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Council of Europe e-voting meeting Progress Report Austria Andreas Ehringfeld INSO - Industrial Software Institute of Computer Aided Automation | Vienna University of Technology INSO www.inso.tuwien.ac.at

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INSO Industrial Software E- Voting in Austria First legally binding election in Austria Federation of Students Election 2009 E-voting as additional voting channel using Austrian citizen card 21 universities 230.749 eligible voters 376 different elections

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INSO Industrial Software Project Setup

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INSO Industrial Software Challenges of the Project Highest requirements on security Organizational level Technical level Emotional topic, public High tensions from the beginning Public discussion around voter coercion, transparency, smart card, security Timeframe Many opponents and activists Protest by Federation of Students right away

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INSO Industrial Software Recommendations Rec(2004)11 Attacks during the election: Denial of Service (DoS) attacks Fake videos Phishing attacks Social engineering attacks Distraction of eligible voters Recommendation Rec(2004)11 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on legal, operational and technical standards for e-voting Evaluation: Analysis of attacks, explaination of countermeasures and relation to Rec(2004)11 Act: Recommentations and updates that should be discussed within the biennial review cycle of Rec(2004)11 Experiment: 2009 Austrian federation of students election Hypothesis: Are Rec(2004)11 sufficient to handle state-of-the-art real world attacks PlanDo CheckAct

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INSO Industrial Software Summary and Conclusion Recommendation Rec2004(11) provides a good basic framework. The challenge is to face state of the art attacks E-voting demands an overall security strategy Covering all aspects (legal, technical, operational), considering international experience and state of the art mechanisms in all project phases and implementing a continiuous improvement process 11 appeals to constitutional court Paper (EVOTE 2010): Analysis of Recommendation Rec(2004)11 Based on the Experiences of Specific Attacks Against the First Legally Binding Implementation of E-Voting in Austria Evaluation Report: http://www.oeh-wahl.gv.at/http://www.oeh-wahl.gv.at/

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INSO Industrial Software Contact Information Andreas Ehringfeld andreas.ehringfeld@inso.tuwien.ac.at INSO - Industrial Software Faculty of Informatics Vienna University of Technology http://www.inso.tuwien.ac.at/

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INSO Industrial Software Additional Slides

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INSO Industrial Software Rec2004(11)

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INSO Industrial Software Chronicles of Attacks - dDoS Rec(2004)11 (art. 45): remote e-voting may start and/or end at an earlier time than the opening of any polling station. Remote e-voting shall not continue after the end of the voting period at polling stations

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INSO Industrial Software Chronicles of Attacks Fake E-Voting System Rec(2004)11 (art. 46): For every e-voting channel, support and guidance arrangements on voting procedures shall be set up for, and be available to, the voter. In the case of remote e-voting, such arrangements shall also be available through a different, widely available communication channel Rec(2004)11 (art. 103): The audit system shall record times, events and actions, including: [...] any attacks on the operation of the e-voting system and its communications infrastructure [...] malfunctions and other threats to the system

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INSO Industrial Software Chronicles of Attacks Fake Vote Buying Rec(2004)11 (art. 80): The e-voting system shall restrict access to its services, depending on the user identity. User authentication shall be effective before any action can be carried out. Rec(2004)11 (art. 51): A remote e-voting system shall not enable the voter to be in possession of a proof of the content of the vote cast.

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INSO Industrial Software Chronicles of Attacks Fake Vote Flipping Rec(2004)11 (art. 76): Where incidents that could threaten the integrity of the system occur, those responsible for operating the equipment shall immediately inform the competent electoral authorities, who will take the necessary steps to mitigate the effects of the incident. The level of incident which shall be reported shall be specified in advance by the electoral authorities.

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INSO Industrial Software Chronicles of Attacks Social Engineering Rec(2004)11 (art. 79): The e-voting system shall perform regular checks to ensure that its components operate in accordance with its technical specifications and that its services are available.

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INSO Industrial Software Voting Process

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INSO Industrial Software

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