[contributions to phenomenology] phenomenology of natural science volume 9 || husserl’s...

Chapter 6

Husserl's Phenomenology

and the Ontology of the Natural Sciences

Charles W. Harvey and Jim D. Shelton University of Central Arkansas

Abstract: Husserl's identification of three strata of formal logic, his ph enomenology of objectifyingintentions, and thesynthesesoffulfillment are used to catalogue the ways in which an object of scientific theory can attain or fail to attain ontological status. Examples from the history of the natural sciences are used to make the case.

Cognition in the ideal sense is the title for the actually attained true being of the objec

tivities themselves, in respect of all the categorial formations in which their being shows

its true being, the formations in which it becomes constituted originally as true; and so

far as that has already occurred, just "so far" is there something truly existent from the

standpoint of cognition.!

In this stUdy we use Husserl's identification of three strata of formal logic, his phenomenology of Objectifying intentions, and the syntheses of fulfillment to catalogue some of the ways in which an Object of scientific theory can attain or fail to attain ontological status. By "ontological status" we mean only the

, Edmund HusserL Formal and Transcendental Logic, trans. by Dorion Cairns (fhe Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978), p. 129.

119

L. Hardy and L. Embree (eds.), Phenomenology of Natural Science, 119-133. Ii:> 1992 Kluwer Academic Publishers.

120 PHENOMENOLOGY OF NATURAL SCIENCE

status attained within the scientific community as a physical something really existing (or having really existed) somewhere, at some time, in the universe.

To do what we propose, we need to articulate the Husserlian concepts to which we shall appeal (section I), and we need examples from the history of the physical sciences to show how the eidetic distinctions and intentional activities identified by Husserl have been determinative in decisions about what really is, and about what is not (section II).

I

In this part of the essay we will (a) explicate Husserl's distinctions between the threefold strata of formal logic. This will provide the purely eidetic materials presupposed in the determination of ontological status. Then (b) we will consider his descriptions of objectifying intentions and their syntheses of fulfillment as these relate to the determination of truth statements about what is.

a.) In Formal and Transcendental Logic Husserl distinguishes between the pure forms of judgment (§13), "consequence logic" (§14) and "truth logic" (§15). Sequentially understood, he shows that the constitution of logical sense achieved in each of these domains is prerequisite for the sense of the expressions in the next, dependent domain.

When identifying the morphology of the pure forms of judgment, Husserl isolates and identifies the formal structures and combinations of assertions that allow for "the mere possibilities ofjudgments, as judgments . .. "2 By "mere possibility" he means the most primitive conditions of sense making, namely, conditions that are prior to and independent of considerations of the consistency or inconsistency of the judgments made, and of the truth or falsity of the judgments. The "fundamental form" of judgments is the form that predicates an attribute of a substrate.3 "S is p" symbolizes this fundamental form of sense making, where "S" can be filled in by any "substrate" and "p" by any predicate. A violation of this form would result in non-sense in the literal

sense-it would result in the absence of sense, period. A sign string such as "all and but," would be indicative of the violation of this pure grammatical form.

2 Edmund HusserL F1L, p. 50. Also see Logical Investigations, traos. by J. N. Findlay (London: Routledge & Kegan PauL 1977), p. 522.

3 HusserL F1L, pp. 50-52

ONTOLOGY OF NATURAL SCIENCE 121

Such a string makes no unified, propositional sense. In contemporary formal language, Husserl's first stratum of formal logic is equivalent to the formation rules for well-formed formulae (wft) that constitute pure syntactics.

"Consequence logic" (the logic of noncontradiction) presupposes the primitive sense-constraints identified in pure grammar while attempting to isolate and identify the pure forms of judgment consistency. Here, the expression "p and -'p" is recognized as inconsistent though nevertheless as having a sense. But the sense is formally countersensical or absurd. It is formally countersensical in as much as it is formally inconsistent and it is formally inconsistent because regardless of what content fills in the variable 'p', the expression would remain contradictory. Such an expression has the sense of a contradictory expression but it has a sense nonetheless.4 By virtue of the fact that it has a sense it is not non-sense, only absurd or countersensical. Stratum (2), in contemporary formal terms, is equivalent to wffs that are true by virtue of form alone, that is, they cannot not be true. All such forms rest on the principles of non-contradiction and excluded middle.

Finally, Husserl identified the stratum of "truth logic." Truth logic presupposes the constraints of the laws of the pure forms of judgment and consequencelogic.s This stratum oflogic isolates the point where logic gears into the world and where the contents of expressions playa significant role in determining their sense.6 Here again, since successful judgments at the level of truth logic have necessarily already met the sense requirements of the pure judgment forms and non-contradiction, unsuccessful judgments at the level of truth logic are ones that are grammatically well-formed and formally consistent, but materially incoherent. An example of such an expression, especially important for our concerns, would be reference to "a thing that cannot, in principle, appear (now or ever)." Such an expression would be countersensical because the evidential fulfillment-correlate to the signitive intention "thing" could not be (and never could have nor could be) achieved in principle, even though the sense of the word "thing" demands the possibility of such fulfillment. We have here what Husserl labeled "material countersense"

, HusserL LI, pp. 516-17; F7L, §89a.

, HusserL F7L §§ 15, 19.

• HusserL F7L §90.


(Widersinn) for the contents of such an expression simply do not sensibly (i.e., materially) cohere; hence, they issue in a "material countersense." In contemporary formal language, this stratum refers to wffs as they gear into the world. And it is in relation to this final factor especially that Husserl's program is similar to the verificationism of the logical positivists of the Vienna Circle (though not to that of the early positivists, who would reduce meaning to intuition, simpliciter, and whom Husserl criticized in the Logical Investiga

tions).7 Husserl, similar to A J. Ayer in Ayer's less subtle attempt sometime later,S was here identifying a principle of/actual sense, that is, a principle for determining the meaningfulness of sentences about the empirical world that follow both grammatical and logical rules but nevertheless, for necessary reasons of their own, fail to achieve fulfillment in principle and hence fail to achieve the sense required by the logic of truth.

b.) If logic and the world intersect in the region Husserl identifies as "truth logic," intentionality is the vehicle that brings us to, and steers us through, that intersection. Husserl's theory of intentionality, and especially his phenomenology of objectifying intentions, play essential roles in this always complex navigational task. As we will see, the eidetic demarcations established by the threefold strata of logic also operate, in the background of explicit intentional activities, as constant guides for our acts of knowing the world.

Husserl's notion of intentionality refers to the directed ness of consciousness, or more broadly, to the directedness of the involved person, to situations in the world. More simply put, intentionality refers to the manifold manners in which people consciously interact with their world. With Husserl, though, we isolate a privileged set of intentions-the "objectifying intentions"-that have explicit "knowings" or "identifications" carried out as judgments as their special characteristic.9 This kind of intention functions as the telos of judgments about ontological status because such judgments strive to say "x is" or "x is not." That is, they aim to achieve an explicit knowledge claim or iden tifica tion.

, HusserL LI, pp. 291-95, 301-308.

• Alfred J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic (New York: Dover Publications, 1952), pp. 5-16, 33-45.

• HusserL LI, pp. 668, 7(1).


One variant of an objectifying intentional act identified by Husserl is an unfulfilled intentional act.10 An unfulfilled intentional act which aims at a knowing identification is one that has as part of itself empty components. This emptiness, however, is not a barren emptiness; it is instead an articulated emptiness that outlines in advance the filling that it intends or anticipates. The structural, intentional web oftheories, beliefs, values, etc., presupposed by any particular act of empty or purely 'signitive' intending is, of course, vast. But in the case of particular judgings, all the relevant cells of such a web, through the intentional interest of the particular act, 'zoom in' to focus on the one thing, or situation, judged.

Once this intentional zooming-in has occurred, ideally, fulfillment will also occur. That is, the Object will appear just as it was intended via the noematic sense which was (an irreal) part of the intentional act. If the object does so appear, it will thereby 'fill in' the intentionally objectifying act; if it does not, the intentional act will be frustrated. But when such fulfillment does occur a "synthesis of fulfillment" or a "synthesis of identity" also occurs. This is a synthesis of the empty, signitive intention and its fulfilling data.

Husserl does, of course, recognize various gradations of such syntheses of fulfillment and the correlative degrees of certainty or uncertainty that goes with greater or lesser fulfillment,u The ideal limiting case (which is, in fact,

unattainable) would be total adequation between intentions and fulfillment where the intentions categorically capture all aspects of the thing and that thing is simultaneously intuited in all those aspects.12 Short of this ideal are all the varieties of implied fulfillment, mediate fulfillment, and immediate, partial fulfillment.

"Implied fulfillment" can be described by appealing to Husserl's notion of "intentional implication." About this he writes:

... as a common circumstance ... certain objects or states of affairs of whose reality

someone has actual knowledge indicates to him the reality of certain other objects or states of affairs, in the sense that his belief in the reality of the one is experienced . . . as motivating a belief or surmise in the reality of the other. This relation of "motivation"

I. HusserL LI, pp. 280-82, 694f[

11 HusserL LI, pp. 719-736.

12 HusserL LI, pp. 670.


represents a descriptive unity among our acts of judgment in which indicating and

indicated states of affairs become constituted for the thinker .... Plainly such a state

of affairs amounts to just this: that certain things may or must exist, since other things have been given."

The point being made here is familiar to us in terms of associationistic psychology.14 Owing to certain things that we have experienced, and our beliefs, theories, etc. about the connection of those things with other things, we believe that these other things mayor must also "be," since those things with which they are thought to be connected clearly are. In many cases, indeed in most cases in everyday, nonscientific life, such conditions strongly imply the possibility of fulfillment by the thing implied. For example, if I see my wife's automobile in the parking lot of Torreyson Library, her presence in the library is intentionally implicated with my sighting of her car. And indeed, I know ahead of time that the possibility of gaining intuitive fulfillment of my empty intention of her is a real possibility. Nevertheless, the emphasis that Husserl places on the modals "may" and "must" in this passage is significant. It depicts his recognition that an indicating reality does not always logically necessitate the real being or even the possible appearance of an indicated reality. Hence, he is clear that phenomenological motivation (indication) is not logical entailment. This is because in intentionalimplication our evidentially grounded experience of one state of affairs often motivates belief in an implied fulfillment by other, not so evident, states of affairs. But, since such associative implications often produce an almost seamless merging of our beliefs and judgments, they induce beliefs about the being of things that are not immediately grounded in intuitive evidence. Thereby, often it only seems that something (the indicated) must be because of something else (the indicating). It is often the case that it only may be because intentional implication, like all non-deductive inference, is frequently mistaken. The relation between indicating evidence and the indicated is thus empirical and contingent, and is verifiable only a posteriori. Hence, as we will see, unsupplemented intentional implication is one of the weaker forms of a posteriori evidence for assertions about ontological status.

" HusserL LI, p. 270.

"Husserl explicitly correlates his descriptions of motivation with associationistic psychology in Ideas II, trans. R Rojcewicz and A Schuwer (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989) pp. 233-238.

ONTOLOGYOFNATIURALSCIENCE 125

Stronger than intentional implication, but always supplemented by it, is mediate fulfillment. Mediate fulfillment occurs when an object intended is presented through a presentation other than itself. IS That is, it occurs when an intention, say, toward object 'y' is filled in by object 'x' which is a way of presenting object 'y', though it is not object 'y' itself. For example, we are involved in mediated fulfillment when we are intentionally directed toward the seeing of electrons, we then see 'dots' on a photographic plate, and say that we are seeing electrons. Here, our intentions of seeing an electron receive mediate fulfillment.

Partial fulfillment, as the locution indicates, refers to cases where only some portions of a signitive or act-intention are fulfilled and other portions left empty. Such fulfIllment may be mediate or immediate. To consider immediate partial fulfillment, when I intend to see the moon and expect that it will be full, but instead see only a crescent moon, then partial fulfillment has occurred, while part of my intentional act has been frustrated. Or, to mention immediate partial fulfillment without frustra tion, when I think about my entire house and its many points of ill repair while looking at only the door hanging off of its frame, then immediate partial fulfillment has occurred.

Now, before turning to some examples of these verificational processes in natural scientific knowing, we should relate the distinctions to Husserl's early conceptions of knowledge and truth. Husserl defined "knowledge" in terms of the successful correlation of intention and intended. As he writes (in relation to the ideal of perfect fulfillment):

The synthesis of fulfillment [between an empty intention and intuitive evidence] ... is

self-evidence or knowledge in the pregnant sense of the word. Here we have being in the sense of truth, 'correspondence' rightly understood, the adaequatio rei ac intellectus: here this adaequatio is itself given, to be directly seized and gazed upon.'·

Knowledge and truth are thereby achieved when an Objectivity is given and given as the fulfillment of a prior meaning intention. The meaning intention, of course, is itself lodged within a system of intentions and the degree of certainty attributed to any particular identification is in part a function of the

15 HusserL LT, p. 724.

" HusserL LT, p. 670.


degree of certainty attaining to the system itselfY Needless to say, because of the intricacy of most of our theoretical webs, error can also occur. A particular meaning intention may be 'mutilated' owing to some internal inconsistency, or more likely, it may be internally coherent, but flaws in the background web of beliefs lead to misidentification or false proclamations of knowing. Such errors will be recognized as errors, however, only in terms of other intentional acts achieving fulfillment in other theoretical networks or within the same network. And these networks do communicate with one another and with the world, else even such processes of falsification and correction could not occur.

In any case, as we will now attempt to demonstrate, when knowledge claims are made-in science and in ordinary life-they are made on the basis of a fulfilling synthesis between system-governed intentional acts and fulfilling intuitions. In relation to judgments of ontological status, such syntheses of identification determine whether, in a given case, we say "x is," or "x is not."

II

In this part of the essay we will show how the distinctions made by Husserl have been used when scientists have decided about ontological status. The following scheme identifies the "decision frames" for the determination of ontological status. We will give a brief explanation of the decision frames and then provide each with empirical content through an analysis of historical cases.

11 For a strong defense of this thesis see J. N. Mohanty, 'Towards a Phenomenology of Self-Evidence," contained in his book The Possibility o/Transcendental Philosophy (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhof~ 1985), pp. 83-100, esp. pp. 87-92


Background Experimental Decision Frame

Theory .. (Conditions .. Object)

Decision Elements

Eidetic (A Priori) Sense Parameters

Reasons for ",

Postulation.. denial .. apriori ,

Fulfillment Requirements (A Posteriori)

Reasons for ", Postulation.. affirmation

a posteriori

(la) Nonsense (Lt)

(lb) Logical inconsistency (~)

(lc) Empirical unfulfillment in principle (~)

(2a) intentional implication (~)

",

(2b) intuitive fulfillment (~) , (bz) immediate

By "background experimental decision frame," we mean that for any scientific decision about ontological status, a theory will be presupposed that

suggests certain conditions, such that in those conditions an object will appear (or be implicated by something that does appear). This background material is composed of all the categorial formations (theories, beliefs, etc.) that constitute the sense of the context within which a decision about ontological


status is made. The particular decisions about ontological status are thus particular intentional acts that have their complete sense only within a nexus of intentionally formed categorial structures.

By "decision elements" we mean the a priori and a posteriori conditions necessary for the granting of ontological status. The eidetically established a

priori sense parameters for the granting of ontological status are delimited by the three strata of logic. That is, the conditions of sense demanded by each of these strata are necessary conditions for the granting of ontological status, such that there is a sufficient condition for denying ontological status if anyone of

these conditions is not met. Hence, rejection of ontological status can occur, broadly, in any of three ways. (1) Because the supposed postulation itself was "expressed" in a propositionallynonsensical manner. (2) Because of a logical (or theoretical) inconsistency in the propositional form. Or, (3), owing to the a priori impossibility of empirical fulfillment by the Object that was postulated to appear.

The fulfillment requirements are a posteriori conditions necessary for the granting of ontological status. (And these presuppose the positive fulfillment of the eidetic a priori conditions just mentioned.) When ontological status is granted this occurs, broadly, in one of two ways: (1) Through the implication of an object through something that does appear, where what does appear is not the thing itself with which one is concerned, but it is a thing that, through various connections, indicates the actual being of that other thing. Or, (2) through intuitive fulfillment which might be (a) mediated fulfillment or (b) immediate fulfillment. The precise point at which these latter two types of fulfillment differ is an issue of debate in contemporary philosophy of science.1s

For instance, in Galileo's day observation through a telescope was considered by some to be so "mediated" as to be totally untrustworthy, whereas today most of us think of telescopic observation as immediate observation of the Object itself. Hence, these distinctions probably refer to a difference in degree, rather than kind. But broadly, we mean by "mediate fulfillment," fulfillment through representations of the thing referred to, as, for example, photographs of an electron; whereas by "immediate fulfillment" we mean direct observation of the Object referred to, as, for example, when we see Venus in the morning sky.

,. See, e.g., Dudley Shapere, ''The Concept of Observation in Science and Philosophy," Philosophy of Science 49 (1982), pp. 485-525.


The absence of a priori sense parameter type 1(a), that is, the violation of the primitive judgment forms, in relation to an assertion about ontological status, has never occurred. At most, it could only occur as an error resulting in nonsense so senseless that it could not be a postulation of ontological status or of anything else. For example, it would occur if one mistakenly wrote the formula liE = MC2" as "M =2 EC". However, the absence of this sense parameter, in relationship to an ontological claim, cannot occur in principle; that is, its occurrence is impossible a priori. This is because the rejection of an ontological claim on the grounds that the claim failed to meet purely formal standards of judgment would mean that the "linguistic" postulation itself would be incomprehensible and hence no postulation at all. Hence, there is no such case in the annals of the sciences; we could not recognize "it" if there were-other than to remark on some meaningless sign string found lodged in a text.

It is also not so easy to find outright contradictions within a single hypothesis in science. This is because scientists are not likely to make simple contradictions and because more complicated hypotheses can always be "jimmied" to create consistency. However, contradictions do occur between hypotheses or between a hypothesis and observational evidence. Eliminating such contradictions has often resulted in the rejection of ontological status. For instance, during the eighteenth century the caloric theory of heat, which postulated "heat" as a substance trapped in bodies, implied that a sharp drill would produce more heat than a dull drill (since more trapped heat substance would be released by a sharp drill which would abrade an Object more effectively). Since Count Rumford observed the falsity of this prediction, indeed, that the opposite was true-a blunt drill produced more heat, a sharp drill less-the "friction" or "mechanical" theory of heat has replaced the "caloric" or "substance" theory, and caloric has been denied ontological status and has been converted into measurement terms.19

The more fruitful and interesting contradictions in science, therefore, are usually not internal to a particular intentional act or a particular theory at all. Rather, they are external in the sense that they stem from experimental or theoretical notions outside the theory itself. These contradictions often force changes in the internal structure of the theory or, indeed, force the creation

19 Stephen F. Mason A History of the Sciences (New York: Collier Books, 1962), pp. 486ft


of a new theory. For example, Einstein's original general theory of relativity implied an expanding universe. This contradicted what was then believed in cosmology. Namely, that the universe was eternally static. So Einstein modified his theory, only to regret it later-as his most serious blunder?» But often such contradictions do prove of positive long-term value because much scientific progress is generated by the attempt to overcome them. The phlogiston theory, for instance, ended up positing a substance with negative weight. 21 This contradicted a fundamental assumption of Galilean-Newtonian physics, and thus contributed to the eventual rejection of the ontological status that had been generally granted to "phlogiston."

As with each of the sense parameters considered thus far, the sense parameter concerning "intuitive unfulfillment in principle" indicates a judgment form about ontological status that occurs both inside and outside of science. One who says "there is in this room an Object that can cause no effects on anything in it, it cannot in anyway be detected, and is not affected by any other objects" is generally regarded as talking counter to ordinary sense. This is likewise the case in the physical sciences. While the "ether" that was once thought to fill space was not originally postulated as being undetectable in principle, when the ether-drift experiments at the turn of this century repeatedly failed to detect such a substance such an assertion became increasingly necessary if the concept was to be salvaged.22 This, however, was (and is) a material countersense because part of the logical sense of the notion of a 'substance stuff was (and is) experienceability, at least in principle. To say in science, as in ordinary life, that there is a stuff that cannot be experienced in any way, shape or form is to talk nonsense, it is to utter an a priori absurdity, it is to make a countersensical claim. This was indeed the case with the incipient suggestion that "ether is, but it is undetectable in principle."

As we have noted,fulfillmentrequirementtype 2(a), intentionalimplication, is also a form of existence positing familiar to us from everyday life. We may believe very strongly in the existence of a murderer given a corpus delicti, a

,. Richard Morris, Dismantling the Universe (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), p. 69 .

., Mason, pp. 302-313. M. M. Pattison Muir,A History o/ChemicalTheories and Laws (New York: Arno Press, 1975), pp. 20-21.

22 Mason, pp. 542-43. G. Toraldo Di Francia, The Investigation 0/ the Physical World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 114.


severe stab wound in the back that pierced the heart, even in the absence of any sharp instrument in the vicinity ofthe body. These facts intentionally imply a murderer. And their presence provides considerable grounds for positing the actual existence of such a murderer. The same kind of reasoning takes place in science. The belief that the chromosomes of a cell held causally operative hereditary units, genes, or "Mendelian unit factors," was such a belief. During the late nineteenthand early twentieth century these "entities" were implicated by the observed ratios in inherited qualities. But because such entities could not be observed more evidence was demanded, and so the issue was not settled. Yet, eventually, similar to the case of our murderer, enough facts implying such entities were accumulated, so that "genes" generally came to be held as real physical existents.23 Similarly, when Joseph Leverrier and John Couch Adams noticed small deviations of Uranus from the orbit theoretically predicted for it from Newton's law of gravity, each, quite independently, realized that a more distant planet was thereby implied. For each of them, having internalized Newton's theory, this other planet was intentionally implicated. And, of course, Neptune was later detected through a telescope precisely where the two astronomers had predicted it would be. A virtually identical procedure occurred in relation to deviations in Neptune's orbit and the implication of the planet "Pluto.''24

As in common sense experience, intuitive fulfillment is in science a more or less deciding factor in determination of ontological status. It should be remembered, however, that even intuitive evidence is not absolutely decisive, owing to factors such as the strength of the evidence for the connections between theory, intentions, and intuitive expectation. In everyday experience, though, mediated intuitive fulfillment, type 2(bJ), would occur if one saw a photograph of Elvis Presley and thereby concluded that one had some idea of how Elvis had looked and that at one time Elvis really had been an existing person. Error, of course, is possible, but the background information and various connections amongst our beliefs about the media, photography, etc., are strong enough to warrant such an ontological claim. A similar logic operates in the reconstruction of prehistoric animals. On the basis of their

" Mason, pp. 529-40.

" Uoyd Motz, The Universe: Its Beginning and End (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1975), pp. 172-74.


understanding of animal anatomy, Georges Cuvier and others reconstructed the fossil skeletons of prehistoric mammoths and various other extinct creatures, and thereby gave us mediated intuitive fulfillment of extinct species.2S Similarly, given the background information required for an understanding of the technological miracle we call a "cloud chamber" we achieve mediated observationof"electrons." When a scientist observes a series of dots on a photograph, in light of her knowledge of technology and the physical world, she concludes that she has observed an electron. Those "dots on the photographic plate," she might even say, "are electrons." The implicating relations in this case are strong, and the theoretical causal processes are direct enough to bring about ontological commitment to the existence of electrons. We thus say "electrons are."

Finally, immediate fulfillment, fulfillment type 2(b2), refers to the fact that immediate intuitive fulfillment generally provides conclusive grounds for ontological positing (barring the usual reasons for the possibility of erroneous perception). However, this is precisely the kind of confirmation that is most difficult to attain in problems concerning ontological status. If it were not so difficult to attain, there simply would not be a serious problem about ontological status. But the achievement of such confirmations has occurred. Again, the discovery of the planet Neptune can serve as an example. When its existence was postulated in 1846 because of perturbations in the orbit of Uranus, and then when it was actually observed, immediate intuitive evidence was achieved and the ontological reality of Neptune was readily accepted by scientists.u A contemporary case where scientists are still waiting to achieve such direct intuitive confirmation occurs in the case of quark theory. Here, while a high degree of mediate intuitive fulfillment exists,27 direct intuitive

" Mason, pp. 379-86. Adrian 1. Desmond, The Hot-Blooded Dinosaurs (New York: The Dial Press, 1976), pp. 7-'213.

'" Motz, pp. 172-74.

2? Henry Simmons, "Particle Physics: A Realm of Charm, Strangeness and Symmetry," contained in the 1977 Yearbook of Science and the Future (published by Encyclopedia Britannica, 1978), pp. 146-163.


evidence still does not.28 And this, alone and by itself, leaves scientists with some indecision about the existence of quarks.29

These final types of fulfillment come closest to Husserl's ideal case of "syntheses of identification." Here, empty intentional acts, motivated by and embedded in, systems of theoretically governed beliefs, are fulfilled by the objects they intended just as they intended them. It is in this sense that, as J. N. Mohanty writes, "all knowledge of truth is characterized by evidence ... " But this evidence is necessarily a relational event. It is a relation between an intentional act-sense and the object that would fulfil that sense. Hence, when truth is achieved, what occurs is that this relational structure fuses into an identifying synthesis or synthesis of coincidence. This identifying synthesis is the experience of evidence, truth and being. Again, as Mohantywrites: "Truth is, then, a possible object of a consciousness of the form 'It is this' ... "30 Or, in terms of the concerns of this essay, truth is instanced in the various types of identifying syntheses that allow the natural scientist to say "it is," or "it is not."

Husserl makes these same points when he writes that

... truth as the correlate of an identifying act is a state of affairs (Sachverhalt), as the

correlate of a coincident identity it is an identity: the full agreement of what is meant

with what is given as such . ... [In the ideal limiting case, this occurs when the 1 object

is not merely meant, but in the strictest sense given, and given as it is meant, and made one with our meaning-reference.31

When this occurs we can say that the meaning reference is, and is as we intended it to be. In what has preceded, we have tried to show how this is also the case in the decisions of physical scientists when they decide about what is and what is not.

,. P. C. Davies, The Forces of Nature (London: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 209-211.

,. P. T. Matthews, The Nuclear Apple: Recent Discoveries in Fundamental Physics (St Martin's Press, 1971), p. 112

,. Mohanty, p. 91.

" HusserL LI, p. 765.

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