copyright, kevin w bowyer, 2002. (revised 25 sept 2002) video surveillance, biometrics, and privacy...

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Copyright, Kevin W Bowy er, 2002. (revised 25 Sept 2002) Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy After 9-11 Professor Kevin Bowyer Computer Science & Engineering University of Notre Dame

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Page 1: Copyright, Kevin W Bowyer, 2002. (revised 25 Sept 2002) Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy After 9-11 Professor Kevin Bowyer Computer Science

Copyright, Kevin W Bowyer, 2002. (revised 25 Sept 2002)

Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy After 9-11

Professor Kevin BowyerComputer Science & Engineering

University of Notre Dame

Page 2: Copyright, Kevin W Bowyer, 2002. (revised 25 Sept 2002) Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy After 9-11 Professor Kevin Bowyer Computer Science

Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy

Disclaimers

I receive research funding from the Defense

Advanced Research Projects Agency under

the “Human ID At A Distance” program.

I have no financial interest in any biometrics

related company.

Page 3: Copyright, Kevin W Bowyer, 2002. (revised 25 Sept 2002) Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy After 9-11 Professor Kevin Bowyer Computer Science

Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy

Overview

The “right to privacy.”

“Response-to-terrorism” motivation.

State of biometric surveillance.

The privacy versus security tradeoff.

Page 4: Copyright, Kevin W Bowyer, 2002. (revised 25 Sept 2002) Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy After 9-11 Professor Kevin Bowyer Computer Science

Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy

Video Surveillance or Privacy?

In what public places do you already assume you are under video surveillance?

When you walk into a building from a parking lot?

Page 5: Copyright, Kevin W Bowyer, 2002. (revised 25 Sept 2002) Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy After 9-11 Professor Kevin Bowyer Computer Science

Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy

Video Surveillance or Privacy?

In what public places do you already assume you are under video surveillance?

When you shop at your favorite store? Or go to your bank?

Page 6: Copyright, Kevin W Bowyer, 2002. (revised 25 Sept 2002) Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy After 9-11 Professor Kevin Bowyer Computer Science

Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy

Video Surveillance or Privacy?

In what public places do you already assume you are under video surveillance?

When you buy gas for your car?

Page 7: Copyright, Kevin W Bowyer, 2002. (revised 25 Sept 2002) Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy After 9-11 Professor Kevin Bowyer Computer Science

Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy

Video Surveillance or Privacy?

What if these daily instances of video surveillance were not just isolated commercial interests, …

but instead all part of a networked national government security plan?

Page 8: Copyright, Kevin W Bowyer, 2002. (revised 25 Sept 2002) Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy After 9-11 Professor Kevin Bowyer Computer Science

Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy

The “Right to Privacy”

“The Supreme Court has

explained that government action

constitutes a search when it

invades a person’s reasonable

expectation of privacy. …

Page 9: Copyright, Kevin W Bowyer, 2002. (revised 25 Sept 2002) Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy After 9-11 Professor Kevin Bowyer Computer Science

Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy

The “Right to Privacy”

Do citizens have a “right to privacy”

from the government?

If so, what is the basis for it?

Where does it apply and not apply?

Page 10: Copyright, Kevin W Bowyer, 2002. (revised 25 Sept 2002) Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy After 9-11 Professor Kevin Bowyer Computer Science

Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy

The “Right to Privacy”

“But the court has also found that a

person does not have a reasonable

expectation of privacy with regard

to physical characteristics that are

constantly exposed to the public, …

Page 11: Copyright, Kevin W Bowyer, 2002. (revised 25 Sept 2002) Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy After 9-11 Professor Kevin Bowyer Computer Science

Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy

The “Right to Privacy”

So although the Fourth Amendment

requires that a search conducted by

government actors be ‘reasonable,’

which generally means that there

must be some degree of suspicion …

Page 12: Copyright, Kevin W Bowyer, 2002. (revised 25 Sept 2002) Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy After 9-11 Professor Kevin Bowyer Computer Science

Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy

The “Right to Privacy”

… the scan of spectators’ facial

characteristics at the Super Bowl

did not constitute a search.”

John Woodard, RAND Tech Rep.

Page 13: Copyright, Kevin W Bowyer, 2002. (revised 25 Sept 2002) Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy After 9-11 Professor Kevin Bowyer Computer Science

Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy

The “Right to Privacy”

In summary –

There is no clear constitutional

barrier to government deploying a

national video surveillance,

identification, and tracking system.

Page 14: Copyright, Kevin W Bowyer, 2002. (revised 25 Sept 2002) Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy After 9-11 Professor Kevin Bowyer Computer Science

Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy

Why Video Surveillance & ID?

On 9-11 of 2001, nineteen terrorists hijacked four commercial airliners and murdered over 3,000 people.

Their stated motivation is hatred for America and its support of Israel, plus Islamic religious justification.

Page 15: Copyright, Kevin W Bowyer, 2002. (revised 25 Sept 2002) Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy After 9-11 Professor Kevin Bowyer Computer Science

Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy

Why Video Surveillance & ID?

Some of the terrorists were known to the government and on “watch lists.”

Khalid Al-Midhar, terrorist on the plane that crashed into the Pentagon.

Mohamed Atta, terrorist on the plane that crashed into the WTC NT.

Page 16: Copyright, Kevin W Bowyer, 2002. (revised 25 Sept 2002) Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy After 9-11 Professor Kevin Bowyer Computer Science

Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy

Why Video Surveillance & ID?

Consider the following scenario outlined in a Business Week article on 5 November 2001:

Page 17: Copyright, Kevin W Bowyer, 2002. (revised 25 Sept 2002) Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy After 9-11 Professor Kevin Bowyer Computer Science

Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy

Why Video Surveillance & ID?

“As the Saudi Arabian [Al-Midhar]

strolled into a meeting with some of

Osama bin Laden’s lieutenants in

Kaula Lumpur in December 1999,

he was videotaped by a Malaysian

surveillance team.

Page 18: Copyright, Kevin W Bowyer, 2002. (revised 25 Sept 2002) Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy After 9-11 Professor Kevin Bowyer Computer Science

Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy

Why Video Surveillance & ID?

The tape was turned over to U.S.

intelligence officials and, after

several months, Al-Midhar’s name

was put on the INS’s “watch list”

of potential terrorists. …

Page 19: Copyright, Kevin W Bowyer, 2002. (revised 25 Sept 2002) Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy After 9-11 Professor Kevin Bowyer Computer Science

Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy

Why Video Surveillance & ID?

Using biometric profiling, it would

have been possible to make a

precise digital map of his face.

This data could have been hooked

to airport surveillance cameras.

Page 20: Copyright, Kevin W Bowyer, 2002. (revised 25 Sept 2002) Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy After 9-11 Professor Kevin Bowyer Computer Science

Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy

Why Video Surveillance & ID?

When cameras captured Al-Midhar,

an alarm would have sounded,

allowing cops to take him into

custody.”

Page 21: Copyright, Kevin W Bowyer, 2002. (revised 25 Sept 2002) Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy After 9-11 Professor Kevin Bowyer Computer Science

Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy

Why Video Surveillance & ID?

So if it worked as well as the Business Week article suggests, would you …

Page 22: Copyright, Kevin W Bowyer, 2002. (revised 25 Sept 2002) Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy After 9-11 Professor Kevin Bowyer Computer Science

Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy

Why Video Surveillance & ID?

So if it worked as well as the Business Week article suggests, would you …

Want it in every airport?

Page 23: Copyright, Kevin W Bowyer, 2002. (revised 25 Sept 2002) Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy After 9-11 Professor Kevin Bowyer Computer Science

Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy

Why Video Surveillance & ID?

So if it worked as well as the Business Week article suggests, would you …

Want it in every airport?

and at every border crossing?

Page 24: Copyright, Kevin W Bowyer, 2002. (revised 25 Sept 2002) Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy After 9-11 Professor Kevin Bowyer Computer Science

Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy

Why Video Surveillance & ID?

So if it worked as well as the Business Week article suggests, would you …

Want it in every airport?

and at every border crossing?

and every federal building?

Page 25: Copyright, Kevin W Bowyer, 2002. (revised 25 Sept 2002) Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy After 9-11 Professor Kevin Bowyer Computer Science

Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy

Why Video Surveillance & ID?

So if it worked as well as the Business Week article suggests, would you …

Want it in every airport?

and at every border crossing?

and every federal building?

and stadiums, malls, etc?

If so, you would not be alone!

Page 26: Copyright, Kevin W Bowyer, 2002. (revised 25 Sept 2002) Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy After 9-11 Professor Kevin Bowyer Computer Science

Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy

Why Video Surveillance & ID?

In a poll just after 9-11, 86% favored “use of face recognition technology to scan for suspected terrorists at various locations and public events.”

Six months later, support still at 81%.

Page 27: Copyright, Kevin W Bowyer, 2002. (revised 25 Sept 2002) Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy After 9-11 Professor Kevin Bowyer Computer Science

Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy

Biometric Technologies

A biometric is something about a

person that can be measured and

used to identify the person.

Page 28: Copyright, Kevin W Bowyer, 2002. (revised 25 Sept 2002) Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy After 9-11 Professor Kevin Bowyer Computer Science

Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy

Biometric Technologies

Numerous biometrics exist:

Fingerprint FaceIris Retinal scanHand shape EarGait …

Page 29: Copyright, Kevin W Bowyer, 2002. (revised 25 Sept 2002) Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy After 9-11 Professor Kevin Bowyer Computer Science

Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy

Biometric Technologies

Different biometrics may be:

– invasive / non-invasive – contact / non-contact – near / at a distance– cooperative / non-cooperative

Page 30: Copyright, Kevin W Bowyer, 2002. (revised 25 Sept 2002) Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy After 9-11 Professor Kevin Bowyer Computer Science

Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy

Biometric Technologies

The ideal surveillance technology would be

– non-contact – at a distance– non-cooperative

also fast, cheap, and accurate.

Page 31: Copyright, Kevin W Bowyer, 2002. (revised 25 Sept 2002) Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy After 9-11 Professor Kevin Bowyer Computer Science

Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy

Biometric Technologies

Commercial face recognition systems have been evaluated for airport security applications.

Recognition from gait is another hot area of biometrics research.

Page 32: Copyright, Kevin W Bowyer, 2002. (revised 25 Sept 2002) Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy After 9-11 Professor Kevin Bowyer Computer Science

Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy

A Face Recognition System

“Watch List”or “Gallery”

Detect Face

ExtractFeatures

Video Feed

“Probe”

matching algorithm

(probe, possible matches) Police

Page 33: Copyright, Kevin W Bowyer, 2002. (revised 25 Sept 2002) Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy After 9-11 Professor Kevin Bowyer Computer Science

Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy

Some Terminology

TruePositive

FalseNegative

TrueNegative

FalsePositive

What the system reportsinnocentcitizen

wantedterrorist

wantedterrorist

innocentcitizen

Whatis

reallyin thescene

Page 34: Copyright, Kevin W Bowyer, 2002. (revised 25 Sept 2002) Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy After 9-11 Professor Kevin Bowyer Computer Science

Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy

Practical Performance Tests

The Visionics face recognition system was tested at the Palm Beach Int’l airport in March-April 2002. The ACLU used FOIA to obtain a report and post it on the web.

(Visionics has now merged to become Identix.)

Page 35: Copyright, Kevin W Bowyer, 2002. (revised 25 Sept 2002) Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy After 9-11 Professor Kevin Bowyer Computer Science

Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy

Practical Performance Tests

Palm Beach airport test results:• about 50% true positives• 3 false alarms per hour• processing 10,000 images / day.

Is this good or bad?

Page 36: Copyright, Kevin W Bowyer, 2002. (revised 25 Sept 2002) Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy After 9-11 Professor Kevin Bowyer Computer Science

Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy

Practical Performance Tests

An ACLU representative was quoted as saying that the Palm Beach airport evaluation results show that – “face recognition is a disaster.”

Page 37: Copyright, Kevin W Bowyer, 2002. (revised 25 Sept 2002) Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy After 9-11 Professor Kevin Bowyer Computer Science

Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy

Practical Performance Tests

But would 50% chance of detection deter terrorists?

Would systems at two checkpoints give 3/4 chance of detection? three systems give 7/8 chance? …

Page 38: Copyright, Kevin W Bowyer, 2002. (revised 25 Sept 2002) Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy After 9-11 Professor Kevin Bowyer Computer Science

Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy

Practical Performance Tests

Palm Beach airport tests also cited the importance of:

– Subject’s head motion– Lighting conditions– Pose off-angle by 15 to 30%– Eyeglasses and glare

Page 39: Copyright, Kevin W Bowyer, 2002. (revised 25 Sept 2002) Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy After 9-11 Professor Kevin Bowyer Computer Science

Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy

Practical Performance Tests

A test of … systems at Boston’s Logan Airport in May-July 2002 showed greater true positives but also too many false positives to be practical. The director … conducting the test –“It’s not ready for prime time yet.”

Page 40: Copyright, Kevin W Bowyer, 2002. (revised 25 Sept 2002) Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy After 9-11 Professor Kevin Bowyer Computer Science

Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy

Recognition from Gait

“Gait” refers to walking pattern.

Johansson’s 1973 work with “point light display” is a landmark result.

This was followed by other work showing gender discrimination, and recognition of known persons.

Page 41: Copyright, Kevin W Bowyer, 2002. (revised 25 Sept 2002) Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy After 9-11 Professor Kevin Bowyer Computer Science

Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy

Recognition from Gait

Currently a hot topic in computer vision, DARPA has released a “gait challenge problem” composed of a set of video clips and a sample algorithm.

The first release has clips of 75 people walking under various conditions.

Page 42: Copyright, Kevin W Bowyer, 2002. (revised 25 Sept 2002) Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy After 9-11 Professor Kevin Bowyer Computer Science

Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy

Recognition From Gait

Two surfaces, shoe types, and camera views.

452 sequences (~300GB)

Grass Concrete

Page 43: Copyright, Kevin W Bowyer, 2002. (revised 25 Sept 2002) Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy After 9-11 Professor Kevin Bowyer Computer Science

Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy

Recognition from Gait

Experiment Probe Difference

A (G, A, L) [71] View

B (G, B, R) [41] Shoe

C (G, B, L) [41] Shoe, View

D (C, A, R) [70] Surface

E (C, B, R) [44] Surface, Shoe

F (C, A, L) [70] Surface, View

G (C, B, L) [44] Surface, Shoe, View

Gallery: (G, A, R) [71]

Page 44: Copyright, Kevin W Bowyer, 2002. (revised 25 Sept 2002) Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy After 9-11 Professor Kevin Bowyer Computer Science

Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy

Recognition from Gait

Page 45: Copyright, Kevin W Bowyer, 2002. (revised 25 Sept 2002) Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy After 9-11 Professor Kevin Bowyer Computer Science

Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy

Recognition from Gait

Just as face recognition has now run into dealing with the “hard” or “real” versions of the problem,

Recognition from gait also has hard problems to deal with in order to become a practical surveillance tool.

Page 46: Copyright, Kevin W Bowyer, 2002. (revised 25 Sept 2002) Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy After 9-11 Professor Kevin Bowyer Computer Science

Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy

Recognition from Gait

For more details on the gait analysis challenge problem, see the paper by Phillips et al in ICPR ’02.

Page 47: Copyright, Kevin W Bowyer, 2002. (revised 25 Sept 2002) Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy After 9-11 Professor Kevin Bowyer Computer Science

Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy

Biometric Technologies

It appears that there is modest “real” increase in security from video-based biometrics in short run (2-3 years).

But there may be a deterrent effect.

And technology is rapidly improving.

Page 48: Copyright, Kevin W Bowyer, 2002. (revised 25 Sept 2002) Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy After 9-11 Professor Kevin Bowyer Computer Science

Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy

Biometric Technologies

“Massachusetts governor Swift said she embraced the technology as part of security improvements she ordered at Boston’s Logan airport to restore confidence in flying.”

L. Gay, “Technology: face recognition has limits, some say,” www.nando.net/technology/story/ 214481p-207c.html

Page 49: Copyright, Kevin W Bowyer, 2002. (revised 25 Sept 2002) Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy After 9-11 Professor Kevin Bowyer Computer Science

Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy

Biometric Technologies

Important principles to remember:

– A person can’t be recognized unless they have been enrolled.

– False positives are unavoidable.

– FPs trade against false negatives.

– A human operator is still needed.

Page 50: Copyright, Kevin W Bowyer, 2002. (revised 25 Sept 2002) Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy After 9-11 Professor Kevin Bowyer Computer Science

Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy

Security versus Privacy

The civil libertarian fear is that

the desire to be safe from

terrorism will push aside reason in

balancing security versus privacy.

Page 51: Copyright, Kevin W Bowyer, 2002. (revised 25 Sept 2002) Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy After 9-11 Professor Kevin Bowyer Computer Science

Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy

Security versus Privacy

Often quoted by civil libertarians:

They that can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty or safety.

- Benjamin Franklin

Page 52: Copyright, Kevin W Bowyer, 2002. (revised 25 Sept 2002) Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy After 9-11 Professor Kevin Bowyer Computer Science

Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy

Security versus PrivacyBut a common opposing view is:

Benjamin Franklin said that anyone who gives up essential liberties to preserve freedom is a fool, but maybe he didn’t conceive of nuclear war and dirty bombs.

- Neil Young (musician, “Let’s Roll”)

Page 53: Copyright, Kevin W Bowyer, 2002. (revised 25 Sept 2002) Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy After 9-11 Professor Kevin Bowyer Computer Science

Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy

Security versus Privacy

The proposed tradeoff is clear –

Loss of some amount of privacy for Increase by some amount in security.

Computing technology largely defines the boundaries of possible tradeoffs.

Page 54: Copyright, Kevin W Bowyer, 2002. (revised 25 Sept 2002) Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy After 9-11 Professor Kevin Bowyer Computer Science

Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy

Media Reports / Opinions

“A computer glitch could match the face of an innocent person with the digital image of a criminal.”

“Super bowl snooping,” NY Times, Feb 4, 2001.

Is it really a “glitch?” Or an unavoidable “feature?”

Page 55: Copyright, Kevin W Bowyer, 2002. (revised 25 Sept 2002) Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy After 9-11 Professor Kevin Bowyer Computer Science

Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy

Media Reports / Opinions

On the system used at Super Bowl – “The beauty of the system is that it is disguise-proof. You can grow a beard and put on sunglasses, and FaceTrac will still pick you out of a crowd.”

Lev Grossman, “Welcome to the snooper bowl,” Time, Feb 12, 2001.

Page 56: Copyright, Kevin W Bowyer, 2002. (revised 25 Sept 2002) Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy After 9-11 Professor Kevin Bowyer Computer Science

Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy

Media Reports / Opinions

Is use of the term “disguise-proof” in connection with these systems …

Unrestrained technology optimism? Unprofessional journalism? Misleading the public?

Page 57: Copyright, Kevin W Bowyer, 2002. (revised 25 Sept 2002) Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy After 9-11 Professor Kevin Bowyer Computer Science

Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy

Media Reports / Opinions

“A woman in Texas who saw the image claimed the man in the picture was wanted for crimes. She called the Tampa police, who questioned the man, a construction worker. It was the wrong person ...The system … is not 100 percent accurate.”

“Electronic surveillance: From `Big Brother’ Fears to Safety Tool,” NY Times, Dec 6, 2001.

Page 58: Copyright, Kevin W Bowyer, 2002. (revised 25 Sept 2002) Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy After 9-11 Professor Kevin Bowyer Computer Science

Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy

Media Reports / Opinions

What does this incident illustrate?

That the computer isn’t 100% accurate? Or that humans aren’t 100% accurate?

Page 59: Copyright, Kevin W Bowyer, 2002. (revised 25 Sept 2002) Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy After 9-11 Professor Kevin Bowyer Computer Science

Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy

Media Reports / Opinions

Quoting Ed Markey (D., Mass.) – “It’s chilling, the notion that 100,000 people were subject to video surveillance and had their identities checked by the government.”

Lev Grossman, “Welcome to the snooper bowl,” Time, Feb 12, 2001.

Page 60: Copyright, Kevin W Bowyer, 2002. (revised 25 Sept 2002) Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy After 9-11 Professor Kevin Bowyer Computer Science

Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy

Media Reports / Opinions

What do you think of when you hear “had their identities checked?”

Is this an accurate analogy?

Page 61: Copyright, Kevin W Bowyer, 2002. (revised 25 Sept 2002) Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy After 9-11 Professor Kevin Bowyer Computer Science

Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy

Media Reports / Opinions

What do you think of when you hear “had their identities checked?”

Is this an accurate analogy?What about a police lineup?

Page 62: Copyright, Kevin W Bowyer, 2002. (revised 25 Sept 2002) Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy After 9-11 Professor Kevin Bowyer Computer Science

Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy

Media Reports / Opinions

What do you think of when you hear “had their identities checked?”

Is this an accurate analogy?What about a police lineup?Or a policeman on a street corner holding a photo of a suspect?

Page 63: Copyright, Kevin W Bowyer, 2002. (revised 25 Sept 2002) Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy After 9-11 Professor Kevin Bowyer Computer Science

Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy

Media Reports / Opinions

ACLU representatives have claimed that the technology (1) does not work, and (2) it greatly threatens privacy.

Can both claims be true at once?

Page 64: Copyright, Kevin W Bowyer, 2002. (revised 25 Sept 2002) Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy After 9-11 Professor Kevin Bowyer Computer Science

Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy

Ethical Issues

Ethical issues arise in (at least)

– Protection of privacy.

– Performance claims.

– Public understanding.

Page 65: Copyright, Kevin W Bowyer, 2002. (revised 25 Sept 2002) Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy After 9-11 Professor Kevin Bowyer Computer Science

Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy

AITP Standards of Conduct

Protect the privacy and confidentiality of all information entrusted to me.

Inform the public in all areas of my expertise.

Insure that products of my work are used in a socially responsible way.

Page 66: Copyright, Kevin W Bowyer, 2002. (revised 25 Sept 2002) Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy After 9-11 Professor Kevin Bowyer Computer Science

Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy

ACM Code of Ethics

Respect the privacy of others.

Ensure that those affected have their needs clearly articulated.

System must be validated to meet requirements.

Page 67: Copyright, Kevin W Bowyer, 2002. (revised 25 Sept 2002) Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy After 9-11 Professor Kevin Bowyer Computer Science

Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy

Software Eng’g Code of Ethics

Cooperate in efforts to address matters of grave public concern caused by software, ...

Be fair and avoid deception in all statements, particularly public ones, concerning software …

Page 68: Copyright, Kevin W Bowyer, 2002. (revised 25 Sept 2002) Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy After 9-11 Professor Kevin Bowyer Computer Science

Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy

Software Eng’g Code of Ethics

Ensure that specifications … have been well documented, satisfy the users’ requirements and have the appropriate approvals.

Page 69: Copyright, Kevin W Bowyer, 2002. (revised 25 Sept 2002) Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy After 9-11 Professor Kevin Bowyer Computer Science

Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy

Int’l Biometric Ind. Assoc.

“Accountability in Marketing: Because truth is the key to industry credibility, members attest that their stated claims are accurate and can be independently verified by a competent authority.”

www.ibia.org/principl.htm

Page 70: Copyright, Kevin W Bowyer, 2002. (revised 25 Sept 2002) Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy After 9-11 Professor Kevin Bowyer Computer Science

Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy

Ethically Responsible?

“… knowing how many checkpoints these people had to go through, we had a high probability to alert, intercept, these individuals maybe August 21-st or 23-rd when they crossed the Canadian border and we would have perhaps foiled the whole plot.”

J. Atick, Visionics CEO, NPR Morning Edition

Page 71: Copyright, Kevin W Bowyer, 2002. (revised 25 Sept 2002) Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy After 9-11 Professor Kevin Bowyer Computer Science

Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy

Ethically Responsible?

“It’s simply the fear of change and technology. … Once you’ve adapted, you look back and say ‘I was afraid of what?”’

T. Colasti, CEO of Visionics, inLev Grossman, “Welcome to the snooper bowl,” Time, Feb 12, 2001.

Page 72: Copyright, Kevin W Bowyer, 2002. (revised 25 Sept 2002) Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy After 9-11 Professor Kevin Bowyer Computer Science

Video Surveillance, Biometrics, and Privacy

The End.