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TheU.S.BudgetaryCostsofthePost-9/11Wars

NetaC.Crawford1BostonUniversity

September1,2021

Overview The United States, over the last two decades, has already spent and the Bidenadministration has requested about $5.8 trillion in reaction to the 9/11 attacks.2 ThisincludestheestimateddirectandindirectcostsofspendingintheUnitedStatespost-9/11warzones,homelandsecurityeffortsforcounterterrorism,andinterestpaymentsonwarborrowing.Costsformedicalcareanddisabilitypaymentsforveteransisthelargestlong-termexpenseofthepost-9/11wars.AsresearchbyLindaBilmesshows,futuremedicalcareanddisabilitypaymentsforveterans,overthenextdecades,willlikelyexceed$2.2trillioninfederalspending.Includingestimatefuturecostsforveteran’scare,thetotalbudgetarycostsandfutureobligationsofthepost-9/11warsisthusabout$8trillionincurrentdollars. Ofcourse,thisreportonthebudgetaryimpactofthecounterterrorwarsisnotthefullstory of the costs and consequences of the post-9/11 wars. Behind every one of thesenumbers are people—inspecting containers for possible weapons of mass destruction,deploying overseas, and caring for veterans. Included in these numbers is anacknowledgmentofdeath:behindthedecimalpointofestimatedtotalcosts,$704millionhasbeen spentondeathgratuities for thesurvivorsof the7,040menandwomenin themilitarywhowerekilledinthewarzones.AndthereisalsomoneytheU.S.hasprovidedincompensationtotheciviliansinjuredandkilledinthesewars. ThisestimateincludestheamountrequestedinMay2021bytheBidenadministrationforFY2022.ItdoesnotincludetheadditionalmoneymembersofCongresshavesuggested

1NetaC.CrawfordisaProfessorandChairoftheDepartmentofPoliticalScienceatBostonUniversityandaCo-DirectoroftheCostsofWarProject.2Allthecostsreportedhereareincurrentdollars.

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thattheymayappropriatefortheDODfortheFY2022request.NordoesitincludeallthemoneyprovidedforhumanitarianassistanceandeconomicdevelopmentaidinAfghanistanandIraq.3Itdoesnotincludethefuturecostsofinterestpaymentsonborrowingtopayforthepost-9/11warsafterFY2023.ItdoesnotincludespendingbythedozensofUnitedStatesallies, including Australia, Britain, Canada, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Romania,GermanyandFrance.IftheU.S.hadnothadthesupportofthoseallies,itwouldlikelyhavespentmoreonthosewars(andarguablytakenmorecasualties).4Thisestimatealsodoesnotinclude spending by state and local governmentswithin theU.S. for counterterrorismorservicesforpost-9/11warveterans. TherehasbeennosingleU.S.governmentestimateforthetotalcostsofthepost-9/11wars.Therearepartialaccountsofpost-9/11warcosts.Forexample,startinginFY2017,theDepartmentofDefense(DOD)hasbeenrequiredtoreport theestimatedcostsof thewars in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria to each taxpayer and since then, the DOD regularlyproducesatabulationofthe“EstimatedCosttoEachTaxpayerfortheWarsinAfghanistanand Iraq.”5 InMarchof2021, theDepartmentofDefense concluded in theirmost recentpublic estimate that emergency/overseas contingencyoperations (OCO) spending for thewarsinIraq,Syria,andAfghanistancostatotalof$1.596Trillion,or$8,094pertaxpayerthroughFY2020.However,astheDODnotes,“theseamountsexcludenon-DepartmentofDefenseclassifiedprograms.”6OnAugust16,2021,astheU.S.exitedAfghanistan,PresidentBidensaid,“Wespentoveratrilliondollars.”7Thisis,ofcourse,correct,—ifwefocusonlyonwhattheDODwasappropriatedfortheAfghanistanwarandleaveoutothermajorcosts,perhapsmostimportantly,thecostsofcaringforthepost-9/11warveterans.

One of the major purposes of the Costs ofWar Project has been to provide a morecomprehensive view of federalwar appropriations and expenses, to clarify the types ofbudgetarycostsoftheU.S.post-9/11wars,howthepost-9/11operationshavebeenfunded,andthelong-termimplicationsofpastandcurrentoperationsonspending.Thecostsofthepost-9/11wars includedirect appropriations foroperations in thewar zones, additionalexpensesincurredbytheDepartmentofDefenseinthe“base”militarybudget,spendingtodefendthe“homeland,”andspendingforveteran’smedicalanddisabilitycare.Moreover,thecostsassociatedwiththewarsincludetheinterestpaymentsmadeonborrowingtopayfor thewars.Further,because theU.S. continuesother counterterroroperations, and the

3 Forinstance,thisaccountingofStateDepartmentspendingdoesnotincludemorethanabilliondollarsinUSAIDandStateDepartmentfundsappropriatedsince2002forDevelopmentAssistance,GlobalHealthPrograms,HumanRightsandDemocracy,andTransitionInitiativesinAfghanistan. 4 SeeJasonW.Davidson.(2021).“TheCostsofWartoUnitedStatesAlliesSince9/11,”CostsofWarProject,https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2021/Davidson_AlliesCostsofWar_Final.pdf.5PublicLaw114-328,theNationalDefenseAuthorizationActforFiscalYear2017.6DepartmentofDefense,“EstimatedCoststoEachU.S.TaxpayerofEachoftheWarsinAfghanistan,IraqandSyria,”March2021.https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/documents/Section1090Reports/Estimated_Cost_to_Each_U.S._Taxpayer_of_Each_of_the_Wars_in_Afghanistan,_Iraq_and_Syria_dated_March_2021.pdf.7PresidentJosephBiden.(August16,2021).“ReadtheFullTranscriptofPresidentBiden’sRemarksonAfghanistan,”TheNewYorkTimes.https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/16/us/politics/biden-taliban-afghanistan-speech.html.

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costsofcaringforveteransandinterestonborrowingwillcontinue,thebudgetarycostsdonotendwhenthefightinginthemajorwarzonesstops.Figure 1. Post-9/11War Related Spending FY2001-FY22 & Obligations for FutureVeterans’Care(inCurrentDollars)

ThisestimateincludesthefiguresforU.S.warsinthetwomajorwarzonesandmanysmallwarzones.Notincludingthefutureobligationstocareforveteransthrough2050orestimatedhomelandsecurityspending,thewarinAfghanistanandPakistan,whichispartofthesametheaterofoperations,cost$2.313trillionthroughFY2022.TheU.S.warsinIraqand Syria cost $2.058 trillion through FY2022.8 The post-9/11wars and counterterroroperationsinotherplaces,suchasSomaliaandotherpartsofAfrica,costabout$355billion.(SeeTable2onp.14ofthisreport).

The figures given here are a conservative best estimate through fiscal year 2022 incurrentdollars.AtthiswritingtheU.S.hassaiditwillstayinAfghanistanuntilAugust31,2021 to evacuate all American citizenswhowish to leave Afghanistan, andmany of theAfghans who worked with them. The costs associated with a massive airlift effort inAfghanistanmay increase theFY2021costsofwar inAfghanistan for theDODandStateDepartment. It isunclearhowrecentevents inAfghanistanwillaffect theFY2022budgetrequestsforDODandState.

8 Assuming Congress grants the Biden Administration requests for these wars.

DOD OCO, $2,101 B

State Department, $189 B

Interest Payments on War Spending Through FY2022,

$1,087 B

Increases to the Pentagon Base Budget, $884 B

Veterans' Care Through FY2022,

$465 B

Estimated Future Obligations for Veterans' Care,

through FY2050, $2,200 B

Homeland Security/Domestic Counterterrorism, $1,117 B

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This best estimate relies on public sources. The public and Congress has lost some

transparency on government spending—in particular for the Department of HomelandSecurity.Where,asnotedbelow,itisdifficulttofindinformation,theassumptionsfortheestimatesaregiveninthefootnotesanddiscussedinthetext.

ThenumbersandoccasionallycategoriesarerevisedintheCostsofWarestimatesbythisauthorwhentheU.S.governmentprovidesmoreprecise,corrected,orcomprehensiveinformation.9Forexample,thisreportreliesonupdatedDODspendingdata.TheDODhasrecently, as discussed below, used the categories of “OCO for base requirements,” and“enduringrequirements,”whichcouldapplytomorethanonewarzone.Further,thisreportuses newer interest rate data in calculating the estimated interest on borrowing foremergency/overseas contingency operations (OCO) spending.10 Additionally, this reportrevises the estimate of increases to the Pentagon base budget given changes in theDepartment of Defense’s categories and patterns ofmilitary spending and the relationsbetweentheOCObudgetandbasemilitaryspending.Context OnSeptember11,2001,alQaedahijackedfourAmericancivilianaircraftandattackedNew York’sWorld Trade Center and the Pentagon in assaults as shocking as theywerehorrific; nearly 3,000 people died, including thosewho resisted and broughtdown theirplaneinPennsylvania.Manymorewerewounded.Thenextday,attheirNationalSecurityCouncilmeeting,participantsdecidedthatthethreatwouldbedefined,inSecretaryofStateColinPowell'swords,as"terrorisminitsbroadestsense."PresidentBushagreed:theU.S.would,"startwithbinLaden"andmoveon.11AsVicePresidentDickCheneysaidinpublicafewdaysaftertheattacks,"thingshavechangedsincelastTuesday.Theworld'sshiftedinsomerespects...becauseofwhathappenedinNewYorkandwhathappenedinWashington,it'saqualitativelydifferentsetofcircumstances."12TheU.S.respondedbyreorienting itsnationalsecuritystrategytofocusonterrorismand“violentextremism”inwarsfoughtbyfourUnitedStatespresidents. In2010,economistsAdamRoseandS.BrockBlombergsurveyedeconomists’estimatesofthetotaleconomicimpactofthe9/11attacks:theestimatesrangedbetween$35billionand$109billion.RoseandBlomberg suggested thatbecause theoverallU.S. economy is

9TheworkofWinslowWheelerandAmyBelasco,andtheanalysisofothermembersoftheCostsofWarProject,notablytheeconomistsLindaBilmesandHeidiPeltier,andtheanthropologistsCatherineLutz,DavidVineandStephanieSavellhavehelpedprovidetheessentialcontextfortheproductionoftheseestimates.TheCostsofWarProjectwillcontinuetorefineitsestimatesasnewinformationorclarificationsaremadeavailablebytherelevantU.S.governmentdepartmentsandagencies,andbytheCongressionalResearchService(CRS)andtheCongressionalBudgetOffice(CBO).10 Asnotedabove,interestratesfluctuateandU.S.debtisrefinanced. 11BobWoodward,BushatWar(NewYork:SimonandSchuster,2002)p.43.12VicePresidentCheneyonNBC's,"MeetthePress,"16September2001.Transcript,TheWashingtonPost,http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/specials/attacked/transcripts/cheney091601.html.

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resilient,theattackswerenotaseconomicallyharmfulastheymighthavebeen.However,RoseandBlombergargued,“subsequentanti-terroristinitiativesathomeandabroadweremorecostlythanthedirectdamagecausedbytheattack.”13 Indeed, the U.S. reaction to the 9/11 attacks was comprehensive—a “global war onterror” abroad and mobilization of homeland security which included everything fromincreasedbordersecurityon land,sea, andair, toresearchonpotentialbioweaponsthatterroristsmightdeploy,tothehardeningofcriticalassetsthatmightbesubjecttoterroristattack. The ripple effects of the war on terror in veterans spending have already beenenormousandtheywillcontinuetogrowbecausethepost-9/11warveteransareclaimingdisabilitybenefitsatveryhighrates.Further,theU.S.financedthesewarsinawaylikenootherwarinU.S.history—goingintodeficitspending—ratherthanraisingtaxesorsellinglargenumbersofwarbonds.14

Optimistic assumptions have, from the beginning, been characteristic of the officialestimatesoftheeffectiveness,duration,budgetarycosts,andthefiscalconsequencesofthepost-9/11wars.TherewerenopublicestimatesforthecostsoftheAfghanistanwar,littlediscussionofitsescalationintoPakistan,andhardlyanydiscussionoftheescalationoftheglobalwaronterrorintoAfricaandAsia.Inmid-September2002LawrenceLindsey,thenPresident Bush's chief economic adviser, estimated that the "upper bound" costs of waragainstIraqwouldbe$100to$200billion.Overall,Lindseysuggestedhoweverthat,"Thesuccessfulprosecutionofthewarwouldbegoodfortheeconomy."15OnDecember31,2002,MitchDaniels,thenthedirectoroftheOfficeofManagementandBudgetestimatedthatthecosts of war with Iraq would be $50-60 billion.16 Neither Bush administration officialprovideddetailsforthebasisoftheirestimates.

Therewereotherestimatesofthecostsofthemajorpost9/11warswhichtookaccountofthelikelymuchlongertime-lineofcosts.InSeptember2002U.S.HouseofRepresentativesDemocraticBudgetCommitteestaffestimatedcostsof$48-93Billioniftenyearcostsareincluded.17Laterin2002,YaleeconomistWilliamNordhaussuggestedthatwhilethemaincomponentofcostscouldbehigheroilpricesifthewarweretobeprotractedanddifficult,alongwarcouldcost$140billionindirectmilitaryspendingandanother$615billiontopayfor occupation, peacekeeping, reconstruction and nation-building, and humanitarian

13AdamZ.RoseandS.BrockBlomberg.(2010).“TotalEconomicConsequencesofTerroristAttacks:Insightsfrom9/11,”PeaceEconomics,PeaceScienceandPublicPolicy,vol.16,no.1.14LindaJ.Bilmes.(2017).“TheCreditCardWars:Post-9/11WarFundingPolicyinHistoricalPerspective”.CostsofWarProject,https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2017/Linda%20J%20Bilmes%20_Credit%20Card%20Wars%20FINAL.pdf.15Lindsey,quotedinWallStreetJournal,15September2002.16ElizabethBumiller.(December,312002)."ThreatsandResponses:TheCost;WhiteHouseCutsEstimatesofCostofWarwithIraq,"TheNewYorkTimes.17DemocraticCaucusoftheHouseBudgetCommittee.(September23,2002).AssessingtheCostsofMilitaryActionAgainstIraq:UsingDesertShield/DesertStormasBasisforEstimates:AnAnalysisbytheHouseBudgetCommitteeDemocraticStaff.https://usiraq.procon.org/sourcefiles/DHBC.pdf.

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assistance.18 The most comprehensive estimate of the long-term budgetary costs of thewars—bothofdirectandindirectspendingandothereconomiceffects—isTheThreeTrillionDollarWar by Joseph E. Stiglitz and Linda J. Bilmes.19 The Stiglitz-Bilmes estimate wasconservativeinmanyrespects.Duetotheirlongduration,thecostsofthepost-9/11warshaveexceededalltheseestimates.

DiscussionofBestEstimatesandLong-TermTrends

ThisresearchpaperfocusesonfivebroadcategoriesofU.S.budgetarycoststhatwereincurredinreactiontothe9/11attacksorasaresponsetoterrorismbroadlyunderstood.Table1summarizesthesecosts.

1. EmergencyWar/“OverseasContingencyOperations”appropriationsfortheDODand

StateDepartments.2. EstimatedinterestonborrowingforDODandStateDepartmentOCOspending.3. War-relatedincreasestotheDOD“base”budgetduetothepost-9/11wars.4. Medical and disability care for post-9/11 veterans and the associated cost of

increasingtheVA’scapacitytomanagethiscare.5. Homeland Security spending for preventing potential terrorist attacks and

preparationsforrespondingtothoseattacks,shouldtheyoccur.

Table1. EstimatedCosts of Post 9-11Wars, FY2001-FY2022andFutureVeterans’Costs,inBillionsofCurrentDollars,RoundedtotheNearestBillion

$BillionsWar/OverseasContingencyOperations(OCO)Appropriations

DepartmentofDefense(including$42billionrequestforFY2022)20 2,101StateDepartment/USAID(includingan$8billionappropriationforFY2022)21 189

InterestonBorrowingforDODandStateDept.OCOSpending22 1,087 18WilliamD.Nordhaus.(2002)."TheEconomicConsequencesofaWarwithIraq,"inAmericanAcademyofArtsandSciences,WarWithIraq,Costs,Consequences,andAlternatives(Cambridge:AmericanAcademyofArtsandSciences).pp.51-86.19JosephE.StiglitzandLindaJ.Bilmes.(2008).TheThreeTrillionDollarWar:TheTrueCostsoftheIraqConflict(NewYork:Norton)20AllEmergency/OverseasContingencyOperationsAppropriations.Source:DepartmentofDefense,UndersecretaryofDefense,Comptroller.https://comptroller.defense.gov/Budget-Materials/.AlthoughitremovedOCOasacategory,theBidenadministrationFY2022budgetrequestidentified$42billioninOCO.21ForAfghanistan,Pakistan,IraqandSyria.SeeCoryR.Gill,MarianLawson,EmilyMorgenstern,(March18,2021).DepartmentofState,ForeignOperations,andRelatedPrograms:FY2021BudgetandAppropriations,”CongressionalResearchService,R46367.Sourcesinclude:McGarryandMorgenstern,OverseasContingencyOperationsFunding:BackgroundandStatus,”andK.AlanKronstadt,andSusanB.Epstein,(2019,March12).DirectOvertU.S.AidAppropriationsforandMilitaryReimbursementstoPakistan,FY2002-FY2020.CRS,https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/pakaid.pdf.SpecialInspectorGeneralforAfghanistanReconstruction,QuarterlyReports,https://www.sigar.mil/quarterlyreports/index.aspx?SSR=6.22Source:InterestratecalculationsbyHeidiPeltier.ForPeltier’smethods,seeHeidiPeltier,(2020).TheCostofDebt-financedWar:PublicDebtandRisingInterestforPost-9/11WarSpending,”CostsofWarProject.https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2020/Peltier%202020%20-

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IncreasestoDODBaseBudgetDuetoPost-9-11Wars23 884Post-9/11Veterans’MedicalandDisabilityThroughFY202224 465

HomelandSecurityPreventionandResponsetoTerrorism25 1,117

TotalWarAppropriationsandWar-RelatedSpendingthroughFY2022 $5,843EstimatedFutureObligationsforVeteransMedicalandDisability,FY2023–FY205026

c.2,200

TotalWar-RelatedSpendingthroughFY2022andEstimatedObligationsforVeterans’Carethrough2050

$8,043

The post-9/11 wars have largely been budgeted as emergency appropriations or“OverseasContingencyOperations.”TheseconsistofU.S.CongressionalappropriationsfortheDepartment ofDefense (DOD) andStateDepartment in the named operations in themajorwarzonesofAfghanistanandIraq,andinsmallerwarzonesandareaswheretheU.S.hasengagedincounterterrorismoperationssince9/11.27Spendinginthemajorwarzones,discussedmorefullybelow,accountsforabout92percentoftotalDODOCOspending.TherestoftheOCOspendingoccursinothergeographicareasorisusedtosupportoperationsinthemajorwarzones.TheDODhastakentocallingsomeofitsOCOspendingintheCentralCommand region “enduring” costs; these have been split evenly between themajorwarzonesinthecurrentestimate.

%20The%20Cost%20of%20Debt-financed%20War.pdf.TheOCOspendingusedheretocalculateinterestpaymentsisconservativefigure,basedonthelowernumbersreportedbyDODandStateforOCO;theydonotincludeOCOforthebase,whicharelaterinthepaperattributedtothewarzones.23Theseinclude:spendingonotheroperations,suchasOperationNobleEagleafter2004;theeffectsofpost-9/11warrelatedincreasedhealthcarecostsforactivedutysoldiers;andhigherpaytoattractandretainsoldiers.ThisfigureisestimatedasaportionoftheDODOCObudgetat50percentfromFY2001–2011,40percentfromFY2012–2018,and25percentinFY2019and20percentfromFY2020-FY2022.24Source:Bilmesestimaterangesfrom2.2to2.5trillionfor2001-2050.Weknowthatthisisanunderestimatebecausethewarsarenotover—therewillbemoreveteransintheVASystem.LindaBilmes.(August18,2021).“TheLong-TermCostsofCaringforVeteransoftheIraqandAfghanistanWars,”CostsofWarProject.https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2021/Costs%20of%20War_Bilmes_Long-Term%20Costs%20of%20Care%20for%20Vets_Aug%202021.pdf.Bilmesestimateisconservative,anddoesnotincludethecostsofmedicalbenefitsformilitarycontractorswhosemedicalbenefitsmaybecaredforthroughtheDefenseBaseActandtheDepartmentofLabor.AlsoseeLindaJ.Bilmes.(2016).ATrustFundforVeterans.Democracy:AJournalofIdeas,no.39.Retrievedfromhttp://democracyjournal.org/magazine/39/a-trust-fund-for-veterans/andLindaJ.Bilmes.(2013).TheFinancialLegacyofIraqandAfghanistan:HowWartimeSpendingDecisionsWillCancelOutthePeaceDividend.CostsofWar,http://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2013/The%20Financial%20Legacy%20of%0Iraq%20and%20Afghanistan.pdf.25Asdiscussedbelow,theOfficeofManagementandBudgetandtheDepartmentofHomelandSecuritystoppedreportingdetailedinformationonU.S.spendingoncounterterrorismoperations,in2018.ThisestimateisbasedonDHSbudgetsasanalyzedbytheCRSandassumingthatspendingisconsistentsince2017.SeeWilliamL.Painter,8October2019,SelectedHomelandSecurityIssuesinthe116Congress,CRS.26Source:Bilmes.(2021).“TheLong-TermCostsofCaringforVeteransoftheIraqandAfghanistanWars.”27In2012,theStateDepartmentalsobegantocallitswarrelatedspending.OverseasContingencyOperations(OCO). DuringtheBidenAdministration,thecategoryofOCOspendingwaseliminatedandtheDOD’swarspendingwasputintothebasemilitarybudget.StateDepartmentspendinginthewarzones.

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Thesewarswerenotfinancedbyawartax,orbysellinglargenumbersofwarbonds,and

whiletheU.S.hadabalancedbudgetin2001,theU.S.begantorunabudgetdeficitin2002.As a result, the costs associated with the wars include interest payments on this debt.Interestrateshave,formanyyears,beenathistoriclowsandportionsofthedebthavebeenrefinancedsincethe2008financialcrisisonarollingbasisasithasbeenpossiblefortheU.S.Treasurytodoso. Further, it is important tonotethatanestimateof the futurecostsofinterestoverthenextseveraldecadesarenotincludedinthisestimatebecausetheyarelikeestimatedpastinterestpayments,subjecttorefinancingandotherfactorswhichcannotbepredicted.Onthewhole,however,thecostsofinterestonborrowingtopayforthewarswillcontinuetobelargeunlessoruntilCongressdecidestopayforthepost-9/11warsthroughtaxesorwarbonds.

ThePentagon’s“base”budgetisintendedtofundenduringcostsoftheDepartmentofDefenseandthearmedservices,thatwouldbeincurredeveniftheU.S.werenotatwar.ThePentagon’s“base”budgetincludescostsofpersonnel,includinghealthcare,andthecostsofresearchanddevelopment,procurement,operations,militaryconstructionandhousing,andequipmentmaintenance.Thelongmobilizationhascontributedtoincreasedspendinginthebasebudget.Specifically,whileCongressintendedwarspendingtobeseparatefrombasemilitary spending, war spending has tended to inflate base military spending. This isillustrated inFigure2.Overall, thebasemilitarybudgethasmore thandoubledbetweenFiscalYear2001and2022.So,evenwhenspendingonthepost-9/11warsandothermilitaryoperationshasdeclined,DepartmentofDefensebasebudgetspendinghastrendedupward.

Partoftheincreaseinbasebudgetspendingisperhapsdrivenbytherallyaroundtheflag effect—where members of Congress during the Bush and Obama administrationswantedtobeseentobesupportingtheU.S. troopsas theyengaged inwar.For instance,PresidentObamarequested$663.8billioninFY2010.Congressappropriated$691billion.28ThepracticeofCongressawardingmoremoneytothePentagonthanrequestedbyDefenseDepartment continued through the Trump Administration. In March 2018, for example,Congressappropriated$61billionmorethantheDODrequested.29InJuly2021,membersof theSenate indicated that theywanted togivemoremoney to theDOD than theBidenAdministration requested,perhapsasmuchas$25billionover theamountrequestedbyBiden.30

28CongressionalResearchService,“Defense:FY2010AuthorizationandAppropriations,”CRS,R40567.https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20091223_R40567_9861202e3d375ffb07ed5f7d6877e9828335aa51.pdf.29GregMyre.(March26,2018)“HowthePentagonPlanstoSpendthatExtra$61billion.”NationalPublicRadio,https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2018/03/26/596129462/how-the-pentagon-plans-to-spend-that-extra-61-billion.30JohnM.Donnelly.(July23,2021).“DemocraticHawksWanttoGoBiggerthanBidenonDefenseSpending,”RollCall,https://www.rollcall.com/2021/07/23/democratic-hawks-want-to-go-bigger-than-biden-on-defense-spending/.LeoShane.(July23,2021).“PlantoBoostBiden’sDefenseBudgetCouldSeeBipartisanSupport,”MilitaryTimes,https://www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2021/07/21/plan-to-boost-bidens-defense-budget-could-see-bipartisan-support/.

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But additions to the basemilitary budget have occurred—even aswar spending hasdecreased—forfourotherreasonsthatareindirectlyanddirectlyrelatedtothepost-9/11wars.

First, the military has devoted an increasingly large share of military spending tocontractors who provide goods and services such as equipment maintenance,transportation, security, and food services. As Heidi Peltier shows, the costs of usingcontractorshavemorethandoubledduringthepost-9/11wars.31Whilecontractorsmakeupan increasingly largepartof theU.S.presence in themajorwar zones, theyhavealsobecomeastapleofoperationswithinthecontinentalUnitedStatesandatotheroverseasbases.Indeed,spendingoncontractinghasincreased,evenasdirectwar-relatedspendinghasdeclined.

Figure2.U.S.DODBase andOCOSpending inBillionsof CurrentDollars,FY2001-2022*32

*TheBidenAdministration identified $42Billion inOCO spending in the Base budget in itsFY2022request.ItisunclearhowtheAugust2021eventsinAfghanistanwillaffectthisrequest. Second, the U.S. has continued to “modernize” its military forces, procuring newtechnology,weapons,andweaponsplatformstomeetwhatitconsidersexistingorpotentialthreats.Further,someoftheequipmentthatwasdestroyed,damaged,orusedupduringthewarshasbeenrepairedorreplaced,sometimeswithmoreexpensiveequipmentinaprocessknownas“reset.”

31HeidiPeltier.(2020).“TheGrowthofthe‘CamoEconomy’andtheCommercializationofthePost-9/11Wars,”CostsofWar,https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2020/Peltier%202020%20-%20Growth%20of%20Camo%20Economy%20-%20June%2030%202020%20-%20FINAL.pdf. 32Source:ComptrolleroftheDepartmentofDefense,variousyears.https://comptroller.defense.gov/Budget-Materials/.

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Third,while theUnitedStateswasatwarso long,personnelcosts in thebasebudgetgrew.For instance,militarypay increased6.9%in2002, the largestpercentage increasesince the early 1980s.33Overall, between 2002and 2018, regularmilitary compensation(cash,allowancesforfoodandhousing,andtaxadvantages)grewby20percentfortheactivedutyforce.34WhencasualtiesduringtheAfghanistanandIraqwarswerehigh,enlistmentrateswereaffected,andtheuseofbonusesforenlistmentandretentionhavesubstantiallyincreased.35Further,thecostsofhealthcareforservicemembersandretireesgrew.Infact,theDefenseHealthProgram(DHP)budgetmorethandoubledduringthisperiod:incurrentdollarsDHPinFY2001was$13.5billion;byFY2021,itwas$34.1billion.36TheOCObudgetpaidforsomeofthehealthcarecostsofactivedutypersonnelwoundedinthewarzones.37But,asthefollowingfigureillustrates,whiletheDefenseHealthProgramwassupplementedbyOCOmoney,mostoftheincreaseinDHPspendingoccurredintheDHPbasebudget.SeeFigure3.Figure 3. Total DOD Defense Health Program Spending, Base and OCO, FY2000-FY202238

33See“UnitedStatesMilitaryBasicPayHistory,”https://www.navycs.com/charts/.AlsoseeJimAbsher,(January28,2021)“HistoricalMilitaryPayTables,”Military.Com,https://www.military.com/benefits/military-pay/charts/historical-military-pay-rates.html.34CongressionalBudgetOffice,(January2020)“ApproachestoChangingMilitaryCompensation,”https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2020-01/55648-CBO-military-compensation.pdf.35SeeBethAsch,etal,(2010)CashIncentivesandMilitaryEnlistment,Attrition,andReenlistment,(SantaMonica:RANDCorporation).https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA522744.36SeeDepartmentofDefense,DefenseComptrollerdata,variousyears.https://comptroller.defense.gov/Budget-Materials/.37CongressionalBudgetOffice.(January2014).“ApproachestoReducingFederalSpendingonMilitaryHealthCare,”https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/113th-congress-2013-2014/reports/44993-militaryhealthcare.pdf.CongressionalResearchService.(June152021).“FY2022BudgetRequestfortheMilitaryHealthSystem.”https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/2021-06-15_IF11856_2ee5b10639ee71e551b4d72f00dedab932dd2397.pdf.38Source:DepartmentofDefenseComptroller,FY2000-FY2022.

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Defense Health Programs Emergency/OCO

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Finally, thedividing linebetweenDODOCOdirectwar spendingand thebasebudget

becameincreasinglyfuzzyintworespects.Duringsequestration,asIdiscussingreaterdetailbelow,OCOmoneywasusedtosupplementthebasebudget,inflatingtheOCObudget.Ontheotherhand,overtime,someactivitiesinthemajorwarzonesandsmallerwaroperations(suchasOperationNobleEagle)cametobeunderstoodasenduringrequirementsandwerenormalizedandinstitutionalizedinthebasebudget.

While the war zones and costs are sometimes named and included in accounts ofspending,theyareoftennotspecifiedorenumeratedinsummarydocumentsandsomehavebeen funded in both the base and the OCO budget. For example, the U.S. began acounterterrorismoperationinthePhilippinesinOctober2002underthenameOperationEnduringFreedom-Philippinesthatconcludedin2015.InSeptember2017,theU.S.beganOperationPacificEagle-Philippines(OPE-P)asanamedOverseasContingencyOperation.SinceMay2019,OPE-PhasbeenfundedinpartfromthebasebudgetandinpartfromtheOCObudget. InFY2020,theDODhadcommitted$85.6million inspending fromboththebaseandOCOaccountstothePhilippinesforOPE-P.39

The Department of State’s share of war-related spending is comparatively small.However, even as overall Department of State funding has declined compared to otherbudgets, Congress has been generous with OCO funding for the Department of State,frequentlyprovidingmoremoneythantheDOSrequested.AstheCongressionalResearchServicefound,itisindeedrareinrecentyearsforCongresstogivetheDepartmentofStatewhatitrequestsforwarrelatedOverseasContingencyOperations.40AndaswiththeDOD,theStateDepartmentappearstohavegottenaroundBCArestrictionsbetweenFY2012andFY2021byputtinglineitemsintheOCOaccountthatshouldperhapshavebeenfundedintheregularaccount.SeeFigure4.

39DOD,InspectorGeneral,(2020).“OperationPacificEagle-Philippines,LeadInspectorGeneralReporttotheUnitedStatesCongress,July1,2020-September30,22020,”p.34.https://oig.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/2020-11/OPE-P_Philippines%20Lead%20Inspector%20General%20Report%20to%20the%20Congress%20of%20the%20United%20States%2C%20July%201%2C%202020%20-%20September%2030%2C%202020_Q4_Sep2020.pdf.40EmilyM.Morgenstern.(February10,2021.)“ForeignAffairsOverseasContingencyOperations(OCO)Funding:BackgroundandCurrentStatus,”CongressionalResearchService,https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IF10143.pdf.

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Figure4.StateDepartmentForeignAffairsOCOFundingFY2012-2021RequestedandEnacted,inBillionsofU.S.Dollars41

The spending on the counterterrorism mission for homeland security, while neverentirelytransparent,hasbecomeincreasinglydifficulttotrack.WhileterrorismiscentraltomanyDepartmentofHomelandSecuritymissions,theDHSisnottheonlydepartmentthatperformsthemissionsassociatedwithhomelandsecurity,andfurther,DHSpassessomeofits appropriations to other departments. For some years, the Department of HomelandSecuritybudgethighlightedexpenditures forallcounterterrormissions,concatenatingallagency expenditures using three categories: “Prevent and Disrupt Terrorist Attacks;”“ProtectAmericans,CriticalInfrastructureandResources;”and“RespondandRecoverfromIncidents.”TheWhiteHouseandDepartmentofHomelandSecurityhaverecentlystoppedproviding the breakdown of DHS expenditures by missions devoted to post-9/11counterterrorism; as of the FY2018 budget request, the Department Homeland SecuritybudgetwasnolongerexplainedbytheWhiteHouseOfficeofManagementandBudget.42Inmorerecentyears,theseaccountingforthesemissionswasessentiallymergedwithotherDHSmissionsandtheDHSdoesnothighlightitsownorotheragencies’spendingontheseparticularmissions.WilliamPainteroftheCongressionalResearchServicenotedin2019:

Section889of theHomelandSecurityActof2002requiredthePresident'sannualbudgetrequesttoincludeananalysisofhomelandsecurityfundingacrossthefederal

41Source:FromEmilyM.Morgenstern.(February10,2021).“ForeignAffairsOverseasContingencyOperations(OCO)Funding:BackgroundandCurrentStatus,”CongressionalResearchService.https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IF10143.pdf.42In2017,WhiteHouseOfficeofManagementandBudgetstatedinitsAnalyticalPerspectivesonthebudgetthat,“PreviousAnalyticalPerspectivesvolumesincludeda‘HomelandSecurityFundingAnalysis’chapter,andprovidedadditionaldetailedinformationontheInternetaddresscitedaboveandontheBudgetCD-ROM.P.L.115-31eliminatedthestatutoryrequirementforthisinformation.Therefore,thisinformationisnotincludedinthisyears'BudgetanditwillnotbeincludedinfutureBudgets.”OfficeofManagementandBudget.(2017).AnalyticalPerspectives:BudgetoftheU.S.Government,FiscalYear2018,https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/BUDGET-2018-PER/pdf/BUDGET-2018-PER.pdf.

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government—notjustDHS.ThisrequirementremainedineffectthroughtheFY2017funding cycle. The resulting data series, which included agency-reported data onspendinginthreecategories—preventinganddisruptingterroristattacks;protectingtheAmericanpeople, critical infrastructure, andkey resources; andrespondingtoand recovering from incidents—provides a limited snapshot of the scope of thefederalgovernment'sinvestmentinhomelandsecurity.Accordingtothesedata,fromFY2003throughFY2017,theentireU.S.governmentdirectedroughly$878billion(innominaldollarsofbudgetauthority)tothosethreemissionsets.Annualbudgetauthorityrosefromroughly$41billioninFY2003toapeak in FY2009 of almost $74 billion. After that peak, reported annual homelandsecurity budget authority hovered between $66 billion and $73 billion. Thirtydifferent agencies reported having some amount of homeland security budgetauthority.43

TheFY2020budgetsummaryforDHSimpliesthatnearlyallofwhatitdoesisrelatedtocounterterrorism:“Nefariousactorswanttodisruptourwayoflife.Manyareincitingchaos,instability,andviolence.Atthesametime,thepaceofinnovation,ourhyperconnectivity,andourdigitaldependencehaveopenedcracksinourdefenses,creatingnewvectorsthroughwhichourenemiesandadversariescanstrikeus.Thisisavolatilecombination.Theresultisa world where threats are more numerous,more widely distributed, highly networked,increasinglyadaptive,andincrediblydifficulttorootout.The‘homegame’hasmergedwiththe ‘awaygame’andDHSactionsabroadare justas importantasoursecurityoperationshereathome.”44Further,DHSsays,“Bordersecurityisnationalsecurity.”45Butofcourse,DHSdoesotherthings—includingrespondingtodisasters.Yet,becausethecounterterrormissionhasbeeninstitutionalizedandmergedwithitsmainmissions,itisdifficulttofindacoherentanalysisoftheincrementaladditionofthecostofcounterterrorismwithintheDHSbudget.Thisestimateisbasedonthepubliclyavailableevidencefrompreviousyears,andassumescontinuityinspendingforyearswherethereisnotransparency.

Overall,careforveteransconsumesthelargestshareofthetotalcostsofthepost-9/11wars.Theestimateforfuturecostsofveterans’careismuchhigherthanpreviousestimatesbecause,asDr.LindaBilmesofHarvardUniversitynotes,veteransofthepost-9/11warsarealreadyclaiminghigherlevelsofbenefitsthanpreviouslyanticipatedandtheirneedswillgrowastheyage.Duetoadvancesintraumacare,thepost-9/11warshaveseenanearly45percentincreaseinthenumberofsoldierswhoaresurvivingwoundsthat,inthepastwould,havekilledthem.46Further, thetypesof injuriesandco-morbiditiesof thesesoldierswill

43WilliamL.Painter.(February28,2019).“TheBudgetandHomelandSecurity:HomelandSecurityIssuesinthe116thCongress,”CRSInsight,https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/IN11047.pdf.44DepartmentofHomelandSecurity.(2019).FY2020BudgetinBrief,p.1.https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/19_0318_MGMT_FY-2020-Budget-In-Brief.pdf.45DHS,FY2020BudgetinBrief,p.2.46SeeTanishaM.Fazal.(2014).“DeadWrong?:BattleDeaths,MilitaryMedicine,andExaggeratedReportsofWar’sDemise,”InternationalSecurity,39,1:95-125.JeffreyT.Howard,RussS.Kotwal,andCarynA.Stern.(March272019).“UseofCombatCasualtyCareDatatoAssesstheU.S.MilitaryTraumaSystemDuringtheAfghanistanandIraqConflicts,2001-2017,”JAMASurgery,https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamasurgery/article-abstract/2729451.

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requireincreasinglycomplexandexpensivecareastheyage.Thus,Bilmesnotes,“asof2021,some40%ofpost-9/11veteranshadbeengrantedalifetimeservice-connecteddisabilitybytheVA,basedontheclinicalseverityofconditionstheysustainedorthatworsenedduringtheirperiodofservice.”47 SpendingintheMajorPost-9/11Wars:Afghanistan/PakistanandIraqandSyria TheU.S.militarydesignatesmainwarzonesinAfghanistan,Pakistan,Iraq,andSyriaasnamedoperationsandtheseOverseasContingencyOperationshavechangednameswhenthemissionhaschanged.Thelongestwarsofar,inAfghanistanandPakistan,hashadtwonames:“OperationEnduringFreedom”designatedthefirstphaseofwarinAfghanistanfromOctober2001;itwasdesignated“OperationFreedom’sSentinel”on1January2015.ThewarinIraqwasdesignated“OperationIraqiFreedom”fromMarch2003to31August2010,whenitbecame “OperationNewDawn.” When theU.S.began to fight ISIS inSyriaand Iraq inAugust 2014, this war was designated “Operation Inherent Resolve.” For ease ofunderstanding,thecostsarenotlabeledherebytheirOCOdesignation,butbymajorwarzone—namelyAfghanistanandPakistan,andIraqandlaterIraqandSyria.Inbothmajorwarzones,theendofcombatoperationshasbeendeclaredseveraltimes

WhiletheIraqwarwasthemostintensethroughmostofthelast20years(withOCO

spending peaking in 2008 with during the surge), the spending for Afghanistan, wherespendingpeakedin2011,hassurpassedIraqWarspending.TheDODandStateDepartmenttotalappropriatedforAfghanistanandPakistanthroughFY2021wasaboutat$1trillion.InitsMay2021budgetrequest,theBidenadministrationhasrequested$8.9billonforFY2022.ThetotalspentforIraqandSyriathroughFY2021is$886billionwith$5.4billionrequestedbytheBidenadministrationforFY2022.However,thecostsofbeingatwarfornearly20yearsarenotconfinedtothecostsofDODandStateDepartmentspending.Table2providesaroughapproximationoftheportionoftotalwarcoststhatarepotentiallyattributabletoeachofthetwomajorwarzones—AfghanistanandPakistan,andIraqandSyria.Table2.EstimatedCostsAttributedtotheMajorWarZones,FY2001-FY2022,inBillionsofCurrentDollars(RoundedtotheNearestBillion)48 Costs

AttributedtoAfghanistan/PakistanWar

Zone

CostAttributedtoIraq/SyriaWarZone

CostsAttributedtoOther

OCOWarZones

OverseasContingencyOperations(OCO)

DODOCO $1,055 $918 $128

StateDept.OCO $60 $60 $69

47SeeLindaBilmes.2021.“TheLong-TermCostsofCaringforVeteransoftheIraqandAfghanistanWars,”CostsofWarProject.”48Totalsmaynotaddduetorounding.

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PortionofInterestonOCOSpending49

$532 $467 $87

PortionofEstimatedIncreaseinDODBaseSpendingDuetoWar

$433 $380 $71

PortionofVeterans’CaretoDate $233 $233 -

ApproximateShareofCostsofPost-9/11WarsAttributedtoMajorWarZone,NOTIncludingFutureVeterans’Care

$2,313 $2,058 $355

EstimatedObligationforFutureVeterans’MedicalandDisability,FY2022-2050

$1,100 $1,100 -

TOTALIncludingFutureObligationsforVeterans’Care

$3,413 $3,158 $355

*Note:Table2doesnotincludeHomelandSecurity,whichisincludedinthe$8trilliontotal.

Forsomecategories—specifically,theshareofVeteransandDHSspendingduetoeach

majorwar—theexactshareforeachwarzone isimpossibletocalculate.Forexample,theBureauofLaborStatisticsshowsthatofthe4.59millionveteransofthepost-9/11era,1.853million veterans identified as having served in Iraq, Afghanistan, or both. Of this total,507,000servedinbothwarzones,980,000servedinAfghanistan,and1.38millionservedinIraq.50Howeverwithoutaccesstotheservicerecordsofeachveteranitisimpossibletodeterminethespendingformedicalanddisabilitythatshouldbeattributedtoeachwarzone.Theruleofthumbusedhereisthustoascribe50percentoftheshareofveterans’coststoeachwarzone.BecausespendingforcounterterrorismbytheDHSandotheragenciesisnolonger detailed, the total for homeland security was already a soft number. Thus, thisestimateattributedsharesofspendingforhomelandsecuritythatareinlinewiththeshareofDODspendingforthewarzones:c.49percentforAfghanistanand43percentforIraq.Theother8percentofOCOspendingisforothergeographicareasorOCOmissions.Theseinclude the Counterterrorism Partnership Fund, European Deterrence Initiative, trainingandassistance,andotheroperationsinmorethan85countriesintheworld.51

49CalculatedasashareofthetotalofinterestonborrowingforDODandStateDepartmentOCO.Totalinterestthatmaybeattributedtothepost-9/11OCOspendingmaybeasmuchasis$1,117billion.Ifso,Afghanistan’sshareoftotalOCOis49%;Iraq’sshareoftotalOCOis43%.Ofcourse,spendingforAfghanistanisnotonlylarger,butitisthelongerofthetwowars,its’shareoftheinterestisslightlylargerthannotedhere.50BureauofLaborStatistics,“EmploymentSituationofVeterans,NewsRelease”(March18,2021).https://www.bls.gov/news.release/vet.htm#cps_veterans.f.1.51Foramapandasummaryofsomeoftheseoperations,seeStephanieSavell,(2020).“U.S.CounterterrorismOperations,2018-2020”CostsofWarProject,https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2021/US%20Counterterrorism%20Operations%202018-2020%2C%20Costs%20of%20War.pdf.

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These enormous sums include significant programs. The DOD spent more than $83billioninOCOspendingfortheAfghanistanSecurityForcesFund,andtheTrainandEquipFundsprovidedmoneytoequip,trainandpayfortheAfghanNationalDefenseandSecurityForce. In addition, the U.S. also spent near $9 billion on counternarcotics efforts inAfghanistan,asawaytoreduceasourceofincomefortheTaliban.

Figure4illustratesthetrendsinDODandStateDepartmentOCOspendingforthewars

inAfghanistanandIraqandSyria.ThenumberforbothFY2021andFY2022arelikelytochange given recent events inAfghanistan and the decision to fullywithdraw from Iraq.CongressmayappropriatemoremoneytotheDODandStateDepartmentforevacuationsinAfghanistan in FY2021, but may not appropriate as much money as requested forAfghanistan inFY2022. Withinthe largernamedoperations, thereareactivities inothergeographicareas, in somecases far from thewar zones, thatdirectly support thenamedoperations. Forexample, troops in theU.S. supported long sortiesofB-52,B-1, andB-2bombers to the war zones. Operation Enduring Freedom, focused on Afghanistan andPakistan,includedoperationsandtroopsstationedoffshoreandinGuantanamoBay(Cuba),Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Jordan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Philippines, Seychelles, Sudan,Tajikistan, Turkey, Uzbekistan and Yemen.52 Similarly, Operation Iraqi Freedom andOperationInherentResolveinIraqandSyriahasalsoincludedmilitarytroopsstationedoffshoreand inBahrain,Cyprus,Egypt, Israel, Jordan,Kuwait, Lebanon,Oman,Qatar, SaudiArabia,Turkey,andtheUnitedArabEmirates.

52Thecasualtiesforeachnamedoperationincludethoseotherlocations.See,DepartmentofDefenseCasualtyStatus,https://www.defense.gov/casualty.pdf.

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Figure4.DODandStateDepartmentOCOAppropriationsbyMajorWarZone,FY2001-2021andFY2022Request inBillionsofCurrentDollars53

53AppropriationsforMajorOCOinAfPakandIraq/Syria.Includinga50percentshareofDODOCOforBaseandEnduringRequirementsfromFY2015-2022.Sourcesinclude:DepartmentofDefense,UndersecretaryofDefense,Comptroller,variousyears.https://comptroller.defense.gov/Budget-Materials/.AmyBelasco.(December2014).TheCostofIraq,Afghanistan,andOtherGlobalWaronTerrorOperationsSince9/11.CongressionalResearchService(CRS);BrendanW.McGarryandEmilyMorgenstern.(Updated6September2019)OverseasContingencyOperationsFunding:BackgroundandStatus,CRS;OfficeoftheUndersecretaryofDefense(Comptroller).SpecialInspectorGeneralforAfghanistanReconstruction,QuarterlyReports,https://www.sigar.mil/quarterlyreports/index.aspx?SSR=6.

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022Afghanistan 9.0 14.0 17.6 15.2 20.9 18.8 31.4 38.8 57.2 107. 119. 110. 83.7 88.1 57.8 52.1 58.6 57.5 47.8 49.0 37.1 22.9Iraq & Syria 51.0 76.6 79.1 95.6 130. 143. 91.8 65.3 47.1 14.7 3.7 4.1 8.4 11.6 26.3 23.0 17.4 37.6 30.3 19.4

0.0

20.0

40.0

60.0

80.0

100.0

120.0

140.0

160.0

$ Cu

rren

t Bi

llions

Afghanistan Iraq & Syria

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TheNeedforTransparency,ClarityandComprehensiveAccounting

The U.S. government should ideally provide a comprehensive, detailed and clearaccountingof thebudgetarycostsand implicationsof thepost-9/11wars.Thislackofanofficialclearandcomprehensiveaccountingistheresultoftwooverlappingfactors:first,thepost-9/11warsandthemissionsassociatedwiththemhavebeenamorphousandshifting;andsecond,post-9/11spendingoccursinmultipledepartments,eachofwhichmayprovideincomplete or obscure reporting of the costs. The U.S. government has also, at times,classifiedorremovedinformationaboutoperationsandtheirassociatedbudgets.

TheCongressionalBudgetOfficeandtheCongressionalResearchServiceandMembersofCongresshavelongexpressedconcernthatDODaccountingpracticesareopaque,andthatthedistinctionbetweenenduringandemergencyfundinghasnotbeenwellobserved.TheyhaveregularlypointedouttheuseofOCOmoneytofundtheactivitiesthatshouldbefundedintheDODbasebudget.In2014,forinstance,CRSanalystAmyBelasco,inaCongressionalResearchServicereportonthecostsof thepost-9/11warssaid: “Sincethe9/11attacks,someobservershave criticizedwar fundingas ‘off-budget’ora ‘slush fund’ appropriatedlargely inemergency supplemental actsor for “OverseasContingencyOperations” (OCO)wherenormalbudgetlimitsinannualbudgetresolutionsortheBudgetControlAct(BCA)donotapply.”Belasco continued, “In recent testimonyonSeptember18,2014, forexample,formerSecretaryofDefenseChuckHagelacknowledgedtheseambiguities,saying“therearealotofdifferentopinionsaboutwhetherthereshouldbeanoverseascontingencyaccountor not and whether it’s a slush fund or not.”54 A CBO report in 2018 noted that “Ascontingency operations have become the norm and DoD has adjusted its allocation ofresourcestoaccommodatethem,ithasbecomeincreasinglydifficulttodistinguishbetweenthe incremental costsofmilitary conflicts andDoD’s regular, enduring costs.”55TheCBOestimated that, from FY2006 to FY2018, $53 billion inOCO fundingwas being used foractivitiesthatshouldhavebeenfundedinthebasebudget.56

Inearly2019ChristopherMannoftheCongressionalResearchServicenoted,“EstimatesofthecumulativecostsofwararecomplicatedbytheuseofOCO-designatedfundsforbasebudgetactivities.”57Further,Mannsays,“TheuseoftheOCOdesignationforfundingbothwarandnon-war requirementshas createdambiguityaboutenduring costsunrelated toongoingconflicts.”58Mannnotedthat,“Nogovernment-widereportingconsistentlyaccountsforbothDODandnon-DODwarcosts.”Thisleavesaholeinourunderstandingofthetotalcostsofthepost-9/11warsthatallowsforconfusionandtheassertionoffiguressuchasDODspending that canbemistaken foran assessmentof theentirebudgetary costsandconsequences of the post-9/11wars.Mann also correctly notes that, “As a consequence,independentanalystshavecometodifferentconclusionsaboutthetotalamount.”Because

54QuotedinBelasco,Amy.(2014,December8).TheCostofIraq,Afghanistan,andOtherGlobalWaronTerrorOperationsSince9/11.CongressionalResearchService(CRS)p.20.https://web.archive.org/web/20150501203337/http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33110.pdf.55CBO,FundingforOverseasContingencyOperationsanditsImpactonDefenseSpending,p.10.56CBO,FundingforOverseasContingencyOperationsanditsImpactonDefenseSpending,p.2.57Mann,U.S.WarCosts,Casualties,andPersonnelLevelsSince9/11.58Mann,U.S.WarCosts,Casualties,andPersonnelLevelsSince9/11.

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“widely varying estimates riskmisleading the public and distracting from congressionalpriorities”Mannarguesthatacomprehensiveaccountingwouldbeuseful.“Congressmaywishtorequirefuturereportingonwarcoststhatconsolidatesinteragencydata(suchashealth care costs for combat veterans or international aid programs) in a standardized,authoritative collection.”59 There is still, as of this writing, no such comprehensiveaccounting.60

TheDepartmentofDefenseisnotinternallyconsistentorclearaboutitsspendingonthepost-9/11 wars: spending may shift from one budget to another inside the department,categoriesmaybeoverlybroad,ordetailedreportingofafunctionmayentirelydisappear.For instance,OperationNobleEagle,whichbegan inSeptember2001asanoperation todefend the U.S. air space and bases, was funded in the emergency war budget throughFY2004 and switched to the base budget in FY 2005.More significantly, theDOD’s ownreportsofwarspendingareinconsistentandthebasisforaccountingissometimesnotfullyexplained.Forexample,intheDOD’sMarch2021“EstimatedCosttoEachTaxpayerfortheWarsinAfghanistanandIraq,”theDODreportstheannualcostforthewarinAfghanistanas$39.676billion,and$8.892billionforIraqandSyriaforFY2020.Itnotesthat“EstimatedcostsforAfghanistanincluderelatedregionalcoststhatsupportcombatoperationsintheU.S.CentralCommandareaof responsibility.”61 Thisdoesnotmatch the total fundingasappropriatedbyCongressforAfghanistanasstatedbytheDOD’sComptrollerwhichreports$17billionand$7billionrespectivelyfortheAfghanistan,andIraqandSyria,warzones.62These two DOD reports differ from each other because they take different categories offunctionsandoperations intoaccount.Neitherof these reports’ figuresmatch theDOD’sOffice of Lead Inspector General, “COP-OCO: FY 2021 Comprehensive Oversight PlanOverseas Contingency Operations.”63 There was a more detailed breakdown of costsavailablefromtheDOD,butthishasapparentlynotbeenproducedsinceSeptember2019,andinanycase,thisbreakdownalsodoesnotmatchotherDODreports.64

59ChristopherT.Mann,(18April2019).U.S.WarCosts,Casualties,andPersonnelLevelsSince9/11,CRS.60TheCongressionalResearchServicereportsbyAmyBelascothrough2014andlater,byothersinCRS,haveaimedtoprovidethebestandmosttransparentaccountingofthecostsofthepost-9/11wars.AmyBelasco.(December2014).TheCostofIraq,Afghanistan,andOtherGlobalWaronTerrorOperationsSince9/11.CongressionalResearchService(CRS);BrendanW.McGarryandEmilyMorgenstern.(Updated6September2019)OverseasContingencyOperationsFunding:BackgroundandStatus,CRS.61DepartmentofDefense,“EstimatedCoststoEachU.S.TaxpayerofEachoftheWarsinAfghanistan,IraqandSyria,”March2021.https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/documents/Section1090Reports/Estimated_Cost_to_Each_U.S._Taxpayer_of_Each_of_the_Wars_in_Afghanistan,_Iraq_and_Syria_dated_March_2021.pdf.62DODOfficeoftheUndersecretaryofDefense,(Comptroller).(2020)“DefenseBudgetOverview,”RevisedMay13,2020.https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2021/fy2021_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf.63DODOfficeofLeadInspectorGeneral,“COP-OCO:FY2021ComprehensiveOversightPlanOverseasContingencyOperations.”October2020.https://media.defense.gov/2021/Jan/22/2002569409/-1/-1/1/FY2021_LIG_COP_OCO_REPORT_.PDF.64SeeDepartmentofDefense“FY2019Quarter4,CostofWarUpdateasofSeptember30,2019,”https://fas.org/man/eprint/cow/fy2019q4.pdf.AlsoseetheDOD’sSpecialInspectorGeneralforIraqReconstructionwhichproducedreportsthroughSeptember2013,andtheSpecialInspectorGeneralforAfghanistanReconstructionhavealsoproducedreportswhicharedetailed.SeeSIGIRreportsarchivedin

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While we should know whether spending should be classified for one war zone oranother,supportandcombatoperationsintheU.S.,EuropeorCentralCommandmayservemultiplewarzonesandoperations.Forexample,theU.S.baseatDiegoGarciaintheIndianOceanhassupportedairstrikesinbothAfghanistanandIraq.Further,whiletheU.S.nationalsecurity establishment certainly regards Pakistan as part of the area of operations forAfghanistan “Operation Enduring Freedom” and “Operation Freedom’s Sentinel,” DODaccounts enumerate the costs of operations in Pakistan and State Department spendingrelatedtoPakistanisnotalwaysincludedinaccountsofdirectwar-relatedspending.

Therehaslongbeenacertainfuzziness,mentionedabove,abouttheuseofOCOmoney,whichwasexacerbatedafterthe2011BudgetControlAct(BCA)setlimitsondefenseandnondefensespending.WhiletheBudgetControlActwasineffect,OCOappropriatedmoneywas, formorethanadecade,usedtosupplementthebaseDODbudget.Thiswasnot theintentionofCongress.65

https://cybercemetery.unt.edu/archive/sigir/20131001084734/http://www.sigir.mil/directorates/audits/auditReports.html.SpecialInspectorGeneralforAfghanistanReconstructionquarterlyreportsarefoundat,https://www.sigar.mil/.65Specifically,theselimitswereenforcedby“sequestration,”theautomaticreductionofenactedappropriationsinexcessofthelaw’sprescribedlevels.However,emergencyappropriationsfortheDODwerenotsubjecttothesamedetailedCongressionaloversightandlimitsasappropriationsforregular,or“base”budgetnon-emergencyappropriations.Inotherwords,spendingdesignatedasOCOwasexemptfromthebasebudgetcapsandsequestration.ThelimitsimposedbytheBCAexpiredinFY2022. Whilethe2011BCAwasineffect,theDOD(andtheStateDepartment)appeartohavechargedadditionalexpensestotheOCObudgetthatshouldhavebeenfundedthroughthebasebudgetappropriationprocess.ItappearsthatnoneofthesetransferswereexplicitlyrequestedbytheDODorauthorizedbyCongress.InFY2019,theTrumpAdministrationmadethepracticeofshiftingemergencyOCOappropriationsintothebasebudgetexplicitwhenitintroducednewwaysofcategorizingtheDepartmentofDefensespendingrelatedtotheOverseasContingencyOperations.SomeofthefundingthatwaspreviouslydesignatedforspecificmilitaryoperationswasmovedduringtheTrumpAdministrationintoacategorycalled“OCOforEnduringTheaterRequirementsandRelatedMissions”andanother,“OCOforBaseRequirements.”TheDODComptrollerexplained:

“TheFY2020OCOrequestisdividedintothreerequirementcategories–directwar,enduring,andOCOforbase.DirectWarRequirements($25.4billion)–Reflectscombatorcombatsupportcoststhatarenotexpectedtocontinueoncecombatoperationsendatmajorcontingencylocations.Includesin-countrywarsupportforOperationFREEDOM’SSENTINEL(OFS)inAfghanistanandOperationINHERENTRESOLVE(OIR)inIraqandSyria.FundspartnershipprogramssuchastheAfghanistanSecurityForcesFund(ASFF),theCounter-ISISTrainandEquipFund(CTEF),theCoalitionSupportFund(CSF),andMiddleEastbordersecurity.OCOforEnduringRequirements($41.3billion)–Reflectsenduringin-theaterandCONUScoststhatwillremainaftercombatoperationsend.Thesecosts,historicallyfundedinOCO,includeoverseasbasing,depotmaintenance,shipoperations,andweaponssystemsustainment.ItalsoincludestheEuropeanDeterrenceInitiative(EDI),theUkraineSecurityAssistanceInitiative(USAI),andSecurityCooperation.Combined,enduringrequirementsanddirectwarrequirementscomprise“traditional”OCO.OCOforBaseRequirements($97.9billion)–Reflectsfundingforbasebudgetrequirements,whichsupporttheNationalDefenseStrategy,suchasdefensereadiness,readinessenablers,andmunitions,financedintheOCObudgettocomplywiththebasebudgetdefensecapsincludedincurrentlaw.”

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ThispracticeoffundingbaserequirementswiththeOCObudgetwasincreasinglyevidentintheTrumpAdministrationandhasbecomeexplicitundertheBidenadministration.IthasnowledtonormalizationandinstitutionalizationofspendinginPentagon’s“base”budgetthatwaspreviouslyconsideredaspartofthepost-9/11wars.Specifically,theDOD’sFY2019requestOCOforbasewas$2.5billion.TheFY2020budgetrequestincluded$97.5billioninOCO funding for base budget requirements and $35.3 billion for “Enduring TheaterRequirements and Related Missions.” Another new DOD OCO category for FY2020 was“EmergencyRequirements,”moneyintendedfortheSouthernUnitedStatesborderwallanddisasterreliefforrecenthurricanes.Thus,inFY2020,onlyabout$25billionofthe$173.8billionOCOrequestweredesignatedasforOperationInherentResolveinIraqandSyrianand Operation Freedom’s Sentinel in Afghanistan. In the FY2020 request, the DODComptroller also applied some of these new categories retroactively to previous OCOfunding—respectively$2,$8,$18, and$17billion forFiscalYears2015to2019.66Again,these changes were specifically and explicitly intended to get around congressionallyimposed limits on the base defense budget. TheDepartment ofDefense FY2020 requestexplicitlystatedasmuch:“ThesebasebudgetrequirementsarefundedintheOCObudgetdue to limitsonbudgetdefense capsenacted in theBudgetControlActof2011.AsbasebudgetfundingattheBudgetControlActlevelisinsufficienttoexecutetheNationalDefenseStrategy,additionalresourcesarebeingrequestedintheOCObudget.”67TheFY2020OCOforbaserequirementsrequestalso,accordingtotheComptroller’sreport“includeground,air, and ship operations, base support, maintenance, weapons system sustainment,munitions,andotherreadinessactivities,whichareneededtopreparewarfightersfortheirnextdeployment.ThisOCOrequestforbaserequirementsincludesadditionalresourcesfornon-DoDactivities,whicharedescribedindetailunderseparate(classified)cover.”68TheFY2021DODbudgetenacted$16.5billionin“OCOforBaseRequirements.”TheFY2022DODbudgetrequestseeksmoneyforwhattheDODdescribesas“enduringtheaterrequirements”that “reflects enduring in-theater and Continental United States (CONUS) costs thatwillremainaftercombatoperationsend.”69Thesehavebeenequallydividedbetweenthemajorwar zones in this report because the size of the troop presence in each war zone wasapproximately thesameoverthe last3years.ThedistinctionbetweenOCOandthebasebudgetwereeliminatedintheFY2022DODbudgetrequestbytheBidenadministration.70

OfficeoftheUndersecretaryofDefense(Comptroller).(2019).DefenseBudgetOverview:UnitedStatesDepartmentofDefenseFiscalYear2020BudgetRequest,p.6-2.66OfficeoftheUndersecretaryofDefense(Comptroller).(2019).DefenseBudgetOverview:UnitedStatesDepartmentofDefenseFiscalYear2020BudgetRequest,p.6-4.67OfficeoftheUndersecretaryofDefense(Comptroller).(2019).DefenseBudgetOverview:UnitedStatesDepartmentofDefenseFiscalYear2020BudgetRequest,p.6-8.68OfficeoftheUndersecretaryofDefense(Comptroller).(2019).DefenseBudgetOverview:UnitedStatesDepartmentofDefenseFiscalYear2020BudgetRequest,p.6-8.69OfficeoftheUndersecretaryofDefense(Comptroller).(2021).DefenseBudgetOverview:UnitedStatesDepartmentofDefenseFiscalYear2020BudgetRequest,p.7-2.70“TocomplywiththeOfficeofManagementandBudgetdirectionintheSummaryofthePresident’sDiscretionaryFundingRequest,datedApril9,2021,theDepartmentofDefense(DoD)isshiftingfundsthathadpreviouslybeendesignatedasOCOtothebasebudget.ThediscretionaryrequestalsodiscontinuesrequestsforOCOasaseparatefundingcategory,insteadfundingdirectwarcostsandenduringoperationsintheDoDbasebudget,asignificantbudgetaryreform.”OfficeoftheUndersecretaryofDefense(Comptroller).(2021).DefenseBudgetOverview:UnitedStatesDepartmentofDefenseFiscalYear2020BudgetRequest,p.7-2.

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Oneofthemostimportantdutiesofanygreatnationwhenitgoestowaristohaveaclear-eyeddiscussionofthecosts,risksandbenefitsofwar.AsIshowedabove,transparencyaroundcostshasdiminishedovertime,notincreased.Thelackofclarityincludesbutextendsbeyondthebudget.Somenumberssimplydisappear.TheDODhassometimesnotclearlyreported the number of personnel deployed in the war zones and the larger theater ofoperations. In 2017, the DOD stopped reporting the number of troops deployed inAfghanistan and Iraq although they continue to report the number of troops that wereinvolvedinthenamedoperationsandthosesupportingthemintheU.S.71AnotherlossoftransparencyoccurredwhentheDepartmentofDefensestoppedreportingitsairstrikesandweaponsreleasesinAfghanistanafterFebruary2020.72

In 2017, the DOD classified previously unclassified information about the Afghan

NationalDefenseandSecurityForces.TheDODalsoclassifiedsomepreviouslypublicdatain 2015.73 The classifications and restrictions make it difficult for Congress to evaluatepoliciesandSpecialInspectorGeneralstoconductoversight.AsSIGARnotedin2017,“Noneof the material now classified or otherwise restricted discloses information that couldthreatentheU.S.orAfghanmissions(suchasdetailedstrategy,plans,timelines,ortactics).”Further, “All of the data include key metrics and assessments that are essential tounderstandingmissionsuccessforthereconstructionofAfghanistan'ssecurityinstitutionsandarmed forces.” Special InspectorGeneral forAfghanistanReconstruction, JohnSopkotoldCongressin2020,“Everytimewefindsomethingthatlookslikeit’sgoingnegative,itgetsclassified…Mostofthe[methods]ofmeasuringsuccessarenowclassified.”74

But informationdoesnothave todisappear tobeunavailable. Ithas sometimesbeen

merged into larger categories that blurs distinct classifications.Determining the costs ofmedical care and disability compensation for Post-9/11 veterans has at times beencomplicatedbythecategoriestheDepartmentofVeteransAffairshasusedtodenotepost-9/11veterans.Forexample,theVAcategorizestheveteransofthepost-9/11warsinthesamecategoryas1990GulfWarveterans,withveteransfromtheentireperiodfrom1990tothepresentcategorizedas“GulfWarEraVeterans”inVAdisabilitycompensationrecords.In theirFY2022budget theVAestimated thatGulfWareraveterans,whoserved from2August 1990 to the present would account for 51.9 percent of the veterans receivingcompensationin2022,anincreasefrom50.7percentofallveteransreceivingcompensation

https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2022/FY2022_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf.71HeidiM.Peters,“DepartmentofDefenseContractorandTroopLevelsinAfghanistanandIraq:2007-2020,”CongressionalResearchService,CRSReports,R44116.February22,2021.https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R44116.pdf.72U.S.AirpowerSummary,CombinedForcesAirComponentCommander2013-2019AirpowerStatistics,https://www.afcent.af.mil/Portals/82/Documents/Airpower%20summary/Jan%202020%20Airpower%20Summary.pdf?ver=2020-02-13-032911-670.73SeetheMemoOctober31,2017,fromtheResearchandAnalysisDirectorate,OfficeofAfghanistanReconstructiontoJohnSopko,SpecialInspectorGeneralforAfghanistanReconstruction.74SopkoquotedinSteveBeynon,“AreWeWinningtheAfghanistanWar?That’sClassifiedSopkoSays,”StarsandStripes,11February2020.https://www.stripes.com/theaters/middle_east/are-we-winning-the-afghan-war-that-s-classified-sopko-says-1.618399.

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inFY2020.75However,in2021theBureauofLaborStatisticsisclearaboutthethatthereare4.5millionveteranswhoservedintheU.S.militaryfromSeptember2001throughAugust,2020,andtheyclassifytheseas“GulfWarEraII”veterans.76 TheCostsofWarProjectwouldwelcomeafullaccountingandanalysisfromtheOfficeofManagementandBudgetofthetotalcostsofthepost-9/11wars,includingthecostsofveteran’smedicalanddisabilitycare,theuseofthewarbudgets,theeffectoftheoverseascontingencyoperationsspendingontheDODandStateDepartment’sbasebudgets,thefederalcostsofcounterterrorismeffortsathome,aclearaccountofthecost-effectivenessofhomelandsecurity,andanestimateofthestateandlocalcostsofthepost-9/11warsandcounterterrormobilization.Conclusion

TheU.S.respondedtothe9/11attacksthroughamilitarymobilizationofunprecedentedscope,scale,andduration.ThecostsofsucharesponsewillnotendafterU.S.troopswithdrawfromAfghanistanandIraq.TheU.S.continuestoinvestinwarinotherareasaroundtheglobe,devoteagreatdealofresourcestocounterterrorismathome,andmustpayfuturecosts—includingforveterans’disabilityandmedicalcareandinterestonborrowingtopayforthepost-9/11wars. Everycountrygoestowarbelievingthattheycanwin,thatthefightinganditsconsequenceswillbecontrollable,thatthecostsofwarwillbelessexpensivethandiplomaticeffortsorsanctions,andthattherewillbefewcasualtiesbecausetheywilltake

75“Benefitsinthecompensationprogramareestimatedtobedispersedto5,033,113Veteransand443,407Survivorsin2020and5,192,776Veteransand456,294Survivorsin2021.The2020VeteranandSurvivorcaseloadestimateisdistributedamongWorldWarIIandPrior(76,823),KoreanConflict(126,947),VietnamEra(1,717,752),GulfWar(2,702,897),andPeacetime(852,101)periodsofservice.”DepartmentofVeteransAffairs.(2019).VolumeIII,BenefitsandBurialProgramsandDepartmentAdministration,2020CongressionalSubmission,p.VBA-56.https://www.va.gov/budget/docs/summary/fy2020VAbudgetvolumeIIIbenefitsBurialProgramsAndDeptmentalAdministration.pdf.“Benefitsinthecompensationprogramareestimatedtobedispersedto5,503,550Veteransand475,146Survivorsin2022,and5,724,030Veteransand492,868Survivorsin2023.The2022VeteranandSurvivorcaseloadestimateisdistributedamongWorldWarIIandPrior(49,527),KoreanConflict(107,584),VietnamEra(1,835,934)GulfWar(3,087,762),andPeacetime(897,888)periodsofservice.Caseloadfortheolderperiodsofserviceissteadilydeclining.ThenumberofVeteransandSurvivorsofVeteransfromtheGulfWarErawhoarereceivingcompensationbenefitswillcontinuetoincreaserapidlythroughthebudgetyear.”DepartmentofVeteransAffairs.(2021).VolumeIII,BenefitsandBurialProgramsandDepartmentAdministration,2020CongressionalSubmission,p.VBA-59.https://www.va.gov/budget/docs/summary/fy2022VAbudgetvolumeIIIbenefitsBurialProgramsAndDeptmentalAdministration.pdf.76BureauofLaborStatistics,“EmploymentSituationofVeterans,NewsRelease”(March18,2021).https://www.bls.gov/news.release/vet.htm#cps_veterans.f.1.“VeteranswhoservedinIraq,Afghanistan,orbothareindividualswhoservedinIraqatanytimesinceMarch2003,inAfghanistanatanytimesinceOctober2001,orinbothlocations.ServiceinIraqorAfghanistanisdeterminedbyanswerstotwoquestions:‘DidyouserveinIraq,offthecoastofIraq,ordidyouflymissionsoverIraqatanytimesinceMarch2003?’and‘DidyouserveinAfghanistan,ordidyouflymissionsoverAfghanistan,atanytimesinceOctober2001?’”

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greatcaretoprotecttheirownsoldiersandthelivesofinnocentcivilians.Butwarrarelygoesasplanned.Whenthingsdon’tgoasplanned,newincrementsofforceareadded—orsurged—tothewarzoneonthetheorythatjustabitmoreforcewillmakethedifference.Thecostsinlivesandtreasuregoesupasthelevelofforceisratchetedup.Andwarcontinues. Democracycansometimestakeabeatingduringwar.Operationsmaybeshroudedinwell-intentionedbutperhapsunnecessarysecrecy,andmistakesaregenerallysweptundertherugordownplayed.Voicesofcautionorthosewhoaskformoredetailsaboutplansandalternativesareoftenignored,derided,orsilencedascitizensanddecisionmakersrallyaroundtheflaganddefertogeneralsinanatmosphereoffearandurgency.TheCostsofWarProjecthopesthatthisaccounting,andourotherwork,promotestransparencyandfacilitatesinformedconversationsaboutcurrentandfuturewars.