convergence justifications within political liberalism: a defence · 2018-09-01 · relations,...
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ConvergenceJustificationsWithinPoliticalLiberalism:ADefencePaulBillinghamThisisanAcceptedManuscriptversionofanarticlepublishedinResPublica.Publishedversionavailablehere:http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11158-015-9278-x.Abstract According to political liberalism, laws must be justified to all citizens in order to be
legitimate. Most political liberals have taken this to mean that laws must be justified by appeal to a
specific class of ‘public reasons’, which all citizens can accept. In this paper I defend an alternative,
convergence,modelofpublicjustification,accordingtowhichlawscanbejustifiedtodifferentcitizensby
different reasons, including reasons grounded in their comprehensive doctrines. I consider three
objectionstosuchanaccount–that itunderminessincerity inpublicreason,that itunderestimatesthe
importance of shared values, and that it is insufficiently deliberative – and argue that convergence
justifications are resilient to these objections. They should therefore be included within a theory of
political liberalism, as a legitimate form of public justification. This has important implications for the
obligationsthatpoliticalliberalismplacesuponcitizensintheirpublicdeliberationsandreason-giving,and
mightmake the theorymoreattractive tosomeof its critics,particularly thosesympathetic to religious
belief.
Keywords Politicalliberalism·Publicjustification·Respect·Sincerity
Political liberalsbelievethat lawsmustbe justifiedtoallcitizensbyreasonstheycanaccept.Mosttake
thistomeanthatlawsmustbejustifiedbythesamereasons–byreasonsthatallcitizenscanaccept.In
fact,however,‘therecanbeconvergenceonalawwithoutconsensuswithrespecttothereasonsforthat
law’(Eberle2007,p.435).Whilesometheoristshavearguedthatsuch‘convergencejustifications’should
berecognisedaslegitimateformsofpublicjustification(GausandVallier2009;Vallier2011b,2014),this
remainsaminorityposition,requiringfurtherdefencefromseveral importantobjections. Inthispaper I
defendconvergence justificationsfromthreesuchobjections,pertainingtosincerity,sharedvalues,and
deliberation.
Endorsingconvergence justificationsas legitimatehassignificant implications forpolitical liberalism.For
example, it provides new resources to respond to the common criticism that political liberalism is
inhospitabletoreligiousgroups.1Underconvergence,religiousreasonscanplayarole in justifying laws,
P.BillinghamStAnne’sCollegeandDepartmentofPoliticsandInternationalRelations,UniversityofOxford,UKe-mail:[email protected]
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and political liberalism’s implications for religious citizens are much less restrictive than is commonly
thought.
Ifurtheroutlinepoliticalliberalismandtheimplicationsofacceptingconvergencejustificationsinthenext
section, before responding in turn to the three objections, which each claim that our theory of public
justificationshouldonlypermitconsensusjustifications.
PoliticalLiberalism,Consensus,andConvergencePolitical liberals believe that the exercise of political powermust be justified to those subject to it, by
reasonstheycanaccept.Mostpoliticalliberalsgroundthisclaimonthefundamentalpremisethatrespect
forpersonsdemandsthatcoercionbe justified to thecoerced.2 If individualswithin liberaldemocracies
aretobeshownrespectasfreeandequalcitizensthenthecoercivelawsthattheyaresubjecttomustbe
justifiedtothem.This iswhatdistinguishes legitimatecollectiveauthorityfrombruteforce.Coercionby
lawis impermissibleunlesseach(reasonable3)citizenisgivenreasonstoaccept it.Thiscanbestatedas
the Public Justification Principle (PJP): L is a justified coercive law only if every reasonable citizen has
reasontoendorseit.4
AsJamesBoettcherandJonathanHarmonnote,makingthisconnectionbetweenrespectforpersonsand
public justification is the ‘standardapproach’withinpolitical liberalism(BoettcherandHarmon2009,p.
8). Forexample, LawrenceSolumwrites that ‘respect for citizensas freeandequaldoesmean thatwe
shouldgiveourfellowcitizensthesortofreasonsthattheycouldreasonablyaccept’(Solum1993,p.736).
GeorgeKloskoarguesthatgovernmentsnotbasingcoercionongroundscitizenscanreasonablyrejectis
‘part of what it means to treat people with adequate respect’ (Klosko 2003, p. 169). Jonathan Quong
concurs: ‘respect forpersons requires that theynotbepolitically coercedongrounds that they cannot
reasonablyaccept’(Quong2004,p.246).Thus,‘respectforpersonsliesattheheartofpoliticalliberalism’
(Larmore1999,p.606).5
Somepoliticalliberals,mostnotablyJohnRawls,applyPJPonlyto‘constitutionalessentialsandmattersof
basic justice’–toquestionsaboutbasicrightsandlibertiesandbasiceconomicandsocial justice(Rawls
1UsefuloverviewsareBoettcherandHarmon(2009);Weithman(1997).2Bird(2014)criticisesthis‘coercion-based’accountofpoliticalliberalism,butitremainsthestandardapproachintheliterature,soIwillassumeithere.Manyofmyargumentscouldbeadaptedsoastoapplytotheoriesthatseesomethingotherthancoercionastriggeringthedemandforpublicjustification.3Thisqualificationisassumedthroughout.Preciselywhatisrequiredforacitizentobe‘reasonable’iscontroversial.Suchacaveatisnecessary,butItakenopositionhereonwhatitentails.4MyformulationofPJPisbasedonGausandVallier’s(2009,p.53),butismoreecumenicalthantheirs.PJPisanecessary,notsufficient,conditionforlegitimacy.Othernecessaryconditionsmightincludedemocraticenactmentandconstitutionality.5Rawlsdoesnotmakethisexplicit,butLarmore(1999,2003)arguesthatrespectisfundamentaltoRawls’sthought.
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2005, p. xlviii, fn. 23). ForRawls, legal coercion is legitimate ‘when it is exercised in accordancewith a
constitutiontheessentialsofwhichallcitizensasfreeandequalmayreasonablybeexpectedtoendorse’
(Rawls 2005, p. 137). Others, such as Quong, contend that PJP applies to all laws (Quong 2004).
Constitutional essentials must satisfy PJP because coercion must be justified to the coerced, and this
argumentequallyappliestoallothercoercivelaws.ThisisreflectedinmyformulationofPJP.Inthispaper
I assume that PJP must be fulfilled by every coercive6 law, but my arguments for the legitimacy of
convergencejustificationsequallyapplytothemorerestrictedapplicationofPJP.
Political liberals disagree as to precisely what it means to offer citizens reasons they ‘can accept’ (or
‘cannot reasonably reject’), but all agree that citizens need not be offered reasons that they currently
acceptinorderforcoerciontobejustified.Citizensmustbeofferedreasonswhichtheycouldinprinciple
accept,oracknowledgeashavingnormativeforce,undersomelevelofidealisation.Myownviewofwhat
thisinvolveswillemergeovercourseofthepaper.
Thevitalpointforourpurposesisthatmostpolitical liberalsbelievethatPJPexcludesreligiousreasons,
andreasonsderivedfromothercomprehensivedoctrines, fromplayingarolewithinpublic justification.
Crudelyput,theargumentisthatinorderforlawstobejustifiedtoeverycitizentheymustbejustifiedby
reasonsthatallcitizens‘canaccept’(howeverthisisinterpreted)–by‘publicreasons’.Givenreasonable
pluralism,reasonsarisingfromcomprehensivedoctrinesarenon-public,sincetheycannotbeacceptedby
everycitizen.Thus,suchreasonscannotbeusedtojustifylaws.
This argument is fallacious, however, as can be seen by distinguishing between consensus and
convergencejustifications.Aconsensusjustificationoccurswhenalawisjustifiedtoeverycitizenbythe
same reason(s). There is a (set of) reason(s) that all citizens can accept, which justifies the law. A
convergencejustificationoccurswhenalawisjustifiedtoeverycitizen,butdifferentcitizens(orgroupsof
citizens)havedifferentreasonstoacceptit.Thelawisjustifiedtodifferent(groupsof)citizensbydifferent
considerations, and there is no one justifying reason that all accept. Utilitarians believe that the law
increasesutility, Christiansbelieve it is in accordwith theBible, and Scanloniansbelieve it satisfies the
constraints of contractualism. In this way, the law is justified to every citizen, and yet the overall
justificationisbaseduponseveralcomprehensivedoctrines.Religious(andothercomprehensive)reasons
canplaya rolewithinconvergence justifications,aspartof thenetworkof reasons that serve to justify
lawstoeverycitizen.
6Allfuturereferencesto‘laws’shouldbetakentomean‘coercivelaws’.Sometheoristsbelievethatalllawsarecoercive.Itakenopositiononthishere.PJPappliestoallcoercivelaws,whetherornoteverylawiscoercive.
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Asitstands,PJPisneutralbetweenconsensusandconvergencejustifications.Itallowsbothaslegitimate
formsofpublic justification. It is therefore false to claim that the requirement that lawsbe justified to
every citizen itself excludes religious reasons frompublic justification.AsGeraldGausandKevinVallier
write, ‘even if they are not shared by all, religious reasons can enter into a network of justificatory
relations, crisscrossing and overlapping diverse reasonable viewpoints to secure an overall public
justification’(GausandVallier2009,p.61).7
Under a convergence justification, each citizen is given reasons they can accept for the law, so PJP is
fulfilled, and coercion is legitimised by this fact.8 Every citizen is shown respect as a free and equal
memberof thepolity, since the coercion they face is justified to them.At first glance, therefore, there
appears to be no reason to reject convergence as a legitimate form of public justification. This has
importantimplicationsforpoliticalliberalism.
Two obligations fall upon citizens if only consensus justifications are legitimate.9 First, since there is a
specificsetofreasonsthatmustbeusedwithinpublicjustification,thosethatcanbeacceptedbyevery
citizen, citizens have an obligation to provide such reasonswhen advocating a law. Theymust provide
publicreasonstotheircompatriots,inordertojustifythelawtothem.‘Whencitizensengageinpolitical
advocacy, they have amoral duty to justify their decisions according to public reasons that others can
reasonablyaccept’(Schwartzman2011,p.375).Thisisthe‘public-reason-givingrequirement’.10
Second, citizens should refrain from supporting laws for which they have only non-public reasons –
unsharedreasons,suchasthosearisingfromtheircomprehensivedoctrines.Mostpoliticalliberalsaccept
whatBoettchercalls‘weakinclusionism’(Boettcher2005,pp.498-500),soholdthatcitizensaremorally
permittedtooffertheircomprehensivereasonsinpublicdeliberation,butonlyiftheyalsooffersufficient
publicreasonsforlawstheyadvocate.11Thus,iftheonlyreasonsacitizenhasforendorsingalawarenon-
publicthensheoughtnotsupportit,sincethesereasonscannotpubliclyjustifylaws.Thisistherestraint
requirement(Eberle2002,pp.68-71).
Thelegitimacyofconvergencejustificationsmakestheseimplicationsforcitizenconductmuchlessclear.
Thereisnolongeraspecificclassofreasonsthatmustbeusedinpublicjustification,sotherecannotbea
public-reason-giving requirement. There can also be no simple restraint requirement, since all of the
7Thisalsoappliestosecularcomprehensivereasons.8Thesereasonsmustbe‘conclusive’,or‘sufficient’,asIexplainbelow.9Someconsensustheoristsarguethattheseobligationsonlyapplytoofficials,nottoordinarycitizens.SeeHabermas(2006);Laborde(2013).10ThistermisfromStearsandHumphrey(2012,p.287).11Rawls’s(2005,pp.462-463)‘proviso’isanexampleofthis.
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reasons a citizen can accept can be part of a law’s public justification. Even if the only reasons an
individualhasforsupportingalawareonesthatarisefromhercomprehensivedoctrine,thelawmightbe
justifiedtoothersbytheirownreasons.Ifcitizensexercisedrestraintinsuchcasesthensomelawsmight
not be enacted which could in fact be publicly justified.12 ‘Strong inclusionism’, where no restraint is
required,isthuscorrect.Citizensshouldsupportanylawtheywish,appealingtoanyreasonstheybelieve
arerelevanttoitsjustification.13
Theremightbe reasons forus to reject convergence justifications,however.AlthoughPJPallows them,
perhapsthereareargumentswhichshowthattheyarenot legitimateformsofpublic justification. Iwill
consider three. The first is that convergence permits insincerity in citizens’ advocacy, allowing them to
manipulateoneanother.Thesecondisthatthevalueofpublicjustificationpartlyderivesfromtheshared
purposes and unity it encourages in society, which are undermined by convergence. The third is that
convergenceisinsufficientlydeliberative.
Iwilldiscuss,andreject,theseobjectionsinturn.Convergenceisresilienttothem,soshouldbeaccepted
asalegitimateformofpublicjustification,withalltheimplicationsthisbrings.14
TheSincerityRequirementPoliticalliberalismshouldincludeasincerityrequirement,accordingtowhichcitizensshouldnotsupport
lawsthattheyknowotherslackreasonstoendorse.15Thisisimportantbecauseitpreventsmanipulation.
Bettymightbelieve thata law is justified toher,basedon informationthatAlfknowstobe false. IfAlf
supportsthelawdespiteknowingthatitcannotinfactbejustifiedtoBettythenhemanipulatesher.She
acceptsthelawasjustifiedtoher,butiswrongtodoso,andAlfplaysonthisfactinpresentingthelawas
publiclyjustified.Thisisdisrespectful.Itshowsawillingnessforotherstobecoercedinwaysthatcannot
be justified to them, so fails to show adequate respect for them as free and equal. The sincerity
requirementthereforestatesthatAmaysupportlawLonlyiftwoconditionsaresatisfied:16
(i)AbelievesheisjustifiedinendorsingL.
12Thisisnottoimplythateverypubliclyjustifiedlawmustbeenacted,butthattherewillbesomepubliclyjustifiedlawswhicharenotknowntobeso.Awarenessthattheycouldbelegitimatelyenactedislacking.13Theremightbeaminimalproposal-restraintrequirement,statingthatacitizenshouldnotsupportlawssheknowscannotbepubliclyjustifiedandthatarelikelytobeenactedifshesupportsthem.SeeVallier(2014,pp.184-190);Gaus(2009).14Intheabsenceoffurtherobjectionsnotconsideredhere.15Atleastincaseswhereitislikelythelawwillthenbeenacted–seefn.13.Evenwhenthelawisunlikelytobeenacted,itwouldbeinsinceretoclaimthatalawispubliclyjustifiedwhenoneknowsitcannotbejustifiedtosomefellowcitizen(s).Iputthesecomplicationstooneside,sincetheydonotaffectmyarguments.16ThisisbasedonQuong(2011,p.266).Ihaveamended(ii),however.Quong’s(ii)saysthatAmustreasonablybelievethatBisjustifiedinendorsingL.Thisisproblematic,sincecitizensareunlikelytoknowwhethereveryfellowcitizenisjustifiedinendorsingalaw.Instead,therequirementshouldbethattheyshouldn’tsupportlawsthattheyknowcannotbejustifiedtosomefellowcitizen(s).
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(ii)AdoesnotbelievethatLcannotbejustifiedtoB.
Quong(2011,pp.265-273)arguesthatthisrequirementisnotfulfilledwhenlawsonlyhaveconvergence
justifications.SupposeAlfsupportsLbasedsolelyonRaandBettysupportsLbasedsolelyonRb,where
Ra andRb are reasonsderived from their respective comprehensivedoctrines.Alf rejectsRb andBetty
rejectsRa,sincetheyeachregardtheother’scomprehensivedoctrineasfalse.Alfthereforebelievesthat
LisnotjustifiedtoBetty.AlfrecognisesthatBettybelievesLisjustifiedtoher,butBettydoessobasedon
a falsebelief (Rb). The reasoning fromBetty’s comprehensivedoctrine toRbmightbe flawless, butAlf
rejects Betty’s comprehensive doctrine, so thinks that Rb is false, and is not a reason for Betty. It is
thereforedisrespectfulandmanipulativeforAlftosupportL.Condition(ii) isnotmet,soAlfshouldnot
supportL.17Thesameistrue,ofcourse,ofBetty’sviewofRa.NeitherAlfnorBettycansincerelysupportL
‘becauseeachpersonmustbelievetheotherisnotjustifiedinendorsing’it(Quong2011,p.267).
In order to be publicly justified, laws must be justified to every individual. To defend convergence
justificationsfromthisobjection,onemustarguethatitispossibleforRbtobeareasonforBetty,andfor
Alftobeabletorecogniseitassuch,eventhoughitisnotareasonforAlf,whobelievesittobefalse.Alf
thus believes that L can be justified to Betty, by Rb, so condition (ii) is satisfied and Alf can sincerely
supportL.
Charlesaccepts theTorahasauthoritative, andon thisbasisbelieves itwouldbewrong forhim toeat
pork.18DeborahrejectstheauthorityoftheTorah,sodoesnotbelievethatCharleswouldbewrongtoeat
pork.Nonetheless, shemightaccept thatCharles’s Jewish faithgiveshim a reasonnot toeatpork.Not
eating pork is justified to him, given his beliefs. Deborah accepts that Charles has a valid reason, even
thoughshebelievesitisfalse.Itisrationalforhimtoactonthisreason,givenhiscomprehensivedoctrine.
Thisappearstobethekindofcaseweneed.
This example involves a conception of reasons and justification which Quong explicitly rejects:
‘justificationrequiresmorethanimpeccableinferences–italsorequiressoundpremises’(Quong2008,p.
5).DeborahbelievesCharles’spremisesarefalse,socannotbelieveheis justifiedinbelievingheshould
noteatpork.However, this conflates rational justificationandsoundness.AsEberleargues, ‘soundness
hastodowiththeobjectiveadequacyofanargumentforagivenconclusion;rationalityhastodowith
whethersomeargumentappearstobesoundgivenacitizen’sevidentialsetandgiventhatshehasgone
about evaluating that argument in the appropriatemanner’ (Eberle 2002, p. 62). Eberle here identifies
17Forsimilararguments,seeBohmanandRichardson(2009,pp.269-270);Audi(1997,pp.135-136).Schwartzman(2011)isafulldiscussionofsincerityinpublicreason.18Quong(2008,pp.5-6)givesasimilarexample.
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twoaspectsofrationaljustification.First,itprimarilyconcernsthemannerinwhichoneformsabelief.It
requiresonetosubjectone’sconvictionstocriticism,seekgoodevidence,andrespondtothatevidence
appropriately, changing one’s beliefs where appropriate. Second, rational justification depends on the
beliefs and experiences one already has, since these are the only bases on which one can evaluate
evidenceandreasons.
Givenhisexperienceandavailableinformation,Aristotlewasrationallyjustifiedinbelievingthatthesun
orbited the earth, just as I am rationally justified in believing the reverse. Aristotle might have used
impeccable reasoning, but he applied it to false premises and thus reached a false conclusion.
Nonetheless,hewasjustifiedinhisbelief.Quong’sstatementthatjustification‘requiressoundpremises’
impliesthatIcannotregardAristotle’sbeliefasjustified,butthisissurelyincorrect.
WecanrefertoEberle’sconceptionofjustificationas‘openjustification’.Toopenlyjustifyaproposition
to John,onemust ‘showthat it canbeproperly inferred fromJohn‘spresentbelief-valuesetconjoined
withadequateinformation,reasoningabilityandsomedegreeofbeliefcoherence’(Vallier2011a,p.112).
John’s belief-value set is the set of all his beliefs, experiences, goals etc.19 A proposition is not openly
justified tohimsimply ifhebelieves it.Afterall,hemighthavereasonedbadlyor lackeasilyattainable
relevant information, or his belief-value setmight containplain contradictionswhichpreventhim from
believing the proposition in question.We should correct for thesemistakes, imputing to agents easily
attainable relevant information and correcting any obvious errors in their reasoning. This ‘moderate
idealisation’formsthe‘admirablyrational’versionofanagent(Vallier2011a,pp.211-284;Gaus2011,pp.
232-257).20Alawisjustifiedtoanagentwhentheiradmirablyrationalcounterparthasreasontoaccept
it;inotherwords,whentheagentisopenlyjustifiedinacceptingreasonsthatjustifythelaw.
Otherswilloftenrecognisethatabelief isopenly justifiedtoanindividual.Deborahcanappreciatethat
Charles’sbeliefregardingporkisinferablefromhisbelief-valueset.Inthisway,thebeliefisintelligibleto
her.Sheregardsitasmisguided,butcanrecognisethatitprovidesareasonforhim:itisopenlyjustified
tohim.
Quongcanacknowledgethatopenjustificationisalegitimatetypeofjustification.21Buthecontendsthat
public justificationrequiresthatwebelievethatothersareactually justifiedintheirbeliefs,‘justifiedfull
19Eberlecallsthisone’s‘evidentialset’.20Thereisclearlyambiguityintermslike‘easilyattainable’empiricalinformationand‘obviouserrors’inreasoning.Differentspecificationsofthesetermsgivedifferentlevelsofidealisation.Theprecisespecificationsdonotmatterformyargumenthere.21AtonepointQuong(2011,p.142,fn.11)explicitlysaysthatindividualscanbejustifiedinbelievingfalsehoods,iftheyreasonblamelesslybutreachfalseconclusionsduetotheirlimitedepistemicsituation.
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stop’,ratherthanmerelyopenlyjustified.Thisisbecausesincerityattachestoactualjustification.Evenif
AlfrecognisesthatBettyisopenlyjustifiedinendorsingL,basedonRb,hecannotsincerelybelievethatL
is justifiedtoBetty.FromAlf’spointofview,LcannotbejustifiedtoBetty,sinceBetty’sonlyreasonfor
endorsingLisRb,whichAlfrejects.Ifanotherismerelyopenlyjustifiedinendorsingalaw,thenIconsider
them to be unjustified, so cannot sincerely support the law. I will argue that this is incorrect; the
requirementsofsincerityandrespectcanbefulfilledbyopenjustification.
Openjustificationinvokesaninternalistconceptionofwhatitisforanindividualtohaveareason:reasons
arerelativetoone’scurrentbelief-valueset.CharlescanthereforehaveareasonincircumstancesCthat
Deborahlacks,giventheirdifferentbelief-valuesets.Charleshasreasonnottoeatpork,sinceheaccepts
theauthorityoftheTorah,whereasDeborahdoesnot.StevenWallrejectsthisinfavourofanexternalist
conception, according towhich all individuals in the same circumstanceshave the same reasons to act
(Wall2010,pp.134-135).These reasonsare those thatwouldbeacceptedbya fully rationalagent:an
agent who knows all relevant factual information, reasons flawlessly, and knows of all the evaluative
considerationsthatapplyandtheirrelativeweights.Inthissense,Charlesmightnothavereasontorefrain
fromeatingpork– i.e. if theTorah isnot in fact theauthoritativewordofGod.22Thequestionforus is
whatkindofreasonsarerelevanttopublicjustification.Theanswermustcomefromwhatisrequiredby
respectforpersons,thevalueunderlyingpoliticalliberalism.
Respect for persons requires us to offer explanations for coercion that are addressed to the coerced
individual(s): reasons they can accept. An externalist conception of reasons prevents this. According to
externalism,AlfcansupportlawLaslongashebelievesthatheiswarrantedinbelievingLtobejustified
and that a fully rational version of Bettywould also believe this. Thus,WilliamGalston claims thatwe
respectothersbyofferingthem‘asexplanation,whatwetaketobeourtrueandbestreasons’(Galston
1991,p.109).Wepresentthetruthasweseeit,andthisisenoughtojustifycoercion.
This fails to respect people as they are, with their current beliefs and values. Others might believe
themselvestohavenoreasontoacceptthelawasjustified,sincethebeliefs,informationorreasoningwe
baseourjustificationuponarerejectedbythem,orbeyondtheircomprehension.Coercioninterfereswith
others’capacitytoactbytheirownlights.Wecannotjustifythissimplybyappealingtoourownreasons,
butmustengagewiththecoercedperson’sviewpointandseektoofferreasonstheycanaccept(Eberle
2002, pp. 98-99). Further, it is not enough to say that theywould accept this reason were they fully
rational.EvenifwecanplausiblyclaimthatafullyrationalandinformedversionofBettywouldacceptthe
reasonAlf offers to justify L, this explanation fails to addressBetty. Justification is offerednot toBetty
22Andifallotherargumentsagainstmeat-eatingaremistaken.Iamnotendorsingthisviewhere.
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herself, but to a non-existent radically idealised Betty, whomight have very different beliefs to actual
Betty.Moderate idealisation is necessary, to correct for obvious errors in reasoning or a lack of easily
attained empirical information. Any changes this makes to citizens’ belief-value sets are epistemically
accessible to them, imputing reasons they could themselves recognise if theyengaged in a respectable
amount of deliberation (Gaus 2011, pp. 244-257).Radical idealisation, justification basedonwhat fully
rationalagentswouldaccept,lacksthesefeatures,soisunacceptable.
Quong’s interpretation of the sincerity requirement takes things in the opposite direction: Alf can only
justifylawstoBettyusingreasonsthatBettyacceptsandthatAlfalsobelievesaresound.Sharedreasons
are needed for public justification. This also fails to respect people as they are, since it denies the
relevanceofthefactthatotherscanhaverationallyjustifiedbeliefsbaseduponconsiderationswereject.
It is not insincere for Alf to recognise that from Betty’s perspective L is justified by Rb, which Betty is
openlyjustifiedinacceptinggivenherbelief-valueset,eventhoughAlfhimselfrejectsRb,sinceit isnot
openly justified by his belief-value set. This simply reflects the fact that Alf’s belief-value set does not
determinewhat is (openly) justified toBetty. Accepting this fact is necessary if political liberalism is to
adequatelyrespectpluralism.People’sdifferentcomprehensivedoctrinesmeanthattheyhavedifferent
values and beliefs – different evaluative standards – which give rise to different internalist reasons,
reasonsopenlyjustifiedtoanindividual.Citizensmustrecognisethesereasonsiftheyaretorespectone
another as agents holding to different conceptions of the good. This does not require believing these
reasonstobetrueintheexternalistsense,23butitdoesmeanbelievingthemtobeopenlyjustifiedtothe
individualconcernedandthattheycanjustifylawstothoseindividuals.Notdoingthisexpressesaformof
disrespect.ContraQuong,respectingourcompatriotsmeansthatsincerityattachestoopenjustification:
we can sincerely believe that another is justified in endorsing a lawwhenwe recognise that they are
openlyjustifiedindoingso.24
Imagine a society deciding whether to implement a safety net providing income to the long-term
unemployed. A Nozickian might support this law based on her belief that without it the long-term
unemployedwould be in aworse position than in the state of nature prior to appropriation, violating
Nozick’s version of the Lockean proviso (Nozick 1974, pp. 174-182). A Rawlsianmight support the law
becausehebelievesitcontributestothefulfilmentofthedifferenceprinciple(Rawls1999,pp.52-73).A
Christian might support it because it is in line with Biblical injunctions to help the poor (such as
Deuteronomy 14:28-15:11 and Isaiah 58:6-10). There is thus a convergence justification for the law.
23i.e.Alfdoesn’thavetobelievethatRbwouldbeacceptedbyafullyrationalindividual.PresumablyAlfbelievesthathisreasonsaretrueinthissense,sincehebelieveshiscomprehensivedoctrineistrue,buthecannotbelievethatreasonsarisingfromothers’comprehensivedoctrinesaretrueinthissense.24AsVallier(2011b,p.262)writes,‘onlybyembracingconvergencecanpublicreasonliberalstrulyrespectreasonablepluralismandindividualliberty.’
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Importantly, each individual believes that the law is actually justified, each for their own reasons.
Condition (i) ismet.Theyalso caneach recognise thatothersareopenly justified inendorsing the law,
since they can recognise that others have reason for doing so from within their belief-value sets, so
condition (ii) ismet.There isno insincerity involved in themeachadmittingthese facts,andsupporting
thelawonthisbasis.25
Ifthisisright,whycan’twegofurther?VallierandGausbotharguethatthereasonswhichjustifythelaw
toothersmustbeintelligibletoustolegitimatelybepartofapublicjustification(Vallier2011a,pp.145-
147;Gaus2011,pp.289-292).Wemustbeabletorecognisethattheyarereasonsforthem,thattheyare
openlyjustifiedtothemgiventheirbelief-valueset.Ifjustificationisperspectival,however,thenshouldn’t
wesimplyacceptothers’word?IfBettyclaimsthatLisjustifiedbyreasonRbthenmaybethisshouldbe
enough forAlf, even ifAlf cannotunderstand this claim, sobelieves that the lawcannotbe justified to
Betty.PerhapsAlfdoesnotunderstandhowRb justifiesL,orhowRbcanbeinferredfromBetty’sother
beliefs, or how it is supported by the evidence that Betty points to. But Betty believes the law to be
justified,sothisisenough.
Thisdoesfall foulofthesincerityrequirement. IfBettyacceptsRbduetoempirical informationthatAlf
knowstobefalse,thenitisinsincereforAlftoclaimthatRbjustifiesLtoBetty.Ifamodern-dayAristotle
believedthatthesunorbitedtheearththenitwouldbedisrespectfultojustifycoerciontohimbyappeal
tothisbelief,sinceweknowit tobeempirically false. It isno longerpossibleforanagenttobeopenly
justified in believing that the sun orbits the earth. There is easily attainable empirical evidence that
conclusivelyprovesthatthisisnotthecase,andthusnoadmirablyrationalagentbelievesit.
Similar considerationsapply in caseswhereAlf rejectsBetty’s reasoning toRb fromBetty’sbelief-value
set,orfromRbtoL.IfAlfcannotunderstandthisreasoning,orcanseeobviousflawsinit,thenhecannot
sincerelyholdLtobejustifiedtoBettybasedonit.HebelievesthatamoderatelyidealisedBettywould
notacceptRb–RbisnotopenlyjustifiedtoBetty,socannotjustifyLtoher.Alfmightwellberightabout
this.OritmightbethatBettyisopenlyjustified,butforsomereasonAlfcannotrecognisethis.Ineither
case, claiming that a law is justified to someone based on their word even though one cannot
comprehend how this is the case fails to take them seriously as a personwho should not be coerced
lightly. If one believes that a law cannot be justified to another then imposing it upon them is
25Forsupportfor‘adhocjustification’,wheredifferentcitizensareoffereddifferentreasonsforalaw,seeWolterstorff(1997,pp.106-107);Swaine(2009,pp.191-193);Stout(2004,pp.72-73);Eberle(2007,pp.434-435).
11
disrespectful. This iswhy theremust be an intelligibility requirement; onemust recognise that a law is
openlyjustifiedtoanotheragentinordertosincerelyclaimthattheyarejustifiedinendorsingit.26
Convergencejustificationscanfulfilthesincerityrequirement.AslongasRbisintelligibletoAlfandRais
intelligible toBetty, they canboth sincerely support L,despite lacking shared reasons.27 L is justified to
bothindividualsbyreasonstheyaccept,andtheycaneachrecognisethatLisjustifiedtotheother,sothe
sincerityrequirementisfulfilled.
SharedValuesandSocialUnityA secondobjection to convergence justifications is that they fail to incorporate an important aspect of
publicjustification:sharedvalues.Formanytheorists,oneofthecentralattractionsofpoliticalliberalism
is that it createsapolityunitedbya setofvaluesandprinciples thatall canendorse.StephenMacedo
statesthatpolitical liberalsseek ‘politicalprinciplesthatcanbepublicly justifiedandwidelyaffirmedby
reasonable people in a diverse society’ (Macedo1997, p. 2). Requiring consensus justifications ensures
that citizens justify laws by appeal to values that all can accept, thus creating a polity unified around
shared motivations for political action. Consensus is not simply on each law, but also on the values
underlyingthelaws.
Convergencejustificationslackthisdimension.Lawsarejustifiedtocitizensbydiversereasonsandvalues.
Each accepts laws for her own reasons, which may not be shared by others. While it is likely that
subgroupswithinsocietysharevalues that theydrawonto justify laws, thereneednotbeanypolitical
principles accepted by all citizens. Permitting convergence removes an important aspect of political
liberalism’sappeal.28
26ThispointcanalsobemadeusingSwaine’s(2009,pp.194-196)distinctionbetweeninaccessibleandincomprehensiblereasons.Inaccessiblereasonsareopenlyjustifiedtoanotherindividual,butrelyonexperiencesonelacksorpremisesonerejects.Theyareintelligible;onecanseethattheyareopenlyjustifiedtotheother.Incomprehensiblereasonsaresimplyimpenetrable;onecannotmakesenseofthem.Theyareunintelligible.Appealtoanother’sinaccessiblereasonsisn’tdisrespectful;appealtotheirincomprehensiblereasonsis.27Asareviewerrightlynoted,therearedifficultquestionshereaboutpreciselywhenanother’sbeliefsare,orarenot,intelligible.He/sheofferedacasewhereBettybasesabeliefon‘mysticalperception’ofGod’scommands(onwhich,seeEberle(2002,pp.239-251)).Icannotofferafullreplytosuchcases,butthemostimportantpointtonoteisthatintelligibleopenjustificationdoesnotrequirethatwebelieveothers’basicevaluativestandards,orworldview,tobesound,orall-things-consideredjustified.Quong(2011,pp.271-272)rightlyarguesthatweshouldnotexpectthisofcitizens.Instead,intelligibleopenjustificationcentresonwhetherwecanrecognisethatothers’beliefsarejustifiedtothemgiventheirevaluativestandards.IfBetty’sbeliefinmysticalperceptionispartofabroader,reasonablycoherent,worldview,thenIthinkthatitcanbeintelligible,evenifAlfconsidersitmisguided.UsingSwaine’sdistinction,thebeliefisinaccessibletoAlf,butnotincomprehensible.28Macedo(2010)arguesalongtheselines.Mydiscussiondiffersfrom,butdoesnotcontradict,Vallier’s(2011b)replytoMacedo.
12
Asapreliminaryresponse,Valliernotesthat ‘convergencedoesnotruleoutcommonreasoning; itonly
allows diverse reasoning’ (Vallier 2011b, p. 272). Theories that permit convergence can still encourage
consensus justificationswhereverpossible.Convergence justificationsaresimplyalsopermitted.Shared
values and principles can be as common, and appealed to as often, as ifwe only permitted consensus
justifications,andfurtheroverlaponlawsjustifiedbydiversevaluesisthenalsoencouraged.
Topresstheobjection,onemustthereforearguethatpermittingconvergenceunderminesthebenefitsof
consensus. Society is less unified, sincemany laws are justified by convergence. Further, shared values
themselvesmightbeundermined.Theyarenotnecessaryforjustifyinglaws,soarenolongerthefocusof
politicallife,andarenotencouragedtothesameextent.
Evenifthisweretrue,itdoesnotgiveusreasontofavourexistingconsensus-onlytheories,becausesuch
viewspermittheenactmentoflawsthatarenotjustifiedtoallcitizens.Alawthatisjustifiedbyappealto
valuesthatallcitizensacceptmightnotbejustifiedtoall(Wolterstorff2007,p.150).Citizenscansharea
setofvaluesyetdisagreeonwhethertheygiverisetoreasonssufficienttojustifyacertainlaw.Permitting
the enactment of such laws, as existing consensus theories do, fails to respect all citizens as free and
equal.Thiscannotbejustifiedbypotentialgainsinsocialunity.
Quong’s view provides an example here. Quong (2011, Chapter 6) argues that all reasonable citizens
acceptthreegeneralliberalprinciplesofjustice.Theseare:
(i) Allcitizensshouldbeassignedbasicrightsandliberties.
(ii) Theserightsandlibertiesshouldbegivenspecialpriority.
(iii) Allcitizensmusthaveadequateall-purposemeanstomakeuseoftheirrightsandliberties.
Each citizen also endorses some reasonable political conception of justice,which interprets and orders
variouspoliticalvaluesthatallacceptonthebasisof(i)-(iii).Thisgivesacommonbasisforpublicdecision-
making.Eachcitizencanappealtothebalanceofsharedvalueswithintheirconceptionofjustice,andany
lawthatisjustifiedbysuchaconceptioncanbelegitimatelyenacted.
This view permits the enactment of laws that are not justified to all. Anthony and Belinda both have
reasonsforandagainstlawL,arisingfromtheirrespective(reasonable)conceptionsofjustice,JaandJb.L
hasegalitarianmerits,butwouldalsorestrictfreedomofchoice.Onbalance,AnthonyconsidersLtobe
justified,while Belinda considers it to be unjustified, because Jb places lessweight on equality than Ja
does.BelindabelievesL’srestrictionoffreedomistoogreattojustifythereductionininequality.Shehas
decisivereasontorejectthe law,sothecoercion it involves isnot justifiedtoher.OnQuong’saccount,
however,Lcanbelegitimatelyenacted,sincethereisareasonablebalanceofpoliticalvaluesaccordingto
13
whichitisjustified(i.e.Anthony’s).ThefactthatthelawisnotjustifiedtoBelindadoesnotstopitbeing
enacted.
Quong would respond to such examples by arguing that the law is in fact justified to Belinda in the
relevantsense,bydrawingonhisdistinctionbetween‘foundational’and‘justificatory’disagreements.Ifa
lawisjustifiedsolelybyappealtoaparticularconceptionofthegoodthenthosewhorejectthelawhave
a‘foundationaldisagreement’withthelaw’sadvocates.Theydonot‘shareanypremiseswhichcanserve
asamutuallyacceptablestandardof justification’ (Quong2011,p.193).They lackanysharedvaluesby
whichtheirdisputecanbeadjudicated.Ineffect,thosewhorejectthelawhavebeenofferednoreasons
initsfavour,sinceacontroversialconceptionofthegoodcannotprovideamutuallyacceptablestandard
ofjustification.
Thecaseisverydifferent,forQuong,whenalawisjustifiedbyappealtoareasonablepoliticalconception
of justice, even one that some citizens reject. The disagreement in this case is ‘justificatory’, because
reasonable citizens share a set of values that ‘serve as amutually acceptable standardof justification,’
though they ‘nevertheless disagree about certain substantive conclusions’ (Quong 2011, p. 204). The
values used to justify the law aremutually acceptable, even though the parties disagree on the ‘exact
weightorrankingofthosevaluesorprinciples’(Quong2011,p.207),andthusdisagreeonwhetherthose
valuessupportthislaw.Allcitizenscanrecognisethatthelawisjustifiedbyappealtoaplausiblebalance
ofvaluesthattheyaccept.Itistruethatsomecitizenswillinterpretorweighthosevaluesdifferently,and
thusrejectthe law.Buttheirfreedomandequality isrespected,becausetheirdisagreementwiththose
whoadvocatethelawismerelyjustificatory,notfoundational.Theycanendorsethevaluesusedtojustify
thelaw,soitisjustifiedtothem.29
In my view, this account of what is involved in justifying coercion to an individual fails to fulfil the
requirementsofrespect.Acoercivelawisnotjustifiedtoanindividualwhentheyhaveconclusivereason
to reject it. This is true even if they can recognise that some reasonable interpretation of values they
acceptsupports the law,so theirdisagreementwith itsadvocates is justificatory. IfCharlottecoercively
interfereswithDonaldandoffersajustificationappealingtoavaluethatDonaldaccepts,butwhichinthis
instanceiscompletelyoutweighedwithinhisbelief-valueset,thenCharlottedoesnotshowhimadequate
respect.CharlottemotionstowardrespectforDonald,engagingwithhisperspectivetosomedegree,but
picksoutreasonsfavouringherinterferencewhileignoringthefactthathehasconclusivecountervailing
reasons.Similarly,Belindaisnotshownsufficientrespect ifL isenacted.Accordingtoherconceptionof
29InLister’s(2013b)terms,Quong’sviewappliesthe‘unanimousacceptabilityrequirement’tothereasonsfordecisions,ratherthantodecisionsthemselves.
14
justice,L isobjectionable,andthusit isnot justifiedtoher,evenif it is justifiedaccordingtoadifferent
reasonablepoliticalconception.
OurunderstandingofPJPshouldincludea‘conclusivityrequirement’.Citizensmusthavesufficientreason
to endorse a law, so lack decisive reasons to reject it, in order for its imposition upon them to be
legitimate. Sincehis view lacks such a requirement,Quongpermits coercion that is not justified to the
coerced.Thesameistrueofalltheoriesthatclaimthatappealto(aplausiblebalanceof)sharedvaluesis
sufficienttofulfilPJP.
WemightamendQuong’saccounttoincludeaconclusivityrequirement,byholdingthatinorderforalaw
tobepublicly justifiedall citizens’political conceptionsof justicemustendorse it.Allmustendorse the
lawonthebasisoftheirreasonablebalancesofpoliticalvalues.Butthisaccountstillfailstotrulyrespect
citizens,duetoitsdismissalfrompublicjustificationofvaluesthatacitizenacceptsbutarenotsharedby
allothers.Basedsolelyonherpoliticalconceptionofjustice,EricaviewsLasjust,buthercomprehensive
doctrinegivesherdecisivereasonstorejectLandconsideritunjust.OnQuong’sview,onlysharedvalues
count,andallreasonablecitizensrecognisethispriorityofpoliticalvalues.However,itisnotunreasonable
for Erica to object to L based on the fact that it is ruled out by her comprehensive doctrine.30 It is
disrespectful toclaim thatL is justified toherby sharedvalues,whenher fullbelief-valuesetgivesher
conclusivereasontorejectL.31
Inmyview,therefore,lawsmustbeconclusivelyjustifiedtoeachcitizenonthebasisofallofherreasons,
taking her full belief-value set into account.32 Convergence justifications achieve this, while existing
theoriesthatrequiresharedvaluesdonot.
The‘conclusivityrequirement’mightseemtohaveundesirableimplications,however.Perhapsfew,ifany,
lawswillbeconclusivelyjustifiedtoeverycitizen,andthusconvergencepoliticalliberalismwillleadtoan
ultra-minimalstate,oreventoanarchism.Ifaninterpretationofwhatrespectforpersonsdemandswith
regard to the justification of coercion inevitably rules out almost all laws as illegitimate, then that
interpretationissurelyimplausiblystrong.
30NotethatEricaisnothereimposinghercomprehensivedoctrineonothers,orarguingthatitprovidesreasonsforthem,merelythatitprovidesreasonforhertorejectL.31GausandVallier(2009,pp.62-65)callarefusaltoallowreligiousreasonstoactatdefeatersthe‘errorofsymmetry’.32IamdrawingontheinternalistunderstandingofreasonsthatIdefendedintheprevioussectionhere.IfQuong’sinterpretationofthesincerityrequirementwascorrect,thensharedvalueswouldbenecessaryforpublicjustification.Myargumentsinthissectionthusdependonthesuccessofmyargumentsintheprevioussection.
15
Whethertheconclusivityrequirementdoeshavesuchimplicationsdependsonhowitisinterpreted.Ifa
citizenmustconsidera lawtobethebestpossible lawinorderfor it tobeconclusively justifiedtoher,
thenwewillcertainlygetanarchisticresults.Nolawwouldbeconsideredoptimalbyeverycitizen.Thisis
an implausible interpretation of conclusivity, however.Muchmore plausible isGaus’s (2010b, pp. 195-
197) claim thata law is conclusively justified toa citizenwhen,according toher (moderately idealised)
belief-value set, it is an improvement on having no law on this issue. Thismeans that she prefers this
coercive law to facing no such coercion, and thus it is justified to her. The conclusivity requirement is
violatedwhencitizenshavedecisivereasonstorejectlaws,suchthattheyviewalawasbeingworsethan
havingnosuchlaw.
The implications of this view ultimately depend upon the beliefs and values of citizenswithin a polity.
Respect for citizensmeans that lawsmust be conclusively justified to them on the basis of their own
belief-value sets, and therefore it is thosebelief-value sets that determinewhat laws are, and arenot,
publicly justified. There are good reasons tobelieve that this viewwouldnot have anarchistic, or even
ultra-minimalstate,implications,however,giventhemanygoodsthatareachievedbysocialcoordination
throughlaw(seeGaus2011).33Gaus(2010a)arguesthattheconvergenceviewhasa‘classicalliberaltilt’,
renderingillegitimatelawsimplementinghighlevelsofredistribution.WhileIlackspacetoshowithere,I
believe that his arguments for this conclusion are flawed, and Gaus’s own view in fact permits more
redistributionthanherecognises.34
Sofarinthissection,Ihavearguedthatexistingconsensus-onlyviews,whichdonotincludeaconclusivity
requirement, fail to adequately respect citizens as free and equal. Quong’s distinction between
justificatoryandfoundationaldisagreementdoesnothavethenormativesignificancethatheclaims,so
cannotrebutthisobjection.Ihavealsobrieflyexplainedmyunderstandingof‘conclusivity’,whichfollows
Gaus’s,andwhyIdonotthinkitleadstoanultra-minimalstate.
ThereisonepoliticalliberalviewthatIhavenotconsidered,however,whichendorsesconclusivitywhile
also seeking to maintain the importance of shared values. According to this view, laws must be
conclusivelyjustifiedtoallcitizensbytheirownbelief-valuesets,andmustalsobejustifiedbyappealtoa
reasonablebalanceofsharedvalues.35
33Ilackspacetodefendthisclaimhere.Thequestionoftheimplicationsofconvergencepoliticalliberalism,giventhisunderstandingofconclusivity,isanareainwhichmoreworkisneededfromdefendersoftheview.34Forargumentstothiseffect,seeLister(2013a),Baccarini(2013,pp.40-49).TheimplicationsofconvergencepoliticalliberalismdependontheprecisespecificationofPJP.Forcriticaldiscussion,seeLister(2013b,pp.81-101).Gaus(2010b)repliestosomeofLister’sarguments.35Notheoristhasendorsedthisview,asfarasIamaware.
16
Theimplicationsofthisviewintermsofwhatlawsarepubliclyjustifiedareprobablyverysimilartothose
ofconvergencepoliticalliberalism.Mostlawsthatareconclusivelyjustifiedtoallcitizenswillhavesome
plausiblejustificationusingsharedvalues.Anadvocateoftheviewwouldarguethatitachievesahigher
level of social unity that convergence political liberalism, however, due to requiring appeals to shared
values. Thisensures that citizens can recognise common reasons for laws, soareunitedaround shared
politicalpurposes.
Thisargumentismistaken,however.Themerefactthatlawsarejustifiedbyappealtosharedvalues, in
additiontobeingconclusivelyjustifiedtoall,doesnotincreasesocialunity,becauseformanycitizensitis
notthosesharedvaluesthatactuallyjustifyparticularlawstothem.Imightrejecttheinterpretationand
weightingofsharedvaluesthatisusedtosupportapubliclyjustifiedlaw,whilenonethelessendorsingthe
law,becauseitisconclusivelyjustifiedtomeonthebasisofmyfullbelief-valueset.WhileIdonotthinkit
is justified by shared values, I have other, comprehensively-based, reasons to endorse it. The law is
justified to all, but there is no consensus on the values that underlie it, so no deeper social unity is
achievedbytheappealtosharedvalues.
This isnot tosay that there isdisunity insuchcases,or thatconvergencepolitical liberalismdenies the
valueofsocialunity.Thefactthat lawsareconclusively justifiedtoall itselfachievesavaluable idealof
socialunity,sinceitmeansthatallcanendorsethelawsthattheyliveundertogether.Further,Iamnot
denyingthatsharedvalueswillbeusedto justify laws. Indeed,citizenshaveclearpragmatic reasons to
appealtovaluesthattheysharewithothers inordertopersuadethemofthemeritsofparticular laws.
Appealstobothsharedandunsharedvalueswillbecommon.
The crucial point, however, is that once we recognise that respect for persons requires that laws are
conclusivelyjustifiedtoall,thereisnofurtherbenefitgainedfromalsorequiringthatlawsarejustifiedby
appealtosharedvalues.Sharedvaluesarenotnecessaryforpublicjustification,sincelawscanbejustified
tocitizensbyadiverserangeofreasonsandvalues.Further,requiringappealstosharedvaluesinaddition
to conclusive justificationdoesnotachieveanygreaterdegreeof socialunity,or senseofbeingunited
around shared reasons for political action, since it will often not be those shared values that actually
justify laws tosome,orevenmany,citizens.Thosecitizensconsider the interpretationofsharedvalues
that isused to justify the lawmistaken,although theyendorse the lawon thebasisof their fullbelief-
valuesets.
TheRoleofDeliberation
17
Athirdobjectiontoconvergencejustificationsisthattheyundervaluedeliberation.Theyconfinetherole
ofpublicdiscoursetothediscoveryofreasonscitizensalreadyhave,inordertoidentifywhetherlawsare
justified to them. Deliberation is not necessary for public justification; all that is required is that each
citizenhassufficientreasontoendorselaws.Politicalliberalismshouldincludeagreaterrolethanthisfor
deliberation.Requiringconsensusjustificationsencouragesdeliberationbyobligingcitizenstoshowthat
their common values can support laws. Citizens deliberate together on themerits of each policy from
theirsharedperspective.Convergenceremovesthiscentralroleofdeliberation,soshouldberejected.
Quong levels this criticismatGausandVallier, arguing that their exclusive focuson lawsbeingpublicly
justified gives ‘a slightly impoverished conception of public reason’s value’ (Quong 2008, p. 17). By
engaging in the practice of public reason, deliberating over the justification of laws, citizens manifest
respectforoneanotherasfreeandequal,honouringtheideathateachisowedjustificationforthelaws
theyliveunder.Civicrespectisrealisedbypractisingpublicreasoning,notmerelybyenactedlawsbeing
publiclyjustified.
Toassesthisobjection,wemustidentifytherolesthatdeliberationshouldplaywithinpoliticalliberalism.
Boettcher offers three. First, deliberation enables citizens to understand others’ arguments and views.
Citizens exchange reasons ‘in order to improve their decision-making and better understand their
differentclaims,arguments,andconceptionsofjustice’(Boettcher2007,p.225).Second,deliberationcan
changecitizens’judgments,astheyrecognisetheforceofothers’arguments.Citizens‘shouldbewillingto
revisetheirpoliticaljudgmentsthroughdiscussionanddeliberationwithothers’(Boettcher2007,p.225).
Third,deliberationshouldaimat theachievementof justice,or thecommongood(Boettcher2005,pp.
503-504).
These three aspects of deliberation are indeed appealing. However, it is not immediately clear how
importanttheyareinatheoryofpublicjustification.Theyconcernthewayinwhichcitizensdirectlyshow
respecttooneanother,whereasPJP’simmediateconcernisthatlawsbejustifiedtoeverycitizen.Ideals
ofpublicreasonarealmostalwaysjustifiedbyanappealtotheneedtojustifycoerciontothecoerced,yet
thiscanbefulfilledbyonlylawsthatcanbejustifiedtoeverycitizenbeingenacted.36Themainvaluethat
deliberation appears to have is that itmakes information available as towhat reasons citizens have in
relationtoalaw.Deliberationisausefulwayforallthedifferentreasonsforalawtobeputforward,in
ordertoidentifywhetheritcanbepubliclyjustified.Itisthusameanstoanend:itishelpfulinensuring
thatallcitizensarerespected,byonlylawsthatcanbejustifiedtothembeingenacted.
36And,perhaps,thispublicjustificationbeingpubliclyoffered.
18
Nonetheless, we should certainly also require that citizens directly show one another respect in their
publicinteractions.Ifcitizensaretorespectoneanotherintheirpoliticalconductthentheyshouldindeed
deliberativelyengagewithoneanother,offeringanddiscussing reasons forandagainst laws,andbeing
readytochangetheirviews.Ifapubliclyjustifiedlawisenactedwithoutanydeliberationhavingoccurred
amongthecitizenrythennoindividualhasbeenwrongedbybeingunjustifiablycoerced.Yetdeliberation
remains a central aspect of citizens’ obligations, and something which political liberalism should
encourage. Does a theory permitting convergence justifications by necessity place too little value on
deliberation,sofailtoencourageadequatemanifestationsofrespect?
It might appear so. Under convergence, citizens have laws justified to them by different reasons, so
deliberation need not aim at identifying shared values and reasons. Citizens are not obligated to
deliberatebasedonasharedperspective,ortodemonstratetoothersthattheirsharedprinciplessupport
alaw.Thus,deliberation’sroleisreducedcomparedtowhenonlyconsensusjustificationsarepermitted.
Publicjustificationconsistsmerelyindemonstratingthatdifferentreasonscanbeusedtojustifythelaw
toeachcitizen,giventheirbeliefs-valuesets.
This analysis ismistaken. Convergence shouldnot takepre-deliberative opinions as fixed.Although the
focus is on ensuring that citizens have sufficient reason to endorse laws, this will often be achieved
throughdiscussion.Acitizen’sbeliefscanbechangedthroughdeliberation,causinghertoacceptreasons
shepreviously rejected. Sometimes the lawwill alreadyhavebeen justified toher: her belief-value set
alreadygavesufficientreasonforit,althoughshedidnotrealisethis.Inmanycases,however,herbelief-
valuesetitselfwillbechangedbydeliberation,solawsthatwerenotpreviouslyjustifiedtoherwillcome
tobeso.Persuasioniscrucialtotheachievementofconvergencejustifications.
Ifwepermitconvergencejustificationsthenwecannotexpectanyindividualcitizentojustify lawstoall
other citizens, showing each that they have reason to support a law. Nonetheless, deliberation is
important on a smaller scale. Citizenswhoadvocate a law should seek topersuade those theydirectly
engagewiththattheyhavereasontosupportit.Thiscanbeachievedbyappealeithertosharedvaluesor
to idiosyncratic values thatone’s interlocutorsaccept.Convergencecan thusbemore deliberative than
consensus.Ratherthandeliberationbeinglimitedtothediscussionofsharedvaluesandreasons,citizens
canengagewithothers’comprehensivedoctrinesandseektoshowthattheseprovidereasonsforlaws.
Convergenceallowscitizenstoengagewithallofeachothers’reasons,ratherthanonlywiththosethat
aresharedbyall.Thisencouragesmoredeliberation,ratherthanless.
Further, deliberation is not necessary for public justification on a consensus view either. The state, or
individual citizens, could identify laws that are justified by shared values without participating in
19
deliberation.Aslongasacitizenbelievesthatpublicreasonsjustifyalaw,theycanlegitimatelysupportit
anditcanbelegitimatelyenacted.Deliberationisnotneeded.Thedirectrolefordeliberationarisingfrom
the need for publicly justified laws isminimal, even on a consensus view. Indeed, convergence gives a
needforallthedifferentreasonsthatcitizenshavetobecomeknown,anddeliberationisusefulforthis,
whereasonaconsensusviewonlyalimitednumberofreasonsandvaluesarerelevant,andcitizensmight
knowmanyofthesewithoutengagingindeliberation.More,ratherthanless,deliberationandpersuasion
mightbeneededinorderforconvergencejustificationstobeachieved.
Deliberation has an important place within political liberalism. It is a central way that citizens directly
manifest respect for one another, and persuade one another of the merits of proposed laws. All the
arguments for this equally apply under convergence, and deliberation will still be encouraged if
convergencejustificationsarepermitted.Convergenceallowsatleastasmuchofarolefordeliberationas
consensusdoes.
ConclusionConvergence justifications are legitimate forms of public justification. They satisfy the requirement,
demandedbyrespectforpersons,thatlawsbejustifiedtoeverycitizen,andthethreeobjectionstothem
that I have considered all fail. As I outlined above, this has significant implications for the constraints
applyingtotheconductofcitizens.Theseareimplicationsthatweshouldaccept.Infact,theymightwell
make political liberalismmore attractive tomany of its critics, particularly those defending the role of
religioninpubliclife.
Acknowledgements ThispaperoriginatesfrommyMPhilandPhDresearch,whichweresupportedby
anArts&HumanitiesResearchCouncilStudentship.Fornumeroushelpfulcomments,Iwishtothankmy
supervisor,StuartWhite,andtheaudienceattheOxfordGraduatePoliticalTheoryWorkshop,particularly
Franz Mang and Matthias Brinkmann. This essay was previously shortlisted for the Res Publica
postgraduateessayprize2014.Iowethankstotheanonymousreviewersbothoftheversionofthepaper
thatIsubmittedfortheessayprizeandofearlierdraftsofthisversion.
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