific Nature and Transcendental Aesthetic." In Kant and Phenomenolo6'Y· Ed. Thomas Seebohm and Joseph Kockclmans. Lan ham, MD: The Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology/University Press of America, 1988,31-59.
Klein, Ted. "Being as Ontologica] Predicate: Heidegger's Interpretation of 'Kant's Thesis of Being' ." Southwestern Journal of"Philosophy 4 ( 1973), 7-33.
Mohanty, J. N. The Possihility o/Transcendental Philosophy. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1985.
Prauss, Gerold. Erkennen und Handeln in Heideggers "Sein und Zeit. "Freiburg: Karl Alber, 1977.
-. "1ntentionalităt bei Kant." In Akten des VI. internationalen Kant-Kongresses. Vols. 1-3. Bonn: Bouvier, 1987, 853-59.
Ricreur, Paul. "Kant et Husserl." Kant-Studien 46 ( 1954), 44-67; "Kant and Husserl." In his Husserl: An Anal1·sis ofHis Phenomenology. Trans. Edward Ballard and Lester Embree. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1967, 175-201.
Seebohm, Thomas. Die Bedingungen der Măglichkeit der Transzendentalphilosophie. Bonn: Bouvier, 1962.
-. and Joseph Kockelmans, eds. Kant and Phenomenology. Lanham, MD: The Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology/University Press of America, 1984.
Sherover, Charles. Heidegge1; Kant and Time. Lanham, MD: The Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology/University Press of America, 1988.
FELIX KAUFMANN
FRANK M. KJRKLAND Hunter Ca/lege
Kaufmann was horn
in Vienna in 1895 and received a doctorate in law
from the University of Vienna in 1920. His disserta
tion under Hans Kelsen ( 1881-1973) was published
in 1922 as Logik und Rechtswissenschaft (Logic and
jurisprudence). This work led to his appointment as
Privatdozent in philosophy of law with the juridica!
faculty of the University of Vienna. While a student,
Kaufmann introduced his fellow law student, ALFRED
SCHUTZ, to the philosophy OfEDMUND HUSSERL. Through
the years, Kaufmann and Schutz read and discussed a
number of Husserl 's seminal phenomenological texts,
including Vorlesungen zur Phi.inomenologie des in
neren Zeitbewusstseins [ 1905], Formale und transzen
dentale Logik ( 1929), and Cartesianische Meditatio
nen [ 1931]. Kaufmann received a doctorate in philoso
phy from the University ofVienna in 1922, publishing
this dissertation in 1924 as Die Kriterien des Rechts
(Criteria ofright). While serving as Privatdozent, Kauf
mann earned his living by working as a manager for
the Anglo-Persian Oii Company. Meanwhile, he par
ticipated in a number of intellectual circles, including
the circle surrounding Hans Kelsen; a private semi
nar of Richard von Mises ( 1883-1953); and the group
that was !ater to become known as the Vienna Circle
(where he referred to himself as "his majesty's loyal
opposition," to indicate his nonpositivist stance).
When Germany invaded Austria in 1938, Kaufmann
accepted an invitation to join the New School for So
cial Research in New York, where he fled with his wife
and son. He was a member ofthe Graduate Faculty of
the New School and also served as a founding mem
ber ofthe International Phenomenological Association
and on the editorial board of Philosophy and Pheno
menological Research until his death. From the UNITED
STATES, Kaufmann labored to help others escape from
the Nazis, and also was actively involved in the preser
vation of Husserl 's manuscripts and the relief effort for
EUGEN FINK and LUDWIG LANDGREBE.
Kaufmann 's research ranged widely, including pub
lications in philosophy of LAW, the foundations of
LOGIC and MATHEMATICS, ECONOMICS, SOCIOLOGY, and
the methodology of the HUMAN and the NATURAL SCI
ENCES. In his main interests (law, mathematics, and
scientific methodology) Kaufmann introduces and de
velops methodological insights, based upon key con
ceptual and experiential analyses in Husserl 's writings,
to recast traditional and contemporary controversies
and problems. In each case he argues that a phenomen
ological foundation leads to a more fruitful account of
the problems at hand, and to resolution for a number
of traditional controversies. A champion of Husserl 's
phenomenology in the Vienna Circle, Kaufmann's de
bates with RudolfCarnap (1891-1973), Cari Gustav
Hempel, and others led to decades-long exchanges of
articles on the nature of MEANING and TRUTH, the foun
dations ofmathematics and the social sciences, and the
status oflaws, principles, and data in scientific inquiry
in general. Kaufmann, who characterized himself as a
"methodologist," always sought to clarify and to so
lidify the logica! and experiential foundations of any
inquiry. Husserl regarded him as one ofthe most com
petent logicians in the phenomenological movement
and as one of his most loyal friends, and Kaufmann 's
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Iose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna, Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner ( eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology. © 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
FELIX KAUFMANN 383
acclaim by a diverse array ofrespected contemporaries
is noteworthy. Albert Einstein ( 1879-1955) regarded
him as one ofthe great living philosophers.
Kaufmann develops Hans Kelsen's pure theory of
law (according to which the normative nature of laws
and legal terms cannot be derived from facts alone,
since norms belong to a different "sphere") from its
Kantian basis to a view based on a phenomenological
analysis ofthe concept ofnorms. This analysis denies
the existence of a separate "normative sphere" requir
ing a peculiarly normative method. He also applies
a phenomenological approach to key legal concepts, such as that of responsibility in criminal law.
Kaufmann's Das Unendliche in der Mathematik und seine Ausschaltung (The infinite in mathematics
and its exclusion, 1930) was regarded by Husserl as
a major contribution to the phenomenology of math
ematics, and engendered a great deal of interes! and
discussion among the members of the Vienna Circle.
In this and related works, Kaufmann develops a con
structivist approach to the foundations ofmathematics
based upon a phenomenological account of the basic
facts of cognition. This account includes discussion of
the JNTENTIONALITY of mental life, the objectivity of
logica! and mathematical concepts, the nature of es
sential features of the objects of consciousness, and the difference between empirica] and non-empirica]
universal statements - the distinction between indi
vidual and specific universality drawn by Husserl in
the Logische Untersuchungen ( 1900--1901 ). From this
basis various problems in the foundations ofmathemat
ics are analyzed, including the set-theoretic interpretation of mathematics, the extended functional calculus,
the Dedekind cut, Cantor's diagonal procedure, trans
finite numbers, and a number of logica! antinomies in
mathematics and set theory. In each case Kaufmann
uses his phenomenological approach to reject various
interpretations of mathematical and logica! notations,
procedures, and problems.
Many of these problems are seen to stern from two
methodological errors: interpreting symbols as repre
senting sets of objects, when in fact they represent
formation laws and not objects, and misunderstanding
the nature of(and cquivocating between) empirica! and
non-empirica! universal statements. The set-theoretic
account of mathematics is rejected, and the concept
of "set" is argued to be completely unnecessary for
the definition ofthe natural number series. Kaufmann
also rejects transfinite numbers and non-denumerable
infinite sets, which he claims to be impure (because
ambiguous and circular) pseudo-concepts. The natural
numbers are defined as formal eidetic singularities (in Husserl's sense), and Peano's axioms are modified to
clarify the definition of natural numbers. AII of math
ematics flows from the definitions ofthe natural num
bers and keeping this clearly in focus enables one to
avoid many of the logica! antinomies of mathematics.
While taking a constructivist position, Kaufmann also
criticizes the tendencies toward PSYCHOLOGISM ofsome
other constructivist mathematicians, such as Luitzen
Egbertus Jan Brouwer ( 1881-1966). Kaufmann holds that methodology (which he de
fines as the logica! analysis of scientific procedure)
deserves the status of a separate field, independent of
logic, whose goal is to explicate and clarify the rules,
laws, postulates, and procedures of the social or hu
man sciences and natural sciences. Central to this role
is methodology's goal of clarifying the procedures for
verifying and falsifying scientific claims. For Kauf
mann, methodology presupposes objective MEANINGS
that are already constituted (logica! analysis is the
analysis of meanings, according to Kaufmann); thus
methodology presupposes phenomenological analyses
oflived meanings. Many ofhis methodological analy
ses begin with explicit phenomenological analyses of
basic scientific and prescientific terms and concepts.
Kaufmann discusses a number of methodological is
sues stemming from the social sciences, as well as some ranging over ali the sciences, both natural and
social.
For Kaufmann the key to the methodology of the sciences !ies in viewing science as an ongoing and
highly structured human enterprise that is based upon
lived meanings stemming in part from ordinary, pre
scientific experience. Indeed, Kaufmann holds that the
prescientific and scientific realms share some basic em
pirica! procedures, and are thus (at that level) not en
tirely distinguishable. A science is defined not in terms
of its objects of study, but in terms of its rules of pro
cedure. Although Kaufmann 's view of the structure of
science went through development and modification,
it is possible to find in his work a rather consistent
set of the primary elements of scientific procedure:
the ideals of science (such as truth, precision, and the
384 ENCYCLOPED!A OF PHENOMENOLOGY
ideal of a rational, and therefore knowable, cosmos
- these ideals serve as regulati ve ideas of science in
Kant's sense); the basic rules of scientific procedure
(unrelated to goals, these provide the criteria for the
truth and falsity of propositions); preference rules of
scientific procedure (related to scientific goals, hav
ing the status of conventional norms for the gathering,
verification, falsification, and employing of empirica!
evidence); heuristic postulates (having the status of
conventions, not refutable by empirica! evidence, e.g., the principles of ceteris paribus and marginal utility
in economics, free will in sociology, uniformity ofna
ture in physics ); the scientific situation ( the state of a
given field of inquiry at a particular time ); the impor
tance of grounds (with protocol propositions playing
key ro les as grounds); and the layers or strata ofhuman
experience (including the distinction between presci
entific and scientific strata of experience ). Kaufmann's
methodology of the sciences studies and clarifies the ways in which these elements interact in the pursuit of
scientific knowledge. The basic rules of science guide research in every
science, but they are not a priori laws. Rather, they
serve as regulative ideas (so as not to violate the prin
ciple of permanent control). Methodology ofthe Social
Sciences (1944) identifies seven basic rules of science.
These rules are: scientific decision (the basic decision in scientific research is that of adding or deleting propo
sitions from the corpus of propositions belonging to
a particular science); the methodological principle of
sufficient reason (scientific decisions must be grounded
in EVIDENCE and procedural rules); grounds (propositions recording sense observations must play a central
role in evidence); scientific situation (a proposition be
ing considered for addition to the scientific corpus must
be judged in light ofthe totality of relevant knowledge
available at the time of a scientific decision); the prin
ciple of permanent control (no empirica! proposition is
immune from rejection based on further evidence ); the
procedural correlate ofthe principle of contradiction (a
scientific decision may not admit any proposition to the
scientific corpus that generates a contradiction in that
corpus ); and the procedural correlate ofthe principle of
the excluded middle (no undecidable proposition may be admitted into the corpus).
Kaufmann traces many methodological problems
( and the controversies surrounding them) to basic epis-
temological problems. Phenomenology plays a key
role in sorting out and solving these problems. The
issues of truth and knowledge are central to method
ology. The concepts of "truth" and "verification" in
science are defined in terms of coherence- a coherence that can never be finally or ultimately established,
and that is defined in terms of the rules of scientific
procedure. Truth, knowledge, and probability must not
be defined in terms of absolute or perfect knowledge.
In spite of this, Kaufmann rejects RELATIVISM in its
various guises (nominalism, sociologism, historicism,
etc.). For him many ofthe methodological controver
sies in the natural and the social sciences (for instance,
the pervasive one between rationalism and empiricism)
stern from a lack of clarity with respect to the status
of the rules and postulates of science. These rules and
postulates have the status ofnorms, and are not subject to the sort offalsification characterized by Karl Popper
( 1902-1994 ). The reason for this is to be found in the
scientific situation, in which rules, postulates, obser
vations, mechanisms, and hypotheses are interrelated
in an extremely complex fashion. An unexpected experimental result could stern from a faulty assumption
about control parameters, an imperfection in a mecha
nism or sample, or a false hypothesis. No experiment
or observation taken by itself is sufficient to establish
its own interpretation (the data cannot speak for them
selves ). Kaufmann holds that scientific laws should not
be interpreted as laws of nature but as laws relating observation to expectation, based on contemporary scien
tific understanding and instrumentation. Thus even ba
sic laws of physics such as the conservation of energy
and the uniformity of nature are in essence heuristic
postulates, rules guiding physicists in what to expect,
and how to observe, in their experimental and theoret
ical grappling with nature. Such postulates are subject
to the principle of permanent control.
Even logica! laws are often misunderstood in
methodological controversies. For instance, Kaufmann
argues that despite many claims to the contrary, the
law ofthe excluded middle does not apply to synthetic
propositions- its procedural correlate does (and this
correlate is a property ofthe system of procedural rules
of science, rules that determine how to proceed with
a science, given the observational input and the con
temporary scientific situation). Likewise, the concept
of "ground" in science is related to the rules of sci-
FRIEDRICH LEOPOLD KAUFMANN 385
entific procedure and thus differs from the concept of
"ground" in deductive logic.
It is characteristic of Kaufmann 's work that his
thought developed and changed. While his focus upon
methodological and phenomenological issues and the
clarity and precision of his thought and writing re
mained steadfast, he continually refined his view. He
published various lists of basic and procedural rules
ofscience. His conception ofscience gradually shifted
its emphasis from the side of logic ~ and the notion
of science as a set of propositions and rules for ad
mitting or rejecting propositions from the set ~ to
science as a set of procedures and heuristic procedural
rules. His reading of the work of John Dewey ( 1859-
1952), with whom he corresponded extensively in the
!940s, contributed to a shift from stress upon deductive
and a priori rules to a growing concern with inductive
and probabilistic elements of scientific procedure. Al
though Kaufmann 's work has been heretofore largely
ignored, his methodological pluralism enabled him to
assimilate ideas from many sources, and the insight,
precision, and intellectual honesty ofhis work won the
respect of thinkers as diverse as Edmund Husserl, Al
fred Schutz, Albert Einstein, RudolfCarnap, and John
Dewey.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Helling, Ingeborg K. "Alfred Schutz, Felix Kaufmann, and the Economists ofthe Mises Ci rele: Personal and Methodological Continuities." In Alfi·ed Schutz. Neue Beitrăge zur Rezeption seines Werkes. Ed. Elisabeth List and Ilja Srubar. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1988, 43--68.
--."A. Schutz and F. Kaufmann: Sociology Between Science and Interpretation." Human Studies 7 (1984), 141--6!.
-. "Wirken in der Emigration. Felix Kaufmann." In Exil. Wissenscha{t. Identităt. Die Emigrat ion deutscher Sozialwissenschafiler 1933-1945. Ed. Ilja Srubar. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1988, 181-205.
Kaufmann, Felix. Methodenlehre der Soziahvissenschaft. Vienna: Verlag Julius Springer, 1936; Methodologia de las ciencias sociales. Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Economica, 1946.
--. Das Unendliche in der Mathematik und seine Ausschaltung. Leipzig and Vienna: Dentike, 1930; The Infinite in Mathematics: Logico-Mathematica/ W!·itings. Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1978.
--. "Remarks on Methodology ofthe Social Sciences." Sociologica/ Review 28 ( 1936), 64-84.
-. "The Significance of Methodology for the Social Sciences." Social Research 5 ( 1938), 442--63; 6 ( 1939), 537-55.
-. "Truth and Logic." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 1 ( 1940--1941 ), 59--69.
-. "Strata ofExperience," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 1 ( 1940-41 ), 313-24.
-. "The Logica! Rules of Scientific Procedure." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 2 ( 1941-42), 457-7!.
-. "Verification, Meaning and Truth." Philosophy ami Phenomenological Research 4 ( 1943-44), 267--s3.
-. Methodology of the Social Sciences. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1944 [ not a translation of Methodenlehre, but a different book, influenced by the work of John Dewey].
-. "The Nature of Scientific Method." Social Research 12 ( 1945), 464-80.
-. "Scientific Procedure and Probability." Philosophy ami Phenomenologica/ Research 6 ( 1945-46), 47--66.
-. "Basic lssues in Logica! Positivism." In Phi/osophic Thought in France and the United States. Ed. Marvin Farber. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1950, 565-88.
Reeder, Harry P. The Work of Felix Kaufinann. Lanham, MD: Center for Advanced rcsearch in Phenomenology/University Press of America, 199!. [Including the index and classification of Kaufmann's Nachlass and a bibliography ofKaufmann's published works].
Srubar, Ilja. "On the Origin of 'Phenomenological' Sociology." Human Studies 7 ( 1984 ), 163-89.
Kaufmann 's papers reside in the Archival Repository of the Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology at Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, Ontario. A microfilm of the papers is located at the Sozialwissenschaftliches Archiv, University of Konstanz, Germany.
HARRY P. REEDER University of Texas at Arlington
FRITZ LEOPOLD KAUFMANN (1891-1958) Kauf-
mann is generally not well known to contemporary
students of phenomenology and was not always un
derstood by his contemporaries, but is actually one
of the most innovative phenomenologists of the first
generation. Kaufmann carne to phenomenology from
the perspective of WILHELM DILTHEY's philosophy, with
an eye to developing a "middle ground" or unity in
corporating both philosophical positions. In doing so,
he anticipatcd even MARTIN HEIDEGGER in viewing con
sciousness as an essentially worldly phenomenon and
the work of art as a world-revelatory phenomenon.
Born in Leipzig, Kaufmann began his university
career enrolled in the faculty of law at Geneva ( 191 O)
and Berlin ( 191 ~Il). His interests quickly gravitated
from law to philosophy. Only his unpublished and un
submitted 1918 Leipzig Habilitationsschrift, entitled
386 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
Der Konflikt, conta ins material reflecting his legal stud
ies. In Berlin, Kaufmann was quickly immersed in a
philosophical tradition shared with EDMUND HUSSERL. He studied with Husserl 's former teacher Cari Stumpf
(1848-1936) and with Benno Erdmann (1851-1921), among others. Both Erdmann and Stumpfstressed, al
though quite differently to be sure, the relevance of
psychology to philosophical investigation. From 1911
to 1913, Kaufmann studied in Leipzig under Wil
helm Wundt (1832-1920), Johannes Volkelt (1848-
1930) and Eduard Spranger ( 1882-1963). He was
deeply indebted to Volkelt for introducing him to a
metaphysically oriented aesthetics and especially to
Spranger who, in his 1912 course, "Die Philosphie
der Gegenwart," introduced Kaufmann to the philos
ophy of Dilthey within the perspective of Husserl 's
Logische Untersuchungen ( 1900--1901 ). The Dilthey
Husserl connection is a key to understanding Kauf
mann 's phenomenological orientation.
Kaufmann studied with Husserl in Gottingen from
April 1913 until the outbreak of the war in 1914.
He came to study phenomenology, of course, but
a phenomenology whose character and philosophi
cal relevance he interpreted in a unique way. Even
before he arrived in Gottingen, he did not inter
pret phenomenology realistically, nor did he view
Husserl's ldeen zu einer reinen Phănomenologie und phănomenologischen Philosophie 1 ( 1913) as a retreat
back into idealism. In both respects Kaufmann was unique in the Gottingen circle of Husserl's students.
His interest in phenomenology was threefold. In the
first place, he viewed Husserl 's "strengen Sachlichkeit"
as an antidote to nea-Kantian system building. In the
second place, he further interpreted Husserl 's rigorous
method and insistence upon the constitutive function
of consciousness and the correlation of subject and ab
ject as the way to escape the traps of realism, idealism,
and intuitionism. In the third place, and what most dis
tinguishes Kaufmann the phenomenologist, is the fact
that he saw Husserl 's 1913 constitutive analysis of con
sciousness as a rigorous clarification and extension of
Dilthey's interpretati an of historicallife.
Already by 1913 Kaufmann was engaged in
the phenomenological investigation of a historically
viewed, embodied consciousness that can only be de
scribed within the context ofthe world in which it finds
itself. In a 1914 lecture on Kant's ethics, for example,
he rejected both KANT's formalism and MAX SCHELER's
intuitionism regarding values. He claimed that ethical
values must be regarded as "meaning-elements of the
everyday world which can only be understood within
the context of that world." Moreover, as meaning
elements of a historically viewed consciousness, values
are accessible to phenomenological analysis.
In Freiburg after the war Kaufmann continued his
investigation of consciousness as a historical phe
nomenon. While there, he met Heidegger for the first time. Although it would bea mistake to say that Kauf
mann 's philosophical direction was altered by his en
counter with the young Heidegger, it did intensify and
focus his interest in historical consciousness in terms
ofthe new structural analyses ofoASEIN and "being-inthe-world." Heidegger's influence is clear in the first
chapter ofKaufmann 's Freiburg dissertation, Das Bild
werk als ăsthetisches Phănomen (The image as aes
thetic phenomenon, 1924). lts three chapters progres
sively deepen one 's insight into the consciousness of an
artistic image in analyses that are existentially (Heideg
ger), phenomenologically (Husserl), and finally histor
ically (Dilthey) based. The dissertation sets out the ba
sic ideas and subject matter that occupied Kaufmann
throughout his life. His book on Thomas Mann ( 1957),
the last major work that he completed during his life
time, can be viewed as a mature expression of basic
analyses and concepts already present in the 1924 the
sis, applied this time to a particular artist and his work
rather than to artistic consciousness in general. Kaufmann's philosophical vision is rooted in his
passionate commitment to discovering the fundamen
tal nature of reality. Above ali, he was in search of
the TRUTH, and both the content and the form of his thinking are integral to this search as he conceived of
it. Without understanding this, one cannot understand
his writings or his life. His rejection of idealism and realism, his interest in the concept of representation,
and his preoccupation with art and the artistic vision
are ali motivated by that search. His interest in a mid
dle ground between realism and idealism, Dilthey and
Husserl, individual and universal must be understood
in terms ofthe same motivation.
Starting, as always, with historically determined
consciousness, Kaufmann 's thesis examines the con
stitutive process whereby the experience ofthe artistic
representation causes a transformation of conscious-
KOREA
ness and its intended object. In this transformational
process the object of consciousness attains univer
sal significance and consciousness itself becomes en
dowed with universal meaning. Artistic consciousness
is a privileged access to the true nature of reality, ac
cord ing to Kaufmann, which explains its pivotal role
in his writings as a whole. Without access to the true
nature of reality, i.e., without art and, we might add,
philosophy or religion, life is reduced to purely indi
vidual meaning, which for Kaufmann would be a life
that is not fully human, one completely engulfed in the
present moment and its immediate demands. For Kauf
mann, a life reduced to the merely personal is not worth
living, and its valuelessness is revealed with each of
life's tragedies.
More than half of Kaufmann 's published works re
ma in untranslated. His Nachlass, housed at the Husserl
Archives in Leuven, contains both published and un
published material written for the most part in German
longhand and shorthand (Gabelsberger stenography),
as well as in English. It includes notes for the lectures
Kaufmann delivered in Freiburg from 1926 to 1935,
offprints of his many articles in German and English,
originals of his Leipzig and Freiburg Habilitations
schriften, his doctoral thesis, notes for lectures deliv
ered at Northwestern University ( 1938-46) and at the
University ofBuffalo (1946--54) during his refugee pe
riod in the United States, and much ofhis philosophical
correspondence. The current grouping of many of the
documents on aesthetics in the Nachlass, incorporating
material from very early and late periods, reflects Kauf
mann 's plans for a wide-ranging book, to be entitled
Phenomenology of Art, which was never completed.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Kaufmann, Fi-itz. "Die Philosophie des Grafen. Paul Yorck und von Wartenburg." Jahrhuch fiir Phănomenologische Forschung 9 ( 1928), 1-236.
--. "Die Bedeutung der kiinstlischeren Stimmung." Jahrhuch .fiir Phănomenologische Forschung 1 O Ergăn:::ungshand (1929), 191-223.
--. Geschichtsphi/osophie der Gegenwart. Berlin: Junker & Diinhaupt, 1931.
--. "Art and Phenomenology." In Phi/osophical Essays in Memm:1· o{ Edmund Husserl. Ed. Marvin Farber. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1940.
~. "Ethik und Metaphysik." Zeitschriji fi'ir philosophische F orschung 1 O ( 1956 ).
387
~. Das Reich des Schănen. Bausteine ::urei ner Philosophie der Kunst. Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1960 [conta ins a bibliography].
Spiegelberg, Herbert. The Phenomenological Movement. 3rd rev. and enl. ed., with the collaboration of Karl Schuhmann. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. 1982, 248-9.
CHRISTINE SKARDA University o( California, Berkelev
FRED KERSTEN University ol Wisconsin, Green Bay
KOREA The earliest acquaintance of Korean
scholars with phenomenology dates back to the late
1920s and early 1930s, when a handful of Koreans at
tending what was then known as the Keijo Imperial
University in Seoul took part in seminars on EDMUND
HUSSERL, MAX SCHELER, and MARTJN IIEIDF.GGER. Perhaps
it was indicati ve of the general trend of reception of
philosophy from GERMANY at institutions in .JAPAN like
this before World War II that the main interest had al
ready shifted from the somewhat "dated" Husserlian
philosophy to Heidegger's thought. Still retaining the
labei of phenomenology, Heidegger introduced an en
tirely new and, especially to the Orientals, surprisingly
intuitive and appealing way oflooking at human being
and the world. Some of the clearest documents from
this period are an article on Heidegger 's notion of care,
"Haideiga-ni okeru Sorge ni tsuite" ( 1932), and one on
"Haideiga-ni okeru chihei-no monddi" ( 1935), which
were published in the journal Ris o by CHONG HONG PARK.
On the other hand, KI-RAK HA, who wrote "Haidege-e
issese kongkansengkwa sikanseng muncey'' (On spa
tiality and temporality in Heidegger, 1940), criticized
Heidegger for orienting his analysis of DASEIN one
sidely to the issue ofTIME, neglecting the other essential
aspect ofhumankind's being, namely, SPACE.
A serious and systematic study of phenomenology
in Korea shows not only that it reflected the worldwide
Husserl "renaissance," but that it was also sensitive to
what occurred in the works of major followers, reform
ers, and critics of Husserl developed after World War
Il. Seoul National University quickly emerged as the
Republic of Korea's central academic institution af
ter 1945. Its Department of Philosophy was occupied
by respectable senior faculty, one of whom, HYONG
KON KOH, conducted seminars on Heidegger while the
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna, Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner ( eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology. © 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
388 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
aforementioned Park lectured on Kierkegaard, Niet
zsche, and JASPERS. But phenomenology did not gain a
firm foothold on Korean soi! for at least another decade.
Moreover, the ravages of the Korean War ( 1950-53)
had c1aimed heavy tolls on the human and physical re
sources ofthis newly emerging nation, rendering it ali
the more necessary to seek graduate education over
seas.
Thus, from the viewpoint of the history of the re
ception of modern Western philosophy in Korea and
of phenomenology in particular, there was a nearly
absolute hiatus between what was taught in a severely
regimented cultural environment before 1945 and what
was tobe a new learning experience for a growing num
ber ofphilosophy students after 1945. KANT and HEGEL,
the epistemology ofneo-Kantianism as well as BRITISH
EMPIRICISM, pragmatism, and a variety of other schools
of thought continued, but phenomenology was reju
venated by a new generation of scholars who studied
in Europe. During 1959--{) 1, .JEON sooK HAHN studied
in Heidelberg and brought more recent knowledge of
Husserlian phenomenology back to Korea. KAH KYUNG
CHO, who had previously studied in Heidelberg, vis
ited the Husserl Archives in Koln in 1963 and main
tained a close relationship to LUDWIG LANDGREBE. He
was also the first returnee from Europe to teach pheno
menology at Seoul National University. Though he
lectured mostly on Heidegger and his Siljon Chelhak (Philosophy of existence, 1961, 1 Oth ed. 1993) treated
Husserl only marginally, he began Husserl seminars in
the early 1960s, using Die Krisis der europăischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phănomenologie (1936) and Erlahrung und Urteil ( 1939), as well as
Landgrebe's Husserl interpretations.
While three younger colleagues- YER-SU KIM, IN
SUK CHA, and HYONG-HIO KIM- may also be considered
pioneers among Korean phenomenologists trained in
post-war Europe, a steady stream of aspiring students
went to Europe in the 1 970s and 1980s. Thus by 1994,
no less than thirty-five Koreans returned home with
Ph.D. degrees, mostly from German universities, after
having written on phenomenology or in closely re
lated areas. Especially in the early stages ofthe expan
sion and reorganization of Korean universities, study
abroad was a crucial career decision. But unlike young
academics dispatched and supported by their home
institutions, the "freelancing" students never had the
guarantee of an appointment upon returning home,
and this lack of coordination contributed to an over
supply of "foreign" Ph.D's. in philosophy. There are
dozens of well qualified, but unemployed philosophy
degree holders, not a few of them having been trained
in phenomenology. Some moved away from pheno
menology or sought employment in entirely unrelated
areas. Meanwhile, incentives were given to those in
academic positions without the Ph.D. (the degree not
having been previously mandatory) to obtain it. There
were at least twenty-three phenomenology-related dis
sertations accepted during this "grace period" at var
ious Korean universities, raising the current total of
phenomenology-related degree holders, both home ed
ucated and foreign trained, to about sixty.
Given so many specializing in phenomenology, it
was inevitable that phenomenologists formed a perma
nent section of the Korean Philosophical Association
in 1976, and as the volume ofactivity increased further,
the Korean Society for Phenomenology was officially
born in 1978. lts presidents ha ve been MYONG-RO YOON,
JEON SOOK HAIIN, IN-SUK CIIA, and YOUNG-HO LEE. The
official outlet of the Society, fl.vunsang-hak Yim-gu
(Research in Phenomenology), was not intended as a
journal in the strict sense. It is a series ofvolumes pub
lished at varying intervals from papers presented at the
meetings of the society. Such meetings are held four
to six times a year, totaling eighty-four by the end of
1994. Volume titles indicate the common theme under
which the papers are collected and are, in English trans
lation, What is Phenomenology? (1983 ), Phenomenology and Individual Sciences ( 1985), Development of" Phenomenological Issues ( 1984 ), Husserl and Modern Philosophy ( 1990), Phenomenology of" Lif"eworld and Hermeneutic.\· ( 1992), World, Man, and the Intentionality of Consciousness (1992), and Phenomenology and
Practica! Philosophy ( 1993 ).
A significant am o unt ofpubl ication, however, stems
from individual initiatives. According to a recent sur
vey of Korean phenomenology by Jeon Sook Hahn
there are 35 books, roughly 250 articles, and over 36
major titles of translated books that have appeared,
for the most part, during the past quarter of a century.
These statistics do not include the some 60 disserta
tions referred to above, parts of which ha ve been pub
lished separately in shorter articles. In Die HeideggerRezeption in Korea ( 1991 ), GWANG-IL sw lists 288
KOREA
Korean-language titles of books and articles on Hei
degger alone. No doubt there are more lists of spe
cialized titles, such as those on JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, but
such titles can only be suggested here: YER-su KIM, Die bedeutungstheoretische Problematik in den Philosophie Husserls und Wittgensteins (1966); IN-SUK CHA,
Eine Untersuchung uber der Gegenstandsbegriff in der Phănomenologie E. Husserls ( 1968); MYONG-RO
YOON, On the Objectivism of the German-Austrain School ( 1971 ); KYU-YOUI\G KIM, lntentionality and Visua! Direction in Husserl 's Time Constitution (1974);
JEON sooK HAHN, The Cartesian and Non-Cartesian Way for Husserl (1975); KWANG-HIE SOH, Time and Time-Consciousness in A ugustine and Husserl ( 1977);
OH-HYUN SHIN, Sartre :5 Concept of the Self ( 1977);
KEEL-WOO LEE, Subjektivităt und lntersubjektivităt: Un
tersuchungen zur Theorie des geistigen Seins bei E.
Husserl und N. Hartmann ( 1984 ); CHONG-HYON PAEK,
Phănomenologische Untersuchung zum Gegenstandsbegrţff in Kants "Kritik der reinen Vernunfi" (1985);
JEONG-OK CHO, "Liebe" bei Max Scheler unter besonderer Beriicksichtigung des Begriffs "Eros" ( 1990);
KWAN-SUNG CHO, Das Verstăndnis van Phiinomenologie bei Roman fngarden ( 1990); HAK-SOON KANG, Die Bedeutung von Heideggers Nietzsche-Deutung im Zuge der Verwindung der Metaphysik ( 1990); NAM-IN
LEE, Edmund Husserls Phănomenologie der Instinkte ( 1991 ); ZAE-SHICK CHOI, Der phănomenologische Feldbegriffbei Aran Gurwitsch (1994).
One may wonder what the central contribution of
Korean phenomenology thus far might be. More than
any other thought significantly accepted, transmitted,
and assimilated across national and cultural bound
aries, phenomenology is conscious· ofthe problematics
of how and why such knowledge of the "other" is
possible. The factual encounter with and the possible
assimilation of an "alien world" (Fremdwelt) as dif
ferent from my own "familiar world" (Heimwelt) is
predicated on the structure of the "horizon" and the
phenomenological sense of the WORLD as the "total
horizon" of human experience. The alien part of the
world, however, is never so totally severed from mine
or so abysmally strange as to defeat ali my efforts to
understand it. According to Husserl, it is always by
way ofprojecting and extrapolating from my own per
spective that 1 can have access to an alien perspective
and assimilate it.
389
Time and again, students from Asia traveling to Eu
rope would ha veto face the curious question from their
Western teachers and peers as to how they overcame the
barriers of language and the entirely different cultural
tradition. Without false modesty, Asian students nor
mally responded by saying that they had "brought with
them" the basic ability to understand the seemingly dif
ferent West and only failed previously to explain what
they have been doing ali along, which was to bring
what they already knew about their own tradition to
bear upon the new and unfamiliar one.
If Korean scholars have truly understood some of
the most basic problems of phenomenology "origi
nally," it must be because they were able in princi
ple to recognize them as their own problems. This
could be made manifest in the way they "interpret"
those problems "differently," and yet in a manner es
sentially faithful to the phenomena. Until recently, this
"affinity recognition" has been ignored in the interest
ofintellectually more gratifying higher-level construc
tions. But we have to descend into the lower layers
of conscious life and explicate the structures and re
lations between what is "founding" and what is "be
ing founded." Moods or basic states of mind ( Grundstimmungen) such as anxiety, sorrow, shame, boredom,
wonder, and doubt are always there in reallife regulat
ing the lifestyles of Buddhism, Zen Buddhism, Con
fucianism, and Taoism, and yet, seldom analyzed in
their constituting function for the higher order of ideas
and values. They must become topics of sharpened
analysis. In this connection, NAM-IN LEE's recent work
has disclosed, through a great feat of empathetic read
ing, a congenial ground in Husserl 's theory of instincts
that shows his phenomenology to be a "universal vol
untarism." More intercultural phenomenology may be
built on this basis.
There ha ve also been attempts to apply the insights,
methodological and otherwise, gained of phenomen
ology to inherently Korean thought. In Yul-Gok-kwa Merleau-Ponty bikyo Yengoo (A comparative study of
Yul-Gok and Merleau-Ponty, 1972), HYONG-HIO KIM has
compared, for example, Yul-Gok, a noted Confucian
scholar of 16th century Korea, with MAURICE MERLEAU
PONTY. He also connects Husserl 's notion of LIFEWORLD
to the way the concept of TRUTH is formed in tradi
tional Korean thought. But similar short essays by Kim
on ancient stories and myths can be regarded more as
390 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
preliminary pointers than precedent-setting exemplars
in intercultural phenomenology. His most recent work,
Derrida-wa Nojang-uy Tokbup (Derrida and the art of
reading Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu, 1987), is a much
more spirited attempt at an East-West synthesis that
merits international critica] review. Another philoso
pher, .IYONG-BOK RIE, was a participant in the Third
Oriental Phenomenology Congress, sponsored by the
World Institute for Advanced Phenomenological Re
search and Learning ( 1992), and presented a paper en
titled "Eine Hermeneutik des Symbols im Buch der
Wandlungen."
Most Korean phenomenologists, though trained in
Europe and multilingual, adjust to the academic envi
ronment at home soon after returning, and are obliged
to publish for the most part in their native tongue.
Exceptions are those with long-term or permanent
overseas appointments, thus having much freer ac
cess to conferences and publications in Westem lan
guages. For example, a POLITIC AL SCIENTIST residing in
the United States, IIWA YOL JUNG, has made himself
known through erudite and elegant essays on pheno
menological, existential, and hermeneutica! subjects.
Perhaps his "Heidegger's Way with Sinitic Thinking"
( 1987) should be mentioned as a typically intercultural
and international contribution by an overseas Korean scholar. YINHUI PARK, though now returned to Korea
permanently, was also a frequent participant in phenomenological conversations in the U"'ITED STATES during
his decades-long teaching career in Boston.
However, a more durable bond has been estab
lished between the international community of phe
nomenologists and Korean scholars through the activ
ities of KAH KYUNG cHo. His "Gedanken abseits der
dichotomischen Welterklarung" ( 1967) was the first
attempt by an Asian to review critically Heidegger's
relationship with Lao Tzu and his conversation with a
Japanese visitor entitled "Aus einem Geschach von der
Sprache." Cho's lecture, "Anschauung und Abstrak
tion im Lichte der modernen Wissenschaftentheorie"
( 1969) was also the first major phenomenological pre
sentation by a Korean scholar at an international con
ference. More recently, at the Xlllth Conference ofthe
General Society of German Philosophy, Cho pointed
out the significance of physis for Heidegger's thought
of Being in a widely noted paper, "Die okologische
Suggestibilitat der Spatphilosophie Heideggers" (Eco-
logica! suggestibility in Heidegger's !ater philosophy, 1986).
Landgrebe noted in his introduction to Cho 's Bewusstsein and Natursein ( 1987) that whereas most
Japanese tried to appropriate Husserlian phenomen
ology by setting it against the background of Zen Bud
dhism, Cho made his knowledge ofTaoist philosophy relevant to interpreting phenomenology. Phenomen
ology was seen as an extreme form ofthe modern "phi
losophy of consciousness." Gratifying though the great
degree of self-transparency was that consciousness
has achieved from its subject-centered coNSTITUTIVE
PHENOMENOLOGIC AL perspective, Husserl himself even
tually had to face the consequences of having blurred
the boundary of ordo essendi and ordo cognoscendi. His talk of the primacy of the lifewordly a priori, and
a bodily a priori, ofthe "norm-giving" authority ofthe "factual"- as well as his admission ofthe unsurpass
ability of "world logic" by ali real as well as possible
logics-all this points to the limits ofthe philosophy of
consciousness and suggests the need for a different kind
of openness toward what !ies beyond consciousness.
Heidegger's !ater philosophy may be construed as an
attempt at opening such a consciousness-transcending
vîsta in an approximation to Lao Tzu's posture of"let
ting be."
The future ofphenomenology in Korea depends on the possibility of creatively participating in ongoing
international dialogues. Fresh cues coming from reve
lations about Husserl 's universal voluntarism and mon
adology suggest, if anything, that the opportunity rad
ically to rethink the problem of intersubjective and so
cial understanding beckons- a very real opportunity
if multi cultural and ETHNIC diversity are to function in today's globallife with more than a semblance ofhar
mony born offear. Lack ofvenues, especially for those
who were trained early to express themselves also in English or German, but having no means to keep it up
once they returned home, has been a sorely felt handi
cap for Korean scholars. The recently inaugurated se
ries of publication, Orbis Phănomeno/ogicus, holds
out a promise of bridging such a gap. Volumes under
preparation include Korean Contributions to Pheno
menology.
ALEXANDRE KOYRE 391
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Cho, Kah Kyung, ed. Philo~ophy and Science in Phenomenological Perspective. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1984.
~. Bewusstsein und Natursein. Phănomenologischer WestOst-Diwan. Freiburg: Karl A1ber, 1987.
Hahn, Jeon Sook. Hyensanghakuy ihhae [Understanding of phenomeno1ogy]. Seou1: Minumsa, 1984.
~. Hyensanghak: Gu Ppoorlilul Chajase [Phenomeno1ogy: In search of its roots]. Seou1: Minumsa, 1995.
Jung, Hwa Yol. "Heidegger's Way with Sinitic Thinking." In Heidegger and Asian Thought. Ed. Graham Parkes. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987,217--44.
Kim, Hyong-Hio. Gabriel Marcel-uy goochey chelhakkwa yejenquy hyengisanghak [The philosophy ofthe concrete and the metaphysics of being-on-the-way]. Seoul: Ingansarang, 1990.
~. Derrida-wa Nocang-uy Tokbup [Derrida and the art of reading Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu]. Seol: Hankwuk Jungsinmwunhwa Yenkuwen, 1987.
Kim, Young-Han. Heidegger-eyse Rica:ur-kkaji: Hyentay chelhakjek haysekhaklnva sinhakjek haysekhay [From Heidegger to Ricreur: Philosophical herrneneutics and theological hermeneutics of modem times]. Seoul: Bakyengsa, 1987.
Lee, Ki-Sang. Heidegger-uy siljonkwa ene [Existence and language in Heidegger]. Seoul: Mwunyey chwulphansa, 1991.
Lee, Nam-ln. Edmund Husserls Phănomenologie der Instinkte. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993.
Park, Yinhui. Hyensanghakkwa bwunsekchelhak [Phenomenology and analytic philosophy]. Seou1: Iljokak, 1977.
Seo, Gwang-11. Die Heidegger-Rezeption in Korea. Ph.D. diss., Diisse1dorf, 1991.
Shin, Oh-Hyun. Jayuwa bikuyk: Sartre-uy ingansiljonlon [Freedom and tragedy: Sartre's theory of human being]. Seou1: Moonhakga Jisengsa, 1979.
Suh, Woo-Suk. Umak hyensanghak [Music and phenomeno1ogy]. Seoul: Seoul University Press, 1989.
KAH-KYUNG CHO State University of New York, Buffalo
NAM-IN LEE Seoul National University
ALEXANDRE KOYRE Koyre was bom in
Odessa on August 29, 1892, and died in Paris on April
28, 1964. He went to Paris in 1908, probably to study
mathematics (and philosophy). During winter 1909-
1 O he moved to Gottingen, at that time the "Mecca of
mathematics," where especially Ernst Zermelo ( 1871-
1953) was working on set-theoretic paraduxes such
as Russell 's antinomy, and ADOLF REINACH, appointed
Privatdozent only in 1909, was working on classical
paradoxes in philosophy (the liar, Zeno's paradoxes).
Already at the end of his first Gottingen semester, in
February 191 O, Koyre was a leading figure in the circle
of young students of phenomeno1ogy there. He man
aged to procure for Reinach a set of the proofs of an
article on the psychology of judgment that Karl Marbe
(1869-1953) was about to publish; probab1y on this
basis Reinach criticized Marbe's views in an article on
negative judgment that appeared in 1911.
In summer 191 O, Koyre attended not only the lec
tures of David Hi1bert (1862-1943) on fundamental
problems of mathematics, but also Reinach 's lecture
course on Plato, in which the pre-Socratics ( especially
Zen o, who is criticized along with Russell 's Principles
of Mathematics of 1903 ), Socrates, and three early di
alogues by Plato were treated. Although Koyre stated,
in his own lntroduction a la !ee ture de Platon ( 1945),
that he had "leamed to understand Plato only by ex
plaining him," it is noteworthy that in the first part of
this work he treats Meno, Protagoras, and Theaetetus,
which are precise1y the dialogues Reinach had dea1t
within1910.
In winter 1910--11 Koyre turned to experimen
tal psychology and entered a lasting friendship with
David Katz (1884-1953), an assistant in psychology at
Gottingen whose psycho1ogical work was influenced
by Reinach. He a)so tumed to EDMUND HUSSERL. He
attended Husserl's lectures on logic as theory of cogni
tion, those ofReinach on KANT's critique ofreason, and
the meetings of the Gottingen Philosophical Society,
where ali the students of phenomenology participated.
Together with Reinach, MAX SCHELER, and two other
students, he even participated in an "inner circle" of
this society where he presented his own ideas on math
ematical and logica! paradoxes. He also discussed them
with Hilbert's assistant Richard Courant ( 1888-1972),
a cousin of EDITH STEIN.
In 1911 Koyre lectured to the society on HENRI BERG
soN. He must have leamed about Bergsonian thought
in Paris. Husserl first heard of Bergson through this
lecture. In the same year Koyre prepared three unpub
lished manuscripts, "Insolubilia," "Die Antinomien
der Mengenlehre," and "Paradoxa als Perpetuum mo
bile." His very first publication, "Sur les nombres de
M. Russell" in Revue de Metaphysique et Morale,
carne from this fund of ideas. Russell 's definition of
number in The Principles of Mathematics was said
to contain paradoxes and thus could not serve as
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna, Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner ( eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology. © 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
392 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
a foundation for mathematics (Russell published a "Reponse a M. Koyre"). From the same source Koyre also derived "Bemerkungen zu den Zenonischen Paradoxen," which was published in Husserl 's Jahrhuch fiir Philosophie und phănomenologische Forschung in 1922. There he insists, against Reinach 's way of sol ving Zeno's problem by means of an analysis ofthe concept ofmotion, that the paradox in question is common to motion, infinity, and continuity and thus requires a broader framework for its solution. Notwithstanding this critica! approach, the article is dedicated "to the memory of AdolfReinach": Koyre's erstwhile teacher who had been killed in action in 1917. Finally, the two !ater articles, "The Liar" and "Manifold and Category," published in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research after World War II, are ultimately drawn from the same fund of ideas.
In March 1912, Koyre submitted his manuscripts to Husserl, who studied them carefully and in part annotated and took excerpts from them. Nevertheless, he considered them insufficient as a basis for Koyre's projected doctoral dissertation. Finding his way thus blocked, Koyre followed Reinach's advice and returned to France in late 1912 or early 1913. Like his lifelong friend and fellow Gottingen student HED
WIG CONRAD-MARTIUS, he had meanwhile developed a strong interes! in religion. At the same time, Reinach 's vast erudition had aroused in him a strong interes! in the history of philosophy. Accordingly, he took the doctorat es lettres at the Sorbonne in June 1923 with two works, L 'idee de Dieu et les preuves de son existence chez Descartes ( 1922) and L 'idee de Dieu dans la philosophie de Saint Anselme ( 1923). In his orals he defended Scheler's phenomenology of religion against the scholar of German literature Henri Lichtenberger (1864-1941).
After Reinach's death, Husserl became the leading figure of the phenomenological movement for Koyre too. He paid him extended visits, first in July 1921 and again in September and October 1922. Another visit in October 1928 was meant to help prepare Husserl 's Paris lectures, for which Husserl had been invited by Lichtenberger at Koyre's instigation. In these lectures, given in February 1929, Husserl referred publicly to "the fine and profound investigations of Messrs. Gilson and Koyre" that had made clear the presence of Scholastic thought in Descartes 's philoso-
phy. Husserl had worked out a summary ofthese lectures for the French audience and the translation, while anonymous, is without doubt the work of Koyre. In Paris Husserl was also present at Koyre 's defense of his thesis, La philosophie de .Jacoh Boehme ( 1929). Part of it also appeared, in Conrad-Martius's translation, as "Die Gotteslehre Jakob Boehmes" in the Husserl Festschrift ( 1929). Koyre was a bie to travel to Freiburg for the presentation because of a grant from Husserl. A month !ater Husserl sent the expanded manuscript ofhis Paris lectures to Koyre, who revised the french translation of it by EMMANUEL LFVINAS and Gabrielle Pfeiffer and supervised the publication of Husserl 's las! book, Meditations Cartesiennes (1931 ); in fact, Husserl considered him as the "true translator" of this work. In July 1932, while Koyre was staying with Husserl for what was to be his last visit to Germany, Husserl was elected a Corresponding Member of the French Academie des Sciences morales et politiques. Here again Koyre had played a decisive role by writing the four-page report to Leon Brunschvicg (1869-1944) on the basis ofwhich Husserl was elected.
In Paris, Koyre co-founded the journal Recherches Philosophiques ( 193 I-36), which introduced phenomenology into FRANCE by publishing translations of work by, among others, Conrad-Martius, HELMUTII
PLESSNER, OSKAR BECKER, MARTIN HEIDEGGER, and KARL
LOWITH. The journal also published the first studies of JEAN WAHL, GABRIEL MARCEL, and JEAN-PAUL SARTRE.
When an eventually short-lived scientific committee for the edition of Scheler's posthumous work (he had died in 1928) was formed in 1932, Koyre was called to serve on its board. He was also among the first members ofthe International Phenomenological Society founded by MARVIN FARBER in 1940. Nevertheless, he told HERBERT SPIEGELBERG in 1956 that he did not know whether he was a phenomenologist or not. At the same time, however, he spoke ofHusserl 's influence on him as decisive. Actually, this statement results from a certain distortion of historical perspective, for the Platonic realism, historical approach, and high regard for medieval objectivism that Koyre on that occasion erroneously attributed to Husserl are ali hallmarks of Reinach 's approach.
It was also in line with Reinach that at the 1932 meeting of the Societe Thomiste in Juvisy on phenomenology Koyre declared himself in agreement with
ALEXANDRE KOYRE 393
Edith Stein, who asserted: "Husserl never managed
to convince any of his old students of the necessity
to arrive at a transcendental idealism." Such expres
sions werc more of general convictions inherited from
Reinach, rather than thcmes Koyre would ha ve worked
on, for his interest in the connection between the his
tory of philosophy and that of RELIGION soon had also
led him to the bistory of NATURAL SCILNCE. It is in these
historical fields and above ali on their interconnection
that his work had become concentrated and that he at
tained prominence. During 1922--40 he taught mainly
at the Ecole Pratique des Hautcs Etudes in Paris. In
1941 he became Professor at the French Ecole Libre
co-foundcd by him at the New School for Social Re
search in New York. He returned to the Ecole Pratique
in 1945 and continued teaching there, except for vis
its to the UNITED STATES (Columbia University, Univer
sity of Chicago, Johns Hopkins University, and above
ali the Princeton Institute for Advanced Study), which
continued until 1962.
Koyn!'s work spans an amazing variety ofthemes.
As regards the history of phi1osophy, he published,
besides his aforementioned books on Plato, Anselm,
and Descartes, annotated French translations of texts
by Anselm, Fides quaerens intellectum (1927), and
Spinoza, Trai te de la reforme de l'entendement ( 1936).
In 1944 his Entretiens sur Descartes appeared. He
had written La philosophie et le probleme national
en Russie au debut du X!Xe siecle in 1929. A col
lection of related articles appeared in 1950 under the
tit le Etudes d 'histoire de la pensee philosophique en
Russie. Another collection, Etudes d 'histoire de la
pensee philosophique ( 1961 ), brings together articles
on Condorcet, Hegel, Louis de Bonald, and Heidegger.
As concerns the history of religious thought, in
1955 Koyre published, in addition to his early book
on Boehme, a collection of articles, Mystiques, spir
ituels, alchimistes du XV!e siecle allemand dealing
with Valentin Weigel, Caspar Schwenckfeld, Sebas
tian Franck, and Paracelsus. But he is above ali the
author of severa! major classics in history of sci
ence, such as his Etudes galileennes (Galilean stud
ies, 1940), on the laws of falling bodies and iner-
tia; From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe
( 1957), which traces the history of cosmology from
Nicholas of Cusa to Leibniz; and the more special
ized work, La revolution astronomique, Copernic, Ke
plet: Borelli ( 1961 ). In 1965, 1. B. Cohen published
Koyre's Newtonian Studies on Newton's "Rules of
Phi1osophizing," his optics, and the law of attrac
tion posthumously. A year !ater Rene Taton collected
most of Koyre 's articles on Leonardo da Vinei, Gio
vanni Battista Benedetti, Galileo, Bonaventura Cav
alieri, Pierre Gassendi, Nicolo Tartaglia, and Blaise
Pascal under the title Etudes d 'histoire de la pensee
scientifique. Already in 1934 Koyre had published an
annotated French trans1ation ofBook I ofCopernicus's
main work as N. Copernic, Des revolutions des orbes
celestes. Togetherwith 1. B. Cohen he also prepared the
two-volume critica] cdition of Newton's main work,
Philosophiae natura lis principia mathematica ( 1972).
Materials of a more biographical nature are contained
in De la mystique a la science: Cours, conferences
et documents 1922-1962, edited by Pietro Redondi in
1986. Koyre's influence made itself fe1t above ali among
historians of science in the United States, France, and
Italy. More particularly, it should be mentioned that
Thomas Kuhn developed his theory of paradigms out
of Koyre's work, where the very expression "scien
tific revolution" was coined. A two-volume Festschrift,
Metanges Alexandre Koyre publies a l'occasion de son
70e anniversaire ( 1964), testifies to his unique signif
icance in this field. An issue of the Revue d 'Histoire
des Sciences et leurs Applications ( 1965) is devoted
to his memory; also worthy of mention is Gerard Jor
land, La science dans la philosophie. Les recherches
epistemologiques d 'Aiexandre Koyre (1981 ). Under
the title Science: The Renaissance of a History, Pietro
Redondi published the proceedings of a conference on
Koyre's thought in an issue of History and Technol
ogy. Koyre's Nachlass is kept at the Centre Alexandre
Koyre, Museum National d'Histoire Naturelle, Paris.
KARL SCHUHMANN Universiteit Urrechr