1

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, FOURTHJUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND FORDUVAL COUNTY, FLORIDA

CASE NO.: 16-2013-CA-007407BERNARD ALBERT KRUIDBOS,

Plaintiff,

v.

ANGELA B. COREY, in her official capacity asSTATE ATTORNEY FOR THE FOURTHJUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF FLORIDA,

Defendant./

DEFENDANT ANGELA B. COREY’S, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS STATEATTORNEY FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF FLORIDA, AMENDED

COUNTERCLAIM

Pursuant to Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(c) and (d), 1.170(a) and this Court’s Order entered

September 11, 2014 (“Court’s Order of Dismissal”), Defendant Angela B. Corey, in her Official

Capacity as State Attorney for the Fourth Judicial Circuit of Florida (“State Attorney”),

specifically amends her counterclaim which was set forth in Defendant’s Second Amended

Answer,1 stating as follows:

AMENDED COUNTER CLAIM

Pursuant to Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.170(a), Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff (“State Attorney”)

asserts her counterclaim against Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant (“Plaintiff”) and alleges as follows:

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

1. This Court has jurisdiction over this counterclaim pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 26.012

and venue is proper pursuant to Fla. Stat. §47.011.

1 State Attorney understands, pursuant to the Court’s Order of Dismissal, that State Attorney’s Second AmendedAnswer and Affirmative and other Defenses to Count II in the Amended Complaint remains intact with theexception of the striking of Exhibit “A” and references to Exhibit A therein.

Filing # 18729674 Electronically Filed 09/26/2014 04:05:38 PM

2

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

2. Plaintiff was an employee of State Attorney and therefore an agent of State

Attorney during all relevant times.

3. Plaintiff was State Attorney’s Information Technology Director charged with

certain responsibilities including, but not limited to, maintaining optimal efficiencies of hardware

and system software; analyzing and implementing system software and hardware upgrades;

troubleshooting network, communications and computer hardware problems; planning for the

development, procurement and installation of automated systems to support the operational

requirements for the legal/administrative needs; maintaining the security and integrity of the

communications and computer networks; and managing and directing other employees with

similar responsibilities.

4. In March of 2013, it was discovered by Cheryl Peek and Bernie de la Rionda,

Managing Directors of the SAO, that Plaintiff: (a) improperly returned a cell phone (belonging to

a former SAO employee) to factory settings and re-imaged that former employee’s computer and

deleted files on the computer without preserving the information and data prior to reimaging it;

and (b) allowed several SAO computer profiles belonging to other employees to be improperly

accessed, including information stored on their personal drives copied without permission (and

Plaintiff was one of only two people who had access to the subject drives and he had been

charged with securing and ensuring the retention of SAO documents and files.)

5. Subsequent to said discovery, Plaintiff was disciplined and counseled, and given a

de facto demotion for, among other things, failing to protect confidential State Attorney

information. The disciplinary action included removing his access to employees’ personal

drives; requiring that he seek prior approval for any requests that were made to the IT department

3

for any budgeting matters or purchases; and removing his supervisory authority over eight

employees. Plaintiff was specifically reminded during the counseling that he must document (in

writing) whenever computer equipment was moved or reassigned; that he must preserve a copy

of all future terminated employees’ computer hard drives prior to wiping them clean for

subsequent use by different and/or new employees; and that under no circumstances was he to

delete information from a computer without first properly saving the contents of same.

6. Subsequent to the de facto demotion, Plaintiff intentionally disclosed without

authorization his employer’s confidential work product and/or other sensitive information from a

pending high profile murder case (“Trayvon Martin case”) to a former employee of State

Attorney, whom Plaintiff knew had recently resigned unhappy with the State Attorney, and who

had agreed to act as Plaintiff’s attorney.

7. In that regard, focusing on his own interests and without ever consulting with

State Attorney, Plaintiff conveyed to this attorney (“Plaintiff’s attorney”) that he allegedly had a

concern about whether a report Plaintiff had created for State Attorney concerning Trayvon

Martin’s cell phone had been disclosed to George Zimmerman’s lawyers, and if the report had

not been disclosed, whether such non-disclosure could cause Plaintiff criminal exposure.

Plaintiff then told Plaintiff’s attorney about at least three photographs and/or text messages (out

of thousands of pages of data) on Trayvon Martin’s cell phone that could be seen as negatively

impacting State Attorney’s arguments in the Trayvon Martin case.

8. Plaintiff’s attorney advised Plaintiff that he was not sure about whether Plaintiff

could face criminal liability if State Attorney did not disclose his report. However, Plaintiff’s

Attorney alleged that he believed he himself had a legal obligation to call Mr. Zimmerman’s

lawyer to see if State Attorney had disclosed Plaintiff’s report.

4

9. Again, without ever consulting about his concerns with State Attorney, his

employer to whom he owed a duty of loyalty, Plaintiff authorized Plaintiff’s attorney to call the

defense attorney in the Trayvon Martin case for the purpose of inquiring whether his report had

been disclosed and, apparently, to discuss the three photographs and text messages.

10. Plaintiff’s report was preliminary and produced data that was not found by the

expert used by State Attorney, who had previously extracted data from Trayvon Martin’s cell

phone. As such, his report was work product and State Attorney had no obligation to provide

Plaintiff’s report to Mr. Zimmerman’s lawyer. State Attorney was working with its expert to

understand why Plaintiff (who was not an expert) was able to generate data from Mr. Martin’s

cell phone that the expert could not, with the goal of generating a complete report by the expert

and producing same to Mr. Zimmerman’s lawyer. Additionally, the entire “bin” file of Trayvon

Martin’s cell phone had previously been produced to Mr. Zimmerman’s lawyer, along with

thousands of pages of data from same. To the extent those records contain pictures and/or text

messages that may arguably have had a negative impact on State Attorney’s arguments or may

have been inadmissible in evidence, such mental impressions about that data were confidential

and no one at State Attorney’s office was authorized to highlight such evidence for the defense.

11. Even if the information Plaintiff disclosed to the defense during the Trayvon

Martin case did not rise to the level of confidential work product, it was still information

belonging to and considered confidential by State Attorney, and Plaintiff should not have

disclosed it or authorized it to be disclosed to a third party, especially to the defense attorneys in

an active prosecution being conducted by State Attorney. This third party, the defense counsel in

the Trayvon Martin case, had no interest superior to that of Plaintiff’s employer/principal (State

Attorney).

5

12. In accord with Plaintiff’s authorization, Plaintiff’s attorney telephoned the defense

attorneys in the Trayvon Martin case and claimed that State Attorney had information in its

possession that it was improperly withholding from the defense (although Plaintiff admitted

under oath in a later proceeding that he had no knowledge of whether State Attorney did in fact

disclose the report.) Plaintiff’s attorney asked a defense attorney in Trayvon Martin as to

whether he had received certain photographs and text messages described by Plaintiff, and

Plaintiff’s attorney then described the photographs to the defense attorney, and he also described

information about the substance and timing of internal communications by Plaintiff to a key

prosecutor for State Attorney in the Trayvon Martin case.

13. Plaintiff himself had a conversation with a defense attorney in the Trayvon Martin

case and explained the process he engaged in for State Attorney of downloading information.

Plaintiff did not inform anyone at State Attorney that he was having a conversation with this

defense counsel, and he described to the defense attorney the “whole process” he engaged in on

behalf of the State Attorney.

14. The defense attorneys in the Trayvon Martin case were adverse to State

Attorney—that is, defendant Zimmerman’s lawyers’ interests were different from and contrary to

the interests of State Attorney. Plaintiff had no privilege to discuss his work on behalf of State

Attorney with Mr. Zimmerman’s lawyers.

15. The defense attorneys in the Trayvon Martin case subsequently filed a pre-trial

motion seeking sanctions against State Attorney for such alleged non-disclosure. Plaintiff’s

attorney testified at the hearing on such motion on or around May 28, 2013 and identified

Plaintiff as the source of the confidential information, asserting that Plaintiff could testify about

the information in State Attorney’s possession.

6

16. Upon learning of Plaintiff’s unauthorized disclosure, on or around May 28, 2013,

State Attorney placed Plaintiff on an immediate paid leave of absence.

17. Several days later, on June 6, 2013, Plaintiff’s attorney again testified at a

subsequent hearing, in addition to Plaintiff. The court determined that the defense was not

deprived of any admissible evidence and proceeded to trial; however, the court deferred ruling

on the defense’s request for sanctions.

18. During a subsequent investigation, State Attorney concluded that Plaintiff had

again improperly deleted any existing data and files, this time from a laptop that was assigned to

him, and he then restored the laptop to a fresh installation of an Apple operating system.

Plaintiff deleted files and restored the laptop to factory settings on May 24, 2013--one business

day before Plaintiff’s attorney testified and disclosed Plaintiff’s identity.

19. Plaintiff had previously been specifically directed not to delete files from any

State Attorney computer. Plaintiff’s conduct was in direct contradiction to the prior instruction

and counseling given to him. Additionally, because Plaintiff deleted files from public agency

computers, Plaintiff’s conduct put State Attorney in jeopardy of a possible violation of Florida’s

Public Records Act. Further, in his job managing information technology for State Attorney, he

knew that his conduct could be in violation of such law, and in fact violated State Attorney

policy and the prior instructions given to him by State Attorney.

20. Because Plaintiff disclosed confidential work product relating to the Trayvon

Martin case (or at a minimum, information belonging to State Attorney that he was not

authorized to disclose to the defense attorney) to a former employee of State Attorney who

Plaintiff testified that he knew was unhappy with State Attorney, and then authorized this former

employee to disclose the work product or confidential information to the defense attorney in the

7

Trayvon Martin case (for Plaintiff’s attorney’s own reasons) without first discussing his

purported concerns with State Attorney, and subsequently deleted data on his laptop, State

Attorney terminated his employment on July 11, 2013.

21. State Attorney was subject to unwarranted negative criticism as a result of

Plaintiff’s conduct. State Attorney incurred fees and costs for having to defend itself at a hearing

on a motion for sanctions. State Attorney is still subject to sanctions as the court in the Trayvon

Martin case has yet to dismiss the defense attorney’s motion.

22. State Attorney paid Plaintiff a salary during all relevant times in exchange for

Plaintiff performing his duties in the best interest of State Attorney. State Attorney did not

receive the full value of services in exchange for the compensation she paid to Plaintiff during

the period of time Plaintiff was engaging in the conduct described herein.

COUNT ONE

23. State Attorney incorporates here her allegations in paragraphs 1-22 of State

Attorney’s counterclaim.

24. At all relevant times, as an employee and agent of State Attorney, Plaintiff owed a

duty of loyalty to his employer/principal (State Attorney.)

25. Plaintiff breached his duty of loyalty to State Attorney when he knowingly

disclosed confidential work product (or at a minimum, information belonging to State Attorney

that he was not authorized to disclose to the defense attorney) relating to the Trayvon Martin

case to a former employee he knew was unhappy with State Attorney, authorized such former

employee to disclose the work product to the defense attorney in the Trayvon Martin case

without first discussing his purported concerns with State Attorney (and did so in a context

where that defense attorney had no interest superior to State Attorney’s in knowing about the

8

information) and subsequently deleted data on State Attorney computers in violation of a specific

State Attorney directive to him.

26. State Attorney has suffered actual damages as a result of Plaintiff’s conduct.

Specifically, State Attorney had to spend resources defending itself at two pre-trial hearings in

central Florida, including but not limited to the costs associated with travel. Additionally, State

Attorney did not receive the full value of services in exchange for the compensation she paid to

Plaintiff during the period of time Plaintiff was engaging in the misconduct described herein, and

such wages paid to Plaintiff, including when he was appropriately on administrative leave, are

losses to State Attorney. Finally, State Attorney is entitled to nominal damages, even if no actual

damages can be proven. In that regard, Plaintiff’s unauthorized disclosure subjected State

Attorney to public criticism in a high profile murder case for having been falsely and publicly

accused of withholding material documents from the defense in the Trayvon Martin case. State

Attorney also had to dedicate a substantial amount of time in the Trayvon Martin case to the

knowingly false claims made by Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s attorney.

WHEREFORE State Attorney hereby demands judgment in its favor and actual and/or

nominal damages against Plaintiff and any other relief this Court deems just and proper.

COUNT TWO

27. State Attorney incorporates here her allegations in paragraphs 1-22 of State

Attorney’s counterclaim.

28. Plaintiff owed a duty of loyalty to State Attorney while employed with State

Attorney.

29. While employed with State Attorney, Plaintiff communicated with Plaintiff’s

attorney and the two of them devised a plan to disclose State Attorney’s confidential work

9

product (or at a minimum, information belonging to State Attorney that Plaintiff was not

authorized to disclose) to Mr. Zimmerman’s attorney, which disclosure was in violation of

Plaintiff’s duty of loyalty owed to State Attorney, and therefore a tortuous act. These

communications were part of an agreement and conspiracy between Plaintiff and his attorney to

disclose the confidential information to Mr. Zimmerman’s lawyers without ever discussing the

alleged concerns of Plaintiff or Plaintiff’s attorney.

30. During such communications and in furtherance of the conspiracy, Plaintiff made

an agreement with Plaintiff’s attorney to disclose information in breach of Plaintiff’s duty of

loyalty when he and Plaintiff’s attorney agreed to disclose State Attorney’s confidential work

product (or at a minimum, information belonging to State Attorney that he was not authorized to

disclose to Mr. Zimmerman’s attorney) to the defense in the Trayvon Martin case. Plaintiff’s

attorney engaged in an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy by contacting Mr.

Zimmerman’s defense attorneys in the Trayvon Martin case and disclosing confidential

information of State Attorney. Plaintiff himself then engaged in an overt act in furtherance of

the conspiracy by also disclosing confidential information to defense counsel.

31. Plaintiff and his attorney thus acted with the purpose of accomplishing together an

unlawful purpose, which was specifically the breach of Plaintiff’s duty of loyalty to State

Attorney.

32. These overt acts were done in furtherance of Plaintiff’s conspiracy against State

Attorney.

33. As a result of Plaintiff’s agreement with his attorney to violate Plaintiff’s duty of

loyalty and disclose confidential work product (or at a minimum, information belonging to State

10

Attorney that he was not authorized to disclose to the defense attorney), State Attorney has been

damaged.

34. State Attorney has suffered actual damages as a result of Plaintiff’s conduct.

Specifically, State Attorney had to spend resources defending itself at two pre-trial hearings in

central Florida, including but not limited to the costs associated with travel. Additionally, State

Attorney did not receive the full value of services in exchange for the compensation she paid to

Plaintiff during the period of time Plaintiff was engaging in the misconduct described herein,

including the period of time he was on a paid administrative leave of absence. Finally, State

Attorney is entitled to nominal damages, even if no actual damages can be proven. In that

regard, Plaintiff’s unauthorized disclosure subjected State Attorney to public criticism in a

significantly high profile murder case for having been falsely and publicly accused of

withholding material documents from the defense in the Trayvon Martin case. State Attorney

also had to dedicate a substantial amount of time in the Trayvon Martin case to the knowingly

false claims made by Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s attorney.

WHEREFORE, State Attorney hereby demands judgment in its favor and actual and/or

nominal damages against Plaintiff and any other relief this Court deems just and proper.

Respectfully submitted this 26th day of September, 2014.

By:/s Robert G. Riegel, Jr.Robert G. Riegel, Jr.Florida Bar No. 325759Robert.riegel@bipc.comBUCHANAN INGERSOLL & ROONEY PC |FOWLER WHITE BOGGS50 N. Laura Street, Suite 2800Jacksonville, FL 32202Telephone: (904) 446-2645Facsimile: (904) 598-3131

Counsel for Defendant

11

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been

electronically filed with the Clerk of the Court on this 26th day of September, 2014, by using the

Florida Courts E-Filing Portal system which will send a notice of electronic filing to:

Wesley F. White, EsquirePost Office Box 17015Fernandina Beach, FL 32035Tel. 904.335.8335Email. wfwhite@gmail.com

By:/s Robert G. Riegel, Jr.Robert G. Riegel, Jr.Florida Bar No. 325759Robert.riegel@bipc.comBUCHANAN INGERSOLL & ROONEY PC |FOWLER WHITE BOGGS50 N. Laura Street, Suite 2800Jacksonville, FL 32202Telephone: (904) 446-2645Facsimile: (904) 598-3131