convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological...

ASEAN Regional Forum Workshop on Biological Threat Reduction

Manila, 10-11 June 2009

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction

International Efforts to Mitigate Biological Threats

Richard Lennane

Head, BWC Implementation Support Unit

United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs(Geneva Branch)

BWCIMPLEMENT

ATIONSUPPORT UNIT

UNITED NATIONS

OFFICE FOR DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS




International response to the BW threat

• 1925 Geneva Protocol

– Prohibits use of CW and BW in warfare

• 1972 Biological Weapons Convention

– Prohibits development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, retention or transfer of BW

• 2004 UN Security Council Resolution 1540

– Requires all states to take measures to prevent WMD (including BW) terrorism




BWC facts and figures

• Opened for signature in 1972; entered into force in 1975

• Current membership:– 163 States Parties

– 13 signatories

– 19 states neither signed nor ratified

• No BWC organisation or implementing body (in contrast to CWC/OPCW, NPT/IAEA, CTBT/CTBTO)– Implementation Support Unit is new development

• No verification mechanism (cf. CWC, CTBT)




BWC: key provisionsArticle I Never under any circumstances to acquire or retain biological weapons

Article II To destroy or divert to peaceful purposes biological weapons and associated resources prior to joining

Article III Not to transfer, or in any way assist, encourage or induce anyone else to acquire or retain biological weapons

Article IV To take any national measures necessary to implement the provisions of the BWC domestically

Article V To consult bilaterally and multilaterally to solve any problems with the implementation of the BWC

Article VI To request the UN Security Council to investigate alleged breaches of the BWC and to comply with its subsequent decisions

Article VII To assist States which have been exposed to a danger as a result of a violation of the BWC

Article X To do all of the above in a way that encourages the peaceful uses of biological science and technology




Strengthening the BWC

• Confidence-building Measures (CBMs) introduced 1986, expanded 1991

• Attempt to negotiate protocol from 1991-2001

• Failure in 2001 sparks crisis, reorientation

• 2006 Review Conference consolidates new direction

• Review Conferences every five years (1980, 1986, 1991, 1996, 2001, 2006 – next one in 2011)




Sixth Review Conference (2006)

• Calls on BWC States Parties to:– implement appropriate transfer measures, including effective national

export controls

– take measures to ensure that relevant biological agents and toxins are protected and safeguarded

– promote the development of training and education programs for those working with relevant biological agents and toxins

– encourage development of codes of conduct and self-regulatory mechanisms, and promote awareness among relevant professionals of the need to report suspicious activities

• Establishes Implementation Support Unit

• New intersessional work program 2007-2010




New direction• Focus on improving and coordinating national

implementation of BWC

• Annual work programme deals with specific topics; exchange of technical expertise

• Range of different actors and organisations involved

• Implementation Support Unit coordinates activity

• Renewed focus on CBMs, universalization




The Spectrum of Biological Risk

Natural disease outbreak

Deliberate use of BW

Unintended consequences Accidents

Vandalism, sabotageNegligence

WHO BWC

“We must look at [the BWC] as part of an interlinked array of tools, designed to deal with an interlinked array of problems” – Kofi Annan, 2006




Biological threat reduction network

BWC

State State

WHO

FAO

OIE

SCR 1540

INTERPOL

Professionalassociations

IndustryScientific

organisations

WorkProgram

ISU




UNSCR Resolution 1540

• Adopted 2004, renewed 1673 (2006) and 1810 (2008)– imposes binding obligations on all States to establish

domestic controls – prevents proliferation of NCB weapons by establishing

controls over related materials – encourages enhanced international cooperation – promotes universal adherence to WMD treaties

• Committee under UN Security Council

• Supported by group of experts

• Committee maintains database on implementation

• Committee acts as a clearing house for assistance




1540: formal links to BWC

• Affirms “support for the multilateral treaties whose aim is to eliminate or prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and the importance for all States parties to these treaties to implement them fully in order to promote international stability” (pp 5)

• Welcomes the non-proliferation commitments and efforts made under these treaties, in particular in securing sensitive materials (pp 6 &11)

• Calls on states to promote the universal adoption and full implementation of the treaties (op 8)




BWC: formal links to 1540

• Sixth RevCon (2006) recognized the “contribution of full and effective implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 by all states to assist in achieving the objectives of this Convention”.

• Final Declaration on BWC Art. IV (national implementation) also explicitly refers to Resolution 1540

– notes that information provided by states in accordance with Resolution 1540 may provide a useful resource for fulfilling their Art. IV obligations




Implementing SCR 1540

1. Reporting• on steps taken and planned

• matrix for each state: analysis of requirements

2. Legislation and other measures• Implementing legislation for WMD treaties (incl. BWC)

• Measures for accountability and security of sensitive materials; border protection; export controls.

3. Enforcement• Onus on states: monitored by 1540 Committee

• Promotion of dialogue and cooperation among governmental agencies

not traditionally in arms control • Customs and law enforcement, eg, to improve border security




Assistance for 1540 implementation

• Where Next Steps/Action Plans indicate assistance requirements, IGOs and States have assistance delivery programs: eg, for legislation, training and equipment.

• Regional organizations, eg, ASEAN, OSCE, OAS, CIS, can provide political support and forums for sharing experiences and lessons learned; some NGOs can deliver specific project assistance.

• 1540 Committee has clearing house role and can match requests/offers.

• Assistance Template available on website (www.un.org/sc/1540) to facilitate process.





BWC

State State

WHO

FAO

OIE

SCR 1540

INTERPOL


IndustryScientific

organisations

WorkProgram

ISU




BWC intersessional work program

• Mandate to “discuss, and promote common understanding and effective action on” specific topics related to better implementation of the BWC

• Runs from 2007 to 2010 (7th RevCon in 2011)

• Two meetings each year: Meeting of Experts mid-year; Meeting of States Parties in December

• Wide range of participants: objective is sharing information and experience, identifying best practices, improving effectiveness of the BWC




BWC intersessional work program

NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION

REGIONAL ACTIVITIES

RESPONSE TO USE OR THREAT OF USE

BIOSAFETY & BIOSECURITY

OVERSIGHT, EDUCATION & OUTREACH

CAPACITY BUILDING FOR DISEASE SURVEILLANCE, DETECTION, DIAGNOSIS, AND CONTAINMENT

2007 2008 2009 2010




2008: common understandings: biosafety/biosecurity

COMPONENTS TOOLS CHARACTERISTICS ASSISTANCE NEEDED

Developing national biosafety and biosecurity frameworks

Defining the role of different national agencies and bodies

Building national, regional and international networks of relevant stakeholders

Taking better advantage of assistance already available

Improving bilateral, regional and international cooperation to build relevant capacity

Enhancing the role played by the ISU

Accreditation Certification Audit or licensing for

facilities, organisations or individuals

Training requirements for staff members

Mechanisms to check qualifications, expertise and training

National criteria for relevant activities

National lists of relevant agents, equipment and other resources

Measures should: Be practical Be sustainable Be enforceable Be readily understood Be developed with

stakeholders Avoid unduly

restricting peaceful use Be adapted for local

needs Be appropriate for

agents being handled Be suitable for work

being undertaken Make use of risk

assessment, management and communication approaches

To enact and improve relevant legislation

To strengthen laboratory infrastructure, technology, security and management

To conduct courses and provide training

To help incorporate biosafety and biosecurity into existing efforts to address disease




2008: common understandings: oversight/awarenessOVERSIGHT

CHARACTERISTICSEDUCATION & AWARENESS

RAISING COMPONENTSNEXT STEPS FOR

CODES OF CONDUCT

Develop national oversight frameworks:

• To prevent agents and toxins being used as weapons

To oversee relevant people, materials, knowledge and information

To oversee the entire scientific life cycle

To cover private & public sectors That are proportional to risk That avoid unnecessary burdens That are practical and usable That do not unduly restrict

permitted activities With the involvement of

stakeholders in all stages of design and implementation

That can be harmonised regionally and internationally

Formal requirements for seminars, modules or courses in relevant scientific education and training programmes that:

Explain the risks associated with the malign use of biology

Cover moral & ethical obligations Provide guidance on the types of

activities which could be prohibited

Are supported by accessible teaching materials, seminars, workshops, publications and audio-visual materials

Address leading scientists, managers and future generations of scientists

Can be integrated into existing national, regional and international efforts

Complement national legislative, regulatory and oversight frameworks

Help guide science so it is not used for prohibited purposes

Further develop strategies to encourage voluntary adoption of codes




BWC intersessional program 2009

• Two meetings in Geneva:– Meeting of Experts, 24-28 August 2009– Meeting of States Parties, 7-11 December 2009

• Topic: “promoting capacity building in the fields of disease surveillance, detection, diagnosis, and containment of infectious diseases”




The Implementation Support Unit (ISU)

• “Help States Parties help themselves”

• Officially operational in August 2007

• Housed in Geneva Branch of UN Office for Disarmament Affairs

• Funded by BWC States Parties

• Three full-time staff

• To be reviewed by Seventh Review Conference in 2011




Mandate of the ISU

• Provide administrative support for BWC meetings

• Facilitate communication among States Parties and with relevant organizations

• Support national implementation efforts

• Act as clearing-house for offers of and requests for assistance

• Administer confidence-building measures (CBMs)

• Support universalization activities

• Support implementation of decisions and recommendations of Sixth Review Conference




ISU resources• Website: http://www.unog.ch/bwc

– includes restricted area for States Parties

– official and informal documents, useful links

• National Implementation Database

– over 2000 measures from 116 States Parties

• Confidence-building measures (CBMs)

– online forms in six languages

– tips and advice on participation, sample submissions

– submitted CBMs available in restricted area




Types of assistance• National implementation

– Drafting legislation and regulations

– Designing administrative systems

– Training and capacity-building

• Confidence-building measures (CBMs)

– Advice and “coaching”

– On-site assistance to prepare first submission

• Participation in intersessional process

– Travel to Geneva for expert meetings

• Anything else related to improving implementation of the Convention…





BWC

State State

WHO

FAO

OIE

SCR 1540

INTERPOL


IndustryScientific

organisations

WorkProgram

ISU




A shared responsibility

“Governments alone cannot confront the risks posed by biological weapons ... to manage the full spectrum of biological risks, you need a cohesive, coordinated network of activities and resources. Such a network will help to ensure that biological science and technology can be safely and securely developed for the benefit of all.”

- Ban Ki-moon, Secretary-General of the United Nations, 2008




Further information:

BWC Implementation Support UnitUnited Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (Geneva Branch)Room C.115, Palais des NationsGeneva

tel: +41 (0)22 917 2230

fax: +41 (0)22 917 0483

e-mail: [email protected]

web: www.unog.ch/bwc

convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological...

Documents

biological weapons convention

biological weapons article

toxin weapons

relevant biological

new development

bw threat

bwc article vi

bwc article x