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Copyright © 2012 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. Chapter 27 Regulation and Antitrust Policy in a Globalized Economy

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Copyright © 2012 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved.

Chapter 27

Regulation and Antitrust Policyin a Globalized Economy

Copyright © 2012 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-2

Introduction

Congress has assigned the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to enforce new food-labeling regulations for large supermarkets and restaurant chains.

In this chapter, you will learn about both the costs and benefits of government regulation, such as those new regulations enforced by the USDA and FDA.

Copyright © 2012 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-3

Learning Objectives

• Distinguish between economic regulation and social regulation

• Recognize the practical difficulties in regulating the prices charged by natural monopolies

• Explain the main rationales for government regulation of industries that are not inherently monopolistic

Copyright © 2012 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-4

Learning Objectives (cont'd)

• Identify alternative theories aimed at explaining the behavior of regulators

• Understand the foundations of antitrust laws and regulations

• Discuss basic issues in enforcing antitrust laws

Copyright © 2012 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-5

Chapter Outline

• Forms of Industry Regulation• Regulating Natural Monopolies • Regulating Nonmonopolistic Industries

• Incentives and Costs of Regulation• Antitrust Policy• Antitrust Enforcement

Copyright © 2012 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-6

Did You Know That ...

• In a recent year not only did 285 laws enacted by the U.S. Congress go into effect, but U.S. federal agencies also imposed 3,830 new regulatory rules?

• While many of these rules are intended to promote greater economic efficiency and benefit consumers, some critics have estimated that the annual cost of complying with these regulations exceeds $1 trillion.

• In this chapter, you will study the economic effects of regulation.

Copyright © 2012 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-7

Forms of Industry Regulation

• The U.S. government began regulating social and economic activity early in the nation’s history.

• The amount of government regulation began increasing in the twentieth century.

Copyright © 2012 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-8

Figure 27-1 Regulation on the Rise

Sources: Institute for University Studies; Federal Register, various issues.

Copyright © 2012 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-9

Forms of Industry Regulation (cont'd)

• Two basic types of government regulation:

1.Economic regulation of natural monopolies and nonmonopolistic industries

2.Social regulation which covers all industries

Copyright © 2012 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-10

Forms of Industry Regulation (cont'd)

• Economic regulation of natural monopolies

– Initially, most economic regulation in the United States was aimed at controlling prices in industries considered natural monopolies

– Over time, federal and state governments have sought to influence products and processes of firms in a variety of industries

Copyright © 2012 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-11

Forms of Industry Regulation (cont'd)

• Economic regulation of nonmonopolistic industries

– Securities (SEC)

– Banking (Fed, FDIC, Comptroller)

– Transportation (FAA)

– Communications (FCC)

Copyright © 2012 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-12

Forms of Industry Regulation (cont'd)

• Social regulation

– The aim is better quality of life

• Improved products

• Less pollution

• Better working conditions

Copyright © 2012 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-13

Table 27-1 Federal Agencies Engaged in Social Regulation

Copyright © 2012 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-14

Regulating Natural Monopolies

• The theory of natural monopoly regulation includes our understanding of:

– Unregulated natural monopoly

– Impracticality of marginal cost pricing

– Average cost pricing

Copyright © 2012 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-15

Regulating Natural Monopolies (cont'd)

• Recall

– Natural monopoly is a monopoly arising from the peculiar production characteristics in an industry

– It usually arises when there are large economies of scale relative to the industry’s demand

– One firm can produce at a lower average cost than can be achieved by multiple firms

Copyright © 2012 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-16

Figure 27-2 Profit Maximization and Regulation Through Marginal Cost Pricing, Panel (a)

Max profits at point A where marginal cost equals marginal revenue

Copyright © 2012 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-17

Figure 27-2 Profit Maximization and Regulation Through Marginal Cost Pricing, Panel (b)

Losses eventually drive the natural monopolist out of business

Copyright © 2012 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-18

Regulating Natural Monopolies (cont'd)

• Methods of rate regulation

– Cost-of-Service Regulation• Regulation based on allowing prices to reflect only the actual cost of production and no monopoly profits

– Rate-of-Return Regulation• Regulation that seeks to keep the rate of return in the industry at a competitive level by not allowing excessive prices to be charged

Copyright © 2012 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-19

Regulating Natural Monopolies (cont'd)

• Natural monopolies no more?– Are natural monopolies a thing of the past?

• Before answering this question, consider:

– Electricity and natural gas: separating production from delivery

– Telecommunications services meet the Internet

Copyright © 2012 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-20

Regulating Nonmonopolistic Industries

• Protecting consumer interests has been the main rationale for governmental regulatory functions

• The Latin phrase caveat emptor, “let the buyer beware,” was once the operative principle, but no more

Copyright © 2012 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-21

Regulating Nonmonopolistic Industries (cont'd)

• Rationales for government oversight in nonmonopolistic industries

– Market failure arising from externalities

– The need for consumer protection arising from asymmetric information

Copyright © 2012 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-22

Regulating Nonmonopolistic Industries (cont'd)

• The Lemons Problem

– The potential for asymmetric information to bring about a general decline in product quality in an industry

• Credence goods such as pharmaceuticals, health care, and professional services are vulnerable to the lemons problem.

Copyright © 2012 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-23

Regulating Nonmonopolistic Industries (cont'd)

• Implementing consumer protection regulation

– Liability laws and government licensing

– Direct economic and social regulation

Copyright © 2012 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-24

Incentives and Costs of Regulation

• Abiding by government regulations can be costly

– Consequently, businesses engage in activities intended to avoid intent or to change regulations agencies establish

Copyright © 2012 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-25

Incentives and Costs of Regulation (cont'd)

• Creative response and feedback effects: Results of regulation

– Creative Response

• Behavior on the part of a firm that allows it to comply with the letter of the law but violates the spirit, significantly lessening the law’s effects

Copyright © 2012 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-26

Incentives and Costs of Regulation (cont'd)

• Creative response and feedback effects: Results of regulation

– Feedback effect• Changing behavior after the regulation that offset the regulation

– Example• HOV lanes added to combat air pollution have higher accident rates

Copyright © 2012 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-27

Policy Example: Food Makers Respond to Regulation by Replacing Trans Fats

• Because trans fats—fats created when hydrogen is added to vegetable oil—induce the human body to boost production of unhealthful cholesterol, the FDA has decided to require companies to disclose the amounts of trans fats in their food products.

• In response, companies have replaced the trans fats with equally unhealthful ingredients of saturated fats, such as coconut oil and palm oil, so that the total fat content of the food remained the same but with no trans fats.

Copyright © 2012 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-28

Incentives and Costs of Regulation (cont'd)

• The Capture Hypothesis

– Predicts that the regulators will eventually be captured by the special interests of the industry being regulated

Copyright © 2012 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-29

Policy Example: The Tobacco Industry Sees Benefits in Regulation

• Tobacco firms are among the strongest supporters of the new legislation that grants the FDA the authority to regulate the tobacco industry. Why?– While the new regulation does not permit the FDA to ban existing tobacco products, it would eliminate threats of entry by new competitors as the FDA is unlikely to approve any new tobacco products.

– The FDA would now be required to stop the distribution of counterfeit cigarettes, so that another source of competition would be removed.

Copyright © 2012 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-30

Incentives and Costs of Regulation (cont'd)

• The Share-the-Gains, Share-the-Pains Theory

– States that regulators must take account of the demands of three groups: legislators, members of the regulated industry, and consumers of the regulated industry’s product or service

Copyright © 2012 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-31

Incentives and Costs of Regulation (cont'd)

• The benefits and costs of regulation

– Regulation offers many potential benefits

– Actual benefits are more difficult to measure

Copyright © 2012 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-32

Incentives and Costs of Regulation (cont'd)

• Direct costs to taxpayers

– Taxpayers pay more than $40 billion per year

– Agencies employ more than 250,000 employees

Copyright © 2012 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-33

Figure 27-3 The Distribution of Federal Regulatory Spending

Copyright © 2012 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-34

Incentives and Costs of Regulation (cont'd)

• The total social cost of regulation

– Explicit costs of compliance in the United States is estimated to be between $500 billion and $600 billion per year

– Economists estimate the opportunity cost of complying with federal regulations may be as high as $270 billion

– Add state and municipal regulations, and consider all implicit and explicit costs, and we are over $1 trillion in total

Copyright © 2012 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-35

Antitrust Policy

• An expressed aim of the U.S. government is to foster competition

• This is the general idea behind antitrust legislation

• Congress has enacted four key antitrust laws, seen in Table 27-2

• The most important of these laws is the Sherman Act

Copyright © 2012 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-36

Table 27-2 Key U.S. Antitrust Laws

Copyright © 2012 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-37

Antitrust Policy (cont'd)

• Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890

– Section 1

• Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal.

Copyright © 2012 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-38

Antitrust Policy (cont'd)

• Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890

– Section 2

• Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce… shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.

Copyright © 2012 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-39

Antitrust Policy (cont'd)

• The Clayton Act of 1914– Passed to remove the vagueness of the Sherman Act

• Federal Trade Commission Act in 1914– Established the Federal Trade Commission to investigate unfair trade practices and enumerated certain business practices that involved overly aggressive competition.

– An amendment in 1938 expressly prohibited “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce”

Copyright © 2012 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-40

Antitrust Policy (cont'd)

• The Robinson-Patman Act of 1936

– Amended Section 2 of the Clayton Act

– Designed to protect independent retailers and wholesalers from “unfair discrimination” by chain stores

Copyright © 2012 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-41

Antitrust Policy (cont'd)

• Exemptions from antitrust laws

– All labor unions

– Public utilities – electric, gas, and telephone

– Professional baseball

– Cooperative activities among U.S. exporters

Copyright © 2012 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-42

Antitrust Policy (cont'd)

• Exemptions from antitrust laws

– Hospitals

– Public transit and water systems

– Suppliers of military equipment

– Joint publishing arrangement in a single city by two or more newspapers

Copyright © 2012 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-43

International Policy Example: Antitrust Authorities Fine Intel for Its Low Prices

• Recently, Advanced Micro Devices (AMD)—the second largest global producer of microprocessors, which power computer and other computing devices—filed an antitrust in Europe against Intel—the largest microprocessor producer—for setting its prices of microprocessors below the average total costs of Intel’s competitors in order to induce them to exit the market.

• Soon after Intel paid a $1.45 billion fine and then another $1.25 billion to AMD as part of a legal settlement, consumers were paying higher prices for microprocessors.

Copyright © 2012 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-44

Antitrust Policy (cont'd)

• International Discord in Antitrust Policy

– As more U.S. firms seek to merge with companies in other countries, the international dimensions of antitrust policy become more important

– In the European Union, there are restrictions against any business combination that would enhance the market dominance of one firm

Copyright © 2012 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-45

Antitrust Enforcement

• Monopolization

– The possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power

– As distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historical accident

Copyright © 2012 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-46

Antitrust Enforcement (cont'd)

• Market Share Test

– The percentage of a market that a particular firm supplies; used as the primary measure of monopoly power

Copyright © 2012 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-47

Antitrust Enforcement (cont'd)

• The relevant market

– The relevant product market

– The relevant geographic market

Copyright © 2012 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-48

Antitrust Enforcement (cont'd)

• A particular problem in U.S. antitrust enforcement is determining whether a firm has engaged in “willful acquisition or maintenance” of market power

• What appears as good business to some may look like antitrust violations to others

Copyright © 2012 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-49

Why Not … outlaw all mergers between firms that sell similar items?

• While some mergers lead to reductions in quantities and increases in market prices, a number of mergers in fact result in the combined firm incurring lower marginal cost than the individual firms incurred before their merger.

• Thus, in many markets in which mergers occur, the mergers result in higher production and lower equilibrium prices.

Copyright © 2012 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-50

Antitrust Enforcement (cont'd)

• Versioning

– Selling a product in slightly altered forms to different groups of consumers

– An example is selling software in “professional” and “standard” versions

Copyright © 2012 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-51

Antitrust Enforcement (cont'd)

• Bundling

– Offering two or more products for sale as a set

Copyright © 2012 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-52

Antitrust Enforcement (cont'd)

• Tie-In Sales

– Purchases of one product that are permitted by the seller only if the consumer buys another good or service from the same firm

Copyright © 2012 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-53

You Are There: A Church Loses a Pie Fight with Pennsylvania

• In Rochester, Pennsylvania, some attendees of a Friday fish-fry dinner at one catholic church set out pies for sales, with the proceeds slated for church upkeep and charity work.

• The Pennsylvania Department of Agriculture banned the pie sales because the pies were not baked in the church’s state-approved kitchen.

• While the ban caused a potential loss of revenues from pie sales, the media attention raised public awareness of the church’s Friday dinners and thus boosting revenues from the dinners.

Copyright © 2012 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-54

Issues & Applications: Food-Labeling Regulations Multiply

• The new grocery food-labeling regulation for fruit, vegetable and meat items may result in “small” benefits to consumers

• The USDA estimated that the costs of complying with the rule is $26,000 per store, or over $2.7 billion for society as a whole

Copyright © 2012 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-55

Issues & Applications: Food-Labeling Regulations Multiply (cont’d)

• The calorie-labeling requirements for restaurants will involve new calorie-counting software priced at $1,000 and the costs of redoing menus

• However, studies have found that, on net, offering calorie information on restaurant menus did not significantly reduce a typical consumer’s daily intake of calories

Copyright © 2012 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-56

Summary Discussion of Learning Objectives

• Government regulation of business– Includes economic and social

• Practical difficulties in regulating the prices charged by natural monopolies– Marginal cost pricing results in losses

– Regulation aims at zero economic profit

Copyright © 2012 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-57

Summary Discussion of Learning Objectives (cont'd)

• Rationales for regulating nonmonopolistic industries

– Market failure

– Asymmetric information

Copyright © 2012 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-58

Summary Discussion of Learning Objectives (cont'd)

• Regulators’ incentives and the costs of regulation

– Capture hypothesis

– Share-the-gains, share-the-pains

Copyright © 2012 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-59

Summary Discussion of Learning Objectives (cont'd)

• Foundations of antitrust

– Sherman Act (1890)

– Clayton Act (1914)

– Federal Trade Commission Act (1914)

– Robinson-Patman Act (1936)

Copyright © 2012 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-60

Summary Discussion of Learning Objectives (cont'd)

• Issues in enforcing antitrust laws

– Enforcement is through Supreme Court interpretations

– Authorities use market share test and determine “relevant market”