[contributions to phenomenology] encyclopedia of phenomenology volume 18 || s

JEAN-PAUL SARTRE Sartre was bom in Paris on June 21, 1905. He studied philosophy and

passed his agregation examination at the Ecole Nor

male Superieure in 1929. After eighteen months of military service as a meteorologist he taught ata lycee

in Le Havre from 1930 to 1936. During this time he became greatly inftuenced by phenomenology, particularly by the writings of EDMUND HUSSERL and MAR

TIN HEIDEGGER. Although precise details of when and how Sartre was exposed to their writings are still be

ing chronicled, what is clear is his strong attraction, which led him to study Husserl 's writings in Berlin

from November 1933 to July 1934 on a grant from the French Institute. It was during this period that he wrote La nausee ( 1938), arguably a phenomenological novel, and began La transcendance de 1 'ego ( 1936), his first sustained treatment of Husserl 's work.

From then on phenomenology, as Sartre developed,

modified, and extended it, played a prominent role in his work, even as he seemed to reject it !ater in his career. In his earliest work he cites, and clearly has studied, Husserl 's Logische Untersuchungen (2nd ed., 1913 ), ldeen zu einer reinen Phiinomenologie und

phiinomenologischen Philosophie 1 ( 1913 ), Vorlesun

gen zur Phiinomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins

(1928), Formale und transzendentale Logik (1929), and Meditations cartesiennes ( 1931 ). In addition, he seems to ha ve read widely in other of Husserl 's writings and some ofhis commentators such as EUGEN FINK.

Sartre 's version of phenomenology has its roots in Hei

degger's writings as well; his working from Sein und

Zeit ( 1927) and Was ist Metaphysik? ( 1929) is especially clear in his L 'etre et le neant ( 1943 ).

Severa! of Sartre's earlier writings, including the previously mentioned works as well as L 'imagination

(1936) and L 'imaginaire (1940), are direct responses to themes in the writings of Husserl and Heidegger. Chief among these are the · INTENTIONALITY of consciousness; the distinction between consciousness and

that of which there is consciousness; IMAGINATION vs. PERCEPTION; EMOTION; the status of the EGO; and the roJe of EIDETIC METHOD and FUNDAMENTAL ONTOLOGY.

As many of Sartre's commentators have tried to sort

out, his versions ofhow Husserl and Heidegger developed these themes may be based on some misunderstandings, yet his own descriptions can be appreciated in their own right.

Fundamental to Sartre's method was his notion of reflection as focusing on conscious intentionallife. He characterized phenomenology as proceeding through

intuition, by which he meant putting oneself, in reflection, in the presence of the object being described as

it is presented, as a NOEMA. This was Sartre 's way of characterizing Husserl 's phenomenological reduction. He very early described the intentionality of conscious

ness as putting us in direct contact with objects and he effusively praised Husserl, as early as 1939, for the move to seeing objects as not being immanent in con

sciousness. The object ofreflection could be either the consciousness ofwhatever, or that ofwhich consciousness was conscious ~ the latter being a particular factual object, a previous or expected consciousness of whatever, or an essence. This meant the resulting de

scriptions could be either factual or eidetic. Although Sartre called this method a transcendental o ne, he used the term "transcendental" to apply to the present phase of consciousness whether it is reflecting or not. What is meant by "intuition," "reflection," and "transcendental" can be seen particularly well in his description of consciousness as nonegological.

In La transcendance de !'ego, Sartre described the ego, or self, as a "relative" existent, like the objects

ofthe world, that is, an object for consciousness; consciousness itself is non-egological. According to him, every time I reflect on my conscious life an ego ap

pears as the one who was doing the thinking. This ego appears, however, only in a reftective operation wherein consciousness looks upon itself as an object. In other words, the reflecting conscious process directs

itself to the reflected-upon conscious process, which

did not reflect upon itself previously but was, instead, a straightforward consciousness ofwhatever. It is only in this further act that an ego appears. The ego observed

at the reflective level is given as transcendent and permanent apart from the individual conscious process through which it is presented; it does not appear as the

Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna, 620 Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia ofPhenomenology. @ 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.

JEAN-PAUL SARTRE 621

reflected-upon consciousness, but rather as apart from,

or behind, the particular consciousness through which

it appears. The ego is seen as having a real existence

that is transcendent to the object being confronted, in

this case, the activity of viewing. Consequently, the

ego is like ali objects and can be given in intuition,

i.e., the direct seeing of the object, "in person." Ini

tially and most fundamentally consciousness is none

gological. This fundamental level of consciousness is

termed by Sartre transcendental consciousness. This

is the for-itself (le pour-soi), the impersonal sponta

neous consciousness. It is impersonal because there is

no person, ego, or self at this level and it is sponta

neous because there is no-thing determining or even

motivating a necessary course of action or project.

With this description of consciousness Sartre clearly

followed Husserl 's method and descriptions to the

point of accepting without question the correlation of

consciousness and its intended object as intended, both

ofwhich are given at one stroke. The object is relative

to consciousness and yet is not a part or piece of it.

From his earliest writings on, Sartre continued to praise

Husserl 's method and results for restoring to things

their reality while preserving the role consciousness

plays. The application of this method was displayed

extremely well in his work on the imagination in the

books mentioned above. Sartre wanted to claim that the way an image, or

feigned object, appears is analogous to PERCEPTION,

rather than an image being a copy of a perceptual ob

ject. Both an act of perception and an act of imagina

tion aim at their objects, which are not parts of con

sciousness. The difference between them is partly on

the si de of the conscious act; imagination is a kind of

quasi-observation in which the object is characterized

as lacking certain positive existential characters. Yet

ali intentiona! objects have transcendence. Basically

this means, as it did in the case of the ego, that ali

objects give rise to the "ontologica! proof." As Sartre

develops it in L 'etre et le neant, this is the move from

seeing that the phenomenon ofbeing- being as it dis

closes itself in a particular phenomenon, which is the

intentiona! object- requires in its essence that what

exists for consciousness must exist not only insofar as

it appears.

Consciousness itself is not sufficient to account for

what appears and the being ofthis appearance, because

consciousness always and of necessity aims not only

at, but beyond, its object, which is the totality ofits ap

pearances. This totality of appearances cannot exist, be

given to consciousness, aliat the same time. Instead it is

essential to what it means tobe a series of appearances

that they are ali absent except for the one to which

attention is now directed. It is their absence coupled

with their presence through the past appearings that

gives them objectivity. The being of the appearances,

Sartre argues, is defined as a lack, as that which is not

consciousness. Their being is revealed as a being that

is not consciousness and as already existing when con

sciousness reveals it. This is part of Sartre's contention

that consciousness is not something that confers being;

rather, it is nothing apart from that of which it is con

scious. Thus the essence ofwhat appears includes that

its existence does not depend on the consciousness of

it for its being.

This transphenomenal being is not a noumenal be

ing hidden behind the appearings, the phenomena. By

"transphenomenal" Sartre means that the being of the

phenomenon presents itself as not reducible to either

the consciousness of it - otherwise there would be

no objectivity- nor to a transcendent object- then

there would be no appearing distinct from this object.

Each appearance is itself a transcendent being, and

consciousness of it can be defined only in terms of

this something that is transcendent and whose being is

transphenomenal. Consciousness is consciousness of

itself in a nonobjectivating awareness of itself as that

which is supported and defined by this phenomenon

whose being is transphenomenal. The picture is of con

sciousness aware of itself as that which 1s supported in

its being by a being that is not itself.

Severa! important points emerge from these analy

ses of the ego and intentiona! objects yielding further

insight into the relation of Sartre's phenomenology to

that of Husserl and Heidegger. Although Sartre tried to

distance himself significantly from Husserl, especially

with respect to the ego and the reality ofthe intentiona!

objects, there is hardly any difference in the result

ing descriptions, as the preceding analyses show. The

correlation conception of consciousness, with the at

tendant status of the ego and objects as constituted

through the workings of consciousness, is very much

the same in both Husserl and the early work of Sartre.

The primary difference is Sartre's articulation of the

622 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY

ro le of nothingness, or lack, at the fundamental level of consciousness, which results in a dualism of an impersonal spontaneous consciousness and its object.

However, both Sartre and Husserl did ontology in the same way. As experienced, reality is not tobe compared with some unexperienced or "true" reality, nor is it to be questioned about its origin. Instead, to paraphrase Sartre, experienced reality just is. In this way they challenged the assumption and did not enter into the controversy about whether they have made a correct description of some unavailable transcendent reality, or whether such a description is possible. This shift of attitude, which is the phenomenological reduction, moves from the necessity of an answer to the question "what is the nature of reality?" to a description of how the various worlds including the "real" one, as well as this question, arise in and from our experience. Most importantly, the description of being as it is meant in our experience is explicated and found to be the answer desired. This kind of concern eventuated in Sartre 's ontologica! "proof' that the essence of the being of the phenomenon includes its transphenomenality. Consequently, Sartre developed a phenomenological ontology but without a prejudice about what the answer must look like or that it must answer the traditional questions.

Sartre 's relation to Heidegger is much more difficult to track because it is an interactive one. Sartre said he learned about historicity and authenticity from Heidegger as he turned from Husserl 's idealism toward Heidegger, around 193 7. Fundamental to this turn, which was not a complete one because Sartre throughout retained his notion of consciousness as described above, was a perceived need to ground his analyses in the concrete, in human reality as situated in the historical world. In Esquisse d 'une theorie des emotions (Sketch of a theory ofthe emotions, 1939), Sartre praised Heidegger for giving us a view of human reality and the need to question ourselves-a view that is phenomenological, yet with a shift in focus. As he wrote in Les carnets de la drâle de guerre: Novembre 1939-Mars

1940 (War diaries, 1983), Sartre thought that Heidegger had given him the tools to understand his history and situation. However, Heidegger's own assessment was quite different: he claimed Sartre had vulgarized his ideas in L "etre et le neant.

At this stage in his development Sartre basically

conflated the Husserlian consciousness with Heideggerian DASEIN while emphasizing the voluntaristic nature of consciousness set over against ali objects; the for-itself and the in-itself are heterogeneous. Pure reflection should reveal consciousness freely constituting its projects and the world such that being-in-the-world is only a characterization of the reflected-upon consciousness ofthe world.

In his !ater writings, Sartre seemed to think phenomenology was inadequate to cope with the experience of social conditioning and that concrete situated freedom was at odds with the empty spontaneous consciousness of his previous work. lnterestingly, however, one can see him still using phenomenology even in "Question de methode" and Critique de la raison dialectique ( 1960), wherein he promoted the dialectica! progressive-regressive method, which moves back and forth from an awareness of the social and historical conditioning - the cultural context - to the historical particularity of the individual. This dialectic is still based on a phenomenological appreciation and description of human experience as the starting point of the analysis. The emphasis on the role of lived experience in his !ater writings can be seen as retaining the need for a phenomenological explication of experience but with an increasing commitment to contextualizing phenomenological descriptions by coordinating the ro le of interior and exterior experience, as well as acknowledging the force of circumstances. In Cahiers pour une morale (Notebooks for an ethics, 1983), which was finished around 1945, Sartre goes even further and explicitly says that Husserl and Heidegger are minor philosophers, and HEGEL and MARX are seen by him as having a major influence on his ideas.

Severa! other phenomenologists played a role on Sartre's development. His earlier reading of MAX SCHELER helped convince him that as part of each of our personal fundamental projects there exists VALUEs that help to regulate our acts and judgments. These are, in effect, part of our lived experience and not derived from some universal value system. WILHELM DILTHEY's influence is particularly evident in Sartre's explication of lived experience as including an understanding of how individual projects are enabled in their interaction with the historical system. Sartre's long association and collaboration with SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR and MAURICE

SCANDINAVIA 623

MERLEAU-PONTY resulted in an extensive crossfertiliza

tion of each oftheir works. A full appreciation ofhow

their individual works interpenetrated and inftuenced

each other is stil! underway.

Many of the themes in Sartre's philosophizing

are further evident and developed in his numerous

contributions to LITERATURE, THEATER, and POLITICS.

Throughout these works, as his various concems

emerged, matured, and were modified, there remained

a consistent appraisal and reappraisal of how con

sciousness/freedom interacts with the historical con

ditions/conditioning.

Sartre seems to further decenter the primacy ofthe

individual consciousness in the very last period ofhis

life and speaks of individuals as always already ob

ligated toward the Other and as given within a so

cial and historical set of conditions. However, what

remains clear throughout his work is a strong com

mitment to describing human experience as experi

enced. Whether or not a full and adequate description

oflived experience will reveal and uphold Sartre 's orig

inal views about the primacy of individual spontaneous

consciousness and the independent ro le of objects re

mains an open question. What is clear, however, is his

continuous attempts until his death on April 15, 1980

to legitimate his insights about how human beings are

both free and products of themselves and their situa

tions.

FOR FURTHER STUDY

Busch, Thomas W. The Power of Consciousness and the Force of Circumstances in Sartre :S Philosophy. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1990.

Cumming, Robert. Phenomenology and Deconstruction. 2 vols. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991-93.

Embree, Lester. "The Natural-Scientific Constitutive Phenomenological Psychology of Humans in the Earliest Sartre." Research in Phenomenology il ( 1981 ), 41-61.

Ho1mes, Richard. The Transcendence ofthe World. Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 1995.

Howells, Christina, ed. The Cambridge Companion ta Sartre. Cambridge: Cambridge Universtty Press, 1992.

Sartre, Jean-Paul. "La transcendance de l'ego: Esquisse d'une description phcnomenologique." Recherches philosophiques 6 (1936--37), 85-123; rpt. as La transcandence de !'ego: Esquisse d 'une description phimomenologique. Paris: Vrin, 1965; The Transcendence of the Ego. Trans. Forrest Williams and Robert Kirkpatrick. New York: Noonday Press. 1957.

-. L 'imagination. Paris: Alcan, 1936; lmagination. Trans.

Forrest Williams. Ann Arbor. MI: University of Michigan Press, 1962.

--·. L 'imaginaire. Pans: Gallimard, 1940; Psychology ofthe Imagina/ion. Trans. Bemard Frcchtman. New York: Philosophical Librarv, 1948.

--. Esquisse d 'une theorie des emotions. Paris: Hermann, 1939; Sketchfor a Themy ofthe Emotions. Trans. Philip Mairet. London: Methuen, 1962.

-.La nausee. Paris: Gallimard, 1938; Nausea. Trans. Lloyd Alexander. New York: New Directions, 1964.

-.Les carnets de la dr6le de guerre: Novembre 1939--Mars 1940. Paris: Gallimard, 1983; The War Diaries. Trans. Quintin Hoare. New York: Pantheon Books, 1984.

-. L 'etre el neant. Paris: Gallimard, 1943; Being and Nothingness. Trans. Hazel Bames. New York: Philosophical Library, 1956.

-. Qu 'est-ce que la literature? Paris: Gallimard, 1948; What is Litera ture. Trans. Bernard Frechtman. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988.

--. "Question de methodc." In his Critique de la raison dialectique. Paris: Gallimard, 1960; Searchfor a Method. Trans. Hazel Barnes. New York: Vintage Books, 1968.

-. Critique de la raison dialectique. Paris: Gallimard, 1960; Critique of Dialectica! Reason. Trans. Alan SheridanSmith. London: New Left Books, 1976.

-. Cahiers pour une morale. Paris: Gallimard, 1983; Notehooks for an Ethics. Trans. David Pellauer. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992.

Schlipp, Paul, ed. The Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre. LaSallc, IL: Open Court, 1981 ).

Spiegelbcrg, Herbert. The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduc/ion. 3rd rev. and cnl. ed., with the collaboration of Karl Schuhmann. The Haguc: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982.

SCANDINAVIA

RICHARD HOLMES

University of Waterloo

Sweden, Denmark, and Nor-

way make up Scandinavia. Often, however, Finland

and Iceland are added to make the five Nordic Coun

tries. The five countries will be discussed in the order

in which they got their first universities, which coin

cides with the order in which phenomenology carne

into these countries. In Sweden phenomenology was

taken up in 1911, while in the other four countries sig

nificant developments did not start until after World

War II. The survey includes main contributions, pri

marily by those who write in major languages. It does

not include the many PSYCHOLOG!STS and HUMAN SC!EN

TISTS who have been inftuenced by phenomenology.

Sweden has the oldest and the fourth oldest Nordic

universities: Uppsala, founded in 1477, coming be-

Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna, Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology. © 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.


fore Copenhagen by two years, and Lund, founded in

1668, twenty-eight years after Fin1and's first university. Stockholm was, for a short time, the residence of the

most illustrious philosopher ever to work in the Nordic

countries (rivalled only by S0ren Kierkegaard and by

LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, who spent Jong periods ofhis Jife in Norway). In 1649 Rene Descartes carne to Stock

holm as Queen Christina's teacher. The following year he died from pneumonia. Not un tii three centuries !ater,

in 1937, did Stockholm get its first regular professor of

philosophy, at what was then Stockholm 's Hogskola. In 1960 Stockholm 's Hogskola was made into a university. Sweden bas a large number ofphilosophers work

ing within ali main areas of philosophy. Uppsala and

Lund have the most positions. The other universities have fewer positions, but Stockholm and Gothenburg

(Gotenborg) have very active departments and produce many doctoral candidates. The University ofUmeâ in the north has focused on the philosophy of science and the University of Linkoping has focused on medical

ethics and action theory. The first philosopher in Scandinavia to write on

phenomenology was Adolf Phalen (1884-1931) in

1911. Phalen, who carne back to EDMUND HUSSERL severa! times, became professor of theoretical philosophy in Uppsala in 1916, and together with his colleague, Axei Hagerstrom (1868-1939), founded the so-called Uppsala school of philosophy. Their suc

cessors at Uppsala went in other directions. However, the Flemish-born Andries MacLeod ( 1891-1977), who

studied with Phalen, wrote severa! penetrating studies of the contents of consciousness, reality, and negation that show affinities with the early Husserl.

Also, Thorild Dahlquist includes Husserl and phenomenology in his broad philosophical repertoire. The

main publications in the phenomenological tradition at Uppsala since Phalen have come from the Department of Literature, where THURE STENSTROM has written severa! major works on EXISTENTIAL!SM, particularly JEAN-PAUL SARTRE. In theology, Eberhard Her

rmann wrote his dissertation on Bolzano, Der religion

sphilosophische Standpunkt Bernard Bolzanos unter Beriicksichtigung seiner Semantik, Wissenschaflstheo

rie und Moralphilosophie (1977).

It was, however, at Gothenburg more than at Uppsala that the phenomenological tradition found a

home. Inspired by Phalen, IVAR SEGELBERG wrote sev-

erai phenomenological studies from 1945 on. He be

came professor of philosophy in Gothenburg in 1951 and bas engendered a general awareness of pheno

menology among his students. His successor, MATS

FURBERG, bas written extensively on speech act the

ory, and bas in recent work attempted a reconciliation between speech act theory and HERMENEUT!CS. Furberg

bas also written engaging books on death and the mean

ing oflife. One of Segerberg's students, DICK HAGLUND, now

professor of the philosophy of religion in Lund, is

the main contributor to phenomenology in Sweden today. Haglund received his doctorate in Gothenburg

on Perception, Time, and the Unity of Mind ( 1977). More recently, he bas published Phenomenological

Studies 1 (1979) and On the Nature of Hyletic Data

(1984). Unfortunately, much ofHaglund's careful and

interesting work is unpublished or published only in

mimeographed form. Another of Segelberg's students, HELGE MALMGREN,

wrote his unpublished dissertation on intentionality

and knowledge ( 1971) and bas published on the early

Wittgenstein and his affinity with phenomenology.

Also at Gothenburg, Thomas Wetterstrom published

an expanded version of his 1973 dissertation, Inten

tion and Communication: An Essay in the Phenomen

ology ofLanguage ( 1977). He combines impulses from

Segelberg and Furberg and exploits Husserl 's distinc

tion between the matter and quality of acts to throw light on Austin's distinction between locutionary and

illocutionary acts. In Towards a Theory of Basic Ethics

( 1986), he presents a normative ethical theory based onan intuitionistic VALUE THEORY, "mental quality he

donism," explained in terms of Husserl 's "intentiona!

moods." Wetterstrom has also written on AESTHETICS

and on "Consciousness from a Quality-Instance Point

ofView" (1974). One of Wetterstrom's students, ĂKE SANDER, has

written a two-volume dissertation ( 1988) using Husser

lian phenomenology to study the ro le played by RELI

GION in the constitution of the LIFEWORLD. One of his

points is that religious belief is a kind of practica! com

petence rather than an intellectual attitude of holding

something true. Sander is now engaged in a pheno

menological study ofthe way Moslem immigrants en

counter the Swedish society. JAN BENGTSSON has written on the reception and in-

SCANDINAVIA 625

fluence of phenomenology in Scandinavia, culminat

ing in his dissertation on the phenomenological movement in Sweden ( 1991 ). This book collects a wealth of

material on references to Husserl, possible influences from Husserl, etc. in Swedish philosophy. It is, however, seriously marred by the author's crusade against

philosophers who do not share his views. STAFFAN CARLSHAMRE has written a remarkably lu

cid and well-argued dissertation, Language and Time:

An Attempt to Arrest the Thought of Jacques Derrida

( 1986) and is now working in Stockholm. At Lund there is not much phenomenology, except

for that which is do ne by Dick Haglund. However, LARS

FROSTROM discussed various theories ofjudgments and

propositions, including those of Husserl and Meinong,

in his 1983 dissertation. Recently, the center of phenomenological activity

in Sweden has gravitated from Gothenburg to Stockholm, largely due to a major project on phenomenology and related subjects supported by the Axei och

Margaret Axelson Johnsons Foundation. The initia

tive for this project was taken by DAG PRAWITZ, professor of theoretical philosophy in Stockholm. Working with him are ALEXANDER ORLOWSKI, PER MARTIN-LOF,

STAFFAN CARLSHAMRE, HANS RUIN, DANIEL BIRNBAUM, and SVEN-OLOV WALLENSTEIN and DICK HAGLUND from Lund

and DAGFINN F0LLESDAL from Oslo. Their themes are

connected with Husserl, FRANZ BRENTANO, MARTIN HEI

DEGGER, JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, ROMAN INGARDEN, MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY, HANS-GEORG GADAMER, PAUL RICCEUR,

and JACQUES DERRIDA, and also on the influence of

phenomenology in LITERATURE and the arts. A key person in the development of phenomen

ology in Stockholm has been ALEXANDER ORLOWSKI,

who carne from Poland in 1971 after having taken his

doctorate at Lodz with a dissertation on Schelling. Orlowski has worked extensively on Husserl, Kazimierz

Twardowski (1866--1938), Sartre, and Heidegger, and

on the reception of German philosophy in Central and

Eastern Europe. PER MARTIN-LOF, research professor in logic at Stock

holm, has taken a strong interest in Husserl's phenomenology, both in his study ofMFANING and in his work

on MATHEMATICS. STAFFAN CARLSHAMRE is working on the reception of

phenomenology in FRANCE and how it is merged with

modern text theory and aesthetics. HANS RUIN wrote

his dissertation entitled Heidegger and Historicity:

Enigmatic Origins-Tracing the Theme of Historicity

Through Heidegger 's Works (1994) and is now con

tinuing his work in phenomenology and hermeneutics. He is also active as a translator, editor, and contributor to cultural journals. DANIEL BIRNBAUM is writing

on Husserl 's late philosophy, while SVEN-OLOV WALLENSTEIN is working on Heidegger's way ofwriting the

history of philosophy. Also at Stockholm, HANS-JORGEN ULFSTEDT has writ

ten a dissertation on Brentano 's views of existence and

judgment, and JENS CAVALLIN obtained his doctorate in 1990 with a dissertation entiled Content and Object,

Twardowski and Psychologism. E. PEREZ-BFRCOFF has

written Para una lectura hermeneutica de Sartre (For a hermeneutica! reading of Sartre).

At Umeâ in the north of Sweden, INGVAR JOHANSsoN, who studied with Segelberg, wrote his dissertation on Karl Popper ( 1902-1994) and has !ater turned

to phenomenology. His main work so far is Ontolog

ica! Investigations: An Inquiry into the Categories of

Nature, Man, and Society (1989), where he tries to find an adequate set of categories for those matters.

In Denmark, Soren Kierkegaard anticipated aspects

of phenomenology through his descriptions of human experience and through his conception of the now (oyeblikket). When Kierkegaard was fighting against

the dominance of HEGEL 's thought at the University

of Copenhagen, the university was already old. It was founded in 1479 and remained the only university in

Denmark until the University of Aarhus (Arhus) was established in 1928. This was followed by the University of Odense (1966) and the "University Centers" in

Roskilde ( 1970) and Aalborg (Alborg) ( 1971 ). One may distinguish two main phases in the de

velopment of phenomenology in Denmark, one starting with the Aarhus theologian Kund Ejler Logstrup

( 1905-1981 ), and one beginning to develop among

some young philosophers who are oriented toward

Husserl and the problems with which he was grap

pling. Inspired by Kierkegaard and the phenomenologi

cal tradition, severa! Danish theologians have been

working on phenomenology, mainly at the Institute

for Ethics and the Philosophy of Religion at Aarhus. Logstrup has been a source of inspiration for most of

them, particularly through Den etiske fordring (The


ethical claim, 1956), but also through his many other

infiuential works. Logstrup 's phenomenological ap

proach to the philosophy of religion is central for the

dissertation ofhis successor, SVEND ANDERSEN, Sprog og skabelse (Language and creation, 1989). The book dis

cusses religious language drawing both on phenomen

ology and ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY. Andersen has pub

Jished severa! other books and articles and is now ac

tive in Denmark's council of medical ethics. Another

main follower of Logstrup at Aarhus is the theologian

H. c. WIND, who wrote his dissertation on historicity

and ontology in Heidegger (1974), and has also written a general presentation of Heidegger's philosophy

and articles on phenomenology.

The most infiuential of Logstrup 's students was

JORGEN K. BUKDAHL, who during his short Jife wrote

a number of articles on philosophical movements in

Germany and France that inspired many ofthe younger

philosophers in Denmark.

Aarhus has also had an Institute of the History of

Ideas for some years. It was founded by Johannes Slok,

who has written a large number ofbooks, including an

introduction to Kierkegaard ( 1990). His successors at

the Institute have largely been infiuenced by MARX

ISM. Hans Jorgen Schanz wrote his dissertation on the

relations between metaphysics and modernity ( 1981 ),

and is now working largely on Heidegger, Adorno, and

Wittgenstein. Also at Aarhus, Soren Gosvig Olesen has writ

ten the yet to be published Wissen und Phănomen. Eine Untersuchung der ontologischen Klărung der Wissenschaft bei Edmund Husserl, Alexander Koyre, und Gaston Bachelard (Cognition and phenomenon.

An investigation ofthe ontologica! clarification of sci

ence in Edmund Husserl, Alexandre Koyre, and Gaston

Bachelard).

At the young university at Roskilde, NIELS OLE BERNSEN is working on the borderline between pheno

menology and COGNITIVE SCIENCE. In Know/edge: A Treatise of Our Cognitive Situation ( 1978), he argues

that epistemological positions presuppose assumptions

belonging to what is nowadays called "cognitive science." His concept of a "cognitive situation" is an at

tempt to capture this interdependence, including the

unique epistemological sta tus ofvarious commonsense

beliefs. He has pursued these ideas further in Heidegger s Theory of Intentionality ( 1986) and has written

over a hundred articles and books; he has been Re

search Professor of Cognitive Science at Roskilde Uni

versity since 1989, where he established the Centre of

Cognitive Science in 1990.

Work on the borderline between cognitive science and phenomenology is also done in Copenhagen by

Ole Fogh Kirkeby, who teaches at Copenhagen Busi

ness School. He took his doctorate at the Univer

sity of Aarhus with Event and Body-Mind, where he

presents a theory of consciousness that draws on MAU

RICE MERLEAU-PONTY's discussions ofthe BODY, on Hei

degger, and on Wittgenstein and philosophy of lan

guage. Kirkeby has earlier written on Marx and artifi

cial intelligence.

Also in Copenhagen PETER KEMP has a very large

production in French, much of it relating to the work of

PAUL RICCEUR. He has also, together with David M. Ras

mussen, edited The Narrative Path: The Later Works of Paul Rica!ur ( 1989), in which he has an article,

"Toward a narrative ethics," that refiects his turn to

ward ethics, particularly medical ethics. POUL LOBCKE

has also written extensively, mainly on Kierkegaard, Husserl, and Heidegger, but also on TIME, on personal

identity, and on medical ethics. He has coedited and

contributed large parts of the two-volume survey Die Philosophie unserer Zeit. ARNE GRON has also written

on French philosophy.

The last few years have seen the emergence of a

group of young Danish philosophers who are combining careful Husserl scholarship with an awareness

of the contemporary discussion of the central issues

dealt with in phenomenology. DAN ZAHAVI has been re

markably productive. After a Master's A. thesis on

Intentionalităt und Konstitution ( 1992), he went to

Leuven to write his dissertation with RUDOLF BER

NET: Husserl und die transzendentale lntersubjektivităt. Eine Antwort auf die sprachpragmatische Kritik (Husserl and transcendental intersubjectivity: An an

swer to the criticism of linguistic pragmatism, 1996).

Zahavi has also written articles in Husserl Studies, Man and World, Etudes Phenomenologiques, and other jour

nals, and edited a volume on subjectivity and lifeworld.

He now has a research fellowship in Copenhagen.

SOREN HARNOW KLAUSEN in Qdense has a similar

combined interest in phenomenology and philosophy

of language. He studied for his doctorate in Ttibingen,

writing a dissertation on Zur Sinnfrage in der Philoso-

SCANDINAVIA 627

phie des 20. Jahrhunderts (The question of meaning

in 20th century philosophy, 1996), and is now working

on Husserl, Heidegger, FREGE, and Wittgenstein.

Finland's first university was founded in Turku

(Abo) in 1640 and moved to Helsinki (Helsingfors)

in 1828. Turku got a Swedish university in 1918 and

two years !ater also a Finnish one. These two cities are

the main centers for philosophy in Finland, the other

four universities where philosophy is offered ha ve very

small departments, but in Jyvăskyla and Tampere there

are people working on phenomenology.

Together with Georg Henrik von Wright and Erik

Stenius, JAAKKO HINTIKKA at Helsinki has been a lead

ing figure in Finnish philosophy during the past thirty

years. Ali three have had wide interests, and those of

Hintikka include phenomenology. He has written sev

era! studies relating to phenomenology, in particular

The Intentions of Intentionality ( 1975) and "Degrees

and Dimensions oflntentionality" in The Logic ofEpis

temology and the Epistemology of Logic ( 1989). He has

also written on applications of phenomenology to art.

Among his students, MARTIN KUSCH has been particu

larly productive. He carne to Finland from Germany in

1981, but has now moved to England. In his disserta

tion, Language as Calculus vs. Language as Universal

Medium: A Study in Husserl, Heidegger, and Gadamer

(1989), he uses Merrill and Jaakko Hintikka's gen

eralization of Jean van Heijenoort's 1967 distinction

between "logic as calculus" and "logic as language"

to throw light on Husserl, Heidegger, and HANS-GEORG

GADAMER.

A preeminent contributor to phenomenology in Fin

laud is LEI LA HAAPARANTA. Her dissertation is Frege s Doctrine ofBeing ( 1985), but she has since published a

1arge number of articles on Husserl, including her own

contributions to her editions of Language, Knowledge,

and Intentionality: Perspectives on the Philosophy of

Jaakko Hintikka ( 1990); Mind, Meaning, and Mathe

matics: Essays on the Philosophical Views of Husserl

and Frege ( 1994 ), and Mind and Cognition: Philosoph

ical Perspectives on Cognitive Science and Artificial

Intelligence (1995). Lilli Alanen is a leading Descartes scholar, but has

also written on intentionality and is directing a research

group on intentionality and the foundations of cogni

tive science. Maria Johanna Sara is writing a dissertation on the

phenomenology of the body and has also written arti

cles Oll Merleau-Ponty, SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, and re]ated

topics. At Turku, SVEN KROHN showed an interest in pheno

menology in the 1950s. LAUR! ROUTILA, who wrote

his dissertation on Die aristotelische Idee der ersten

Philosophie (The Aristotelian idea offirst philosophy,

1969) and taught in Turku for a while, is now teach

ing at Jyvăskylă in central Finland. Routila has written

on Husserl, Heidegger and hermeneutics. His interests

in meaning, interpretation, and Husserl come together

in Wahrnehmung und lnterpretation (Perccption and

interpretation, 1974).

At Tampere, between Jyvăskylă and Turku, ERNA

OESCH has written Squaring the Hermeneutic Circle

A Treatise in the Borderland of Two Traditions ( 1985)

and has also written articles on related subjects. Also

at Tampere, JAANA PARVIAINEN has written her Mas

ter's thesis on phenomenology ofthe body and modern

DANCE and written related articles.

An early admirer of Husserl in Finland was YRJ6

REENPĂĂ, professor of physiology in Helsinki, who

wrote a number of studies of perception using Husser

lian ideas, in particular Wahrnehmen, Beobachten,

Konstituieren (Perception, observation, constitution,

1967). The first positions in philosophy in Norway carne

with the establishment of the University of Oslo in

1811. Until then, Norwegian academics had received

their education abroad, mainly in Copenhagen. Ali stu

dents at Norwegian universities have to study philos

ophy for one half semester when they enter the uni

versity. Due to this, Norwegian universities have large

philosophy departments, the department in Oslo hav

ing presently forty-five full time faculty members in a

variety of fields. In Norway, the study of phenomenology started at

Oslo in the 1950s and then spread to the other univer

sities. Arne Na:ss showed some interest in phenomen

ology at that time and in 1965 wrote the Norwegian

version of what !ater became Faur Modern Philoso

phers: Carnap, Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Sartre ( 1968)

and is well known for his DEEP ECOLOGY. In 1956,

DAGFINN F0LLESDAL Wrote the first major study in

phenomenology in Norway, his Master's thesis entitled

Husserl und Frege (1958), and has !ater written more

on Husserl, and also on Heidegger and Sartre. HANS


SKJERVHEIM, who was professor at Roskilde in 1968-69 and professor at Bergen until he retired, received his

M.A. in Oslo in 1957 with Objectivism and the Study

of Man ( 1959). Basing himself largely on Husserl 's

phenomenology, in it he criticized various tendencies to "objectivize" mental and social phenomena and not

recognize their intentionality. ELLING SCHWABE-HANSEN received his doctorate in

1987 with Das Verhăltnis zwischen transzendentaler

und konkreter Subjektivităt in der Phănomenologie Edmund Husserls (The relation between transcendental

and concrete subjectivity in Edmund Husserl 's pheno

menology, 1991 ), in which he presents and critically discusses Husserl 's theory of the two egos: the em

pirica! and the transcendental. Schwabe-Hansen has also written severa! articles on intentiona! systems, the

body, and the lifeworld. EINAR 0VERENGET has just re

ceived his doctorate from Boston College with a dissertation entitled Heidegger: A Phenomenological Jn

terpretation of Subjectivity, and has published severa! articles on related topics. Among the other members of

the faculty at Oslo who ha ve written within phenomenology are ARNE TUV, who wrote his Master's thesis on

Concepts of Erlebnis, Bewusstsein and Jch in Husserl s Logische Untersuchungen and Ideen (Concepts of experience, consciousness, and I in Husserl's Logische

Untersuchungen and Ideen ). A!so in Oslo GUTTORM FL0ISTAD, since 1975 profes

sor of the history of ideas, has written on Heidegger, on Verstehen, and on many other topics. DAG 0STER

BERG has written a book on forms of understanding

(1960), a major study of Sartre (1993), and a number

of other works. BERNT VESTRE has worked on contemporary French philosophy, as has ASBJ0RN AARNES, professor ofFrench literature, who has lately concentrated on EMMANUEL LEVINAS.

Bergen got its university in 1948; before then some

research and higher education had taken place at the

Bergen Museum, which dates from 1825, and at the

Christian Michelsen Institute, established in 1930. At

Bergen, the main figures in phenomenology besides

HANS SKJERYHEIM have been KNUT VENNESLAN, who has

written Der Wissenschaftsbegriff bei Edmund Husserl

(The concept of science in Edmund Husserl, 1962),

and GUNNAR SKIRBEKK who wrote his dissertation on

Heidegger's theory oftruth (1969), but has !ater tumed

more toward POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY and phiJosophy of

NATURAL SCIENCE, and in 1993 published a volume on

the relationship between rationality and modemity. KONRAD ROKSTAD wrote his Master's thesis on the !ater

Husserl. Trondheim has a long and venerable academic tra

dition, much of it connected with the oldest high school

in Norway, the Cathedral School, which recently celebrated its 800th anniversary, and the oldest scien

tific society in Norway, the Royal Norwegian Society of Sciences and Letters, founded in 1760 by Johan Ernst Gunnerus, who was a professor ofphilosophy in Copenhagen before becoming bishop in Trondheim. In 1837 the Society gave Schopenhauer one ofhis first official recognitions, for a prize essay Ober die Freiheit

des menschlichen Willens. The Society's Museum was one of the three insti

tutions that in 1968 joined to form the University of

Trondheim, the other two being Trondheim Institute

of Technology, founded 191 O, and the College of Arts

and Science, founded 1922. In 1962 the University got its first faculty member in philosophy, Ingemund

Gullvăg. Gullvâg and most of the other philosophers

who now make up the department combine a concern

with Continental trends in philosophy with an interest in analytic tendencies. Gullvâg has written some

unpublished work on phenomenology. Severa! contributions by the other members of the department that

relate most closely to phenomenology should be mentioned.

MAGNE DYBVIG has mainly been working within epis

temology, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of science. The Husserlian notion of "lifeworld" recurs in severa! ofthem, for example in a study of geometry and

the lifeworld. AUDUN 0FSTI started out in mathematics,

but most of his philosophical work has been devoted

to various aspects of a transcendental approach to phi

losophy, particularly to issues connected with "objectivism" and with the use oflanguage. He comes closest

to phenomenology in a recent note on INTENTIONALITY

(1994). HELGE H01BRAATEN is the latest arrival in Trond

heim. His interests, like those of0fsti, are mainly prag

matics conjoined with transcendental philosophy, with applications in the social sciences and the humanities.

Hoibraaten is also working in politica! philosophy and

is currently engaged in a project on modernity. KARl OP

DAHL wrote a Master's thesis entitled Phenomenology

-A Semantic-Ontologica! Synthesis.

MAX SCHELER 629

Tromso has the world's northernmost university,

founded in 1968. JON HELLESNES, in studies of self

knowledge and other minds and of socialization and technocracy, brings in phenomenologica1 anti

objectivist elements, partly in criticism of Wittgenstein. In addition to severa] books on these themes

in Norwegian, he has written an article that relates

to phenomenology entitled "Die Transzendentalprob

lematik und die Frage nach dem Sinn des Lebens"

(The transcendental problematic and the question of the meaning oflife, 1993 ). Hellesnes has also published

novels and collections of widely read essays. Pheno

menology also has inspired ATLE MĂSEIDE, who in "How

to do things with words- Notizen zum Verhăltnis

zwischen Phănomenologie und Pragmatik" ( 1986) and

other articles has argued for the importance of tacit

knowledge in various areas. ELIN SVENNEBY has written

a Master 's thesis in which she makes use of Heideg

ger's Sein und Zeit ( 1927) to throw light on the notion

oftoo] in ETHNOLOGY. Iceland, with a population of merely 250,000, has

two universities, Hask6li Islands at Reykjavik, founded

in 1911, and a small university, established in 1987, in

Akureyri in the north. At both universities the com

pulsory "philosophicum" is taught, but only Reykjavik

has permanent positions for philosophers. Two ofthem,

in particular, have been working on phenomenology.

ARNOR HANNIBALSSON wrote his dissertation on ROMAN

INGARDEN's ontology (1973) and has also been working

on Husserl and on Meinong and Brentano. His main in

terests are epistemology and aesthetics. PĂLL SKULASON

wrote his (unpublished) dissertation on Heidegger and

Ricoeur and has mainly been working on Hegel and Heidegger. He also has done some work on Husserl,

but his philosophical orientation is closer to Heidegger

than it is to Husserl. Skulason is an active and produc

tive philosopher, but is primarily writing in Icelandic.

DAGFINN F0LLESDAL University of Oslo

MAX SCHELER Scheler was born in Munich,

Germany, on August 22, 1874. His mother was of Jew

ish extraction, his father was Lutheran. He joined the

Catholic religion early in his life but !ater he became

noncommittal in favor ofmetaphysical attempts to ex

plain the divine as becoming together with humankind

and world in absolute time. He received his doctorate at Jena University in 1887 and finished his Habilitations

schrift there in 1899. After teaching at Jena until 1906, he joined the University of Munich. In 191 O he lost

his position there because of a divorce, alienating the predominantly Catholic administration. It was only in

1919 that he received a professorship in philosophy

and sociology from the University ofKoln. He was engaged in the politica\ situation in Europe and by 1927

had repeatedly warned the public of the rising Nazi

movement in Germany and Fascism in Italy. His work

was suppressed in Germany during the Nazi regime

from 1933 to 1945. From 1909 on, Scheler was an avid reader of

WILLIAM JAMES and Charles Sanders Peirce and is the

on1y European phenomenologist who entertained a

lifelong interest in American pragmatism. In English,

Scheler's name is mentioned first in a favorable review

ofhis book Zur Phiinomenologie und Theorie der Sym

pathiegefuhle und van Liebe und Hass, in Mind (Towards the phenomenology and theory of the feeling

of sympathy and of love and hate, 1914). Among his

early American admirers were Howard Becker ( 1889-1960), Paul Arthur Schilpp (1897-1993), and the so

ciologist Alb ion Small ( 1854-1926). Toward the end

ofhis life he received invitations to lecture extensively

in Japan, Russia, and the United States, but followed hesitatingly his physician 's advice not to embark on the

trip. A rapidly deteriorating heart condition caused his

death in Frankfurt am Main on May 19, 1928, shortly

after he hadjoined the university there. He is buried in

Koln. Scheler made a number of references in his works

to the fledgling phenomenologica\ movement early this

century and to the part he played in it. His first discussion with EDMUND HUSSERL occurred in 190\. It centered

on the concepts of intuition and PERCEPTION. Scheler,

who was fifteen years younger than Husserl, outlined

his novel concept of intuition. He explained its scope

as much wider than either sensible components or log

ica! forms. Husserl remarked that he too had come up

with an analogous extension of the concept, probably

referring to the categoria! intuition ofhis Logische Un

tersuchungen ( 1900--1901 ). Between 191 O and 1916,

Husserl recommended Scheler highly for various ca-

Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna, Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner ( eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology. © 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.


reer opportunities, but the relationship had cooled by

the end of World War 1. As a freelance writer from

191 O to 1919, Scheler had an almost incredible record

ofpublications spreading his name fast throughout Eu

rope, prompted also by addressing politica! issues of

the time, such as war, the feminist movement, resent

ment, the causes of hatred of Germans, the future of

capitalism, the psychology of social security expecta

tions, and global overpopulation, among many others.

Like other phenomenologists in Germany at

the time, Scheler was not only critica! of

Husserl 's Ideen zu ei ner reinen Phănomenologie und phănomenologischen Philosophie 1 (1913 ), charging

him with ego logica! Cartesianism and methodological

shortcomings, but also of his Logische Untersuchungen. The critique of the latter was formulated by 1904 and is contained in his posthumous Logik I. It provides

incontrovertible evidence ofhis early independence in

matters phenomenological and from what he called the

"loose circle" ofphenomenologists he knew in person,

such as MORITZ GEIGER, DIETR!CH VON H!LDEBRAND, JO

HANNES DAUBERT, THEODOR L!PPS, ALEXANDER PFĂNDER,

and ADOLF REINACH. He charged Husserl with "platoniz

ing" phenomenology in the Logische Untersuchungen with the notion oftruth in itself as separate from objects

and thinking, and as existing prior to judgment-making.

This was, of course, incompatible with Scheler's con

tention- anticipating as early as 1904 his subsequent

interest in American pragmatism- that thinking must

be conceived as functional (Denkfunktion) with states

of affairs and things.

His independence from the early phenomenological

movement carne fully to light, however, in lectures held

in 1908-9 on the foundations of biology. They con

tained the central themes of his emerging phenomen

ology of time. These lectures and the treatises Lehre

van den drei Tatsachen (The theory of the three facts)

and Phănomenologie und Erkenntnistheorie (Pheno

menology and the theory of cognition, 1911-14), are

his only works dealing exclusively with phenomen

ology. The remainder ofhis phenomenological contri

butions are unfortunately dispersed in his works, in

cluding his first magnum opus: Der Formalismus in

der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik. Neuer Versuch der Grundlegung ei nes ethischen Personalismus (For

malism in ethics and nonformal ethics ofvalues: New

attempt at the foundation of an ethical personalism).

Its two parts were completed by 1913 and published

in 1913 and 1916 respectively in Husserl 's famous

Jahrbuch. There is clear evidence of Scheler's inftu

ence on ARON GURW!TSCH's Phănomenologie der The

matik und des reinen lch (Phenomenology of the the

matic and of the pure I, 1929) and Die mitmenschliche Begegnung in der sozialen Welt [Human encounters

in the social wor]d, 1931); MAUR!CE MERLEAU-PONTY'S

"Christianisme et ressentiment" ( 1 936), and JEAN-PAUL

SARTRE's Les carnets de la drâle de guerre: Novembre 1939-Mars /940 (War diaries, 1983), ALFRED SCHUTz's

Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt. Eine Einleitung in die verstehende Soziologie (The meaning

structure ofthe social world, 1932) and Collected Papers ( 1962, 1964, 1966), and other figures.

Scheler's phenomenology has remained in the back

ground of the post-World War II phenomenological

movement for severa! reasons. The German collected

edition began only in 1954 while the growing pheno

menological movement centered on Sartre, Merleau

Ponty, Husserl, and also MARTIN HEIDEGGER, largely be

cause ofthe international availability oftheir writings

and promoters ]ike HERMAN LEO VAN BREDA, HANS-GEORG

GADAMER, ARON GURW!TSCH, HERBERT SP!EGELBERG, LUD

WIG LANDGREBE, ERW!N W. STRAUS, and others who had

known some of the first generation of phenomenolo

gists in person.

The phenomenology of Scheler is distinct from

those of other phenomenologists in severa! respects:

phenomenology is not tobe based in a method; pheno

menology must suspend sensory data in intuition; time

originates in the center ofthe self-activity oflife; con

sciousness presupposes the being of the person; emo

tive intentionality is pregiven to ali other acts; the ego

is an object of interna! perception; and reality is resis

tance.

Method. It must first be pointed out that the noetic

noematic bipolarity of act-consciousness and the con

sciousness of noematic meaning-contents conjoined

with the former allows two approaches to lay bare

the structure of consciousness: it is possible to investi

gate its noetic INTENTIONALITY or to make the meaning

contents of the NOEMA conjoined with it subject to

investigation. The noetic approach is referred to by

Scheler as act phenomenology, the noematic one as

phenomenologyoffacts. The former shows "how" phe

nomena are given, the latter "that" they are given. How-

MAX SCHELER 631

ever, while using either approach it is not possible to exclude its correlative opposite entirely.

At the basis ofScheler's project !ies the phenomen

ological tenet "that" Being, as ultimate background

of all meaning-contents, is pregiven to the cognition

(Erkenntnis) ofthem. There is no cognition, including

phenomenological cognition, without the pregivenness

of the meaning of Being, including the meaning of its

ultimate incomprehensibility. The pregivenness to cognition must not be understood as sequential but as in

the order offoundation. From this it follows that a phe

nomenon is a fact of consciousness or consciousness

is "of'' facts. A fact is given as the content of an iru

mediate intuition. Such phenomena are, for instance, spatiality, temporality, materiality, relationality, thing

ness, aliveness, the divine, or the absolute. Methods, observations, and definitions, says

Scheler, presuppose that which is to be found or clarified by them. This is why "that" something is spatial,

temporal, material, or alive is neither observable nor definable as "something" to be uncovered by a method.

Phenomena are therefore "pure" facts. The fact of spa

tiality would allow an observation ora method only to

the extent that a particular extended configuration of

a thing- say, something triangular- is in question.

But the "fact" of the spatiality of something triangular or the "fact" of the aliveness of something alive

are already intuited, a priori meaning-contents devoid

of sense experience. They are, as Scheler also put it,

"there" (da). This does not exclude the thereness of

illusions occurring in the field of intuition, on which

Scheler focused agreat deal. An illusion occurs, for ex

ample, when something is apprehended as displaying the phenomenon of aliveness when in reality it is not

ali ve. Such illusions are distinct from logica! errors.

Descriptions of intuited facts are always found early

in his numerous treatises, such as those of shame, the

tragic, repentance, and resentment. Concern ing the fact

of the divine in consciousness, he developed an entire

Wesensphiinomenologie der Religion. Ali pure facts

not only have in common that they can neither be

observed nor subjected to methods, but also - con

trary to facts of the LIFEWORLD and facts in science

- they are indifferent to truth and falsity. This is be

cause intuited facts are pre-logical. They are only in

tuitable or "seen" in a phenomenological attitude or

"Bewusstseinseinstellung." Scheler was aware that in

this respect his phenomenology was akin to psychic

techniques in BUDDHISM. Granted that phenomena are pure facts in the inception of intuition rather than the result of a method, the question of whether or not the

senses play any part in intuition must be addressed. Sensibility. Scheler's independence of the early

phenomenological movement is further substantiated

by the role that he assigns to sense data. Since intuition is much richer than sense experience, it cannot

be maintained that the latter is primordial, let alone that it is the only experience a person can have. The

structure of the lifeworld conceptualized first, albeit not in a phenomenological sense, in 1885 by Scheler's

teacher RudolfEucken (1846-1926), who called it the

"workaday world" (die Arbeitswelt), and renamed in 1908 by Scheler as the natural world view (niiturliche

Weltanschauung), is given prior to the functions ofthe

senses. Only those sensory data come into play that the structure ofthe lifeworld "allows." This also pertains to

the "milieux" of animals. The ro le of sense data is said to be a vehicle of an organism 's reactions to preserve

its life. Showing this to be the case, sense experience

is no conditionat all for facts of intuition. On the contrary, assigning sense experience a foundational role for intuition resists a scrupulously phenomenological

approach. Time. The phenomena of spatiality and temporality

must not be confined to human beings alone. Rather, they are generated in two powers of any living being: self-movement and selfalteration. Spatiality and temporality take their root neither from the lived body

nor from consciousness and intuition. They stern, like

reality itself, from a four-dimensional manifold of vital energy, called "Drang," meaning "impulsion," in

which they are not yet separated. The state of impulsion is pure, ftuctuating variation (Wechsel). There is

no substance as a bearer of it and it may be compared to wave patterns of atomic physical energy whose reality, according to Scheler, also rests on impulsion. Fourdimensional impulsion suffuses ali entities. It reaches

also into the visual field of humans where parallels,

as in four-dimensional geometry, do not exist. In the visual field itself, for instance, parallel railroad tracks

"meet" at the horizon. lmpulsion is both individual and universal. In every

one of its phases of ftuctuating variations, it is simultaneously "becoming and un-becoming" (Werden und


Entwerden), a character translucent in the continuous simultaneous decline and growth ofliving beings. The following two laws obtain: al! movement issues from impulsion and is, in principle, reversible, even if only

in thought; ali alteration issuesfi·om impulsion and is, in principle, irreversible. This allows any fluctuating variation in practice to be interpretable as either reversible movement or as irreversible alteration. Seen as reversible, it turns into spatiality and, in the end, objective SPACE. Seen as irreversible alteration it turns into temporality and, in the end, objective TIME. For instance, one can interpret the fluctuating variation of lights and shadows under a tree exposed to sun and varia bie winds as either reversible movement of specks of shadows and light, oras irreversible alterations of a particular surface.

Granted that impulsion propels life into a continuous becoming-unbecomingprocess in any ofits phases and that space and time are not separated in it, the phenomenological constitution of time-consciousness must take its root in impulsion. This may be condensed in the following way. Impulsion breaks up into three main drives: propagation, growth (power), and nutrition. Its fluctuating variation divides the drives into reversible movement (spatiality) and irreversible alteration (temporality): what in drive-life is more "urgent" becomes "near" and "first"; what is less urgent becomes "distant" and "!ater." The main drives are conjoined with three germ layers of vertebrate organisms (ectoderm, mesoderm, endoderm) in the gastocele stages of an embryo. By dint of complex ramifications with other drives, this plays a basic role in the temporalization of passions, needs, and interests, as well as perception, which is, accordingly, always drive-conditioned.

The first phenomenological experience of spatialization as detached from temporalization is a vague about-awareness (das Herumbewusstsein), while the first phenomenological experience of temporalization as detached from spatialization consists in preconscious runoffs of phases "filled" with phantasmic images in impulsion and drives. Scheler stresses that living beings do not li ve "in" objective space and time. First and foremost, they spatialize and temporalize themselves out of the vital energy of impulsion.

The passage of impulsion into alteration reaches consciousness in the form of"absolute," not objective,

time. Absolute time is characterized by three qualities: ( 1) simultaneous congruence of meanings and their phases, (2) continuous becoming-unbecoming, and (3) the runoff of absolute time "in" transitions between any A turning into a B; the latter implies the transition between one meaning and another in consciousness, or between potency and actualization. The absolute time oftransitions also applies to protentions turning into retentions. Timeconsciousness may be described, therefore, as absolute self-temporalization of transitions in the flux ofbecoming and unbecoming meanings locked in their phases, ali propelled by impulsion.

Absolute time is also latent in the continuous transitions from aging toward death. This holds, a fortiori, forthe shifting in consciousness ofthe horizons ofpast, present, and future. In its early stages, consciousness has before it an endless future horizon. A small horizon of the past begins to grow and grow until both horizons are in relative balance in midlife phases and increasingly squeeze the present between them. From this stage on, the future horizon retracts by closing in on the present, while the horizon ofthe past gets wider and wider, pressing against both the present and future until their resistance collapses. The shifting dynamics of the three transient time horizons is a fact of timeconsciousness. Aging runs off in absolute time. Dying is absolute ending "in" absolute time and not in objective time. Aging and dying are not to be seen in an empirica! experience of objective time. In contrast to absolute time, in objective time, MEANINGS and their phases are separable. Everyday meaning-contents such as plans are as open to schedule changes as physical events can be assigned new time frames in the sciences. Objective time, says Scheler, may be an enormous illusion in the human species. StiU, measurable time is indispensable for human progress.

Person. Scheler tells us in the 1913 Jahrbuch that the being of the person is the foundation of ali intentiona! acts. This implies that the sphere of the person is subject neither to absolute time-consciousness nor to objective time. Rather, person is "supratemporal." As such, "person" is the form of consciousness. Each act of consciousness is different in essence from any other act. He declares that especially feelings as well as volitions and religious acts must not fali victim to the traditional privileging of rational acts and reason in the wake ofthe Cartesian cogito. For this and other

MAX SCHELER 633

reasons he branded the concepts of a consciousness in general and a transcendental ego as "evident nonsense." Both concepts overlook the being and the selfvalue ofthe person permeating ali acts. More precisely, what is called person exists solely in the "execution" ofany and ali possible acts. The person is no substance of acts. The execution of acts, however, is different in each person by virtue ofthe "qualitative direction" acts take in each different person. The individual person executes his or her own existence, a point foreshadowing JEAN-PAUL SARTRE'S idea of existence.

Emotive intentionality. Ali perception, willing, and thinking are based on the experience ofvalues, a tenet ofScheler's value-ethics. That every act is suffused by the person and that the person varies in each different act by virtue of said qualitative direction encompasses, a fortiori, emotive intentionality, that is, acts of EMO

TION or feeling and their correlates: values. VALUE is the pre-rational, intentiona! referent or the noema of emotive intentionality. It hinges on the act of loving. Like colors, values are independent of their substrates. The value of beauty may pertain to a landscape or a musical work of art, just as the sky or a cloth can be blue. Ali values are ordered in a spectrum of fi ve ascending ranks: the values ofwhat is bodily agreeable or not; pragmatic values of what is useful or not; the life values ranging from noble (edel) to faulty (schlecht); the rank of the mental values of beauty, justice, and cognition oftruth; and the rank ofthe holy and unholy.

Emotive intentionality consists in the act of preferring higher (or lower) values to given ones. Preferring them is nota rational act of choosing them; rather, it is a spontaneous leaning toward something. This "leaning toward" has no rational reasons. lts seat is the heart, the "ordo amoris" whose "reasons" ha ve a logic of their own. In this, Scheler followed "le coeur a ses raisons"

of Pascal. Good and evi! do not belong to the above five value-ranks. They are not intentiona! referents of emotive intentionality. They emerge during the realizations of preferring higher (lower) values and "ride on the back" ofthese acts. They are purely temporal and, phenomenologically, an emotive instance of passive synthesis. As such, they are not objects.

Ego. Since a phenomenology of consciousness-of presupposes for Scheler the being ofthe person, it follows that ali consciousness, be it human, divine, or fictional, must be in person. The EGO is no founda-

tion in the make-up of the human being, nor is it a point of departure of acts. This Schelerian assessment ofthe ego, also made in the 1913 Jahrbuch, appears to be the very opposite of the foundational ro le the ego has for Husserl in the same Jahrbuch. Scheler locates the ego in terms of fi ve descending steps. ( 1) The ego is shown in the book on sympathy to emerge around the age of two and against "pregiven" alter egos. (2) Pure intuition in the sphere ofthe person alone encompasses interna! and externa! intuition. Pure intuition is not linked to the presence of a lived body. (3) In reality, however, the ego belongs to a lived BODY, which spawns three separate act-qualities: sense perception, remembering, and expecting, ali encompassed by pure intuition. ( 4) The three act-qualities ha ve as intentiona! referents "being-present" (hic et nunc), "being-past," and "being-future." Like protentions, retentions, and the fleeting present between them, these referents do not occur in objective time. The being-present as intertwined with retentions and protentions yields the division between externa! and interna! perception. (5) The ego is constituted in interna! perception as its "object." But this object appears neither as extended nor as sequential because past and present experiences as well as future expectations are "intercontained." The ego 's intercontainment (das lneinandersein) is the ultimate object of the acts of interna! perception, whereas those of externa! perception is "pure expanse" (das A useinandersein ).

The traditional Cartesian dualism between nonextension and extension does not hold. While the ego can be pure, as in states of personal ingatheredness or self-communion, and while in such cases the lived body becomes less important, it can also "spread" throughout the lived body and undergo the transition from pure ego to a lived body-ego. This occurs in many human conditions such as in extreme physical exhaustion, intoxication, and gluttony. It may be, says Scheler, that in a dreamless sleep the ego disappears altogether un tii it begins to resuffuse the lived body during waking up.

Reality. While the concept of reality weighs heavily on Sche]er's ]ater PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY, it must be mentioned that it is, in part, a result of a critique of Husserl's phenomenological reduction. This reduction must not center in a method, but in a "technique" of nullifying (aufheben) the factor of reality in the lifeworld so that pure phenomena can appear


in consciousness. As Scheler sees it, Husserl's under

standing ofthe reduction is not radical enough. Instead,

he proposes to eliminate the very root that posits real

ity. This root is the capacity to posit reality: impulsion. While consciousness can only posit whatness, it or the

mind is "impotent" (ohnmachtig) to posit reality. A

temporary nullification of impulsion can be achieved

only by the technique of the "phenomenological attitude" mentioned above. It alone promises a momentary

access to "pure intuition" offacts severed from the reality oflifeworld and the world of science. Scheler also envisioned a reversal ofsaid technique by momentarily

suspending the sphere of the person instead of impul

sion in order to "see" the essence of impulsion. He

called this technique "dionysian reduction." Throughout his work, Scheler developed his own

phenomenology of intuition, which was not an application of Husserl 's method. As increasing attention is

devoted to his work, he is increasingly recognized for

his many brilliant insights into the nature ofthe human

person as a whole.

FOR FURTHER STUDY

Barber, Michael. D. Guardian of Dialogue: Max Scheler s Phenomenology, Sociology ofKnowledge, and Philosophy of Love. Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell University Press, 1993.

Bershshady, Harold J., ed. Max Scheler on Feeling, Knowing, and Valuing. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992.

Blosser, Philip. Scheler s Critique of Kant s Ethics. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1995.

Frings, Manfred S. "Der Ordo Amoris bei Max Scheler." Zeitschrift fur philosophische Forschung 20 ( 1966), 57-76.

-. Person und Dasein. Zur Frage der Ontologie des Wertseins. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969.

-. "Max Scheler: Rarely Seen Complexities of Phenomenology." In Phenomenology in Perspective. Ed. F. Joseph Smith. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970, 32-53.

-. "Drang und Geist." In Grundprobleme der grossen Philosophen. Ed. Josef Speck. Gottingen: UTB Vandenhoeck, 1973, 9-42.

-. Zur Phănomenologie der Lebensgemeinschaft. Ein Versuch mit Max Scheler. Meisenheim am Glan: Anton Hain, 1971.

-. "Toward the Constitution of the Unity of the Human Person." In Linguistic Analysis and Phenomenology. Ed. Wolfe Mays and S. C. Brown. London: Macmillan, 1972, 68-80; 110-13.

-. "Husserl and Scheler: Two Views on lntersubjectivity." Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 9 (1978), 143-9.

-. "Time Structure in Social Communality." In Phenomenology and Science in Phenomenological Perspective. Ed.

Kah Kyung Cho. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1984, 85-93.

Gabel, Michael. Intentionalităt des Geistes. Der phănomenologische Denkansatz bei Max Scheler. Leipzig: Benno, 1991.

Good, Paul, ed. Max Scheler im Gegenwartsgeschehen der Philosophie. Bem: Francke, 1975.

Kelly, Eugene. "Ordo Amoris: The Moral Vision of Max Scheler." Listening 21 ( 1986), 226-42.

Leonardy, Heinz. Liebe und Person. Max Schelers Versuch eines "phănomenologischen "Personalismus. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976.

Luther, Arthur R. Persons in Love: A Study of Max Scheler s "Wesen und Formen der Sympathie." The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1972.

Ranly, Emest W. Scheler s Phenomenology of Community. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966.

Scheler, Max. Gesammelte Werke. Ed. Maria Scheler and Manfred S. Frings. Bem: Francke, 1954-86; Bonn: Bouvier, 1986.

-, English translations ofworks by Max Scheler are listed in Max Scheler on Feeling, Knowing, and Valuing. Chicago: University of Chicago, 1992.

Schutz, Alfred. "Scheler's Theory oflntersubjectivity and the General Thesis ofthe Alter Ego." In his Collected Papers !: The Problem of Social Reality. Ed. Maurice Natanson. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962, 150-79.

-. "Max Scheler's Philosophy." In his Collected Papers III: Studies in Phenomenological Philosophy. Ed. Ilse Schutz. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975.

Shimonisse, Eiichi. Die Phănomenologie und das Problem der Grundlegung der Ethik. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971.

Spader, Peter H. "The Primacy ofthe Heart: Scheler's Challenge to Phenomenology." Philosophy Today 29 (1985), 223-9.

-."A Change ofHeart: Scheler 's Ordo Amoris, Repentance, and Rebirth." Listening 21 ( 1986), 188-96.

Stikkers, Kenneth. "Phenomenology as Psychic Technique of Non-Resistance." In Phenomenology in Practice and Theory: Essays for Herbert Spiegelberg. Ed. William S. Hamrick. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1985.

Vacek, Edward, S.J. "Personal Development and the Ordo Amoris." Listening 21 (1986), 197-209.

-. "Scheler's Evolving Methodologies." Analecta Husserliana 20. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers 1987

Wojtyla, Karol [Pope John Paul II]. Primat des Geistes: Philosophische Schriften. Ed. Juliusz Stroynowski. Introduction by Manfred S. Frings. Stuttgart: Seewald, 1980.

MANFRED FRINGS

DePaul University

FRIEDRICH WILHELM JOSEPH VON SCHELLING

(1775--1854) Schelling does not engage in "pheno

menology" in the senses of either HEGEL or EDMUND

HUSSERL, but he encounters problems !ater confronted

FRIEDRICH WILHELM JOSEPH VON SCHELLING 635

by MARTIN HEIDEGGER as the latter tums away from the "phenomenology" he had earlier embraced.

Hegel's Phănomenologie des Geistes (Phenomen

ology of spirit, 1807) is an investigation that purports

to lead the reader along a path compellingly ordered

by dialectica! logic, from a presuppositionless and

immediately available natural standpoint to sophisticated positions from which an "absolute knowing" is

possible. This "absolute knowing" is then articulated through the unfolding of the Hegelian system in Wis

senschafi der Logik (Science of logic, 1812-16) and

the philosophies of nature and spirit (Enzyklopiidie

der philosophischen Wissenschafien [Encyclopedia of

philosophical sciences, 3rd. ed., 1830]). Hegel introduces his Phanomenologie des Geistes in part as a

reaction to Schelling's attempts, in such early works

as System des transzendentalen Idealismus (System of

transcendental idealism, 1800) and Darstellung meines

Systems der Philosophie (Exhibition of my system of

philosophy, 1801 ), simply to begin from an absolute standpoint, without showing how that standpoint is attained. In Hegel 's view, Schelling's absolute appears

"as though from a pistol."

From as early as 1795, in his Philosophische Briefe

iiber Dogmatimus und Kriticismus (Philosophicalletters concerning dogmatism and skepticism), Schelling

insists that there could be no need for any preliminary

discipline of the sort Hegelian phenomenology was

supposed to be, arguing that problems arise not with

attaining the absolute, but only with escaping it: "we

would all agree concern ing the absolute ifwe never left

its sphere." Even following the appearance of Hegel's

Phănomenologie, Schelling never acknowledges the need for a discipline serving its purpose.

Husserlian phenomenology differs most strongly

from other philosophical endeavors in its reliance

on description of experiences rather than on abstract

or theoretical argument. Schelling, however, engages

throughout his career in what the young Heidegger - still in his own "phenomenological" days- calls

"theory without phenomenology," i.e., rational con

structions not grounded in descriptions of human ex

periences. Unlike both Hegel and Husserl, Schelling is con

cerned not with experiences that human beings do or

could have, but instead with experiences attributed hy

pothetically to an absolute spirit attempting to come to

know itself. In displacing human experiences from the

heart ofhis system, Schelling opposes phenomenology in both the Hegelian and Husserlian senses.

If there is a positive connection between Schelling and a form of phenomenology, it is with the form

projected by the young Heidegger. Just as Schelling, throughout his career, attempts to reconcile the con

fiicting demands of freedom and system- to develop a system that would be comprehensive without denying

the latitude and fiexibility required by human freedom - the young Heidegger envisages a phenomenology

that would reconcile the conflict ing demands of temporality and foundationalism- an account that would

be strictly scientific without denying or distorting what THEODORE KISIEL has called "the evasive immediacy of

the human condition." Heidegger looks positively to Schelling only af

ter he abandons his "scientific" project, and with

it his description of his own work as "phenomen

ological." Although he alludes to a Schelling titie - Philosophische Untersuchungen iiber das We

sen der menschlichen Freiheit und die damit zusam

menhăngenden Gegenstănde (Philosophical investigations into the essence of human freedom, 1809)- in

naming his 1930 lecture course "On the Essence of

Human Freedom," Schelling is not considered in that

course. In 1936 and 1941, however, he devotes courses explicitly to the work recalled by his earlier title, describing that work as "the peak of the metaphysics

of German idealism" and its author as "the genuinely

creative and most broadly provocative (am weitesten

ausgreifende) thinker of this entire epoch of German

philosophy." Schelling's central contribution, according to Hei

degger, is his completion ofthe transformation of"the

idealism ofthe 'I think (ich stelle vor)' of Descartes to

the higher idealism of 'I am free,' to the idealism of freedom," a transformation stimulated by KANT's Kritik

der praktischen Vernunfi (Critique of practica! reason,

1788), but also retarded by the problematic relation,

in Kant's thought, between the practica! employment

of reason and the theoretical. Schelling does not recognize that this transformation entails ( 1) a shift of

attention from the absolute sought by the German ide

alists ·to the finitude that is "the essence of all being"

(das Wesen a/les Seyns), and thus (2) the abandonment of metaphysics (and !ater of "phenomenology,"

636 ENCYCLOPEDJA OF PHENOMENOLOGY

as foundational science). Nevertheless, that Schelling's thought was "shattered" by his own work is, in Heidegger's view, evidence ofhis decisive importance within the history ofWestern philosophy.

FOR FURTHER STUDY

Bowie, Andrew. Schelling and Modern Philosophy: An Introduction. New York: Routledge, 1993.

Holz, Harald. Spekulation und Faktizităt. Zum FreiheitsBegriff des mittleren und Spăten Schelling. Bonn: Bouvier, 1970.

Kisiel, Theodore. The Genesis of Heidegger s Being and Time. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.

Schulz, Wa1ter. Die Vollendung des Deutschen Idealismus in der Spătphilosophie Schellings. 2nd ed. Pfullingen: Neske, 1972.

Tilliette, Xavier. Schelling: Une philosophie en devenir. 2 vols. Paris: J. Vrin, 1970.

White, Alan. Schelling: An lntroduction ta the System of Freedom. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1983.

ALFRED SCHUTZ

ALANWHITE

Williams College

Schutz was horn in Vienna on April 13, 1899 and, after service in the Austrian army in World War I, he attended the University of Vienna where he received a doctorate in law in 1921, concentrating chiefly in international law. Upon receiving his degree he became executive secretary of the Austrian Banker's Association, joining the private bank of Reitler and Company in 1929 - remaining with the company when he emigrated with his family to France in 1938 and to the United States in 1940. In 1943 he received a part-time teaching position at the newly formed Graduate Faculty of Politica] and Social Science at the New School for Social Research. It was not until 1956, however, that he was able to devote himself to the responsibilities of a full-time academic position.

Schutz's intellectual interests and studies were multifarious, as can be seen in the collection of early writings edited by ILJA SRUBAR under the title Theorie der Lebensformen ( 1981, subsequently translated under the title Life Forms and Meaning Strucures). Between 1921 and 1929, however, he developed the

central focus for his many interests in the sciences and the humanities. There are numerous factors that contribute to that focus, outstanding among them being the inftuence ofhis teachers Hans Kelsen (1881-1973) and Ludwig von Mises (1881-1973) in LAW and ECONOMICS. Study of the former suggested to Schutz the need to find a way from the normative discipline of law to its application and underpinnings in the HUMAN SCIENCES and then to the underlying "subjective" interpretations of social, legal, and economic phenomena; study of the latter, especially with respect to the analysis of impersonal economic and legal mechanisms, suggested to Schutz the need to revise and develop anew and more broadly the ideas of subjectivity and understanding, and, after intensive study of the work ofMAX WEBER, the way in which mutual understanding among human beings comes about in the first place. This focus ofSchutz's studies, guiding him throughout his life, was first formally developed in Der sinnhafte Aujbau der sozialen Welt (The meaningful strucure of the social world, 1932) and still significantly informs the project and plan of his last, uncompleted book, Strukturen der Lebenswelt (The structures of the lifeworld, posthumously completed by his student THOMAS LUCKMANN in 1979/1984 ).

Schutz soon realized that Weber's work, important as it was, could not adequately account for how the self-understanding and self-interpretation that proceed in common sense can be made into the subject matter of the social sciences and amenable to theoretical investigation. To develop this problem Schutz sought inspiration in HENRI BERGSON's examination of the duree or inner duration characterizing the life of consciousness. Here he found the means for bypassing the difficulty of having to begin with concepts to disc! o se the basic nature ofthe relationship ofl and Thou and its typifying (otherwise taken for granted by social scientists such as Weber), which, while not the domain of the social sciences, nonetheless defines the very daily world in which they locate their problems.

In short, how is legitimate scientific knowledge possible of the world defined by everyday, nonscientific life in the natural attitude? The solution for Schutz was

to find a way to proceed from the inner duration to the common, typifying I-Thou world ofthings and events that comprises the foundations of everyday working life. Schutz's first attempt to deal with the problem

Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, lase Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna, Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner ( eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology. © 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.

ALFRED SCHUTZ 637

was in terms of"life forms," a concept derived as much

from WILHELM DILTHEY as from MAX SCHELER and Berg

son. It was also in this connection, in the late 1920s, that Schutz first began to formulate the problem ofrel

evance, which was inaccessible from the standpoint of the concept of life forms, and his own ideas about

the sociality ofthe I-Thou relationship. These were to become the central themes of Der sinnhafte Aujbau,

which required a more reliable foundation than that

provided by Bergson. That foundation was found in the work of EDMUND HUSSERL.

Quite early on, possibly in his university days, Schutz had been encouraged to read Husserl by FE

LIX KAUFMANN. However, it was only from about 1928

on that Schutz turned to the intensive study of Husserl:

Husserl's lectures on the consciousness of inner time

( Vorlesungen zur Phanomenologie des inneren Zeit

bewusstseins, 1928), then the newly published book

on transcendental logic (Formale und transzenden

tale Logik, 1929), afterwards Ideen zu einer reinen

Phiinomenologie und phiinomenologische Philosophie

1 ( 1913 ), and finally the early Logische Untersuchun

gen (1900---190 1) - all of which he read and dis

cussed, section by section, with Felix Kaufmann. In

a very short time Schutz had thoroughly mastered the

phenomenology of Husserl, which can be seen in his

mid-1930s reviews of Formale und transzendentale Logik and Meditations cartesiennes ( 1931) and his de

tai led review of Grundlegung der Lehre vom sozialen

Verband (Foundations ofthe theory of social organiza

tion, of 1932) by his friend from Japan TOMOO OTAKA.

Because the latter work was largely based only on

Husserl 's Logische Untersuchungen, Schutz severely

criticized it by showing that it is rather in the context

of Husserl's !ater transcendental phenomenology that

the necessary philosophical underpinning for clarify

ing the constituting of social organizations with respect

to legal, economic and politica! theory may be found.

To be sure, Schutz had already suggested this in his

extensive analyses ofthe components and structures of

sociality in Der sinnhafte Aufbau, published the same

year as Otaka's book, and in which Schutz either sup

planted or reinforced Bergson 's insights with Husserl 's

in coming to grips with the phenomena of I and Thou

and the constituting of subjective and objective MEAN

ING in a rich diversity of situations in the intersubjective

everyday world of working.

Alfred Schutz had as many criticisms of Husserl

as of Weber, but as the review of Otaka shows, he

strongly held the belief that Husserl was right about

the transcendental dimension of human experience in

the social world. To be sure, his interests were often

different, and he limited himself to certain problems,

as did his friend Felix Kaufmann, and as Kaufmann

noted, deliberately to limit oneselfto certain problems

does not mean to be limited. Thus, for example, in

Der sinnhafte Aufbau Schutz limited himselfto certain problems in the psychology and sociology of the ev

eryday world ofworking, but always within the frame

work of transcendenta[ CONSTITUTIVE PHENOMENOLOGY.

This strategy persisted throughout his last writings.

Thus Schutz writes that the aim of his book, "to

analyze the meaning-phenomena in mundane social

ity, does not require the acquisition of transcenden

tal experience beyond [ mundane sociality] and there

fore a further remaining in the transcendental pheno

menological reduction." Referring to Husserl 's "Nach

wort zu meinen 'Ideenlldots "' ( 1930), Schutz explains

what he means by saying that he is not concerned

with the phenomena of constitution in the transcen

dentally reduced sphere, but instead with their "corre

sponding correlates in the natural attitude"- "corre

lates" because for every proposition in transcendental

phenomenology there is a correlative one in psychol

ogy and sociology, but the converse need not be the

case. He then proceeds to formulate a transcendental

phenomenological eidetic account of the consciousness of inner time, applying the results to the clar

ification of the natural attitude not as transcenden

tallyphenomenologically reduced, but as p~ychologi

cally-phenomenogically reduced. Schutz then devel

ops a psychological, and by extension, a sociologica!

phenomenology of great originality consistent with a

transcendental phenomenology, but actually a CONSTI

TUTIVE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE NATURAL ATTITUDE.

Moreover, because not every proposition in a tran

scendental phenomenology is included in phenomen

ological psychology or sociology, it is possible to pro

ceed without having to maintain the transcendental

phenomenological attitude. In this context, too, Schutz

locates much of his criticism of Husserl: namely, that

not every proposition about intersubjectivity and the

ego, about behavior and action in the taken-for-granted

world of working and its systems of relevance and


typifying, is included in the transcendental phenomenology.

At the same time, this signifies that some methodological procedures in the social sciences must be developed that have their own warrant and legitimacy because they deal with "correlates in the natural attitude" of subjective and objective meanings of action, even though set in the context of transcendental phenomenology. Like the natural scientist, the social scientist deals with theoretical constructs, but rather "ofthe second degree," for in contriving them the social scientist must make allowance for the interpretations that social actors ha ve ofthemselves and of each other in the daily world ofworking. Schutz was able then to further circumscribe the limits of transcendental phenomenology especially in "The Problem of Transcendental Intersubjectivity in Husserl" ( 1957), as well as in essays concerning methodology.

Schutz sent a copy of Der sinnhafte Aujbau to Husserl, who responded enthusiastically. Through the auspices of Felix Kaufmann, Schutz met Husserl for the first time in 1932, and he continued to visit Husserl three or four times a year up to Christmas of 193 7, shortly before Husserl 's death. It was at Husserl 's request that Schutz wrote his reviews of Meditations cartesiennes and Formale und transzendentale Logik. He also heard Husserllecture in Vienna in May of 1935 and again in Prague in November of 1935, when he watched Die Krisis der europaischen Wissenschqften und die transzendentale Phiinomenologie ( 1936) take shape, supplying new impetus and ideas for the focus of his work on the lifeworld. We may say with ARON

GURWJTSCH that Schutz's work is truly re1ated to this last phase of Husserl 's thought.

With his emigration to the United States and introduction to academic life at the Graduate Facu1ty, Schutz increased his knowledge ofthe works of American sociologists and anthropologists, finding a shared concern for basic social theory as well as important ideas for its philosophical underpinnings. At the same time he became acquainted with the work of WILLIAM

JAMES, John Dewey (1859-1952), Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947), and George Herbert Mead (1863-1931) among many others; and at the instigation of MARVIN FARBER, he became an editor and contributor to the newly foundedjournal, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Atthis time Schutz commenced

to address the academic communty in lectures, first at Harvard and then elsewhere, as he steadily gained a wider audience in philosophy and sociology. By the mid-1940s Schutz had begun to develop in detail some ofthe ideas he had already spawned in the !ater 1930s on the social person; the lifeworld as the working world of everyday life with its empirica! and pure typifyings; and onfinite provinces of meaning and their correlative "multiple realities," which, along with his concepts of sign and symbol, provided him with the conceptual means to unify his focus with respect to law, economics, LITERATURE, painting, MUSIC, phantasms, and dreams.

While his essays "The Stranger" ( 1944) and "The Homecomer" (1945) deepened the connections between American sociOLOGY and his own attempts at the phenomenological grounding of sociology, in the late 1940s and early 1950s Schutz extended and enlarged his investigations into the problems of intersubjectivity and relevance in both sociology- e.g., in "Making Music Together" ( 1951) and "Mozart and the Philosophers" (1956)-and philosophy, e.g., in "Equality and the Meaning Structure of the Social World" (1957), "Max Scheler's Epistemology and Ethics" ( 1957-58), and 'Tiresias or Our Knowledge of Future Events" ( 1959).

By the late 1950s Schutz decided to puii together in three volumes of Collected Papers some thirty published essays displaying various approaches to his focus of thought achieved from the late 1930s. He also realized that the focus required a systematic presentation impossible in essay form. Shortly before his death, he began planning a large work. However, the precarious state ofhis health prevented him from carrying out this task, leaving only outlines and plans for analysis of both old and new themes, working pa pers, and instructions for completion of the work; as mentioned, the task was eventually completed by Thomas Luckmann. Alfred Schutz died on May 20, 1959.

Alfred Schutz was a remarkable and powerful, at times mesmerizing, teacher who brought out the best

in his students, some ofwhom were able to become his collaborators and explore in original ways the frontiers

of social and philosophical thought that he opened up. In his teaching as well as in his scientific research he sought to produce a systematic phenomenology and sociology ofthe lifeworld, detailing and analyzing its spe-

ALFRED SCHUTZ 639

cific structures and interna! workings (with the "epoche

of the natural attitude"), its various principles of orga

nization; and its shifts of accents of reality in various

provinces of meaning with respect to the "paramount

reality" of the working world of daily life. Moreover,

he provided a large body of supporting and substan

tiating phenomenological analyses with his "method

of ideal types" reconstructing the typifications of daily

life by exploring the typifying intentionalities of the

lifeworld, revealing their phenomenological genesis

from pre-predicative grounds to self-conscious gener

alizations and formalizations grounding what MAURICE

NATANSON has termed an "epistemology of the social

world" that is of great importance for the various so

cial and cultural sciences. Schutz's critica! studies revised Bergson's idea of

dud:e in light ofHusserl's idea ofinnertime; Bergson's

notion of memory and shifting accents of reality was

broadened and redeveloped in terms of James 's subuni

verses ofreality; and both Weber's notion ofsubjective

and objective meaning and Mead's notion of the ma

nipulatory sphere of action as core of the paramount

reality of daily life were carried to their radical extreme

when redeveloped in terms of the typicality of social

ro les, the stock of knowledge at hand, and the moti

vations of actions. Schutz's published correspondence

with Talcott Parsons (1902-1979), ARON GURWJTSCH,

and Eric Voegelin ( 190 1-1985) is especially important

for new insights into sociology and phenomenology as

well as for revealing the bearing ofhis criticism.

In brief, if Aron Gurwitsch may be said to have

sought the principles of organization of the noematic

characterization of the sociocultural world, Alfred

Schutz sought the principles of organization of its

correlative, constituting noetic characterization. At his

death, his work was not just incomplete in a negative

sense, but also in the positive sense ofproviding a pro

gram for furture work. The focus of his life's work

included tasks that he realized were still unfulfilled,

such as developing in the spirit of Leibniz a "logic of

everyday thinking" that sti li remains a major requisite

for establishing the foundations of the phenomenology

and sociology of the lifeworld. Yet it is as much in

the accomplished work as in clear sight of the unful

filled tasks that his greatness and continuing inftuence

in many different fields lie.

FOR FURTHER STUDY

Algarra, Martin Manuel. Materiales para el estudio de Alfred Schutz. Navarra: Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Navarra, 1991.

Embree, Lester, ed. Worldly Phenomenology: The Continuing Infiuence ofAlfred Schutz on North American Human Science. Lanham, MD: Center for Advanced research in Phenomenology/University Press of America, 1988

-, ed. Alfred Schutz :5 '"Sociologica! Aspects of Litera ture··: Text Construction and Complementary Essays. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, forthcoming.

Gurwitsch, Aran. The Field of Consciousness. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1964.

List, Elisabeth, and Ilja Srubar, eds. Alfred Schutz. Neue Beitrăge zur rezeption seines Werkes. Studien zur Oesterreichischen Philosophie, Voi. XII ( 1988).

Natanson, Maurice, ed. Phenomenology and Social Reality. Essays in Memory ofAlfred Schutz. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970.

-. Anonymity: A Study in the Philosophy of Alfred Schutz. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1986.

Schutz, Alfred. Der sinnhajie Aufbau der sozialen Welt. Eine Einleitung in die verstehende Soziologie. Vienna: Julius Springer, 1932 (2nd ed. 1960; rpt. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1974; The Phenomenology o{the Social World. Trans. George Walsh and Frederick Lehnert. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1967

-. Collected Papers I: The Problem of Social Reality. Ed. Maurice Natanson. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962.

-. Collected Papers 1/: Studies in Social Theory. Ed. Arvid Broadersen. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964.

-. Collected Papers III: Studies in Phenomenological Philosophy. Ed. 1. Schutz.The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966.

-. Refiections an the Problem of Relevance. Ed. Richard M. Zaner. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1970.

-. On Phenomenology and Social Relations.Ed. Helmut R. Wagner. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1970.

-. Alfred Schiitz/Talcott Parsons. Zur Theorie sozialen Handelns. Ein Briefwechsel. Ed. and trans. Walter M. Sprondel. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1977; The Theory o{ Social Action: The Correspondence of Alfred Schutz and Talcott Parsons. Ed. Richard Grathoff. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1978.

-, and Thorrias Luckmann. Strukturen der Lebenswelt. 2 vals. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1979--84; The Structures of the Life-World. Voi. 1 trans. Richard M. Zaner and H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1973; Voi. 2 trans. Richard M. Zaner and David J. Parent. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1983.

-. Theorie der Lebensformen. Ed. and trans. Ilja Srubar. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1981; Life Forms and Meaning Structure. Trans. Helmut R. Wagner. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982.

-. Alfred Schiitz. Aron Gurwitsch. Briefwechsel 1939-1959. Ed. RichardGrathoff. Munich: WilhelmFink, 1985; Philosophers in Exile: The Correspondence of Alfred Schutz and Aran Gurwitsch, 1939-1959. Trans. J. Claude Evans. Bloomington, IL: Indiana University Press, 1989.

-. Collected Papers IV. Ed. Helmut Wagner and George


Psathas in collaboration with Fred Kersten. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996.

Sozialwissenschaftliches Archiv Konstanz. Alfred-SchiitzGedăchtnis Archiv. Universităt Konstanz. Tătigkeitsbericht. 1988-1992.

Sprondel, Walter M., and Richard Grathoff, eds. Alfred Schiitz und die Idee des Alltags in den Sozialwissenschaften. Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke, 1979.

Srubar, Ilja. Kosmion. Die Genese der pragmatischen Lebenswelttheorie von Alfred Schiitz und ihr anthropologischer Hintergrund. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1988.

Wagner, Helmut R. Alfred Schutz: An Intellectual Biography. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1983.

Schutz's papers are held at Yale's Beineke Library, with copies in the Sozialwissenschaftliches Archiv at the University of Konstanz, Germany, and the Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology, Inc. at Florida Atlantic University.

FRED KERSTEN University of Wisconsin, Green Bay

SCIENCE, NATURAL See NATURAL SCIENCE IN

CONSTITUTIVE PERSPECTIVE and NATURAL SCIENCE IN

HERMENEUTICAL PERSPECTIVE

SCIENCE, POLITICAL See POLITICAL SCIENCE.

SCIENCES, HUMAN See HUMAN SCIENCES.

GEORG SIMMEL The German sociologist-philosopher Georg Simmel is generally remembered, along with his contemporaries Emile Durkheim ( 1858-1917), Ferdinand Tonnies (1855-1936), and MAX WE

BER (1864-1920), as a founder of modern sociOLOGY

and a major impetus to sociology's elevation to scientific status. Even today's more empirically trained soci

ologists possess at least a general familiarity with Simmel's theoretical writings on the philosophical foun

dations of sociology and other matters sociologica!.

The same cannot be said, however, of philosophers. Even philosophers whose interests lie in contemporary Continental philosophy have generally failed system

atically to study Simmel's work. Consequently, highly interesting and provocative points of contact between

Simmel's philosophy of history and Lebensphiloso

phie and the phenomenological philosophies of ED

MUND HUSSERL and MARTIN HEIDEGGER have llOt been recognized.

Born in Berlin on March 1, 1858, Simmel pursued his university studies and spent most of his professional life there. He began his studies in history, Vălkerpsychologie, and philosophy at Berlin in 1876

and remained there until the completion of his Ha

bilitationsschrift in 1884. Shortly thereafter he began teaching as a Privatdozent at the university, and in 1901

he received an appointment as Extraordinarius professor. Despite his success as a lecturer and an impressive record ofpublications, Simmel was never promoted to Ordinarius or fu li professorship at Berlin. He also twice failed- in 1908 and again in 1915 - to secure a full professorship at Heidelberg. In 1914, Simme1 accepted what he considered to be a 1ess desirab1e appointment to Ordinarius professor at Strasbourg where, after just four years, he died on September 28, 1918.

Simmel's disappointing academic journey from Berlin to Strasbourg was perhaps portended in his student days. His first dissertation - Psychologisch

ethnographische Studien iiber die Anfiinge der Musik

(Psychological-ethnographic studies concerning the origin of music)- was rejected by his readers, Hermann Ludwig von Helmholtz ( 1821-1894) and Eduard Zeller (1814-1908), and in order to complete his doctoral studies, Simmel submitted a second dissertation, Das Wesen der Materie nach Kants physiker Mon

adologie (The essence of matter according to Kant's physical monadology, 1881 ). Simmel returned to Kant for his Habilitationsschrift but once again found himself beset with difficulties that would delay the completion of his habilitation until 1884. The problem this

time was Zeller's "unsatisfactory" (ungeniigend)judg

ment ofSimmel 's Probevorlesung, ajudgment that was ostensibly based as much on the tone as the substance

of Simmel's response to Zeller's question regarding the precise location ofthe soul.

It is difficult to explain why a thinker such as

Simmel, whose work shows genuine creativity and

originality, would experience such difficulties in gaiuing acceptance. Some oft-cited reasons are that antiSemitism within the German academic community

hampered his efforts to secure an academic position commensurate with his accomplishments; concerns

Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnlce, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Koclcelmans, William R. McKenTUJ, Algis Miclcunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology. C 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.

GEORG SIMMEL 641

over his alleged relativism and aestheticism made it

generally difficult to accept his thought; reservations

about the new field of sociology within philosophical

circles extended by association to Simmel himself for

his involvement in it; and Simmel's "lively and versa

tile" intellect, as R. G. Collingwood once described it,

was insufficient to overcome questions about the con

tent and unsystematic character of his philosophical

writings.

Of course, Simmel did not help his own cause when he intentionally eschewed the scholarly convention of

scrupulously citing the works of contemporaries and

predecessors to whom he might be indebted; deliber

ately approached objects of study in interdisciplinary

fashion, at times obfuscating the lines of demarcation

between sociology, psychology, and philosophy; and

steadfastly refused to engage in textual exegesis as

an end in itself. Simmel was much less inclined to

ward scholarship in the strict sense than he was toward

philosophizing about the matters themselves. His goal was to philosophize not "vis-a-vis books, but vis-a-vis

life," and this effort alone is reason enough to sug

gest, as MICHAEL LANDMANN has, that SimmeJ fuJfilJed

in his own fashion the injunction issued by Husserlian

phenomenology- "zuriick zu den Sachen selbst."

The matters themselves that carne under Simmel's

gaze represent the broadest conceivable range of cultural phenomena and philosophical issues and included

such "unphilosophical," quotidian topics as coquetry,

music, money, society, FEMINISM, and fashion, as well

as the more traditional philosophical themes of AES

THETrcs, HISTORY, TIME, and ETHICS. GeneralJy speak

ing, though, Simmel's philosophical interest was more

focused than it first appears because each investiga

tion probes the same basic philosophical question, viz.,

what is the precise nature of the relationship between

subjective experiential life and the objective cultural

forms that it engenders and encounters? Objective

forms are rooted in life; they arise from our mental ac

tivities, yet they bear the sense of autonomous entities

because, once created, they follow their own indepen

dent logic and momentum, which means we can, and

often do, experience them as opposing life and block

ing its development. For Simmel, this tension between

life and its creations is the source ofwhat he calls the

"tragedy of eul ture."

The importance Simmel attaches to the objective

content or MEANING (Sinn) belonging to expressions of

life defuses any attempt to explain the phenomenon

of cu! ture in terms of NATURALISM and PSYCHOLOGISM,

and at the same time, it provides an unmistakable

bridge connecting him to the phenomenological tradition. Even though Simmel 's connection with that tradi

tion has received little attention, it has been noted that

Simmel's sociocultural studies should have a certain

appea1 for phenomenologists, that his approach to so

cial phenomena is "phenomenological in method and spirit" (GEORGE PSATHAS), and that there is a possible

direct link between Simmel and phenomenology via his influence on Husserl and ALFRED SCHUTZ. There is

good reason to believe that Simmel influenced not just

Husserl, but also Heidegger, and any consideration of Simmel's relevance to the development ofphenomen

o1ogy needs to look in both directions. As regards Heidegger, an observation by his former

student, HANS-GEORG GADAMER, provides the essential

clue as to where we should begin looking for Sim

melian traces in Heidegger's thought. Gadamer men

tions in a note in his Wahrheit und Methode (Truth and

method, 1960) that as early as 1923, Heidegger spoke

to him "with admiration" of Simmel 's !ater writings.

He goes on to identify Simmel's temporal conception of life as "truly past and future," a conception that

Simmel articulates in his Lebensanschauung (View of

life, 1918), as the source of Heidegger's admiration.

Gadamer obviously takes this matter quite seriously,

since he underscores the fact that Heidegger's remark

was "not just a general acknowledgement of Simmel

as a phi1osopher." A cursory study of §72 of Heidegger's Sein und

Zeit (1927) against the backdrop of Simmel's Leben

sanschauung will uncover enough suggestive and

provocative parallels between Heidegger 's analysis

and Simmel 's thoughts on life and death to support

Gadamer's contention. For Heidegger, the "connect

edness of life" derives from the manner in which DA

SEIN "stretches along between birth and death." In or

der fully to appreciate the way this "connectedness"

is lived, Dasein's orientation toward the future, its

being-toward-death, as Heidegger would say, must be

comp1emented by looking back at the other end of

the temporal arc, the beginning, and thus at Dasein 's

"being-toward-the-beginning." From this new perspec

tive, o ne can understand why the "question" ofhow life


forms a unity as it passes through successive moments of time is, in fact, a pseudoproblem that only arises when life is viewed from the outside, as a mere entity having the continuity of a thing in objective time. Here only the experience that is present-at-hand in the "now" is thought to be real, and "those experiences which have passed away or are only coming along, either are no Ion ger orare not yet 'actual'."

With Heidegger's observations in mind, we turn to Simmel's Lebensanschauung, where, especially in Chapter 1, we tind him covering much the same ground as Heidegger. When Simmel wrote this work he was aware of his own impending death, yet he also recognized that the moment was really no different from any other during his life except perhaps for a heightened awareness of death, because it was evident that "death is imminent in Iife from the outset .... " For Simmel, an individual 's death is not just another predictable event, something that undoubtedly occurs one day and establishes the Iimit of the individual 's Iife but has no bearing on the present. On the contrary, death is an essential part oflife as it is being lived, and for that reason it has a bearing on the individual 's life from beginning to end. AII this follows from Simmel 's conception of the temporality of Iife.

Simmel anticipates Heidegger's characterization of life as stretching out in the twofold directions ofbirth and death, because for him birth and death are not mere appendages to Iife, as though life were nothing more than the content filling the temporal space between these two poles. Rather, Iife embraces both poles because "life is truly past and future .... " As Simmel expresses it, "The mode of existence which does not

restrict its reality to the present moment, thereby placing past and future in the realm of the unreal, is what we calllife. "

As with Heidegger, Simmel finds any conception of life that reduces Iife to a thing among things, i.e., to an entity like any other that is in time, tobe a misconception. Nonetheless, even on this mistaken view, Iife is assigned a type of temporality, but only to the extent that it is thought to traverse a succession of"nows," and this is at best a secondary and derivative notion oftime and one that is incompatible with life as experienced. The reality of Iife cannot be confined to the present simply because its past is thought to be no longer and its future not yet, because to do so would render Iife

atemporal. From the perspective oflife itself, its being is time. "Time is Iife," remarks Simmel, "because life alone transcends the atemporal present of every other kind of reality in both directions and thereby realizes ... the temporal dimension, that is, time."

For Simmel, the temporal structure of Iife is the condition for the possibility of HISTORY as a science, or, as Heidegger notes, "historiology, as the science of Dasein s history, must 'presuppose' as its 'object' the entity which is primordially historical." Although they see the past, present, and future as inextricably intertwined in Iife - or Dasein, as Heidegger would say- they nonetheless both accord a certain priority to the future insofar as it is the source from which the past and the present derive their significance for us. Simmel emphatically makes this point in one of his last works dealing with the problem of history, "Die historische Formung" (1917-18), where he notes that the "historical moment" must be understood in terms of the future, i.e., its possibilities and consequences. Human events and creations are authentic objects of "history only ifthey fali under the form oflife." In fact, a distinguishing characteristic of HISTORY as a HUMAN

SCIENCE is its connection with Iife. History, of course, is not life, but neither "does it cut the umbilical cord that connects it to the bloodstream ofhuman Iife as it is actually Iived. The inner dynamic that is derived from life itself also vibrates within the structure of history." Perhaps, as Heidegger observes, Simmel's philosophy of history is primari1y concerned with setting forth an epistemology of historiography, but his insights ha ve deeper significance, as Heidegger himself no doubt recognized.

Heidegger's encounter with Simmel's work is not the only occasion to caii for a consideration of Simmel's impact on phenomenological philosophy, for Husserl too apparently consulted Simmel 's phi1osophy of history and was probably influenced by it. Interestingly, Husserl's attention seems to have focused primarily on those works in which the issues pertaining to history, including questions of historiography, are directly confronted. What makes the Husseri-Simmel connection particularly noteworthy is the likelihood that the Iines of influence ran in both directions with Husserl influencing Simmel and Simmel influencing Husserl. There are a dozen letters from Simmel to Husserl in the Husserl Briefwechsel.

GEORG SJMMEL 643

It is widely accepted that the problem of history

gains prominence in Husserl's phenomenology during

the last phase ofhis philosophical development,just as

it is widely accepted that Husserl 's concern for history

and the historical world owes much to his familiarity with WILHELM DILTHEY's philosophy of the human

sciences. What is less recognized is the mention by

LUDWIG LANDGREBE in a Selbstdarstelfung that Husserl

presented the 1905 second edition of Simmel 's Die

Probleme der Geschichtsphilosophie (The problem of the philosophy ofhistory) as a seminar topic in the sum

mer semester of 1924. Unfortunately, there appear tobe

no lecture notes in Husserl's Nachlass corresponding

to Die Probleme. Nonetheless, Husserl 's copy of this

work, along with his copies of Simmel's Hauptprobleme der Philosophie (Major problems ofphilosophy,

191 O) and Vom Wesen des historischen Verstehens (On

the essence ofhistorical understanding, 1918), are part

of his personal library now preserved at the Husserl

Archives in Leuven. Each text contains sufficient un

derlinings and marginal notes to offer a glimpse of

where, from Husserl's point of view, there is agree

ment and disagreement between the two men. More

importantly, these textual notations provide evidence

that Husserl took Simmel 's contributions to the philosophy ofhistory seriously.

Three points of convergence stand out: ( 1) their

criticism ofhistoricism, (2) their rejection ofpsychol

ogism, and (3) their acceptance of"motives" as somehow central to the process of historical understanding.

At Ieast six years before Husserl 1aunched his own

weli-known attack on historicism in the Logos article, "Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft" ( 1911 ), Sim

mel had already set out to extricate philosophy from

its grip. Simmel 's strategy was not to transform phi

losophy into a rigorous science as it was with Husserl.

In fact, in a certain sense, Simmel's approach more

closely resembled Dilthey's inasmuch as he consid

ered philosophy itself a Weltanschauung that flows

from and reflects a particular type of human spiritu

ality. That said, however, Simmel clearly has no in

tention ofyielding ground to the forces ofhistoricism,

especialiy when philosophy itself is at stake. Antici

pating Husserl, he Iaments that the "concept ofhistory

has become an idol," and that historicism tends to draw

at least two erroneous conclusions regarding philoso

phy: ( 1) that the history of philosophy comprises the

legitimate subject matter of philosophizing in general

and (2) that philosophical theories and the philosophers

that proffered them can only be understood historically,

i.e., in terms of the place they occupy in a historical

sequence. Simmel takes issue with both points. He rejects

historicism's first claim because it rests on the false

assumption that the realm of philosophy can be ac

cessed without actually philosophizing. What results

is a mode of reductionism that conflates philosophical reflection and purely historical reflection, if indeed

there is such a thing for Simmel. The mark of philosophy is not mere receptivity, but productivity, which

is why he describes genuine philosophizing as "abso

Iutely ahistorical." What renders it ahistorical is not

the epistemic value of its content, and certainly not if

this were to imply the miraculous discovery and ex

pression of immutable truths beyond history. Nothing

could be more foreign to Simmel 's thought than such

a conception of philosophy. On the contrary, if philos

ophy is ahistorical, it is so only insofar as ali genuine

philosophizing brings forth something new, something

that cannot be accounted for if a particular philoso

phy is viewed as nothing more than an effect in a long

causal series. For Simmel, ali genuine philosophizing arises from a fresh perspective on the "matters them

selves," although such a perspective will sti li be shaped

by an intimate awareness of antecedent perspectives.

The history ofphilosophy is not simply a kaleidoscope of disparate and inchoate philosophical perspectives,

but a nexus of such perspectives that is held together,

however fragile1y, by their logica! content and by the fact that for those who seek to philosophize, the his

tory of philosophy is their history, their past, and, as

such, be1ongs to their present. This is the reason why

the philosopher needs history, as Husserl himse1f rec

ognized as early as the Logos article even though he

failed fully to capitalize on the insight until his his

torical reflections of Die Krisis der europăischen Wis

senschaften und die transzendentale Phănomenologie

(1936).

AII of this brings us to Simmel 's reason for reject

ing historicism's second claim that philosophies and

phi1osophers must be understood historically, which,

in turn, will shed light on his efforts to distance him

self from the psychologistic orientation of the first

edition of his Die Probleme. Even his early piece,


"Uber Geschichte der Philosophie" ( 1904), reveals his

attempt to void his theory of interpretation ofpsychol

ogism and his last writings on the question of history

- including Das Problem der historischen Zeit (The

problem ofhistorical time, 1916), "Die historische For

mung" ( 1917-18), and Vom Wesen des historischen

Verstehens ( 1918)- continue the effort with renewed

vigor and conviction. As with Husserl, Simmel argues in Vom Wesen that

even the "sort of interpretati an that seems to be purely

historical regularly employs a form of trans-historical

or superhistorical interpretation." Indeed, we could not

even "understand the what or essence of things by ref

erence to their historical development unless we al

ready had some sort of independent understanding of

this essence." Put another way, every historically ex

isting philosophy expresses an objective content that is independent of the time and place in which it hap

pens to appear, as well as of the psychic acts of the

particular philosopher responsible for its articulation. For this reason, the author's intention has no bearing

upon, and no role to play in, the objective interpretation inasmuch as the sale aim is to understand the

meaning of the work. To stress this point and at the

same time to underscore his rejection of the histori

cist's claim that we understand a philosophy when we

understand the philosopher who elaborated it, Simmel reverses the matter and suggests instead that "we understand the philosopher insofar as we understand his [or her] philosophy."

Of course, one might argue that Simmel 's abandon

ment of his early psychologistic stance owes at least as much to Dilthey as it does to Husserl, but one needs

to recall that Dilthey himself credits Husserl's Logische Untersuchungen (1900--190 1) with providing the

necessary conceptual tools to deal with the problem

of psychologism. What these critiques of psychologism share- especially Simmel's and Husserl's

is the acute awareness that to overcome or reject psychologism is not a license to ignore the subjective or

noetic si de of the intentiona] equation. Of course, any

investigation ofthe mental acts necessary to constitute

mental creations runs the risk of being interpreted by

others as a relapse into psychologism, as was the case

when Husserl tumed his attention in that direction in

the sixth ofhis Logische Untersuchungen. Such inter

pretations rest on a failure to recognize that what is at

issue for Husserl and, of course, for Simmel, are not the

real psychic acts of particular persons but the essential

structures manifested in them and accessible via what Husserl calls EIDETIC METHOD.

Just how successful Simmel is at overcoming psychologism will undoubtedly remain open to discussion

and debate, if for no other reason than his refusal to

abandon his commitment to the idea of reconstructing or re-creating the mental activities that engender the

sociohistorical phenomena one wishes to understand. However, "recreation" (Nachbildung) is nota question

of achieving some sort of numerica! identity with an

author, artist, or historical personality, for as Simmel himself observes, one need not become a Caesar in

order to understand Caesar. What is of concern in the

process ofre-creation pertains to the "trans-subjectivity

or super-subjectivity of psychological structures themselves, structures which are only independent of their

realization in any given mind." To paraphrase Sim

mel, one could assert that the mental acts necessary

for the accomplishments of objective culture are im

manent to subjective life, and yet independent of the

name ofthe individual who performs them. Simmel is

not far from Husserl on this score, for the latter also

maintains in Phănomenologische Psychologie [ 1925]

that whenever numbers, propositions, or theories, for

example, become objects of consciousness, the correla

tive lived experiences must ha ve "essentially necessary

and everywhere identica! structures." What is more

significant, especially in light of Simmel 's remarks, is

that Husserl 's observati an extends beyond the realm of purely theoretical accomplishments to include "psy

chic correlations referring to objects of every region

and category." It is also noteworthy that Simmel cautions against

naturalistically conceiving the relations between men

tal performances and then between these performances and their objects. Mental activities may legitimately be

viewed psychophysically, but not when it is a matter

ofunderstanding human behavior or sociocultural cre

ations. What Simmel has in mind in Die Probleme is

precisely what Husserl develops in considerable detail

in §56 of Jdeen zu einer reinen Phănomenologie und

phănomenologischen Philosophie II [ 1912-15] under

the rubric of motivati an as the type of lawfulness that

obtains in the spiritual realm. Husserl 's articulation

and elaboration ofthe "law ofmotivation" would ha ve

GEORG SIMMEL 645

helped Simmel clearly to distinguish the type of regu

larity and necessary connections relevant in the sphere of life from the "nomological necessity" applicable in the domain of nature. As for Husserl, we should at least mention in this context that the importance that

his conception of the human sciences attaches to motives and motivations has considerably more affinity

with the principal tenets ofSimmel's thought than with

Dilthey's theory of historical understanding.

Naturally, there is still much that needs to be investigated regarding Simmel's relation to Husserl and

Heidegger beyond the interna! connections and convergences that have been mentioned. Although not dis

cussed here, it is noteworthy that MAX SCHELER also

held that money economies tend to ignore the qualitative dimension of reality and thus function hand in

hand with the mechanistic conception of nature. Furthermore, it is not surprising that Simmel's thoughts

on time invite comparison with HENRI BERGSON's influential work on the same topic, given the fact that

Simmel 's Lebensphilosophie was developed in part under Bergson's influence. But even if one ignores these historical connections and especially the question of

Simmel 's inftuence on Husserl and Heidegger, there

are reasons to consider his treatment of temporality

as phenomenological inasmuch as he does not simply

give an account of TIME per se but, more precisely,

attempts to describe the lived experience oftime. Furthermore, even though his phenomenology of time is

not explicitly articulated until the Lebensanschauung,

it evidently already informs his philosophy ofhistory,

and particularly his expression of it in his last writings.

The true import ofhistorical understanding is not realized if one thinks that it pertains merely to that which is "no longer." The "past as it really was," even if we

could recreate it, would have neither significance nor

relevance for us because it would be located outside

the temporal structure of life. Here again the accent

is on lived experience. Simmel 's work deserves to be

considered a part of the complex web of inftuences at

work in the formation and development of phenomen

ological philosophy.

FOR FURTHER STUDY

Aron, Raymond. Essai sur la thi'orie de 1 'historie dans 1 'Alfemagne contemporaine: La philosophie critique de

1 'historie. Chapter 3: "Philosophie de la vie et logique de l'histoire (Simmel)." Paris: J. Vrin, 1938, 159-218.

Dahme, Heinz-Jiirgen, and Otthein Rammstedt, eds. Georg Simmel und die Moderne. Neue Interpretationen und Materialien. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1984.

Frisby, David. Sociologica! Impressionism: A Reassessment of Georg Simmel s Social Theory. London: Heinemann, 1981.

Gassen, Kurt, and Michael Landmann, eds. Buch des Dankes an Georg Simmel. Briefe, Errinerungen. Bibliographie. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1958.

Simmel, Georg. Die Probleme der Geschichtsphilosophie. Eine erkenntnistheoretische Studie. Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1892; The Prob!ems of the Philosophy o{ History: An Epistemological Essay. Trans. and ed. Guy Oakes. New York: The Free Press, 1977.

~-. Philosophie des Geldes. Leipzig: Duncker&Humblot, 1900; The Philosophy of Money. Trans. Tom Bottomore, David Frisby. London: Routledge&Kegan Paul, 1978.

-. "Uber die Geschichte der Philosophie (aus einer einleitenden Vorlesung)." Die Zeit No. 34 (1904 ), 504; "On the History ofPhilosophy (from an introductory lecture)." In his Essays on Interpreta/ion in Social Science. Trans. Gary Oakes. Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield, 1980, 198-204.

--. Schopenhauer und Nietzsche. Ein Vortragszyklus. Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1907; Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. Trans. Helmut Loiskandl, Deena Weinstein, and Michael Weinstein. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1991.

-. Das Problem der historischen Zeit. Berlin: Reuther, 1916; "The Problem of Historical Time." In his Essays in Interpretation in Social Science, 127-44.

-. "Die historische Formung." Logos 7 (1917-18), 113-52; rpt. in his Fragmente und Auf.~ătze. Aus dem Nachlass und Verojfentlichungen der lezten Jahre. Ed. Gertrud Kantorowicz. Hi1desheim: Georg Olms, 1967, 147-209; "The Constitutive Concepts ofHistory." In his Essays on lnterpretation in Social Science, 145-97.

-. Der Konflikt der modernen Kultur. Ein Vortrag. Munich: Duncker & Humblot, 1918; The Conflict in Modern Cultureand OtherEssays. Trans. Peter K. Etzkom. New '{ork: Columbia University Teachers College Press, 196R.

-. Vom Wesen des historischen Verstehens. Berlin: Mittler, 1918; "On the Nature ofHistorical Understanding." In his Essays on Interpretation in Social Science, 97-126.

-. Lebensanschauung. Vîer metaphysische Kapitel. 2nd ed. Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1922; chapter 1 trans. in On Individuality and Social Forms: Selected Writings. Ed. Donald N. Levine. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971, 353-74.

-. Brucke und Tur. Essays des Philosuphen zur Geschichte. Religion, Kunst, und Gesel/schaji. Ed. Michael Landmann with Margarete Susman. Stuttgart: K. F. Koehler, 1957.

-. Georg Simmel: Sociologist and European. Ed. Peter A. Lawrence. Sunbury-on-Thames: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1976.

Weingartner, Rudolph H. Experience and Cu/ture: The Philosophy of Georg Simmel. Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1960.

JOHN E. JALBERT Sacred Heart Universi(Y


SOCIAL GEOGRAPHY The expression

"ge6graphie sociale" was coined by the French sociol

ogist Paul de Rousiers ( 1857-1934) in a review of the

first volume of Elisee Reclus's Nouvelle ge6graphie

universelle: La terre et les hommes (New universal geography: The earth and human beings, 1876). This is

one of the most comprehensive works in the history of geography since the publications of Alexander von

Humboldt (1769-1859) and Cari Ritter ( 1 779-1859).

Reclus ( 1830-1905) was inspired by George P. Marsh 's Man and Nature: Physical Geography as Modified by

Human Action ( 1864 ), which is o ne of the founding texts of modern ECOLOGY, and was opposed to natural

or environmental determinism, which was the domi

nant geographical view ofhis time. In describing geographical conditions, Reclus and

members of the Le Play school recognized the emergence of new social formations produced by industrial

ization. Everyday life went through dramatic transformations. Actors were confronted with labor and land markets and with competition for positions in the production process and subsequently with competition for social positions. Furthermore, they had to deal with the

bureaucratic order of sociallife through the radicalized

territorial control mechanisms ofthe nation state. Thus

the traditional "society"-"space" nexus changed from a religiously and culturally dominated one to a rationally constructed market and an institutionally controlled bureaucracy. "Society" could then appear as a spatial mosaic, patterned in correspondence with social

differences that are economically based- i.e., slums,

business districts, fine residential areas- and normative or legally defined territories, i.e., counties, nation states, etc.

In its beginning, social geography was first of ali and understood by most geographers as the geogra

phy of the social. The aim of this subdiscipline of geography and/or sociOLOGY was to analyze the spatial

patterning of the social facts. Guided by the ideal of natural sciences, the theoretical target for many social

geographers was to discover the spatial (causal) laws

of the social world. In the French tradition, the social geography of the Reclus and Le Play schools could

not succeed. Paul Henri Vida! de la Blaches's (1845-1918) "geographie humaine" dominated the discipline,

defined not as HUMAN SCIENCE or social science but as science of places. Only in the late 1940s could Pierre

George and Max Sorre establish social geography at

French universities. They were interested in the social aspects, the regionallife forms, and the spatial pattern

ing and regional differences of social classes. In the English-speaking world, the Chicago school

of sociology pioneered this field of research by the turn ofthe 20th century. The models ofplant ecology ofthe

Danish biologist Johannes E. Warming (1841-1924)

had been applied to the study of regularities in the

social patterning in cities. This starting point, strengthened by the scientific spatial approach pioneered by

William Bunge and Brian J. L. Berry, had a strong infiuence on British and Anglo-American social ge

ography until recently. On the one hand, the current orientations are linked to David Harvey's integration

of MARXISM into the geographical discipline and to the

application ofHenri Lefebvre's ( 1901-1991) theory of

the production of space. On the other hand, strong ef

forts are made, mainly by Derek Gregory and Nigel

Thrift, to establish social geography as a discipline of

critica! social science drawing on social theory and

cultural studies. In the early 1920s, Sebald R. Steinmetz ( 1862-

1940) claimed for the Dutch tradition that "sociogra

phie" should provide a knowledge of villages, cities,

counties, and countries in their "concreteness" and pre

ciseness, as the natural sciences do for the physical

world. This knowledge should promote regional and urban planning, the most important application of so

cial geography, especially in Continental Europe after World War II. In the 1950s Wolfgang Hartke for

mulated a research program for the German "Sozial

geographie" that was oriented toward the delimitation

ofthe space established by the same social geographi

cal behavior, meaning spaces of homogeneous values,

and norms of behavior. Dietrich Bartels (1931-1983)

brought this together with the claims of the Chicago

school to discover spatiallaws in the pattern ing of social formations, settlements or urban systems, and the determinants of human actions, such as social norms

and cultural values. The German and English-speaking

debates merged in the 1970s and early 1980s into the

scientific spatial approach. The humanistic critique of behavioral geography

in the 1970s is focused on this combination of the

spatial dimension, everyday life, and the scientific at

titude. On the basis of EXISTENTIAL PHENOMENOLOGY,

Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Koclcelmans, William R. McKenna, Algis Miclcunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner ( eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology. C 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.

SOCIAL GEOGRAPHY 647

ANNE BUTTIMER, EDWARD RELPH, and DAVID SEAMON ob

jected to the Cartesian idea of rationalistic, objective

sciences that are alienated from the LIFEWORLD and

- at least implicitly - from the Western project of

reason. Instead of searching for spatiallaws and expla

nations, human geography should be interested in the

subjective meaning of places, the subjective percep

tion of geographic spaces (mental maps) and objects,

as well as in the subjective evaluation of natural haz

ard and risk. The underlying hypothesis is that these

aspects play an important role for environmental be

havior and behavior in space. To make such knowledge

available is seen as behavioral geography's contribu

tion to a better understanding of human behavior.

But for behavioral geography "space" is still the

center of the geographer's attention and is still taken

for granted. "Behavior" happens "in space" and "en

vironment" is "perceived." What is not asked is if

"behavior" and "perception" are concepts compatible

with phenomenological thought. Neither are "space"

nor "environment" seen as constituted by the know

ing and acting subject. Therefore, this first reference to

phenomenology is an adaptation from the perspective

of traditional geographical concepts and frameworks.

It is not an adaptation of phenomenological principles

as such to the field of geographical research, including

the task of questioning everyday realities.

Based on phenomenological ground beyond psy

chological categories, DAVID LEY questions some aspects of the "taken-for-granted world." Referring to

ALFRED SCHUTZ'S CONSTITUTIVE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE

NATURAL ATTITUDE, he emphasizes the constitutive and

meaningful character of INTERSUBJECTIVITY by moving

from behavior to ACTION as the focus of research. He ca Ils on geographers to pay more attention to the sub

jective meanings of actions produced in the natural

attitude. They should not, consequently, be interested

merely in the subjective perception ofplaces, but also

in the subjective constitution ofthe meaning of"place."

The city is no longer seen as a special pattern of social

acts, but rather as a "mosaic of social worlds" with

specific meanings of particular places.

Torsten Hăgerstrand and the time geography ofthe

LunJ school look at the paths of the agent's social

actions through TIME and SPACE. The agent's BODY is

recognized as an indivisible unit. Accordingly, action

in space is always time consuming, and urban and re-

gional planning includes time planning. Schutz's con

cept of"reach," and COURTICE ROSE's interpretation of it,

are used in this context for the reconstruction of space

time action pattems in the everyday world as well as

for their optimization through urban and regional plan

ning. SOLVEIG MĂRTESSON's studies of the "formation

of biographies" and subjects' stocks of knowledge in

space-time categories open a new research perspec

tive for the analysis of children's socialization pro

cesses. The influence of the rhythms and conflicts of

parents with institutional space-time patterns become

more transparent. For more encompassing social geographical studies,

the BODY can be seen-in Schutz's terms-as a func

tional link between inner processes and movements

directed toward the outer world. On the one hand, the

body in the physical world becomes a medium of ex

pression for intentiona! consciousness. On the other

hand, the spatial dimension is mediated and incorpo

rated via the body, especially in face-to-face situations.

Thus the physical or geographicallocation ofthe body

affects the nature of pure duration experiences and

thereby this location affects, as Schutz puts it in re

ferring to HENRI BERGSON, memory-endowed duration.

Therefore, the function of the body is to mediate between duration and the homogeneous space-time world

of extension. Furthermore, the body is crucial for the constituting

process and intersubjectivity. If a subject is learning

intersubjectively valid rules of interpretati an that exist

within a certain sociocultural world, then it is necessary

for this subject to verify his or her interpretations and evaluations. This means that the constitution and ap

plication of intersubjective meaning-contexts depend on the possibilities oftesting the validity ofallocations

of MEANING. The attainment of certainty about inter

subjectively valid constitutions of meaning is possible

above ali in the immediate face-to-face situation. Here

the bodies of the actors face each other directly as

fields of expression for the ego and alter ego. This

makes it possible to support communication through

subtle symbolic bodily gestures, thus li miting the num

ber of misinterpretations. Accordingly, co-presence is

the prerequisite condition of ontologica! and interpre

ti ve security, on which both the more abstract and the

more anonymous allocations of meaning are based.

For social geography this is oftwofold significance.


First of ali, in the context of urban theory, this helps us to understand how face-to-face communication is still important for decisions in modern business worlds, even if telecommunication is largely available. In ur

ban planning, this helps to make clear the social significance of public spaces. Second, the significance of

co-presence makes possible a deeper insight into conditions ofthe everyday social worlds. The corporeality of human actors is thus central for an understanding ofthe so-called "society"-"space" nexus. In traditional societies highly tied to face-to-face situations, mean

ing worlds have therefore much more thoroughgoing regional limits and are internally less segregated than

in modern societies. To grasp these regionally differentiated worlds in an

appropriate way is o ne of the premises of intercultural understanding as mutual understanding of actors living in different (regional) sociocultural worlds. Traditionally, social and cultural geography play a crucial part

in producing the knowledge of these regionally different worlds. This needs empirica! research in a sub

jective perspective. In traditional human geography, "subjective" rarely refers to the subjective standpoint of the analyzed actor or action in the natural attitude.

It rather refers to the subjective standpoint of the researcher. This naive subjectivism can be overcome by a genuine adaptation of phenomenological methodology, whereby Schutz's postulates of subjective interpretation and adequacy are maintained.

"Space" and "place" were and still are the unques

tioned given key "objects" for most geographers and many "geographical investigations" ofthe world. JOHN

PICKLES criticizes the objectivation of "space" and understands phenomenology as a method that seeks to clarify these concepts. On the basis of the existential

phenomenology of MARTIN HEIDEGGER he elaborates a perspective in which "space" cannot be the abject of theoretization and empirica! research, but "spatiality" can. For him, an "ontology of spatiality" is needed

to determine what must be the case if there can be anything like spatial and environmental behavior. The

aim of social geography would then be the appropriate interpretation of "human spatiality."

Starting from Heidegger's premise that the spatial ordering of entities occurs through human activities,

we can understand that the spatiality of "ready-tohand" entities always belongs to a place within the

"equipmental" context of a particular activity. It is important to point out that according to Heidegger, space and time do not serve merely as parameters. Both are rather foundational for DASEIN. "Space" (Raum) is the result of răumen (clearing away) and therefore has an existence of its own. However, neither is "space" part

of the subject, nor does the subject observe the world "as if'' the world !ies in a Newtonian or container space. Rather, the subject for Heidegger is spatial and "spatializes" the world through his or her mode of being.

Consequently, in geography the assertion was made

that human spatiality has to be part of a spatial theory. The fu ture of social and human geography will depend

- that was and sti li is largely the argument- on the nature ofthe research program that develops from this incorporation. Therefore, human geography should be understood as a human science of human spatiality. But is empirica! investigation of "spatiality" possible in spatial categories and can "spatiality" be the "abject"

of spatial theory? Would it not be more accurate to link "spatiality" methodologically to human activities and actions instead of "space"? Nevertheless, spatial theory would not be the core of the geographer's interest

anymore. The constitutive phenomenology of EDMUND

HUSSERL and Schutz makes it possible to start from the hypothesis that what geographers describe as spatial problems are in fact problems of certain types of actions, actions in which corporeal involvement and material things are fundamental parts. The fact that the self experiences the body primarily in movement also

means that it experiences the body only in, and not as, a functional context. The experience of movement is necessarily reinterpreted as an experience of space and opens up access to the world of extension. With the experience ofthe spatial character of one 's own body, the

spatiality of things is discovered. The constitution of the material world and of"space" is thus bound up with the experiencing, moving, and acting "1." Apart from

the experience ofthe spatiality ofthe physical-material world, the subject also experiences the qualities ofthe

various objects in relation to his or her own body, verifying them with corresponding meanings for her or his

actions. With a radical integration of phenomenological

thinking into social geography and the adaptation of

action theory, the project of social geography changes

SOCIAL GEOGRAPHY 649

its focus. The center of interest is no longer "space" or

"spatiality." In accordancewith Schutz's idea ofthe so

cial sciences, the aim of social geographical research is then the scientific reconstruction of the everyday

making of geographies in the natural attitude. We certainly need precise theoretical categories to grasp the

different types of everyday geographies.

Schutz and THOMAS LUCKMANN offer a body-centered

view of geographies in the natural attitude. This view

begins from the distinction between the "world within

immediate reach" and the "world within potential

reach." The "immediate reach" encompasses a "pri

mary" and a "secondary zone ofinftuence." The first is

the zone of direct manipulation, the area that offers the

fundamental text of ali reality. The "secondary zone of

inftuence" is defined as that part of the world that the

agent can only affect through the use of technological

aids. Developments in technology offer a qualitative

leap in the range of experience and an enlargement

of the zone of operation. The areas within "potential

reach" are divided into the world "within restorable

reach" and "within accessible reach." The former was

at one time the agent's core ofreality. Chances ofreach

ing the latter depend, first, on physical and technolog

ical capacities in a particular time and society and,

second, on the access a particular agent has to such

means. To analyze everyday geographies in a phenomen

ological perspective indicates that scientific investigation has to put subjects and not primarily spaces,

regions, or spatiality at its center. Then the question

is how subjects produce geographies by placing ob

jects for particular activities and how they maintain

a certain order of objects by consumption. As Schutz

and Luckmann show, this can happen and does happen

in the "secondary zone of inftuence" and with differ

ent degrees of probabilities "within accessible reach."

Therefore social geographical research is not just in

terested in the geography of objects and the subjects in

the world, but also in how the subjects tie the "world"

to themselves through their actions of production and

consumption. A seconddomain of everyday social geography con

cerns the normative-politica! interpretations of zones

of actions, of territories. Starting points are the body

centered regionalizations of the front-regions of social

presentation, i.e., stage, performance, etc., and back-

regions of social hiding, i.e., intimacy, shame, etc., with

their differentiation with respect to age, sex, sta tus, and

role. Another form concerns the territorial regulations of inclusion and exclusion of actors through property

rights, politica! or legal definitions ofnation states, and citizen rights. These forms of everyday social geogra

phies are linked to the authoritative control of people

through territorial means, as "geographies ofpolicing"

and the specific types of control of the means of vio

lence. A very important form of making everyday geographies are the activities of regional and nationalistic

movements aiming for a new politica! geography, and all different forms of regional and national identities

they are based on. Finaliy, a third research area of everyday geography

is asking how the constitution process of the actor's

stock ofknowledge is linked to global telecommunica

tion and how this affects symbolization processes. This

kind of informational-significational social geography

is first of ali interested in the conditions of coMMUNICA

TION, networks, and the "access particular agents have

to such means." This geography of the distribution of

in formation has to be differentiated by different means

and channels of communication (books, newspapers,

radio, television, data highways, etc.). But this form

of constitution of the stock of knowledge has to be

linked to the constitution ofmeaning-content and sym

bolization processes of different areas of the everyday

world. In this way, a phenomenologicaliy informed and

action-based social geography reconstructs the every

day regionalizations ofthe lifeworld and the taken-for

granted geographical representations of the world by

subjects.

FOR FURTHER STUDY

Buttimer, Anne. "Grasping the Dynamism of Lifeworld." Annals of the Association of American Geographers 66 ( 1976), 277-92.

Gregory, Derek. Geographical Imaginations. Oxford: Basi1 81ackwell, 1994.

Hagerstrand, Torsten. "Time-Geography: Focus on the Corporea1ity of Man, Society, and Environment." Papers of the Regional Science Association 31 ( 1984), 193-216.

Heidegger, Martin. "Der Wesen der Sprachc." In his Unterwegs zur Sprache. Pfullingen: Ncske, 1959, 147-225; "The Nature of Language." In his On the Way to Language. Trans. Peter D. Hertz. New York: Harper & Row, 1971,57-108.


Husserl, Edmund. Ding und Raum. Vorlesungen 1907. Ed. Ulrich Claesges. Husserliana 16. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973.

Jackson, Pcter, and Susan J. Smith. Exploring Social Geography. London: Allen & Unwin, 1984.

Ley, David. "Social Geography and the Taken-For-Granted World." Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, n.s. 2 (1977), 498--512.

Livingston, David N. The Geographical Tradition. Oxford: Basi1 B1ackwell, 1992.

Marsh, Geroge P. Man and Nature: Physical Geography as Modified by Human Action. New York: Charles Scribner, 1864.

Mârtesson, Solveig. On the Formation of Biographies. Lund 1979.

Park, Robert E. "The Urban Community as a Spatial Pattern and Moral Order." Publications of the American Sociologica/ Association 20 (1925), 1-14.

Pickles, John. Phenomenology, Science, and Geography: Spatiality and the Human Sciences. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.

Relph. Edward. Place and Placelessness. London: Pion, 1976.

Rose, Courtice. The Notion of Reach and its Relevance ta Social Geography. Ph.D. dissertation, C1arke University, 1977.

Schutz, Alfred. Life Forms and Meaning Structures. Trans. Helmut R. Wagner. London: Routledge, 1982.

-, and Thomas Luckmann. Structures of the Life World. Trans. Richard M. Zaner and H. Tristram Engelhardt Jr. London: Heinemann, 1974.

Seamon, David. A Geography of the Lifeworld. New York: St. Martins Press, 1979.

Werlen, Benno. Gesellschaft, Hand/ung und Raum. Grundlagen handlungstheoretischer Sozialgeographie. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1987; Society, Action, and Space: An Alternative Human Geography. Trans. Gayna Walls. London: Routledge, 1993.

-. Sozialgeographie alltăglicher Regionalisierungen. 2 vols. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1995.

BENNO WERLEN University ofZiirich

SOCIOLOGY IN GERMANY It was via

the UNITED STATES that a so-called "phenomenologi

cal sociology" as an independent theoretical paradigm

within the social sciences emerged in postwar Ger

many. Two factors were of major importance. The first

was the German translation of ALFRED scHuTz's Col

lected Papers in the early 1970s and the renewal of

an action-oriented and hermeneutica! tradition also as

sisted by the German translations of studies like Peter

Winch's The Jdea of a Social Science ( 1966); Aaron Ci

courel 's Method and Measurement in Sociology ( 1970)

and Cognitive Sociology ( 1976); and some articles by

Harold Garfinkel, as well as Richard J. Bemstein's

Praxis and Action (1975).

The second and decisive factor was the transla

tion ofPETER BERGER and THOMAS LUCKMANN'S The So

cial Construction of Reality (1966) in 1969. Berger

and Luckmann inaugurated a synthesis of the sym

bolic interactionism of George Herbert Mead ( 1863-

1931) and Schutz's phenomenological approach that

also emerged a little !ater in the United States. In ad

dition, they referred to the tradition of German PHILO

SOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY that dominated the intellectua1

scene between World Wars I and II and featured such

authors as MAX SCHELER, HELMUTH PLESSNER, Pau] Lud

wig Landsberg ( 1901-1944 ), ERNST CASSIRER and, ]ater,

Arnold Gehlen.

The first independent reception of these develop

ments can be found in Jurgen Habermas's essay "Zur

Logik der Sozialwissenschaften" ( 1967), which fo

cuses on the "problem of understanding meaning in

the empirical-analytical sciences of action." Under this

heading Habermas dealt with the phenomenological

approach exemplified by the works of Abraham Erving

Kaplan, Cicourel, Schutz, Garfinkel, and Erving Goff

man, even though he looked with outspoken skepticism

upon the project of"phenomenological sociology." Out

ofthis context Ulrich Oevermann and his group devel

oped the project of a so-called structural or objective

hermeneutica! approach. A second line of reception combined phenomen

ological and interactionist aspects into a new the

oretical perspective. This was initiated through two

textbooks edited by Walter L. Buhl ( Verstehende

Soziologie, [Interpretive sociology, 1972]) and Heinz

Steinert (Symbolische Interaktion, 1973) as well as

through the documentation edited by the research

group of sociologists at Bielefeld around Joachim

Matthes and Fritz Schutze. In Alltagswissen, lnter

aktion, und gesellschaflliche Wirklichkeit (Everyday

knowledge, interaction, and social reality, 1973) this

group introduced texts by Garfinkel, Cicourel, and

GEORGE PSATHAS to a German-speaking audience for

the first time and thus laid the foundations for the de

velopment of ethnomethodo1ogical and conversation

analytical research in Germany. A following volume

on Kommunikative Sozialforschung (Communicative

social research, 1976) by the same group gave addi-

Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, iose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna, Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner ( eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology. © 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.

SOCIOLOGY IN GERMANY 651

tional impetus to research. A 1978 supplement to the Kălner Zeitschrift fiir Soziologie und Sozialpsycholo

gie with the ti tie Materialien zur Soziologie des Alltags

(Materials for a sociology ofthe everyday) and the anthology Alfred Schiitz und die Idee des Alltags in den

Sozialwissenschaften (Alfred Schutz and the idea of

the everyday in the social sciences, 1979), edited by

WALTER SPRONDEL and RICHARD GRATHOFF, documented

the beginning ofthe professional institutionalization of

these research perspectives. In Germany as well as in the United States the in

terest in phenomenological research developed in connection with a systematic critique of the general sys

tems theory ofTalcott Parsons ( 1902-1979). The need for new theoretical orientations emerged not only in

action theory but also in the CRITICAL THEORY of the

Frankfurt school and in German system theory itself.

The ongoing development ofNiklas Luhmann 's theory

of social systems and Habermas's efforts to continue

the project of a critica! theory of modem societies rely implicitly or explicitly on phenomenological concepts,

e.g., the concepts of TIME and MEANING in Luhmann 's

Soziale Systeme ( 1984) and the concept of LIFEWORLD

in Habermas's Theorie des kommunikative Handeln

(Theory of communicative action, 1981 ). The beginning of phenomenologically infiuenced

studies in German sociology could also rely on a broad

stream fiowing from PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY and

phenomenology of sociality between World Wars I and

Il. These include Theodor Litt, EDITH STEIN, and GERDA

WALTHER, who developed a phenomenology of society in the sense of an ontology of community; Al

fred Vierkandt, who introduced a phenomenological approach as a counter to positivism, and especially

Max Scheler and Helmuth Plessner. The basic motives were defined by the problems of

classical German sociology. Even though MAX WEBER

and GEORG SIMMEL understood social reality as an al

ready meaningfully ordered sociocultural reality and

declared meaningful actions to be the central topic of

the social sciences, they did not answer the question

ofthe social constitution ofmeaning itself. Within this

basic orientation related to the analysis of- as Max

Scheler puts it- the "relatively natural attitude" of ev

eryday life, the socio-phenomenological approaches of

Scheler, Plessner, and Schutz find their specific profite. Max Scheler's philosophical anthropoiogy concen-

trates on the question of the development of social

identity, on the constitution of social milieus, and on the connection of pragmatic and cognitive moments

in human access to the world. With analytical stress on the pre-refiective, emotional, animate, and norma

tively accentuated constitutive elements of experience and the definition of the situation of pragmatic world

access, his epoch-making contribution illuminated the autogenesis of social reality through the plasticity of

human beings and their world. Helmuth Plessner's natural-philosophical and so

cioanthropological studies presented a constitutive theory of life focusing on the conception of positionality,

i.e., the relationship ofthe BODY to its confines, which

leads to an anthropology of sociology on the basis of the fundamental axiom of ex-centric positionality. The

importance of Plessner's writings for the project of

what is often called "phenomenological sociology of

everyday life" is illustrated by his preface to the Ger

man translation ofBerger and Luckmann's The Social

Construction of Reality. Finally, the first major work of the inaugurator

of a phenomenological foundation of sociology, Al

fred Schutz's Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt

(The meaning-structure ofthe social world, 1932), was reprinted in Germany in 1960 and 1974. This led to a

rediscovery of his earlier manuscripts and the dozens of essays ofhis American period. The works ofSchutz,

who can be called the founder of "phenomenological sociology," have become most influential in Germany

within this context ofthe actionist turn in sociologica!

theory in the 1970s. Subsequent to Max Weber's con

ception of"understanding" or "interpreti ve" sociology and the inclusion ofphilosophical motives of Leibniz,

HENRI BERGSON, EDMUND HUSSERL, MAX SCHELER, and

MARTIN HEIDEGGER, Schutz developed an independent

phenomenological approach to sociologica[ theory. Schutz starts from the basic assumption of Husserl 's

philosophy, according to which every worldview is

constituted by the way the world is given in the inten

tiona! acts of consciousness. lf, according to Husserl,

the meaning of the world, i.e., the constitution of re

ality, constitutes itself in the intentiona! acts of consciousness, then the constitution of social reality as a

meaningful interactive context has tobe understood as

emerging from individual acting. For Schutz this means

that one has to examine the constitution ofmeaning in


the realm of mundane sociality. Thus the reception

of phenomenological motives in sociologica! research leads to processes in which rules of social action are

brought forth by social acting itself. The systematic examination of everyday reality, considered a meaningful result of social action, also ca lis for the development of

a new sociologica! type oftheory. A constitutive theory

of social reality has to be conceived by which the autogenesis ofbasic processes and structures ofthe life

world can be grasped. A theory of action has tobe at the same time a theory of the lifeworld as well as a theory

of its action-orienting and action-regulating meaningstructures, which are produced and reproduced in con

crete actions. The further development of German "phenomen

ological sociology" owes much to Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann's The Social Construction ofReal

ity, which can aptly be called a classic. They attempted

to elaborate Schutz's theory of the pragmatic constitution of the lifeworld in the sense of a sociology of knowledge leading to a general theory of social reality

and society. They applied Schutz's "proto-sociological studies" concern ing the structures of the lifeworld to

the level of everyday life and analyzed the mechanisms and forms ofinstitutionalization of social action as well as of the legitimation of finite provinces of meaning, and were thus able to relate Schutz's basic theoretical perspective to central concepts of modern sociological theory, such as identity, socialization, social differentiation, social roles, language, and knowledge. In general, they aimed at an alternative to established sociologica! theories of action. If Schutz's assumption

that social reality is a product of meaningful and selfregulated social acting is correct, then it must follow that in every given part of any given social interaction

there are mechanisms identifiable, and in their formal

aspects describable, by which this self-constitution and self-regulation are achieved. The description of these

mechanisms and their contexts lead to a general theory of action that proceeds constitutive-genetically and is

thus a sociologica! theory ofthe autogenesis ofthe so

cial world. The common ground ofphenomenologicalsociological approaches is found in stressing both subjective and intersubjective experiencing and acting as processes by which meaning is established.

From a developmental point of view two lines of a

specifically phenomenological approach can be differ-

entiated. A first line goes back to the works ofThomas

Luckmann, while a second line, influenced mostly by Harold Garfinkel, initiated research in ethnomethodol

ogy and speech analysis. These stimuli led to a complex field of theory and research, which can be roughly divided into two groups: ( 1) studies of theoretical and

methodological problems and conceptions of theory

and research in "phenomenological sociology," and (2) empirica! fields ofresearch built on a phenomenologi

cal foundation and concentrating on ethnomethodological and ethnographical studies, conversational analy

sis, biographical research, family sociology, cpistemology, and the sociologica! analysis ofreligion.

(1) Thomas Luckmann, who completed Schutz's unfinished last work on the Structures ofthe Life World

( 1973 and 1984 ), in his own writings develops a pheno

menological conception of "proto-sociology." He in

terprets the structures of the lifeworld as a universal

"matrix," as a mathesis universalis, which serves as

guide to sociologica! typology and research. This matrix allows a comparison and verification of sociolog

ica! statements concerning different aspects of the so

cial world. His empirica! research concentrates on the

sociology of RELIGION and mainly on the sociology of

LANGUAGE, in which he examines the structures of ev

eryday communication and its genres, i.e., structured

communicative actions as components of the societal stock of knowledge (instructions, moral communica

tion, etc.). Other important studies focus on the prob

lems of personal identity. In contrast to Luckmann, Richard Grathoff attempts

to find a direct phenomenological access to social reality, developing socio-phenomenology as a phenomen

ological social theory. It was the edition ofthe Schutz

Gurwitsch correspondence ( 1985) that triggered his

approach. Influenced by Schutz's conceptions of typi

fication and relevance as well as by ARON GURWITSCH's

concept of miii eu, Grathoff interprets the lifeworld as

a milieu-world, the meaning-structures of which he finds in concrete phenomena like generations or neigh

borhoods. Thus according to Grathoff, the concept of

lifeworld includes a dynamic dimension and cannot

be seen as a formal matrix only, as Luckmann does.

Grathoff's approach establishes the concept of life

world as a central sociologica! category, similar to the

concept of ro le in the 1950s and 1960s. The works of Luckmann and of Grathoff mark the

SOCIOLOGY IN GERMANY 653

two poles ofthe relation between phenomenology and

sociology in Germany. Severa! other authors concen

trate on its clarification and on methodological ques

tions within this field. The emphasis ofHANSFRIED KELL

NER's research is on the constitution of social orders.

On the philosophical level, Husserl's transcendental

approach serves him as analytical access to the con

cept of rule. On the sociologica! Jevel, he is guided

by Schutz's methodological concepts. He analyzes, for

example, POSTMODERN constructions of lifestyles and

the changing cultural dimensions of economic actions

in late capitalist societies.

ILJA SRUBAR starts with a reconstruction of Schutz's

oeuvre on the basis of the unpublished material of his

estate. He shows that the anthropological dimensions

of sociality, temporality, and reflexivity and their prag

matic molding are essential for the constitution of ac

cess to the human world. On these foundations he at

tempts to analyze how human acting and interacting

regulate themselves.

ULF MATTHIESEN pleads for cooperation between

phenomenology and Habermas's critica! theory for

an analysis of the crisis of modern lifeworlds and

discusses the difference and common grounds of

socio-phenomenological conceptions ofhermeneutics,

on the one hand, and Ulrich Oevermann's objective

hermeneutics, on the other hand, in order to state more

precisely the methodological conception of what is

called "Deutungsmusteranalysen." THOMAS EBER LE (Switzerland) is the author of a crit

ica! study on the formation of phenomenological ap

proaches in sociology. He especially concentrates on

the further development of Schutz's methodological

conception and on the examination ofthe influence of

the Austrian school of ECONOMICS on his methodologi

cal thinking.

BURKHARD LEHMANN points OUt the eminent impor

tance ofthe principle of adequacy of everyday and sci

entific typifications for the methodology of interpreti ve

sociology, with critica! reflections on ethnomethod

ological research strategies.

The theoretical and empirica! works of HANS-GEORG

SOEFFNER are devoted to the conception of a social sci

entific hermeneutics of everyday lifeworlds. His main

field of research is the conscious and mundane mark

ings of the meaning-structures of the lifeworld. Thus

he refers to Husserl 's philosophy, to Schutz's and Gur-

witsch 's sociophenomenological approaches, and to

Scheler's and Plessner's traditions of PHILOSOPHICAL

ANTHROPOLOGY. He focuses primarily on symbolic or

ders in different social milieus, where his works meet

with the tradition of symbolic interactionism.

(2) Recent empirica! sociologica] studies in some

way related to phenomenological foundations are, as

mentioned, more or less influenced by the works of

Luckmann and Garfinkel. At least six fields ofresearch

can be differentiated.

(a) Conversational analysis and research on so

cial structures of knowledge and communication. The

works ofFRITZ SCHUTZE and JORG BERGMANN derive from

Garfinkel 's impulses as they were taken up by the

aforementioned research group at Bielefeld. Schtitze

discusses the philosophical implications of a sociolog

ica! account of language, and his research is especially

on the analysis of everyday narratives and on the devel

opment and application of the technique of "narrative

interviews." Some ofhis recent empirica! studies focus

on biographical research.

Jorg Bergmann, together with Luckmann, studies

the structure of everyday communication. He views

the ethnomethodological and conversation-analytical

methods as instruments by which Schutz's theoreti

cal outlines, especially his theory of everyday life

typifications, can be transformed for empirica! re

search. An example ofhis procedure is Klatsch (Gos

sip, 1987), a study of gossip as a communicative genre

of social control.

Also starting from Luckmann's conception of ev

eryday communicative structures, Angela Keppler ex

amines different kinds of talk in contemporary soci

eties. In her study on Tischgesprăche (Table talk, 1994)

she draws attention to the sociology of communication

and offamily sociology. By examples of table talk she

illustrates the community-building role of everyday

communications and analyzes the principal communi

cational forms and mechanisms that play an important

ro le in the development of the social milieu within a

family. In this context she makes special reference to

the ro le of the mass media as "social occasions" for

the contents of speech and the construction of reality.

The discussion ofthese occasions in families leads to a

specific interpretation ofthe families' biographies and

their everyday lives. HUBERT KNOBLAUCH dea]s systematically with the


symbolic communicative structures that transform the

lifeworld into a culturc world, i.e., a "communcative

lifeworld." With reference to Luckmann's studies of

communication he tries to show on an empirica] level

the connection between action and structure within

structure forming and changing processes of human

communication, thus supplying the basis for a "the

ory ofthe communicative construction of cultural con

texts."

(b) Sociologica! analysis of religion. In the tradi

tion of Luckmann's Die Unsichtbare Religion (Invisi

ble religion, 1 967) and with the help of Schutz's con

cept oftranscendence, Knoblauch approaches a "social

ethnography" by studying the social milieus of eso

teric and new religious movements. Walter Sprondel's

contribution within this field goes back to his Ger

man edition of the Schutz-Parsons correspondence in

1977. Focusing especially on institutionalization pro

cesses of social reality, Sprondel discusses religious

conversion as a mechanism of social control of in

dividual experience and thus as the crucial factor in

defining religious phenomena, and he pays attention

to structural effects of cultural modernization through

such antimodernist protest movements as the German

"Lebensreform" movement. Also to be mentioned are WOLFRAM FISCHER (

ROSENTHAL)'s earlier studies on problems of profes

sional identities and institutional career patterns, in

ftuenced theoretically by Berger and Luckmann and

methodologically by Fritz Schutze.

(c) Biographical research. Wolfram Fischer (

Rosenthal)'s recent interest is in theoretical and

methodological questions of biographical research

in the context of which he intends to overcome the

micro-macro polarity in sociologica] theory- and in

empirica] studies, some ofwhich are especially located

in the intersection of biographical research and medi

cal sociology inftuenced by Anselm Strauss. Here he

concentrates on examining the constitution of nonlin

ear biographical time structures in relation to viewing

chronic illness as a crucial point between everyday rau

tine and lifespan-projects. His wife Gabriele Rosenthal

concentrates on the field of historical biographical re

search and on the analysis of intergenerational relations

following the tradition of oral history. The principal in

terest ofbiographical research in times of personal and

social crises becomes highly visible in her studies of

German National Socialism, World War Il, and the re

sulting problems.

(d) Ethnomethodology and ethnography. In 1980,

CHRISTA and THOMAS FENGLER presented one ofthe first

German empirica! ethnomethodological studies, A lltag in der Anstalt (Everyday in the institution), in which

they analyzed the practice of psychiatric treatment in

order to explain the emergence of the idea of a norma

tively correct psychiatric therapy within the everyday

life-processes of its normalization. On the hasis of a

nineteen month stay in a psychiatric hospital they re

constructed the processes in which the members of

this social organization are continuously constituting

its social order by describing and explaining it.

Similarly, STEPHAN WOLFF's research centers on the

question of the rhetorical constitution of social or

ders. A study under this title in 1976 was based on

Cicourel 's concept of cognitive sociology and the con

cept of ethnomethodological analysis, and gave both

a transcendental turn in order to reach a "theory of

a priori fundamental mechanisms" of the constitution

of social experience to sol ve the ethnomethodological

problems of application and indexicality. A subsequent

study, Die Produktion von Fiirsorglichkeit (The pro

duction ofthoughtfulness), concentrated on the scenic

practices of the construction of social reality with an

empirica! analysis of the everyday routines of a social

welfare oftice and the acting of its clients. His mostre

cent study is about the rhetoric of psychatric experti se

in court.

ELISABETH usT works on methodological problems

of ethnomethodology and on the formulation of a FE:vi

INIST theory and research on socio-phenomenological

grounds. She concentrates on showing the implicit but

always actually present horizon of selfevidences of

the "mtellectuallandscape ofthe male-stream" and on

defining the outline of a feminist pattern of conscious

dissent.

Jo Reichertz concentrates in his theoretical writings

on aspects of developmental and conceptual problems

of the so-called structural or objective hermeneutics.

In his research he focuses on the question whether

there is a logica! procedure by which it is possible to

acquire knowiedge and whether this procedure can be

methodized. He illustrates these problems by empirica!

studies done dunng a six month stay with a criminal

investigation dcpartment.

SOCIOLOGY IN JAPAN 655

In this context the ethnographic and lifeworld

analytical studies of RONALD HITZLER and ANNE HONER

can also be taken into account. In the tradition ofBENITA

LUCKMANN's analysis of The Small Li(e- Worlds of Mod

ern Man ( 1970), Honer, fac ing the plurality and com

plexity of modern acting perspectives and quests for

meaning, searches for the possibilities and problems

of withdrawal into very small and extremely closed

provinces of meaning. In his recent studies Hitzler pays

attention to the conceptualization of a "proto-theory"

of politica! action.

(e) With the starting point in the phenomenological

conception ofmilieu worked out by Scheler and Gur

witsch, BRUNO HILDENBRAND works on the genesis of

familial lifeworlds over severa! generations. He is in

terested in pathological developments, that is, the gen

esis of and the coping with physical il! ness in the pat

terns of familial communication and interaction. The

author refers to studies on phenomenologically ori

ented PSYCHOLOGY and PSYCHIATRY, especialiy to those

of LUDWIG BINSWANGER and WOLFGANG BLANKENBURG.

Another central point of his research is the analysis

of the consequences of modernization processes in the

mi !ieu of farmer families.

Inftuenced by Anselm Strauss and Fritz Schiitze,

CHRISTA HOFFMANN-RIEM has studied the structural dif

ferences of everyday processes of reality construction

and normalization in families with double parenthood.

She also pays attention to the consequences oftechno

logical developments for the organization of modern

family life.

(f) With reference to Schutz's methodological re

ftections, KARIN KNORR-CETINA concentrates on empir

ica! studies of cognitive operations in laboratory sci

ences, pointing out the transepistemological compo

nents and transversive alignments of scientific work.

Some of her recent studies apply to the methodology

of the variants of constructivism in sociology.

It needs to be mentioned, finally, that the pheno

menological approach in German sociology owes other

important impulses to phenomenological work in psy

chology and psychiatry (CARL F. GRAUMANN as well as

BJankenburg) and EDUCATION (KĂTE MEYER-DRAWE).

FOR FURTHER STUDY

Băumer, Angelica, and Michael Benedikt, eds. Gelehrtenre-

publik- Lebenswelt. Edmund Husserl und Alfred Schutz in der Krisis der phănomenologischen Bewegung. Wien: Passagen 199 3.

Berger, Peter L., and Thomas Luckmann. The Social Construction o( Realitv: A Treatise in the Sociology of" Knowledge. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1966; Die gesellschaft/iche Konstruktion der Wirklichkeit. Eine Theorie der Wissenssoziologie. Trans. Moniko Plessner. Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer, 1969.

Grathoff, Richard, and Bernhard Waldenfels, eds. Sozialităt und Intersubjektivităt. Phănomenologische Perspektiven der Sozialwissenschaften im Umkreis van Aran Gurwitsch und Alf'red Schiitz. Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 1983.

Hammerich, Kurt, and Michael Klein, eds. Materialien zur Soziologie des Alltags. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1978.

Herzog, Max, and Cari Friederich Graumann, eds. Sinn und Etjahrung. Phănomenologische Methoden in den Humanwissenschaften. Heidelberg: R. Asanger, 1991.

List, Elisabeth, and Ilja Srubar, eds. Al("red Schiitz. Neue Beitrăge zur Rezeption seines Werkes. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1988.

Luckmann, Benita. "The Small Life Worlds of Modem Man." Social Research 37 (1970), 580-96.

Patzelt, Werner J. Grundlagen der Ethnomethodologie. Theorie, Empirie und politikwissenschaftlicher Nutzen ei ner Soziologie des Alltags. Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 1987.

Sprondel, Walter M., ed. Die Objektivităt der Ordnungen und ihre kommunikative Konstruktion. Fiir Thomas Luckmann. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1994.

Sprondel, Walter M., and Richard Grathoff, eds. Alfi·ed Schiitz und die Idee des Alltags in den Soziahvissenschaften. Stuttgart: Enke, 1979.

MARTIN ENDRESS

Universităt Erlangen-Niirnberg

lLJA SRUBAR Universităt Erlangen-Niirnberg

SOCIOLOGY IN JAPAN There are various

stances in what is broadly called phenomenological so

ciology. For example, the reflexive sociology of Alvin

W. Gouldner, the symbolic interactionism of Herbert

Blumer, and the dramaturgical approach of Erving

Goffman are sometimes called phenomenological soci

ology. This is also true in Japan. The term "phenomen

ological sociology'' will be restricted here to sociology

that consciously attempts to found itself on insights

found in phenomenological philosophy.

There are two eminent sociologists who tried

to found their work on phenomenology and

thereby launched Japanese phenomenological sociol

ogy: KAZUTA KURAUCHI and JISHO USUI. Kurauchi 's soei-

Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Iose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,

Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia ofPhenomenology. © 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.


ology began from the ideas that the social was an expe

rienced fact and that the essence of society could only

be approached through the given in experience. Crit

icizing the position of GEORG SIMMEL, which searched

for the fundamental structure of society in mental in

teraction (die seelische Wechselwirkung), he instead

posited the "reciprocity ofperspectives" and the "con

tact circle" as fundamental for society. He analyzed the

experience of SPACE and TIME from that standpoint and,

drawing on theoretical insights in THEODOR LITT, con

structed a theory of social relationship, social group,

and the whole of society.

Jisho Usui also sought a firm foundation for so

ciology in phenomenology. He studied under KITARO

NISHIDA, the philosopher who introduced phenomen

ology into JAPAN, and after completing his university

studies, visited Freiburg and studied under EDMUND

HUSSERL and MARTIN HEIDEGGER during 1930-32. He

did this along with GOICHI MIYAKE, a leader of pheno

menology in Japan, and TOMOO OTAKA, who was AL

FRED scHuTz's Japanese friend. Usui's main concern

was with how sociology as a rigorous science is possi

ble. He began with MAX WEBER's work and in particular

his notion of ideal type. He was disappointed because

the criteria of validity for ideal types were rather rel

ative and ambiguous. He hoped that essences in the

sense of the EIDETIC METHOD might serve in sociologi

cal cognition. Taking hints from Heidegger's ontology

in Sein und Zeit ( 1927), he posited concrete sociohis

torical beings as the theme of sociology. His accounts

of social reality in terms of meaning-configurations

(Sinnzusammenhănge) and the understanding of oth

ers (Fremdverstehen) drew on works of Husserl and

can be called phenomenological.

These early phenomenological sociologies did not

have far-reaching influence in Japan. Indeed, from the

beginning of the 1960s through the mid-1970s, most

leading Japanese sociologists tended to equate socio

logica! theory with the structural functionalism ofTal

cott Parsons ( 1902-1979) and oriented almost ali of

their theoretical concern toward it.

But a change in theoretical sociology appeared

in Japan in the mid-1970s. Some sociologists be

gan to consider phenomenological sociology. For ex

ample, a symposium entitled, to translate it, "New

Trends in Contemporary Sociology'' was included in

the forty-seventh annual meeting of the Japan Socio-

logica! Society in 1974. One of the four presentations

was "Amerika shakaigaku no doko ~ Genshogaku

teki shakaigaku wo chushin ni" (The trend in Amer

ica around phenomenological sociology) by Yasuhiro

Aoki. The next year a symposium ofthe same title in

cluded a paper entitled "Rikai-shakaigaku no seiritsu

tenkai to genshogaku" (The origin and development

of verstehende Soziologie and phenomenology) by

Teruyoshi U gai. Both of these presentations sketched

aspects of Alfred Schutz. Since then, phenomenologi

cal sociology has been almost entirely identified with

the Schutzian perspective of CONSTITUTIVE PHENOMEN

OLOGY OF THE NATURAL ATTITUDE. "New trends" con

noted altematives to Parsonian structural functional

ism, and phenomenological sociology in Japan, as in

SOCIOLOGY IN THE UNITED STATES, was one such trend.

From that time, the number of papers referring to

works of Schutz read at the annual meetings of the

Japan Sociologica! Society has gradually increased.

The first Schutz session was held at the fiftieth an

nual meeting in 1977 and one or two have been held

every year, except 1982, until 1987. Then for severa!

years there were Schutzian approaches presented in

sessions on such topics as communication, discrim

ination, and FEMINISM, and then Schutz sessions each

year since 1992. As regards publications, many articles

were published between the mid-1970s and the early

1980s by those who had been presenting papers and

became the leaders ofthe phenomenological sociology

movement in Japan: YUMIKO EHARA, HIDEO HAMA, MASA

TATAKA KATAG!Rl, HISASHI NASU, KAZUHISA NISHIHARA, HI

ROSHI OGAWA, HIROSHI SAKURAI, and YOSHIKUNI YATANI.

They may be called Schutzian sociologists of the first

generation. Other sociologists, who had begun in other

theoretical perspectives, e.g., those of Parsons, We

ber, or CRITICAL THEORY, also wrote about Schutzian

SOcioJogy: YOSHIKAZU SATO, YOSHIYUKI SATO, NAOHARU

SHIMODA, TAKESHI YAMAGISHI, and SETSUO YAMAGUC'HI.

Their topics included rationality, understanding,

motivation, ACTION, objective and subjective meaning,

and the everyday intersubjective lifeworld. The works

ofSchutz were used to establish one ofthe bridgeheads

for a "paradigm revolution" in which the sociologica!

enterprise seeks to break through the "over-socialized"

conception ofhumanity (Denis Wrong), the "static and

conservative conception of society," and "methodolog

ical dualism" (Alvin Gouldner), which were consid-

SOCIOLOGY IN JAPAN 657

ered inherent in Parsonian structural functionalism. A

new phase in Japanese sociology was ushered in.

Scholars who were not sociologists also became in

terested in phenomenological sociology. A book by an

eminent ETHNOLOGIST, MASAO YAMAGUCHI, discussed the

relationship between centrality and marginality from

the perspective ofSchutz's multiple realities; an article

by the POLITICAL SCIENTIST KAZUHIKU OKUDA surveyed

the new trends in North American sociology in detail;

an article by an EDUCATION theorist, TAKESHI ISHIGURO,

examined Schutz's methodology ofthe social sciences;

and a book by an ethicist, ISAMU NAGAMI, dealt, on the

basis of Schutz, with the relationship between soci

ety and knowledge. These publications brought more

attention to Schutz.

There is no doubt that translations ha ve contributed

to the spread ofphenomenological sociology in Japan.

Part two of Schutz's Collected Papers l (1962) was

translated by SHOZO FUKATANI in 1974 and "Concept

and Theory Formation in the Social Sciences" and

"The Problem of Rationality in the Social Sciences"

were translated in anthologies by Kiyoshi Matsui the

same year. "The Stranger" was trans1ated by Shizuya

Okazawa in 1977. In 1980 part two of Schutz's Col

lected Papers Il ( 1964) was trans1ated by Atsushi Saku

rai and HELMUT WAGNER's anthology of Schutz texts,

On Phenomenology and Social Relations ( 1970), was

translated by Makio Morikawa and HIDEO HAMA. The

Theory of Social Action and Der sinnhafie Aufbau

der sozialen Welt (The meaning-structure of the so

cial world, 1932) were translated by YOSHIKAZU SATO

in 1980 and 1982. Re.fiections on the Problem of Rele

van ce was translated by HISASHI NASU, HIDEO HAMA, CHIE

!MAI, and MASAKATSU IRIE in 1995. finally, the project

of a complete translation of the Collected Papers by

HIKARU WATABE, HISASHI NASU, and KAZUHISA NISHIHARA

produced volumes one and two in 1983, 1985, and

1991.

Against this background, the Genshogaku-teki

Shakaigaku Kenkyu-kai (The Society for Research in

Phenomenological Sociology), organized by younger

sociologists, held its first meeting in 1980 and has

met to discuss members' research once or twice a

year since. In December 1983 Nihon genshogaku

shakaikagaku-kai (The Japan Society for Phenomen

ology and the Social Sciences) was organized so that

philosophers and social scientists of the older and

younger generations with a common standpoint might

meet to discuss topics of common interest. The annual

meeting has held multidisciplinary symposia on inter

subjectivity ( 1984 ), everydayness ( 1985), manners and

customs (1986), symbols (1987), rationality (1988),

power ( 1989), communality ( 1990), system ( 1991 ),

discrimination ( 1992), information ( 1993), relativism

(1994), and sound (1995).

There are various developments in the current situ

ation of phenomenological sociology in Japan. Some

Japanese scholars ha ve visited GERMANY, the UNITED

STATES, and CANADA for discussions or study under lead

ing scholars: RICHARD GRATHOFF (Bielefeld), lUA SRUBAR

(Konstanz), LESTER EMBREE (Fiorida Atlantic Univer

sity), MAURICE NATANSON (Yale University), GEORGE

PSATHAS (Boston University), JOHN o'NEILL (York Uni

versity), and JOSE HUERTAS-JOURDA (Wilfred Laurier

University). The number of sociologists interested

in it is also increasing, largely because the above

mentioned Schutzian sociologists of the first genera

tion have taught phenomenological sociology at vari

ous universities and interested graduate students in it.

The developments ha ve taken, generally speaking, four

directions.

(1) Schutz's works are being closely examined, his

perspectives are being elaborated and philosophical

and sociologica! possibilities are being pursued. Top

ics here include action, choosing among projects, in

order-to- and because-motives, multiple realities, typi

fication, reification, relevance, the everyday lifeworld,

and the relationship between subjectivity and objectiv

ity.

(2) Schutz's perspectives are being introduced into

wider contexts by philosophers and sociologists and

related to the perspectives of Weber, Husserl, Jiirgen

Habermas, Niklas Luhmann, symbolic interactionism,

ethnomethodology, and HERMENEUTICS and also the his

torical circumstances in the Vienna of the 1920s and

the sociologica! trends in the United States in the 1960s

and 1970s.

(3) Some sociologists are trying to introduce

Schutzian perspectives for rather empirica! topics such

as anonymity, discrimination, privatization, organi

zations, social movements, and so forth. These at

tempts concern themselves with phenomena that were

long taken for granted before being considered from

Schutzian viewpoints.


(4) Finally, many studies in ethnomethodology should be mentioned. It attracted the attention of

Japanese sociologists in the mid-1970s. It was initially spoken of together with Schutzian phenomen

ology, symbolic interactionism, and the Goffmanian perspective, i.e., as one of the new complex trends in American sociology, and the connections between ethnomethodology and Schutz were emphasized.

From about the middle ofthe 1980s, however, some younger sociologists have gradually come to focus on the phases of ethnomethodology as a perspective sui generis, especially the perspective called conversational analysis, and to emphasize the differences as well as the similarities of Schutzian phenomenological sociology and ethnomethodology. Articles and books have been written and translated. Empirica! re

search has been conducted into sexism, discrimination, wheelchair users, psychotherapy activities, daily conversation, television news, space cognition, etc.

The following sociologists belong to this group: Yutaka Kitazawa, Aug Nishizaka, Nobuo Shiino, Tomiaki Yamada, Keiichi Yamazaki, and Hiroaki Yoshii. The Esunomesodoroji-Kaiwa Bunseki Kenkyuakai (Soci

ety for Research in Ethnomethodology and Conversational Analysis) includes not only social scientists but also natural scientists, and has met since 1993.

Currently, most ethnomethodologists are not interested in phenomenology. But if their interest in the taken-for-granted assumptions of everyday activities and their emphasis on reflexivity in accounting for practices are considered, ethnomethodology is stil! a practice inspired by phenomenology.

FOR FURTHER STUDY

Ehara, Yumiko. Seikatsu-sekai 110 shakaigaku (Sociology of the everyday lifeworld). Tokyo: Kciso-shobo, 1985. , and Takeshi Yumagishi, eds. Ge11shogaku-teki shakaigaku (Phenomenological sociology). Tokyo: Sanwa-shobo, 1985.

Hama, Hideo. "Pygmalion to Medusa" (Between Pygmalion and Medusa). Japa11ese Sociologica! Review 33 (1982), 64--77.

Hiromatsu, Wataru. Genshogaku-teki shakaigaku 110 sokei (The archetype of phenomenological sociology). Tokyo: Seido-sha, 1991.

Ishiguro, Takeshi. "Shakaigaku to genshogaku" (Sociology and Phenomenology). In Koza Ge11shogaku (Lectures on phenomenology). Voi. 4. Ed. Hajime Kida. Tokyo: Kobundo, 1980, 101-52.

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SOCJOLOGY IN THE UNITED STATES 659

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HISASHI NASU Waseda University

SOCIOLOGY IN THE UNITED STATES The

influence of phenomenology on sociology in CANADA

and the UNITED STATES has been extensive, although its

effects are not always readily apparent. (Phenomen

ological sociology is ied in GREAT BRITAIN by MAURICE

ROCHE, MICHAEL PHILLIPSON, and DAVID SILVERMAN). Ma

jor postpositivist currents in the development of sociology in the latter half of this century have been

influenced by EDMUND HUSSERL (via ALFRED SCHUTZ),

MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY, and MARTIN HEIDEGGER.

Important precedents to these developments may be

found in the work of European sociologists and American philosophers, psychologists, and sociologists. MAX

WEBER, whose influence on sociology has been extensive and pervasive, had defined the disciplinary enterprise as concemed with the interpreti ve understanding

of social action. His interest in the subjective dimension, his use of the method of ideal types, and his continued focus on understanding (verstehen) provided a strong sociologica! underpinning for !ater scholars such

as Schutz, who sought more explicitly to incorporate

the phenomenological insights of Husserl. GEORG SIM

MEL developed a "formal sociology'' focused on the

study of forms of sociation and examined the particulars of situations and their contents in order to disceru those structures that underlay the particularities,

a quest that parallels the EIDETIC METHOD ofphenomenology. Karl Mannheim ( 1893-194 7), a former student

of Husserl, contributed much to the development of

a sociology of knowledge. He not only showed the

significance of the subjective dimension of sociallife

- the ways in which institutions and social structures

provide frameworks for intellectual life and activity

- but also focused on individual activities as these

are part of and comprise group, class, or collectively

expressed thought. MAX SCHELER contributed important phenomen-

ological insights in such areas as the sociology of

knowledge, EMOTIONS, VALUE THEORY, and RELIGION. His studies of the nature of sympathy and ressentiment are

among the most widely known ofhis works. However,

despite his significant contributions, his ideas and approaches have not affected or been incorporated into phenomenological sociology in the United States.

In the United States and under the influence of

WILLIAM JAMES among others, Charles Cooley (1864-1929), W. I. Thomas (1863-1947), and George Herbert Mead ( 1863-1931) ali saw society as a process, the individual and society as closely interrelated, and the subjective aspect of human behavior as a necessary part of the process of the formation and dynamic

maintenance of the social self and the social group. Mead's theorizings in particular contributed to a view

of the self as a reflexive process and of the human being as an active, interpreting, symbol-using, and self

interacting socialized being. Since ACTION is ongoingly constructed by persons, their meanings and ideas must be understood since these are actively involved in so

cial interaction. Society was also conceptualized as a process by Mead, group life being constructed from the meaningful actions of individuals. Institutions, roles,

statuses, organizations, norms, and values were considered as developing and reciprocally influencing those engaged in their construction and maintenance. The methodological significance of these views was that the actor's perspective, meanings, and ideas were to be considered seriously in order to understand human action.

Alfred Schutz, a philosopher and social scientist trained in Austria and familiar with Husserl's pheno

menology, was the central figure in the development and influence of phenomenology on sociology. He sought to clarify the significance of Husserl 's thought for sociology and for the philosophy of the social or HUMAN SCIENCES. His Der sinnhafle Aujbau der sozialen

Welt (The meaning-structure ofthe social world, 1932) represented an effort phenomenologically to expand

and clarify Weber's interest in the subjective dimen

sion. Schutz's most important contributions focused on the description and analysis of the essential fea

tures of the WORLD of everyday life; on discovering the presuppositions, structures, and significations of

that world; and on the realization of a CONSTITUTIVE

PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE NATURAL ATTITUDE. Among his



many interests, besides the theory of action, were the study ofthe intersubjective world of everyday life (the lifeworld), the study of commonsense knowledge, the significance ofLANGUAGE in the sedimentation ofmeanings and in the processes oftypification, the problems of multiple realities, and the methodological problems of the human sciences.

Those whom Schutz infiuenced in sociology during his teaching at the New School for Social Research include PETER BERGER, THOMAS LUCKMANN, and HELMUT R. WAGNER. KURT WOLFF a[so advanced Schutz's ideas, particularly in the sociology of knowledge. Wagner became a major American expositor as well as biographer of Schutz. He wrote extensively on themes from Schutz and undertook to elaborate the Schutzian perspective. His own work sets out in lucid fashion the major points in phenomenology and their relation to psychology and sociology while drawing extensively on Schutz's conceptualizations.

Schutz's dominant influence on American sociology was mediated by the incorporation of many of his key ideas in Berger and Luckmann 's The Social Construction of Reality ( 1966). Berger's own prominence as a sociologist of religion as well as a social theorist with a broad humanistic perspective attracted many younger sociologists to his ideas as well as to those of Schutz. In Germany Luckmann continued to advance Schutz's ideas in his subsequent writings and completed the final Schutz manuscript.

A major approach in American social science known as "social constructionism" has taken its name from the Berger and Luckmann volume, although most of its practitioners do not see themselves either as phenomenologists oras Schutz scholars. Nevertheless, as an approach, it is oriented to the subjective dimension of human activities by considering the ways in which human actors construct MEANINGs in everyday situations. Its practitioners use qualitative methodologies such as interviews, field studies, case studies, and narrative analysis as well as developing interpretive analyses of the meaning( s) of social actions, situations, and organizations. In fact, the approach has gained a major foothold in the study of social problems and social problems theory, replacing the "labelling theory" perspective, although derivative from it to some degree. "Social constructionism" has also affected some theorists associated with symbolic interactionism (the

sociologica! approach most directly related to Cooley, Thomas, and Mead). Some of its most recent interpreters have borrowed from Heidegger, HANS-GEORG GADAMER, and PAUL RICCEUR in the effort to introduce the perspectives of HERMENEUTICAL PHENOMENOLOGY into sociology.

Kurt Wolff, who was trained in Europe but has taught in the United States since the 1940s, has made many original contributions to phenomenological theory and method as well as to the sociology of knowledge. Infiuenced by Mannheim as well as Schutz, he developed the phenomenological approach of"surrender" (total involvement, suspension of received notions, pertinence of everything, identification, and risk of being hurt) and "catch" (the cognitive or existential result, yield, or harvest of surrender, the beginning, new conceiving, or new conceptualizing that it is). Wolff's field research has provided insights into the ways in which this theoretical and methodological approach can be incorporated in descriptions and reflections about lived experience. His !ater writings ha ve added a concern for the crisis of Western cu !ture, a macropolitical, economic, ecologica!, and cultural crisis, a concern that is penetrated by his own recall of the horrific Nazi years. The recovery of meaning and concern is possible through such means as surrender and catch and the direct confrontation of our lived circumstances in their historical moments.

GEORGE PSATHAS actively relates Schutz's phenomenological sociology to developments in ethnomethodology. Since his first edited volume, Phenomenological Sociology ( 1973 ), which introduced many American sociologists to the work of severa! Schutzian scholars (RICHARD M. ZANER, Wagner, Wo!ff, and EGON BITTNER, among others ), he has continued to teach and publish in phenomenology, to organize conferences in ethnomethodology, to co-found the Society for Phenomenology and the Human Sciences in 1981, and also to found, in 1979, an international quarterly journal, Human Studies, which is devoted to phenomenological approaches in the human sciences. Psathas's approach, influenced by Mead, Schutz, and Garfinkel, has been to focus on questions ofhow the lifeworld is organized and how social order is ongoingly produced, and to address these interests in empirica! studies oflifeworldly phenomena ranging from social psychological experiments in the laboratory and observations of mobility

SOC!OLOGY IN THE UN!TED STATES 661

and orientation among blind travelers to interactionally produced sets of travel directions. His critiques of Schutz ha ve focused on the static and nontemporal character of Schutz's studies, on his emphasis on sedimented meanings rather than on the ongoing emergence of meaning in interaction, and on his concern with the description of structures in the lifeworld rather than with the production ofthe sense of social structure for persons operating in the natural attitude.

At Boston University, Psathas (with VICTOR KESTENBAUM and ERAZIM KOHĂK in phiJosophy) and JeffCouJter (and Michael Lynch in recent years) in sociology have influenced a number of students who have continued to teach and research in both phenomenological sociology and ethnomethodology; these include FRANCES WAKSLER, JAMES OSTROW, ANN RAWLS, DAVID BOGEN, and DUSAN BJELIC. The International Institute for Ethnomethodology and Conversation Analysism begun at Boston University by Psathas and Coulter, has sponsored conferences since 1975 and developed a publishing program in 1990.

Ethnomethodology is frequently cited as one of the post-Schutzian evolutions of phenomenology. Its founder, HAROLD GARFINKEL, can be shown to have retained a phenomenological foundation, evolving from an interest in Husserlian phenomenology and ARON GURWITSCH's phenomenoJogicaJ PSYCHOLOGY to Schutz's phenomenology ofthe lifeworld, to MerleauPonty's studies of the lived BODY, and to Heidegger's HERMENEUTics. His penetrating analyses of the significance of the taken-for-granted assumptions operative in the world of everyday life and the natural attitude, together with the use of "breaching experiments" for their discovery, and his explication of the methodical practices of participants in everyday life have shown how phenomenologically oriented research on practica! reasoning and practica! actions can be conducted.

As Garfinkel states in Studies in Ethnomethodology ( 1967), the aims of ethnomethodology are to discover, describe, and analyze "the how it [society] gets put together; the how it is getting done; the how to do it; the social structures of everyday activities ... studying how persons, as parties to ordinary arrangements, use the features of the arrangement to make for members the visibly organized characteristics happen." These would include ali methods of practica! reasoning, methods of interpreting, methods of corn-

municating, methods of interacting, and methods of accomplishing ali manner of practica! activities in the world of everyday life. Since many of these practices are repeated and patterned, their methodical character, their orderliness and their organization, can be discovered and described. Garfinkel's writings have combined critica! refiections on sociologica! theories and methods; the formulation of program policies to guide ethnomethodological studies; and the con duct of a variety of empirica! studies ranging from how jurors decide on the "correctness" of a verdict; how a transsexual, born male, passed as female and convinced others of the necessity of a sex change operation; to the discovering practices of astrophysicists.

Among the major concepts of ethnomethodology are indexicality and refiexivity. Indexicality refers to the fact that for members of a group, the meaning of what they say and do is dependent on the context in which their doing and saying occurs and, significantly for the human sciences, such indexicality cannot be remedied by developing standardized or idealized conceptualizations. Refiexivity refers to the fact that for members, the features of society are produced by persons' motivated compliance with background expectancies, i.e., with commonsense knowledge of the features of society. There is thus a reflexive relation between the "facts" about society and the ways that members use practica! reasoning and commonsense knowledge to depict society.

In contrast to Schutz, ethnomethodology makes commonsense knowledge and commonsense understandings topics for study in order to learn how these may be used in the accomplishment of everyday activities. For ethnomethodology, knowledge and understanding can be studied directly, considered not as mentalistic phenomena and inaccessible, but as practically demonstrated in the ongoing actions and accomplishments of members, in the ways that they are produced and achieve their recognition and visibility for members. Garfinkel's starting point is not consciousness, but practica! action in the lifeworld.

The works of Garfinkel himself and his closest students and associates, e.g., Harvey Sacks, EGON BITTNER, David Sudnow, D. Laurence Wieder, Kenneth Liberman, Eric Livingston, Mic haei Lynch, and David Goode demonstrate the breadth and depth of phenomenological and ethnomethodological ideas and per-

662 ENCYCLOPEDJA OF PHENOMENOLOGY

spectives. Sudnow, drawing on Merleau-Ponty's approach to the lived body, has produced a remarkable study of embodied actions in the work of the hands at the keyboards of the piano and the typewriter. Liberman has studied "understanding" as an interactional achievement, examining Australian aborigines' reasoning practices as well as those of Tibetan monks. Goode has studied the lived experience of deaf-blind children and the ways in which they achieve communication in contexted relations with others. Lynch has studied the discovering practices of astrophysicists and the laboratory practices of microbiologists. He has contributed to the development of a research perspective characterized as "social studies of science," an approach heavily influenced by ethnomethodology. Coulter has traced the relevance of the philosophy of LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN for ethnomethodo]ogy, an interest that Lynch has also pursued. Wieder has contributed studies ofthe reasoning practices ofmembers in everyday situations ranging from the residents of a halfway house and their telling of the code (i.e., the uses of "norms" in the organization of accounts of action) to the artful practices of magicians and to the interactional production and interpretation ofthe meaning of the behavior of chimpanzees by their trainers and by animal researchers.

Other sociologists influenced by ethnomethodology and by phenomenology include MELVIN POLLNER (who studied practica! reasoning in theoretical and applied work), EGON BITTNER (with theoretical work and applied studies ofthe po]ice), DOROTHY SMITH, and JAMES

HEAP, among others. Smith moved from her early readings of Schutz and Merleau-Ponty to an active engagement with elements of Marxist and ethnomethodological perspectives. She developed what she calls a sociology for women, which is grounded in women's experience and which begins with the study of concrete actions of persons engaged in concerted social relations. Her early dissatisfaction with Schutz's greater emphasis on the cognitive and her active incorporation of feeling and lived experience has resulted in a feminist perspective that is, in large part, grounded in phenomenology. Her work shows the importance of connecting the experientiallevel to extended social re]ations at the macro-]evel. LOUISE LEVESQUE-LOPMAN

also relates Schutz's thought to FEMINISM.

JAMES HEAP has combined interests in phenomen-

ology and ethnomethodology to focus on the meaning of action as constrained by what language makes possible. He has also developed ethnomethodology in an applied direction in empirica! studies of READING and writing in instructional settings in education. His interest is in the study of culturally possible ways in which activities can be done and with how actions are organizable such that they can be recognizable and intelligible.

EDWARD ROSE represents another sociologica! blending ofphenomenological and ethnomethodological interests. His studies and !ater writings, including The Werald (1992), demonstrate a unique and perceptive approach that is historical, etymological, textual, and analytic with a focus on the study ofworldly order, the everyday lifeworldly actions ofpersons.

JOHN o'NEILL has been a major contributor for over two decades to a variety of phenomenologically informed studies and writings in sociology. He at first devoted his attention to the philosophy of the social sciences and pursued both the Frankfurt school of CRITICAL THEORY and phenomenology in their focus on the problem of the complementarity between causal and hermeneutica! explanations. Both as translator and expositor of his views on politics, history, Janguage, and art he has specialized in the work of Merleau-Ponty. He has also concentrated on interdisciplinary studies in MARXISM, phenomenology, and ethnomethodology. In more recent years his research has explored problems in politica! economy and the semiology of embodiment, and, following the linguistic turn and Wittgensteinian philosophy, he has also studied the theory oftextuality and discourse production, considering phenomenological, STRUCTURALIST, and POST

MODERN theories of discourse production and intertextuality. In his position at York University O'Neill cofounded a graduate program that has continued to focus on, among other approaches, Continental thought; he has been instrumental in the formation of the journal Philosophy of the Social Sciences; and he has edited a book series, the International Library of Phenomenology and Moral Sciences. In these va:rious activities he has contributed to advances in phenomenological approaches in sociology and his wide-ranging scholarship and intellectual vigor has influenced many students.

A number of other scholars ha ve produced a corpus of works that reflects ongoing interest in phenomen-

SOMATICS 663

ological themes. These include PETER MANNING in his

fieldwork studies ofthe police and in his effort to link semiotics and fieldwork; MARIANNE PA GET for studies of

communicative practices ofphysicians as well as feminist studies ofwomen artists; RON SILVERS and VIVIAN

DARROCH-LOZOWSKI, whose visual and reflexive studies

are phenomenoJogicaJ; KENNETH MORRISON and PETER

EGLIN, who have engaged in textual studies; JACK KATZ

in methodology and criminology; and GISELA HINKLE,

BURKHARDT HOLZNER, and MARY ROGERS who ha ve made

various theoretical contributions. The issues confronting sociologists who continue

to retain a connection to phenomenology are how to pursue their studies of social phenomena and connect to

the broader and larger-scale interests ofthe sociologica! mainstream. The development of ethnomethodology

has attracted a number of researchers as an approach

that offers both rigor and theoretical acumen in the

pursuit of studies of Iifeworldly actions by members

of society. However, the interweaving of the various

themes raised by phenomenology into the fabric of empirica! sociology in the United States has not as

yet produced coherent "schools" of thought based on

phenomenology.

FOR FURTHER STUDY

Berger, Peter L., and Thomas Luckmann. The Social Construction of Reality. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1966.

Denzin, Norman. Interpreti ve Interactionism. Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1989.

Garfinkel, Harold. Studies in Ethnomethodology. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1967.

-, and Harvey Sacks. "On Formal Structures of Practica! Actions." In Theoretical Sociology. Ed. John C. McKinney and Edward A. Tiryakian. New York: Appleton CenturyCrofts, 1970, 33 7--66.

Garfinkel, Harold, Michael Lynch, and Eric Livingston. "The Work of a Discovering Science Construed from Materials from the Optically Discovered Pulsar." Philosophy ofthe Social Sciences Il (1981), 131-58

Garfinkel, Harold, and D. Laurence Wieder. "Two Incommensurable, Asymmetrically Alternate Technologies of Social Analysis." In Text in Context: Contributions to Ethnomethodology. Ed. Graham Watson and Robert M. Seiler. Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1992, 175-206.

Goode, David. "On Understanding Without Words: Communication Between a Deaf-Blind Child and Her Parents." Human Studies 13 ( 1990), 1-38.

Heap, James. "Applied Ethnomethodology: Looking for the Local Rationality of Reading Activities." Human Studies 13 (1990), 39-72.

Levesque-Lopman, Louise. Claiming Reality: Phenomen-

ology and Women s Experience. Lanham, MD: Rowan & Littlefield, 1988.

Liberman, Kenneth. Understanding Interaction in Central Australia: An Ethnomethodological Study of Australian Ahoriginal People. Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985.

Lynch, Michael. Art and Artifact in Lahoratory Science: A Study ofShop Work and Shop Talk in a Research Lahoratmy. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985.

O'Neill, John. Sociology as a Skin Trade: Essays Towards a Reflexive Sociology. New York: Harper & Row, 1972.

-. The Communicative Body: Studies in Communicative Philosophy, Politic~. and Sociology. Evanston, IL: Northwestem University Press, 1989.

Psathas, George, ed. Phenomenological Sociology: Issues and Applications. New York: J. Wiley, 1973.

-, ed. Phenomenology and Sociology: Theory and Research. Lanham, MD: Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology/University Press of America, 1990.

Rose, Edward. The Werald. Boulder, CO: Waiting Room Press, 1992.

Schutz, Alfred, and Thomas Luckmann. The Structures ofthe Life-World. 2 vols. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1973-83.

Smith, Dorothy. The Everyday World as Problematic. Boston: Northeastem University Press, 1987.

Srubar, Ilja. "On the Origin of 'Phenomenological' Sociology." Human Studies 7 (1984), 163-89.

Sudnow, David. Talk s Body: A Meditation Between Two Keyboards. New York: Knopf, 1979.

Wagner, Helmut R. Phenomenology of Consciousness and Sociology of the Lifeworld: An Introductory Study. Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1983.

-. Alfred Schutz: An Intellectual Biography. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983.

Wieder, D. Laurence. Language and Social Reality. The Hague: Mouton, 1974; rpt. Lanham, MD: Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology/University Press of America, 1988.

Wolff, Kurt. Surrender and Catch. Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1976.

-. Survival and Sociology: Vindicating the Human Suhject. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1991.

GEORGE PSATHAS

Boston University

SOMATICS Encounters between phenomenology and the body- and movement-centered approaches col

lectively known as "somatics" can best be understood

by recognizing that phenomenology and somatics are

contemporaries within a broader historical and cultural

context characterized by a new type of focus on the BODY appearing in the !ater 19th and early 20th cen

turies in Europe and North America. Here the body is no longer exclusively conceived as a physical object



opposed to a disembodied mind, but is increasingly rec

ognized as subjective, expressive, and primordial. For

example, while EDMUND HUSSERL emphasized the fun

damental role ofkinaesthesis as early as 1907 in a !ee

ture course concerning the perception ofthings in space

(now published under the ti tie Ding und Raum ), educa

tors such as Emile Jaques Dalcroze (1865-1950) and

Rudolf Laban ( 1879-1958) as well as modern dancers

such as Isadora Dune an ( 1878-1927) and Mary Wig

man (1886-1973) were pursuing novel movement ex

plorations of their own during the same period. That

early phenomenologists were not altogether isolated

from new trends in the DANCE, PHYSICAL EDUCATION,

and general physical cu !ture movement of their time

is suggested by MORITZ GEIGER 's use of the notion of

"Eurhythmie" in o ne of the essays in his Zugănge zur

Asthetik (Approaches to aesthetics, 1928), where eu

rhythmy is presented as the foundation for ali artistic

form; the word is perhaps most closely associated with

Dalcroze, who was already working out his principles

of eurhythmics as applied to music and movement by

the turn ofthe century at the Geneva Conservatory (and

whose college of eurhythmy was established at the ex

perimental community ofHellerau, outside Dresden, in

191 0), but the term was also used by Laban during the

1920s with reference to dance movement and appears

in the works of Rudolf Steiner (1861-1925) as well.

In fact, as cultural historian Hillel Schwartz has sug

gested, the 20th century itself has been characterized

by a new appreciation for the kinaesthetic dimension

in many areas oflife, notjust in specific disciplines ad

dressing it directly. Thus phenomenology is not only

- as HERBERT SPIEGELBERG has pointed OUt - part of

a larger historical turn to immediate experience, in its

full range and richness, but is also situated in a cultural

milieu in which new experientially-grounded bodily

practices (as well as new ways oftheorizing about the

living, moving body) have emerged.

The field of somatics embraces a great number of

such bodily based educational and therapeutic prac

tices, including various "body work" and "body aware

ness" approaches. Though its full history has yet to be

written - especially regarding its 19th century roots

- it is often associated with the names of such pi

oneers as Frederick Mathias Alexander ( 1869-1955),

Elsa Gindler (1885-1961 ), Ida Rolf (1896-1979), and

Moshe Feldenkrais ( 1904-1984); it also includes body-

centered practices developed in the 20th century by

many other individuals, along with such approaches as

biofeedback, sensory integration, and dan ce and move

ment therapy. Moreover, it embraces such traditions as

yoga, martial arts, and massage, each of which has a

Jengthy history of its own. Yet somatics owes its rela

tively recent emergence as a field or discipline (rather

than a mere collection of competing "marginal" or "al

ternative" practices) to the work in EXISTENTIAL PHENO

MENOLOGY ofTHOMAS HANNA, and phenomenoJogy not

only played a key ro le in its inception, but continues to

contribute to its development, offering critica! reflec

tions on its assumptions as well as eidetic descriptions,

and constitutive and genetic analyses, concerning the

"matters themselves" proper to the field.

Hanna's establishment of the field may be seen as

comprising two phases. (1) In articles published in the

late 1960s and the early 1970s, and in Bodies in Re

voit ( 1970), he retrieves the old term "somatology" as

a title for a new HUMAN SCIENTIFIC multidiscipline that

would draw on the one hand from such fields as evo

lutionary biology, ethology, and developmental psy

chology, while on the other hand also incorporating

the phenomenological notion ofbodily subjectivity, as

well as an existential concern for human freedom. Al

though he was not aware of it at the time, his project

echoes Husserl 's own proposal, in Ideen zu einer reinen

Phănomenologie und phănomenologischen Philoso

phie III [ 1912], for a "somatology" that would combine

research in such natural sciences as physiology with the

direct somatie perception that each researcher has, ex

perientially, only with regard to his or her own lived

body. Hanna's somatology is nondualistic in severa!

ways: it explicitly accomodates both scientific, third

person knowledge and experiential, first-person knowl

edge without requiring either ofthese tobe assimilated

to the other; it takes into account both the evolution

ary adaptation of an organism to its environment and

the existential adaptations roade possible by human

awareness, autonomy, and Jearning; and it moves res

olutely beyond mind-body dualisms by focusing upon

the soma, which in earlier formulations is defined as

an organic whole or process comprising many inter

articulating "mental" and "physical" functions. In that

Hanna's somatology is concerned not only with habit

ual, "acquired" kinaesthetic patterns but also with an

instinctual substratum of somatie life, it also converges

SOMATICS 665

with the !ater Husserl 's investigations of Triebinten

tionalităt, as well as with MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY's

analyses of an anonymous, pre-personal "motor inten

tionality" in Phenomimologie de la perception ( 1945).

And Hanna 's detailed treatment of upright posture in The Body of Life ( 1980)- including its frontal orien

tation, its possibilites of lateral manipulation, and its temporal coordination - is reminiscent of ERWIN w.

STRAUS 's work on similar themes in, for instance, "Die aufrechte Haltung" ( 1949).

(2) Though Hanna's earlier works made use ofthe adjective "somatie" (a term also found in Husserl,

Merleau-Ponty, and ARON ouRwnscH), he coined the noun "somatics" in a 1976 essay, "The Field of Somat

ies," appearing in the first issue ofajoumal ofthe same name. By including essays and book reviews devoted to

the many body-centered practices making up the field,

this joumal brought diverse approaches together in a

common context or forum, and although not all prac

titioners necessarily agreed with Hanna's own project

of somatology, they rapidly carne to see themselves as members of a common field called somatics. Dur

ing Hanna's years as editor of Somatics (1976-90), not

only did the joumal publish a number of essays in or

referring to phenomenology, but Hanna himself grad

ually refined the notion of the soma to emphasize the

phenomenological roots of the concept, culminating in a definition of the soma as "the body experienced

from within" - which recalls the phenomenological

concept of"lived body" (Leib). Though some somatie practices rely on metaphysi

cal frameworks from various world traditions and others are associated with various schools of psychother

apy, the most common framework is NATURALISM; for instance, practices may be explained and justified in

terms ofthe way neurological activity controls muscu

lar activity. There is also a tendency toward what Don

H. Johnson terms "somatie Platonism"- comparing

all individual bodies to some abstract ideal image or

model of the body and seeing bodies only through the

grid of assumptions that this paradigm entails. Never

theless, some somatie practitioners have become actively interested in phenomenological discourse as a

way of giving voi ce to the rich nuances oflived bodily

experience their work elicits, while others tind eidetic

phenomenology a useful tool in exploring similarities

and differences among various somatie approaches.

Still others make use of phenomenological concepts in their theoretical writings and/or cite phenomenological

works among their sources. In addition, ELIZABETH A. BEHNKE is conducting a series of phenomenological in

vestigations of somatie practice. Thus phenomenological work continues to contribute to theory and research

in the field of somatics. Furthermore, in addition to his important contributions to somatie theory, EUGENE T.

GENDLIN 's development of the notion of a bodily "felt sense" in Focusing (1978; rev. ed. 1981) and other

works is a classic example of an outstanding contribution by a phenomenologist to practica! somatie educa

tion. Another indication of interchange between these fields is found in the fact that on severa! occasions, per

sons trained in or familiar with phenomenology have left the world of academic philosophy to become fulltime somatie practitioners. And during the 1980s, two

graduate programs in somatics emerged, one directed

by SEYMOUR KLEINMAN at The Ohio State University and

the other by Don Hanlon Johnson, whose program is currently located at the California Institute of Integral

Studies in San Francisco; both programs draw upon

the phenomenological tradition in various ways. However, in addition to the influences ofphenomen

ology upon somatics, it is also possible to see somatics as contributing to phenomenology- in part because

in some respects, they are kindred movements or traditions. For example, many phenomenologists have

pointed out that as we go about our daily life, we are

caught up with things, tasks, and others, and seldom notice our own bodily comportment itself; as Husserl acknowledges, a special "asking back into" (Riickfrage)

is necessary to thematize the operative kinaestheses

and make them available for phenomenological description. Similarly, F. Mathias Alexander character

izes everyday life in terms of "end-gaining," and caUs

for a turn to the usually unnoticed "means whereby,"

bringing to light the ongoing "how" of somatie life,

including its deeply sedimented habits. With transformative somatie practice, however, what is taken for

granted in the everyday attitude is not merely disc! o sed

as a theme for possible theoretical reflection, but is actually changed: habitual tensions and restrictions are

released, movement becomes easier, bodily alignment

becomes more optimal, and so on. And in the process,

somatie practice allows one to appreciate many nuances ofkinaesthetic and somaesthetic experience that


were previously vague ( or out of awareness altogether). Thus somatie practice can help phenomenologists develop what ROBERT SOKOLOWSKI refers to in Husserlian Meditations ( 1974) as "appropriate sensibility" for certain sorts ofphenomena. This in turn recalls Husserl's emphasis in "Entwurfeiner 'Vorrede' zudenLogischen Untersuchungen" [ 1913] on phenomenological "seeing" as a ski li that can be developed, so that phenomenological research depends on the evidence available to an experienced observer and is not identica! with what can be garnered through naive "seeing." Moreover, somatie work suggests a further methodological refinement. In The Context of Self ( 1981 ), RICHARD M.

ZANER demonstrates the use of what he terms "prominence by absence"- i.e., a key feature ofthe matters themselves under investigation can become conspicuous precisely by considering cases where this feature is lacking- as an additional strategy complementing the free phantasy variation that is a part of the EIDE

nc METHOD. What the richness of distinctions evoked by practica! somatie work suggests is the parallel possibility of "prominence through heightened optimality," i.e., the use of striking "plus" variations (rather than "minus" variations where a key feature is missing) in elucidating the usually tacit structures of the type of experience in question. Thus while phenomenology enriches somatics by providing a language and a framework within which to articulate its assumptions and achievements, somatics enriches phenomenology - especially, but not exclusively, phenomenology of the body - by opening up a realm of hitherto unnoticed phenomena and specifying attitudes and styles of comportment that allow these phenomena tobe thematized and explored in great detail.

This is of particular importance in ensuring that certain themes pertaining to CONSTITUTIVE PHENOMEN

OLOGY and GENETIC PHENOMENOLOGY - e.g., passive synthesis (Husserl), kinaesthetic consciousness (uL

RICH CLAESGES), and the distinction between the body as constituted and the body as constituting (LUDWIG LAND

GREBE) - are not merely taken up conceptually, but

can be worked out by subsequent phenomenologists on the basis of the appropriate experiential EVIDENCE.

Such investigations are in turn crucial to demonstrating that the Husserlian conception of transcendental "consciousness," "subjectivity," or "person" cannot be confused with a Cartesian ego radically sundered from a

thing called a "body," but already includes a corporealkinaesthetic stratum (as JITENDRA NATH MOHANTY has indeed suggested in severa! essays).

Yet another area of convergence between phenomenology and somatics can be indicated by borrowing (and extending) the notion of a "critique of corporeal experience" mentioned by ENZO PACI in Funzione delle scienze e significato dell 'uomo (Function of the sciences and signification ofthe human, 1963). Like FEM

INISM, somatics is often critica! both ofthe objectified, commodified body endlessly measured up against externally imposed ideals and ofthe ruthless domination of a "naturalized" body by medical authorities. For example, in Body (1983 ), Don Hanlon Johnson uses the notion of "techniques ofthe body" introduced in a 1934lecture by Marcel Mauss ( 1872-1950) to contrast "techniques of alienation"- bodily practices that disempower us by disconnecting us from our own somatie experience and foster authoritarian control of bodies - and "techniques of authenticity," which take lived experience seriously (Johnson explicitly credits phenomenology with helping to develop this as a historical possibility) and foster embodied self-responsibility as the hasis for true community, as well as honoring bodily diversity rather than positing some sort of"ideal" body as standard or goal. Here and elsewhere, somatie theory recognizes not only that bodies are in general socially shaped, but that- as MICHEL FOUCAULT has pointed out - our own history in particular has been geared in many ways toward molding "docile bodies." Yet many somatie practitioners and theorists see somatie practices as providing a genuinely liberatory alternative whose effects need not be confined to isolated individuals, but are increasingly seen as having the potential to change bodily practices, and embodied power relations, within the intersubjective/intercorporeal field. In other words, somatie practice cannot be reduced to a narcissistic focus on the "self," but elicits styles of bodily comportment and action that challenge or shift current social patterns by responding to a situation in an innovative and productive way, thus enabling new kinds of social order to emerge (a theme emphasized in Gendlin, resonating in certain respects with recent work independently pursued by BERNHARD

WALDENFELS).

Finally, we may point to some emerging links between somatics and a phenomenologically grounded

SOUTH AFRICA 667

ETHICS. Like other practica! disciplines, somatics finds

a variety of concrete ethical issues arising during, for

instance, a session between an individual client and a

practitioner. But at a deeper level, there is a core theme

in both Hanna's !ater work and Gendlin's recent work

that has to do with being able to experience oneself

as being addressed by the Other rather than solely as

addressing the other, oras being looked at by the Other

rather than solely as observing the other, a theme rem

iniscent of the work of EMMANUEL LEYINAS. for both

Gendlin and Hanna, however, there is a fundamental

fellowship not only among human somas, but among

humans and animals and plants, which recalls Merleau

Ponty's notions of reversibility and flesh ofthe world.

Thus the somatie philosophy of Hanna and Gendlin

moves toward an embodied ethics with implications

for ECOLOGY.

Somatics is a field that is still in the process of cre

ating a disciplinary identity, retrieving the threads of

its history, and searching out an appropriate language

for its theory and practice. Yet its own historical roots

and "proto-phenomenological" elements have already

fostered significant relationships with the phenomen

ological tradition, based largely on the fact that for

both fields, the body is no Ion ger relegated to the sta tus

of a thing among things, but is an active, expressive,

responsive, and transformative lived body that is im

plicated in ali our experience. Though the interaction

between phenomenology and somatics is still in its

early stages, we may expect an increasingly fruitful

collaboration between these disciplines in the years to

come.

FOR FURTHER STUDY

Behnke, Elizabeth A. "The Philosopher's Body." Somatics 3:4 (1982), 44-46.

-. "Matching." Somatics 6:4 ( 1988), 24--32; rpt. in Bone. Breath, and Gesture: Practices of Embodiment. Ed. Don Hanlon Johnson. Berkeley: North Atlantic Books/Califomia Institute of Integral Studies, 1995, 317-37.

-. "Sensory Awareness and Phenomenology: A Convergence ofTraditions." Study Project in Phenomenology of the Body Newsletter 2: 1 ( 1989), 27-42.

Gendlin, Eu gene T. "A Philosophical Critique ofthe Concept of Narcissism: The Significance of the Awareness Movement." In Pathologies of the Modern Self: Postmodern Studies. Ed. David Michael Levin. New York: New York University Press, 1987, 251-304.

-. "Three Assertions About the Body." The Foii o: A Journal for Focusing and Experiential Therapy 12 (1993), 21-33.

Hanna, Thomas. "What is Somatics?" Somatics 5:4 (1986), 4--8: rpt. in Bone, Breath, and Gesture: Practices ofEmbodiment. Ed. Don Hanlon Johnson. Berkeley: North Atlantic Books/Califomia Institute oflntegral Studies, 1995, 314--52.

Landgrebe, Ludwig. "Reflexionen zu Husserls Konstitutionslehre." Tijdschrift voor Filosofie 36 (1974 ), 466-82; "The Problem ofPassive Constitution." Trans. Donn Welton. In his The Phenomenology of Edmund Husserl: Six Essays. Ed. Donn Welton. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1981, 50-65.

Schwartz, Hillel. "Torque: The New Kinaesthetic of the Twentieth Century." In Incorporations. Ed. Jonathan Crary and Sanford Kwinter. New York: Urzone, 1992, 70-126.

Spicker, Stuart F. "Terra Firma and Infirma Species: From Medical Philosophical Anthropology to Philosophy of Medicine." Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 1 ( 1976), 104--35.

Straus, Erwin W. "Die aufrechte Haltung. Eine anthropologische Studie." Monatsschrift fur Psychiatrie und Neurologie 117 ( 1949); rpt in his Psychologie der menschlichen Welt. Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1960, 224--35; rev. and enl. as "The Upright Posture." Psychiatric Quarterly 26 ( 1952), 529--61; rpt. in his Phenomenological Psychology: The Selected Papers of Erwin W Straus. Trans., in part, Erling Eng. New York: Basic Books, 1966, 137-65.

ELIZABETH A. BEHNKE

Study Project on Phenomenology ofthe Body

SOUTH AFRICA Phenomenology in South

Africa carne into full swing in 1948 with the appoint

ment of CAREL KRUGEL OBERHOLZER to the chair of phi

Josophy at the University of Pretoria. That university

remained the center for phenomenology un tii recently,

when the center shifted to the University of South

Africa (Pretoria), especially to the faculty of education.

In 1950 PETRUS SECUNDUS DREYER returned from Eu

rope, having studied PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY un

der HELMUTH PLESSNER and EXISTENTIALISM under KARL

JASPERS. In 1952 Dreyer was appointed lecturer at the

University ofPretoria. Right from the beginning, Ober

holzer taught the principles of phenomenology and EX

ISTENTIALISM. By that time Europe and the UNITED STATES

had been working in this direction for practically half a

century. As a result, phenomenologists in South Africa

tried to start at the level of European and American

phenomenology and they could manage this only by

taking the study ofthe phenomenological classics, in-



cluding EDMUND HUSSERL, for granted. On the one hand,

they tried to move on the European level; on the other hand, they tried to apply phenomenological principles to the problems- scientific and otherwise - of the South African situation. Beginning at this level had its

advantages, but also disadvantages. Right from the beginning the South African pheno

menological movement was greatly inftuenced by European philosophical anthropology, especially Hel

muth Plessner, Amold Gehlen, FREDERIK J. J. BUYTENDIJK, Martin Buber, Erich Rothacker, MAX SCHELER,

NICOLAI HARTMANN, Adolph Portmann, and, indirectly, Baron Jakob von Uexkiill, the teacher of many ofthese

philosophers. Of equal importance was the inftuence of existentialism, especially Soren Kierkegaard, Friedrich Nietzsche, MARTIN HEIDEGGER, Karl Jaspers, and to a much lesser extent JEAN-PAUL SARTRE. Fundamental, however, was the influence of Husserl, most of ali his view of knowledge and science, and his phenomen

ological EPOCHE AND REDUCTION and EIDETIC METHOD. The undisputed leader ofphenomenology in South

Africa was Oberholzer, professor of philosophy and fundamental pedagogics at Pretoria. He was primar

ily interested in EDUCATION, and published ali his most important work in this field. According to Oberholzer, however, every science has an ontic base, a field of reality that is the primary object of study of the particular science, and that at the same time determines the parameters and the basic principles ofthe science. The educational reality must be based on the anthropological reality, because the phenomenon of education can only be understood as a human activity. The ontic foundation ofpedagogics is the human being. Pedagogics as a science must necessarily be based on a valid view of the human being. Such a view ofthe human Oberholzer found by way of Husserl 's method of Wesensschau. He was absolutely convinced of the view of the human being that he developed inside the phenomenological

horizon through phenomenological analysis; the philosophical anthropology of the school of von Uexkiill

(especially Buytendijk, Portmann, and some medical anthropologists; the psychology ofviKTOR FRANKL,

and existential philosophy, especially Heidegger and Jaspers. This view of the human was the foundation,

on the one hand, ofhis most important work, in partic

ular Prolegomena van 'n prinsipiele pedagogiek (Prolegomena to pedgogic principles, 1968) - and, on

the other hand, an untiring struggle against ali forms of perspectivism, RELATIVISM, reductionism, PSYCHOLOGISM, NATURALISM, scientism, etc.

Oberholzer's view ofthe human can be summarized as follows: the prim eva! (in the sense of original, basic, not further to be reduced, that which makes something

what it is, essential) qualities ofbeing human are openness, possibility, being qualified by norms, freedom, responsibility, accountability, and existentiality. Only

when these qualities determine our view ofhumankind is it possible to understand human beings in their be

ing and actions. A child is a human being growing up, a human being becoming mature. Being on the way

to maturity does not make the child less of a human being, but it does imply a not yet, a movement to the future of maturity. This phase of being human is a phase of needing help, especially in the form of protection and guidance. Being a child is a mode ofbeing

human that essentially appeals to a responsible human being to respond by giving protection and guidance on the way. The essence of education is the relationship of an adult human being giving protection and guidance to an immature human being on his or her

way to maturity, an adult human being responding to the appeal of an immature human being. This response is always guided by values and norms. This is essentially the meaning of the word "pedagogic," which is derived from the Greekpaidos (child), and agein (to lead). An implication of this view of education is that terms like adult education, reeducation programs, distance education, in-service education, etc., can only have analogical meaning. Education in the true sense of the word is a direct relationship between an adult and a child.

A result of Oberholzer's approach of ontologica!

analysis was an extraordinary emphasis on the importance of ontologica! categories to describe the phe

nomenon of education. This was strongly influenced by Heidegger's "analytic ofDASEIN." The discovery of

categories makes the formulation ofnorms for educa

tional practice possible. For some students of Ober

holzer this became a somewhat one-sided activity. Under Oberholzer's influence a strong phenomen

ological movement arose (and is still going strong) in education at the Universities of Pretoria, South Africa

(Pretoria), Port Elizabeth, and the Rand Afrikaans University (Johannesburg), with leading figures WILLEM A.

SOUTH AFRICA 669

LANDMANN, STEPHANUS J. SCHOEMAN, JACOBUS J. PIENAAR,

PIET VAN ZYL, DANIEL J. GREYLING, MAURITS OTTO OBER

HOLZER, PH!LIP HIGGS, and CHRISTIAN GUNTER (Univer

sity of Stellenbosch). Common to this movement is

the conviction that a radical reflection on the educa

tional situation is required in order to understand the

phenomenon of education. Such a radical reflection

will lead to a description of the essence of the edu

cational situation in terms of pedagogica! categories

and corresponding criteria derived from them. In pen

etrating the essence of the phenomenon of education as

it occurs universally, the phenomenologist is required

to suspend provisionally his or her extrinsic aims and

beliefs.

Dreyer joined and supported Oberholzer enthusias

tically in his struggle against psychologism, natural

ism, and scientism, and especially against ideologica!

thinking. Primarily he was interested in the fundamen

tal epistemological problems of the HUMAN SCIENCES

( Geisteswissenschaften ). His field of speciality was the

theory of HISTORY, especially the historian 's concept of

time, the problem of subjectivity and objectivity, the

truth and validity ofhistorical propositions, and the ap

plicability ofKANT's Zur Natur des Menschen gehOrige

Metaphysik (Metphysics belonging essentially to hu

man nature) to history. Related to this field ofstudywas

his interest in culture as an essential human character

istic. Basic problems that arose time and again were the

problems of the relation and communication between

persons separated from each other by space, time, and

culture, as well as the methodological problems ofthe

phenomenological approach to a phenomenon that be

longs to past history.

In his Inleiding tot diefilosofie van die geskiedenis (Introduction to the philosophy of history, 197 4) and

a number of papers published in journals, Dreyer em

phasizes that history is the science that has its field of

study in the reality ofhumans in their LIFEWORLD exist

ing in the past. The universal essence of the human is

openness; the human being is completely part ofhis or

her lifeworld, and yet able to transcend the lifeworld

to stand on its periphery in order to change it; thus the

human is a normative being that is constantly active

in consciously knowing, evaluating, and changing his

or her self and lifeworld. Human beings are funda

mentally and essentially cultural beings. Culture is the

nature of humankind.

This view of the human is the pivot for the ap

proach of history. It enables the historian- a unique

human being in his or her own unique life world- to

look back from one point intime (the present) to other

unique human beings in their unique lifeworlds and

their points in time (the past), in such a way that they

can be understood. In this way the past becomes a !iv

ing, meaningful past into which we of the present can

enter and that we can grasp nearly as well (and often

better) than we can grasp our own world or the people

of the past theirs. Only on the basis of this view of the

human is it possible to know history in the true sense of

the word. It is the guide of the historian 's approach to

the epistemological problems ofhistorical study; ofthe

constructions a historian has to make to bridge gaps in

his or her knowledge ofthe past and to give a coherent

narrative ofthe past; ofthe evaluation ofthe so-called

laws of history; of the search for meaning in history;

and so on. As an illustration, a short summary ofDreyer's ap

proach to the problem ofthe TRUTH ofhistorical inter

pretation can be offered: the intention ofthe historian is

to te li the truth about the past, but the past is notat hand.

We must penetra te the past by way of the memory of

people, documents, and monuments. We must establish

facts ofthe past. Facts according to the realist-positivist

approach are statements that correspond to events of

the past. These events, however, do not lie around like

stones on a beach. They must be reconstructed and

evaluated in the historical narrative, which compels the

historian to discover and evaluate facts in the context

of a coherent whole. This is the source of the never

ending difference between realists-positivists, on the

one hand, and idealists, on the other hand, between

adherents of correspondence or coherence. Neither a

catalogue of facts nor an abstract system of coherent

pronouncements can give a meaningful and compre

hensive narrative ofthe past. Without facts, knowledge

ofhistory is impossible; without coherence, the impor

tance, meaning, and even the factuality offacts are in

conceivable. A simple combination of correspondence

and coherence does not solve the problem. Only when

the historian remembers that the objects of history are

humans, who are the makers of history, therefore also

the subjects of history; that humans are never things

among other things; that the human story can never

be told, except when the human essence- that which


makes us human beings- is fully expressed; only, in other words, when historians remember that humans of the past are subjects even as the historian is him

or herself, subjects only to be approached through intersubjective communication, only then can a true and meaningful narrative ofthe past be told.

The influence ofphenomenology was disseminated by Dreyer's students. Students of the history of eulture, ARCHITECTURE, and history - some to the level

of magister - attended his lectures and seminars. In philosophy a number ofhis students played an important role, although each had his own special field of interest.

FREDERIK J. ENGELBRECHT wrote his doctoral disser

tation on the phenomenon of the threshold. He was greatly interested in and influenced by the metabletika of J. H. van den Berg. Before he retired, Engelbrecht was head ofthe department ofphilosophy and dean of arts at the University ofthe North.

GERRIT VAN wvK's doctoral dissertation was on the ethics of Nicolai Hartmann, and he became head of

the philosophy department at the University of Zululand. ERSMUS D. PRINSLOO doctor's thesis was on the phenomenological approach. His special field is infor

mallogic and he is head ofthe philosophy department at the University of South Africa (Pretoria).

c. s. DE BEER's doctor's thesis was on meaning in history. He is Professor of Communication Sciences at the University of South Africa. His special field is the philosophy of PAUL RICCEUR.

JENS KROGER's doctor's thesis was on the concept of horde in the philosophies of Nietzsche, ORTEGA Y GASSET, and Heidegger. He is a senior lecturer at the University of South Africa.

ANDRIES P. DU TOIT's doctor's thesis was on

Kierkegaard. His special field is logic and he is the head ofthe philosophy department at the University of

Pretoria. Indirectly the influence of phenomenology can be

seen in other sciences, e.g., the PSYCHOLOGY ofREX VAN vuuREN, currently at the University of Pretoria.

In ETHNOLOGY at the University of Pretoria the fundamental approach has changed from evolutionary, naturalistic principles to phenomenological principles. Terms from the phenomenological sphere, like life

world, horizon, scale of values, cultural values and norms, the uniqueness of the human being, etc., ha ve

become part of everyday language, even outside scientific circles, in South Africa.

P. S. DREYER University ()[Pretoria

SPACE As early as the preface to Philosophie der Arithmetik ( 189\ ), EDMUND HUSSERL spoke of another volume devoted to studying additional concepts belonging to mathematical analysis and to fash

ioning a new philosophical theory of Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometries as well as their relation to arithmetical analysis. This volume was never completed, although manuscripts treating these issues dating from 1886 to 1901 ha ve been published as Studien zur Arithmetik und Geometrie. These texts distinguish faur senses in which we ordinarily employ the word "space": (l) the space of everyday living, i.e., the intuitive space that is both before and beyond science; (2) the space of pure geometry or MATHEMATics; (3) the

space of applied geometry, i.e., the space of the NATURAL SCIENCEs; and ( 4) the space of metaphysics. The texts devote themselves, however, primarily to the first

two senses. The early studies of intuitive space in these

manuscripts are not as developed or extensive as those of the 1907 Dingvorlesung published as Ding und Raum ( 1973). By 1907 Husserl had begun to clarify his conception of the phenomenological EPOCHE AND

REDUCTION and method. In the earlier texts he is already aware of an important distinction that is easily

overlooked and that continues to operate in the 1907 text, viz., the distinction between the conceptual content of the description of intuited space and intuited space itself. We must be careful not to ascribe the conceptual properties used in the description of intuited space to intuited space as such. In other words, even though our philosophical description of intuited space

and ofvisual fields might employ mathematical terms and structures, it does not follow that we intuit or immediately experience space as mathematically struc

tured. Indeed, a careful reflection on this distinction shows that we must distinguish different senses ofthe

intuitive experience and of intuited spaces, for if the geometric presentation of space depends on the ideal

izing of intuited space, as Husserl says it does, and if


SPACE

in our everyday perception of space we use analogues ofmathematical concepts, as Husserl says we do, then there must be a more fundamental or immediate experience of space already contained within this ordi

nary perceptual experience. One implication of such a distinction, as JOHN DRUMMOND argues, is that immediately experienced space in and of itself does not ha ve a particular mathematical structure, although PARTRICK

HEELAN argues a contrary position in his detailed study of the relations between the perceptual experience and the scientific understanding of space.

Husserl 's differentiation in the 1907 text of the "phantom"- i.e., the purely sensible object, within the

ordinary, concrete material object ofperception with ali its ca usa!, functional, and value-properties- permits him to speak ofthe immediate experience ofspace and

the sensible experience of the phantom as they occur within ordinary, perceptual experience. Within PERCEP

TION our investigation of the sensible properties of an object can never be complete; our experience can never exhaust the object's sensible appearances. In ordinary experience, the tendency toward a more complete and precise determination of an object is limited by the

practica! interest momentarily governing our perceptual life. This interest calls forth certain qualities for attention and demands that the object be given so that we can best experience those qualities. In the case of vision, for example, the possibility o fan optimal given

ness of an object relative to our practica! interest in the object requires, among other things, that the object be ( 1) given in the center of the vi sua! field rather than at its margins, (2) presented at a suitable distance from the perceiver ( not too ne ar and not too far), and (3) susceptible to careful and comprehensive scrutiny by the perceiver.

The key to understanding the satisfaction of each part of this requirement is what Husserl calls "kinaesthesis," by which he means ( 1) the capability of perceiving subjects to move their sense organs and BODY

such that the position ofthe sense organs relative to the object changes and (2) the appertinent awareness in ki

naesthetic sensations ofbodily movements and bodily attitudes. Husserl describes the motivational connec

tion between a particular course ofkinaesthetic sensations and the sensations (hyletic data) that present the

objective determinations ofthe object existing in space, although Drummond argues that the motivational con-

671

nection properly exists between the bodily activities themselves and the objective qualities as intended. The awareness ofspace, then, is achieved by virtue ofthose kinaesthetic activities that produce the satisfaction of the requirement for optimal appearances. The first part ofthe requirement deals with an appearance's position

within the visual field, whereas the second and third parts deal with an object's position in space relative

to the percipient. The satisfaction ofthe first part does not require that the whole body move, whereas, at least with respect to vi sion, the satisfaction ofthe second and third parts do.

Husserl identifies levels in the awareness of space,

levels in the sense that a more complex experience presupposes a less complex one even when the less complex cannot concretely and independently exist.

As ULRICH CLAESGES has shown, the visual fields that present space can properly be conceived as correlates of kinaesthetic systems. Starting with the artificial kinaesthetic situation in which the perceiver is perfectly at rest, Husserl identifies the visual field simpliciter,

the field consisting entirely of aflat expanse of areas of contrasting apparent qualities filling delimited parts of the field. He then begins systematically to add different

kinaesthetic systems, beginning with the system of eye movements. The resultant oculomotoric field differs from the previous field insofar as objects newly appear and disappear at the margins ofthe field and ali objects continuously change their orientation in the field as the eyes are moved. The oculomotoric field, then, is the quadridirectional (up and down, left and right) widening ofthe visual field simpliciter generated by moving the eyes both left and right and up and down.

Different kinaesthetic systems can up to a point substitute for or extend one another. The changes found in the oculomotoric field, for example, can be duplicated

if the eyes are kept still but the head moves. More importantly, the changes introduced by eye movement can be extended by additional movements ofthe head

to the left and right and up and down. The result is the cephalomotoric field, the correlate of eye and head

movements; it is a field that forms a closed, cyclical

unity in the left-right dimension, but remains limited in the up-down dimension. The movements ofthe eyes and the head enable the object to which our interest

and perceptual attention are directed to be brought to

the center ofthe visual field. But we do not yet experi-


ence objective, three-dimensional space; the fields are two-dimensional presentations of space, and no third dimension is available within the field itself.

The kinaesthetic activities necessary for the constitution of three-dimensional space involve the movement ofthe whole body; they are two, viz., distancing and orbiting. Distancing is the movement ofthe body toward or away from the object such that its apparent size expands or contracts, as does the apparent size of the other appearances forming the background against which the object appears. It allows us to ensure that the object is at a suitable distance for optimal viewing. Orbiting is the movement ofthe body around the object such that there results an apparent tuming motion of the object, specifically an axial rotation of its appearances and of the field presenting the thing in space. This allows us to become aware of the bodily enclosedness ofthe object and to inspect the object in its various dimensions and aspects.

Husserl identifies vision and touch as the two forms ofperception that bring an identica!, objective space to presence. There are two important differences between the kinaesthetic activities involved in touch and vi sion. The first is that a single tactual system, that of the hand with its fingers, is sufficient for the constitution of tactual space. The systems of the lower arm, upper arm, and whole body are merely extensions ofthis basic system and are brought into play because ofthe size of the object or for convenience and comfort. The second difference is that in tactile perception, distancing does not present a continuous third dimension. Although it still does indicate the object's own position in space relative to the moving body parts, distancing in touch is a simple binary system: the object is distant and not touched or it is near and in contact with the tactual organs.

Husserl rejects both a priori and empiricistic accounts of the origin of our geometric experience of space. He claims instead that this presentation is grounded in an idealizing abstraction of empirica!, intuited spatial structures and in the asymptotic approximation of a li mit. The idealizing presentation of shape has three aspects: ( 1) the limitation of a general concern with objects to a theoretical concern with their shapes simply as measurable; (2) the focusing of attention on a side or appearance of an object in abstraction both (a) from the field and its horizons in which the side or

object is presented and (b) from other si des and views of the object; and (3) the limitation of attention to the two-dimensionality ofthe presentation ofthe object or its side. We perceptually attend to the side or appearance ofthe object as measurable, focus on its surface, and then idealize this edge, and this idealization consists precisely of the approximating approach to pure two-dimensionality, to the two-dimensional limiting surface, e.g., a square ora rectangle. This process can be repeated to yield the awareness ofthe line and then the point. With similar starting points and a similar process we can arrive at other geometric notions, such as continuity, congruence, distance, direction, and position.

The point is the intersection ofthe geometrica! concern with shapes and volumes - a concern that ideally postulates the point as the li mit of one-dimensional magnitudes and that fully developed itselfin Euclidean plane and solid geometry- and the geometrica! concern with position, which developed itself most fully in analytic, coordinate geometry. The introduction of number and of algebraic techniques in the coordinate geometry is a significant step beyond the idealization found in Euclidean geometry, for numbers are achieved in formalizing abstraction. As such, numbers are purely formal concepts, applicable to anything whatsoever. The significance ofthis arithmetization of geometry is that the coordinate pairs or triads used to indicate points in either two- or three-dimensional space are no Ion ger limited to a spatial interpretation. The formalization of geometry breaks the essential connection between the idealized geometries and the shapes ofbodies.

The further significance ofthe formalization of geometry is that the algebraic functions used to describe the relations between those things designated by pairs or triads of numbers can be complicated in a variety ofways through the exercise ofmathematical "choice" with its conventions. One way is to introduce a greater number of variables into the formulas. This produces "geometries" that are n-dimensional (n > 3) wherein "points" are identified by n-tuples. The development of such hyperspaces is crucial for the development of a faur-dimensional space-time continuum in Einstein 's theory of relativity.

Husserl's development of multiplicity or manifold theory allows him to distinguish between geometry as an idealization of intuited structures and geometry

SPACE

as an instance of manifold theory. In the case of Eu

clidean geometry, the abstraction of the theory-form

from the idealized geometry yields a Euclidean man

ifold of three dimensions. Other n-dimensional Eu

clidean and non-Euclidean manifolds can then be con

structed by mathematical "choice." For Husserl, then,

the Euclidean manifold and the Euclidean space for which it is the pure categoria! form are prior to the

non-Euclidean manifolds and spaces. Indeed, the the

ory of non-Euclidean manifolds is for Husserl a logica!

consequence ofthe theory ofEuclidean manifolds.

The clarification ofthe distinction between regional

ontologies and FORMAL ONTOLOGY and of that between

idealization and formalization allows us to view the

Euclidean idealizations as a regional ontology and the

Euclidean manifold as a formal ontology, which, while

normally applied to space, is applicable to any object or

region ofbeing at ali. Since the three-dimensional Eu

clidean manifold is the formalization (via abstraction of

the theory-form) of idealized geometry it can safely be

applied in a physical geometry. Once free mathemati

cal constructions are introduced into the manifolds and

these manifolds are interpreted as "geometries" and ap

plied to spatial objects of experience, however, "false"

regional ontologies might result. In the case of space,

this means that a mathematically derived manifold is

applicable as a physical geometry only if it is consis

tent with the Euclidean idealizations ofthe local space

in which we li ve. Since Husserl was writing before the

publication ofEinstein 's papers on the theory ofrelativ

ity, we can obtain from these texts no indication ofwhat

he would ha ve thought about this theory. We can point out, however, that even though relativity theory in

volves the application of a faur-dimensional manifold, it satisfies this condition. And we can also point out

that Husserl apparently approved OSKAR BECKER's dis

cussion of the philosophical significance of relativity

theory. As Becker points out, however, one reason for

the successful application of Einstein 's theories is that

the four coordinates of space-time cannot be arbitrar

ily interchanged; every point in the faur-dimensional

continuum involves a splitting apart of three spatial

dimensions and a time dimension.

MARTIN HEIDEGGER's phenomenology of space in

Sein und Zeit( 1927), sharply distinguishes the immedi

ate experience of spatiality from the cognitive and for

mal intuition of an objective and homogeneous space.

673

Heidegger stresses the need to ground analyses of space

in the comportment of DASEIN toward the world rather

than in the subject's cognitive awareness of space. This

difference is manifest in his discussion of distancing.

For Heidegger, distancing is not essentially related to objective distance; instead, the activity of distancing is

the overcoming of a state of distance by bringing close,

making ready-to-hand, what was formerly remote from

our practica! concems. For the analysis ofthe cognitive

and formal awareness of higher-order space, Heideg

ger simply refers to Becker's study. Similarly, MAURICE

MERLEAU-PONTY, who is primarily concerned with an

account of how space comes to presence in a bodily

relation to the world, refers to Becker for detailed anal

yses of the bodily activity involved in our awareness

ofspace.

Becker, to whom the texts of Ding und Raum and

Studien zur Arithmetik und Geometrie were not avail

able, provides a slightly different account of the lev

els in the constitution of space: ( 1) the pre-spatial

or quasi-spatial fields, further distinguished into the

sense field ( corresponding to the sense field simpliciter) and the kinaesthetic field (corresponding to the ki

naesthetic sensations themselves and the oculomotoric

and cephalomotoric fields they motivate); (2) oriented space, wherein the perceiving body is considered a

body in the world and the absolute "here," i.e., the

absolute point of orientation for ali other objects; and

(3) homogeneous space, which (a) is essentially char

acterized by the relativization of the "here" and by

intersubjectivity and (b) is the space of concern to

mathematical and scientific investigation. Becker's no

tion of homogeneous space leads beyond the space of

immediate and perceptual awareness to the space con

stituted in the mathematical and physical sciences. He

characterizes the approximating approach to the limit

as the contraction ofthe visual fields to the line and to

the ideal vanishing point. Since Becker is concerned

to show how geometric axioms are grounded in the original experience of space, he tends to disclose these

perceptual foundations in the same order required by

the axiomatic system in which they are mathemati

cally presented. From this starting point, Becker can

then clarify the awareness of the definite mathemati

cal manifold and the mathematical continuum, both of

which are important not only in geometry itself, but

in its physical applications. Becker indicates how Eu-


clidean geometry is the categoria! form for the space of

everyday experience and how non-Euclidean geometry is the categoria! form for the space of NATURAL SCIENCE.

ELJSABETH STROKER also develops a comprehensive view of different levels of the experience of space. Whereas Becker's study is more Husserlian in char

acter, limiting itself to the discussion of the experiential foundations of geometry in our intuitive experience and to the discussion of geometric and physical spaces; Stroker's develops Heideggerian insights. She more fully explores the ordinary, lived experience of space as manifested in our comportmenttoward things; she then proceeds to a discussion of mathematical

spaces, but ignores issues raised by their application in physics. Stroker discusses the foundations of our geometric experience of space in lived space, within which she distinguishes (1) "attuned" space, (2) the

space of ACTION, and (3) intuitive space. The distinction between these spaces is fundamentally a distinction between three different spatial structures correlated to three different styles of bodily comportment in which the body is viewed as ( 1) the carrier of expressive content, (2) the physical aspect of practica!, goal-oriented activity, and (3) the center of perception. Within ge

ometric or mathematical spaces Stroker distinguishes (1) Euclidean and (2) non-Euclidean spaces, and under (2) she distinguishes (a) hyperbolic and (b) Riemannian geometries. Stroker identifies the elements in the pre-theoretical experiences of space that contribute to the grounding and understanding ofthe various geometries, and thereby avoids discussing non-Euclidean geometries solely in terms ofthe mathematical propensities that led to their development, although she, like Husserl, maintains the priority of Euclidean geometry over non-Euclidean geometries. She also discusses intuitability and the pictorial symbolism of analytic

and formalized geometries, as well as the relationship between mathematical demonstration and the constitution of mathematical idealities.

Discussions of the perceptual and affective experi

ences of space can also be joined together in a con

sideration ofthe aesthetic experience ofspace. Stroker has in another context discussed problems of perspec

tive in pictorial art, and Heelan has tied his discussion

of the mathematical features of perceptual space to a discussion of our experience of pictori al space in art. In addition, Gaston Bachelard ( 1884---1962) explores in

detail the affective dimensions of the various kinds of space and spatially characterized objects that capture the attention ofpoets. Finally, EDWARD s. CASEY investigates the richly articulated phenomenon of "place,"

in contrast to mere "sites" in homogeneous, isotropic "space."

Reftection on the nature of space has traditionally been central to philosophical reftection. This centrality stems from the fact that space, again along with TIME,

is a form governing the objects of the physical world in which we live. As such, space becomes central to

ali our experiences of those objects, from our most immediate encounters with individual things to our

most detached, theoretical explanations ofthe physical world as a whole. Space is experienced in multiple ways in these various experiences, and these ways need tobe carefully distinguished, but care fu! attention must also be paid also to their interrelationships, indeed to their unity, for it is one space we experience. Reftection

on the experiences of space is thus necessarily complex and varied; indeed, this complexity makes it difficult

to provide a truly comprehensive account of ali the varied modes in which space might be experienced and present itself to us.

FOR FURTHER STUDY

Bachelard, Gaston. La poetique de l"espace. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1958; The Poetics of Space. Trans. Maria Jolas. Boston: Beacon Press, 1969.

Becker, Oskar. "Beitrăge zur phănomenologischen Begriindung der Geometrie und ihrer physikalischen Anwendungen." Jahrbuch fiir Philosophie und phănomenologische Forschung 6 (1923), 385-560.

Casey, Edward S. Getting Back into Place: Toward a Renewed Understanding ofthe Place-World. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1993.

Claesges, Ulrich. Edmund Husserls Theorie der Raumkonstitution. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964.

Drummond, John J. "On Seeing a Material Thing in Space: The Ro le of Kinaesthesis in Vis ual Perception." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 40 ( 1978-79), 19~ 32.

-. "Objects' Optimal Appearances and the Immediate Awareness of Space in Vision." Man and World 16 ( 1983 ), 177~205.

-. "The Perceptual Roots of Geometric Idealization." The Review of Metaphysics 3 7 ( 1984 ), 785-81 O.

Heelan, Patrick A. Space-Perception and the Philosophy of Science. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983.

Husserl, Edmund. Studien zur Arithmetik und Geometrie: Texte aus dem Nachlass 1886--1901. Ed. Ingeborg

SPAIN AND LATIN AMERICA 675

Strohmeyer. Husserliana 21. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1983.

~. "Die Frage nach dem Ursprung der Geometrie a1s intentiona1-historisches Prob1em." Ed. Eugen Fink. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 1 ( 1939), 203-25; rpt. in his Die Krisis der europăischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phănomenologie. Eine Einleitung in die phănomenologische Philosophie. Ed. Walter Biemel. Husserliana 6 [1954]. 2nd ed. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962, 365-86; "The Origin ofGeometry." In his The Crisis o/European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An lntroduction to Phenomenological Philosophy. Trans. David Carr. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1970, 353-78.

~. "Grund1egende Untersuchungen zum phănomeno1ogischen Ursprung der Răum1ichkeit der Natur." In Philosophical Essays in Mem01y of Edmund Husserl. Ed. Marvin Farber. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1940, 307-25; "Foundationa1 Investigations ofthe Phenomeno1ogica1 Origin of the Spatiality of Nature." Trans. Fred Kcrsten. In Husserl: Shorter Works. Ed. Peter McCormick and Frederick A. Elliston. Notre Dame, IN: University ofNotre Dame Press, 1981, 222-33.

~. "Notizcn zur Raumkonstitution." Ed. A1fred Schutz. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 1 ( 1940), 21-3 7, 217-26.

Stroker, Elisabeth. Philosophische Untersuchungen zum Raum [ 1965]. 2nd. ed. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio K1ostermann, 1977; lnvestigations in Philosophyoj"Space. Trans. A1gis Mickunas. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1987.

~. "Die Perspektive in der bi1denden Kunst. Versuch einer phi1osophischen Deutung." Jahrbuch fiir Asthetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft 4 (1958-59), 140-231.

JOHN J. DRUMMOND

Mount Saint Mary s Ca/lege

SPAIN AND LATIN AMERICA Phenomen-

ology was introduced into Spain by JOSE ORTEGA Y GAS

SET, whose first book, Meditaciones de! Quijote (Medi

tations on Quixote, 1914 ), contains phenomeno1ogical

themes- the condition ofbeing latent or patent, mean

ing as a correlative notion to interpretation, flesh as the

depth dimension ofthings-along with the first formu

lation ofthe thesis that "I am 1 and my circumstances."

In a course given in 1915/16, published as Investiga

ciones psicol6gicas ( 1982), Ortega went on to develop

a pure descriptive science ofnoetic phenomena, draw

ing heavily on EDMUND HUSSERL 's ldeen zu ei ner reinen

Phiinomenologie und phiinomenologischen Philoso

phie 1 (1913). The issue of Ortega's relationship to

phenomenology has long been debated, particularly in

view of his statement that he abandoned phenomen

ology at the very moment in which he received it. But

he also made clear that it is necessary to go through

phenomenology and its method of intuition and de

scription as opposed to abstract conceptual thought in

order to situate philosophy in a dimension of system

atic thought grounded on a phenomenon that by itself

is a system, i.e., the life in each one ofus.

Life is described as the radical reality in which ali

other realities are grounded. It should be understood

as the coexistence and interaction with circumstances

or the world. Neither 1 nor my circumstances can be

conceived of separately because they are rooted in the

ultimate reality that is life. Change, development, and

hence history are distinctive traits of life insofar as it

unfolds as a problem, a being occupied with things, a

preoccupation with oneself, a life project or vocation

based on choice, and a radical insecurity as ifwe were

shipwrecked in the midst ofthings.

This presentation oflife resembles in some respects

MARTIN HEIDEGGER'S characterization of DASEIN. Ortega

acknowledges this connection, yet claims precedence

for himself, arguing that it forms the core of his own

work since his first book. On the other hand, Or

tega's notion oflife exhibits similarities with Husserl 's

"worldexperiencing life" in that it entails the simul

taneity of subject and object in a singular event and

is the presupposition on which alone it makes sense

to assert any other reality whatsoever. In El tema de

nuestro tiempo (The theme of our time, 1923 ), Ortega

states that each life is a point ofview upon the uni verse,

and analyzes the divergence and complementarity of

perspectives between persons, peoples, and epochs. A

reduction ofthe world must be accomplished, i.e., its

transformation into the horizon of a living subject or

the life course that runs through peoples, generations,

and individuals. It must be noted that he speaks of

the "world of our life" as an encompassing unity or

immense circumstance.

Ortega's influence was exerted not only through

teaching and writing, but also as the editor of a jour

nal and a series of books. After 1923 they were

the chief channel through which phenomenology was

made known to the Spanish-language world. The group

that gathered around Ortega included MANUEL GARciA

MORENTE; JOSE GAOS, whose translation of Husserl 's Lo

gische Untersuchungen ( 1900-1901) was decisive for

Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna, Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. ZLlner ( eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.

© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.


the dissemination of phenomenology; and JOAQUiN Xl

RAU, author of Lafilosojia de Husserl ( 1942), the first

comprehensive presentation of Husserl in Spanish.

XAVIER ZUBIRI received his doctorate in philosophy

under Ortega with a dissertation in which Husserl's

theory of judgment is examined in terms of both sub

jective acceptance and objective intention. Having !ater

attended Husserl's and Heidegger's courses, he carne

to emphasize the double function of phenomenology

for his generation in the sense that it made possible the

apprehension of the content of things and laid open a

free domain for philosophy against the constraints of

psychology and science. But he objects that reality is

not the problematic arrival point, but ratherthe point of

departure. Intentionality must be understood not only

as "going toward" but also as "starting from." lts dou

ble movement is grounded on that primordial sentient

intellection of the real as such that characterizes the

human being. Being prior to the subjective and objec

tive pole of intentionality, this intellection breaks up

into them and so establishes them as related terms.

lnftuenced by Ortega and Zubiri, PEDRO LAiN EN

TRALGO has dealt with phenomenological standpoints

on the knowledge of others. Important also for his

efforts to keep phenomenology on the scene is SERGIO

RĂBADE ROMEO. In Experiencia, cuerpo, y conocimiento

(Experience, body, and cognition, 1985), he examines

the relationship holding between the lived BODY and

knowledge and provides a careful historical and sys

tematic account ofthis problem. But the foremost rep

resentative ofphenomenology in this transition period

is FERNANDO MONTERO MOLINER, who argues both for an

expansion in order to include subjects closely related to

those ofHERMENEUTICS and ORDINARY LANGUAGE ANALY

SIS, and for a retum to the historical forerunners who in

the past ha ve contributed to the unveiling of genuine

phenomena. For instance, Husserl's phenomenology

of time should be complemented with an analysis of

objective time inspired by Aristotle.

JAVIER SAN MARTIN has Jaid emphasis On the oppo

sition between a descriptive and a critica! project in

Husserl 's phenomenology. He contends that the task of

explication is incompatible with the initial motivation

that seeks for absolute assurance. Nevertheless, in the

practice of phenomenological analysis there emerges

a different critica! project that belongs to the sphere

of practica! REASON. Another significant philosophi-

cal contribution is to be found in the differentiation

of structure, function, and principle within phenomen

ology.

San Martin has been, since its foundation in 1989, president of the Spanish Society of Phenomenology,

which has organized annual conferences and a seminar

devoted successively to the phenomenology ofOrtega,

the lifeworld, and cultural pluralism. A bulletin has

been issued regularly and will henceforth be expanded

into the joumal lnvestigaciones Fenomenol6gicas.

Prominent members are interested in a variety of top

ics. MIGUEL GARCiA-BAR6 is best known for his studies

of Husserl 's concept oflogical reason and the relation

ship holding between transcendental phenomenology

and rational theology. JEsus CONILL stresses the pheno

menological motives in Ortega and Zubiri and the

metaphysica] significance of HERMENEUTICAL PHENO

MENOLOGY. JOSE GOMEZ HERAS is concemed with the

phenomenological foundations for an ETHICS of NATU

RAL SCIENCE and TECHNOLOGY. CESAR MORENO MARQUEZ

offers in La intersubjetividad en Husserl ( 1989) an

analysis ofhow the intentiona! openness of experience

to a manifold of perspectives requires the implication

of othemess in egological subjectivity. AGUSTiN SER

RANO DE HARO has attempted to show the significance

of the ontologica! framework supplied by the theory

of parts and wholes. NEL RODRIGUEZ RIAL deaJs in 0

planeta ferido (The wounded planet, 1991) with the

contribution of phenomenology to ECOLOGY.

Remaining to be mentioned are ANTONIO PINTOR

RAMOS, author of El humanismo de Max Scheler

(1979) and studies on Zubiri and LEVINAS, and MIGUEL

OLASAGASTI, who, in Introducci6n a Heidegger (1967)

has provided an accurate presentation of this philoso

pher with an appraisal ofthe possibilities ofhis thought.

Ortega has also played an outstanding role in the

introduction of phenomenology into Latin America

because of his visits to Argentina in 1916, 1928,

and 1939. A key figure there was FRANCISCO ROMERO,

who was consulting foreign editor for Philosophy and

Phenomenological Research from its foundation. He

developed a "theory of man" under the inftuence of

Husserl, Sche]er, and NICOLAI HARTMANN. His most im

portant thesis is that a movement oftranscendence runs

through reality and increases as it gradually advances

from inorganic reality through life, pre-intentional psy

chism, and intentiona! psychism to the realm of spirit.

SPAIN ANO LATIN AMERICA 677

Reality as a whole is permeated by the general tendency

of entities to go beyond themselves. This universal im

petus increases its rhythm as we ascend in the scale and

provides the ground out ofwhich intentionality stems.

The re-encounter of reality with itselfthrough an inten

tiona! duplication implies an abrupt and revolutionary

change in the sense that reality not only continues to

be what it is, but is also its reflection in consciousness.

Along with the essential intentionality of the human

being, Romero holds that the basic intentiona! struc

ture is cognitive.

In applying Husserl 's phenomenology to the philos

ophy of law, CARLOS coss1o has propounded an "ego·

logica! theory" structured according to a formal logic

ofLAW consisting in an analysis oflegal norms and sys

tems (logic of parts and wholes) and a transcendental

legal logic or theory of! egal knowledge. Following the

Ii nes laid down by Heidegger, CARLOS AS TRADA empha

sizes in El juego existencial (Experiential play, 1932)

that play is the metaphysical essence ofthe human be

ing and tries to take into account the historical elements

in the constitution ofDasein. Influenced to some extent

by Romero, EUGEN! O PUCCIARELLI advocates a hierarchi

cal theory oftime that takes account ofthe stratification

ofhuman reality in order to harmonize the plurality of

temporalities that occur in different levels. Also con

cerned with Heidegger, ADOLFO P. CARPIOargues in favor

ofthe resolvability ofphilosophical problems once we

transcend beings toward a comprehension of Being. As

this leap cannot be but each one's event, metaphysics

shows a "pluranimous" character.

Another type of Heideggerian interpretation is es

poused by HECTOR MANDRIONI, who has also written on

MAX SCHELER. His point is that in view of the human

situation in the technological world, a disclosure ofthe

ways in which poetic and conceptual discourse emerge

in the articulation of silence and language is essential

to unveil the originary sense of experience. Whereas RI

CARDO MALIANDI has undertaken a revision ofScheler's

and Hartmann's material-value ethics from the stand

point of Karl Otto Apel's transcendental pragmatics,

and MARIO A. PRESAS has written on the hermeneutica!

transformation of phenomenology, ROBERTO WALTON at

tempts to show that the notion of horizonality has en

abled Husserl not only to foreshadow new versions

of phenomenology, but also to point toward cognitive

sources for other forms of transcendental philosophy.

Also influenced by Husserlian phenomenology are JU

LIA IRIBARNE, who, in La intersubjetividad en Husserl

( 1987), provides a characterization of monadology ac

cording to the levels of intersubjectivity, and ALCIRA

BONILLA, who, in Mundo de la vida (Lifeworld, 1985), examines the a priori structure ofthe Iifeworld. The Ar

gentine Society for Phenomenology and Hermeneutics

was founded in 1992. An interest for phenomenology in Mexico goes back

to Antonio Caso-who, although not tobe counted as a

phenomenologist, wrote Lafilosofia de Husserl ( 1934)

and summarized the antagonism between phenomen

ology and positivism- and EDUARDO GARclA MĂ YNEZ,

who, influenced by Hartmann and ALEXANDER PFĂNDER,

attempted to develop a theory of VALUE that would

provide the foundations for positive law. Exiled from

Spain after the Civil War, JOSE GAOS continued his ex

tensive work as translator of Husserl, Heidegger, and

Hartmann in Mexico. A personal student ofGaos, FER

NANDO SALMERON, wrote his doctoral dissertation on

the theory of ideal being and has also written on the

problem of meaning and language in Heidegger. LUIS

VILLORO has published a collection of articles bearing

the title Estudios sobre Husserl (Studies on Husserl,

1975) in which he expounds the main themes along

with the relationship between phenomenology and AN

ALYTIC PHILOSOPHY, i.e., a position to which he as well

as Salmer6n were !ater drawn. Other philosophers in

terested in phenomenology have been EDUARDO NICOL,

who discusses the Heideggerian notion of concealment

and advocates a metaphysics based upon the evidence

that Being is in sight, and MANUEL CABRERA, who has

elaborated a criticism of Husserl from the standpoint

of the sociology of knowledge with considerable debt

to Scheler. Relevant work today includes a project that

will lead to a guide for translating Husserl under the

direction of ANTONIO ZIRION, with the participation of

other Spanish and Latin American translators, and an

examination of problems in the field of phenomen

ological hermeneutics by MAURICIO BEAUCHOT.

In Venezuela two prominent phenomenologists

have to be mentioned. ERNESTO MAYZ VALLENILLA first

surveyed the development of phenomenology from

Husserl to Heidegger in two books dealing with the

phenomenology and ontology ofknowledge. Ata !ater

stage he developed personal insights on reason and

technology inspired in phenomenology. Important is


the examination ofthe instruments that technology af

fords in order to extend our power beyond the frontiers

imposed by bodily and psychologicallimitations. In his

Fundamentos de la meta-tecnica ( 1990), he unfolds the

implications of the replacement of an anthropological

or geocentric conception oftechnology by a new tech

nological project that brings forth a nonhuman logos.

The other leading figure is ALBERTO ROSALES, author

of Transzendenz und Differenz ( 1970). Attempting to

stimulate a critica! discussion of Heidegger 's philoso

phy, he argues that the endeavor to lay bare the foun

dations of consciousness fails because expressions like

"Dasein" or "transcendence" are subject first to a pro

cess offormalization in order to deprive them oftheir

primary spatial connotations, and then to a process of deformalization in order that they may attain an

adequate significant content. It is because the second

operation must evoke the phenomenon of conscious

ness that such expressions do not outline what human

beings are but rather how they are.

In Colombia, DANILO CRUZ VELEZ has dealt with the

ideal of a lack of presuppositions in philosophy by

linking the antagonism between objectivism and sub

jectivism in Husserl with the overcoming ofthe meta

physics of subjectivity in Heidegger. This leads him to an analysis ofthe nature ofphilosophy and its relation

ship with science and theology. He also contends that

the basic problems ofPHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY are to be illuminated in the process of disclosing the ori

gin offreedom. GUILLERMO HOYOS VASQUEZ undertakes

a study ofthe teleology pertaining to intentionality and

HISTORY in his Intentionalitiit als Verantwortung (ln

tentionality as responsibility, 1976) and recently em

phasizes that the contributions of a theory of action and of the social conditions of scientific production must

be combined with Husserl 's criticism of the positivist

idea of science.

Phenomenology gained a foothold in Peru through

the contributions ofthree influential thinkers. ALBERTO

WAGNER DE REYNA had a phenomenological training

under Heidegger and was one of the first to make

him known through a monograph on fundamental on

tology in 1939. FRANCISCO MI RO QUESADA has writ

ten on a wide variety of topics, and an early inter

est in phenomenology is reflected in his Sentido de!

movimiento fenomenol6gico (Meaning of the pheno

menological movement, 1940). Inspired by Hartmann,

AUGUSTO SALAZAR BONDI offers an investigation of ideal

being in Irrealidad e idealidad (Irreality and ideality,

1958). When these thinkers shifted their concern to

other trends of thought, phenomenology tended to be

neglected. Important today is the ro le of the Catholic University of Lima, where a German-Peruvian Collo

quium on Phenomenological Philosophy with the par

ticipation of leading German phenomenologists was

organized in 1993 by ROSEMARY RIZO-PATRON, who has

written on the development of intentionality in early

Husserlian texts. The outstanding representative of phenomenology

in Chile has been FELIX SCHWARTZMANN, who contends

that the phenomenon of expression goes beyond what

is externalized by sensuous signs. When we express ourselves and communicate with others, we not only

bring forth meaning, but also let the peculiarity of our

existential condition be seen. Both EMOTION in its sin

gularity and an undefinable expressive infinitude are

disclosed. This amounts to a symbolization ofthe mys

tery of existence. Also tobe mentioned is RAUL VELOZO

FARiAs, who has examined the meaning of the pheno

menological EPOCHE AND REDUCTION with an empha

sis on its motives. Uruguay is represented by JUAN

LLAMBJAS DE AZEVEDO, who, in his Max Sche/er ( 1966),

has offered a full-scale analytic treatment ofthis pheno

menologist. In Brazii, phenomenology can be found in the phi

losophy of law advanced by MIGUEL REALE, who has

studied how legal models as normative structures are

involved in social praxis, emphasizing that they must

be differentiated from hermeneutica! models that either

contribute to clarifying their significance or demand

their abrogation when they do not meet the general interests dominant in the lifeworld. In addition, GUIDO

ANTONIO DE ALMEIDA, author of Sinn und fnhaft in der genetichen Phiinomenologie E. Husserls (Sense and

content in Husserl's genetic phenomenology, 1972),

shows that Husserl 's GENETIC PIIENOMENOLOGY does not

allow for the unbuilding of complexes of sense or a

given content into ultimate entities. Rather they must

be traced back to the world as an allembracing horizon

of understanding or to a totality of time structures in

the temporal process of sens ing. We have sketched above the main lines of devel

opment country by country because although interna

tional collaboration is improving today, work in the

EDITH STEJN 679

region has been done more separately than in coor

dination. In conclusion, it should be emphasized that phenomenology in the Latin American world can be

characterized by the variations and refinements attempted on the theses advanced by leading European phenomenologists. Despite the widespread acceptance

commanded by Ortega, there has been a profusion of trends rather than a recognizable developing unity.

Whatever the shortcomings in other respects, scholarly research on Husserl and Heidegger has been published in Phaenomenologica (two titles ha ve been men

tioned). Deserving of mention in the first period is the strong interest aroused by Scheler and Hartmann and

the attempts to develop a philosophy of law with a phenomenological outlook. Even if the promotion of

Thomism in Spain (particularly in the 1940s), and of

analytic philosophy after the 1960s, have caused setbacks, phenomenology has shown deep roots which

must be measured by the success with which it has

been able to meet these challenges. Over the past

decade, along with the in crease in Husserlian research,

recent developments such as the analysis oftechnology and PAUL RICCEUR'S HERMENEUTICAL PHENOMENOLOGY are

gaining a hearing, and perhaps the most important future contributions will be made in these areas.

ROBERTO WALTON Universidad de Buenos Aires

EDITH STEIN EDMUND HUSSERL 's first assistant,

Edith Stein, was born into an Orthodox Jewish family

in Breslau on October 12, 1891. She was a member

of the Carmelite order when she was put to death at

Auschwitz in 1942. Unique among phenomenologists,

she was beatified by Pope John Paul II in 1987 at a

ceremony in Koln attended by 70,000 people. On this

occasion he referred to her as "Jew, philosopher, nun,

martyr." Like Edith Stein a student of ROMAN INGARDEN

and MAX SCHELER, the pope, KAROL WOJTYLA, wrote his

first work on St. John of the Cross; Stein left her final

work, also on St. John of the Cross, unfinished at her

martyrdom. This pope commends her for her practice

ofthe phenomenological virtues: "In keeping with her

intellectual abilities, she did not want to accept any

thing without careful examination, not even the faith

ofher fathers. She wanted to get to the bottom ofthings

herself. As such, she was engaged in a constant search for the truth."

Stein began her studies in literature and German at the University of Breslau where she became inter

ested in empirica! psychology, but soon became dissatisfied with this science stil! in its "infancy." An early encounter with Husserl 's Logische Untersuchun

gen ( 1900-1901) led her to study with the master at Gottingen ( 1913-16). Stein then worked as Husserl 's

assistant at Freiburg ( 1917-18), teaching his new stu

dents and editing his manuscripts. She was initially attracted to Husserl's phenomenology because it took

up the task of conceptual clarification so Jacking in the psychology ofher day. In addition, along with the other REALISTIC PIIENOMENOLOGISTS at Gi:ittingen, she saw in

Husserl possibilities of moving beyond the dominant

psychologism ofthe day into essential analyses conditioned by the "intuitive self-givenness" ofthe "matters themselves."

The golden age of Gottingen was over when

Stein arrived in 1913, although figures such as ADOLF

REINACH, FRITZ KAUFMANN, and HANS LIPPS exerted strong inftuences on her. MAX SCHELER 's lectures caused her to entertain the philosophical possibility of Christianity. Adolf Reinach 's character and conversion touched her deeply, as did his widow's courage and acceptance of

his death in World War I. Phenomenology, for Stein, as well as for many others, provided an access to religion. Her actual conversion to Christianity took place

in 1921 while she was staying with her friend HEDWIG

CONRAD-MARTIUS. After a night spent reading St. Teresa

of Avila's autobiography, Stein was convinced that the saint's life of experiential faith was "the truth."

It was, however, patriotism and solidarity with the war effort and her fellow students rather than religios

ity that induced Stein to serve as a nurse to Austrian soldiers for six months in 1914-15. She returned to her studies to complete her dissertation, Zum Problem der

Einfuhlung, at Freîburg in 1916. After completing her

studies, she worked for Husserl on Ideen zu ei ner reinen

Phănomenologie und phănomenologishen Philosophie

II [1912-15] and on his manuscripts on tîme. ROMAN

INGARDEN reports that Husserl, with hîs typîcallack of

concern for publishîng hîs manuscripts, failed to keep

his end ofthe bargain by neglecting to review her transcriptions and editorial changes. Recent scholarship

Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, iose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph 1. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna, Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner ( eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology. © 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.


may suggest that her revisions were significant. Her frustration ultimately caused her to seek other work.

Stein 's strictly phenomenological work from this period includes Beitriige zur philosophis

chen Begrundung der Psychologie und der Geisteswissenschaften (Contributions to the philosophi

cal groundng of psychology and the human sciences, 1922) and Eine Untersuchung uber den Staat (An in

vestigation conceming the state, 1925). Yet her best recognized legacy to phenomenology must be the work with Husserl on empathy, which determined the course of her lifelong preoccupation with the human as psy

chophysical being. Although the topic of empathy was given to her by Husserl, her early interest in the na

ture of the human person was already observable in her initial interest in psychology as a course of study in Breslau. While Husserl 's major emphasis was the epistemological and systematic functions of empathy and INTERSUBJECTIVITY, Stein 's analysis features empathy as

a lived experience, an existential phenomenon. Husserl referred to Stein as his "best pupi!." De

spite HERBERT SPIEGELBERG's verdict that Stein abandons phenomenology for Thomism, many contempo

rary scholars find her entire corpus tobe shaped by her

phenomenological training. She explicitly practices the EPOCHE ANO REDUCTION in her 1916 dissertation with a suspension of the ordinary opinions about empathy, criticizing Lipps's view among others. She argues that empathic imitation of the other is not a confusion of self and other. Lived experiences of separate primordialities ensure that the two members of an empathic pair are still separate selves.

Stein distinguishes between primordial and nonprimordial experience within a single unitary consciousness in order to make an analogy between the EGO or self and the other. Ali experience takes place in

the present moment; even acts ofremembering are primordial. Nevertheless, the 1 can ha ve MEMORY or IMAGINATION about that which is non-primordial. That which is no longer immediately present can be made present memorially (RE-PRESENTATION). The unity ofthe person

constitutes itself in acts that link "the present 1 and the past 1." "As my own person is constituted in primor

dial mental acts, so the foreign person is constituted in empathically experienced acts." The other can be in

tentionally present to the empathizing consciousness, but, like memories, in principle never primordially.

In empathic intuition, the I can experience the other's every action as proceeding from a will mo

tivated by feelings. Simultaneously, 1 am given the range of VALUES that the other can experience, which

leads to expectations about the other's future volitions and actions. A single unitary consciousness can intend another ego stream that it constitutes as other than itself although never possibly present in the fullness of givenness.

Another point to bear in mind concerning Stein 's work on empathy is that for her, as for Husserl and

MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY, recognition of the other is founded on perceptual, i.e., bodily experience. One lives one's own soov from the "inside" and sees one

selfimaginatively from the "outside" as an object-other in a world of others. It is possible to see the other from the "outside" as well. My sensuous intuitions of the other's body and bodily incarnations in words and ges

tures allow a kind of sui generis empathic cognition, based on perception, but not reducible to perceptual intuitions alone. My experience of the other's joy is non-primordial, albeit triggered by his or her primor

dial experience. 1 may experience primordial j oy at my friend's success, i.e., 1 may rejoice with my friend, but

according to the intentions evoked by my own motivations.

Although Stein endorsed Scheler's criticism of THEODOR UPPS's theory of empathy, she was more critica! of Zur Phiinomenologie und Theorie der Sympathiege.fuhle (On the phenomenology and theory of the feeling of sympathy, 1913) than she had been of Scheler's religious views. Her critique of this work caused Scheler, in his preface to the fourth edition, to credit Stein's criticism with leading him to distinguish between feelingin-common and fellow-feeling. This

distinction establishes limits to shared experience so that the ethical principle ofthe inviolability ofpersons can be justified. Scheler spoke highly of Stein many times in his finallectures at Koln on empathy.

As already mentioned, Stein worked on the

manuscript to Ideen II and she and Husserl understood

the constitutive function of empathy as demanding, in its basic structure, an incipient other whose otherness

may be overtaken by empathy. Yet empathic connection must never be mistaken for identification with the

other so that two ego streams fuse into an ontologically higher unity. Empathy can take the other's conscious-

EDITH STEIN 681

ness into its own only as a separate ego stream. After After her initial inability to habilitate at the univer-ali, ifthe other is but an extension ofmyself, neither is empathy required nor can a coherent account be made of its everyday experience.

Constitutively, empathy functions to reveal not only the in ner life of the other, but also the self as other to its others. Thus empathy provides a means to selfknowledge vis-a-vis real differences between the self and the other, and such real differences circumscribe the arena of human freedom. The basic structure of empathic intentionality is such that the correlate ofany act may be strictly objective, focusing on an "externa!" constitution, such as when I perceive the room as warm. On the other hand, when I take myself, the subject, as an object, I constitute myself as, e.g., uncomfortable. Likewise, for a subject who empathizes with another, this other may become an individual with a character and a personality: one who feels injustices, enjoys children and riddles, loves truth, and so forth; the other can be constituted as a substrate of his or her acts through a focus of regard in which I intend to constitute the other as, like myself, a self constituted in its own motivations, habitualities, and sedimentations. My self-experience is a prerequisite for empathetically knowing the other; the degree to which I ha ve engaged in self-constitution determines the refinement of my potential understanding of the other. In her autobiography Aus dem Leben einer jiidischen Familie (Life in a jewish family, 1965) Stein reftects on her early work on empathy, which led her "to something which was personally el o se to my heart and which continually occupied me anew in ali !ater work: the constitution of the human person."

Although she was one of the earliest women students in German universities, she was denied a university post because of her gender despite her summa cum laude dissertation directed by Husserl. She subsequently campaigned for and won a landmark ruling that women could not be denied habilitation on the basis of gender. She was given an opportunity to work as Dozent at the German Institute for Scientific Ped

agogy in Mi.inster in 1932, but her appointment was not renewed the following year because of the rise of National Socialism. Her lifelong insistence on the equality of ali people and her refusal to acknowledge distinctions of caste or class stand in sharp contrast to her own experiences.

sity level, she worked as a secondary school teacher at a convent school for girls in Speyer from 1922 to 1932. Although she felt a religious calling at the time ofher baptism, her spiritual advisor believed that she had work to do in the world. Her teaching situation caused her to think about women 's education as well as larger feminist concerns. Her strong sense of social responsibility led her to an active participation in the struggle for women's suffrage as well as feminist theorizing in lectures and writings. She became the most important feminist in Germany, speaking to the Catholic intelligentsia in German-speaking Europe between the wars. By 1932 Edith Stein was recognized as the intellectual leader of Catholic FEMINISM in Europe.

Stein 's tripartite analysis ofwoman follows the general structure she employs in her theory ofthe constitution ofthe person. The person is an individual essence. Persons may be grouped according to types, but each human being embodies the human essence in her own particular being. Also, the individual human essence is developed in freely chosen acts. No vocations can be closed to women since women and men may share the same talents.

Her conviction that woman 's vocation included citizenship inspired her to some guarded but unmistakable criticism for the condition of her country and Europe. In her semipopular speeches and writings for women educators and women students, collected as Die Frau (Woman, 1959), she encouraged ali women to follow their feminine nature and reject the depreciation ofthe value ofthe person.

Edith Stein became a Carmelite only when it was no longer possible for her to publish or to work after Adolf Hilter became Reichskanzler on January 30, 1933. After Erich Przwara, S.J. suggested that she write her autobiography, her early work on empathy began to suggest to her that writing about ordinary Jewish life might motivate fellow-feeling for the Jews among the Germans. It was this project that spawned Aus dem

Leben einer jiidischen Familie, which she left unfinished in favor of her philosophical study, Endliches und ewiges Sein (Finite and eterna! being, 1950), as well as her work on St. John ofthe Cross.

Edith Stein was forty-two years old when she became Sister Teresa Benedicta a Cruce, O.C.D. in 1934. Despite the widely held view that Stein's !ater theolog-


ical work repudiates her earlier studies with Husserl,

themes pertaining to REALISTIC PHENOMENOLOGY and

even to EXISTENTIAL PHENOMENOLOGY strongly influ

ence her version ofSt. Thomas Aquinas's philosophy. Her early translation of Aquinas's Disputed Questions

on Truth into German proved to be quite controversial. Her contribution to the Festschrift in honor of

Husserl's seventieth birthday attempted a reconciliation of Thomism and realistic phenomenology. In

Endliches und ewiges Sein, completed in 1937, she defines finite being as "that which does not possess

its being, but needs time in which to reach being," whereas infinite being "cannot end, because it is not

given its being, but is in possession ofbeing, the master ofbeing, even being itself." Thomistic teaching on

act and potency may provide the starting point for this work, but its main concern is the search for the meaning of being in a synthesis of medieval thought and

phenomenology. The experience ofbeing supported by the supernat

uralleads Stein to take issue with MARTIN HEIDEGGER 's

emphasis on Angst (she refers to his work as the philosophy of a bad conscience). Examining her own lived experience, she finds that anxiety is not the typical

human experience; the normally dominant feeling is security, "as if our being was a certain possession." This sense of feeling oneself supported by being cannot be accounted for by the uncertainties of life or the

indubitability of death, but rather suggests a Being beyond beings that grounds beings: "in my being I meet another, which is not mine, but is support and ground

ofmy unsupported and groundless being." In the same work, her analysis ofthe authentic life

of the soul relies on phenomenological description of its "layers." This interest in the human person and its

proper fulfillment which had initially shown itself in her earliest studies ofliterature and psychology, moved her to seek in Husserl 's phenomenology a science capa

ble of grounding its system in conceptual clarity. Nevertheless, her attraction to phenomenology began with

and continued tobe her appreciation ofthe objectivity

latent in it, which was for heras for other Gottingen

phenomenologists- their escape from Kantian sub

jectivism and the German idealistic tradition. Despite their real and/or perceived philosophical differences,

Husserl and Stein remained in contact over the years. He telegraphed his best wishes to her on the day of

her investiture at the Koln Carmel. On hearing an ac

count of her clothing ceremony (the Carmelite novice takes the habit of the order and can no Ion ger be seen

except behind a grille), Husserl said, "Ido not believe

that the Church has any neo-Scholastic ofEdith Stein 's

quality." He regretted not having travelled to KOln and

remarked to Sister Adelgunis, O.S.B., also one of his pupils, "I should have been the bride's father." "Every

thing in her is utterly genuine, otherwise I should say

that this step was romanticism. But - down in Jews there is radicalism and love faithful unto martyrdom."

Her superiors determined that she should continue her writing and assigned her various projects, includ

ing her last major work, the Kreuzeswissenschaft (The science ofthe cross, 1960), which shows how her think

ing was molded by her training in phenomenology. One

learns the "science" ofthe Cross through personal ex

perience of "the Cross," i.e., by accepting human suf

fering and baptizing it with divine meaning. In some

of her instructive works from the final period of her life, she describes the aim ofthe religious life as self

forgetfulness in favor ofwhat might be seen as a kind

of empathy with God Himself, taking on the "love of

the divine heart" that "mourns with those who mourn,

rejoices with the joyful, and puts itself at the service of

every creature so that each creature becomes what the

Father wishes it to be ... " Here also is an expression ofwomanly fulfillment in materna! nurturing.

The experience ofGod's presence in the innermost

being of the soul is the essence of the mystical expe

rience of"meeting God as one person meets another."

Stein could not complete the third part of the work

commissioned to honorthe four hundredth anniversary

of St. John of the Cross. She had fled the Carmelite convent in Koln-Lindenthal in 1938 into exile in a

Carmelite community in Echt, The Nethcrlands. Her

sanctuary in the Carmel at Echt was violated as part of a reprisal for the Catholic bishops' pastoralletter con

demning the Nazi deportation ofthe Jews. Ali Catholic

Jews were rounded up and sent east to Poland. On Au

gust 9, 1942, one week about being removed from the

Carmel, she died in the gas chambers at Auschwitz.

Eye witness reports te li of Sister Benedicta 's own tran

quility at this time and her concern for the bereaved

women and their children. John Nota, S.J., who at

tempted to get her manuscript Endliches und ewiges

Sein published in The Netherlands after a typeset ver-

STRUCTURALISM 683

sion could not be printed in Germany in 1936 due

to an anti-Semitic publishing ban, reported that "the

fascinating thing about Edith Stein was that truth did

not exist as an abstraction for her, but as something

incamated in persons ... "For Edith Stein, philosophy

and life were one. Like the earlier Carmelite mystic, St.

John ofthe Cross, Edith Stein exemplifies herwritings.

FOR FURŢHER STUDY

Baseheart, Mary Catherine, and Linda Lopez McAlister, with Waltraut Stein. "Edith Stein." In A Hist01y of Women Philosophers. Ed. Mary Ellen Waithe. Voi. 4. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995, 157-87.

Fetz, Reto, Mathias Rath, and Peter Schulz, eds. Studies zur Philosophie von Edith Stein Symposion (1991 Eichstatt, Germany) Frieburg: Alber, 1993.

Graef, Hilda C. The Scholar and the Cross. Westminster, MD: The Newman Press, 1955.

Herbstrith, Waltraud. Edith Stein. Trans. Bernard Bonowitz. San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1985.

O ben, Freda Mary. Edith Stein: Se hol ar, Feminist, Saint. New York: Alba House, 1988.

Poselt, Teresa Renala. Edith Stein. Trans. C. Hastings and D. Nicholl. New York: Sheed & Ward, 1952.

Secretan, Philibert. "Edith Stein On Thc 'Order and Chain of Being."' Analecta Husserliana 11. Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1981,113--23.

Stein, Edith. Zum Problem der Einfiihlung. Dio., Halle, 1917; On the Problem ofEmpathy. Trans. Waltraut Stein. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964.

-. "Beitrage zur philosophischen Begrundung der Psychologie und der Geisteswissenschaften." Jahrhuch fiir Philosophie und phănomenologische Forschung 5 ( 1922), 1-284; rpt. Tiibingen: Max Niemeyer, 1970.

-. "Eine Untersuchung iiber den Staat." Jahrhuch fiir Philosophie und phănomenologische Forschung 7 ( 1925), 1-124.

-. "Husserls Phănomenologie und die Philosophie des Thomas von Aquino. Versuch einer Gegeniiberstellung." Festschrift Edmund Husserl (zum Gehurtstag gewidmet), Supplement-hand, Jahrbuch fiir Philosophie und phănomenologische Forschung. Halle: Max Niemeyer,l929, 315-38; rpt. In Husserl. Ed. H. Noack. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1973, 61-86.

-. Kreuzeswissenschafi. The Science of the Cross. Trans. Hilda Graef. Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1960.

--. Endliches und ewiges Sein. Edith Steins Werke 2. Ed. L. Gelber and Romaeus Leuven. Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1950.

--. Die Frau. Aufgabe nach Natur und Gnade. On Woman. Trans. Freda Mary Oben. Washington, DC: ICS Publications, 1987.

-. Aus dem Lehen ei ner jiidischen Familie. Life in a Jewish Family. Trans. Joesphine Koeppel. Washington, DC: ICS Publications, 1986.

-. Edith Steins Werke. Ed. L. Gelber and Romaeus Leuven. Freiburg: 1950 ff.

Writings of Edith Stein. Ed. and trans. Hilda Graef.Westminster, MD: Newman Press, 1986.

Stein, Waltraut. "Edith Stein, Twenty-Five Years Later." Spiritual Life 13 (1967), 244--51.

Sullivan, John, ed. Edith Stein Symposium. Washington, DC: ICS Publications, 1987.

Stein 's Nachlass is held in the Archivum Carmelitanum Edith Stein, Leuven.

KATHLEEN HANEY University of Houston

STRUCTURALISM Like phenomenology,

structuralism is more a method of analysis than a

subject matter. Because of its origins in the HUMAN

scJENCES, structuralism is usually considered a sci

entific method that studies systems, relations, and

forms, i.e., structures, or, in the more current des

ignation, cades. Systems are phenomena that inter

relate with one another according to a discover

able logic usually expressed as a key relation and

its transformations through deduction, induction, ab

duction, adduction, etc. As a "here and now" phe

nomenon, a system is usually contrasted with HIS

TORY as "there and then." Familiar systemic re

lations are similarity/difference (metaphor), oppo

sition/apposition (simile; irony), part/whole (synec

doche), substance/attribute (metonymy), self/other/

world, cause/effect, space/time, quatitative/quantita

tive, and form/content. Note that most relations are

binary or trinary as a result of the system logic be

ing used. In this structural context, eidetic phenomena

are referred to as mentifacts or contents, while empiri

ca! phenomena are specified as artifacts or forms. The

structural method is closely associated with coMMUNI

COLOGY, LANGUAGE, and sign systems, alt of which are

viewed as systemcodes and are grouped together under

the general name of semiotics ( or semiology) in current

usage. While semiotics now has an international scope,

structuralism as a doctrine is popularly known because

its French origins in the 1960s. As Vincent Descombes

suggested in 1980, there are basically three histori

cal and philosophical progressions of "structuralism":

structural analysis, structuralism per se, and semiotics.



Given current developments, two more categories need to be added: poststructuralism and phenomenological structuralism. These types of "structuralism" are distinguished by their ontologica! (systemic) and epistemological (relational) orientations toward cultural phenomena in consciousness (contents or mentifacts) and in experience (forms or artifacts).

( 1) Structural analysis refers to the various schools of anthropology and especially linguistics that rejected a diachronic (historical) approach to analyzing speech (parole) as a series of events, in fa vor of a synchronic approach to language (langue) as a present moment in a system. The diachronic relation is temporal and signifies a linear progression of change over time that is historical, whereas the synchronic relation is an atemporal relation that signifies a reflexive moment existing at the present time. In short, the diachronic expresses a "then" relation, while the synchronic expresses a "now" relation. The parallel spatial system expresses a syntagmatic relation of "there," whereas a paradigmatic relation expresses a position of"here."

Having made these distinctions, we must take account of a disciplinary anomaly in linguistics, i.e., the diachronic approach is called American structuralism (the Bloomfieldian school) and the synchronic approach is known as European structuralism (the Moscow, Prague, and Copenhagen Cireles). The American tradition is grounded in the work of Franz Boas ( 1858-1942), especially as discussed in his major work Race, Language, and Cu/ture (1940). In addition, it was Boas who founded The International Journal of American Linguistics, which brought together the parallel work of Edward Sapir ( 1884--1939) and Leonard Bloomfield ( 1887-1939). Contemporary work in this context is best illustrated by Noam Chomsky's many publications on the place of syntax in language-use.

The European tradition follows the work of Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913), who is commonly held to be the undisputed founder of modern linguistics. The principal formulation in Cours de linguistique generale ( 1916), for which Saussure is most famous, is his system definition ofthe sign (S) as a synchronic relation composed of two elements: (a) the signifier

(Sr) or signţfYing eidetic element that we understand as the linguistic concept ( content ), and (b) the signi

fied (Sd) or empirica! element that we comprehend as the linguistic sound-image (form). Saussure offered the

following formula:

Sr S = Sd.

Further, he argued that the systemic operation of signs was both (a) arbitrary and (b) conventional in the social use oflanguage (langue). Thus the study ofspeaking (parole) was condemned as diachronic and of secondary importance.

Among the important contributors to the Saussurian model are the members of the Moscow linguistic cirele (1915-21), ineluding ROMAN JAKOBSON, WhO wrote no major book, but left an extensive research corpus. The cirele also ineluded Husserl 's student, GUSTA V SPET.

This Moscow group set the interdisciplinary tone for the birth of structuralism by combining the study of linguistics with that of poetics, metrics, and folklore, along with logic and philosophy.

Also important to the Saussurian tradition was the Prague Linguistic Circle founded in 1926 by Jan Mukarosky (1891-1975) and others, ineluding the notable French members Emile Benveniste (1902-1976) and Andre Martinet, and again Roman Jakobson, a Russian emigre. Finally, the Copenhagen Linguistic Cirele marked its beginning with the publication of the first issue of Acta Linguistica in 1939. It contained a manifesta by Viggo Brondal (1887-1942) entitled "Structural Linguistics." It is important to note that Brondal's artiele advocated a phenomenological correction to the dominant formalist theory of the cirele !ater articulated in Omkring sprogteoriens grundloeggelse (Prolegomena to a theory oflanguage, 1943) by Louis Hjelmslev (1899-1965) as glossematics, i.e., a formal homology between expression and content in Ianguage. Hjelmslev's theory may be formalized as an extension ofthe Saussure model:

S = Sr/Sd/ /Sr/Sd

with these definitions:

Sign =

Expression-Substance

Expression-Form

Content-Form Content-Substance

In this formulation, the signifier is renamed expres-

STRUCTURALISM 685

sion and divides itself semiotically into an eidetic Sr

form and Sd substance. The signified is now called

the content and semiotically divides into an empirica!

Sr .form and Sd substance. Hjelmslev's key relation

is the notion of dependence/independence that occurs

between phenomena. It is in this context that Brondal

suggested, against Hjelmslev's deductive formalism,

that "Husserl's penetrating meditations on phenomen

ology will in this case be a source of inspiration for

every logician of language."

It must be noted that as Brondal suspected, Hjelm

slev's Prolegomena was a failure as a deductive sys

tem for language, but viewed as an abduction, it has

provided the standard vocabulary and model used in

communicology to describe the operation of animal,

human, and machine communication systems. In this

respect, Hjelmslev's greatest inftuence has been on the

semiotic theories of Algirdas J. Greimas ( 1917-1991)

and the Paris school of semiotics and, in part, on the

theory of Umberto Eco; both theorists ha ve had an es

pecially notable international impact on the study of

aesthetic texts in the mass media.

(2) Structuralism per se refers to the theory of signs

as a specification of structural analysis in the human

sciences where there is an emphasis on the description

ofwhole systems. The goal is a new theory ofmeaning

based on significations generated by various system

codes including language and discourse, kinship, and

economic exchange. A major intellectual confrontation

developed inasmuch as structuralism in the tradition of

Saussure opposed the tradition of Husserl as it was

taken up and transformed in French phenomenology.

In particular, structuralism offered itself as a major al

ternative on the French scene to the post-World War

II popularity ofEXISTENTIALISM, especially that of JEAN

PAUL SARTRE. The failure of existentialism as social and

POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY encouraged the scientific expli

cations of structural analysis. The ensuing intellectual

debate was a straightforward opposition between the

"new" structuralist concept of difference embodied in

language as a system defining society - a text-code

(i.e., grammatology) perspective-and the "old" EXIS

TENTIAL PHENOMENOLOGICAL concept of identity embod

ied in speaking as a system defining the person - an

embodied discourse perspective. The period of struc

turalism 's popularity roughly began with the publica

tion of Andre Martinet's La linguistique synchronique

in 1949 and climaxed with the appearance of Claude

Levi-Strauss's Anthropologie structurale (1958) and

La pensee sauvage (The savage mind, 1962), the 1at

ter dedicated to MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY. Rather than

a mere gesture, the dedication and the preface to La

pensee sauvage remind us ofthe influential phenomen

ological critique and revision ofSaussure that Merleau

Ponty offers in his essays of this period, published as

Signes ( 1960).

(3) Semiotics or semiology refers to the theory of

signs as a linguistic specification of structural analysis

in philosophy and the human sciences where there is

an emphasis on relations. In this modified version of

structuralism, the revised goal is a theory of meaning

based on signification generated in the first instance by

discourse. While Saussure had argued that semiotics

was the whole and linguistics o ne of the parts, semi

oticians contended that linguistics was the origin and

semiotics was the derived science. French semiotics

carne into focus with the publication of Elements de

semiologie in 1964 by Roland Barthes (1915-1980)

and &mantique structurale: Recherche de methode

in 1966 by Greimas. Barthes essentially adapted the

Hjelmslevian model of structural analysis to literary

and cultural criticism by discounting problems ofform

in fa vor of relations and systems. He at once moved

away from the inftuence of empirica! science and to

ward philosophical issues of concern by making semi

ology a "creative activity" in literary science. His stud

ies of mythology, rhetoric, and ideology ha ve been a

major force in the popularity of structuralism both in

side and outside the academic world. The toute Paris

popularity of structuralism thus carne to displace that

of existentialism in public discourse.

As a counterbalance to the Barthes model, Grei mas

constructed a model that he called the semiotic square.

The model articulated in his book Semiotique ( 1979)

uses relations of contradiction, contrariety, and com

plementarity to specify a generational category of

meaning at one ofthree levels of semantic signification.

In more familiar usage, Barthes names these levels con

notation, denotation, and the real, while Jacques Lacan

in the psychoanalytical context refers to them as the

symbolic, the imaginary, and the real. Greimas argues

that at a third (reality) level of semantic generation,

a combinatory "both/and" relation between contrary

terms creates MEANING, and, coincidentally, confirms


the work of Brăndal in bridging the logic of pheno

menology with that of structuralism.

The most extensive expression of the connection

between phenomenology and structuralism is Roman

Jakobson 's theory of communication and his model

of the human sciences, which incorporates much of

Husserl 's phenomenology in the explication of lin

guistics as a complex eidetic and empirica! science.

For the moment, suffice it to say that Jakobson also

advocates a hierarchical model of the human sciences

grounded in 1 inguistics- remembering that for Jakob

son, spoken language is an inherently existential and

embodied human capacity. The graphic model begins

with linguistics as the study of verbal messages at the

center with a second circle containing semiotics as a

contextual extension for the study of any messages.

A third circle contains the anthropological science of

communication, which is the domain of implied mes

sages in social anthropology and economics. A fourth

circle specifying the message systems of living or

ganisms as the biologica! science of communication

completes the model. Jakobson's model became quite

popular in France, then in the United Kingdom and

the United States, with the explication of his theory

in the "Que sais-je?" book series publication of La

semiologie ( 1971) by Pierre Guiraud. This book cov

ers the full range of semiotic concems from language

and sign systems to logica! and aesthetic codes as well

as the mass media and social practices.

There is also an American school of semiotics based

on the work ofthe philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce

(1839-1914), but Peirce's work is neither related to

American structural linguistics nor to the European

tradition of structuralism. Nonetheless, Peirce has had

a major impact on contemporary semiotics, especially

the work ofUmberto Eco. A major connection between

semiotics and phenomenology exists in Peirce's work

and has been studied in recent years by Karl-Otto Apel.

(4) Poststructuralism also refers to the theory of

signs as a discursive specification of structural analy

sis in philosophy and the human sciences where there

is an emphasis on contents andforms. As such, post

structuralism is largely a critique of classical pheno

menology and semiology. A fundamental distinction is

made between discourse (parole; langue), which is the

verbal utterance or stating (MI CHEL FOUCAULT's enonce)

of a message-as-code, and language (langage), which

is the empirica! manifestation of a code-as-message

or enonciation. In both cases, note that the simplis

tic hypostatization of a message or code gives way to

the realistic notion that both messages and codes are

interconnected (Jakobson 's poetic function) and mutu

ally motivated (Martinet's double articulation) as one

phenomenon. In short, the phenomena of discourse are

simultaneously eidetic in content (i.e., codes), while

those of language are empirica!, hen ce a form of mes

sage. While this distinction may at first seem illogical,

recall the Hjelmselvian model where we can view dis

course as an Sr relation of expression containing its

own substance and form. In turn, language is an Sd

relation of content available to perception as another

substance and form. Thus the combination of discourse

and language is the actual phenomenon (a) ofwhich we

are noetically conscious and (b) that we noematically

experience in the "here and now" moment of human

communication. In the medieval sense of the trivium, we might il

lustrate the distinction by saying that for discourse, ex

pression (message-code) is a combination of rhetoric

or stating as the substance and the statement or speak

ing as the actual form, just as grammar is expressed in

the text or writing, and logic is expressed in the propo

sition or thinking. While rhetoric, grammar, and logic

have basically the same eidetic substance (persuasion,

information, reflection, etc., as expression), they are

different empirica! forms of expression.

In turn, for perception in language ( code-message ),

content is a combination of listening as the form and

rhetoric as the substance, i.e., narratology. In parallel

fashion, READING offers a sense of grammar as gram

matology, while judging constructs a logic or semiotic.

The method of structural analysis for this poststruc

turalist approach to research is called deconstruction.

While largely an applied method in literary criticism,

especially in the United States, deconstruction as a

theory in the human sciences oras a philosophical po

sition is usually associated with the French theorists

in a number of CULTURAL DISCIPLINES. Among others,

these include Louis Althusser (Marxism), Michel Fou

cault (systems ofthought; history), Gilles Deleuze and

Jacques Lacan (psychoanalysis), and JACQUES DERRIDA

(philosophy). Recalling the Saussurian definition of

the sign as the combination ofboth a signifier (expres

sion) and a signified (perception), deconstructionists

STRUCTURALISM 687

focus their analysis exclusively on the signifier as a

content or form, while dismissing the relevance ofthe

signified as a socially determined referent in a sign

system. Hence the emphasis is upon discourse to the

exclusion of language. The synchronic ("now") and

paradigmatic ("here") interplay of contents and forms

as a vehicle of expression is pushed to its outer limits

so that the politically and socially dominant language

(langage) is critiqued and ruptured by the discourse in

the emergent text or practice. Simply put, the opposi

tion between a message-as-code (parole) and a code

as-message (langue) is transformed into an apposition.

That is to say, an opposition counterpoises one thing

against another as different ( e.g., a binary relation of

expression versus perception), which is the diacritical

function of language as information, i.e., an either/or

choice in a pregiven context. But an apposition coun

terpoises two parallel, but similar, phenomena ( e.g.,

both expression and perception) to a third referent

phenomenon ( e.g., a triadic relation of embodiment

as perception and expression), which is the combina

tory function of discourse as communication, i.e., a

both/and choice of a new context.

Unlike other approaches to discourse analysis, de

construction aims to articulate a space for this apposi

tion in such a way that any existential or social refer

ence point is lost to the auditor ofthe text or practice. In

this sense, deconstruction utilizes the rhetorical, gram

matological, or tropic logic of relations to confront

systems with their own constituent contents and forms.

However, the poststructuralist dislocation and decen

tering of the speaking subject, the writing author, and

the thinking philosopher as a result ofthe deconstruc

tionist method has in itself provoked a structuralist

response by phenomenologists.

(5) Phenomenological structuralism refers in the

first instance to Roman Jakobson 's phenomenological

revisions of structuralist linguistics and semiotics in

the European tradition. The same theoretical point has

been made by the linguist-psychoanalystJulia Kristeva

and the semiotician Umberto Eco. Jakobson's theory

of discourse and language is based upon two basic

concepts about the eidetic and empirica! features of

human communication as a semiotic practice.

First, the concept of distinctive features is a phono

logical description of how sounds combine paradig

matically (vertical substitution) with one another tobe

recognizable in communication. There are the inher

ent sound features of sonority, protensity, and tonality,

together with the prosodic features of force, quantity,

and tone. Distinctive features in a generalized sense

function to manifest certain paradigmatic relations of

conjunction such that when we compare or contrast two

phenomena, we do so with a both/and analogue logic of

inclusi an. As Jakobson suggests, a metaphoric relation

is created in which selection, substitution, and simi

larity determine a meaningful unit that is synchronic

(existential). Simply put, distinctive features combine

two phenomena so as to display the positive opposition

(distinction) that each phenomenon possesses when

placed in conjunction. Similarity (both/and relation)

in expression causes a difference (either/or relation)

in perception. Our ability to change any noun for any

other noun in a sentence and understand the difference

between the two forms of the sentences based on the

similarity of their content illustrates this relationship.

The process also occurs when a speaker's meaning

and a listener's understanding are linked by the same

cognitive proposition. Second, the concept of redundancy features is a

phonological description of how sounds join syntag

matically (horizontal combination) with one another

to become recognizable in communication. In this

case, an either/or digital logic of exclusion creates a

metonymic relation of combination, contexture, and

contiguity that is diachronic (historical). In short, re

dundancy features combine two phenomena so as to

display the apposition (redundancy) that each phe

nomenon possesses with reference to a third phe

nomenon. Difference (either/or relation) in expression

causes similarity (both/and relation) in perception. For

example, our ability to change any statement into a

question and understand the difference between the

two forms of the sentences based on the similarity of

their content illustrates this relationship. The process

also occurs when a speaker's meaning and a listener's

understanding are linked by the difference between the

utterance as spoken and as heard, or as intended versus

spoken (e.g., Freud's "slip ofthe tongue").

Last, it is important to note the poeticfunction built

into ali messages, namely that the paradigmatic and

syntagmatic features are reversible. That is to say,

a cade or metalinguistic function operates such that

distinctive and redundancy features are the context


of choice for each other. In this sense, system-codes are always motivated and constitutive. Or put another way that is important both to a poststructuralist and phenomenological structuralist perspective, a choiceof-context apposition as a transformation always motivates ( occurs first) a context-of-choice opposition as a constitution or formation ( occurs second). One of the best examples of this type of analysis that applies and extends Jakobson 's phenomenological structuralism in a contemporary context is the theory of autocommunication suggested by Yuri M. Lotman. This theory 1 inks the existential perception of the person to the universal expression of cultural values in the practice ofhuman communication. Chaim Perelman and L. Olbechts-Tyteca offer a parallel model of rhetoric as the universal practice of discourse.

Phenomenological structuralism in a more general sense refers to various modifications of Husserlian phenomenology, most notably by MAURICE MERLEAUPONTY and MI CHEL FOUCAULT, as existential and semiotic phenomenology. The theory suggested by MerleauPonty in his essays on speech and language parallels that of Roman Jakobson, namely that signs are (a) motivated rather than arbitrary and (b) constitutive rather than conventional or regulati ve. These signs in their multiplicity are the embodiment of human expression and perception that Merleau-Ponty designates and illustrates with the conscious experience of human speaking and gesture in his major work, Phenomenologie de la perception (1945). A similar approach is the focused study of communication in GEORGES GUSDORF's La parole (Speaking, 1953) and more recently in FRANCIS JACQUEs' Difference et subjectivite: Anthropologie d 'un point de vue relationnel (1982).

Following his teacher Merleau-Ponty, the theme of semiotic phenomenology also emerges in Michel Foucault's famous quadrilateral model of le meme et l 'autre

that translates as both self/other and same/different. Foucault's corpus should be viewed as (a) a phenomenological examination of subject matter contextualized by (b) a structural view of that subject matter that progresses from (i) contents and forms to (ii) relations and on to (c) system-codes. Foucault views discourse as a contest (agon) between subject and abject, and between power and desire in language and other social practices. The conscious experience of stating or

speaking ( enonce) discourse is the contest between the subject/object phenomenon and yet the practice of articulating or uttering (enonciation) language is the contest between the power/desire phenomenon. Such discourse/language is the problematic that is studied by the method of archaeology, a concept borrowed from Merleau-Ponty. As a first level of analysis (i.e., contents and forms in a system-code ), archaeology compares and contrasts the subject/object expression over against the power/desire perception. The method is discussed most notably in Foucault's Les mots et les

choses (Words and things, 1966 [translated as The Order of Things]) and his L 'archeologie du savior (The archaeology ofknowledge, 1969).

Foucault further developed his method of analysis by suggesting a second level of investigation (i.e., relations in a system-code) that he called the method of genealogy, a concept taken from Nietzsche. In this context, the subject/power relation is explored as the concept ofunderstanding or "know-how" (savoir), and then the objectldesire relation is examined as the notion ofknowledge or "knowing about" ( connaissance ). While this genealogical method is most apparent in Foucault's many studies of institutional practice in such areas as medical diagnosis, the penal system, and social deviance, the theoretical discussion ofthe method is best articulated in his three volume L 'historie de la sexualite (1976--84).

As a third methodological level of analysis (i.e., the system in the system-code), Foucault suggests in L 'ordre du discourse ( 1971) that the methods of archaeology (diachronic and syntagmatic) and genealogy (synchronic and paradigmatic) are reversible as a context for one another, thus establishing a method of criticism. Hence Foucault adopts the poetic function principle suggested by Roman Jakobson.

As a clarification ofthe many crossovers and counterinfluences that characterize structuralism, semiotics, and phenomenology, the following summary may be helpful. In the discussion, keep in mind that a com

munication medium is discourse or practice, while a communication channel is a language or performance in the conscious experience ofpeople.

First, structuralism is the general view that the process of communication is a practice (system) in which a human group (society) is the medium of communication for any given channel, such as language, kinship,

STRUCTURALISM 689

commerce, etc. Individual performance is a represen

tation of practice (relation), while group performance

is a relationship that is signification per se ( contents

and forms). Second, semiotics maintains the view that the pro

cess of communication is a performance in which an individual person is the medium of communica

tion (system), e.g., speaker/listener, writer/reader, sub

ject/object, etc., for culture as the channel of commu

nication (relation), as suggested by Kristeva. Here the

group practice is a representation of individual per

formance (content) and practice is a relationship that

signifies (form). Third, phenomenology is the perspective that the

process of communication, as meaning, is a presentation of performance in which the person (system)

is the embodied channel of communication (relation) for given practices (content) ofrepresentation such as

speaking, interacting, sharing, etc., that are the media

of communication (forms). For the phenomenologist,

performance is the practice of human being, i.e., the

performance comprises the embodied practice of existential meaning, e.g., Merleau-Ponty's explication of

gesture.

FOR FURTHER STUDY

Barthes, Roland. Elements de semiologie. Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1964; Elements ()[Semiology. Trans. Annette Lavers and Colin Smith. New York: Hill & Wang, 1968.

Benveniste, Emite. "Communication." In his Problemes de linguistique generale. Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1966; "Communication." In his Problems in General Linguistics. Trans. Mary E. Meek. Coral Gables, FL: University ofMiami Press, 1971,41-75.

Descombes, Vincent. Le meme et l'autre. Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1979; Modern French Philosophy. Trans. L. ScottFox and J. M. Harding. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980.

Eco, Umberto. A Theory of Semiotics. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1976.

Greimas, Algirdas Julien. The Social Sciences: A Semiotic Vzew. Trans. Paul J. Perron and Frank H. Collins. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990, [selections from his Du Sens I ( 1970), Du Sens II ( 1983), and Semiotique et sciences sociales ( 1976), Paris: Editions du Seuil].

-, and Joseph Courtes. Semiotique. Paris: Librairie Hachette, 1979; Semiotics and Language: An Analytical Dictionary. Trans. Larry Crist and Daniel Patte, with James Lee, Edward McMahon Il, Gary Phillips, and Michael Rengstorf. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1982.

Guiraud, Pierre. La semiologie. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1971; Semiology. Trans. George Gross. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975.

Holenstein, Elmar. Jakobson ou le structuralisme phenomenologique. Paris: Editions Seghers, 1974; Roman Jakobson :S Approach to Language: Phenomenological Structuralism. Trans. Catherine and Tarcisius Schelbert. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1976.

-. "The Structure of Understanding: Structuralism Versus Hermeneutics." PTL: A Journal of Descriptive Poetics and Theory of Literature 1 (1976), 223-38.

Jakobson, Roman. Selected Writings, Voi. II: Word and Language. The Hague: Mouton, 1971.

Kristeva, Julia. The System and the Speaking Subject. Semiotic Theory: I. Lisse: Peter De Ridder Press, 1975.

-. Le langage, cet inconnu. Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1981; Language, the Unknown: An Initiation into Linguistics. Trans. Anne M. Menke. New York: Columbia University Press, 1989.

Lanigan, Richard L. Speaking and Semiology: Maurice Merleau-Ponty s Phenomenological Theory of Existential Communication [ 1972]. 2nd ed. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 1991.

-. The Human Science ofCommunicology: The Phenomenology of Discourse in Foucault and Merleau-Ponty. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1992.

Leach, Edmund. Cu/ture and Communication: The Logic by which Symbols Are Connected; An Introduction to the Use ofStructuralist Analysis in Social Anthropology. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976.

Lotman, Yuri (Iurrii) M. Uni verse ()[Mind: A Semiotic Theory ofCulture. Trans. Ann Shukrnan. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1990 [ simultaneous Russian publication by 1. B. Tauris, 1990].

Noth, Winfried. Handbook of Semiotics. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1990.

O'Sullivan, Tim, et al., eds. Key Concepts in Communication and Cultural Studies. 2nd. ed. New York: Routledge, 1994.

Perelman, Chaim, and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca. La nouvel!e rhetorique: Trai te de l 'argumentation. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1958; The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation. Trans. John Wilkinson and Purcell Weaver. Notre Dame, IN: University ofNotre Dame Press, 1969.

Wilden, Anthony. The Rules Are No Game: The Strategy ofCommunication. New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1987.

RICHARD LEO LANIGAN

Southern Illinois University

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