corey lofdahl 13th iccrts seattle, washington

©2008 BAE Systems. 117 June 2008/UNCLASSIFIED

Synthesizing Information for Senior Policy Makers using Simulation: Addressing EBO problems with System Dynamics

Corey Lofdahl13th ICCRTSSeattle, Washington

2©2008 BAE Systems 17 June 2008/UNCLASSIFIED

Overview

• Effects-Based Operations (EBO)• That is, Political-Military (POL-MIL) planning

• Department of Defense (DoD) perspective• As opposed to State Department/foreign policy perspective

• i.e., the problem

• Working through an EBO example using System Dynamics (SD) • As opposed to explaining how SD applies to EBO

• i.e., the proposed methodology or technical solution


EBO & POL-MIL planning• The DoD perspective (Deptula 2001)

• Gulf War I• Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO)

• Precision Guided Munitions (PGM)• High technology

• Operationally cleaner• Less collateral damage

• More accomplished in less time• Quicker operational tempo

• Fewer casualties• Focus on effects, not destruction

• In the service of both political and military goals

• Focus on new thinking & organization• Focus on airpower, “going light”

• Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)


Executing RMA – a “smaller footprint”

• “Surface forces will always be an essential part of the military, but massing surface forces to overwhelm an enemy is no longer an absolute prerequisite to impose control over the enemy.”

• “Only new organizations and doctrine aiming to exploit effects-based operations can fulfill the full potential of this concept.”


Response to Gulf War 1

• US forces made the world sit up and take notice• PRC Cols Qiao Liang & Wang Xiangsui (1999)• How China can defeat a technologically superior

nation through a variety of means (i.e., effects)• Atomic, Diplomatic, & Financial warfare

• Conventional, Network, & Trade warfare

• Bio-chemical, Intelligence, & Resources warfare

• Ecological, Psychological, & Economic aid warfare

• Space, Tactical, & Regulatory warfare

• Electronic, Smuggling, & Sanction warfare

• Guerrilla, Drug, & Media warfare

• Terrorist, Virtual (deterrence), & Ideological warfare

• Takeaway: Chinese also focus on effects• And get off the battlefield (‘cuz it’s dangerous there!)


Van Crevald 1991 & 1999

• Gulf War 1 success dependent on the core four: 1) POL (oil), 2) Logistics, 3) Electricity, and 4) COM• But political, non-technical systems are key, PMESII• Gulf War the opposite of Vietnam, but Vietnam-style

conflicts will return

• State losing monopoly on violence• Insurgents and non-state actors increasingly potent

• High technology

• Clausewitzian trinity of state, military, population

• In the modern world, for some people, war is not a rational means to a end, it *IS* the end.

• This is a conflict that the United States can lose• History shows that great powers usually lose to

insurgents• “failed states” are increasingly prevalent on the

international stage


The Iraq experience: terrorism & insurgency• FM 3-24 “Counterinsurgency” (Dec. ‘06)

• The “graduate school” of warfare (per Lt. Col. John Nagl on NPR)

• Counterinsurgency is counterintuitive

• Understanding of complex, long-term effects is key

• Argues for systemic thinking

• Incorporate counterinsurgency (COIN) insights (May ‘06)†

• Integrate DIME elements in support of US policy

• Illuminate complex, counterintuitive policy outcomes

• Support planning (e.g., pol-mil planning)

• Transform data, knowledge, and expertise into foresight

• Identify investments for intelligence and force overmatch

• Account for time as it influences freedom of action

• Recognize the importance of perception

• Acknowledge that perseverance must be resourced†Hix, William C. 2006. “Intervening Successfully in the 21st Century – The Campaign in Iraq: Prospects for success and strategic lessons for future decision makers.” Master’s Thesis, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305.


Van Riper’s EBO criticisms (Dec. ‘05)

• EBO insights valuable, but incorrectly executed• Current EBO operational concepts and tools confuse

more than they clarify• The database oriented Operational Net Assessment (ONA)

is not working

• There is a methodological difference between structural or detail and interactive or dynamic complexity• ONA addresses the former, but policy and thus EBO

entails the latter• Modeling and Simulation (M&S) generally, and System

Dynamics (SD) specifically, address dynamic complexity

• Political systems (e.g., Iraq COIN) are more analytically intractable (i.e., complex) than technical systems (e.g., the Gulf War’s core four)• No amount of new technology will ever change the basic

nature of war, which is a "terrible, uncertain, chaotic, bloody business."


Conclusion

• Effects-Based Operations (EBO)• That is, Political-Military (POL-MIL)

planning

• Department of Defense (DoD) perspective• As opposed to State

Department/foreign policy perspective• i.e., the problem

• Working through an EBO example using System Dynamics (SD) • As opposed to explaining how SD

applies to EBO• i.e., the methodology or

proposed solution


Policy (that is, dynamic complexity) analysis methodologies contrasted and compared

• HBS Written Analysis of Case (WAC) • (non-computer aided)

• What is the problem?

• What Courses of Action (COAs) are possible or available?

• Discuss their relative merits

• Pick one• Defend your choice

• Military Decision Making (MDM)

• (semi-computer aided)

• Mission analysis• COA development• Wargame• COA decision• OPORD

• System Dynamics (SD) reference mode (MIT)• (explicitly computer aided)

• Articulate the problem • Identify required additional

expertise and knowledge • Define the time frame • Choose 7±2 central variables• Graph them over time frame• Postulate causal connections• Create the simulation• Iterative development:

• Research the problem,

• Modify the simulation, and

• Test model and repeat


Failed states & nation building

• Political strategy• Security strategy

• i.e., DoD

• Rule of Law strategy• Political-economic strategy

• i.e., State Department


Kosovo example

–Policy–Security–Rule of law–Economic

Their application is not usually coordinated…

P ERS

P ERS


I. The Political Economy of Conflict (ch. 8, Blair et al.)

WhiteEconomy

GrayEconomy

BlackEconomy

CapturedState

Criminal Political elite

$

ClientGroup

Resources

Mass ofSociety

The “start” state


II. The Political Economy of Self-sustaining Peace

WhiteEconomy

Gray Economy

Black Economy

State$ Mass of

Society

Criminalsubculture

taxes

Resources

The “goal” state


III. The Political Economy of Viable Peace

WhiteEconomy

Gray Economy

Black Economy

State

$

ClientGroup

Reso

urc

es Mass of

Society

Criminal politicalelements

DiminishingResources

Internationalassistance

Resources

$

Policy problem: specify

the “missing middle”


Iraq example (failed states/nation building)

– Governance– Security (COIN)– Information– Economic

(development)

Is governance the main effort?What comes first, security or

development?

G EIS

G EIS

Thanks to Col. Darrall Henderson, USMA Academy Professor of Mathematical Science, for

creating this and related slides


Pol-Mil Modeling with System Dynamics (SD) Military and non-military elements of national power are combined w/in a single analysis

EconomicDistribution

EnemyForces

FriendlyForces

LegitimateGovernment

Population

EconomicSector

Data inputs


System Dynamics (SD) modelingPrimary, secondary, and cascading consequences are explicitly represented


System Dynamics (SD) modelingexplicit sector interconnections


Cascading consequences lead to feedbacks A central feature of dynamic complexity

+

+ +–

Self-Reinforcing Goal seeking,Balancing

+ –peoplebirths

deaths


Senior-level decision maker’s interface (rev. A)

50000

0 80000 init white

economy

10000

0 80000 init black

economy0

0 200init level

US forces

15

0 100 init criminal

political covert

400

0 1000 init political

criminal elite

10

0 50

?

US forces

tech level

0

0 500init ISF

7000

0 10000

?

init pop

Baghdad

0

0 100init state

personnel

150

0 200

?

US force

level desired

0.85

0.02 1.02BLUE

threshold 4

0 12covert

lag

10

0 100desertion eff

0.20

0.00 1.00engage

eff

0.96

0.00 1.00pol MIL

split

25

0 40US lift

capability

0.30

0.00 1.00tax rate

0.010

0.000 0.100 covert

pct

0.0

0.0 2.0 init state

inflow

4

0 12job lag

0.00

0.00 1.00 state

recruit rate

Political Economy of Conflict

Page 10.00 13.00 26.00 39.00 52.00

Time

1:

1:

1:

2:

2:

2:

3:

3:

3:

4:

4:

4:

5:

5:

5:

0

120

240

0

200

400

0

25

50

0

200

400

1: US force level 2: overt crim pol 3: covert crim pol 4: deserters 5: KIA totall

1

1 1 1

2 2 2

3

3

3

3

4

4

4

4

5 5 5 5

149.7US force level

1.5state legit personnel

0.0ISF

45.3covert crim pol

0.0overt crim polRestore All

DevicesRun Stop

Data and expertise synthesized into a few

contextualized metrics for senior decision makers

policy levers and dynamic results


Information synthesis and strategic perspective

• Military and non-military elements of national power can reinforce each other both helpfully when synchronized and unhelpfully when not

• Policy progress can be both planned and tracked using simulation’s scenario analysis capability

+

++M: DoD

security

D: Statepol-econ

Power of Obstructionists

Capacity of Legitimate Institutions

X-chart of flywheel effect“synchronized v. separate lanes”(i.e., feedback) (i.e., dynamics)


Deptula 2001 pulled quotes• It was not the number of sorties however, that made this first day of air attacks so important, but how they were planned to achieve

specific effects.• The Gulf War began with more targets in one day’s attack plan than the total number of targets hit by the entire Eighth Air Force in all

of 1942 and 1943.• Well beyond the activity of destroying an opposing force lies the ultimate purpose of war—to compel a positive political outcome.• Even when control of the air was wrested from the Luftwaffe in the spring of 1944 and Allied aircraft were free to roam the Axis skies,

the level of “precision” bombing still required a thousand aircraft to succeed against one target.• In some cases, a single aircraft and one PGM during the Gulf War achieved the same result as a 1000-plane raid with over 9000

bombs in World War II—and without the associated collateral damage.• During the entire war, F-117 stealth aircraft flew less than 2 percent of the total combat sorties, while attacking 43 percent of the targets

on the master target list.• During the war some Iraqi power plant managers shut down their electric plants to avoid targeting thereby creating our desired effect

without exposing Coalition members to danger, and freeing up air resources for another task—Sun Tzu’s dictum fulfilled.• The architects of the air campaign did not limit themselves to the “servicing a target list” approach.• The design of the air campaign grew out of a mindset questioning how to impose force against enemy systems to achieve specific

effects that would contribute directly to the military and politicalobjectives of the Coalition.• An attractive element of parallel war is its potential to reduce the duration of conflict relative to previous wars.• Adherence to legacy concepts of operation despite the illumination of new ideas is needlessly and dangerously stagnant.• Surface forces will always be an essential part of the military, but massing surface forces to overwhelm an enemy is no longer an

absolute prerequisite to impose control over the enemy.• Potential adversaries may capitalize on the massing of forces and associated buildup time required by US legacy CONOPS for

conducting major theater war (MTW) to deny US access. • Changing the manner in which we think about the application of force requires changing the way we structure to employ it.• We must expand our thinking and disengage ourselves from stale notions of warfighting to seize the opportunities at hand.• Only new organizations and doctrine aiming to exploit effects-based operations can fulfill the full potential of this concept.• Jointness is the use of the most effective force for a given situation.• The tenets of effects-based operations can be applied in every medium of warfare.• The parallel approach is a springboard for better linking military, economic, and political elements to conduct national security strategy

in depth.• Potential antagonists recognize the significance in the “revolution in military affairs” now underway—it would behoove us to do the

same.


M&S VV&A (Verification, Validation, and Accreditation)Sterman, John D. 2000. Business Dynamics: Systems thinking and modeling for a complex world. Boston: McGraw-Hill. Chapter 21.

• Boundary adequacy

• Structure assessment

• Dimensional consistency

• Parameter assessment

• Extreme conditions

• Integration error

• Behavior reproduction

• Behavior anomaly

• Family member

• Surprise behavior

• Sensitivity analysis

• System improvement


Stock

inflow outflow

How does SD work?

• SD provides the wide and thin perspective required by senior decision makers and system designers

• SD simulation models the complex causal relationships of technical and social systems• Feedback• Stock-flow• Nonlinear

corey lofdahl 13th iccrts seattle, washington

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