country level evaluation liberia annexes - organisation for

Final Report

Volume 2: Annex

3rd of December 2010

Evaluation carried out on behalf of the European Commission

COUNTRY LEVEL EVALUATION

Liberia

Consortium composed by

ECO Consult, AGEG, APRI, Euronet, IRAM, NCG Leader of the Consortium: ECO Consult Contact Person: Dietrich BUSACKER [email protected]

Contract No EVA 2007/geo-acp

This evaluation is mandated by

The Joint Evaluation Unit for: EuropeAid Cooperation Office (AIDCO)

Directorate General for Development and Directorate-General External Relations

This evaluation is managed by the Evaluation Unit, which also chairs the Reference Group made up of members from EuropeAid, DG Development, EU Delegation in Liberia, and the

Embassy of Liberia

The opinions expressed in this document represent t he views of the authors, which are not necessarily shared by the European Commissi on or by the authorities of the

countries concerned.

Status and versions of the document

Version Date Status Feedback /Date

1st version 18/11/2010 Draft 02/12/2010

2nd version 03/12/2010 Final

EVA 2007/geo-acp: Evaluation of EC’s co-operation with Liberia 1999-2008

ECO Consult – AGEG – APRI – Euronet – IRAM – NCG

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Table of content

Volume 1 – Main report

Volume 2 – Annex

1 Evaluation Matrices ................................ ................................................................. 1

1.1 Relevance of EC Cooperation.................................................................................... 1

1.2 Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration and Rehabilitation (DDRR)................. 23

1.3 Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD) .......................................... 36

1.4 Peace-building and Conflict Prevention.................................................................... 50

1.5 Food Security........................................................................................................... 61

1.6 Income Generation .................................................................................................. 89

1.7 Infrastructure...........................................................................................................104

1.8 Capacity Building ....................................................................................................123

1.9 Education................................................................................................................142

1.10 Adequacy of Cooperation Frameworks and Implementation Mechanisms...............162

2 Bibliography....................................... ...................................................................180

3 EC Portfolio per Evaluation Question............... ...................................................191

4 Effect diagrammes.................................. ..............................................................201

5 Persons met ........................................ ..................................................................205

6 Inventory of EC projects/ programmes in the country .......................................212

7 Supporting documentation to field methodology...... .........................................218

7.1 Evaluation Process .................................................................................................218

7.2 Data Collection........................................................................................................218

7.3 Focus Group Reports..............................................................................................219 7.3.1 Focus Groups DDRR and Peace Building / Conflict Prevention ..............................220 7.3.2 Focus Groups Food Security and Humanitarian Aid................................................227 7.3.3 Focus Groups Income Generation / Infrastructure...................................................238 7.3.4 Focus Group Community Development / Education................................................241

7.4 Synthesis Phase .....................................................................................................243

7.5 Overview about Evaluation Questions, Judgment Criteria and Indicators................244

8 ToR for the evaluation ............................. .............................................................254

9 PPT Slides for the seminar......................... ..........................................................272



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List of Tables

Table 1: Comparison of EC objectives and priority needs of Liberia’s population during transition from relief to recovery (i.e., 2003 – 2005) 2

Table 2: Comparison of medium to long-term EC objectives and GoL priorities (i.e., 2005 – 2008) 7

Table 3: Significant changes in EC aid context and corresponding EC response 16 Table 4: Correspondence of EC cooperation objectives to EC Strategy 19 Table 5: Main EU Policies vis-á-vis Liberia and their correspondence with EC

Development Policy 21 Table 6: Total figures on disarmed and demobilised combatants, 2003-2005 29 Table 7: Total figure of disarmed and demobilised combatants on 15 February 2005 29 Table 8: Total figure of participants in reintegration programmes until 2006 30 Table 9: Table with percentage of households being displaced / resettled 30 Table 10: EC contribution for the LDDRR Programme and related programmes 34 Table 11: Punctuality of Implementation for selected EC financed programmes 45 Table 12: DG ECHO Funds for Liberia 2004 to 2008 46 Table 13: Objectives of humanitarian assistance and response by EC rehabilitation and

development interventions 48 Table 14: Child underweight status in counties 62 Table 15: Beneficiaries of WFP food security interventions 2003 in Liberia 63 Table 16: Outputs of WFP food security interventions 2003 in Liberia 64 Table 17: Gender Process Indicators in Liberia 64 Table 18: Beneficiaries of WFP food security interventions 2004 in Liberia 64 Table 19: Outputs of WFP food security interventions 2004 in Liberia 65 Table 20: Outcomes of WFP food security interventions 2004 in Liberia 65 Table 21: Current EC Food Security Portfolio 66 Table 22: Rice yields Pre-War and 1996 figures 70 Table 23: Estimated production of rice in 2005 70 Table 24: Estimated production of cassava in 2005 71 Table 25: Rice production area in Liberia, 1990-2008 73 Table 26: Rice production, imports and food assistance in Liberia 2004-2008 77 Table 27: WFP food aid distribution in Liberia, 2004-2009 77 Table 28: Rice production in Liberia, 1999-2008 78 Table 29: EC food security priorities 80 Table 30: Women’s priorities with regard to food security and the uptake in programming 83 Table 31: Selected income-relevant Small Scale Projects (SSPs) of the EDF8

Reintegration Programme visited during the field phase of the Country Level Evaluation 91

Table 32: Rough estimates of number directly created permanent / casual jobs, 2005 – 2008. 93

Table 33: Comparison of number of jobs created with EC-support in 2005 to various demographic groups 94

Table 34: Overview of tools and cultivation equipment provided through EC-financed programmes 97

Table 35: Rehabilitated Health Facilities, Second Rehabilitation Programme, 1996 - 2000 104 Table 36: Clinics and other health-related facilities constructed by the CRC / PCRCBP 105



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Table 37: Approximate KM of roads constructed and rehabilitated with EC-assistance/ 1999 - 2008 111

Table 38: Overview of unused road and bridge construction funds; Community Rehabilitation Component of PCRCBP (medium-scale projects) 112

Table 39: Water-relevant projects financed under EDF8 Reintegration Programme in Monrovia 116

Table 40: Number of water sources improved; 2nd Liberia Rehabilitation Programme 118 Table 41: CRC medium grant projects with relevance for rural water supply 119 Table 42: CRC small grant projects with relevance for rural water supply 119 Table 43: Sanitation Projects under the Second Rehabilitation Programme / EC 121 Table 44: Selection of Water and Sanitation “Small Scale Projects” of the EDF8

Reintegration Programme 121 Table 45: Direct beneficiaries of EC capacity development at national level (Economic

Governance) 123 Table 46: Direct beneficiaries of EC capacity development at local level 125 Table 47: Increase of Revenue from Liberian State-Owned Enterprises (2004 – 2007) 138 Table 48: Timeline of EC Support to Education in Liberia (ECSEL) 142 Table 49: Selected design features of ECSEL 145 Table 50: Estimated number of schools rehabilitated / reconstructed with EC-assistance 151 Table 51: Findings of “Rapid Assessment of Learning Spaces” 2003/2004 151 Table 52: Changes in physical conditions of school buildings, Liberia (2005/06 to

2007/08) 152 Table 53: Trend in the Net Enrolment Rate – Liberia (1999 – 2007/08) 153 Table 54: Summary of Final Formal Education Payments by County – EC Contribution 156 Table 55: Junior High Gross Enrolment by Proprietor & Gender, 2007/08 156 Table 56: Senior High Gross Enrolment by Proprietor & Gender, 2007/08 156 Table 57: Gross enrolment rates by school level, 2007/08 157 Table 58: Overall progress towards the primary teacher training target (no EC

contribution) 157 Table 59: Distribution of payments among primary commitments, 1999 - 2008 164 Table 60: Selected EC-financed programmes with significantly delayed inputs from the

European Commission 165 Table 61: Treatment of Risks and Assumptions in project documents of EC-financed

programmes in Liberia 171 Table 62: Comparison of risks & assumptions on “decentralisation” / linkages “line

ministries” to “local authorities”, PCRCBP / CRC vs. County Development 172 Table 63: Selected programme constraints or “risks” and their management 175 Table 64: Selected estimated unit costs for EC-financed programmes 177 Table 65: Financial estimates for the LCD / SSP component of the EDF 8 Reintegration

Programme 178 Table 66: Financial Information for Small Scale Grants, Community Rehabilitation

Component, PCRCBP 178 Table 67: Overview of EC portfolio (EDF financed) with specific regard to EQ2: DDRR 191 Table 68: Overview of EC portfolio (EDF-financed) with specific regard to EQ3: LRRD 192 Table 69: Overview of EC portfolio (non-EDF contribution) with specific regard to EQ3:

LRRD 192 Table 70: Overview of EC portfolio (EDF-financed) with specific regard to EQ4: CPPB 193



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Table 71: Overview of EC portfolio (non-EDF contribution) with specific regard to EQ4: CPPB 196

Table 72: Overview of EC portfolio (EDF-financed) with specific regard to EQ5: Food Security 196

Table 73: Overview of EC portfolio (non-EDF contribution) with specific regard to EQ5: Food Security 197

Table 74: Overview of EC portfolio (EDF-financed) with specific regard to EQ6: Income Generation 198

Table 75: Overview of EC portfolio (non-EDF) with specific regard to EQ6: Income Generation 198

Table 76: Overview of EC portfolio (EDF-financed) with regard to EQ7: Infrastructure 198 Table 77: Overview of EC portfolio (non EDF) with regard to EQ7: Infrastructure 199 Table 78: Overview of EC portfolio (EDF-financing) with regard to EQ8: Capacity Building 200 Table 79: Overview of EC portfolio (EDF-financing) with regard to EQ9: Education 200 Table 80: Inventory of EC Projects/Programmes, EDF-funding 212 Table 81: Inventory of EC Projects/ Programmes, Thematic Budget Lines 214 Table 82: Changes in Judgment Criteria and Indicators throughout the Evaluation 244 Table 83: Overview about all Evaluation Questions, Judgment Criteria and Indicators 245

List of Figures

Figure 1: Reasons for non-participation in DDRR programmes ........................................32 Figure 2: EU Instruments relevant to the field of CPPB ....................................................50 Figure 3: Geographic Distribution of Underweight.............................................................62 Figure 4: Rice yield in kg / hectare, Liberia 1997-2005 .....................................................70 Figure 5: 2007/08 Primary NER and GER by County......................................................154 Figure 6: 2007/08 Junior Secondary NER and GER by County ......................................154 Figure 7: EC commitments vs. Disbursements, 1999 - 2008...........................................163 Figure 8: EC payments by main commitments, 1999 - 2008 ...........................................163 Figure 9: Partial EC intervention logic, reconstructed from Technical and

Administrative Provision (TAPs) of interventions between 1999 - 2005............201 Figure 10: Logically reconstructed diagram of expected effects, CSP and NIP for EDF9

(2006 - 2007) ...................................................................................................202 Figure 11: Intervention Logic, EC support to Liberia, CSP and NIP for 2008 – 2013.........203 Figure 12: Consolidated EC Intervention Logic, 1999 – 2007 (EDF8 and EDF9) ..............204



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List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

ACRONYM MEANING

ACP African, Caribbean and Pacific

ACPA Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement

ADE Aide à la Décision Economique

AECID Spanish Development Agency

AfDB African Development Bank

AFL Armed Forces of Liberia

AFROSAI-E African Organisation for English-speaking Supreme Audit Institutions

AIDCO EuropeAid Cooperation Office

AIDP Agriculture and Infrastructure Development Programme

ALAT Administrative and Technical Local Agent

ALP Accelerated Learning Programme

APC Area Programme Co-ordinator

AU African Union

BCE Bureau of Customs and Excise

BCS Background Conclusion Sheet

BL Budget Lines

BMA Bureau of Maritime Affairs

BTI Bertelsmann Transformation Index

CA Cancelled

CA Contract Agent

CAFF Children Associated with Fighting Forces

CBO Community-Based Organisation

CDA County Development Agenda

CDC County Development Committee

CDD Community Driven Development

CDP County Development Programme

CE Commission européenne

CESD Community Empowerment and Skills Development

CFSNS Comprehensive Food Security and Nutrition Survey

CIBAP Capacity and Institutional Building Action Plan

CL Closed

CMC Cash Management Committee

COE Customs Operations Expert

CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement

CPPB Conflict Prevention and Peace Building

CRC Community Rehabilitation Component

CRIS Common Relex Information Services

CSO Civil Society Organisation



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ACRONYM MEANING

CSP Country Strategy Paper

DAC Development Assistance Committee

DCI Development Co-operation Instrument

DDC District Development Committee

DDH EC Thematic Budgetline for Human Rights and Democracy

DDRR Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration

DfID UK Department for International Development

DG Directorate-General (EC)

DG DEV Directorate-General for Development (EC)

DNH Do No Harm Approach

DPKO UN’s Department of Peace Keeping Operations

DRC Danish Refugee Council

EAMR External Assistance Management Report (EC)

EBA Everything But Arms

EC European Commission

ECHO European Commission Humanitarian Aid

ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States

ECSEL EC Support to Education in Liberia

EDF European Development Fund

EGRA Early Grade Reading Assessment

EIB European Investment Bank

EIDHR European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights

ENRTP Thematic Programme for Environment and Sustainable Management of Natural Resources

ENV EC Thematic Budgetline for Environment

EPA Economic Partnership Agreement

EPP Emergency Power Programme

EQ Evaluation Question

ERW Explosive Remnants of War

ESDP Education Sector Development Programme

EU European Union

EUR Euro

FA Financing Agreement

FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

FD Financing Decision

FDA Forest Development Agency (Liberia)

FED Fonds européen de développement (see EDF)

FG Focus Group

FGD Focus Group Discussion



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ACRONYM MEANING

FLEGT Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade

FS Food Security

FSBL Food Security and Food Aid Budget Line

FSTP Food Security Thematic Programme

GAC General Auditing Commission

GAINS Gbarpolu Agriculture, Infrastructure and Nutrition for Food Security

GE Government Effectiveness

GEMAP Governance and Economic Management Assistance Programme

GDP Gross Domestic Product

GER Gross Enrolment Rate

GHD Good Humanitarian Donorship

GoL Government of Liberia

GTZ Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (German Technical Cooperation)

ha Hectare

HDI Human Development Index

HIPC Heavily Indebted Poor Countries

HIV/AIDS Human Immunodeficiency Virus / Acquired Immuno Deficiency Syndrome

HQ Headquarters

HR Human Resources

HV/MV High Voltage / Medium Voltage

ICGL International Contact Group for Liberia

IDA International Development Assistance

IDP Internally Displaced Person

IGA Income Generating Activities

IMF International Monetary Fund

INGO International Non-Governmental Organisation

INTOSAI International Organisation of Supreme Audit Institutes

IP International Partner

iPRS Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy

IR Inception Report

ISCBP Institutional Strengthening and Capacity Building Programme

ISP Institutional Support Programme

IVS Inland Valley Swamps

JAR Joint Annual Report (EC)

JC Judgment Criteria

JEU Joint Evaluation Unit

JIU Joint Implementation Unit

JNA Joint Needs Assessment

JVG Joint Visibility Guidelines



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ACRONYM MEANING

KfW Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (German Financial Cooeration)

km Kilometer

kV Kilo Volt

LACE Liberian Agency for Community Empowerment

LBR Liberia

LCD Local Community Development

LCIP Liberian Community Infrastructure Project

LDC Least Developed Countries

LDDRRP Liberian Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration Programme

LDHS Liberia Demographic Health Survey

LEC Liberia Electricity Company

LED Local Economic Development

LISGIS Liberia Institute of Statistics and Geo-Information Service

LNPF Liberian National Police Force

LOIC Liberia Opportunities Industrialisation Centre

LPRC Liberia Petroleum Refining Company

LRDC Liberian Reconstruction and Development Committee

LRRD Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development

LTTA Long-term Technical Assistance

LURD Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy

LWSC Liberia Water and Sewage Company

L-PERP Liberian Primary Education Sector Recovery Programme

M Million

MDG Millennium Development Goals

MODEL Movement for Democracy in Liberia

MoE Liberian Ministry of Education

MoF Liberian Ministry of Finance

MPEA Liberian Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs

MR Monitoring Report

MS Member States

MT Metric ton

M&E Monitoring and Evaluation

N/A Not applicable

NAO National Authorising Officer

NCDDRR National Commission on Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration

NDS National Drug Service

NEPAD New Partnership for Africa’s Development

NER Net Enrolment Rate



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ACRONYM MEANING

NGO Non-Governmental Organisation

NIP National Indicative Programme

NPA National Port Authority

NSA Non-State Actors

NTGL National Transitional Government of Liberia

ODA Official Development Assistance

OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

OJ Official Journal of the European Union

OLAS On-line Accounting System

oQSG Office Quality Support Group (EC)

PAAB Programme d’apurement des arrières sur fonds FED de la BEI

PCRCBP Post Conflict Rehabilitation and Capacity Building Programme

PCRD Post Conflict Rehabilitation and Development

PE Programme Estimate

PEACE Enhancing Agricultural Capacities and Economy

PHC Primary Health Care

PIA Project Implementation Agreement

PMT Project Management Team

PMU Project Management Unit

PRS Poverty Reduction Strategy

PSC Project Steering Committee

PTA Parent Teacher Association

REH Rehabilitation Budgetline (EC)

RFTF Results Focused Transitional Framework

RG Reference Group

RIA Roberts International Airport

RIMCO RFTF Implementation and Monitoring Committee

RIP Regional Indicative Programme

ROM Results Oriented Monitoring

RR Rehabilitation and Reintegration

RRM Rapid Response Mechanism

SALW Small Arms and Light Weapons

SC Scheme of Certification

SF Strategy Framework

SGBV Sexual and Gender-Based Violence

SIDA Swedish Development Agency

SMEP Small and Micro-Enterprise Programme

SOE State-Owned Enterprise

SSP Small-Scale Project



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ACRONYM MEANING

SSR Sub-Saharan Region

SSS Special Security Service

STTA Short-Term Technical Assistance

TA Technical Assistance

TAP Technical and Administrative Provisions

TC Technical Cooperation

TCC Technical Cooperation Committee

TCF Technical Cooperation Facility

TF Trust Fund

ToR Terms of Reference

TRC Truth and Reconciliation Committee

UK United Kingdom

UN United Nations

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

UNEP United Nations Environment Programme

UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund

UNMIL United Nations Mission in Liberia

UNSC United Nations Security Council

USA United States of America

USAID United States Agency for International Development

US$ US Dollar

VA Voice and Accountability

VAP Voluntary Partnership Agreement

VET Vocational Education and Training

VRA Volta River Authority

WB World Bank

WFP United Nations World Food Programme

WGI World Governance Indicators

WHO World Health Organization

WTO World Trade Organization

XC Ex-Combatant



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1 EVALUATION MATRICES

1.1 Relevance of EC Cooperation

EQ1: To what extent did EC development cooperation objectives correspond to the needs of the Liberian population, the Government of Liberia (GoL) development priorities and other related objectives of the European Commission, taking into account the evolving situation in Liberia?

Judgement Criteria 1.1: EC cooperation takes into a ccount the short term and longer term needs of Liberia’s population in the conflict, post conflict, rehabilitation and development period



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� Indicator 1.1.1: EC objectives reflect the priorities set in needs assessments of the immediate post-conflict era (e.g., the 2004 UN / World Bank Joint Needs Assessment

Findings at indicator’s level: The objectives of EC support between 2003 and 2005 clearly and consistently reflect the needs-based priorities set in the 2004 UN / World Bank Joint Needs Assessment (JNA). EC programmes respond to nearly all of the substantive areas emphasised in the JNA. This includes issues like security, DDRR, refugees and IDPs, Governance and rule of law (including elections), health, education, agriculture, food security and income generation and economic and financial management. The only substantive area where EC programmes do not seem to offer directly corresponding objectives concerns “civil society and media”. In principle, the EC is able to respond to these priorities through the use of its thematic budget lines, even without having released a previous primary commitment that would allow support in this area. In addition, it probably would have been possible to use funds from the EDF9 Post-Conflict Rehabilitation and Capacity Building Programme for these purposes – although the issue of media is not specifically mentioned in the Financing Agreement.

More significant is the fact that the cross-cutting issues of HIV and AIDS, Environment or Human Rights are not specifically addressed in the Financing Agreements for the Post-Conflict Rehabilitation Programme. The Financing Agreement for the Reintegration Programme for Returnees and Displaced People fails to specifically mention gender or women’s issues. This raises the question, if the FAs provided an adequate basis for subsequent mainstreaming of these issues in the specific programmes and interventions under these commitments.

Data, sources, extracts :

Table 1: Comparison of EC objectives and priority n eeds of Liberia’s population during transition from relief to recovery (i.e., 2003 – 2005)

Identified priority needs (2004 JNA) EC objectives / corresponding programmes

Security:

• “To consolidate and extend the security perimeter beyond Monrovia to the rural parts of the country”

• “To restructure the armed forces into a unified and cohesive military institution”1

• “Support the implementation of the Cease-fire Agreement brokered by ECOWAS and create the conditions of stability in Liberia that will allow the restoration of a normal living standards and process of national reconciliation”2

� Support to Peace Process (ECOWAS) (EDF9, 2003 – 2006)

DDRR:

• “To disarm, demobilise and support the reintegration of 53,000 ex-combatants”

• “To equip the multitudes of ex-combatants who are ready to leave behind a life of war with the wherewithal to survive in a new and, in most cases, completely unfamiliar world of peace and order”3

• Completion of demobilisation / social reintegration of fighters

� Post-Conflict Rehabilitation and Capacity Building Programme – DDRR component (EDF9, 2003 – 2011)

� Support to Peace Process (ECOWAS) (EDF9, 2003 – 2006)

� Demobilisation and Reintegration (contr. to UNDP DDRR trust fund) (2005–2011, EDF9).

1 GoL/UN/World Bank, 2004, p.11 2 EC, 2003a, p.18 3 GoL/UN/World Bank, 2004, p.11



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Refugees, returnees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs):

• “Ensuring that returnees, third-country refugees, and IDPs throughout Liberia are provided with essential basic services and protection”

• “Supporting communities, for it is the interaction between the two that will ultimately determine the sustainability of any given solution”

• “Provision of social protection and legal support will also be essential”4

• Delivery of basic health services / drugs improved; Basic infrastructure / services rehabilitated, including health, education, water

• Support “community capacity” for self-directed development improved; capacities of key institutions at local level (county administrations, Civil society organisations (CSOs)) improved

• Repair of small-scale infrastructure (education, water, roads, etc.)

� 2nd Rehabilitation Programme (1999 - 2001, EDF8)

� Reintegration programme f. Returnees and displaced people (2001 – 2005, EDF8)


� Rehabilitation / NGO Co-financing Budget Lines

Governance, rule of law, human rights

• “Establishment of an institutional framework for sound relations between state authorities and civil society”

• “Upgrading and revitalization of the civil service”

• “Alignment of state practices according to the norms of transparent and law-abiding governance”

• “Increased transparency and credibility of the police, corrections service, and judiciary”5

• Key public Ministries / institutions , CSOs re-established; functioning improved

• Key public bodies and civil society organisations central to the peace and reconstruction process are fulfilling their mandate

� Reintegration programme f. Returnees and displaced people (2001 – 2005, EDF8), in particular “Institutional Support” Component and “Community Rehabilitation” Component.

Civil society and media:

• “Establishment of an independent media”

• “Fostering public dialogue, encouraging freedom of expression, and promoting confidence in democratic institutions”6

[No directly corresponding objective in EC programmes]

Elections:

• “Extensive voter registration and constituency demarcation effort”

• “Holding of state and local elections by October 2005”

• “Launching of nationwide education campaign”

• “Preparatory activities for the holding of free, fair and transparent elections (procurement of equipment and material, training of monitors, etc.)”

• Key public bodies and civil society organisations central to the peace and reconstruction process are fulfilling their mandate (EC, 2003a)7

� Post-Conflict Rehabilitation and Capacity Building Programme – DDRR component (EDF9, 2003 – 2011), in particular “Institutional Support” Component and “Community Rehabilitation” Component.

Health and nutrition:

• “Restore a Primary Health Care (PHC) system that can deliver health and nutrition services through clinics and community-based initiatives across the country and, in particular, in under-served rural areas”

• “Laying the groundwork for a comprehensive reconstruction of the sector, while

• Delivery of basic health services / drugs improved

• Basic infrastructure / services rehabilitated, including health

• Key public Ministries / institutions , CSOs re-established; functioning improved

• Health status of beneficiaries improved



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addressing the most urgent health, nutritional and hygiene needs of returnees and the rural population through the re-activation of key health facilities”

• “Strengthening, in the medium term, of the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare at the central and county levels”8



� Rehabilitation / NGO Co-financing Budget Lines

Education:

• “Rehabilitate at least 25% of the primary and secondary schools in need”

• “Improve access to quality basic education by implementing back-to-school type programmes”

• ”Encourage vocational training and relevant higher education” “

• Define and implement a new policy in education that will serve Liberia for generations to come”9

• Contribute to the physical rehabilitation of basic infrastructure and services (public and other), including the availability of [...] education

• Improvement in the living conditions of communities due to better access to basic services and facilities, particularly income generating activities [...] and education10

• Encourage community responsibility for local management of education systems


� Post-Conflict Rehabilitation and Capacity Building Programme – DDRR component and Community Rehabilitation Component (CRC) (EDF9, 2003 – 2011)

� (EC Support to Education in Liberia (ECSEL)11)

Infrastructure, including Water and Sanitation, Roads, etc.

• “Minimize the pervasive water- and sanitation-related health risks”.

• “Improved levels of, and access to community-based water and excreta disposal facilities in urban areas (Monrovia and six other urban areas)”12

• “Contribute to the physical rehabilitation of basic infrastructure and services (public and other), including the availability of [...] water”.

• “Improve access to clean water, sanitation [...] in Monrovia and rural areas”13

• “Improve access to isolated rural areas”14

� “2nd Liberia Rehabilitation Programme”, EDF8


� Post-Conflict Rehabilitation and Capacity Building Programme – (EDF9, 2003 – 2011)

Agriculture, Food Security, Employment Generation and Livelihoods

• “Improve food security and strengthen domestic production capacity in the agricultural sector”

• Quick impact programmes [to] facilitate the transfer of cash in a rapid and efficient manner, also to meet the “expectations for a peace dividend throughout post-war Liberia”

• Labour-intensive reconstruction and rehabilitation15

• “Improve living standards, particularly regarding food security and family income”

• “Improvement in the living conditions of communities due to better access to [...] income generating activities”

� “2nd Liberia Rehabilitation Programme”, EDF8


� Post-Conflict Rehabilitation and Capacity Building Programme – (EDF9, 2003 – 2011)



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� Thematic Budget Line on Food Security

Economic management and development strategy:

• “The priority outcomes are (a) rapid and sustainable economic growth and (b) structural reforms aiming at the liberalization of the economy and the establishment of a properly functioning financial system”16

• “Support the re-establishment and functioning of key public Ministries and key other Institutions and civil organisations involved in the peace and reconstruction process”17

� Post-Conflict Rehabilitation and Capacity Building Programme – DDRR component (EDF9, 2003 – 2011), in particular “Institutional Support” Component

Environment, Forestry, HIV and AIDS, Gender:

• “Reducing HIV transmission and ensuring adequate treatment [...] in a multi-sectoral response”

• “Human rights and gender considerations must be kept to the fore as interventions within different sectors - at the institutional and community levels – are co-ordinated”

• “Priority needs are related to environmental issues for human health, environmental "danger zones", environmental governance and an approach to the management of all natural resources that pays due attention to their conservation”18

• “Opportunities for gender mainstreaming will be pursued within the public sector and NGOs, as to ensure women needs and representations on equal basis”19

• “Encourage where necessary” the “normal sensitivity to local environmental factors” by local communities, in the context of appropriate agricultural techniques20

• Tap “further Commission managed budget lines” including “the lines to combat HIV/AIDS, human rights and democracy and measures to help promote sustainable forestry management policies”21

NOTE:

• No mention of HIV and AIDS, environment or Human Rights in the FA for the “Post-Conflict Rehabilitation” Programme.

• No mention of gender or women’s issues in the objectives of the FA for the Reintegration programme for Returnees and Displaced People.



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JC 1.1: EC cooperation takes into account the short term and longer term needs of Liberia’s population in the conflict, post conflict , rehabilitation and development period

Statement upon JC: The objectives of EC support between 2003 and 2005 clearly and consistently reflect the needs of dominant needs Liberia’s population during that period. This includes the EC response on issues like security, DDRR, refugees and IDPs, Governance and rule of law (including elections), health, education, agriculture, food security and income generation ad economic and financial management. The only substantive area where EC programmes do not seem to offer directly corresponding objectives concerns is “civil society and media”. In principle, the EC is able to respond to these priorities through the use of its thematic budget lines, even without having released a previous primary commitment that would allow support in this area. In addition, it probably would have been possible to use funds from the EDF9 Post-Conflict Rehabilitation and Capacity Building Programme for these purposes – although the issue of media is not specifically mentioned in the Financing Agreement.

More significant is the fact that the cross-cutting issues of HIV and AIDS, Environment or Human Rights are not specifically addressed in the Financing Agreements for the Post-Conflict Rehabilitation Programme. The Financing Agreement for the Reintegration Programme for Returnees and Displaced People fails to specifically mention gender or women’s issues, which reduces the chance that these issues are adequately mainstreamed in the specific programmes and interventions carried out under these commitments.



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Judgment Criterion 1.2: EC cooperation objectives a re consistent with the policy priorities of the Gov ernment of Liberia

� Indicator 1.2.1: EC objectives reflect the priorities of short-term strategies of the Liberian Government (including the 2004 “Results Focused Transitional Framework” (RFTF), the 2006 “First 150 Day Action Plan”)

Findings at indicator’s level: The focal sectors and non-focal sectors and issues chosen by the European Commission support under the EDF9 CSP correspond with the sectors and issues prioritised by the newly elected GoL for the immediate period after its inauguration (i.e. the 150 day plan). Differences existed, however, regarding the time horizon that the partners considered appropriate for delivering results in these sectors: The newly elected Government of Liberia aimed for quick-impact, relief and rehabilitation-oriented support to rehabilitate infrastructure, the provision of “quick impact” income generating opportunities to Liberians and the continued reintegration of returning refugees and IDPs. The European Commission, on the other hand, advocated using the remaining EDF9 support to begin the “migration” from relief and “short-term rehabilitation” to longer-term development. The apparent assumption was that the needed link between “relief, rehabilitation and development” (LRRD) and the quick improvements in basic infrastructure and social services had already been adequately ensured through earlier programmes from EDF8, ECHO and food security budgetary lines, and the “pre-CSP” “Post-Conflict Rehabilitation and Capacity Building Programme” (EDF9). It now seems that this “migration” happened too early and did not take into account that in 2006 / 07, many immediate needs remained that had to be addressed before the focus could shift to longer-term development objectives. This also seemed to have been the view of the Liberian Government in 2006 / 2007.

These differences notwithstanding, the sector priorities set by the European Commission in 2006 fit well into the overall strategic framework and sector priorities of the Liberian Government: Under the heading of “County Development”, the EC pledged to improve access to infrastructure and services at county and community levels through a participatory, community driven, “bottom-up approach”. Capacity building at county level was meant to ensure sustainability of the investments. The EC commitment to Education as a focal sector was meant to help improve the access of Liberian to education, and thereby, livelihood opportunities. Choosing capacity building as a “non-focal sector” showed the commitment of the European Commission to help the Liberian Government in developing its capacity for appropriate economic and overall democratic governance. The EC strategy does not contain any objectives regarding the reform of the security sector, i.e. reform of the Liberian Armed Forces, or the reorganisation of the country’s security agencies.


• Results-Focused Transitional Framework (RFTF) was only significant for a very short time, i.e. from 2004 until the elections in 2005. With the election of a new president, the focus and GoL priorities might have shifted. Therefore, the best document to compare EC objectives to (for the 2006 – 2007 period) is probably the 150 day plan of the new administration.

Table 2: Comparison of medium to long-term EC objec tives and GoL priorities (i.e., 2005 – 2008)

GoL short-term priorities (150-day plan) GoL long-term priorities (iPRS, PRS) EC objectives (CSPs EDF9, 10)

Enhancing Peace and Security:

• Building a capable and democratically accountable military force by completing the demobilization of ex-combatants, recruiting Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) troops, initiating new military training programs.

• Initiating reorganization of security agencies, completing national security review, beginning to

iPRS / PRS (Pillar I):

• National security assessment, formulation of national security strategy; building effective national security institutions

• Rebuilding capable Liberian security forces; recruitment of personnel, reflecting Liberia’s ethnic and religious diversity, 20% women

CSP – EDF9:

[NOTE: no new commitments to peace and security under EDF9]

CSP – EDF10:

[NOTE: no new commitments to peace and security under



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develop a national security plan, and demobilizing a significant portion of the Special Security Service (SSS).

• Strengthen the Liberian National Police Force (LNPF) by completing severance payments to retire police personnel, recruiting new personnel22

• Continuation of training, in line with acceptable international standards (including gender equity, justice)

• Establish early warning system to prevent conflicts

• Provide jobs for youth and ex-combatants and

• Reduce incidents of corruption and policy brutality

• “Conflict-sensitive policy-making; conflict management mechanisms” (Pillar III)23

EDF10]

Refugees, IDPs, Returnees24:

• Facilitating return of 70,000 refugees from neighbouring countries

• Reintegrating 50,000 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) to their homes (from the original number of 314,000),

• Providing support to the returnees through health, water, training, and employment programs25

iPRS / PRS:

• Programmes to reintegrate and resettle former IDPs and returned refugees26 (GoL / IMF, 2007/2008).

CSP – EDF9:

• “Selected sectors represent a logical continuation of the current Community-funded programmes”, including in:

� Humanitarian support (ECHO); Food Security

� DDRR

� Reintegration Programme for Returnees and Displaced People in Liberia

• “Present strategy will ensure an efficient link between short-term relief and rehabilitation efforts towards long-term development cooperation (LRRD approach).”

Economic Governance:

• Increasing revenues by introducing a computerized “flag receipt” system, cracking down on customs fraud and other forms of tax evasion

• Cancelling non-compliant forestry and ports concessions, and is initiating a process to review the legality of other concessions

• Implementing the first steps of the Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program (GEMAP)

• Placing internationally recruited financial controllers Central Bank, National Port Authority, Forestry Development Authority, Roberts International Airport, and the Liberia Petroleum Refining Company27

iPRS / PRS (Pillar II):

• Develop / Implement robust economic policy; strong emphasis on stable macro-economic environment

• Monetary and exchange rate policy to ensure price stability and prudent fiscal policy

• Improving management of state enterprises

• Recovery of private sector, supporting development of “middle class”

� Provide access to finance

� Lowering / rationalising corporate tax rate

� Reforming investment code

� Modernising laws / regulations for telecommunication sector

CSP – EDF9:

• Support establishment of accountable public finance management system;

• Providing interim relief on Liberian debt servicing, upon Liberia’s completion of HIPC decision point

• Continue capacity building support / governance support for “institutions managing public funds” (Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs (MPEA), MoF, General Audit Office, etc.)

• Support negotiations of Economic Partnership Agreements negotiation, regional integration matters, regional programmes and promotion of certification schemes for exporting goods, notably the new European Forest Law Enforcement Governance and Trade initiative



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� Reforming regulatory practices that hinder economic activities / investment / facilitate expansion and functioning of markets28

CSP – EDF10:

• More efficient use of financial and human resources within public sector

• Governance mechanisms decentralised

• Public service transparency improved / size of public service reduced

• Accountability of public servants increased

• Amendment to EDF10 allows budget support to Liberia

Agriculture, Food Security, Livelihoods:

• Providing seeds and tools to at least 14,000 farmers, supplies for 1,800 fisherman, training assistance for agriculture for 2,000 ex-combatants, and food assistance for 16,000 families through food-for work programs29

iPRS / PRS (Pillar II):

• Restoring production in the leading natural resource sectors, ensuring wide sharing of benefits:

� Revitalising agriculture

� Reviving mining and forestry

• Support to informal sector:

� Productivity enhancing training

� Skills upgrading / increased access to credit

• Improving management and use of natural resources

• Provide access to finance (also above)

• Reform land ownership, tenure system30

CSP – EDF9:

• Agriculture productivity and non-farm employment increased

• Improve livelihood opportunities by increasing access to and the quality of Liberia’s education system.

CSP – EDF10:

• Regional integration of Liberia improved

• Free movement of good improved

Infrastructure, Basic Services:

• Beginning to rehabilitate several hundred kilometres of roads and bridges; repair certain roads in and around Monrovia

• Rehabilitating Zwedru High School, Greenville High School and other High Schools, Zwedru and Phebe hospitals and additional clinics / health facilities

• Beginning to rebuild the electricity grid, with an initial goal of restoring power to some parts of Monrovia by July 26th, and expanding beyond as rapidly as possible thereafter.

• Rehabilitating certain water pipelines in Monrovia, and constructing 100 new water points and 52 new boreholes around the country31

iPRS / PRS (Pillar IV):

• Continue to focus on fundamental national infrastructure to ensure telecommunications, transport, electricity, water and sanitation, education, health and nutrition for all.

� “rebuilding basic infrastructure, especially roads”

• Rebuilding infrastructure in collaboration with county governments and communities

• Secure private sector participation in rebuilding efforts

• Engage youth and community in revitalisation of infrastructure and basic services32

CSP – EDF9:

• More efficient, effective and democratic County administrations / Increased capacity of Local Country Administration to manage local services

• Increase in population with access to sustainable education and health facilities

• Qualitative improvements in health and educational outcomes

• Reduction in water borne diseases

• Improve livelihood opportunities by increasing access to and the quality of Liberia’s education system

� [With various more concrete results, including “increasing number of pupils graduating”;



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“Schools have qualified teachers”, etc.]

CSP – EDF10:

• Access to essential services & infrastructure improved (water, energy, roads)

• Health infrastructure rehabilitated / Access to basic healthcare improved

• Access to basic, primary and secondary education improved / HR management of public education system improved

HIV and AIDS:

• Revitalizing the national strategy to fight HIV/ AIDS, providing 5,000 bed nets to households in high malaria endemic communities, and providing tuberculosis drugs for 300 new cases in Montserrado, Grand Bassa, Bong, and Nimba counties33

CSP – EDF9:

• “Cross-cutting issues (the environment, HIV, gender, land tenure) will be monitored

CSP – EDF10:

• To reduce poverty by improving the health status of the population through more effective, efficient and equitable healthcare (HIV and AIDS mainstreamed)

Overall Governance & Rule of Law:

• Develop comprehensive anti-corruption strategy

• Develop clear plan for constitutional and legal reform

• Submit legislation to establish successor body to the Governance Reform Commission

• Establish Truth and Reconciliation Commission and Human Rights Commission

• Beginning process of removing “ghost” and absentee workers from civil service34

iPRS / PRS (Pillar III):

• Reforming public sector

• Decentralising political governance and social responsibilities

• Strengthening rule of law and respecting human rights

• “Conflict-sensitive policy-making, conflict management mechanisms”

• Addressing gender inequalities

• Strengthening environment rules / regulations

• Rebuilding Civil Society and the Media

• Involve broader participation in Governance

• Reduce corruption35

CSP – EDF9:

• Support civil society, particularly women’s groups and those promoting transparency

• Support to local actors and institutions forming part of the decentralisation process.

CSP – EDF10:

• More efficient use of financial and human resources within public sector

• Governance mechanisms decentralised

• Public service transparency improved / size of public service reduced

• Accountability of public servants increased

• The Country Strategy Paper for EDF9 seems to have been written to allow a departure or transition from relief and “short-term rehabilitation”. The EC states that the

underlying approach for the CSP “is based on the assumption that security and the humanitarian situation will further improve”. Coining improvements in security and the humanitarian situation as “assumptions” puts them to a certain extent outside of the scope of the EC strategy itself. Accordingly, the strategy paper states that “the present support strategy is [...] based on a migration from relief and short-term rehabilitation, currently supported through programmes financed by EDF8, ECHO and food security budgetary line, to support for more long-term oriented development. LRRD was thought to mainly be achieved through the continuation of earlier, EDF8 and EDF9 programmes, such as the EDF8 Reintegration programme and the EDF9 “Post-Conflict Rehabilitation” Programme. However, several observations raise the question, if this



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departure from “short-term rehabilitation” was pre-mature, also in the eyes of the Government of Liberia itself.

� In its CSP for EDF10, the European Commission seems to backtrack on its earlier assumption that Liberia was ready for a transition from “short-term rehabilitation” to “long-tem oriented development”. For EDF10, the EC approach is based on the idea of following “a flexible approach of Linking Relief Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD) in the context of Post-Conflict Fragile States”. Rehabilitation (basic physical infrastructure and provision of social services) and Governance (institutional support and capacity building)” are considered to be “the key drivers of this needed flexible LRRD strategy” 36

� In its Joint Annual Report for 2007, the EC acknowledges “the current gap between the humanitarian phasing out and the development’s policy enter into force [sic]” as a reason for the EC decision to adopt “a flexible EC response strategy to Liberia [...] under EDF10”37

� Finally, the External Assistance and Management Report (EAMR) of February 2007 suggests that the President herself might not have been in agreement with the notion that Liberia had already passed the point where short-term rehabilitation support was no longer necessary. The EAMR states that “It will not be until the Full PRSP (mid 2008) is in place that the President and the GoL will accept that the country is in a development phase and sustainability is the overriding criteria in project design.38



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� pIndicator 1.2.2: EC objectives reflect priorities of medium- to long-term strategies of Liberian Government (including the iPRS).

Findings at indicator’s level: While the priorities of the EDF9 Country Strategy Paper did not always adequately take into account the relatively greater GoL emphasis on “quick-impact” interventions to rapidly bring improved services and infrastructure to Liberians, the longer-term development orientation of that CSP did correspond rather well to the long-term priorities of the Liberian Government. When preparing its EDF10 Country Strategy Paper, the European Commission acknowledged that the aid flow to Liberia up to that point had left a gap between the expiring relief and short-term rehabilitation support and the longer-term development interventions. The EC reacted by allowing the EDF10 CSP to “catch-up” on older LRRD-related needs that had not been fully addressed up to that point (e.g. providing basic infrastructure and services across all sectors), including any remaining “immediate” needs in education. In addition, the broadly-targeted strategy maintains the opportunity for the EC to continue its support of institutional reforms and capacity building to help improve democratic and economic governance. With its acknowledgment of the continued importance of rehabilitation-support to Liberia, the EDF10 CSP seems to close a gap that, in the eyes of the Liberian Government, had been left open by the previous, more “development-oriented” strategy for EDF9. However, the choosing this kind of “flexible approach” for EDF10 does leave the challenge of selecting the most appropriate and relevant areas for EC support to the subsequent process of programming and contracting.

Data, sources, extracts:

• The EC objectives from EDF9 correspond well to the medium- to long-term objectives of the Liberian Government (see Table 2 above).

• The main rationale behind the Country Strategy Paper for EDF10 was to give the European Commission the opportunity to follow a “flexible approach” in its support to Liberia, i.e. in particular to link “Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD) in the context of Post-Conflict Fragile States”. As laid out above (Indicator 1.2.1), this signifies a step “back” towards LRRD, in comparison the more “development” oriented approach of the EC strategy for EDF9.

• This flexible, LRRD-centred approach corresponds more appropriately than the previous EC strategy to the continuing focus on the provision of basic services and infrastructure that the Liberian Government had maintained even in the interim Poverty Reduction Strategy and the final Poverty Reduction Strategy,39 2007, 2008. The strategy continues to stress:

� Access to essential services & infrastructure (water, energy, roads), health infrastructure and healthcare; access to basic, primary and secondary education, combined with:

� Institutional support and support to capacity building

• This relatively broad sweep of the approach in principle gives the European Commission the opportunity to “support delivery in basic social sectors such as education and health” to “contribute to bridging the existing and wide gap between the emergency and sustainable development phases”40 and at the same time not to abandon the longer-term endeavour of a successful migration to a “nationally-owned” sustainable development strategy.

• The focus on capacity development and institutional support also is in line with the corresponding focus of the GoL on improvements in economic governance (robust economic policy, strong macro-economic environment, supporting the recovery of the private sector) and democratic governance (Decentralisation, public sector reform, rule of law, etc.).

• The choice for a “flexible approach” in the CSP leaves the challenge of strategically selecting the most appropriate and relevant areas for EC involvement to the subsequent process of programming and contracting. In the end it will be these steps that will determine the eventual strategic coherence of EC support and the strategic priorities of the Liberian Government.

[Also see Table 2 above]



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JC 1.2: EC cooperation objectives are consistent wi th the policy priorities of the Government of Liberia

Statement upon JC: By and large, EC cooperation objectives were consistent with the policy priorities of the Government of Liberia. However, both sides did have different views on the appropriate timing of “migrating” from relief and short-term rehabilitation to a longer-term, development oriented support. The European Commission’s County Strategy Paper for EDF9, signed in 2006, essentially had been drafted based on the assumption that Liberia’s relief and rehabilitation related needs had been already sufficiently covered by previous assistance from EDF8 and the first half of EDF9. In contrast, the newly elected Liberian Government continued to stress the importance of “quick-impact” rehabilitation of basic infrastructure and services, the provision of “quick impact” income generating opportunities to Liberians, also through “cash-for work” schemes and the continued reintegration of returning refugees and IDPs. Considering these differing priorities, it seems that the “migration” to longer-term development happened too early in the eyes of the Liberian Government, based on the stance that many immediate needs still had to be addressed before the shift to development could be contemplated.

While the priorities of the EDF9 Country Strategy Paper did not always adequately take into account the relatively greater GoL emphasis on “quick-impact” interventions to rapidly bring improved services and infrastructure to Liberians, the longer-term development orientation of that CSP did correspond rather well to the long-term priorities of the Liberian Government. Also, the European Commission essentially acknowledged the gap between relief and short-term rehabilitation support and the longer-term development interventions when preparing its EDF10 Country Strategy Paper. The EDF10 CSP allows the European Commission to “catch-up” on older LRRD-related needs that had not been fully addressed up to that point (e.g. providing basic infrastructure and services across all sectors), including any remaining “immediate” needs in education. In addition, the broadly-targeted strategy maintains the opportunity for the EC to continue its support of institutional reforms and capacity building to help improve democratic and economic governance. The EDF10 CSP therefore seems to close a gap that, in the eyes of the Liberian Government, had been left open by the previous strategy. However, the choosing this kind of “flexible approach” for EDF10 does leave the challenge of selecting the most appropriate and relevant areas for EC support to the subsequent process of programming and contracting.

Judgment Criterion 1.3: EC mechanisms and procedure s for formulating cooperation objectives allow for their accurate and timely defi nition and revision

� Indicator 1.3.1: EC staff or representatives have received regular updates on the evolving situation on the ground

Findings at indicator’s level: Poor working conditions, including in particular staff shortages and insufficient, i.e. unreliable communication infrastructure of EC staff in Monrovia between 200441 and 2008 have constraint the capacity of EC staff to regularly receive and process detailed information on the fast-changing situation in Liberia. The staff shortage seems to have become more acute between 2004 and 2007 / 08 and therefore likely became an increasingly significant bottleneck over time.


NOTE: the available documentation does not allow the evaluators to assess directly, to what extent EC staff has “received regular updates on the evolving situation on the ground”, i.e. in Liberia. Information regarding the working conditions of EC staff in the EC office / EU Delegations only can serve as “proxy” indicators for the ability / capacity of EC staff to be active and pro-active participants in strategic discussions on Liberia over the years:

• All EAMRs, starting with the earliest one from 2004, comment on the difficult human resource situation and overall resource situation of the Delegation / office in Monrovia. The intensity of the expressed frustration increases from 2004 until 2007/08. This is the time when the disconnect between the daily demands on the staff and the actual capacity to fulfil these demands seems to have been most pronounced42

• The EAMRs also comment on the constraints in relation to telecommunication, internet connection and e-mails, suggesting that between 2004 and 2007, all of these tools were notoriously unreliable and often not available at all43



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� Indicator 1.3.2: EC staff were in regular contact with the donor and humanitarian

community to coordinate their programme coverage with that of others

Findings at indicator’s level: EC staff were formally part of a large number of coordination mechanisms and donor – GoL coordination platforms over the years, i.e., between 2004 and 2008. In some areas, such as GEMAP / economic governance or the rehabilitation of the electricity grid, the Commission seems to have adopted the leading or at least one of the leading roles. In the later years, however (i.e. 2007 / 2008), the ability of the EC to remain active in important coordination mechanisms became more and more constraint, which meant that as of 2007, the EC was not able anymore to participate in coordination meetings as important as the workshops accompanying the elaboration of the Governments Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS).


• The EAMRs mention various coordination mechanisms and exchange platforms that the EC participated in over the years. In some areas (e.g., GEMAP, electricity) the EC claims to have taken on lead roles.

• The Joint Annual Report (JAR) 2007, however, gives an indication that EC participation in important coordination meetings has suffered as a result of the human resource constraints. The JAR states that “the EC has not been able to participate to such important processes as the elaboration of the PRS, the preparation of sector policies in the end of 2007 (infrastructure sectors) and it is generally considered by Government and development partners that the EC projects and participation to the developmental process are considerably slowed down and / or delayed, not to say at a standstill44



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� Indicator 1.3.3: Significant changes in the situation of Liberia’s population (violent conflict, changes in the security situation, cease-fires) triggered revision of EC objectives

Findings at indicator’s level: Significant changes in the political and social context of Liberia prior to the election in 2005 triggered adjustments in the objectives and priorities of the EC’s cooperation and assistance to Liberia. The violent conflict between 2000 and 2003 along with the passing of the Security Council Resolution in March 2001 prompted the European Commission to open consultations with the Liberian Government in accordance with the provisions of Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement, reacting to evidence of repeated and worsening violations of human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law. The Commission also initiated the €25m “Reintegration Programme for Returnees and Displaced People”, using Article 255 (assistance to African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states taking in refugees or returnees) as its basis and using funds from the EDF8. Upon signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in Accra in August 2003, the European Council reacted quickly – within 7 days of the signing – to make available €50m to support the peace process. It subsequently also took the European Commission only one (1) and three (3) months to draft and sign two major support programmes, the “Post-Conflict Rehabilitation and Capacity Building Programme” and the Support to the Peace Process in Liberia, to make this money available. The high-level political involvement of the European Commission in the peace negotiations in Accra set the stage for securing the EC’s financial commitment to securing the peace process in Liberia and for speedily writing and adopting the corresponding Financing Agreements, i.e. for the PCRCBP and the Support to the Peace Process in Liberia. However, these commitments at the political level did not translate into commensurate changes at the operational level to prepare the newly deconcentrated EC structures for handling this kind of resources.

The Commission’s speedy and prompt adjustments of its cooperation objectives in response to these first two significant shifts in Liberia’s political and security situation stands in contrast to its understated strategic response to the 2005 election of Ellen Johnson Sirleaf as Liberia’s (and Africa’s) first female president. The strategic orientation of the Country Strategy Paper that was signed on January 16, 2006, the day of President Johson-Sirleaf’s inauguration, was approximately 1.5 to 2 years old. It had been developed during 2004, two years prior to the election, to bring the EC’s involvement Liberia formally in line with the terms and requirements of the deconcentrated EC services. However, signing the CSP was delayed until after the national elections, to allow for the chance to adopt the paper in partnership with a democratically elected Government instead of the transitional Government. As a result, the CSP that was signed in 2006 was based on virtually out-dated strategic frameworks and needs assessments. The “Results-Focused Transition Framework” that served as the central reference of the CSP was set to expire only two months after the Strategy Paper’s signature, in March 2006. The Joint Needs Assessment, the second key reference of the CSP, had been conducted to inform the response of the transitional Government and the donor community for the years 2004 and 2005. The main report does not mention any “priority needs” for subsequent years, i.e., 2006 onwards, the period that the CSP was meant to cover.

The EC did not update the original 2004 strategy to reflect the strategic priorities of the newly elected Government. The President’s 150 day strategy for Liberia (published in April 2006) is not mentioned in the Country Strategy Paper at all, although the EC strategy paper had been signed only 3 months earlier. According to information from the EC, the Commission refrained from updating the strategy in agreement with the incoming Government, based on the understanding that all important issues were covered in the existing, albeit old, strategy.



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Table 3: Significant changes in EC aid context and corresponding EC response

Changes in Liberian Aid Context Corresponding Adjustment of EC strategy

Civil war; resuming of the fighting in 1999/ 2001; Security Council Resolution in March, 2001 (Resolution 1343) against Charles Taylor

Relevant programmes / portfolio of European Commission

• 2nd Rehabilitation Programme (FED/1998/013-789; 1998 – 2001)

• Reintegration Programme for Returnees and Displaced People (FED/2001/015-489; 2001 -2005).

Adjustments to European Commission Strategy:

• “In 2001, the EU opened consultations with Liberia in accordance with the provisions of Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement. The consultations were concluded in March 2002 and the Government undertook a number of commitments aimed at restoring democracy and improving respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms as well as good governance. Liberia is still subjected to six-monthly political reviews as foreseen in the Council Decision of 25 August 2003 adopting measures concerning Liberia under the above-mentioned Article 96” (EC, 2004b).

• “To complement humanitarian assistance in response to the civil war, a €25m rehabilitation programme and post-humanitarian aid was funded in 2001 under Article 255. The EC signed the financing agreement on 13 July 2001 [...] (EC, 2004b). Three components of the programme: support to the health sector; local community development; water and electricity

� Activities put on hold during escalation of civil war (evacuation of personnel in June 2003) (EC, 2004b)

� Reliance on international NGOs as implementing partners (grant contracts) (EC, 2004b).

Signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Accra (08/2003)/ Resignation of Charles Taylor


• Decision of the European Council to make available €50m to support the peace process; decision on 25 August 2003, 7 days after the signing of the “Comprehensive Peace Agreement” in Accra.

� €50m were used for two interventions: “Post-Conflict Rehabilitation and Capacity Building Programme” (initially €40m); “Support to Peace Process in Liberia” (initially €8m)

• Financing Agreement for the “Post-Conflict Rehabilitation and Capacity Building Programme” was signed already 3 months later, i.e. on November 25, 2003

� Objective of PCRCBP was “to provide resources to implement certain activities prioritised in the CPA”, offering support in three components: Institutional Support (€9m); Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reinsertion and Reintegration (€16m); and Community-Based Rehabilitation (€8m) (EC, 2004b).

� Activities implementation and disbursements began in early 2004.

• Financing Agreement for “Support to Peace Process in Liberia” signed on September 18, 2003, within one month after signing of the CPA in 08/2003:

� Rationale of intervention was to provide “logistical support to non-military costs and the ECOWAS secretariat in Monrovia”; only approximately 50% of funds were used, about €4m de-committed and transferred to “PCRCBP” (see above) (EC, 2004b).

• According to information from interviews with EC staff, the high-level political involvement of the European Commission in the peace negotiations in Accra set the stage for securing the EC’s financial commitment to securing the peace process in Liberia. The same staff members who participated in the conference also took responsibility for writing the corresponding Financing Agreements, e.g. for the



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PCRCBP and the “Support to the Peace Process in Liberia” and to ensure their speedy adoption.

� However, these commitments at the political level did not translate into commensurate changes at the operational level to prepare the newly deconcentrated EC structures for handling this kind of resources. While the commitment of the money happened quickly, spending the money ran into a series of challenges, including insufficient staffing at the EC office in Monrovia, but also the setting up of the EC office as a “sister Delegation” of the EC Delegation in Ivory Coast (Interview with EC staff members).

NOTE: During the tenure of Liberia’s transitional Government under Gyude Bryant, the EC started to draft a Country Strategy Paper for EDF9. The drafting process was started in 2004; it was planned to share the draft with EC HQ early in 2005 (EC, 2004b).

Elections and change of Government (2005/2006), incl. expiry of RFTF, etc.


• The first free and fair democratic elections in Liberia in over 25 years were held on October 11, 2005. Subsequently, the first democratically elected President, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, was sworn in on January 16, 2006.

• On the day of President Johnson-Sirleaf’s inauguration, the President signed the European Commission Country Strategy Paper for EDF9, together with Mr Louis Michel, the Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid of the European Commission.

� The strategy paper that was signed in January 2006 was approximately 1.5 to 2 years old. According to information from the European Commission, it had been developed during 2004, and had been submitted to EC HQ in early 2005. The paper stresses that it had been “conceived in full coordination and complementarity with programmes of other donors and NGO community”. However, the “two consultative meetings” at which the strategy had been discussed had been held in November 2004, 1 year before the subsequent election (EC, 2004b).

� The CSP was based on the “Results-Oriented Transition Framework” (RFTF) that had been drafted by the transitional Government under Gyude Bryant that was in office from 2003 until the elections of 2005. The RFTF, the basis for the CSP, was set to expire in March 2006, two months after the strategy paper was signed.

� In addition, the CSP also took into account the findings of the 2004 “Joint Needs Assessment”, done in February 2004 by the transitional Government with support from the UN and the World Bank (see above). The Joint Needs Assessment outlined the needs that would have to be met in Liberia for the years 2004 and 2005. It did not make any specific recommendations for the required support in the subsequent years, i.e. for 2006 onwards.

• So far, there is no evidence that the EC updated the original strategy that had been devised in 2004 in response to the elections in 2005 and the inauguration of Liberia’s new Government. For example, the President’s 150 day strategy for Liberia that was published in April 2006 is not mentioned in the Country Strategy Paper at all, although the EC strategy paper was only signed 3 months earlier.

• According to information from interviews with EC staff, the CSP was written in 2004 to respond to the terms and requirements of the deconcentration process. However, once written, the EC shied away from signing the strategy with Liberia’s transitional Government, in favour of the opportunity of enacting it with the democratically elected Government after the 2005 elections. In 2006, with the Government of President Johnson Sirleaf in power, the Strategy was not updated in agreement with the new Government and based on the understanding that all important short-term issues “could adequately be dealt with under the existing strategy” (Interview with EC staff member).



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JC 1.3: EC mechanisms and procedures for formulatin g cooperation objectives allow for their accurate and timely definition and revisi on

Statement upon JC: Changes in the political circumstances and security situation in Liberia between 2000 and 2003 prompted the European Commission repeatedly to adjust its cooperation objectives and modalities for Liberia. In response to renewed violent conflict in Liberia between that had started in 2000, the EC was able to launch a significant Reintegration programme geared towards improving the situation of internally-displaced persons and refugees in Liberia, i.e. the 2001 “Reintegration Programme for Returnees and Displaced People”. The EC also initiated a formal political dialogue on the worsening human rights situation and violation of democratic principles and the rule of law in the last years of the Taylor Presidency, based on Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement. A decision of the European Council only 7 days after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Accra in August 2003 allowed the European Commission to make available an additional €50.0m to support the implementation of the main principles of the CPA. The money was committed to two major initiatives (the “Post-Conflict Rehabilitation and Capacity Building Programme” and the “Support to the Peace Process in Liberia)) within one and three months of the Council Decision. The high-level political involvement of the European Commission in the peace negotiations in Accra set the stage for securing the EC’s financial commitment to securing the peace process in Liberia and for speedily writing and adopting the corresponding Financing Agreements, i.e. for the PCRCBP and the Support to the Peace Process in Liberia. However, these commitments at the political level did not translate into commensurate changes at the operational level to prepare the newly deconcentrated EC structures for handling this kind of resources.

The Commission’s speedy and prompt adjustments of its cooperation objectives in response to these first two events stands in contrast to its understated strategic response to the 2005 election of Ellen Johnson Sirleaf as Liberia’s President. The European Commission did not use the inauguration of the new Government in Liberia as an opportunity to adapt its cooperation objectives to the stated priorities of the incoming President. Instead, the CSP that was signed on January 16, 2006, the day of the President’s inauguration, had been written two years before, in 2004, to bring the EC’s involvement Liberia formally in line with the terms and requirements of the deconcentrated EC services. However, signing the CSP was delayed until after the national elections, to allow for the chance to adopt the paper in partnership with a democratically elected Government instead of the transitional Government. As a result, the CSP that was signed in 2006 still centred on two frameworks as its main “coordination mechanism” and “development reference” that were essentially outdated at the time of the CSP’s signature45. At the same time, the incoming President’s 150 Day Plan for Liberia (published in April 2006) was not mentioned in the Country Strategy Paper at all, although the CSP had been signed only 3 months before the Plan’s publication. According to information from the EC, the Commission refrained from updating the strategy in agreement with the incoming Government, based on the understanding that all important issues were covered in the existing, albeit old, strategy.



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Judgment Criterion 1.4: Absence of conflict between EC development objectives in Liberia and EU global and regional policies and strategic frameworks

� Indicator 1.4.1: EC CSP objectives / objectives of pre-CSP programmes are a logical subset of objectives stipulated in other relevant global development and regional strategic documents (e.g. Strategy for Africa)

Findings at indicator’s level:

The CSP objectives for both EDF9 and EDF10 are broadly in line with the main principles of the EU strategy for Africa. The biggest detractor in this regard is probably the fact that the EC strategy for Liberia of the EDF9, i.e. its implementation seems to have opened a considerable gap between short-term relief and rehabilitation and longer-term development support. Also, mainstreaming of environmental objectives in the EC strategy is relatively weak. The call for a “more effective” and common EU approach is not yet clearly answered in the case of Liberia: No overall national roadmaps for coordination have been established in Liberia and no joint programming documents for the EC and the EU Member States exist.


Table 4: Correspondence of EC cooperation objective s to EC Strategy

Main Principles of the EU Strategy for Africa (COM_ 2005_0489) Degree of correspondence of EC cooperation objectiv es

Foster peace and security, including:

• Developing comprehensive approach to conflict prevention, integrating security, development and democratic governance

• Support African peace-support operations

• Disarm to break the conflict cycle

• Sustain peace in post-conflict situations by developing a more coherent and smooth transition between short-term (humanitarian assistance) and long-term (development) strategies in post-conflict situations.

• The EC strategy for cooperation with post-conflict Liberia contains all the elements called for in the EU strategy for Africa for a “comprehensive approach to conflict prevention”: security (e.g., support to the peace process); development and democratic governance (election support, support of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, etc.). EC support also was offered for Disarmament.

• EC support has been made available to support the ECOWAS peace initiative.

• The strategy for the EDF9, i.e. its implementation seems to have created a gap in the transition from relief / short-term rehabilitation to development.

Creating a positive economic environment:

• Supporting macro-economic stability

• Creation of integrated regional markets and increased north-south trade

• Stimulate private sector development and boost agriculture

• EC support to Liberia is coherent with the pledge of the EU strategy for Africa to support the creation of a positive economic environment. EC strategy contains possibility for budget support, clearance of European Investment Bank (EIB) arrears, etc.

Tackle Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) directly, including:

• Support primary education through sectoral budget support and support education and learning as life-long process

• Deliver decent healthcare

• Expand access to water supply, sanitation and ICTs

• Stimulate employment policies and decent work

• EC strategy in education foresees the transition into sector support, in keeping with the requirements of the EU Strategy for Africa.

• Health care is part of the EU portfolio and the EC objectives.

• Water and Sanitation has been addressed by the EC strategy throughout the period from 1999 to 2008.



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Build an environmentally sustainable future:

• Manage environmental diversity: forestry, fisheries, water

• Conserve biodiversity

• Mainstreaming of environmental objectives in the EC strategy is relatively weak

• EC strategies do not provide clear guidance how and where environmental principles should be considered.

Increase EU financing for Africa:

• Set new aid targets

• Put in place a more ambitious Community financial framework

[No information available]

A more effective EU approach:

• Establish national roadmaps for coordination

• Adopt joint programming documents

• Develop common procedures

• No overall national roadmaps for coordination have been established in Liberia.

• No joint programming documents for the EC and the EU Member States exist.

• With the exception of multi-lateral trust funds (under UN or World Bank leadership), no EU-specific common procedures exist.



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� Indicator 1.4.2: EC-Liberia cooperation policy is in line with the main EU-policies


EC development policy is broadly consistent with other EU policies vis-á-vis Liberia, including in particular the trade related initiatives, such as “Everything But Arms” (EBA) and also the general intention of negotiating an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with Liberia, as part of the on-going EU-ECOWAS EPA negotiations. EC regional development support in the area of timber certification is consistent with the decisions of the Council of the European Union to revoke the import bans on Liberian timber and rough diamonds and the subsequent legislation to ban import of illegally harvested timber. This requires Liberia to respond to a new set of eligibility criteria and tracing requirements for any timber it hopes to export to the EU common market.


Table 5: Main EU Policies vis-á-vis Liberia and the ir correspondence with EC Development Policy

Main EU Policies – Liberia Correspondence with EC Development Policy

Everything But Arms (since 2001)46

• EBA gives Liberia (along with 49 Least Developed Countries (LDCs)) duty free access to the EU for all products.

• Preferences under the EBA apply to imports into the EU of products originating in LDCs.

• While products wholly obtained in the exporting country are considered as originating there, products manufactured with inputs from other countries are so considered only if they have undergone sufficient processing in the exporting country.

ECOWAS Economic Partnership Agreements (under negotiation)

• Through ECOWAS, Liberia is participating in negotiation of an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with the EU.

Rules and legislation on timber and diamond imports from Liberia

• In 9/2006, European Council ended the ban on imports into the EU of round logs and timber products originating in Liberia, with retroactive effect from 19 September 2006 (15007/06).

� Council regulation is aimed at implementing United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution 1689(2006), not to renew the 2003 prohibition of imports of round logs and timber products from Liberia, after concluding that Liberia had adopted the necessary forestry legislation.

• However, new legislation (vote of EU parliament, July 2010) bans illegally-harvested timber or timber products from being placed on EU market. Requirements of traceability are meant to prevent such wood from effectively being “laundered” once it reaches the EU.

• In 6/2007, the Council of the European Union repealed the ban on rough diamond imports from Liberia (Council Regulation (EC) No 719/2007 of 25 June 2007.

• EC development support is broadly consistent with EC trade policy vis-á-vis Liberia. The EBA (Everything But Arms) initiative is granting Liberian producers free access to the EU common market.

• Although the EC is not directly providing trade related assistance in Liberia, the regional portfolio of the EC includes support to negotiations of Economic Partnership Agreements and other regional integration matters, which also includes the promotion of certification schemes for exporting goods, notably the new European Forest Law Enforcement Governance and Trade Initiative.

� This is particularly relevant, since the European Parliament banned the sale of illegally-harvested timber, and imposed new traceability measures and the possibility of sanctions

� Liberia’s Environmental Protection Agency is therefore working with the European Union to develop a Voluntary Partnership Agreement (VPA) on requirements for legitimacy of exported timber.



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JC 1.4: Absence of conflict between EC development objectives in Liberia and EU global and regional policies and strategic frameworks

Statement upon JC: The CSP objectives for both EDF9 and EDF10 are broadly in line with the main principles of the EU strategy for Africa. The biggest detractor in this regard is probably the fact that the EC strategy for Liberia of the EDF9, i.e. its implementation seems to have opened a considerable gap between short-term relief and rehabilitation and longer-term development support. Also, mainstreaming of environmental objectives in the EC strategy is relatively weak. The call for a “more effective” and common EU approach is not yet clearly answered in the case of Liberia: No overall national roadmaps for coordination have been established in Liberia and no joint programming documents for the EC and the EU Member States exist.

EC development policy is broadly consistent with other EU policies vis-á-vis Liberia, including in particular the trade related initiatives, such as “Everything But Arms” (EBA) and also the general intention of negotiating an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with Liberia, as part of the on-going EU-ECOWAS EPA negotiations. EC regional development support in the area of timber certification is consistent with the decisions of the Council of the European Union to revoke the import bans on Liberian timber and rough diamonds and the subsequent legislation to ban import of illegally harvested timber. This requires Liberia to respond to a new set of eligibility criteria and tracing requirements for any timber it hopes to export to the EU common market.



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1.2 Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration and Rehabilitation (DDRR)

EQ 2: To what extent did EC support to contribute to the disarmament, demobilisation, rehabilitation and reintegration of ex-combatants in Liberia?

The financial agreement 6446/LBR for the "Reintegration programme for Returnees and Displaced People" (8-ACP LBR-002) was signed on 13 July 2001 with the objective to assist the reintegration process of the returnees and displaced in their communities in order to stabilise the socio-economic situation of the country. The programme started in October 2001; a first extension rider allowed implementation until 31 March 2005, a second rider extended the programme phase until 31 March 2006. Previously, the EU had financed between 1996 and 2001 two large rehabilitation programmes (LBR 7001 with an amount of €25m and LBR 7001/1 with an amount of €27m) for providing post-humanitarian aid, focussing on assistance to the peace process and community reconciliation, resettlement of IDPs and ex-combatants, restoration of basic health services, food security, improved access to clean water and sanitation and finally, repairs to essential infrastructure.

Judgement Criterion 2.1: EC-financed DDRR intervent ions tie into a nationally-owned integrated and comprehensive framework for peace-bu ilding and long-term development

� Indicator 2.1.1: Objectives of EC-financed DDRR programmes are derived / flow from national priorities and strategies for Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration


The engagement for DDRR has been identified as one of the key priority areas for the EU in post-conflict peace building and is strategically based on the "European Consensus on Development", the European Security Strategy and the EU Strategy for Africa as well as the 2006 Policy Framework for EU support to the Sub-Saharan Region SSR. The EU has supported around 20 DDRR processes in Africa since the early 1990's. With a contribution of €4.15m for the first UNDP DDRR Trust Fund (DDRR-TF) and an additional support of €5m for the second Trust Fund (TF), the EC is the largest donor to the TF.

The EC has pointed out in various strategic documents its commitment to a long-term approach, which should be in-line with existing GoL priorities and development agenda, e.g. laid down in the List of Commitments of the Government of Liberia. The long-term approach is also visible by the continued support through ECHO and EDF contributions to the Peace Process in Liberia (€8m) and the Post Conflict Rehabilitation and Capacity Building Programme (€40m). Through funds from the EDF8, the EU provided a bridge from relief to development assistance (Art. 255 €25m contribution), with a focus on infrastructure, health and community infrastructure. DDRR priorities are taken into account through consultations with the National Commission on Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (NCDDRR) at government level and the Joint Implementation Unit (JIU). The EC financed interventions are based on the Action Plan of the Liberian Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration Programme LDDRRP and the Strategy and Implementation Framework (SF). The Results Focused Transitional Framework from April 2005 points out under chapter 5.2. For the Clusters 2 "DDR" the importance of an increased funding for Rehabilitation and Reintegration (RR) activities.

Coordination and communication between DG-DEV and ECHO in Brussels has been reported as constructive and effective.


Supporting evidence:

The expert seminar "The EU and DDR: Supporting Security and Development" was held by the EU in Brussels on 13 July 2006 and contributed to the development of the EU approach to DDR.

"The institutional framework, operational strategy and policy guidelines for the [DDRR] Programme were defined ... after the signing of the peace agreement in the form of an Action Plan. This plan was developed in October 2003 by a multidisciplinary team comprised of the United Nations, donors, and NGOs. Under this Action Plan, the NCDDRR would provide policy guidance to a Joint Implementation Unit (JIU), which has the primary responsibility for the implementation of the DDRR Programme."47



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In 2003, the EC consulted with other donors (among others the World Bank, KfW/GTZ (German Financial and German Technical Cooperation), DFID (UK Department for International Development), UN officials) and the EC Delegation in Sierra Leone to identify the funding needs for Liberia. After the signature of the CPA, the Chargés d'Affaires drafted the Post-conflict Rehabilitation and Capacity Building Programme (PCRCBP) with budget of €50m.48

"The chosen sector priorities are fully in line with the development priorities as defined in the JNA and EC co-operation objectives in Liberia. Sectors that are also important for the recovery of Liberia and are included in the JNA, such as security and productive infrastructure, will be supported by other donors, predominantly USAID and the UN family.49

Detracting evidence:

No detracting evidence so far.

� Indicator 2.1.2: Programming of EC-financed DDRR interventions is guided by medium- to long-term socio-economic development prospects of relevant sections of Liberia’s society


Key sectors for the socio economic development have been tackled e.g. in the PCRP through a strategic focus on the social and economic rehabilitation of the affected population particularly at the community level as well as the rehabilitation of basic infrastructure and services; the demobilization, social and economic reinsertion of ex-combatants and the support to the re-establishment and functioning of the key public Ministries in Liberia. DDRR is understood as a key process for security and to stabilizing a fragile situation with high migratory movements, which is characterized by a high conflict potential due to the limited access to resources for the returnees and demobilised ex-combatants. The EC's decision to channel Funding through the UNDP Trust Fund should have guaranteed the coherent and coordinated approach to DDRR. Although the DDRR-TF faced difficulties on management and implementation level, the decision was adequate and corresponded to the international donor focus on strengthening coordination efforts through TF approaches.

Data, sources, extracts: Supporting evidence:

"It is therefore proposed to make the amount of €25m from Art. 255 funds available to build on the achievements of previous Commission Programmes, and help stabilise the region by providing the most basic social services that will enable former refugees to resettle and sustain a decent life. ... Interventions will be in the sector of health, water and electricity supply and sanitation, as well as local community development (increasing family income, food security and strengthening of local capacity."50

"While DDR in the past was seen as a purely military and technical issue, there is increased recognition today that DDR needs to be part of the political and social developments and will be most successful when properly linked to an overall peace process, democratic governance issues, transitional justice and long-term development criteria."51

"More recently DG ECHO and other donors have decided protection, including targeted programmes for Sexual and Gender-Based Violence (SGBV) is now more of a development issue requiring structural and capacity building long-term focus that addresses the social, legal, and cultural and security dimensions."52


"The DDRRP has, with considerable EC support, provided participants with some degree of reintegration opportunities. Most reintegration projects (vocational skills training and agricultural projects) have been designed to provide economic reintegration of participants, while formal education projects allowed for some degree of social reintegration of programme participants. Nonetheless neither of the two components can provide by itself sustainable reintegration over the long-term, as linkages need to be made with the national recovery framework and iPRS with its strong focus on job and income generation, into which DDRRP should exit."53



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� Indicator 2.1.3: Implementation of EC-financed DDRR interventions “create linkages” with relevant national initiatives in education / training, employment generation, reconciliation, security sector and governance reform


Linkages have been created through coordination structures of the implementing agencies for DDRR, mainly the Technical Cooperation Committee (TCC). As the EC financed interventions were in-line with national political priorities, the support for DDRR programmes has strengthened GoL's policy implementation through strategic alignment and coordination with the respective implementation structures at national level (NCDDRR, Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs, Ministry of Agriculture, Bureau of Statistics).

Limitations could be identified in the delayed implementation and under-funding of the DDRR-TF, as well as the low capacity of the TCC and limited capacities of the JIU to undertake monitoring and evaluation of DDRR programmes. The revised documentation highlights also a lack of communication amongst donor agencies and between agencies and the national government, which has created obstacles to a rapid implementation of the DDRR-TF. Although the EC has participated in relevant coordination bodies, sustainability of EC-funded DDRR programmes has been limited due to bi-laterally financed parallel programmes in the sector.

Sustainability and impact of EC-funded DDRR programmes on national sectors is still difficult to measure, as external factors heavily influence the performance of GoL's policy implementation (low capacities, dependence on donor funding, structural deficiencies). Due to a narrow geographical coverage of the DDRRP, possible impacts on local government performance are limited to programme implementation areas only. Stronger evidence for linkages exist in relation to the non-government sector and the integration of INGOs and NGOs as service provider and local implementers.

The lack of alignment of DDRR activities has led to several parallel activities with varying approaches partly with the same target groups or in the same communities. The problem was raised by a number of beneficiaries, who claimed that the missing coordination has created confusion and even conflicts in the affected communities.



"The implementation of the Community’s strategy will be based on coordination mechanisms existing in the country, particularly the RFTF Implementation and Monitoring Committee (RIMCO) and support to the MPEA. RIMCO will provide general policy guidelines and ensure co-ordination on the RFTF implementation at the highest level of Government, Donor representatives and Civil Society Organisations."54

From the revised documentation and based on the policy framework of the GoL, the team has derived the following linkages, relevant for national initiatives and policies:

Governance Area Contribution of EC supported DDRR activities

1 Political democratic governance

- Human rights Training and education activities raise level of awareness for HR issues

- Principles of constitutional democracy

Training and education activities raise level of awareness for democratic principles, respect, dialogue and mutual understanding.

2 Political governance - rule of law

- Judicial and law enforcement system

Police training contributes to strengthening the law enforcement system

3 Control of corruption JIU M&E Unit indicated to NCDDRR cases of data inconsistency and access to funding through misreporting of number of participants in reintegration activities.

4 Government effectiveness

- Institutional capacity Strengthening of NCDDRR and related government administration; Strengthening of the technical capacities of the TCC; Strengthening of local authorities through political stabilization



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5 Economic governance

- Private sector/market friendly policies

Less influential on policy design, more relevant contribution to economic development for small enterprises and local (community) socio-economic stabilization

6 Internal and external security

- Internal stability / conflict Reducing possible levels of violence; Reintegration strengthened communities and cooperation amongst community members (cooperatives); Stabilization through economic and social incentives.

- External threats and global security

Arms collection

7 Social governance Increased respect for community rights; Higher level of participation through enhanced community development

8 International and regional context

- Regional integration Support to ECOWAS strengthened REC

- Migration Resettlement and Reintegration diminished migratory movements

9 Quality of partnership

-Political dialogue Donor-GoL dialogue / NCDDRR enhanced

-Programming dialogue Joint strategy

-Non state actors Integration of NGOs as implementers and service providers through UNDP and UNICEF managed RR programmes

The question of linkages and the impact of EC funded DDRR programmes, is closely linked to the issue of sustainability.


"The DDRRP had insufficient geographical presence to ensure an entirely comprehensive coverage. Coupled with a DD phase during the rainy season, which limited mobility and the limited length of the DD phase in some parts of the country, there is a risk that in some of the remote areas there may have been a degree of exclusion from the programme."55

JC 2.1: EC-financed DDRR interventions tie into a n ationally-owned integrated and comprehensive framework for peace-building and long -term development

Statement upon JC:

The EC has taken into account existing national frameworks and policy agendas to align the support to defined priorities of GoL and the needs of Liberia after the war. Sector priorities are in line with the priorities defined in the JNA. Additionally, the EC has contributed to the understanding of DDRR as part of a long-term political and social development process. Coordination with GoL and other donor agencies was defined as a strategic priority to ensure a participatory and coherent approach. Support to DDRR has contributed to other governance areas in Liberia, although the narrow geographical scope of DDRR programmes has limited the possibilities for an extended positive impact on other sectors.

Linkages have been created as far as the situation allowed for. The absence of a national recovery framework posed limits to the long-term approach, although the main challenge is identified in the lack of capacities on national and local government levels to design and implement policies for a comprehensive and coherent DDRR approach. Despite several TA missions, capacities for governance still need to be improved. The sustainability of EU-funded DDRR programmes is arguable, as follow-up measures and an effective nationally owned M&E system are not in place.



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Judgement Criterion 2.2: EC-financed DDRR intervent ions create and take advantage of synergies with corresponding interventions of othe r stakeholders (donors, GoL)

� Indicator 2.2.1: Mechanisms to coordinate inputs of DDRR stakeholders (donors, GoL) exist


Despite the creation of an overall national management and implementation structure for DDRR, coordination and communication amongst donors seemed to be insufficient and limited. The NCDDRR was responsible for the overall coordination of the overall DDRR process in Liberia. Around 400 staff and representatives from the GoL, ECOWAS, the UN, the African Union (AU) and the (former) International Contact Group for Liberia formed part of the institution. A Joint Implementation Unit (JIU) as part of the Commission was operationally responsible for planning and coordination, while the JIU worked in coordination with the Technical Coordination Committee TCC, in which various bodies of the UN participate. This structure should have enabled a sound coordination and strategic adjustment of DDRR activities. But budgetary shortfalls in the DDRR-TF and the lack of staff for the JIU M&E unit have led to an insufficient field monitoring and evaluation of effects and outcomes of the various programmes. Implementers of EC funding reported directly to the Delegation or the Commission in Brussels, whereas the communication with the JIU was limited and the unit was rarely integrated into the communication.



National structures for management, coordination and monitoring of DDRR activities are in place (NCDDR, JIU, and TCC).

A strategic framework (DDRR Strategy and Implementation Framework) had been developed by the UN in October 2003 to prepare a coherent DDRR implementation.

"It is widely accepted that the Liberia DDRR programme has delivered a measure of reintegration assistance to virtually all eligible persons (and those who were not); not as originally promised, but with no major incidents threatening national security. This is a remarkable achievement, considering the near disastrous start and the rocky continuation."


"The projects of the EC DDRR programme did all achieve their objectives to an appreciable degree, some more some less despite the serious lack of leadership and effective communication and coordination amongst and between key stakeholders of the overall DDRR Programme at policy level and programme implementation, of which the low quality of reporting was one, albeit minor symptom."56

� Indicator 2.2.2: Programming of EC-financed interventions is based on comprehensive view of other DDR resources and programmes


The EC has undertaken coordination activities on a formal and informal level with the main stakeholders for DDRR in Liberia and outside the country. Other stakeholder and programmes for RR include the Liberia Agency for Community Empowerment (LACE), community based rehabilitation of rural infrastructure which received funding from the EC), the EC’s community based recovery programmes, the USAID Liberian Community Infrastructure Project (LCIP) and Rural Apprenticeship Programme, GoL's Community Development Programme, the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) and the World Bank’s Emergency Infrastructure Program.



Interview partners of the desk phase mentioned the following main formal and informal coordination mechanisms, which EC has used and contributed to for the alignment of EC funded DDRR programmes:

- Informal discussions with GoL;

- Pillar I and Pillar IV” meetings (Pillars of Liberia’s PRSP);

- Liberia Reconstruction and Development Committee” (LRDC);

- Meetings with the Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs

- Steering committee for EC projects

- DDRR-Trust Fund meetings



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- NCDDR Technical Coordination Committee

- Technical Working Group of TCC members

� Indicator 2.2.3: M&E systems in place and adequate for assessing programme synergies and effectiveness of coordination


The evaluation did not allow the assessment of EC's internal monitoring level, as the team had no Monitoring Reports (MR) for EC-funded DDRR interventions at its disposal. As the M&E capacities of the NCDDR/JIU M&E were very limited, assessing programme synergies and effectiveness of coordination did not take place as intended. A lack of M&E and overall steering of DDRR programmes can be identified as missed opportunity, even more as parallel programmes could not be harmonized amongst donors, GoL and the DDRR-TF. Although the EC funded programmes have made efforts for timely delivery of data to the JIU, the weak performance of the unit and the lack of analytical data provided by it impeded a systematic and coherent steering of DDRR programmes. This affected EU-funded activities, less for their performance as for their sustainability.



" ... all EC funded parallel programmes exceeded the allocated caseload and provided the required data to JIU, with the exception of the DRC Labour Intensive programme in Southeast Liberia, that exceeded its caseload but did not register and report name and PIN, to prevent stigmatization of xcs in target communities, in agreement with the EC TA at that time."57

Detracting evidence: "Because of the lack of timely and sufficiently well analysed information the international community was not in a position to use its collective resources as efficiently as possible, by pooling resources and coordinating efforts. This is a crucial aspect that donors have to bear in mind in a DDRR process."58

JC 2.2: EC-financed DDRR interventions create and take advantage of synergies with corresponding interventions of other stakeholders ( donors, GoL)

Statement upon JC:

The EC has undertaken efforts for coordination and alignment at various levels of DDRR interventions. Planning processes and strategic design have been supported through external know, consultations with donors in Liberia. The decision to support the UNDP-DDRR Trust Fund was adequate and rightly chosen at the time the Fund was set up. The EC's approach to coherence and donor coordination was nonetheless limited due to a lack of staff at Delegation level (internal factor), a weak steering capacity on government side and parallel interventions in the DDRR sector of other donor agencies (external factors). Despite these limitations, the programme has reached a sufficient coverage of nearly all eligible persons and beyond, which has been identified as remarkable overall achievement of the EC support.

The EC has regularly communicated with the existing coordination bodies at government and donor level, the weak element has been the difficult data exchange with the JIU monitoring and evaluation unit. This has led to a certain degree of inefficiency. Reporting on beneficiaries was temporarily incorrect and the donor community could not use its collective resources for closer coordination and pool funding. Synergies were limited due to the fact that donors acted - due to contextual changes - in a "fire fighting mode".



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Judgement Criterion 2.3: Progress in resettlement o f former combatants

� Indicator 2.3.1: Change of percentage of former combatants settled in their community of choice


There is a clear limitation to the analysis of resettlement migration in Liberia, as the data in the revised documentation on resettlement are mainly based on household samples and therefore need to be observed as estimates, reflecting a specific situation in the sampled region. Furthermore, figures on registration and enrolment had been manipulated to gain access to additional funding. "It was clear that NCDDRR’s attempts to obtain resources not only for projects but also for its operations, warranted close attention, since it was the EC DDRR programme funding almost all on-going projects under the Trust Fund, including a large number of tool kits as well as support to JIU operations cost. ... The verification demonstrated that double and multiple dipping of participants as well as multiple registrations for future projects had been and still were widespread".59 Furthermore, the M&E Unit of the JIU verified that there are about 12,000 cases of participants in parallel programmes, for which the data submitted did not match the records in the data base.

In many cases, households in Liberia experienced multiple displacements, the Comprehensive Food Security and Nutrition Survey (CFSNS) estimates that "the mean number of times sampled households were displaced since the beginning of the civil war was twice".60 The majority of the displaced population had returned to their place of origin at the end of 2003, whereas there is a significant difference in returns related to the geographical location. In the counties of Bong, Grand Cape Mount, Bomi, Lofa and Gbarpolu, return migration continued through 2005. In Lofa, 26% of all households have only returned since the beginning of 2006. The CFSNS survey points out the negative impact of the late return on the vulnerability status of theses households, as the population was still in the process of establishing their homes and livelihoods at a very late stage.

UNDP estimates a 58% of all DDRR Programme participants to have returned to their home community. In contrast to this, UNDP points out that an estimated number of 56% of non-participants in DDRR programmes did not return to their home community. Those ex-combatants who committed war atrocities or severe human rights violations were in most cases not accepted in their communities of origin and moved to Monrovia. Further ppossible reasons for not enrolling in DDRR activities are discussed further under indicator 2.4.1.


Figures on the total amount of ex-combatants enrolled in DDRR activities in Liberia slightly differ from each other, therefore the team used as reference a set of data that has been compiled by the Spanish Cooperation Agency in 2008.61

Table 6: Total figures on disarmed and demobilised combatants, 2003-2005

Disarmed combatants per group Group

Phase I Phase II Phase III TOTAL

AFL 4,164 6,830 1,260 12,254

LURD 48 19,721 14,504 34,273

MODEL 11 2,854 10,283 13,148

Government/militias 12 5,107 10,476 15,595

Other 8,890 16,957 1,902 27,749

TOTAL 13,125 51,469 38,425 103,019

Table 7: Total figure of disarmed and demobilised c ombatants on 15 February 2005

Disarmed Demobilised

Phase I 13,125 11,805

Phase II 51,469 51,341

Phase III 38,425 38,349



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Table 8: Total figure of participants in reintegrat ion programmes until 2006

Participants in reintegration programmes

countrywide / October 2006

Men Women Total

Completed 25,597 7,279 32,876

Underway 21,238 5,717 26,955

Total 46,835 12,996 59,831

Table 9: Table with percentage of households being displaced / resettled

Source: Comprehensive Food Security and Nutrition Survey, GoL, 2006a, p.16

"Home Community Resettlement: 58% of the sample has resettled in their home communities. This high rate of home community resettlement by all categories of DDRR program participants is a good indication of a positive progression towards reconciliation."62

JC 2.3: Progress in resettlement of former combatants

Statement upon JC:

Progress indicators show that the EC supported DDRR programmes have reached a medium to high level of success, as UNDP states a 58 % of the registered and eligible population has returned to their communities. Return migration varied considerably in relation to the geographical location. This can lead to an unbalanced development of economic potentials between counties and - if not tackled at an early stage - create potential for conflict. The major challenge for an in-depth analysis of impact for the resettlement programmes is the unreliable existing data stock on the resettlement situation of former combatants, which only allows for limited qualitative statements.

The fact that there is a certain degree of resistance mainly of male ex-combatants to register should be taken as a serious issue, not only for the case of Liberia, but for DDRR programmes in general.

The first reintegration process in 2003 under the management of the Special Representative of the UN General Secretary has suffered from a serious under-funding, neither the EU nor other donors agreed to increase funding in the moment the number of reintegrated individuals turned out to be four times higher as planned (instead of 30.000 individuals, the number of reintegrated persons was around 120.000). The situation was based on a inefficient registration process, which was not undertaken in accordance to international standards and procedures.



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Judgement Criterion 2.4: Viability of livelihoods o f ex-combatants and their families

� Indicator 2.4.1: Change of percentage of former combatants (in particular female combatants) with employment, micro enterprises or other sustainable income generating activities


Support to ex-combatants to strengthen their socio-economic situation included the following measures: Vocational Skills Training, Small Enterprise Development, Apprenticeship and Job placement, Agriculture and community based Initiatives, Public works Programme - Job placement and Job creation, Formal Education and Reintegration of Child combatants.

An obstacle for the registration of ex-combatants with the NCDDRR and enrolment in reintegration programmes is the fear of being recognized as former member of an armed faction. This poses a limit to the outreach of the programme mainly to male beneficiaries. As been described by Pugel, significantly more men than women expressed this as a main reason for not registering officially with the National Commission. On the other hand, Pugel states that form the sample target group 94% state that they do not have any problems gaining acceptance from their neighbours.

Although the quality of vocational trainings was often assessed as insufficient, the provision of hardware, tools and machines to the participants who finalized the trainings has supported the creation of micro-enterprises and generated a low, but somehow stable income for a number of ex-combatants.


"Several evaluations and ex-combatant surveys, conducted by various stakeholders since 2006, confirm that the DDRR programme, with financing through the EC 3rd contribution, has made a significant contribution to economic and social reintegration by providing ex-combatants with marketable skills, knowledge and formal education." 63

Findings on the socio-economic situation of ex-combatants: 64

Employment: 25% of the sample of ex-combatants reported that they were unemployed. The findings show a strong entry into the formal employment sector by the DDRR program completers as compared with the non-participants.

Occupations: 28% of the respondents indicated that they were farmers.65 The next three most often reported occupations were “student” (17%), “petty trader” and “home duties” (both at 11%).

Poverty reduction 82% of the respondents live on less than US$5/day, DDRR program graduates indicate a better ability to stay above the US$1/day notional poverty line (93% versus 85% for the non-participants). 54% of the sample of respondents who have registered for DDRR benefits but have not received training live on less than US$2/day.

Education 51% of the sample population reported having a junior high or better education while only 18% reported that they never attended school.

Housing On average, 68% of the sample of former fighters rent or own their own home. 85% of DDRR program completers pay their own costs for living accommodations (renter own) compared to 58% of the unregistered former fighters.

Community participation:

80% of the sample reported significant participation in non-combatant lead community activities.



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Source: UNDP, 2006c, p.3

With regards to income sources, the CFSNS survey gives a more detailed overview of the contribution to income sources. Whereas it underlines Pugel's statement on small scale businesses as source of income, it shows that income is widely generated through a variety of low-profit activities. These do not necessarily require vocational or skills training, as provided through reintegration activities.

Over 90% of the respondents who participated in reintegration training believed that the training they received through the DDRR intervention programs would ensure their sustainability for many years to come. Of the respondents who completed reintegration training, approximately half indicated that the work they do today is directly related to the training they received, but a significant percentage of reintegration training completers (65%) indicated that there weren’t any jobs to be found or that the work that was available was only sporadic and temporary by nature.66

The good news is that over 80% of the respondents indicated an increase in their “overall situation” since the completion of the formal disarmament period. Notably, those respondents who had completed a course of reintegration training indicated the largest percentage of improvement in their situation at 89% with 45% or almost half of the sub-sample indicating that their situation was “much better.” 67

Despite the criticism of the participants on the quality and appropriateness of the vocational trainings, the support had a positive impact and enabled a number of individuals to start or carry on their business activities. LRRRC gave a number of 256 individuals from the returnees group who have graduated from university due to support through grants.68

Detracting Evidence: "There is an urgent need to strengthen and develop business skills as a transversal issue in all skills training to improve sustainability of the skills acquired by participants. Furthermore, the policy of just providing tool kits as start-up kits is not sufficient; small business, accounting and management skills, micro-credit schemes and so on are also necessary. A frequent complaint by villagers in Liberia was that returning ex combatants would be more welcome if they were self-sufficient and could make some contribution to the community." 69

Figure 1: Reasons for non-participation in DDRR pro grammes 70



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� Indicator 2.4.2: Change of percentage of child soldiers (in particular female child soldiers) with access to education and / or training


The EC has made a €2.5m contribution through the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) to support the reintegration of 2,700 children associated with fighting forces (CAFF) from September 2005 to June 2007 (EDF 2005 190-520). UNICEF provided skills training and apprenticeship to a total of 3,106 children, thereof 2,043 male and 1,063 female participants. The NCDDRR reported that almost 11% of the disarmed combatants were children.

A main challenge for support to female ex-combatants is the high drop-out rate of participants, which has been mentioned in several cases.

Some reports state the weak adoption of eligibility criteria to child soldiers, which resulted in participation of non-combatants in DDRR activities. On the other hand, the EU joint concept on DDR points out that the definition of combatant is not limited to carrying a weapon: "they can be fighters or accompany regular or irregular forces as cooks, porters, messengers or perform other tasks. Women and girls are often recruited for sexual purposes and forced marriages. Sometimes men and boys are also abused sexually. Defining “combatant” as someone carrying a weapon has often resulted in women and girls being excluded from DDR processes." 71


"A total of 11.780 children (9.042 boys and 2.738 girls) were demobilised through the disarmament and demobilisation programme that was completed in 2004. Of these, 11.773 children were reunified with their families. The rest were placed under temporary foster care arrangements." 72

Through the UNICEF support a total of 3.280 children enrolled for training. From these, 2.043 male and 1.063 female participants completed the training and graduated from the skills placement and apprenticeship placements. UNICEF states that the EU funds contributed to a 60% of the whole training programmes supported by the UN agency.

"78% of the graduates report that their incomes had improved as a result of the training. The children were working both, individuals and in groups. 44% of the children interviewed were in groups (susu or cooperatives). The assessment also shows that 7% of the children had registered businesses. ... Half of the children (50%) despite doing business were back in school. 73

Limiting factors

"Funding support for systematic follow-up of the trainees and for mentoring and coaching graduates who wanted to set up businesses was inadequate. Reaching child mothers and retaining them in the reintegration programmes was complex, as these girls had a number of problems that needed to be addressed at the same time to time." 74

„... many women and children, if they were not able to qualify as combatants by presenting an arm, whether theirs or not, were able to benefit from lax criteria on being associated with armed groups. ... However, ... the manipulation of lists and the lack of prior information disproportionately harmed women combatants, perhaps a majority of whom were left out of the process.” 75

"During the first phase only 424 women disarmed and 1,404 children as compared to 11,296 adult men. Percentage wise women represented only 3% of 13,125 people disarmed, and children 11%. In phase II with a total of 51,469 disarmed, the percentage of women rose to 21% (with 5,310 children still representing around 10%), and in phase III of a total of 38,425 women represented 29% of the total number of people disarmed. From virtual exclusion in the first phase the number of women exploded to 29% in the final phase, showing the difficulties of the screening process and the understanding of the eligibility criteria. 76

JC 2.4: Viability of livelihoods of ex-combatants a nd their families

Statement upon JC:

The EC support has been validated as significant contribution to the economic and social reintegration of ex-combatants and their families. The response of beneficiaries is for the most part positive, as 90% of participants of trainings perceive the measure as useful for their economic sustainability. 50% of participants have reported that their actual work is directly related to the training they received. In total, over 80% of the participants have reported an overall increase in their living conditions as result of the trainings received.

Figures on former child soldiers indicate a 78% positive feedback on the training activities. Female participants had a significant higher drop-out rate, in particular child mothers as the most vulnerable group to end the trainings before certification. The training activities suffered additionally from



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manipulated lists and a lack of prior information. These limiting factors pose a decisive limitation to gender equality. The lack of follow-up measures and the difficult situation on the job market have been identified as the most serious threats to the sustainability of the measures.

Judgement Criterion 2.5: Value-Added of EC involvem ent in DDRR

� Indicator 2.5.1: EC involvement advances the use of a comprehensive range of instruments for security, stability, development, democratic governance and promotion of human rights in DDRR efforts


The EC has been highlighted in various reports as one of the leading donors in Liberia.

Limitations to the impact of the EC on the advancement of instruments can be identified in the lack of visibility of the EU as donor and supporter of Post Conflict Rehabilitation and Development (PCRD) in Liberia. As it has been mentioned by interview partners, one reason was the lack of staff at the Delegation in Monrovia, which made it difficult to fulfil all administrative, political and coordination activities at once. The wide range of sectors supported and the continued funding to the DDRR-TF will extend the regional impact as well as the socio-economic effects for direct beneficiaries. The variety of EU instruments for interventions in conflict and PCRD are the fundament for a flexible approach to stabilization and peace building (and subsequently DDRR), but the revised documentation gives no information about the use of inputs on DDRR from the EC by other donors or sectors in Liberia.


Table 10: EC contribution for the LDDRR Programme a nd related programmes

UN Trust-Fund (first and second contribution) €9.15m

Vocational training with NGOs CESD, LOIC including monitoring and management by UNDP.

€3.20m

Labour Intensive Work Programmes NGO DRC €0.867m

UNICEF Reintegration of children €2.5m

3rd contribution to the UN Trust-Fund €9.1m

Total €24.817m

Support to the National Police Academy (Rapid Response Mechanism) €1.7m

Total €26.517 Source: Italtrend, 2008, p.8

� Indicator 2.5.2: EC-funded projects are visible and the EU is recognized as an important contributor to peace, stability and development in Liberia


The EU has developed specific visibility guidelines for EU-funded programmes, which have to be applied by the implementing agencies of recipients of support. The policies shall not only foster the awareness on EU funded activities, but shall also contribute to a wider discussion and communication on the EU and its support in partner countries. Visibility activities can include press conferences, websites, audio-visual productions, public events and information campaigns. As such, the application of the Visibility Guidelines can support the effectiveness of programmes and strengthen the exchange, dialogue and public awareness on DDRR-related activities that receive EU-funds.

In the case of the LDDRRP, a long-term technical assistant had been assigned to the EC Delegation in the context of the DDRR-TA project. Activities included radio programmes, technical advice to the JIU on the role of the EC DDRR programme for a sensitization campaign and the collaboration with UNMIL and local private radio stations. The Long-term Technical Assistant (LTTA) also chaired the Technical Working Group.



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"[T]he LTTA attained high visibility for the EC DDRR programme with NCDDRR staff, UN and donors, but also with ex-combatants and UN TF implementing partners. High visibility resulted also from the LTTA assisting to resolve the controversies in connection with the UN TF final payments to students enrolled in formal education and to the education institutions, mostly private secondary schools, technical colleges and universities.”

EC's support for infrastructure (road and bridge construction) and to the Phoebe hospital was mentioned by the members of the Peace Council in Gbarnga as milestones which will be long remembered and which are perceived as very positive examples.77

Detracting Evidence:

The revised documentation does not provide information on the implementation of Joint Visibility Guidelines, although the commitment to implement the Joint Visibility Guidelines (JVG) forms part of the Financial Agreements. Apart from the Italtrend DDRR evaluation, there is rarely no evidence of activities or impact of measures undertaken in the context of an applied visibility policy for EU-financed DDRR programmes.

JC 2.5: Value-Added of EC involvement in DDRR

Statement upon JC: The role and relevance of the EC as the most important donor for DDRR programmes in Liberia has been outlined by various evaluations. The added value of the individual programmes, financed by the EC in the DDRR sector, have been additionally highlighted and - where possible - the success has been confirmed by data from samples or regional / sectoral data collection. The assignment of a TA for the implementation of the Visibility Guidelines has had a positive impact on the perception of EC support amongst donors.

Whereas individual programmes have applied and implemented Joint Visibility Guidelines remains uncertain. As the JVG have the potential to support the discussion on EC funded activities - and subsequently having effects on other sectors of society - a non-application of JVGs in programmes must be seen as a missed opportunity to create spaces for exchange and support the democratic process in Liberia.



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1.3 Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD) EQ3: In how far has the EC been able to create appropriate linkages between humanitarian and relief operations in Liberia and its rehabilitation and development support?

Judgement Criteria 3.1: Appropriateness of coordina ted strategic planning for LRRD, in particular between ECHO and Europe Aid

Indicator 3.1.1: Partnership Initiative for Liberia established and functioning


Though there are a considerable number of partnership coordination initiatives for aid interventions at different levels and for various sectors being established since the end of the war, there are some doubts concerning their effectiveness and efficiency with regard to coordination results78.

The overall significance of the EC within the partnership initiatives was severely reduced by the fact that the EC had to withdraw from various coordination initiatives due to the severe staff shortages faced and therefore did not participate in important processes such as the formulation of the PRS and the sector policy for infrastructure even though being one of the major infrastructure donors. Only from the second half of 2008 onwards, the EC resumed active participation in donor coordination efforts. An aid mapping exercise of MS contributions to Liberia highlights the EC’s intention to resume its role as a lead coordinating body with regard to the MS.

None of the existing initiatives seems to appropriately respond to the requirements of a coordinated strategic planning for LRRD.

Data, sources, extract:


There is a considerable number of coordination initiatives for aid interventions to Liberia (ICLG) at different levels and for different sectors:

As the crisis deepened in 2002/2003 an International Contact Group for Liberia was established as an informal group that met with regional heads of states and the then President Taylor in an attempt to avert the crisis.79 The ICGL continues to exist as a donor coordination platform for donor approaches in key policy areas such as the Truth and Reconciliation Process. ICGL is today functioning under the International Contact Group on the Mano River Union (Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea). It is co-chaired by the EC with all major donors except China represented.80 In 2005 the ICGL and the GoL signed GEMAP.

From 2004 to 2006 one of the most important coordination mechanisms in Liberia was the RFTF Implementation and Monitoring Committee RIMCO that was to ensure coordination at the highest level of government, donor representatives and civil society organisations.81

According to the JAR 2007 since 2006 the main instrument for donor coordination, harmonisation and alignment is the Liberia Reconstruction and Development Committee (LRDC).

“The LRDC works through four Working Committees formed around the four pillars of Liberia’s reconstruction and development strategy. The four committees are the security committee, Economic Revitalisation, Governance and Rule of Law and Infrastructure and Basic Services.”82

However, the progress of the initiative is limited by irregular meetings, limited capacity and the lack of technical sub-committees assisting the pillars.83

Two international conferences on the reconstruction in Liberia took place; the first in New York in February 2004 and the second in Berlin in 2008. Prior to the Poverty Reduction Forum in Berlin in 2008 weekly coordination meetings advanced harmonisation efforts especially in the infrastructure sector.84

With improvements in the Delegation’s staff situation in the second semester of 2008 the EC was able to increase its diminished presence in dialogue and coordination fora.85

Various EC documents mention various coordination mechanisms and exchange platforms the EC participated in over the years. In some sectors the EC took lead roles: GEMAP, donor coordination group for the General Auditing Commission (GAC) initiated in 2008, road sector.86

In mid-2008 the Delegation initiated an aid mapping exercise to establish a better picture on Member State contributions to Liberia.87 The results could be used as a basis for fostering future discussions on country support strategies.



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Detracting evidence: The JAR 2007 indicated that the participation of the EC in the existing partnership coordination meetings had to be considerably reduced due to the inadequate staffing level within the EC office. As a consequence the EC did not participate in important processes such as the PRS elaboration and the preparation of a sector policy for the infrastructure sector where the EC is one of the largest donors. Participation in the developmental process was considerably slowed down or even came to a standstill which made the Commission fall way behind other major donors in terms of presence and political leverage.

Despite the fact that coordination activities exist on various levels, there are few documented indications of the quality of the process and results of coordination activities of the existing initiatives. The CSP 2007 comments on the LRDC that the progress of the initiative is limited by irregular meetings, limited capacity and the lack of technical sub-committees assisting the pillars88 and “the poor performance of this system has meant that in practice donor coordination has happened along sector working groups...”89 or as an interviewee put it: “exchanging niceties, diplomatic talk...” There seems to be a perception in the donor community that there is no forum for frank strategic exchange among donors and GoL.

There is no evidence available up to now on partnership initiatives during the period 1998-2002.

� Indicator 3.1.2: Strategic Framework for country support agreed


With the political development in Liberia strategic frameworks for country support are evolving. While the RFTF and the 150 day Action Plan still focus on emergency interventions, the iPRS and PRS are already ambitiously outlining development strategies for different sectors, while maintaining the rehabilitation priority in relation to infrastructure and basic social services.

EC strategic frameworks laid down in the CSPs reflect the needs and strategies laid out in national strategic frameworks even though the CSP for EDF9 seemed to be outdated to a certain extent as it had been elaborated almost a year and a half before its signature and an updating was apparently not carried out (see evaluation question 1 on Relevance).

EC strategic frameworks are laid down in the two CSPs for EDF9 and EDF10. While EDF9 regards EDF assistance as complementary to assistance through ECHO and budget line support and on-going EDF8 interventions and therefore already regards rehabilitation as mostly covered by other instruments, it embarks already strongly on development interventions with education support phasing-in. EDF10 strategy addresses the need to respond to the “rehabilitation gap” as humanitarian assistance is phasing out and stresses rehabilitation needs.

Under the heading “LRRD” EDF10 designs a broad intervention approach covering a whole range of intervention sectors. A streamlining is foreseen at a later stage. This strategic approach could either give the EC the flexibility required to respond to a quickly evolving situation. On the other hand there is a risk that the EC will end up with a hawker’s tray responding to the needs of all sectors lined out in the CSP and spreading out its efforts to thin.


During the war major donors had left the country and EC had discontinued normal EDF assistance even though maintaining its office open. During that period no strategic framework for country support could be established due to the conflict and the quickly changing situation which required quick and flexible responses.

The first strategic framework to base country support on after the war was elaborated after the New Transitional Government of Liberia had taken office. The Joint Needs Assessment elaborated in 2004 by the NTGL, the World Bank and the UN and based on the Results-Focused Transitional Framework was discussed at the International Conference on the Reconstruction of Liberia in New York in 2004 and documented development priorities from 2004-2005. The RFTF was revised in April and served as a strategic framework reference until 2006.

In 2006 the newly elected government of Liberia launched a 150 day Action plan, followed by an interim PRS in 2007 and a full PRS in summer 2008.

The EC strategic planning is based on the CSPs of which two were signed during the period under evaluation: the CSP 2004-2007 for EDF9 signed in 2006 and the CSP 2008-2013 signed in 2007.

Both CSPs relate to the linkage of relief, rehabilitation and development.

“...the present strategy will ensure an efficient link between short-term relief and rehabilitation efforts towards long term development cooperation (LRRD approach). This is based on the assumption that security and the humanitarian situation will further improve. The present support strategy is thus based on a migration from relief and short-term rehabilitation, currently supported through programmes financed by the EDF8, ECHO and food security budgetary line, to support for more long-term oriented development. The EDF9 funded support, with first



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disbursements scheduled for 2005, will complement these programmes and cover rehabilitation needs, contribute to the improvement of institutional framework and start developing a sector approach in education.” (EC, 2006a, p.23)

The CSP foresaw a division of tasks between ECHO (humanitarian assistance, health, food security, watsan), EDF8 funded interventions that were still under implementation (reintegration and rehabilitation) and the FSBL (food security) with EDF9 already focusing more strongly on development, phasing in education as a focal sector.

CSP 2007 states that “there is a growing perception that development results will take longer than anticipated, while humanitarian assistance departs. There is a real danger of suffering a cruel gap between the humanitarian phasing-out and the development policy entering into force. Development actions should then build on humanitarian interventions so as to close the gap created by emergency-intervention phase-out and ensure a smooth transition towards longer-term sustainable activities” (EC 2007d, p.28). The second CSP formulates its intervention strategy more as a response to evolving gaps caused by the out phasing of humanitarian intervention through rehabilitation efforts. There is neither a clear reference to strategic changes from EDF9 to EDF10 nor a reference to the ways the different instruments shall be put together in a strategic LRRD framework. With reference to the needed flexibility in a post-conflict environment the spread of sectors covered under the heading “LRRD” is broad with the perceived need for streamlining at a later time.

� Indicator 3.1.3: Joint Assessment by Partnership Initiative of LRRD process


No evidence suggests that donors jointly systematically assess the LRRD process. However, assessments of LRRD related subjects are carried out by donors and research bodies and results fed into the joint discussion with some issues being solved such as the prevention of a health funding gap in 2006, when humanitarian assistance started to withdraw and development funding was slow to arrive.


No sources could be identified for documenting joint assessments of LRRD processes.

Assessments of LRRD issues are carried out either by donor or by research organisations, usually on a limited subject. For Liberia there is some documentation available on the transition gap in the health sector as this sector is regarded as particularly susceptible to suffer during the transition period from humanitarian aid to development. A study (Royal Tropical Institute 2008) came to the conclusion that the very strong threat of a transitional funding gap in health in 2006 with humanitarian aid starting to leave and development funding slow to arrive was averted by the international community when the facts were presented on a donor conference. This was due to the flexibility of humanitarian donors to agree to continue to fund basic health services until the situation stabilised.

� Indicator 3.1.4: Internal EC inter-service steering group for LRRD support to Liberia in place and functioning


Findings indicate that EC inter-service steering for Liberia was a particularly positive example in the past (around 1996) with regular formalised meeting schedules and regular inclusion of main partners. Today there is no formal structure for inter-service steering existing any longer and coordination depends on good informal contacts, particularly between ECHO and DG DEV and AIDCO country desk officers. The well established communication and cooperation between ECHO, EuropAid and the Delegation has had a positive effect on the structuring of the yearly planning processes.


Supporting evidence

Prior to the period under evaluation Liberia seems to have been a particularly positive example for internal EC cooperation. The EC LRRD communication 1996 (page 6) describes Liberia as a country where ECHO and DG VIII staff responsible for Liberia conducted weekly joint meetings, complementing these with quarterly meetings that involved the main NGO and UN partners. An EC Aid Coordination Office in Monrovia was regarded as a good example of a “one stop shop” for aid to the victims of the crisis in Liberia, thus overcoming the separation

Even though there is no formal EC inter-service cooperation mechanism in place, interviewees describe cooperation as very good and close (for further details see indicator 3.1.5 below)

Detracting evidence Interviewees reported that there is no inter-service steering group for LRRD support to Liberia in place and functioning.



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� Indicator 3.1.5: Linkage strategy for EC LRRD support to Liberia exists


Early LRRD strategies were assessed as a positive example regarding the early inclusion of rehabilitation measures in emergency interventions during the peaks of war time in contrast to other donor’s strategies that limited intervention to mere humanitarian aid only (First and Second Rehabilitation Programme). This was regarded as an innovative feature of EC support and a stabilising factor for the country. Another positive example for coordination with national structures was identified for the ECHO financed activities in the health sector, where the construction of new hospitals was undertaken in a close communication process with the Liberian Institute for Public Administration in Monrovia.

A question that arises regarding the assessment of the EDF9 intervention strategy is, if the conclusion that EDF9 support was to complement ECHO, on-going EDF8 and Budget Line (BL) support and was therefore to concentrate on development was premature regarding the strong need of Liberia in relation to rehabilitation. EDF10 lists EDF9 interventions and EC support instruments without analysing strengths and weaknesses regarding LRRD or drawing conclusions from EDF9 implementations for EDF10 support.

Another important issue is the linking of LRRD support within the interventions in order to develop solutions for balancing relief, rehabilitation and development interventions within the programmes and identify lessons learned with relation to LRRD. Monitoring Reports for selected interventions (County Development and Food Security) indicate that programmes and projects did not live up to this expectation as they were concerned with implementation and service delivery instead of lessons learned and functioned in an isolated manner instead of linking with other programmes. Due to staff shortages the EC was unable to monitor the implementation of interventions to a satisfying degree.


Supporting evidence

Particularly positive views on EC LRRD strategies for Liberia were voiced by several sources for the time before the evaluation period:

“One of the most successful instances of this ‘integrated’ strategy of rehabilitation was the intervention by the EC in the Liberian war. The war went through three main phases throughout the early to mid-1990s (the third phase was ended by the Abuja II Accords in 1996), but the EC intervention referred to here relates to the first Rehabilitation Programme for Liberia, implemented with considerable success between March 1994 and February 1998. The approach in this case was to ensure that the minimum conditions for stability and cooperation emerged through well targeted policies, rather than waiting for minimum conditions to be met at the outset. The implementation of EC rehabilitation policies helped to reduce conflict in Liberia by maintaining – and even launching – rehabilitation activities at peak emergency times. These targeted the principal causes of conflict and the main obstacles to the peace process, and were implemented in lieu of strategies set out in the National Indicative Programme that was drawn up from the Country Strategy Paper prior to the emergency...The basic principles of the strategy were a neutral approach and the stimulation of key services and infrastructures, both preconditions for a sustainable rehabilitation. The continued and increased engagement of the EC during the crisis also gave it more leverage in its mediation efforts to encourage a resolution and helped to enable cooperation from Member States.”90

In Higazi’s view the inclusion of rehabilitation measures throughout the conflict, instead of limiting interventions to humanitarian assistance only, contributed to stabilising the situation in Liberia. This would support the LRRD approach that opts for the inclusion of medium to long term measures already during the relief phase. Even though the assessment of Higazi relates to the time before the evaluation period, his findings can might be extended to the time from 1998 to 2003, when the EC continued to implement rehabilitation and reintegration programmes throughout the last period of war.

Brusset (1999) supports this view and highlights the enormous flexibility of EC interventions including relief and rehabilitation aspects being continuously adapted to local requirements. He cites an evaluation of the Lomé Convention in 1998 that predicted that the experiences of the Liberia programme were likely to have a significant impact on future reforms to the systems and procedures for the management of EC aid. The EC communication on LRRD (1996) cites Liberia as a positive example where the UN and NGO partners of the EC were included in quarterly strategic meetings (p.6).

The CSP 2006 points out the long term development focus of EC EDF support under the LRRD approach, assuming that short term relief and rehabilitation were sufficiently covered by ECHO, budget lines and on-going EDF8 interventions (EC, 2006a, p.23). While in the CSP for EDF9 there was some planning on how to complement other instruments with EDF interventions, which resulted in designing interventions in different sectors than covered by humanitarian assistance and BL, EDF10 identified the need to respond to the transition



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gap by up taking current humanitarian aid interventions and support the transition during the rehabilitation phase. In EDF10 more emphasis is given to the rehabilitation of basic infrastructure and service delivery in an effort to link to ECHO interventions even though the linkages required were not outlined in the planning document.

Detracting evidence Interviewees reported that there is currently no formalised coordinated strategic planning for LRRD between ECHO and EuropeAid for Liberia neither on HQ level nor in Liberia, but that information exchange, coordination and cooperation is happening on an informal level. Nevertheless all parties agreed that cooperation is close and welcomed by all parties involved.

On inter-programme linkage strategies:

“However, the design of the project is quite poor in terms of linkages between the various components. Beyond reducing administrative delays because of packaging each component as a separate project there appears little logic of why seemingly different activities and objectives are bundled together. The design of the overall project states little about how the different components are integrated with one another.”91 “Links to the Paris Declaration occur through calls to increase the effectiveness of EC relief and rehabilitation by considering more synergistic links to development as part of a learning approach. The activities are more about delivery of assets and training, than learning about how to move (overcome obstacles and capitalise on assets) from rehabilitation and relief to development so that scaling up is possible. These lessons learned were a major expectation of member states and others.”

� Indicator 3.1.6: Clear linkage of DG ECHO exit strategies to start-up of rehabilitation and development interventions


The main challenge ECHO faced with regard to its exit strategies was the delay in development programmes to materialise and to take over from ECHO’s relief interventions. If the transition gap could be partly averted – as was the case for health - this was not due to the successful sequencing and phasing in and out of relief, rehabilitation and development interventions, but due to the extension of ECHO interventions beyond the acute emergency phase and the flexibility of ECHO to engage in more development oriented approaches.

ECHO reported to constantly try to find follow-up support for out phasing interventions, if the nature of the intervention required successor programmes, either through including follow-up interventions in EDF9 and EDF10 programming or through identifying other partners. An ECHO project follow-up list from 2009/2010 encountered in the Delegation shows that both ECHO and the Delegation are jointly working towards this end.

A major challenge to the LRRD process is the creation of a dependency syndrome, or at least ongoing expectations of beneficiaries that support to improve their livelihood conditions can only be provided through external assistance. Several INGOs have affirmed the negative effects for creating ownership and sustainable project outcomes. Additionally, the economic structures of the country hamper the economic development process with linkages to the agricultural sector; by way of example, 75% of the national rice trade in Liberia are controlled by only three large companies, with respective negative effects on the control of land and price fixing.


Supporting evidence

The danger to lose achievements from the relief phase was strongly felt within ECHO: “Finally, concerted and determined engagement of development donors with appropriate financial and human resources will determine the success of the LRRD process which is still at an embryonic stage. Any failure to secure activities for development could fuel further economic deterioration and civil discontent.”92

This concern made ECHO extend its presence in Liberia repeatedly: “In view of the current humanitarian needs in the country as well as the time needed to put in place instruments for development aid, DG ECHO will maintain its current level of assistance”.93

ECHO (2006g) reports that strategic planning is carried out in order to prepare for the transition from relief to rehabilitation: “DG ECHO is working with DG DEV to prepare the link with programmes having long-term goals. This is being done in two ways: identifying whenever possible partners capable of staying beyond the humanitarian phase and coordinating closely with AIDCO and DG DEV in the framework of the implementation of EDF9 and programming of EDF10. This coordination is essential to maintain continuity in DG ECHO-funded operations particularly in the health sector.”

“As an example of adapting humanitarian aid, ECHO extended funding in Liberia when it was realised that



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withdrawal of its funds would result in a substantial gap in service delivery. ECHO also allowed funds to be used for more developmental approaches of capacity building rather than merely relief oriented service delivery.”94

ECHO was reported to be part of the evaluation committee for the assessment of projects contracted to NGOs under the Food Budget Line. This was to ensure that ECHO’s experience in food security in Liberia was utilised for identifying suitable programmes und implementing partners.

Detracting evidence The long delays rehabilitation and development interventions by the EC and other donors faced made ECHO prolong it’s in country presence for several years.

JC 3.1: Appropriateness of coordinated strategic pl anning for LRRD, in particular between ECHO and Europe Aid

Statement upon JC:

EC’s role in coordinating strategic planning within the international donor community in Liberia dwindled during the period under evaluation as the EC had to withdraw from important partnership fora due to the severe staff problems faced in the EC Office and. This absenteeism considerably reduced political leverage and could only be reverted in 2008 after improvements in staffing levels. Deterioration also seems to have occurred with regards to the quality of EC inter-service coordination. While in the early years coordination was characterised as well organised and being exemplary, today coordination happens on an informal ad-hoc basis without being structured and formalised.

EC strategic planning documents show little evidence of a coordinated strategic planning approach for LRRD or even a deeper understanding on how to operationalize the LRRD concept as lined out in EC communications. But there is visible concern to utilise all available instruments to avoid the transition gap, in particular ECHO seemed to be fiercely determined to create linkages for a handover of its relief activities. As a result ECHO stayed on as development programmes delayed considerably. If the transition gap could be partly averted – as was the case for health - this was not due to the successful sequencing and phasing in and out of relief, rehabilitation and development interventions, but due to the extension of ECHO interventions beyond the acute emergency phase and the flexibility of ECHO to engage in more development oriented approaches.

Judgement Criteria 3.2: Flexibility and timeliness to react to changing conditions during implementation

Indicator 3.2.1: Utilisation of flexible intervention instruments such as the Emergency Reserve, the B-Envelope of EDF and the thematic budget lines, in particular the Rehabilitation Line, the NGOs Co-financing line and the Food Security Budget Line


An impressive example for the high flexibility of EC support to react to changing conditions is the EC support to the peace process. Only a week after signing the CPA the Council of Ministers authorised €50m for the support of the peace process. Only three months later a financing agreement for €40m was signed for the PCRCBP. Under Article 255 of the Lomé Convention (refugee assistance) Rehabilitation Programmes were launched.

By opting for LRRD as a focal sector in EDF10, the EC intended to maintain a maximum flexibility and sought to avoid determining interventions to a degree that would limit possibilities for reacting to changing conditions during the implementation of EDF10.

The EC systematically used existing financing instruments for increasing its flexibility with regard to the evolving situation in Liberia. Especially the EDF9 B-Envelope was used to finance ECHO relief interventions as well as an additional contribution to the UNDP DDRR Trust Fund. Budget Line was used to transition relief activities into rehabilitation intervention. Particularly the Food Security Budget Line supported the resumption of livelihood activities of displaced persons, while the Rehabilitation Budget Line and the NGO Budget Line were used mainly for health, nutrition and safety nets for vulnerable groups. However, there is evidence suggesting that the utilisation of flexible instruments could have been even higher had the EC had more staff capacities in Monrovia. In 2007 the Delegation in Monrovia was advised against financing new projects under budget lines as the administrative capacity to handle these projects did not exist.



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Supporting evidence

The EC showed flexibility and a very rapid response after the signature of the peace agreement in 2003: “The departure of President Taylor from Liberia on 11 August 2003 and the signing of the CPA one week later heralded the beginning of a new era for EC. Liberia relations. On 25 August 2003 the Council of Ministers made available €50m to support the peace process...A €40m Financing Agreement (“Post-conflict Rehabilitation and Capacity Building Programme”) was signed on 25 November 2003. It supports the NTGL in the implementation of the activities prioritised in the CPA.”95

In order to be able to respond to the humanitarian needs of the Liberian population the EC provided direct assistance to the people of Liberia on the basis of Article 255 of the Lomé Convention (refugee assistance). This was implemented by NGOs and private sector contractors and proved to be flexible and quick in implementation.96 As NAO functions had been transferred to the Chief Authorising Officer (in 1994 up to today) cooperation was possible without depending on the weak state structures. All Financing Agreements up to today are between the EC and the “People of Liberia”.

The EAMR 2008 H2 states the more frequent application of Article 72/73 of the Cotonou Agreement (humanitarian aid) for more flexibility in facilitated aid operations.97

The CSP for EDF10 placed the need for a flexible intervention approach in the centre of its strategy and opted to follow a LRRD approach. By declaring the LRRD approach a focal sector the CSP listed a broad range of sectors potentially to be covered. The specification of interventions was postponed to a time, when a full PRSP was finalised (that was the case in July 2008) and more information and experience available on the “complementarity, readiness, absorption capacity, national sector policy developments, relative capacities of the stakeholders, etc.”98

There is some evidence that the particular support for rebuilding infrastructure (transport, energy and watsan) that is a characteristic of EDF10 is partly due to the insistence of the Liberian government.99

Evidence on the utilisation of flexible intervention instruments are reflected in the CSPs, the JARS and the EAMRs:

B-Envelope of EDF9 (€24m):

(allocation for unforeseen needs)

ECHO utilised €8.4m in 2004, 2005 and 2006 to respond to the needs of internally displaces persons and Liberian refugees moving back to their areas of origin and to address the specific needs of children affected by the armed forces;

€9.1m were used to finance a 3rd contribution to the UNDP DDRR Trust Fund to respond to the high number of persons to be demobilised and integrated;

€6.5m were allocated to the Electricity Grid Rehabilitation in Monrovia to support the newly elected President in the delivery of her promise to supply Monrovia with energy.

B-Envelope of EDF10 (€11.8m):

The food security crisis resulting from global food price increases in 2008 led to allocations of the EDF10 B-Envelope to food security programmes and the support to the National Food Security and Nutrition Strategy in 2009 (€4.14m);

€7.34m were utilised to clear African Development Bank (AfDB) arrears in an effort to clear Liberia’s debts to become eligible for new credits that could be particularly important for infrastructure programmes.

Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM):

RRM was used in 2005 for the project “Media Support for the Peace Process in Liberia and the Mano River Region – Star Radio” to set up a radio station and train journalists;

In 2006 €1.4m were approved for training new recruits of the LNP

No information was available on the utilisation of RRM between 1998 and 2005 and after 2006.

Thematic Budget Lines / Development Cooperation Ins truments (relevant for LRRD) Food Security (€28.7m)

FOOD/1997/002-372 Food Security 1997 Liberia

FOOD/1998/002-980 Food Security 1998 Liberia

FOOD/2004/016-699 Food Security Programme 2004 – NGO Programme Liberia

FOOD/2005/113-599 Sustainable improvement of living conditions of the most vulnerable populations of Bong County

FOOD/2005/113-629 Agro-economic Recovery Assistance to 6,400 Rural Farmers in Bong and Lofa Counties



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DCI-FOOD/2008/172-562 Gbarpolu Agriculture, Infrastructure and Nutrition for Food Security (GAINS)

DCI-FOOD/2008/172-566 Enhancing Agricultural Capacities and Economy (PEACE) in South East Liberia

DCI-FOOD/2008/172-568 Lofa Livelihood Security Programme

In addition to the EDF 10 B-envelope funds, FSTP (€10m) and Food Facility (€10.9m) funds were made available to respond to the food crisis in 2008. These programmes are expected to be contracted and implemented from 2010 onwards.

Rehabilitation (€3.4m)

REH/1998/004-316 Rehabilitation of Phebe Hospital

REH/1999/003-526 Expanded Public Health Activities for Displaced, Returnees and Refugees in Grand Cape Mount County

REH/1999/003-528 Integrated Nutritional Programme for internally displaced persons in Montserrado, Bong, Gran Bassa and Nimba Counties

REH/1999/003-537 Community Child Welfare System

NSA-Support (€4.4m)

NGOPVD/2000/011-594 Human Resource Development for the Prevention of Blindness in Anglophone West Africa

NGOPVD/2002/020-351 Physical, social and economic rehabilitation of people living with disability

NGOPVD/2003/027-220 Block Grant 2002

NGOPVD/2004/063-921 Block Grant 2003

NGOPVD/2004/064-386 Dealing with a Health Crisis among war affected people

NSOPVD/2008/152-057 Supporting Youth Livelihoods

In general observers certify that the EC has increased its flexibility with regard to aid instruments:

“There is an increasing tendency for donors to be more flexible with their aid instruments, which may improve transitional funding. Three different approaches are taken – adapting humanitarian instruments, adapting development instruments and creating new instruments. As an example of adapting humanitarian aid, the European Commission Humanitarian Aid department (ECHO) extended funding in Liberia when it was realised that withdrawal of its funds would result in a substantial gap in service delivery. ECHO also allowed funds to be used for more developmental approaches of capacity building rather than merely relief oriented service delivery."100

Detracting evidence

The EC intervention strategy as outlined in the CSP for EDF9 in 2006 was discussed with major stakeholders in consultative meetings in 2004.101 However the signatures of the CSP dates to January 2006 and the partner was a newly elected government, so it is questionable whether the changes occurred in the meantime were sufficiently taken into account. The utilisation of flexible intervention instruments such as the thematic budget lines was hampered in 2007, when the Delegation in Monrovia advised against financing new projects under budget lines due to its reduced management capacity. However, in an effort to compensate for slowed down and delayed activities under EDF and food security, the ECHO emergency budget was increased for 2008.102



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Indicator 3.2.2: Acceleration of procedures by applying simplified decision-making processes such as selecting implementing bodies, tendering procedures, amendments of contracts


Due to the prolonged presence of humanitarian organisations in Liberia, the shift from relief to development is cushioned through additional program activities with beneficiaries of ECHO funded aid. Nonetheless, the lack of a specific instrument to cover LRRD has aggravated the smooth transition from relief to development; a new model could take into account the experiences of the sp-called "development oriented emergency relief" approach with a focus on enhancing the economic development and improving the infrastructure.103 As a direct result of the armed conflicts, the major obstacle for the sustainable development process is the loss of nearly a generation of educated and trained people, many of them forced into the Diaspora wit only little willingness to return to the country.


Data suggests that flexible procedures are needed given the circumstances in Liberia: EAMRs complained about the difficulties faced:

“The quality of international contractors/technical assistance willing to work in Liberia remains very poor with frequent turnovers (including dismissals). Local contractors lack minimum financial and technical capability. Government and local institutions lack basic capacity beyond the Ministerial level. This in turn necessitates extra supervision, frequent addendums to contracts, lots of back and forth on invoices, etc.”104

Supporting evidence

The need to apply flexible procedures for Liberia resulted in a successful effort to have a list of countries for post-conflict flexible procedures including Liberia:

“Another major achievement has been raising awareness on the need to have Art. 73 post-emergency procedures for countries in transition from humanitarian actions to development cooperation. In the past, as in the case of the Education Project for Liberia, these were removed from the draft Financing Agreements contrary to the recommendation of the Delegation. An effort led by C2, that used Liberia as a demonstration case, has meant that this and other countries in similar situations are now included on a list of countries eligible for post-conflict flexible procedures – still to be approved by the Commissioner. In the same spirit, Art. 73 procedures were now included in all of the new primary commitments (but the EIB clearance where such is not needed), as well as in the Rider to the Electricity Project; a Rider to the on-going Education project is under preparation to re-introduce Art. 73 procedures to the FA.”105

Detracting evidence

EAMRs from 2007 (EC, 2007g, p.1 and EC, 2007f, p.21) indicate that there are some shortcomings regarding the application of simplified procedures:

“Use of more flexible procedures (Article 73 Cotonou Agreement) should be more often allowed and systematically foreseen in the financing agreements in the pipeline to help compensate for impairing the post conflict environment (low capacity of counterparts and of local contractors often leading to failed procurement procedures and the difficulty of quality TA for long term assignments)”.106

“Better follow-up of the application of Article 72&73 Cotonou should be ensured. The simplified procedures launched on this basis have to be handled by both Operations and C&F section in the light of the urgent need they are addressing.”107

Indicator 3.2.3: Punctuality of Implementation (start of implementation, timeliness of fund allocation, disbursement)


The LRRD process suffered from the long delays of rehabilitation and development interventions to come off the ground. Most of the EC-financed programmes in Liberia that were to take up relief interventions and make the transition to the rehabilitation phase were delayed, with procedural delays per programme ranging from close to a year on the low end to 3+ years in the cases of parts of the EDF9 Post-conflict Rehabilitation and Capacity Building Programme. In PCRCBP delays approached the D+3 deadline for the de-commitment of the allocated funds (for further details see Indicator 10.1.2). The delays hampered implementation and put project results at risk.



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As development interventions took a long time to be implemented ECHO tried to bridge the gap:

“In view of the current humanitarian needs in the country as well as the time needed to put in place instruments for development aid, DG ECHO will maintain its current level of assistance”108

The most important reason for the delays occurred was apparently the lack of staff within the Delegation.

As a result:

“quality and swiftness in accompanying the on-going projects also suffered, contributing to slow rates of delivery and to raising of frustration among beneficiaries and government counterparts.109

Table 11: Punctuality of Implementation for selecte d EC financed programmes

Project/Programme Delays caused by EC procedures

Reintegration Programme for Returnees and Displaced People

1 year delay of implementation:

“Delayed commitment decisions”110

“Pending impress account replenishment”111

Lengthy TA procurement process (10 months).

Post conflict Rehabilitation and Capacity Programme for Liberia

Delays in the processing of grant applications under the programme’s Community Rehabilitation Component

“The implementation of the programme was continuously delayed while approvals to proceed were processed by the EC” 112.

“Communities were asked to submit applications for small grants, had their applications approved and were then left to wait up to eighteen months before receiving the grant”113 .

“The EU reputation in the country was negatively affected (both at national and local levels) and Delegation staff undoubtedly faced significant problems trying to respond positively to CRC pleas for timely funds release in the face of time consuming administrative complexity” 114).

County Development Finalisation of financing decision (FD) and Financing Agreement (FA)

Originally planned for 08/2005115

Eventually signed in 9/2007116 , more than two years later than planned

Delays of at least two years in contracting and start of implementation after signing of FA. For Component 1, Community Development, due to the delay of transfer of funds as of 9/2009 117

EAMR for 2007118 states the consequences of such delays:

“...the fact that quality and swiftness in accompanying the on-going projects also suffered, contributing to slow rates of delivery and raising frustration among beneficiaries and government counterparts.”

JC 3.2: Flexibility and timeliness to react to chan ging conditions during implementation

Statement upon JC:

EC cooperation in the LRRD context was extraordinarily flexible regarding decision making and the choice of available cooperation instruments. Decisions on the support of the peace process were taken immediately after the signing of the CPA, Rehabilitation Programmes were launched quickly afterwards.



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Apparently the EC felt that it had lost some of its flexibility during the programming of EDF9. As a result, flexibility was a major issue in EDF10 and the cooperation strategy was designed in a way as to allow for streamlining and fine-tuning at a later stage. Flexible financing instruments were applied systematically and with regard to the evolving situation in the country. As staff shortages within the Delegation severely limited the delivery capacities of the EC, the Delegation was not to finance new projects under budget lines from 2007. It can be assumed that the utilisation of budget lines for linking relief and rehabilitation would have been even higher, if the Delegation would have had sufficient staff for the processing of these funds.

In terms of timeliness the LRRD process suffered from the long delays of rehabilitation and development interventions which were partly due to procedural delays within the EC. These delays caused ECHO to extend its intervention, “stepping in” for the rehabilitation interventions that were slow to materialise.

Judgement Criteria 3.3: Stepwise transition of EC c ooperation with non-governmental partners to governmental partners

Indicator 3.3.1: Decrease of Humanitarian Aid projects / programmes / budgets


As ECHO felt obliged to stay on in an effort to bridge the rehabilitation gap, humanitarian aid presence is still strong in Liberia, even several years after the end of the war. ECHO plans to withdraw from Liberia in 2011. During the period under evaluation the decrease of humanitarian aid through ECHO did not decrease substantially. While €13.38m were spent in 2004, a peak of emergency assistance was reached in 2006 with €19.56m spent when many refugees and displaced persons returned to their places of origin. 2007 and 2008 expenditures were with around €6.6m per year still not much less.

While ECHO is in the process of phasing out livelihood and food security activities as people have returned and resumed agricultural activities and increasingly medium term food security interventions displace short term interventions, programmes continue with regards to water and sanitation and health. As ECHO regarded the Ministry of health as still unable to take over the on-going assistance programmes, it extended its presence in the health sector repeatedly. Because few development programmes are willing to get involved in the water and sanitation sector, ECHO humanitarian support continues also in this sector.


Supporting evidence

ECHO is phasing out food security and livelihood support as returnees have settled and medium to long term interventions have been initialised by other funding instruments.119

Detracting evidence

Table 12: DG ECHO Funds for Liberia 2004 to 2008

Year DG ECHO funds in million €

2004 13.38

2005 15.56

2006 19.56

2007 16.54

2008 16.75

Total 81.79

Sources: EC, 2007r and EC, 2009p (DG ECHO)

“During the transition phase, the health sector remains a problem; according to UNICEF, the Ministry of Health would not be able to take over the assistance programmes before the end of 2010. Consequently, DG ECHO will remain active in this sector at least until the end of 2009. Important requirements also need to be met in the water and sanitation sectors, both in urban areas and in rural areas where very few development programmes have been started.”120



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Indicator 3.3.2: Support to and facilitation of government capacity development


EC support to government capacity development at national and local level is assessed in detail under EQ8 on Capacity Building.

Relevant for the LRRD process are particularly the support to the NAO at national level to increase Liberia’s capacities regarding its representation in EDF cooperation and the support at local level to County and District Authorities to increase their abilities to deliver basic services. Support to the NAO is rendered through the Institutional Strengthening and Capacity Building Programme (ISCBP). In addition components of other programmes, such as the county development programme, include capacity building measures for specific sectors. A relevant support to LRRD relevant national authorities such as the Ministry of Health or the Ministry of Agriculture was not rendered under the period evaluated, but is upcoming as LTTA for the Ministry of Health under EDF10 und support to the National Food Security and Nutrition Strategy.

Capacity building impact for the NAO office cannot yet be assessed from the available documentation as LTTA support started in 2009. Assessments at county level indicate that EC support has not yet significantly contributed to building government capacities EC-supported programme field offices have acted as parallel structures, probably preventing the development of capacities within the state structures. Bottlenecks in complementary resources prevented government employees from transferring learning achievements into their work.

Data, sources, extracts : See EQ 8, Indicators 8.1.1 and 8.1.2 for relevant data.

Indicator 3.3.3: Government gradually assumes state functions: NAO function transferred to GoL, increasing provision of basic services


The GoL is in the process of gradually resuming its state functions. NAO powers which had been transferred back to the Chief Authorising Officer in 1994 are expected to be gradually transferred back to the Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs.

More difficulties are encountered in the government’s increase of provision of services. A lack of qualified staff and resources needed to perform are bottlenecks that have not yet been overcome. The parallel structures often established by aid programmes did not support the improvement of government capacities to take on service delivery tasks. The transition from NGO partners as service providers to government agencies is hampered by the lack of capacity building measures for the Government of Liberia. This indicates that national and international NGOs will continue to play an important role for substituting government responsibilities in particular in rural areas.


Supporting Evidence

Gradual transfer of NAO powers back to GoL is envisaged to take place during the second half of 2010. An LTTA to the NAO office (advisor team) was mobilised in February 2009. The NAO office has been opened and training has started. ROM documentation rates the project design for the NAO support as “good”.121

Detracting Evidence ECHO pointed out that especially in the health sector a hand over of assistance programmes is facing problems because of the serious lack of qualified staff within the public health services and that the Ministry of Health would not be able to take over assistance programmes. Based on this analysis, ECHO decided to continue its engagement in the health sector until at least 2009.122

For most relief and rehabilitation related activities, the government is not regarded as an appropriate partner yet. EC continues to work through INGOs and UN organisations instead of through government structures. ECHO seeks to “hand over” NGO implementation partners to be included in EC programmes.123

The NAO function was transferred in 1994 back to the Chief Authorising Officer and is currently covered by the Delegation in Ivory Coast. It is foreseen to transfer the NAO functions gradually back to the Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs during the EDF10 under the Institutional Strengthening and Capacity Building Programme of the ECF9.



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JC 3.3: Stepwise transition of EC cooperation with non-governmental partners to governmental partners

Statement upon JC:

EC cooperation in the LRRD context still relies mainly on non-governmental partners. As the features of cooperation still focus more on services delivery under relief and rehabilitation, less emphasis is put on long-term development interventions including stronger components of organisational development, capacity building, TA and budget support. This is due to the analysis that government partners continue weak and are unable to deliver the kind of services expected by them.

EC interventions strongly relied on NGOs, contractors and UN organisations. All of these tended to create parallel structures in order to facilitate implementation and made only limited efforts to include government entities for capacity building. Thus government did not benefit from the experiences of these programmes. With the staying on of ECHO and the delay of EDF intervention delivery, the focus remained on short to medium interventions. Transferral of responsibilities was visible mainly at national level where the NAO office should be able to restore its power in 2010.

Judgement Criteria 3.4: Needs of recipients of huma nitarian assistance (in particular women and girls) remain satisfied in transition to rehabilitation and development assistance.

Indicator 3.4.1: Stated objectives of humanitarian assistance (in particular women and girls) remain satisfied in transition to rehabilitation and development assistance


The main stated objectives of ECHO humanitarian assistance to Liberia are food security, access to health care, access to drinking water, access to shelter and livelihood opportunities and protection of the most vulnerable sections of the population, especially women and children.

During the transition to rehabilitation and development these objectives are mostly reflected in EC interventions apart from ECHO. The FSBL and FSTP take up the concern for food security issues; the rehabilitation budget line takes up some health concerns, even though on a very limited scale and some of the NGO interventions reflect the need for safety nets for the most vulnerable. All the three budget lines and the rehabilitation programme under the EDF9 are concerned with the reestablishment of livelihoods. Drinking water concerns are not addressed under other EC interventions, if not as small components under some of the food security projects. The particular needs of women and girls get only marginal attention in most of EC interventions.


Table 13: Objectives of humanitarian assistance and response by EC rehabilitation and development interventions

Objectives of humanitarian assistance Response by EC rehabilitation and development interventions

Food security, livelihoods Improve living standards, particularly regarding food security and family income”

“Improvement in the living conditions of communities due to better access to [...] income generating activities”

“2nd Liberia Rehabilitation Programme”, EDF8

Reintegration programme f. Returnees and displaced people (2001-05, EDF8)

Post-Conflict Rehabilitation and Capacity Building Programme – (EDF9, 2003 – 2011); Thematic Budget Line on Food Security

Health Delivery of basic health services / drugs improved

Basic infrastructure / services rehabilitated, including health

Key public Ministries / institutions , CSOs re-established; functioning improved

Health status of beneficiaries improved

Reintegration programme f. Returnees and displaced people (2001 – 2005,



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EDF8)

Post-Conflict Rehabilitation and Capacity Building Programme – DDRR component (EDF9, 2003 – 2011)

Rehabilitation / NGO Co-financing Budget Lines

Drinking water Not specifically targeted, but part of rehabilitation, food security and other interventions

Repair of small-scale infrastructure (education, water, roads, etc.)

2nd Rehabilitation Programme (1999 - 2001, EDF8)

Reintegration programme f. Returnees and displaced people (2001 – 2005, EDF8)

Post-Conflict Rehabilitation and Capacity Building Programme – DDRR component (EDF9, 2003 – 2011)


Special needs of women and girls

“Opportunities for gender mainstreaming will be pursued within the public sector and NGOs, as to ensure women needs and representations on equal basis” (EC, 2003a)

No mention of gender or women’s issues in the objectives of the FA for the Reintegration programme for Returnees and Displaced People

Indicator 3.4.2: Aid flow to former recipients of EC humanitarian aid, in particular girls and women, continue during transition to rehabilitation and development without interruption


Interviews with resettled refugees and displaced persons during the field visit in Bong county indicate that members of the sample group have not yet received support through development projects. Rehabilitation measures have been provided through the DDRR process, follow-up activities to these measures were undertaken by INGOs, which have included into their longer-term development projects former recipients of DDRR projects.

Due to its character, humanitarian aid and rehabilitation is limited to a short-term period without specific objectives for a long-term change. Thus, an uninterrupted flow of aid to former recipients is understandably not in the focus of EC's humanitarian aid.


Some interviewees of the meeting with war affected population in Gbarnga expressed the opinion that a 2-year period is not enough to achieve education or vocational training with a formal degree; they expected more support for education / formal training from donor agencies. Participants of the meeting asked for small credits, there are no banks or institutions which could provide the necessary funds for investments. The group insisted on a credit scheme instead of loans for their private business.124

There are high expectations for concerted donor support to improve the economic conditions in the county, mainly targeted at the economic empowerment of community and individual level. Participants who run their own business defined their needs for continuous training in the fields of enterprise development and small business skills training.125

JC 3.4: Needs of recipients of humanitarian assista nce (in particular women and girls) remain satisfied in transition to rehabilitation an d development assistance

Statement upon JC:

While ECHO and other humanitarian assistance organisations cared about the basic needs of target groups during the relief phase, the transition necessarily meant that the level of support received had to be reduced. However there was a concern that the humanitarian situation should not deteriorate during the transitional phase and that interventions should keep up the satisfaction of some basic needs, such as food security, health care, drinking water and shelter and livelihood opportunities as well as protection of the most vulnerable sections of the population, especially women and children.

During the transition to rehabilitation and development these objectives are mostly reflected in EC interventions apart from ECHO. Strongly addressed are food security and livelihood issues while health is still secured by humanitarian assistance actors. There seem to be some gaps regarding drinking water and the needs of women and girls.



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1.4 Peace-building and Conflict Prevention EQ 4: To what extent has EC support to Liberia contributed to the consolidation of peace and a reduced risk of future violent conflicts?

Conflict prevention and peace building (CPPB) as a cross-cutting issue

Apart from individual projects with a specific focus on conflict prevention and peace building, the sector needs to be understood as a cross-cutting issue with implications for all intervention areas of EC support. Tackling the root causes of conflict in Liberia enfolds restoring structural stability in the country and the society through sustainable economic development, democracy and respect for human rights, viable political structures and healthy environmental and social conditions.

Figure 2: EU Instruments relevant to the field of C PPB 126

Source: Thematic Evaluation of the EC Support to Conflict Prevention and Peace Building. Preliminary Study Scoping and Mapping, Annex 8, p. 2, June 2009.

The evaluation question focuses on two main aspects of CPPB: first it is assessed in how far the European Commission has sufficiently considered the necessities of conflict prevention and peace building in its assistance to Liberia (closely linked to the question of relevance) and second, to what extent the EC has contributed to a stabilisation of the peace in post-war Liberia.

A number of factors can cause concern for peace and stability in a longer term. Firstly, the arrival of peace and influx of funds changed the political and economic dynamics mainly in the capital Monrovia, with a lesser impact in the provinces, where access to funding sources is far more limited. Secondly, inefficiency of the central and provincial government caused by low skill level, corruption and patronage-based appointments can undermine development efforts. This leads to frustration and political unrest among the population, which so far is hopeful that welfare would improve and that implementation of the CPA would bring economic benefits to rural areas. However, relevance of certain issues, especially in the reintegration and peace CPPB areas, changed over time, as the peace process and the overall social dynamic did not evolve in the expected way with a slower transition from relief to development.



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Judgement Criterion 4.1: EC assistance is guided by conflict prevention principles

� Indicator 4.1.1: EC programming based on adequate analysis of root causes of conflict in Liberia


The EC is one of the major contributors to the discussion on peace and conflict issues and has elaborated over the last decade various concepts and strategic frameworks for interventions in conflict or post-conflict situations. Regional and country strategies have been based on external briefings and internal situation analysis, including assessments of the root causes of conflict and adequate measures to tackle these. The conceptual frameworks for EC assistance to Liberia are based on the assumption that the principal factors for violence and conflict are reduced to enable a stable and sustainable development process.



The EC states in the Communication on Conflict Prevention (2001) the necessity to focus in post-conflict situation on supporting conflict prevention and peace building through specific measures: and special conflict prevention. "In post-conflict situations, EC assistance will concentrate on the consolidation of peace and the prevention of future conflicts, in particular through rehabilitation programmes, child related rehabilitation measures and DDR programmes as well as programmes supporting reconciliation processes." 127

Conflicts over natural resources are identified as a major cause for violence in the region:

" .. The Mano River sub-region includes countries such as Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone. Fuelled by the presence of considerable natural resources, including diamonds and timber, over the last ten years conflict has spread across borders and engulfed the entire region in a severe refugee crisis, further contributing to the regional instability." 128

The Regional Indicative Programme (RIP) includes a regional focus on conflict prevention by earmarking a €35m budget line to support a regional policy of conflict prevention and good governance, additionally strengthening ECOWAS' political role: " The political role of the region and in particular of the ECOWAS in conflict prevention is another major plank of the strategy and allocations in this respect are planned for the “non-focal” sectors (15%)." 129

The addendum to the RIP 2002-2008 includes an additional €5m budget line for the implementation of a rapid reaction mechanism in West Africa and the prevention of conflicts

The CSP 9 and 10 recognize in several parts the root causes of conflict, the socio economic effects and the necessity to tackle the factors that originally caused the conflicts. The environmental effects of conflict have been recognized through the desk study of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), which has been annexed to the CSP 9. 130

The EU has issued a number of key policy statements on conflict prevention and peace building with relevance for Liberia, these include:

• Commission Communication on The EU-Africa Dialogue, August 2003

• Joint Declaration on EU-UN Co-operation in Civilian Crisis Management, September 2003.

• Implementation of the EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts, Seville European Council, June 2002

• Development Council Conclusions on Countries in Conflict, May 2002

• Council Conclusions on Conflict Prevention, July 2001

• EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts, Gotenburg European Council, June 2001

• Development Council Conclusions on Conflict Prevention, May 2001

• Council Common Position Concerning Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution in Africa, May 2001

• Communication from the Commission on Conflict Prevention, April 2001

• European Parliament Resolution on Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management, March 2001

• Report presented by the High Representative/Commission on Improving the Coherence and Effectiveness of EU Action in the Field of Conflict Prevention, December 2000

• The European Parliament Resolution on Gender Aspects of Conflict Resolution and Peace building, November 2000

• EU Checklist for the Integration of the Protection of Children Affected by Armed Conflict into the Education Sector Development Programme (ESDP) Operations (2006)

The 2005 CSP for Liberia identifies explicitly the root causes of conflict, which form part of the policy objectives



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and priorities: "Despite growth before 1980 and its rich natural resources endowment, Liberia has fallen, through a long period of conflict, mismanagement and an abusive exploitation of its natural resources to the very bottom of the UN Human Development Index. The roots of conflict are mainly based in the marginalisation of a large part of the population and the concentration of influence and wealth in the elite based in Monrovia. It has an ethnic and a regional dimension." 131

The Commission has regularly taken into account external policy briefings to support the intervention strategy.


No detracting evidence so far.

� Indicator 4.1.2: Designs of EC-financed projects / programmes based on adequate analysis of root causes of conflict in Liberia.


The reference point for implementing agencies is the Poverty Reduction Strategy, managed by the Liberia Reconstruction and Development Committee LRDC. The strategy highlights the root causes of conflicts in Liberia.

UNDP has developed several sector analyses with detailed description of conflict potentials and root causes.

The National Conflict Mapping process of the TRC, also financed with EU funding, has been assessed as highly important and extremely useful, as it was the first initiative of that kind to systematically analyse the root causes and effects of the armed conflicts and provided a widely used methodology.

From the given state of documentation of individual projects, it can be derived that the majority of programmes have been designed with a sound strategic focus, reinforcing pillars of improving security, expanding participation, enhancing social cohesion and strengthening the environment for stability and development. The team needs to collect more detailed information from the implementing agencies on their analytical fundament for the programme / project design. This is in particular necessary where NGOs or INGOs received budget support from the EU.

Analysing in particular the ECHO programme documentation, the team comes to the conclusion that Cross-cutting issues of gender and human rights were appropriately incorporated into the design of most of the programmes, to be addressed through concrete project interventions.



ECHO's Global Plan 2006 includes an assessment on the main protection needs, exacerbated by the conflict and the population displacements: "Sexual violence towards women, in a context where a culture of impunity and a disintegrating justice system provide neither protection nor justice for victims; Patterns of behaviour resulting from 14 years of civil war continue in certain areas, with the civil population, and especially those who remain behind in the camps once the majority of the population have received return assistance and left, subjected to extortion (theft and pillaging); Family separation is a major problem linked to the return home, with the most vulnerable often left in camps to benefit from services (like education) and/or await assistance for their return; Conflicts revolving around access to land and inter-ethnic tension are the two main reasons for disputes between communities in the return zones; The tense situation in Côte d’Ivoire impacts directly on Liberia, due to operations to recruit combatants, including children, into armed militia. Liberians are an easy target for recruiters, as they have no hope of education or economic activity." 132

Support to the TRC is an additional effort to strengthen the analysis on the root causes of conflicts in Liberia. The ToR for the Short-term Technical Assistance (STTA) to the TRC state: „To complement the TRC inquiry into the root causes of the Liberian conflict with a focus on the status quo so that the findings of this process can inform the TRC Final Report recommendations for sustainable peace building." 133

The UN list in its Development Assistance Framework Liberia 2008-2012 a total of seven main conflict factors that cause instability and which need to be considered in all UN interventions for recovery and development (thus including EU-financed programmes): 1. Poor leadership and the misuse of power; 2. Weak justice systems; 3. Lack of shared vision; 4. Poverty and food insecurity; 5. Mismanagement of natural resources; 6. Pressure on reintegration; 7. The regional dimension. 134

The County Development Programme clearly refers in its situation analysis to the necessity for inclusive governance to avoid the re-establishing old power relationships, which were one of the root causes of the conflict.135



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The DRC's proposal for the PEACE programme in Southeast Liberia tackles - although only with minor activities - " ... the issue of traditional believes, harmful practices and power-relations and their impact on human development ..." as one of the root causes of underdevelopment and institutionalized human rights abuses” 136

Training and capacity building measures often include specific sessions with participants on conflict analysis, conflict management and resolution or on awareness rising for conflict-related issues. E.g. the EU co-financed Community Empowerment Project includes in component 2 'Capacity Building Programme' „... conflict resolution, consensus building, and leadership (communication and trust building)." 137


The team found no evidence for efforts to mainstream conflict sensitivity, DoNoHarm (DNH) or other instruments related to EU financed interventions. DG ECHO was aware of the issue and discussions had been raised on the integration DNH: "Some partners referred to good humanitarian donorship (GHD) as meaning that ‘do no harm’ could not simply be confined to delivering goods or services but must also include the process by which that happens and the impact on different groups. For DG ECHO the challenge of getting involved in issues such as protection as SGBV is what an exit strategy should be; at what point can the humanitarian response be deemed to be implemented and completed or ‘hand over’ assured in a context of LRRD?" 138 Nonetheless, no strategic framework for mainstreaming CS or other approaches (such as DNH) could be identified.

General statements on this indicator are difficult, as different levels of conflict analysis are applied by the implementing agencies. Whereas the analytical framework usually takes into account the root causes of conflict in Liberia, the strategic response and the alignment of activities to tackle the root causes often differ from the analytical findings.

� Indicator 4.1.3: Project monitoring, progress and evaluation reports assess effects on conditions associated with root causes of conflict.


Whereas a standardized Project Cycle Management needs regular updates on progress indicators and necessary adaptations to a fast changing environment, the lack of regular M&E activities became obvious already during the assessment of existing documentation. ECHO has informed the evaluation team of only one comprehensive evaluation of its interventions since the beginning of their engagement. Strategic steering requires building shared understanding of all the EC's intervention objectives among implementers, adjusting relevance when issues change and provision of advice when interventions run into political or operational challenges. The existing Monitoring efforts seem too weak to allow recognising of worrying signals at an early stage.



The draft of the final report of the Institutional Support Programme (ISP) states: "It turned out that the iPRSP badly needed a chapter or stand-alone section on something like “Corruption Causes Poverty in Liberia.” Given that endemic systemic government and private sector corruption are among several root causes of the massive poverty in Liberia over the last century, it seemed quite strange that there was no systematic treatment of corruption and its interrelationships with poverty." 139


Monitoring reports are available only for a limited number of projects

Only one existing comprehensive evaluation of ECHO interventions. 140

JC 4.1: EC assistance is guided by conflict prevent ion principles Statement upon JC:

The EC has undertaken wide efforts for conceptualizing and strategically design interventions for peace building and conflict prevention. Various instruments have been developed to tackle conflict or post-conflict situations and PCRD, a number of key policy statements have been issued with particular relation to the Liberian context. The root causes of conflict in Liberia have been identified and interventions have been planned in accordance to the findings from evaluations and taking into account lessons learned from previous experiences. Conflict prevention principles have guided the design of intervention



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strategies for Liberia, using external advice and expertise as well as extensive communication inside the Commission. The EC has additionally supported national efforts for conflict analysis, reconciliation and peace building, mainly through its assistance to the Liberian TRC and through the integration of conflict-related topics in training and capacity building activities at local level. Implementing agencies have based their programmes equally on conflict assessments, but mainstreaming of conflict sensitivity or the application of related tools (like DoNoHarm) has not been undertaken sufficiently. Especially in a situation where large resources are brought into a post-conflict context, this has been a deficiency of EC-funded programmes. Conflict-related monitoring and evaluation has been difficult, varying approaches to monitoring and a lack of evaluation activities did not allow for an early redesign of projects. Time constraints and a lack of staff at the Delegation and at implementing organisations prohibited the necessary time investment for M&E activities.

Judgement Criteria 4.2: Effect of EC assistance on equalisation of access to economic resources

� Indicator 4.2.1: EC assistance improves equal access to income generating opportunities


Specific attention needs to be drawn to women as the most vulnerable group with a lack of access to scarce social and economic resources. The ECHO Gender review outlines the importance of introducing a gender dimension into humanitarian aid, as it can „... help ensure that any humanitarian interventions do no harm in reinforcing or generating negative power relations and dynamics that can place".141 Despite the EC's strategic focus on gender and most vulnerable groups, it appears that the majority of projects with an employment component had no particular gender strategy in place.142 Labour migration can be identified as an indicator for the level of access to economic resources. In counties that directly benefited from EC-financed programmes (e.g. Lofa and Grand Bassa), households report a significant lower level of labour migration. Data, sources, extracts:


With regards to labour migration, between 15% and 35% of the households consulted for the CFSNS survey reported to having at least one household member migrated. The figure varies essentially between the counties; Montserrado has with an amount of 35% the highest level households with labour migration, whereas in the counties of Lofa, Grand Bassa and River Cess only around 7% of the households report to be affected by labour migration. Most of these migrants are men and above the age of 14. 143 All participants of a group interview confirmed that they have a small, but sustainable income. Those with small enterprises criticize that the competition is high due to the large number of small businesses that have been established in Gbarnga (not enough demand from the community). One of the participants of former vocational trainings has established a carpenter workshop where he is giving vocational training for two (2) male youth who are members of the actual EC financed Livelihood Programme, implemented by YMCA.144 "After the finalisation of the project in August 2006 it is clear that the specific objective of creating employment for up 4,500 ex-combatants and unemployed representatives from the resident population has been reached - and in fact exceeded by 30% since the direct beneficiaries amount to 5,745 persons." 145 "Twenty eight per cent of the small grant scheme projects (approximately 18) are directly related to economic activity, mainly agricultural production. These projects are likely to continue to grow and these small entrepreneurs are very likely to reinvest their revenues in local activities and products, with positive impacts on livelihoods and employment." 146 "DDRR program completers indicated an employment status of employer or employee at a rate of 41% versus program non-participants who reported “formal” employment at a rate of 31%". 147 Detracting evidence: Income generating measures through reconstruction programmes under the Community Rehabilitation Component only had a timely limited effect on the financial situation of target groups / employed workers and had a limited geographical impact.



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CRC, Activity 2.08: Prepare the documentation and then launch a Call for Proposals for grants of between €10,000 and €100,000 to larger organizations, to carry out projects with CBOs and local NGOs that would achieve the result. ... of the 14 dossiers prepared for medium grants projects, only five grants were awarded, and which covered 46 communities.” 148

� Indicator 4.2.2: EC assistance helps to equalise access to skill-building opportunities


Short term employment through reconstruction projects had a positive effect on skills and experiences of employed target groups to work on construction projects. An unintended effect of these improved capacities can be labour migration, as skilled workers will try to find employment in Monrovia or other larger cities in the region.

A specific challenge was the identification of reliable and capable local organisations that could provide training to the target groups. The structure of the civil society is still weak, networks are only in the process of formation and most of the local organisations do not have sufficient implementation capacities to deliver qualitative acceptable services. Another problem was the focus on geographic locations close to or in urban centres, where most of the skill trainings for ex-combatants were provided. This has kept the rural areas partly out of the focus of the skill training activities.



The provision of vocational trainings and skill development was adapted and responded to the needs of the population, in particular the beneficiaries of reintegration measures: „... statistics indicate that 95% of reintegration participants have opted for formal education or vocational training, 4% for agriculture, with a further 1% opting for employment." 149

During the trainings, the participants received all necessary hardware and materials for practical exercise. This was positively acknowledged. Although the trainings were possibly not sufficient or perfectly adapted, they had a visible impact on the improvement of the economic situation of the group members.150


Although skills could be improved in the target groups, the lack of job opportunities undermines the positive effects: "A focus group interview revealed that so far the received training has not lead to permanent employment. The knowledge and the skills are there, but at the moment nobody demands this particular know-how." 151

The diversification of vocational trainings provided was - from the group's point of view - not sufficient. Too many participants focused on the same training issues. This has created an unbalanced situation of demand and offer in the local market. All participants claimed that the training, which they had received, was not sufficient to capacitate them professionally. They could nonetheless establish businesses because of their former experience in their profession. The participants expressed their wish to receive further, more sophisticated trainings to increase their professional capacities, to enhance the quality of their products and thus to become more competitive.152

Training and skills provision for local government officials could have had a more positive impact on planning, design and administration of local policies, if additional hardware would have been provided sufficiently. A UNDP report states: "[T]he capacity problems faced at the county level and below are vast. Civil servants present at the sub-national level are currently operating, to a large extent, without any office equipment, means of communication or mobility." 153

"Vocational training has covered a wide range of skills and there has been no standard curriculum for vocational skills. Therefore each implementing partner has had the chance to develop its own training system but without any direct guidance and oversight from the programme as regards to the quality and contents of the training. Vocational skills training have met with the following difficulties" 154



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� Indicator 4.2.3: EC assistance helps to equalise access to land


The main question refers to the relevance of EC supported interventions in relation to land access. Lack of statistical data does not allow a comparative approach on land access, but the team can assess in how far the interventions have tackled the root causes of land conflicts and community tensions related to land. Resettlement and reintegration usually have an impact on land issues, as migratory movements and the reallocation of land can lead to an increase of conflict potentials.

Land issues as a critical conflict potential in a post-conflict situation have not been sufficiently integrated into the EC's support for the CPPB sector. In the given situation, access to land needs to be accompanied by strengthening community capacities for conflict management and the installation of public structures for the prevention of conflict. The level of these capacities strengthened by EC interventions can only be assessed through a wider quantitative assessment. No statistical data for comparison are available; the team could only refer to general data from other donor agencies. The attribution problem to EC supported interventions does not allow qualified statements on the effects of EC assistance to equalise access to land. The team found evidence in reports for an improved access to land for women, although no comparable statistical data could be identified.


USAID's Global Food Security response Liberia Rice Study indicates: „The Government of Liberia (GoL) owns and administers public land, and rural indigenous communities are permitted to maintain lineage-based communal tenure. In the 2006 Comprehensive Food Security and Nutrition Survey, approximately 66% of agricultural household respondents indicated that they had access to agricultural land, though farm sizes were typically smaller than before the war. On average, households reported current land size of 3.3 acres (1.3 ha) per household. The highest percentage of access to land is in River Gee (90%), Grand Gedeh (88%) and Lofa (88%), while the lowest rates of access to land for farming were in the counties of Montserrado (39%), Margibi (46%) and Grand Cape Mount (52%). The current land policy, under which GoL owns all land in the country until deeded to individuals or corporate organizations, is viewed by some as an impediment to improving agriculture." 155


"Numbers from the Demobilisation and Disarmament process show that the mean age for the former fighters is 26, and most are between 18 and 34 years, 22% were women and 11% children, and over 55% of the ex-combatants (hereinafter XC) had little or no education (JIU January 2005). The majority was in elementary school before joining the fighting forces. Of the XC 50% were single and 38% indicated that they had spouse and family responsibilities. The vast majority (80%) indicated that they have access to land for shelter and agriculture ...." 156


Interestingly, young people do not identify access to land as the key problem of equalisation of access to economic resources. The TRC final report indicates: "Inter-generational tensions between aspiring youth and land-holding elders, where young people’s inability to establish long-term secure tenure over land (for cash-crop agriculture), rather than simply getting access to land, is reported as the main problem." 157

"Access to land is not the problem that young people complain of; it is the inability to obtain the secure, long-term tenure over land that would enable then to establish cash-crop businesses." 158

In the same sense, the report identifies inter-communal divisions as one of the main reasons for land disputes, thus linking land issues to historic conflict settings rather than economic reasons: "Land disputes in the border counties of Nimba, Lofa and Bong pose a potential threat to national and regional security. Land disputes in these counties overlie a volatile context of inter-communal divisions that were engineered by political and military opportunists, and compounded by the inter-communal violence that erupted during the war."

JC 4.2: Effect of EC assistance on equalisation of access to economic resources

Statement upon JC:

Beneficiaries of EU-financed programmes reported an overall positive impact of activities to strengthen their capacities for economic reintegration and development. Coverage of the training activities has been sufficient and in some cases above the indicated targets. Access to land has been positively confirmed by 80% by participants of the DD process. With regards to access to land, establishing long-term secure tenure over land was identified as the key issue, which inhibits potentials for conflict and inter-generational tensions. Land disputes in border counties additionally



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pose a threat to stability and peace on national and regional level.

Follow-up of trainings and skill development was insufficient, as temporary employments through infrastructure reconstruction did not generate job opportunities on a long term. Skill-building measures suffered from a wide range of deficiencies, which has limited the sustainability of this component. The overall approach to skills training cannot be perceived as coherent due to varying curricula, weak local implementing partners and the lack of a steering body. Unemployment in Liberia currently stands at 85%, an improvement on the access to economic resources is closely linked to the macro-economic situation of the country as well as local development dynamics (external factors), which need to be tackled through long-term development interventions with a focus on local economic activities and productive infrastructures.

Judgement Criteria 4.3: EC assistance helps to stre ngthen / does not weaken the democratic culture legitimacy of Liberian State

� Indicator 4.3.1: Administrative procedures of EC-financed projects permit and encourage the participation of beneficiaries and other interest groups


Statements of implementing agencies on EC's tender, contracting and procurement procedures generally deal with the high complexity of the administrative regularities and the long period from issuing the tender until finally receiving funds. Additionally, restrictive disbursement regulations hamper the flexibility of implementing agencies to react on a changing environment, in particular in conflict or post-conflict settings. Delay is disbursement of funds have additionally hampered project implementation at various levels with direct negative effects for the beneficiaries. As described in the case of the Community Rehabilitation Component, resources could only be delivered after changes to the project design had been applied. Taking into account the low capacities for administration and little experience of the business community with public tender procedures, Small and Micro-Enterprise Programmes (SMEPs) do have only little or no chances to benefit from direct EC support.

The EU's support to the TRC has - even though to a limited degree - strengthened the international perception of the Government of Liberia, as the process was observed by the international community with high interest.



Documentation revised so far has little evidence for participatory elements / integration of direct beneficiaries in the project design. This finding is supported by results of interviews with beneficiaries, who stated not being involved in the design or pre-assessments for training activities.


A limiting factor is the complexity of budget support through the UNDP Trust Fund: " Also, the Trust Fund management structure, with JIU responsible for policy, programming and field operations and the UNDP DEX service centre for procurement, finance and administration, made coordination difficult. This explains, in part, the poor quality and lack of transparency of UNDP’s reporting on EC funded projects. In these progress reports there was no noticeable correlation between the narrative on implementation and the financial part invariably lacking an analysis of the use of project finances (budget) in relation to the activities." 159

"The LTTA’s task was made more complicated by the inordinate delay in paying the contribution’s second instalment on the part of EC, which delayed final payments for important commitments. Hence, the LTTA’s efforts to conclude EC TF program operations by the end of the implementation period end of June 2007 were not successful and a no cost extension by four months had to be arranged." 160

"Registration and validation of the targeted number of participants at the Monrovia training sites proceeded without problems as training opportunities were always scarce in Monrovia, compared to the number of excs residing there. The principal reason was the delay by the EC agreeing to the payment of a monthly subsistence allowance of US$30 to the ex-combatants."

"Many of the suppliers were in the process of setting up businesses again and were therefore unable or unwilling to become involved in EC procurement processes. When a request was published, asking for expressions of interest in supply contracts, there were few responses. Subsequent experience with suppliers showed them to be inexperienced in the demands of the usual processes involved in international procurement through tender and therefore unable to supply the projects requirements." 161



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A proposed plan for the phased disposal of programme assets, was sent to the Delegation in October 2008, but was only approved in early 2009, close to the closure of the programme. As a result of cash flow problems the plan had to be changed, both in terms of beneficiaries’ and mode of disposal. Assets were reallocated to recipients with the capacity to collect them from CRC premises, or to access them through intermediaries (i.e. County Officials received some assets on behalf of the individual projects in their counties). 162

� Indicator 4.3.2: Financial (and other) information on EC-financed projects are easily accessible by the Liberian public (i.e. at no / low cost)


Staff shortage has led to a low visibility of the EC in Liberia. This has resulted in a widely unknown role for the EC and the various contributions of the Commission to the peace process in Liberia. The EU has developed a respective guideline on Communication and Visibility for EU External Actions.

There is a high visibility of EU support in later projects, as the EC's visibility guidelines were implemented in a systematic manner. This has contributed to the recognition of the EU as an important donor to peace and stability in Liberia.



Article 16 on Visibility under Title V of the General and Financial Provisions of the EC's Financing Conditions enfolds:

"16.1 Every project / programme financed by the Community shall be the subject of appropriate communication and information operations. These operations shall be defined under the responsibility of the Beneficiary with the approval of the Commission.

16.2 These communication and information operations must follow the rules laid down and published by the Commission for the visibility of external operations in force at the time of the operations."


Reports give no detracting evidence on the level of public accessibility of information about EC funded activities. Investigation of newspaper articles and the analysis of information material of the EC / Delegation in Monrovia as well as the range of distribution of these materials can give more balanced evidence on this indicator.

� Indicator 4.3.3: EC-financed projects have feedback loops in place to ensure direct accountability to beneficiaries / the Liberian public


The team investigated through interviews with direct beneficiaries the level of participation for the project design and - during the implementation phase - necessary adjustments. As a result of these interviews (in general conducted as focus group interviews) the team reasons that the level of participation is low, as the possibilities for feedback or communication between direct beneficiaries and the EC are marginal.

Implementing agencies might function as intermediaries, although it needs to be assessed on how far beneficiaries are informed about the funding of activities through the EC. This aspect is directly linked to the implementation of visibility measures by the implementing agencies and a transparent communication on funding sources. Deducting from previous experiences, TF-approaches lead to a distraction of information on funding sources for beneficiaries.

In 2007, a support of 15 Mio. USD was approved for the Peace Building Priority Plan for Liberia. The funds are provided through the MDTF pool structure, whereas the Ministry of Internal Affairs holds responsible for managing the fund. The fund is implemented through national government and non-governmental organisations. The EU forms part of the management committee for the Fund. Difficulties in the management of the Fund have caused a 3-5 moths delay in disbursement of resources to the implementing organisations.

The EC support has been valued as highly sufficient in particular for the procurement procedures of the TRC, who's members where not familiar with the necessities and procedures.



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Regular monitoring reports inform on the state of the project and constraints and give recommendations to the commission and the implementing agencies on measures to improve the performance of on-going measures.

A critical incident was the publishing of an open letter to the president by one of the TAs of the EC, accusing the Commission of corruption and inefficiency. This situation has created a tense situation and has contradicted the efforts of the TRC to foster a transparent and publicly accepted investigation process.163


"At present, the NAO is not being kept informed about what project proposals are in the EC programming pipeline on a regular basis." 164

"There are communication issues causing friction between the project partners. Most likely, this problem will be partially solved when the EU sub-delegation (EU subDEL) in Monrovia becomes a fully staffed ECDEL, and powers are gradually transferred to the Liberian NAO, shortening chains of command and lead times. Another factor that ought to help in improving the situation is the Project Steering Committee (PSC), which will hold its first meeting shortly. Working on the PSC will assist the EU subDEL and LTTA in better grasping management matters in real-time, before issues become disruptive to implementation." 165

� Indicator 4.3.4: EC investigates and reacts to reports of corruption, misuse of power and favouritism


Due to the fact that Liberia had no National Authorizing Officer, the EC has been the acting as NAO for Liberia. Cases of corruption have been identified in various evaluation reports, mainly linked to the capacity building activities for the NAO. Corruption and the level of misuse of power form part of the root causes of conflict in Liberia, tackling these issues needs is not only a technical, but a cultural approach to change behaviour and attitudes.

The public's perception of corruption is linked to the resource delivery of donor agencies to political and administrative elites. Published cases of corruption inhibit a potential for instability and violence, thus the management of information and a restricted public relations strategy related to corruption can have unintended effects on the political environment in Liberia.



Article 17 on the Prevention of Irregularities, Fraud and Corruption of the General and Financial Provisions of the EC's Financing Conditions enfolds:

"17.1 The Beneficiary undertakes to check regularly that the operations financed with the Community funds have been properly implemented. It shall take appropriate measures to prevent irregularities and fraud and, if necessary, bring prosecutions to recover funds wrongly paid.

17.2 ... The Beneficiary shall immediately inform the Commission of any element brought to its attention which arouses suspicions of irregularities or fraud and of any measure taken to deal with them.

17.3 The Beneficiary undertakes to take every appropriate measure to remedy any practices of active or passive corruption whatsoever at any stage of the procedure for the award of contracts or grants or in the implementation of the related contracts. ..."

The Electricity Grid Rehabilitation Programme (FED/2007/019-186) suffered from cases of corruption and misuse of funds. After these cases came to the EC's awareness, Louis Berger was put in charge to supervise the programme.

“An Anti-Corruption Task Force has been established to investigate corruption allegations against public officials and civil servants. Moreover, a team of auditors from ECOWAS has been invited to conduct forensic audits of ministries and agencies, including the Legislature. The team is presently in Monrovia. The government also expects to receive the findings of audits of revenue-generating agencies sponsored by the EU. It is worth noting that the issue of corruption has also taken centre stage in the national Legislature affecting the Speaker and other members of the Assembly. More recently, the Chairman of the NTGL has also suspended senior officials of the National Social Security and Welfare Corporation for charges of mismanagement.” 166


"By mid-2004, reports of widespread corruption were appearing in the Liberian media and the various factions



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within the NTGL accused each other of siphoning state finances for personal gain, increasing fears for the stability of the peace process. A significant catalyst for donor action was the completion of the EC audits in early 2005, the ECOWAS investigation of corruption within the Office of the Chairman, and the reports by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) of widespread abuse in the Cash Management Committee (CMC), charged with managing the government’s limited cash-based budget. The results were the most comprehensive empirical evidence to date of the extent of corruption in Liberia; so dramatic were the data that the EC did not immediately release them for fear of the reaction they could provoke and the ECOWAS results were officially released only after the change in Government." 167

"In institutional terms, the involvement of the Commissioners in operational matters as well as having oversight responsibilities raises a potential conflict of interest that could generate a lack transparency and accountability and some possibility for corruption and mismanagement of EC support." 168

JC 4.3: EC assistance helps to strengthen / does no t weaken the democratic culture legitimacy of Liberian State

Statement upon JC:

Documentation on the effects of EC's support on the democratic culture is limited due to the limited number of evaluations that give statements on this aspect. Whereas there is evidence for a positive impact on the democratic culture and values for the ISP programme, only little evidence could be found for a wider impact on the democratic legitimacy of the Liberian State of other activities. Closely linked to the above mentioned problem of increased corruption as a result of financial resources provide by the donor community, it can only be assumed that reports on cases of corruption have a counterproductive effect on the legitimacy.

The perception of the government is furthermore linked to the capacity to act as a service provider for basic services and the transparency of financial procedures at central and local government level. No data are actually available on the change of the democratic culture in Liberia as direct result of the EC support.

Capacity building for local governments in the area of CPPB has not been part of the EC portfolio. Only little capacities have been built up by EC funded projects, most of the LGU staff had either experience from previous trainings by INGOs or applied a "learning by doing" approach.

No evidence was found that the EC assistance had weakened the democratic culture legitimacy of the Liberian State.

Extracts:


"In 2004, the EC extended ISP funding to all of the Commissions established under the Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement (ACPA). These Commissions were considered key institutions for the advancement of democracy, promotion of full respect for international humanitarian law, human rights and creating the conditions for the establishment of a reconciliation and healing process." 169

"The impact of the ISP cannot be measured only in tangibles. It was a programme designed to change the entire manner in which a country dealt with public affairs - to introduce international standards of democracy, good governance and sound macro-economic management. All ISP activities and interventions shared this common objective. Whilst being a challenging programme in the context of the Liberian situation, the overwhelming consensus of interviewees throughout the evaluation ... was that its impact was visible. Support for the elections, management studies conducted in each key institution, and audits undertaken in state-owned enterprises were all valuable in ensuring that leaders, officials, and functionaries in Liberia’s future development required a paradigm shift." 170

"The ISP programme, by targeting specific institutions for support, has been effective in assisting in establishing the processes towards a sustainable functioning and representative democracy in Liberia. The ISP focus remained fixed on the key transition points of the rehabilitation and recovery of Liberia, bringing appropriate resources to bear on these events/institutions. The EC role in ensuring the success of institutional support was well regarded amongst stakeholders." 171



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1.5 Food Security EQ 5: To what extent has EC support and particularly support to Food Security

contributed to an increase in food security and in food production capacity based on sustainable rural development in Liberia?

Judgement Criteria 5.1: Decreased undernourishment in counties with EC supported food security programmes

� Indicator 5.1.1: Reduced prevalence of underweight children under-five years of age (boys and girls)172


While some EC food security interventions have been implemented nationwide (e.g. under WFP), the majority of interventions focused on specific counties in the Southwest and the Northeast of the country. South-eastern Liberia, namely the counties Maryland, Grand Kru, Grand Gedeh and River Gee, benefited from the EDF Second Rehabilitation Programme (1998-2001) and is targeted by the DCI-FOOD Programme PEACE that was contracted in 2008 to start in 2009 as well as an Oxfam project under the Food Facility. The Northeast, namely the counties Bong and Lofa, benefited from the Food Security Programme 2004 and is targeted by the Food Facility (GTZ Food Security and UNDP/WFP/FAO/UNDP support to the Joint Programme on Food Security). Fewer singular interventions covered more central parts of the country It would probably not be feasible to assess the impact of EC interventions on underweight children from 1999 up to 2008 in the Southeast of Liberia, as it has to be expected that all results achieved under the Second Rehabilitation Programme have been completely eradicated by the resurgences of fighting in 2002/2003. All project activity reports of projects that were suspended for some period between 2003 and 2004 due to fighting stated that results were wiped out and they had to start from scratch. To assess only impact from 1999 to 2001 is not indicated due to the short time span and the difficulties to trace back changes that were to occur a decade ago. The performance of the current PEACE Programme is not within the scope of the evaluation and it would be too early to assess impact at this point. The most feasible assessment of impact on child malnutrition is to be expected in the counties of Bong and Lofa in the Northwest of Liberia, as there have been on-going food security relevant interventions almost throughout the period under evaluation. CFSNS data from 2006 states that 24.3% of children under-five years are underweight in Bong county, while 22.1% of under-five years are underweight in Lofa, so underweight prevalence in these counties is below average national prevalence rate of 26.8%, which allows for the statement that EC supported counties show a lower underweight prevalence rate of children than other counties without EC support. The CFSNS argues that relatively low acute malnutrition levels of children in Lofa were due to the fact that the population in 2006 had just returned from camps where access to food and basic services secured a relative high level of nutritional status. Several reports suggest that the relatively good nutritional status of the population after the war might be due to high levels of food aid and humanitarian support. Holding true one would expect increasing malnutrition rates after the phasing-out of humanitarian interventions. There is no recent data available yet to verify if malnutrition rates did increase with the phasing out of humanitarian interventions. It is suspected that the global food crisis did increase underweight levels in 2008, but the only data to confirm that are increased admission rates for severely malnourished children in Greater Monrovia. It is assumed that effects of the price hike on rural areas was less severe as they are better equipped with coping mechanisms than the urban population. Taking into account the overall positive development of malnutrition rates in Liberia it seems reasonable to assume that changes depend on a whole range of external factors and not mainly on the contribution of the EC. Project reports to EC did not include any assessments of the impact project interventions had on underweight levels of children under-five. Solely the WFP report from 2004 contains data on underweight levels in relation to project interventions. It shows that targeted feeding programmes (school meals, therapeutic and supplementary feeding) were able to reduce underweight rates from 27% to 22%. The same interventions reduced child mortality rates from 4.9% to 1.5%. Overall it can be stated that targeted short term interventions apparently have contributed to improving child nutrition levels, while there is no available evidence on the impact of long term measures.



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Data, sources, extracts: Supporting evidence: A Comprehensive Food Security and Nutrition Survey (CFSNS) survey carried out in 2006 by GoL and UN agencies in all fifteen counties of the country showed that 26.8%173 of children under-five years of age are underweight. Even though the World Health Organization (WHO) categorises this level as high, it is still a surprisingly low figure in relation to the underweight prevalence average of 34% in the least developed countries in general and corresponds more to the average underweight prevalence of developing countries, which is 26% for 2007174. Five of 15 counties in Liberia have extremely high underweight levels according to WHO classifications, while the rest have high levels175.

A higher prevalence of underweight in boys (29%) compared to girls (25%) has been observed in the CFSNS study and is supported by figures from other studies on nutrition in Africa, but so far there is no scientific explanation for these differences. Hypotheses include social-cultural as well as biological explanations.

Figure 3: Geographic Distribution of Underweight

Source: Comprehensive Food Security and Nutrition Survey, 2006, page 58

Table 14: Child underweight status in counties

County Children < 5 underweight in %

Bomi 25.7%

Bong 24.3%

Grand Bassa 32.6%

Cape Mount 21.2%

Grand Gedeh 30.7%

Grand Kru 28.2%

Lofa 22.1%

Margibi 25.5%

Maryland 25.9%

Montserrado 25.3%

Nimba 31.4%

River Cess 33.9%

Sinoe 24.0%

River Gee 32.6%

Gbarpolu 21.5%

Total 26.8%

Source: Comprehensive Food Security and Nutrition Survey 2006, pag 81-96



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The Liberia Demographic Health Survey (LDHS) from 2007 categorises only 19% of children under-six years as underweight.

“Overall, 19% of children are underweight, which may reflect stunting, wasting, or both.

More children age 18-23 months are likely to be underweight (22%) than those less than 6

months (10%). The present who are underweight decreases as birth interval, size at birth, and

Mother’s nutritional status increase. Underweight varies by region, being highest in South Eastern

(23%) and lowest in North Western (15%)”.176

The LDHS Survey does not disaggregate data by counties, only by region, also pointing out distinct variations with the highest underweight prevalence in the South Eastern Region (23%) and the lowest in the North West (15%). Several facts impede a comparison of the two surveys: While the CFSNS included children age 6-59 months as a basis, the LDHS included children under six months, which are far less likely to be malnourished than older children. The CFSNS omitted the urban population, while the LDHS included urban and rural population. As underweight prevalence is higher in rural than in urban areas CFSNS data, that is only covering rural and semi-urban areas, indicate higher underweight prevalence. Finally the CFSNS is based on the WHO older reference standards while the LDHS utilises new WHO reference standards introduced in 2006.

The United Nations statistical website for the Millennium Development Goals Indicators177 has adjusted the LDHS data to internationally recognised standards to ensure international comparability and categorises 23.8% of children under five years of age as underweight for the year 2007. The same website cites data for the year 1999 from the National Nutrition Survey 1999-2000. According to that data underweight prevalence for children under five was 26.4% in 1999. This figure can be regarded as baseline data to measure changes occurred up to 2007/2008. As the National Nutrition Survey 1999-2000 could not be made available to the evaluators, it is not possible to compare between counties with and without EC food security interventions in 1999/2000, so that baseline data to measure progress against is not available at county level.

The evaluation team will build its analysis on the official UN data that indicates that at national level underweight prevalence in children under five was reduced from 26.4% in 1999 to 23.8% in 2007 which is a reduction of about 10%.

The reduction of underweight prevalence in Liberia corresponds to the regional trends. The Millennium Development Goals Report 2009 also stated a reduction of about 10% (from 31% in 1990 to 28% in 2007) for Sub-Saharan Africa even though it predicted an increase for the time after 2007 due to higher food prices and the economic crisis that has worsened the food security situation in many countries. EC short term measures to support nutrition were implemented mainly under the WFP/UN Consolidated Appeal Process in 2003 (EC contribution € 7m) and in 2004 (EC contribution € 7m) and through EDF funds for Humanitarian Assistance chanelled through ECHO betwe en 2004 and 2006 (€8.4m). WFP interventions in 2003 aimed at saving lives by providing an adequate ration to populations affected by renewed fighting and to other vulnerable populations who continued to be refugees or IDPs as a result of the protracted crisis. At that time access to approximately 80% of Liberia was impossible limiting humanitarian aid178.

Table 15: Beneficiaries of WFP food security interv entions 2003 in Liberia Beneficiary Category Male beneficiaries Female

beneficiaries Total beneficiaries

Total beneficiaries 113,747 157,483 271,230 Refugees 7,600 11,400 19,000 IDPs 74,000 111,000 185,000 Returnees 3,241 4,862 8,103 Beneficiaries of General Food Distribution (GFD)

84,841 127,262 212,103

Children / therapeutic feeding 171 257 428 Children / supplementary feeding 2,080 3,312 5,201 Expectant and nursing mothers n.a. 1,130 1,130 Children receiving school meals 26,495 25,473 51,968 FFW participants 160 240 400

Source: WFP Report Regional PRRO – 10064.1, 2003 In 2003 WFP food security interventions in Liberia benefited 271,230 beneficiaries179 with 29,356 MT MT of food commodities distributed. The EC contributed in cash and in-kind to the measures in West Africa180 with 29,77% of the total commodities purchased181. This equals to about €20m for the EC contribution to the West Africa Cluster (Liberia, Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast and Guinea) out of which 7€m to Liberia. In terms of outputs WFP fully achieved the intended distribution targets. Table x gives an overview on the results achieved.



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Table 16: Outputs of WFP food security intervention s 2003 in Liberia Output Unit of

measure Planned Achieved Achieved

compared to planned (%)

Beneficiaries who received free relief food assistance

No. 145,000 212,103 146,3%

Teachers and school support staff fed on the spot hot meals

No. 2,826 2,826 100%

School children receiving one meal a day No. 20,000 49,142 245% TFC recovery rate (>75%) % 75 72 TFC mortality (<10%) % 10 6 TFC defaulter rate (<15%) % 15 9 SFP recovery rate (>70%) % 70 69 SFP mortality rate (<3%) % 3 SFP defaulter rate (<15%) % 15 22

Source: WFP Report Regional PRRO – 10064.1, 2003 An enhanced commitment to women becomes visible when looking at the gender process indicators.

Table 17: Gender Process Indicators in Liberia Gender Process Indicators Planned Achieved Proportion of women in leadership positions in food management committees

70% 70%

Proportion of women receiving hh. food rations at distribution point in GFD 61% 72% Source: WFP Report Regional PRRO – 10064.0, 2003 In 2004 WFP interventions not only aimed at saving lives, but also at consolidating progress in regional stability. As the overall security situation had improved, WFP could access most parts of the country and was able to open seven sub-offices.

Table 18: Beneficiaries of WFP food security interv entions 2004 in Liberia Beneficiary Category Male beneficiaries Female

beneficiaries Total beneficiaries

Total beneficiaries 519,249 407,569 926,818 Number of children below 5 years of age 43,792 43,501 87,293 Number of children 5 to 18 years of age 272,870 246,567 519,437 Number of adults 202,587 117,501 320,088 Refugees 6,252 6,859 13,111 IDPs 152,344 165,793 318,137 Returnees 6,392 3,398 9,790 Beneficiaries of General Food Distribution (GFD)

164,988 176,050 341,038

Children / therapeutic feeding 138 337 475 Children / supplementary feeding 1,600 1,951 3,551 Expectant and nursing mothers n.a. 3,264 3,264 Children receiving school meals 201,481 186,149 387,630 FFW participants 69,946 8,515 78,361 Participants in FFT 4,034 4,827 8,861

Source: WFP Report Regional PRRO – 10064.1, 2004 The WFP 2004 report stated for Liberia that ”actual outputs consistently exceeded planned figures mainly as a result of emerging needs in newly accessible parts of the country and expansion of activities, notably those related to IDPs, emergency school feeding, disarmed ex-combatants and food-for-work. As these increases were not followed by increased food resources, food rations for general distribution had to be significantly cut to accomodate the increased caseload.” (page 5) In terms of outputs and outcomes the 2004 report showed to what extent humanitarian aid helped to contain the beneficiaries’ food security.



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Table 19: Outputs of WFP food security interventions 2004 in Liberia Output Unit of

measure Planned Achieved

SFP recovery rate (>70%) % 70 89 Beneficiaries in Institutional Feeding Programme No. 0 7,190 SFP defaulter rate (<15%) % 15 8 TFC recovery rate (>75%) % 75 89 TFC defaulter rate (<15%) % 15 8 Ex-combatants beneficiaries in Disarmament and Demobilization Programme

No. 0 86,441

Source: WFP Report Regional PRRO – 10064.1, 2004

Table 20: Outcomes of WFP food security interventions 2004 in Liberia Outcome Base value Previous

Follow-up Latest Follow-up

Proportion of household expenditure on food (%) 5.,0 % Under-5 chronic malnutrition (stunting) 39.0 44.0 31.2 % Under-5 underweight (weight/age) 27.0 27.5 22.0 Crude Mortality Rate (deaths/10,000/day) 2.0 1.1 % Under-5 Global Acute malnutrition (weight/height < -2z) 3.9 4.7 Unter 5 mortality rate 4.9 1.5 % Under-5 severe acute malnutrition (weight/height < -3z) 0.9 0.7

Source: WFP Report Regional PRRO – 10064.1, 2004 As a reaction to the global food crisis in 2008, the EC allocated €4.14m to short-term programmes implemented by UNICEF and WFP to address issues of acute and chronic malnutrition and therefore continues its support to food security short-term interventions. Detracting evidence: More recent studies from 2008 indicate that the undernourishment rate of chilldren under five might have increased again from 2007/2008 onwards, because of the rice price hike during the global food crisis in 2008182. However, this assumption is still based mainly on a step-by-step chain of arguments: ”Based on the situation that prevailed prior to the price increase, it can be expected that higher food prices will have a serious impact on household food security levels, which eventually could lead to an increase in child malnutrition rates.”183 Even though there is no statistical data available on underweight development between 2008 and 2010 in Liberia there are data supporting the assumption of decreasing nutrition levels due to the food crisis: the ACF study by Broudic (2008) observes an increase of new admissions for severely malnourished children in ACF nutritional centres between April and May 2008 of 40%. The rate of severly food insecure housholds in poor households of Greater Monrovia has increased from 4 percent in December 2006 to 8 percent in 2008, which makes it seem likely that child nutrition levels have also declined during that period184 and might by now have fallen back to the 1999 level. For rural areas it was assumed that the rural population would be more resilient to the price hike: ”Rural populations will be somewhat more resilient to the price hike, as they are better equipped with coping mechanisms such as the ability to rely on own food production. Interventions in the short term should therefore mainly be concentrated in urban areas. The medium and long-term response should take place in both urban and rural areas.”185

Statistical evidence on the development of child nutrition levels will not be available before the end of 2010 after the publication of the Food Security and Nutrition Survey currently being carried out by the MoA and WFP. These will show if the intervention measures by GoL, EC and other donors were able to contain the effects of the food price hike.

Apart from the WFP project reports there were no data available on impact of interventions on underweight of children under five.



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� Indicator 5.1.2: Proportion of population (disaggregated by gender) below minimum level of dietary energy consumption


National data indicate that the proportion of the population below the minimum level of dietary energy consumption was about as high in 2008 as it was in 1999 with serious deteriorations during the peak of conflict. Several reports indicate that food aid has prevented higher proportions of people going hungry in the post-conflict period and has contributed to a comparatively stable food security situation (e.g. Tefft 2005). The CFSNS from 2006 points out the huge importance of food aid for the population of Liberia: 36% of the population (in numbers more than a million people) received some kind of food aid in 2005/2006.

End of project reports, interviews, focus group discussions and field observation showed positive impacts on food consumption for short-term emergency oriented measures. The impact of medium to long term support measures was confirmed only for singular examples, not on a broader scale.

As a response to the global food crisis in 2008 that heavily affected Liberia with its high dependency on rice imports, EC quickly developed its food security portfolio and is currently with commitments of almost €34m one of the major donors in the sector.


Liberia’s MDG Progress Report 2008 points out that “between 1993 and 2002 the number of people living below the minimum level of dietary energy consumption in Liberia doubled from approximately 700.000 to 1.4m. Correspondingly, the proportion of the population below the minimum level of dietary energy consumption increased from 33% in 1990 to 46% in 2003”.186

The data from 2003 is the most actual data on dietary energy consumption so that progress or stagnation between 2003 and 2010 cannot be assessed.

The United Nations statistical website for the Millennium Development Goals Indicators has adjusted the data to internationally recognised standards to ensure international comparability and categorises 30% of the population below the minimum level of dietary energy consumption in 1991, 39% in 1996, and 40% in 2004. As changes between 1996 and 2004 were minor, the evaluation assumed the 1996 figure of 39% as baseline data to measure progress against.

A FAO working paper from 2005 points out that malnutrition was apparently not worsened by displacement and return and interprets that as an indicator for the success of humanitarian assistance to contain the most negative consequences of the crisis. Many households strongly depended on food aid. Overall, 36% of the households interviewed during the CFSNS in 2006 had received some form of food assistance either as food-for-education, food-for-work or as resettlement packages. The likelihood of benefiting from aid interventions was highest in the three counties the EC support focused on: Bong, Lofa and Maryland.

The EC Annual Report of 2008 states a significant deterioration of the food security situation in 2008 as a result of global surges in food prices. As Liberia heavily relies on rice imports, increasing food prices directly affect food security, especially in urban areas.

As a result, from 2008 onwards food security has quickly developed into an important intervention area of EC mainly through the Food Security Thematic Programme and the Food Facility. Additional funds are being allocated to food security interventions through an addendum to the CSP utilising the EDF10 Envelope B so that the EC has developed into one of the major donors in the food security sector.

Table 21: Current EC Food Security Portfolio

Instrument Amount (in €) Period M �chani�m Geographical areas

FSTP – Component 4 (LRR�)

10.000.000

2008-2014 Grant Contracts NGO (CfP)

Gbapolu, Maryland, River Gee, Grand Cru, Lofa

FSTP – Resp�nse to Soaring Food Prices

4.700.000 2010-2013 Grant Contracts NGO

Greater Monrovia, Bong, Bomi, other counties

10th EDF Env. B 4.140.000 2010-2013 Contribution agreement with UNICEF and WFP

15 counties

Food Facility 10.856.645 2009-2011 Contribution agreements with UNDP, FAO, WFP

Mainly Bong, Nimba and Lofa



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and UNICEF

Food Facility 3.293.029 2009-2011 Grant Contract NSA/NGO/MS agency

Lofa, Grand Gedeh, River Gee

NSA/PVD 912.696 2010-2011 Grant Contract NGO

Bong

Total 33.902.370

Source: EC sheet on Food Security Portfolio Liberia, May 2010, unpublished internal document

No gender disaggregated data is available concerning the dietary energy consumption and other food security relevant information. No documented evidence on this indicator was available regarding county disaggregated data and data from EC interventions (baseline surveys and evaluations). Projects did not collect data at this level, neither at the level of possible proxy indicators such as “number of meals per day” as a proxy indicator to assess if people go less hungry.

Supporting evidence “In Liberia, WFP’s assistance has contributed to narrowing the gap in the food needs of IDPs, refugees and vulnerable groups. The food rations distributed under the general rations have helped to stabilise the nutritional status of beneficiaries by providing some 1,800 kcal initially and subsequently 2,100 kcal per day per person.”187

During the peak of emergency aid in 2004 almost a million Liberian’s (out of an estimated 3,367,000) benefited from WFP support co-financed by EC. In addition ECHO support through EDF funds benefited an additional number of vulnerable households.

Detracting evidence

There is some evidence that the food security situation worsened in 2008 due to the global food crisis: “The rate of severely food insecure households in poor neighbourhoods has increased from 4 present in December 2006 to 8 present in June 2008. During the same period, the proportion of people with good food consumption patterns has dropped from 64 to 40 present. To guarantee the consumption of basic staple food commodities, households are restricting their consumption of high quality food commodities, in particular protein sources and vegetables, which leads to decreased dietary diversity. Some 9 of 10 respondents reported increasing expenditure for food and transport in the 12 months prior to the survey. Expenses on higher quality food commodities such as meat, eggs, vegetables, has dropped. Also expenses on education and health have declined. Households are substituting rice with less preferred and cheaper food commodities, consume fewer meals, reduce size of meals, give preference to children and purchase food on credit.“188 Interviews and focus group discussions indicated a strong impact of short-term measures on food intake. Food rations given along with seeds and tools after people returned to the villages kept farmers food secure up to the stabilisation of their own harvests. The improvement of food intake levels due to medium and long term interventions was confirmed only for singular examples, not on a broader scale. The only available project evaluation states the following: “Whether the programme has an impact on ‘food security’ at the both household and meso levels remains unclear or even uncertain at the completion of the project. The outcomes on production and income increase (in line with the specific objectives) are hardly estimable. The project did not develop such M&E system which could have helped to give evidence on the impact of its intervention.”189

Project reports generally focus on achievement of outputs and contain almost no data related to outcome and impact.



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JC 5.1: Decreased undernourishment in counties with EC supported food security programmes

Statement upon JC:

The national data on the undernourishment situation indicates that only minor changes have occurred at national level as well as in counties with EC supported food security programmes looking at the start of the period under evaluation and the end of the evaluated period. Within that period changes have been drastic as undernourishment reached extremely high levels during the peak of the conflict in 2002/2003.

As several factors are influencing food security a general attribution of changes to EC intervention is difficult.

The assessment of the result chain is easiest with regard to straightforward and simple short term interventions under EDF ECHO support and the WFP support under the FSBL. Positive results were reported for these as the distribution of food aid satisfied people’s immediate needs and contained the most negative consequences of the humanitarian crisis with over one million internally and externally displaced Liberians. It is likely that the relatively satisfying nutritional status of the Liberian population two years after the war was due to the high coverage of humanitarian aid, partly financed by the EC.

Positive medium term results on undernourishment can partly be traced back to the resumption of agricultural production. As the most pressing constraints in agricultural production for the returnees were the lack of seeds and tools, the distribution of these inputs did increase production and thus self-sufficiency of rural households. This argument will be followed up in depth under JC 5.2.2.

Due to the fact that the resurging conflict in 2002/2003 devastated all results achieved so far in long term oriented rural development programmes, the time span of functioning development oriented programmes is reduced to a few years, so that little impact could be expected within the time frame under evaluation. Trying to increase agricultural production in a manner that can be sustained takes at least five to ten years. The monitoring report for DCI-FOOD/2008/172-566 states for example that “if the target is to remove food insecurity completely from 60% of the targeted households in a manner that can be sustained, then it is clear that the project purpose is unlikely to be attained within a three year period.” And the monitoring report for DCI_FOOD/2008/172-568 states that”The most serious deficiency in design is the lack of realism of trying to increase agricultural production in two years in a manner that can be sustained. Five to ten years would be more realistic.”

Projects wanted farmers to take up activities that were new to them, e.g. fish ponds and pig breeding and often farmers were asked to create new organisational structures for the management of interventions. The project implementation periods frequently were too short to change farmers’ attitudes and behaviour and to bring about changes in social structures.

Programmes used group approaches to reach more beneficiaries and to strengthen community cohesion. In reality handing over innovations to farmers groups often meant that “nobody felt responsible” for the success of the intervention and activities were not be taken care off well leading to abandoned swamps, undernourished pigs and neglected fish ponds. As a lesson learned many NGOs are moving to more individual support approaches in later programmes.

Overall it seems that positive impact on nutritional status during the period under evaluation was mainly through short to medium relief interventions, which had a real impact on availability and access to food and that long term interventions contributed little to improve nutritional status so far.

While positive results are stated in several progress reports on specific project results, it remains unclear how far these EC interventions have impacted on the nutritional status of the vulnerable rural population. Most projects failed to set up an impact oriented monitoring and evaluation system and were not able to respond to questions regarding project impact in a satisfactory manner. The only impact assessment survey in the food security sector available to the evaluation team190 did not show a major impact on the food security status.

While food security EC long-term support has been rather neglected between 2004 and 2008, the EC quickly responded to the impact of the global food crisis in 2008 on Liberian food security by upgrading and developing its food security portfolio substantially, thus turning into one of the major donors in the sector.



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Judgement Criteria 5.2: Increased agricultural prod uctivity in counties with EC supported food security programmes

Indicator 5.2.1: Increase in crop yields / area for the main staple foods Findings at indicator’s level:

Statistical data on agriculture in Liberia is still very scarce and mainly based on estimates by technical short term missions by WFP and FAO, so that their reliability has to be assessed as low. There are hardly any informative project baseline surveys available to measure progress against.

As the conflict prevented farmers from farming and decreased the availability of secure land, labour, agricultural inputs and market opportunities, yields/ha dropped dramatically during the conflict years and have not fully recovered up to today.

Almost all EC food security interventions had the increase of yields as one of their major objectives, but failed to assess project impact with regards to that objective. The few available information indicates that progress in increasing yields overall has been minor. While short-term distribution did support the resumption of agricultural activities (see JC 5.2.2), the medium to long term interventions did not lead to major improvements in crop yields.

Especially the development of Inland Valley Swamps with its high yield potentials, which has been a central element of most of the EC supported food security interventions, still faces the challenge of sustainability. The short implementation time frame and technical weaknesses in implementation have impeded visible benefits sufficient to convince farmers to change their traditional farming systems and invest more of their labour into IVS. Their priorities are still in upland rice farming. This might change in the long run when population pressure and a growing demand on upland areas for tree farming (rubber and cocoa) forces farmers to intensify swamp cultivation for rice production.

Some of the factors limiting impact have been the low technical capacities of NGO project staff that was more experienced in relief operations and the failure to timely outsource complex technical issues to more specialised implementers.

From the side of the EC the shortage of staff in some cases led to delays that hampered smooth implementation as adaptions to the programmes that were necessary because of changing circumstances did take an undue time to be processed and approved by EC.

Targets of food security interventions have in many cases been unrealistic and therefore could not be achieved. Changes in agricultural practices and consequently significant increases in crop yields have so far been negligible.

Data, sources, extracts: A FAO Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to Liberia191 estimated some figures which are confirmed by other data sources.192 The findings of that mission from 1996/1997 will be utilised as baseline data to evaluate progress against as this is so far the most detailed data available for the beginning of the period the evaluation is to cover. According to that data the average crop yield in 1996/1997 was 1,250 kg / ha for upland rice and 6,840 kg / ha for cassava. Another FAO/WFP assessment in 2006 completed the information by estimating yields for swamp rice (1.6 MT/ha) and for equipped inland valley swamps (more than 2 MT/ha), highlighting the yield potential of lowland cultivation.

During the last year of the war and the first years after signing the peace agreement, when refugees and IDPs had not yet returned and the security situation was still fragile in many counties, the average yields per hectare dropped to 916 kg/ha in 2005, a decline of almost 27% compared to pre-war figures which were around 1,250 kg / ha for rice. Total rice production fell from 298,574 MT pre-war level to 94,450 MT (less than one third of previous production) due to declining yields and less area under cultivation.

A crop assessment mission by FAO/WFP in 2006 drew an even more pessimistic picture of 2005 yields: the team estimated rice yields for 2005 to be only 0.4 MT/ha and cassava yields to be only 6 MT/ha and the total production to be only 84,650 MT.

Data for 2007-2008193 estimates average yields at 0.9 MT/ha.

This shows that data on Liberian agriculture lacks accuracy and is based on rough expert estimates with differences of more than 100%.



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Figure 4: Rice yield in kg / hectare, Liberia 1997- 2005

Rice yield in kg / hectare, Liberia

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

Source: Nation Master, www.nationmaster.com, extracted 23/03/2010

Table 22: Rice yields Pre-War and 1996 figures

Pre-War production 1996 County

Planted area (ha)

Production in tons

Production in tons

Production % of Pre-War Figure

Bomi 6,880 9,406 190 2

Bong 40,631 56,413 28,210 50

Grand Bassa 17,479 18,413 4,600 25

Cape Mount 9,749 14,422 720 5

Grand Gedeh 22,663 30,984 1,550 5

Grand Kru 6,690 9,220 460 2

Lofa 38,733 46,009 11,500 25

Margibi 6,888 8,721 2,620 30

Maryland 9,591 13,329 270 2

Montserrado 4,100 5,905 7,640 150

Nimba 57,972 67,565 33.80 50

River Cess 4,411 4,943 100 2

Sinoe 9,875 14,054 2,810 20

Total 235,662 298,574 94.450 32

Source: FAO Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to Liberia (1997)

Table 23: Estimated production of rice in 2005

County Number of farming families

Average yield / ha (MT)

Average yield / family (MT)

Ø 0.6 ha/family

Total production (MT)

Bomi 2,551 0.4 0.24 612.24 Bong 37,736 0.4 0.24 9,056.64 Grand Bassa 18,850 0.4 0.24 4524 Grand Cape Mount 4,572 0.4 0.24 1,097.28 Grand Gedeh 11,515 0.4 0.24 2,763.6 Grand Kru 2,945 0.4 0.24 706.8 Lofa 31,477 0.4 0.24 7,554.48 Margibi 24,117 0.4 0.24 5,788.08



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Maryland 14,864 0.4 0.24 3,567.36 Montserrado 108,366 0.4 0.24 26,007.84 Nimba 62,862 0.4 0.24 15,086.88 River Cess 3,436 0.4 0.24 824.64 Sinoe 8,396 0.4 0.24 2,015.04 River Gee 7,268 0.4 0.24 1,744.32 Gbapolu 13,753 0.4 0.24 3,300.72 Total 352,708 84,649.92

Source: FAO/WFP Crop and Food Security Assessment for Liberia, FAO/WFP 2006

Table 24: Estimated production of cassava in 2005

County Number of

farming families Average yield / ha

(MT) Average yield /

family (MT)

Ø 0.3 ha/family

Total production (MT)

Bomi 2,551 6 1.8 4,592

Bong 37,736 6 1.8 67,925

Grand Bassa 18,850 6 1.8 33,930

Grand Cape Mount 4,572 6 1.8 8,230

Grand Gedeh 11,515 6 1.8 20,727

Grand Kru 2,945 6 1.8 5,301

Lofa 31,477 6 1.8 56,659

Margibi 24,117 6 1.8 43,411

Maryland 14,864 6 1.8 26,755

Montserrado 108,366 6 1.8 195,059

Nimba 62,862 6 1.8 113,152

River Cess 3,436 6 1.8 6,185

Sinoe 8,396 6 1.8 15,113

River Gee 7,268 6 1.8 13,082

Gbapolu 13,753 6 1.8 24,755

Total 352,708 634,874

Source: FAO/WFP Crop and Food Security Assessment for Liberia, FAO/WFP 2006

EC interventions aimed at increasing yields for the main staple foods by

• Seed and tool distribution: successful for increasing yields as otherwise farmers would not have planted or planted less

• Improved seeds: successful as improved seeds did perform better than local seeds. Problem: low sustainability as villages did not establish seed banks (see 5.2.3)

• Development of Inland Valley Swamps: in many (probably even most) cases not successful. In many cases farmers abandoned the developed swamps the very moment project support ceased as they regarded the activity as too labour intensive and technically weak design and technical advice contributed to discouragement. The example from the Concern 2003 Report seems typical for many cases observed and described by stakeholders:

“The level of commitment of the swamp development group has been disappointing. A conflict of interest between the demands of church celebrations in January, the demands of individuals’ farms and general apathy meant that progress, despite the Herculean efforts of the G-Bag technicians, has been slower than anticipated. The physical effort required to carry out the conversion of 5 acres of swamp to managed rice paddies was severely underestimated by the participants. As a lesson learned, actually swamp development micro-projects involve a smaller area (no more than 3 acres) with the option to increase the area later.”194

A short-term TA report from 2010 states that: “The majority of the EC funded projects focus on lowland with higher development potential in order to increase agricultural production in a more sustainable and environmentally appropriate manner. However projects do not seem to make optimum use of existing



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and improved maintenance and management for lowland sites.”

From the five IVS the evaluation team visited in Bong and Nimba counties, four were inactive. Groups stated high labour demand and technical problems as the main reasons for giving in. Local technicians voiced their concern that the timeframe for IVS development was unrealistic. Most NGOs would only initialise the activity without giving time for the farmers to experience and realise the inherent benefits. They pointed out the contradiction between the eight months usually allocated to them for IVS with the timeframe of at least two to three years they think necessary for proper IVS development. Surprisingly recent assessments of failures and successes and sharing of lessons learned do not seem to be practised among stakeholders.

• Training farmers in the utilisation of new agricultural techniques: unsuccessful as farmers did not change their traditional ways of farming. It seems that in many cases the techniques recommended have not been sufficiently tested to convince farmers:

“Project activities should focus on proven, low risk methods of increasing food production and improving food security. Projects should not focus on experimental animal husbandry or crop production practices or crop varieties/breeds of livestock which have not been rigorously tested and subsequently tested and selected through farmer field trials. Food facility project cycles are too short to test and develop unproven technology and this should be strongly discouraged.”195

Another reason is the limited time frame of interventions that is not well adapted to the requirements of a long term increase in agricultural productivity. As the monitoring report for DCI_FOOD/2008/172-568 stated

”The most serious deficiency in design is the lack of realism of trying to increase agricultural production in two years in a manner that can be sustained. Five to ten years would be more realistic.”

This holds true for the majority of food security interventions: targets have a tendency to be unrealistic and are therefore not achievable.

Technical quality problems in many interviews were attributed to the low technical capacities of NGO project staff that was more familiar with relief interventions. Chances for outsourcing technical issues were not taken even though national organisations with expertise were available. Findings of a final project evaluation were confirmed by experts as valid also for other projects: “As a whole, the capacity and expertise of the project staff do not match with the project size and complexity. The initial planning at the time of the project elaboration did to estimate accurately the Human Resources requirements in both quantitative and qualitative aspects. Despite improvements in terms of staff capacity and quantity, the very demanding field work imposed by the development orientation of the project could never reach a sufficient level conducive to quality and impact. For some specific and technical activities or issues, the project and even the organisation did not have the required in-house experience. In such a case as for the fishery activity, expertise should be outsourced from external institutions or consultants. The project understands this need, but the efforts produced to develop such collaboration were not consistent and timely adapted with the requirements.”196

From the side of the EC the shortage of staff in some cases led to delays that hampered smooth implementation.

For example the case of Solidarité: “The original contract was running until end of June 2007. Beginning of 2007, the NGO requested a six-month extension of operations, i.e. until end of 2007. This was agreed by the Monrovia Delegation and the addendum was finalised in April 2007. Unfortunately it has not been signed yet. Apparently the problem lies with a wrong encoding in CRIS not detected on time (the shortage of staff in the Delegation can also explain that).

In the meantime, the NGO has continued to implement the project on the assumption that this addendum had indeed been approved and that the delays in getting the signed copy were just administrative ones. This means that expenditures have been engaged that may not be eligible if the addendum is not signed.”197

“At the beginning of the project implementation, 2 external factors have come up to disturb significantly the project in relation to the original objectives and plans. At the time of the launching of the poultry groups, the bird flu epizooty has pushed the project on the basis of the precaution principle to cancel this activity. At the same time the government of Liberia through the Ministry of Agriculture has issued a new law forbidding the livestock activities in free range. These 2 external elements required the project to reorganize fully the livestock activity. The project decided at this time to inform the donor on these changes although the project objectives on this major component / expected output have remained the same. The late answer from the European Commission Monrovia office, delayed a lot the implementation process for all the livestock activities. Only the fish farming activity began at the onset of the project. For the others the implementation time was reduced from 8 to 16 months.”198

(Assessments based on field observations, reports, focus group discussions and interviews)



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• Indicator 5.2.2: Increase of area of cultivated land Findings at indicator’s level:

Given the very strong correlation between the security situation and the area under cultivation, it can be assumed that the main reasons for increasing the area under cultivation were the end of the fighting and the improvement of the security situation so that people could return to their areas of origin and take up farming again.

The major EC interventions regarding food security aimed at increasing the area of cultivated land mainly through seed and tool distribution to the returning population. There is evidence that supported households were more likely than non-supported to resume farming as access to seeds and tools was regarded as one of the main constraints to farming.

A return to pre-war areas cultivated has been achieved. Today an estimated 190,000 ha are under rice production.199 This could implicate different challenges for the agricultural sector. A few project reports already mentioned that access to land was not always given for the most vulnerable and the CFSNS sees land tenure as becoming an increasingly critical issue with new conflict potential. Population growth rates together with increased agricultural production could exercise a growing pressure on land and lead to unsustainable land utilisation through further shortened fallow periods.


Before the war (1986) the total cultivated area amounted to 538,000 ha, of which 120,000 ha were under commercial estates producing rubber and 376,000 ha land cultivated by smallholder subsistence farmers. Due to the war with the depopulation of the rural areas and the subsequent lack of labour in agriculture, the poor physical condition of the people and the reduction in farm sizes to minimise the risk of loss by theft or destruction, the area under cultivation dropped sharply to about 100,000ha. For 1999 with a relative calm period during the civil strife, the area under production increased quickly to 327,000ha. The FAO mission found a very strong correlation between the security situation and the area under cultivation. In relatively secure counties, agricultural activities were much less affected than in counties where a lot of fighting was going on (FAO, 2006). Less than 10% of the arable land in Liberia is cultivated.

Table 25: Rice production area in Liberia, 1990-2008

Year 1990 2000 2002 2004 2005-2006

2006-2007

2007-2008

Area (ha) 175,000 143,000 120,000 120,000 110,000 152,000 190,000

Source: Liberia National Rice Development Strategy, MoA, February 2009

The CFSNS200 assessed the impact of seed distribution on farming and came up with evidence that households that received external assistance in form of seeds and tools were more likely to have produced crops in 2005 than those households that did not receive that kind of support (82% versus 71%).

The increase of agricultural land is also limited by land tenure issues: “Tenure in the context of access to land is becoming a more and more critical issue in post conflict Liberia.“201 Focus group discussions and interviews confirmed statements in project reports: The distribution of seeds and agricultural tools to returnees, accompanied by food aid up to the first or second harvest did support the resumption of agricultural activities and thus totally increased the area under cultivation. “Overall, the impact of the distribution has been positive for the food security situation of the households involved and their communities. Without the rice seed distribution, the households and communities would have planted no rice, as seed was very scarce in spring 2004. The tools distributed have also been available for other farming activities.”202



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� Indicator 5.2.3: Increased use of improved plant material (seeds and seedlings)


Increasing the use of improved plant material was a central activity of most EC interventions as the poor quality of available seeds and seedlings was regarded as a major constraint to increasing productivity.

The distribution of plant material, which at the time after the conflict was scarce and difficult to access, was relevant for farmers. Coverage and timely availability was good as well as appropriateness and performance of plant material.

Interventions were less successful in setting up functional organisational structures within the village to take care of re-distribution and benefit sharing regarding plant material distribution. After the end of projects village seed banks did not continue, so the available improved plant material is multiplied only by few individuals but not managed as a community asset.


• The coverage and timely availability of improved plant material: NGOs distributed partly improved and partly local seeds and seedlings due to the difficult access to improved plant material. Most of the distributions were timely for the respective planting seasons with only some cases of delayed distributions hampering the planting season. Especially for the immediate post conflict context beneficiaries reported that entire districts were covered by the intervention. In later interventions beneficiaries had to be identified within the communities as the amounts of seeds distributed were continuously reduced and systems for passing on seeds within the community were established.

• The appropriateness and performance of the plant material delivered: Farmers reported that the plant material generally performed well and was appropriate regarding climate conditions, farmers’ priorities, crop requirements, consumption patterns and taste preferences.

• The sustainability of the action including the establishment of village seed banks and training of farmers in seed selection and storage: Even though farmers in many projects received trainings on seed selection and storage and NGOs tried to establish village seed banks to ensure that the improved varieties would be distributed to other farmers within the village and remain available, the sustainability of this activity was low.

Farmers reported that there is a tendency to mix seeds instead of keeping them separate and that seed bank activities do not continue after the end of project mostly because of the low organisational level of the communities. Re-distribution and benefit sharing do not take place after the end of project. Organisational structures created by the project are not mature enough to continue functional.

For the implementation period a project evaluation stated on relevance: ”Anyway, seeds and tools distribution and delivery of agricultural extension services provided by the project are relevant.”203

(Assessment based on project reports, field observation, interviews and focus group discussions)



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� Indicator 5.2.4: Increased livestock population Findings at indicator’s level:

The livestock population was significantly depleted during the war, so that the small ruminant population was almost entirely lost and the rural population was left with very small stocks of poultry only.

Most EC interventions included livestock components into their activity portfolio in order to restock the livestock population as animals have the potential to be an important part of the farming system, serving as “rural saving accounts”, sources of income and for diversifying the local diet. There is no data available on the impact of restocking efforts as projects did not keep track of mortality rates, breeding progress, etc.

Field observations and farmers focus groups indicate that farmers do value livestock interventions, but that only few interventions have successfully contributed to significantly increase the local livestock population due to animal health problems aggravated by the unavailability of veterinary services. Especially the introduction of local and improved pigs seems inappropriate with regards to a competition between human food needs and the needs for feeding the animals. Animal revolving funds did not function in a sustainable manner, so that hardly any animals have been passed on to other beneficiaries, limiting the benefit of the activity to few farmers only.

Data, sources, extracts: CFSNS204 data on livestock population shows the serious depletion of livestock population. In 2006 less than half of the rural population owned chicken, 5% owned goats and 5% owned pigs. Sheep and cattle population is down to almost zero. Animals are important for risk management as they are regarded as a “rural savings account” and can be sold in times of great needs. Furthermore they have a function in rituals, as presents for visitors and are slaughtered for important events. Animal restocking has the potential of increasing income opportunities and diversifying the local diet with protein rich food.

• Appropriateness of choice of animal species, adapted races: EC interventions included livestock distribution of chickens, goats, sheep and pigs. While chickens, goats and sheep seem to be quite appropriate for local conditions, there are serious doubts in relation to the appropriateness of pig breeding.

“The piggery activity has failed in many of these villages because basically people have been struggling for producing their food, and it has been very difficult for them to produce food for the pigs and invest on this development oriented activity.”205

The evaluation team observed successful and less successful pig breeding activities. In some cases it was obvious that competition for food for human consumption and for pig feeding resulted in poorly fed pigs. In the more successful cases it was obvious that the livestock owners were better off farmers who could afford feeding the animals. The activity is not appropriate for the majority of poorer, food insecure households which were the original target groups of EC interventions.

• Availability of access to basic veterinary skills/services and animal health: There are no veterinary skills available in the rural areas neither from government structures nor from private stakeholders. The non-availability of basic veterinary services is one of the main limiting factors regarding livestock activities. Animal diseases are wide-spread and posed a serious risk to livestock interventions. Frequently animal diseases decimated the distributed livestock population and endangered the sustainability of the intervention. The interventions that included a training of village animal health agents as a response to this limitation seem to have partly resolved the problem. Some production groups reported that their animal health worker has successfully treated the animals and health issues could be managed by the groups themselves. There are no data available on animal survival and mortality rates and on the impact of animal health workers on survival rates.

Another issue that arose during the field phase of the evaluation was the effectiveness and sustainability of “animal revolving funds” introduced by some projects. Most animal production groups did not reach the stage of passing on offsprings to other groups because of problems with animal health and mortality and/or because of organisational problems within the groups. Therefore the benefits of the activities remain very limited within the small animal production groups, benefiting only very few farmers, often the better-off ones, who were able to dominate the identification process for beneficiaries.




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� Indicator 5.2.5: Increased connection to road network for market access


Access to markets is crucial for households to purchase food as well as to exchange and sell food products.

Most EC food security interventions incorporate a tertiary road and bridge construction and rehabilitation.206 The utilisation of labour intensive techniques allows for offering income opportunities for the rural poor, often especially female headed households with little income opportunities.

The outcomes and impacts of rural infrastructure interventions are very relevant for rural communities as they significantly facilitate market access.

An unsolved problem is the sustainability regarding the road network maintenance (for details see EQ 7 on infrastructure). There are also some doubts on the quality of road rehabilitation measures carried out by food security interventions that often cannot withstand the first rainy season.


Liberia’s infrastructure is in a very poor condition. Most rural communities are inaccessible by car during the rainy season and regard it as a high priority to connect their villages to the market places. Difficult access to markets has a negative impact on production as transport costs are so high that there are no incentives for the farmers to produce for the market. Most EC food security interventions incorporated tertiary road and bridge construction and rehabilitation measures in order to enhance food security by FFW / CFW measures and establish or re-establish market access for farm products.

• Interventions did increase commercialisation of agricultural products: EC interventions related to rural roads have very visible outcomes and impacts on market access. Wherever roads and bridges have been re-established vehicle access to villages, commercialisation of agricultural products visibly increased and motivated farmers to produce for the market, e.g. vegetables. Some examples were observed, where better access led to the establishment of market days where not only neighbouring villages attend, but traders from Monrovia and the county capitals come with vehicles to purchase products. Farmers give road access a very high priority for village development.

• Interventions decreased access to market costs / improved farmers profits: Even though there are no data on how much access to market costs decreased, farmers do report that costs decreased. Farmers can either sell to traders coming to the village, economising on transport costs or organise their own transport to the bigger markets where they can achieve better prices.


A TA report is critical on the quality of the interventions:

”Several projects include activities to improve and rehabilitate rural infrastructure. Rural Infrastructure activities are generally poorly coordinated. This has resulted in the majority of roads and bridges on farm to market roads failing to meet the requirements of the transport users and the demands of the first rainy season. Farm to market roads must comply with the standard designs and specifications approved by the Infrastructure Implementation Unit (IIU) of the Ministry of Public Works.”207

� Indicator 5.2.6: Decrease of food aid by WFP and INGO


The successful resettlement of returnees and the development of agricultural production gradually reduced the need for food aid.

General food aid decreased, so that in 2007-2008 food assistance for rice decreased to 6% of total rice consumption. WFP decreased food aid distribution from a peak 48,704 MT in 2006 to 18,359 MT in 2009. Focus shifted from food distribution to IDPs, refugees and returnees to targeted distribution programmes, such as school feeding and nutrition programmes as well as to FFW measures to restore rural livelihoods. INGOs correspondingly reduced food aid activities as well.

Interviews and focus group discussions showed that food aid measures tied to agricultural activities have created an expectation for payment on the side of the beneficiaries. As farmers were paid for developing their own land during the emergency and early rehabilitation phase, they expect this support to continue even in the development phase. This is at times hampering development efforts.



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Earthtrend statistical data for 1998-2000 show that Liberia did only produce 56% of its cereal consumption. Imports and food aid amounted to 42.3% with food aid amounting to 18.6% of total cereal consumption. In 2004 food aid amounted to one third of total consumption, confirming other data stating that more than a third of the Liberian population at that time depended on food aid. Food aid figures declined gradually so that in 2007-2008 only 6.02% of total consumption consisted of food aid.

Table 26: Rice production, imports and food assistance in Liberia 2004-2008

Year 2004 2005-2006 2006-2007 2007-2008

Production (MT) 110,000 100,000 152,000 190,000

Production (% of consumption)

36.67 32.26 47.5 57.23

Food Assistance (MT)

100,000 74,000 22,000 20,000

Food Assistance (% of consumption)

33.33 23.87 6.88 6.02

Import (MT) 120,000 160,000 154,000 140,000

Import (% of consumption)

40 51.61 48.13 42.17

Consumption (MT)

300,000 310,000 320,000 332,000

Value US$ m 22 140 170 200

Source: Own calculations and Liberia National Rice Development Strategy, MoA, February 2009

Data on production and consumption though is not always consistent even in government documents. Another survey sees national rice production of 2007/08 only at 40% of total consumption.

“Domestic food production has improved in recent years but remains far below national consumption requirements. In 2007/08, domestic rice production satisfied only about 40 present of total demand and the balance requirements had to be imported at increasingly higher prices.”208

WFP food aid figures reflect the trend of decreasing food aid. While food aid in 2004-2006 was distributed mainly to IDPs, refugees and returnees, today school feeding, targeted nutrition programmes and restoration of sustainable livelihoods through FFW measures prevail.

Table 27: WFP food aid distribution in Liberia, 2004-2009

Year 2004 2006 2007 2008 2009

Distribution (MT)

25,142 48,704 32,797 27,302 18,359

Sources: WFP Standard Project Reports for Liberia 2004, 2008 and 2009

Correspondingly INGOs have shifted their support from emergency measures to longer term development interventions with a minor role of food aid to support activities for enhancing agricultural productivity and market access.

No evidence was found to confirm that food aid distorted markets. It seems that it is rather the government’s policy of keeping the rice prices low that is discouraging commercial rice farming (see 5.2.7).



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� Indicator 5.2.7: Increased availability of local products in national markets


The post-war resumption of agricultural activities has increased the availability of local products in national markets. Rice self-sufficiency is with 57.23% of total consumption back to pre-war levels even though the government policy of keeping the rice prices low to favour urban consumers has decreased the viability of commercial rice cultivation in relation to other cash crops.

An increasing diversification of local products such as vegetables is visible in rural markets. Refined goods are mostly imported.

Data, sources, extracts: Figures show that Liberia is back to pre-war figures regarding the rice self-sufficiency level. While between 2004 and 2006 Liberia could only produce about a third of its rice requirements, production is now at 57.23% of consumption corresponding to 56% around 1999-2000. Imports are 42% of national consumption.209

Table 28: Rice production in Liberia, 1999-2008

Year 1999-2000 2004 2005-2006 2006-2007 2007-2008

Production (MT) 110,000 100,000 152,000 190,000

Production (% of consumption)

56 36.67 32.26 47.5 57.23

Consumption (MT)

300,000 310,000 320,000 332,000

Source: Own calculations and Liberia National Rice Development Strategy, MoA, February 2009

The availability of local rice in the market depends on the season. Right after the harvest local rice is encountered in the local market. Even though farmers regard rice as a crop for consumption rather than a cash crop they do sell parts of the harvest for satisfying household needs. Later in the year, when stocks are low, no local rice is available even in the rural markets. At the time of the evaluation field phase rice on offer at rural markets came from China and Thailand.

“The majority of smallholders participating in focus groups indicated that they view rice production as a necessity for household consumption with only limited potential as a commercial crop. Smallholders prefer to invest their labour and skills in the production of cash crops such as cocoa, palm oil and rubber, which were cited as having a higher cash value than rice. Government policy to maintain low rice prices for urban consumers has further affected the perception of rice as low in commercial viability.”210

Some local produce such as cassava and vegetables are available in the market, more refined products are mostly imported. Agricultural tools in the markets are either imported or produced locally.


� Indicator 5.2.8: Increase in number of months of food stock


The actual number of months of food stock has not changed compared to pre-war levels. This shows that recovery from the crisis situation has been successful, but a long-term increase in food production has not yet taken place.


The number of months of food stock of a household, according to farmers, depends very much on the size of the cultivated land and the labour force available. While some households can be regarded as food secure and manage to stock enough rice for consumption until the next harvest, keep seeds for the next planting season and sell parts of their production, other households run out of stock before the next harvest. Asked for averages farmers responded that most people run out of rice approximately eight months after the last harvest. In farmers perception this is the situation “as it has always been”, i.e. that food stocks have not increased compared to pre-war stock levels. Of course, compared to the crisis situation, when people left their villages and lost all their food stocks completely, changes are significant.

These perceptions correspond with official data on the development of production and consumption (for details see 5.2.6).

(Assessment based on focus group discussions)



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JC 5.2: Increased agricultural productivity in coun ties with EC supported food security programmes

Statement upon JC:

Increasing agricultural productivity was the major focus of EC food security relevant medium to long term interventions. However, it appears that positive changes were mainly due to the improved security situation that allowed farmers to resume their agricultural activities. A significant contribution of EC interventions in this context was the distribution of seeds and tools to the returnees that had lost all their productive assets during the war and clearly benefited from the inputs received thus increasing their production. It contributed to the success of agricultural recovery so that today production is back to pre-war levels.

Medium to long term interventions initiated during a relative calm period with regard to conflict (1998-2001) had to be suspended during the resurgence of fighting and all results that might have been achieved during that period were completely destructed. As almost no long term interventions could be implemented between 2002 and 2004 and right after the conflict quick impact measures prevailed, less attention was paid to long-term measures. However, some long-term perspective interventions were included even from the early relief and rehabilitation phase, but mostly cannot be regarded as sustainable as project intervention periods were too short to render sustainable results.

A couple of factors from the side of EC and the implementing agencies limited impacts of interventions: The staffing situation of the EC Delegation was not favourable for the timely handling of urgent implementation issues that required EC approval. Delays in processes did result in delays in implementation. NGO staff was not prepared to face development activities as their background was relief operations and the NGOs did not sufficiently outsource complex technical tasks such as IVS development.

The tendency to initiate rather complex interventions requiring a high level of community organisation failed in so far that new structures were created, but the abilities to manage them and sometimes even the conviction that innovations would be beneficial could not be established.

EC food security interventions did not yet include support of the development of a policy framework and institutional capacity building for main stakeholders to create structures for long term agricultural development steered by the national government.

As projects did not properly assess the successes and failures of their interventions and the conditions that led to success or failure, an important chance for developing lessons learned in the sector was lost, so it will be difficult to utilise experiences for increasing agricultural productivity in the future.

Targets of food security interventions have in many cases been unrealistic and therefore could not be achieved. Changes in agricultural practices and consequently significant increases in crop yields have so far been negligible.

Overall there is very little visible increase in long-term agricultural productivity that could be attributed to EC interventions.



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JC 5.3: EC food security strategy and other EC poli cies on food aid / food security, gender mainstreaming applied throughout the relief, rehabilitation and development phases

Indicator 5.3.1 EC food security priorities are reflected in programming of interventions


EC food security objectives were overall well reflected in the programming of interventions. There was a clear commitment to focus programmes on the most vulnerable population groups in order to balance development in their favour. As most interventions focused on agricultural production, food aid necessities were to be reduced and long-term development perspectives developed. There were visible efforts to link relief, rehabilitation and development activities and to avoid the transition gap. Programming focused mainly on interventions on the relief and rehabilitation side for an exceptionally long period of time. While interventions regarding food aid and supply with seeds and tools showed good results, little emphasis was put on the strengthening of local structures and capacity building. Accordingly ownership and participation were rather low.

With regard to an integrated approach towards food security the main focus was on access and availability of food. Fewer interventions covered availability, access, utilisation and stability in a balanced way. There was a bias towards quick impact, straightforward interventions. Structural changes necessary for establishing a sustainable framework for food security were not supported as government was not a partner to be counted on in food security interventions during the period under evaluation.

The two available ROM reports from more recent interventions (ROM-FOOD-172-568 and ROM-FOOD-172-566) state problems (C rating) and even serious deficiencies (D rating), indicating that EC supervision of program design quality has not been satisfying in 2008.


Table 29: EC food security priorities

EC food security priorities in post-conflict settings

Uptake in Programming Degree of uptake

Objectives

Promote FS All interventions under the FSBL and FSTP had FS as main focus, several EDF programmes had FS components

Very high

Raise nutrition standard In order to raise nutritional standards, programmes would have had to follow an integrated approach including all aspects of food security. Many interventions focused mainly on availability and access

Medium

Balance development Almost all interventions targeted the most vulnerable population groups in order to include them in economic and social development

Very High

Make food aid superfluous As most interventions targeted the increase of agricultural production they were designed to make food aid superfluous.

High

Establish long term projects Programme development showed a clear shift towards long-term interventions. However, the chance to establish projects with the maximum duration of five years was not taken and the emphasis was more on relief than on development and it is unclear how continuity of interventions was to be secured

Medium

Strengthen / consolidate local institutions and emerging central ones

So far the structural development of local and national institutions was hardly incorporated in interventions

Low

Areas of Action

Food aid Through WFP and ECHO humanitarian relief, high proportion of total commitments

High

Include long-term operations Even ECHO interventions had long-term components, Medium



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maximum duration for long-term operations not fully exploited, clearly development oriented interventions started relatively late, more strategic interventions were not tackled

Supply seeds, tools and other inputs

As this was one of the main constraints for returnees, almost all interventions distributed seeds, tools and other inputs

Very high

Drinking water schemes Only few programmes included drinking water activities, but there were several specific water and sanitation programmes by ECHO not declared as food security projects, listed under WATSAN

Low

Measures to support private sector

Only few programmes included private sector support. The Small-Scale Project (SSP) component of the reintegration programme targeted almost entirely entrepreneurs

Low

Improve early warning systems and storage programmes

Only one intervention included the establishment of a local early warning system, several programmes aimed at supporting local storage, but rather on household level

Low

Integrated Approach

Availability Almost all programmes tackled availability either through food aid or support to domestic production

Very high

Access Many programmes addressed access through supporting income generation and facilitated transport and market infrastructure

High

Utilisation Only few programmes tackled food utilisation and related issues through nutrition and hygiene activities, drinking water supply and early warning systems and addressed individual food distribution within the household

Low

Resilience / Stability Most programmes included stability issues by diversification activities. Few programmes aimed at strengthening communities for increasing self-help capacities

Medium

Actors

Recipient country Almost no inclusion of government structures due to the absence of a functioning state for most of the implementation period

Very low

NGOs Were the main implementers of short, medium and long term interventions

Very high

International organisations FS relevant interventions of WFP, the United Nation’s High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and UNICEF supported

High

Other aspects

Support changes in policy and institutional environment

Programmes were not aiming at changes in policy and institutional environment

Very low

Link humanitarian and relief aid and long-term development

Most humanitarian and relief project included long-term aspects, there were efforts to link long-term development to preceding interventions during programming exercises, but in practice it was often not successful

Medium

Appraisal by direct and indirect impact on the poor

There is almost no evidence of programme appraisal so far. INGOs did not succeed in establishing impact oriented M&E systems and carry out sound impact surveys

Very low

Ownership As implemented through INGOs and International Organisations and little involvement of national and local stakeholders in programme steering a strong ownership could not be expected

Very low

Participatory approach Few programmes strongly involved local structures and beneficiaries in project design, implementation and evaluation

Very low



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Consistent with Code of Conduct for Food Aid

There are no data available on food purchases before 2008. From 2008 onwards purchases are increasingly obtained locally and regionally, in 2009 already under the P4P (Purchase for Progress) local procurement initiative

High

Source: Own presentation, data from EC communications, strategy papers on food security and project documentation

The two available ROM reports criticise the quality of project design:

• Poor log frame quality

• More delivery than learning oriented

• Lack of realism (achievements not possible with the project time frame)

• Lack of clarity of targets

• Limited involvement of stakeholders in project design

• No steering groups to involve stakeholders in management

• Weak in actor and donor coordination insights and planned actions

(ROM-FOOD-172-568)

• The Logical Framework Matrix (LFM) has serious deficiencies in clarity and realism

• Project purpose is unlikely to be attained within a three year period

• Project framework is thinly spread across 5 result areas

• There is no clear phase out or handover strategy

• There is no evidence that stakeholders have been involved in the design of the project

• The project design has not been adapted or made more relevant after 6 months of implementation

• The proposal mentions environmental assessment but does not give detail on critical positive or negative issues

• The proposal does not identify critical gender issues or stress the need for gender disaggregated monitoring and baseline data

• Donor and actor coordination is not mentioned. Actor coordination is vital where efforts by one actor to increase food production can be jeopardised by food hand-outs from another.

(ROM-FOOD-172-566)

Indicator 5.3.2 Particular priorities and challenges of women and girls are reflected in programming of interventions


Liberia ranks as number 87 of 102 countries in the Gender Index of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Women and especially women acting as female heads of households in the rural areas face a lot of constraints.

EC interventions are supposed to mainstream gender into the design and implementation of their programmes. Most interventions involve some analysis of gender issues in the programme context and include activities specifically targeted to women (see table 30). However, there is a lack of gender disaggregated data in project programming, preparation and monitoring, hampering an assessment of the appropriateness of the programming in relation to gender issues. As programming was generally carried out without a detailed gender differentiated beneficiary analysis, the reflection of women’s and girls’ priorities in programming of interventions is not satisfactory.

Lack of household labour was cited as the fourth most significant constraint to agricultural production in the CFSNS. Especially female headed households face serious problems related to labour availability with a direct impact on the area under cultivation and productivity levels.

This is partly reflected in interventions aiming at reducing women’s workload by promoting agro-processing of rice and cassava. On the other hand most interventions do add additional labour to women’s workload and it remains unclear if the benefits of the activity compensate women sufficiently for the labour they have to invest. A number of projects monitor the number of beneficiaries in relation to gender and many state that about 50% and more of the total beneficiaries are female. Some projects introduced quota for women in decision making bodies and trainings to make sure they would be included in decision making processes and in knowledge transfer.

Even though all interventions related to gender through some specific activities targeting women, mainstreaming of gender issues was not consistently applied in the course of interventions.



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Table 30: Women’s priorities with regard to food se curity and the uptake in programming

Women’s priorities with regard to FS Uptake in programming Degree of uptake

Access to resources Include women in rice and cassava cultivation

Offer training in literacy and bookkeeping to women (one project)

Include women in agricultural trainings

Involve women in nutrition and hygiene education

medium

Access to income generating opportunities Encourage women’s groups for vegetable production

Support women’s agro-processing small scale enterprises

Support women’s groups for livestock

Include women in cash-for-work activities

high

Access to decision making bodies Facilitate inclusion of women in decision making bodies

medium

Alleviation of high work-load Some agro-processing activities alleviate women’s workload

Other programme activities add on workload to women

low

Source: Own presentation, data from project documentation and ECHO Gender Evaluation, Liberia case study

The available ROM documentation (ROM-FOOD-172-568 and ROM-FOOD-172-566) states the low inclusion of women in Farmer Resource Centres and the low ratio of female project staff which can be explained with the lower average educational status of women and the fact that women are reluctant to take on field jobs that require mobility and bear security risks for women moving around on their own given the high incidences of gender-based violence. The monitor marked both interventions with the OECD Gender Policy Marker G- which means that the interventions do not have the potential to positively influence gender equity. G-0 is only acceptable in exceptional cases and clearly indicates that programme design with regard to gender needs to be improved.

� Indicator 5.3.3: Phasing-in / phasing-out of assistance and choice of assistance instruments based on reliable information and sound, gender-sensitive analysis (e.g. information is obtained by using the Integrated Food Security and Humanitarian Phase Classification or other relevant data assessments)


In comparison to some other post-conflict countries (e.g. Sierra Leone, Angola, Mozambique) humanitarian food security interventions are continuing for a relatively long period of time. ECHO argued that this extension of its phase out was due to the severe delays in programming and contracting BL and EDF funds resulting from the lack of EC staff for programme operation. There was concern to avoid a transition gap and lose assets and gains generated by humanitarian aid. It seems that phasing-in and out of assistance and the choice of assistance instruments was not so much based on information and analysis, but rather on organisational constraints the EC was facing.

According to a questionnaire on food security issues in the framework of a thematic evaluation on food security in 2004 the Liberian delegation stated that:

• there was no dialogue with ministries related to food aid and food security • there were no consultations with other actors working in the food aid and food security area • There was no specific EC food aid and food security strategy or programme for Liberia

designed since the start of the civil war in 1990.



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The fact that there was only one Official in the EC office in Monrovia supported by an Administrative and Technical Local Agent (ALAT) and that food security experts with a responsibility for Liberia were based in Niger and later on in Sierra Leone and were hardly able to allocate time to Liberia were mentioned to explain the lack of strategic planning capacity.

Phasing out of humanitarian programmes is foreseen for 2011. The next elections are seen as a natural exit point as well as a test of stability and progress.


“This means that the management of the EC FS Budget Line programme in Liberia presently lies nearly entirely with the Contract Agent based in Freetown, which is far from being practical and efficient (the job description of the FS CA schedules a technical and methodological support to the Liberia Delegation and not a direct operational management role).

The lack of FS dedicated staff in the Liberia Delegation will negatively affect the preparation and management of the FSTP as it will depend on the availability of the FS CA.”211

� Indicator 5.3.4: Mechanisms and procedures exist to coordinate programming and planning between FSBL, FSTP, EDF, ECHO and other budget line funded interventions with food security relevant activities


Donor and government coordination in food security has been weak. The monthly meetings of the Agriculture Coordination Committee headed by the MoA are assessed by many stakeholders as lacking effectiveness. Efforts for improving donor sector coordination are recent. During the period under evaluation the EC was perceived as almost “invisible” in the food security sector. This is improving considerably since CAs for Food Security took up their assignments in Liberia in 2010.

There is little evidence for mechanisms and procedures to coordinate programming and planning between the different EC stakeholders in food security. The CSP 2004 regarded food security as an issue ECHO, the FSBL and the NSA-BL would take care of and hardly addressed the issue at all. It did not become clear during the course of the evaluation how FSBL, FSTP and EDF coordinated programming and planning.

All stakeholders assessed the coordination and cooperation between ECHO and other EC interventions as very good, even though informal. ECHO was part of the evaluation committee for the FSBL calls for proposals and tried to arrange for continuity of ECHO initiated food security interventions. Sometimes ECHO made up for budget line funding gaps in order to secure results achieved so far. This at times resulted in rather “bizarre funding histories”, e.g. food security interventions implemented by Solidarité in Bong county took off with a FSBL funding, then consolidated results with ECHO funding and are currently working with funds from the NSA-BL. This highlights the problems implementing agencies are facing when they try to ensure long-term interventions. ECHO flexibility supported these efforts; other instruments proved to be too inflexible and faced too many delays. The Delegation in Monrovia tried to fend off more food security budget line support to Liberia in 2007/2008 as additional programmes at that time could not be handled by the completely overburdened Delegation.

Overall it seems that the lack of an EC food security strategy for Liberia considerably weakened planning and programming efforts. The CA based in Sierra Leone (2007 to 2009) could not allocate additional time for this task, so that up to today there is a growing portfolio without a clear strategy behind.

The lack of coordination in planning and programming of EC funded programmes led to duplications and overlap thus reducing efficiency of interventions. One example constitutes the food facility interventions implemented partly by the UN agencies and partly by GTZ in Lofa county. Both stakeholders planned swamp development and irrigation scheme interventions at the same sites, so that there was a competition on who would be carrying out the intervention and long planning processes proved to be in vain as sites had to be changed again in order not to interfere with the other agencies interventions.

The fact that two sector experts for food security have recently been allocated to the Delegation should improve this situation as well as improve the analysis and documentation of lessons learned (see 5.3.5)



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Programming and planning of food security relevant activities have to be looked at with regards to donor and government coordination, coordination between the different EC stakeholders and between EC funded programmes. Donor and government coordination: ”The call for proposals used evaluation criteria for feasibility including donor coordination. Unfortunately donor coordination is weak or non existent in this sector and this has not improved with increased allocation of resources to the sector. The Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) published a “Guide for the coordination of agricultural activities in Liberia” in January 2006. However the recommendations and mechanisms outlined in this proposal have not been implemented. The contract agent should be pro-active in improving donor coordination at a national and field level. A donor sector coordination meeting was arranged by USAID in late February 2010 and was attended by the contract agent.”212

”As from late 2008, the Delegation was present in most relevant donor and sector coordination fora thanks to improved staff levels. Participation in food security coordination mechanisms still needs to be improved.”

Coordination between EC stakeholders: “Two large rehabilitation programmes providing post-humanitarian aid were funded between 1997 and 2001. The €25m “Reintegration Programme for Returnees and Displaced People in Liberia” financed under Article 255, targeted the following sectors: humanitarian assistance, restoration of basic health services and the provision of essential drugs; food security; improved access to clean water and sanitation; and repairs to essential infrastructure. In parallel, ECHO and the Food Security budgetary line as well as some projects financed by the NGOs co-financing provided important support, focusing on humanitarian assistance, food security and rehabilitation.”213

”The Global Plan 2008 states strongly the commitment to ensuring LRRD between DG ECHO and the development services of the Commission in the context of the 9th and 10th EDF. There is good coordination and cooperation in Monrovia with the EC Delegation and there seem to have been opportunities for DG ECHO to provide input or comment on strategy. However, overall the challenge of transition (as in many post-conflict countries) remains a structural challenge”214

“Due to a management capacity severely reduced by understaffing, the Delegation in Monrovia had to advise against financing new projects under budget lines. The only exceptions are emergency aid (ECHO) the budget of which was increased for 2008 (to EUR 18.2 m), partly with the aim of compensating to some extent for slowed down / delayed activities under the EDF, and food security.”215 “The preparation of a strategy for FSTP is foreseen during the first part of 2008 with support from the food security CA based in Sierra Leone.”216 Coordination between EC funded programmes: ”There has already been serious duplication and overlap of food facility funded activities between EC grants and also between grants awarded by other donors including USAID. Improved coordination must aim to reduce duplication of activities and promote more effective use of resources within the sector.”217

”The four UN agencies collaborating under the joint UN programme need to urgently and drastically improve coordination between agencies within the sector if the programme is to achieve its expected results on time and contribute to sustainable improvements in agriculture and food security.”218

“The original and valuable notion of a joint program seems to have put aside when it came to the preparation of the individual proposals. It is clear that there was very little coordination between the agencies during that period. It is also strange that one agency fields a whole team for the preparation of their own proposal without sharing that resource with the other three agencies. That really puts in question the role of the Food Security & Nutrition Secretariat and is a concern for the cohesion of the implementation of the program.”219

“In operational terms, the FS CA’s concerns in terms of lack of coordination with the two other EC projects in Bong County (Trocaire FS project and Small/Medium Grant EDF project) were reiterated to the Country Director of Solidarités. Further feed-back on this issue was promised.”



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� Indicator 5.3.5: Analysis and documentation of lessons learned from food security interventions


Apparently analysis and documentation of lessons learned from food security interventions did hardly take place, most probably due to the fact that the delegation was highly understaffed and no food security technical expert was available in-country at that time to monitor programme implementation and organise lessons learned events. During some years food security TA based in Niger and in Sierra Leone covered Liberia also, but the mission reports from the Freetown TA show that he had almost no time available for monitoring field visits.220 In contrast to these shortcomings, all stakeholders agreed that ECHO monitoring and joint analysis was much more effective, due to the presence of an ECHO representative who regularly visited the intervention sites and was up to date with regards to implementation problems.

Implementing agencies did little to analyse and document lessons learned. At project level outcome indicators were not properly assessed in baseline studies, monitoring exercises and impact surveys, so that there is little evidence on which impacts can be expected from different interventions. The lack of monitoring by the implementing partner in one case (Trocaire FOOD/2005/113-599) delayed the identification of serious implementation problems not reported by the local partners, so that in the end the intervention could not be satisfactorily finalised. The Trocaire example221, at first regarded as a promising and innovative set-up, could today serve as an example where the long chain of intermediaries makes management, monitoring and handing on of lessons learned difficult.

Shortcomings in implementation quality in some programmes, such as badly designed inland valley swamps, were at times only identified by an end of project evaluation and in most cases probably never detected at all.

Given the very similar nature and approach of most interventions with differences in implementation modalities, a lessons learned approach could have been highly beneficial for the development of interventions. An exchange platform consisting of the implementing agencies of EC food security interventions under the supervision and guidance of the EC, as sometimes established by the EC in other countries, e.g. in Mozambique) could have streamlined interventions and fostered the standardisation of objectives and indicators in order to facilitate assessments and comparisons. Implementing agencies were left to a high degree on their own with little monitoring from the EC. This means that a lot of learning opportunities were missed out.

EC knowledge management in the food security sector is weak. The evaluation team had in many cases to approach the implementing NGOs for obtaining basic documentation as the EC did not have these documents or did not know that they were available in the EC archives. A first step for improving knowledge management was to contract an experienced consultant with more than a decade of country experience and EC implementation experience in the sector to introduce the new food security staff to the history and reality of the EC food security portfolio.


There is no evidence yet that EC interventions analysed and documented their lessons learned in a way that it would benefit actors at national level and / or future programming. The available ROM documentation (ROM-FOOD-172-568 and ROM-FOOD-172-566)222 for more recent programmes criticises that the call for proposals did not stress the need for a learning approach and therefore the pilot nature and the necessity to generate and disseminate lessons learned have not been included into project design. Programmes are focused almost exclusively on implementation and there is no actor coordination. The fact that there are no EC assessment documents on food security interventions shows that at national level there has been no effort to bring together and assess the experiences of the different projects. A thematic strategy for food security was to be designed in 2008 that would have brought together the implementation experiences, but apparently this did not happen.

“Monitoring missions remain very few due to lack of human resources, endless meetings in the capital and the need to have continuity of visa circuit. One monitoring mission did take place on food security budget lines together with a food security contractual agent based in Sierra Leone, whose TORs also cover Liberia. The time and budget sharing between Sierra Leone and Liberia must be put in stone to allow for him to act as Operational Initiator for these programs and undertake supervision missions every six months. Apart from this one mission, very little time could be awarded to close monitoring and site visits due to the understaffing. The proposed HQ led ROM (Price Water House Coopers) has to be postponed for the third time due to the impossibility of the limited Delegation staff to accompany such an exercise.”223 “However, the number of missions remained few due to capacity constraints and with the food security portfolio substantially growing (number of individual projects will quadruple during 2009) adequate monitoring of projects will not be possible without a reasonable increase of staff resources, i.e. a full food security post in the



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Delegation Monrovia.”224 Out of the six missions the CA from Freetown was able to conduct between March 2007 and May 2009, only the first mission included a field visit to ongoing projects.225 ”The majority of the EC funded projects focus on lowland with higher development potential in order to increase agricultural production in a more sustainable and environmentally appropriate manner. However projects do not seem to make optimum use of existing knowledge and existing technical manuals for the identification, selection, design, layout, water control and improved maintenance and management of lowland sites. Use of manuals such as the Safe and Effective Development in Conflict (SEDC) swamp development manual developed in the 1980’s would ensure more consistent and appropriate development of the more productive lowlands. Failure to understand and adhere to these best practices will at best limit the productivity of lowlands and could lead to the destruction of valuable farm land by introducing iron toxicity and other problems associated with poor swamp developments. These manuals should be sourced by project managers and/or the contract agent and made available to food facility practitioners. Liberia and Liberian farmers can ill afford the continued proliferation of ineffective and inappropriate agricultural practices. EC funded projects must be more rigorous in ensuring that projects have the necessary technical capacity and strictly adhere to established best practices. CARI and the African Rice Centre/WARDA are cooperating to implement a regional rice improvement programme and EC funded projects should show linkages with activities planned and underway within the rice sub-sector with particular relevance to lowland development.”226 ”Regular field monitoring and joint assessments to the projects under the EC portfolio are essential to timely improvements and modifications that are usually required for succesful project cycle management of agriculture and food security projects in Liberia. The recent ECHO programme and EC food security programme of the late 1990’s established effective national support teams utilising the skills and knowledge of experienced staff...and, in the case of the food security programme, contributed significantly to improving coordination of the sector.”227 ”A Monitoring and Evaluation system with clear objectives and comprehensive data collection and analysis procedures has never been developed. Practical adjustments and improvements have been done during the implementation, but it has been insufficient due to a lack of strategic thinking and capacity on the M&E process. The lack of a proper information system based on a clear strategy and framework prevented especially an in-depth analysis of the project outcomes and impact.”228

JC 5.3: EC food security strategy and other EC poli cies on food aid / food security, gender mainstreaming applied throughout the relief, rehabilitation and development phases

Statement upon JC:

There were visible efforts to link relief, rehabilitation and development throughout the intervention period. The efforts to avoid the transition gap between emergency interventions and development resulted in the extension of the relief and rehabilitation period due to delays in the programming and implementation of long-term support. Phasing in and out seems to have depended mainly on organisational constraints rather than on a sound analysis.

Overall it can be stated that the main policies and strategies on food aid and food security were applied in food security interventions in Liberia. While there was a strong emphasis on relief and rehabilitation, some long-term interventions were included early in humanitarian relief interventions. With regard to an integrated food security approach, the focus was on availability and access of food, while few interventions aimed at balancing the main components of food security. Little attention was paid yet to participation and ownership and to the support of structural changes as well as the support of local institutions. A specific EC food security strategy for Liberia was supposed to be worked out, but has not been elaborated up to today, a fact that is negatively influencing planning and programming efforts.

Due to a lack of technical assistance to implementing partners and a lack of monitoring caused by severe staff shortages within the Delegation, there was no actor coordination established and many opportunities for learning missed out. The lack of coordination in planning and programming led to duplications and overlap, reducing implementation efficiency. The lack of supervision in programming resulted in projects that have problems and serious deficiencies in project design.

The non-availability of long term support for food security, because of delays in getting longer term instruments in place, made it very difficult for implementing agencies to sustain and consolidate development oriented interventions.

Gender mainstreaming was not comprehensively applied in programming and implementation. Even though there was awareness on gender issues, gender specific priorities were not properly assessed and planning was not based on gender disaggregated data and hence could not be sufficiently



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gender specific. All interventions did target women with specific activities and some projects had more than 50% female beneficiaries, but it is not evident that gender was mainstreamed, i.e. taken consistently into account through all stages of planning and implementation.

As two food security experts, one with several years of experience in the region, have taken up their assignments with the EC in 2010 should improve the strategic planning as well as coordination and monitoring.



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1.6 Income Generation EQ6: In how far has the EC successfully contributed to sustainably increasing and improving the quality of income generating opportunities in urban and rural areas, in particular for Liberia’s youth, returnees and displaced people and ex-combatants?

Judgment Criterion 6.1: Increased availability of E C-financed “quick-impact” income generating opportunities (including cash-for-work, public works programmes),

� Indicator 6.1.1: # of jobs created by EC-financed cash-for-work and other quick-impact programmes within 6 months / 1 year / 2 years after signing of Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)

Findings at indicator’s level: In 2005, three years after signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), EC support helped to create jobs for approximately 4,000 individuals, including both “permanent” positions in private businesses and temporary or “casual” jobs connected to the labour intensive construction of infrastructure. However, the number of people who could be provided with employment due to EC support in the years following 2005 sank relatively rapidly: In 2006, only approximately 2,000 people still received EC-supported employment and income. In 2007 and 2008, these numbers likely sank further, to about 1,000 people in 2007 and an estimated 600 people in 2008. This significant decrease over time was due firstly to the limited sustainability of jobs in private businesses that had been created through the EDF8 “Reintegration Programme for Returnees and Displaced People”: In 2006, only a few months after programme closure, merely 55% of the initially created positions still existed. It is likely that these losses continued in the subsequent years due to the absence of continued support to fledgling, newly created businesses and an exceedingly narrow and exclusive focus on “recurring costs” as the only possible sustainability threat during project selection. The weak needs and poverty orientation of the project selection process and the misplaced use of grants as funding instruments likely have exacerbated these shortcomings. The Community Rehabilitation Component of the “Post-Conflict Rehabilitation and Capacity Building Programme” that was intended to be the “follow-up” programme of the EDF8 Reintegration Programme” was even less effective than its predecessor in the creation of employment generating opportunities. In 2007 and 2008 combined, the Community Rehabilitation Component of the PCRCBP ensured full-time employment equivalent of approximately 150 people229.

Data, sources, extracts : Supporting evidence:

• For the time of signing of the CPA, two EC-financed programmes offered assistance that was relevant for income generation:

� The “Reintegration Programme for Returnees and Displaced People” (EDF8), in particular its “Small Scale Projects” that were implemented between 2005 and 2006

� The “Post-Conflict Rehabilitation and Capacity Building Programme (EDF9), in particular the labour-intensive small, medium and large-scale investment projects of its “Community Rehabilitation Component” (CRC).

Reintegration programme (EDF8)

• The figures of how many permanent and temporary jobs have been created through the programme differ significantly among sources and are generally deemed to be rather unreliable:

� An implementation report of the Project Management Unit (PMU) for the programme puts the total number of permanent positions created at 3,659.230

� The evaluation of the programme of June 2006 estimates that overall 2419 permanent jobs had been created (Klein, et.al, 2006, p.168 (Annex 7.3).

Post-Conflict Rehabilitation and Capacity Building Programme (PCRCBP), EDF9; Community Rehabilitation Component:

• The CRC component of the PCRCBP meant to create income opportunities through community participation in various small, medium and large-scale investment projects: “CRC project design was geared to maximise employment using labour based approach and direct involvement of the communities. The 49 completed small grants projects and the four successful medium grants projects and all the large scale infrastructure projects generated different levels of employment which injected cash directly into the community economy”231



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• “CRC commenced operations in Liberia on 26th June 2005 and closed on the 31st of March 2009”232

� Implementation period for small, medium and large scale projects was 2/2007 – 2/2009, i.e. two years. [one could make the assumption that job creation was divided between these two years more or less equally, i.e. 50% of the jobs in the period 2/2007 – 2/2008; and the remaining 50% in the period 3/2008 – 2/2009.


• EC contributions to DDRR interventions (three financial contributions to the UNDP DDRR trust fund and additional “parallel” programmes for employment creation, implemented by two NGOs (Community Empowerment and Skills Development - CESD, Liberia Opportunities Industrialisation Centre - LOIC) supported primarily the vocational training of ex-combatants and related “proxy” beneficiaries. No support for actual “job-placement” was offered under these programmes. Therefore, it is difficult to establish, how many trainees actually succeeded in securing employment after their training ended.233

� “As the UN observes in its own Mid-term Evaluation of the DDR programs in Liberia "the assumption that economic reintegration leads to social reintegration does not hold true. The challenge to integrate the students graduating from the vocational training programs was left to community leaders and neither the EC nor UNDP provided any significant assistance in this process.”234

� “The EC VET program neither made provisions for the tracing of former beneficiaries, nor for business extensions services or job placement after the graduation of the students. While both LOIC and CESD stated in their project proposal that they would offer these services, there is no indication that either organization did so on any scale after the end of the EC.”235

� “UNDP had elaborated an overall "Programme Framework" (the UN version of a log frame), which however seems to have been considered only for the 3rd Contribution Agreement, containing 6 results, with related activities and indicators. Overall objective mentioned is "Consolidation of National Security through economic and social reintegration"; a possible project objective refers "to equip XCs with productive skills and options for employment". At a closer look, results (and related activities) only address the training (including the tool kit), while nothing is planned "to equip...XCs with options for employment."236

Reintegration programme (EDF8)

• At the time of the final evaluation, only about 55% of the originally created jobs still seemed to be in place. Assuming the original number taken from the PMU report is correct, this would mean that within 3 months of programme closure (programme was closed in March 2006); only about 2,018 of the original 3,659 jobs remained.

• The visits of individual projects during the field phase (see Table 31) support the desk phase findings of low sustainability and an insufficient needs orientation of SSP income generation support:

� In particular the experience with the Kokoyah Bakery, – initially heralded as a “promising project” – and the Parker Oil Farm Project illustrate the sustainability threats projects of this kind can face (see Table 31 below).

� The Parker Oil Farm and the Morris Rubber Farm illustrate how an insufficient needs orientation (i.e. low project relevance) can contribute to an inefficient use of EC support.

� In the case of the Morris Rubber Farm, it does not seem justified that the EC subsidised the operating costs of an already established and viable business with “free”, i.e. grant money. It is reasonable to assume that the proprietor would have opened the 300 acres of mature rubber trees to production regardless of the availability of EC support.

� The same criticism applies in principle to the Parker Oil Farm project. Here, EC goo money was used to temporarily open a previously defunct business operation. After the intervention, palm oily was only produced for 1 year. Production was halted because a tractor that had been used to haul the harvested palm leaves to the processing facility broke down237. The fact that “free” grant money had been used to jump-start the oil production left the proprietor without any incentive to seek solutions for this hurdle. This illustrates why grants are inappropriate instruments to promote business creation, in particular when the recipients are well established business people with relatively easy access to alternative credit-based sources of financing.



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Table 31: Selected income-relevant Small Scale Proj ects (SSPs) of the EDF8 Reintegration Programme visited during the field phase of the Cou ntry Level Evaluation

Name of Small Scale Project (SSP) and Description Status of SSP in 2010

Establishment of Kokoyah Bakery (Contract No. 8.ACP.LBR.02/40-143) Purpose: “Providing sustainable income” for one family; ultimately meant to provide unspecified “benefits” for 140 beneficiaries238.

Intended results: construction of bakery building and oven, well, equipment (flour mixer machine, dough roller), basic financial management training, employment of 12 bakers, cashiers and 6 sales persons.

Implementation: By private contractor239

Budget: US$ 24,969.00 (grant)

Duration: 12 weeks

Bakery was closed, the brother of the original beneficiary was living in the building with his family. Brother stated that the bakery had only been in operation for 1 day, i.e. the opening day. The flour mixer broke down at the end of the first day, and the bakery closed240. Therefore, the bakery has not been in operation for the last 4 years.

In 2006, the bakery had still been considered to be a “promising project” by the final evaluation of the Reintegration programme.241

Number of jobs remaining in 2010: None

Liberian Tennis Federation Tennis Court Construction (Contract No. 8.ACP.LBR.02/40 – 89) Purpose: “[...] Increase the total number of tennis courts available to the Liberia Tennis Federation so as to improve its eligibility to engage in and host international tennis tournament”. “[...] many internationally sponsored tournaments which could be brought to Liberia provided the nation builds its capacity by way of improving its infrastructures for tennis games. [...] Let us take one of the games sponsored by the International Tennis Confederation; the Davies Cup”

Intended results: a new tennis court in fence, complete with flood lights, and modern viewing stand; membership drive to attract fresh talents; coaches will be hired permanently by the federation; area surrounding the tennis court will kept clean; number of spectators to tennis games will increase.

Budget: US$ 24,222.00 (grant)

Duration: 8 weeks

Tennis court, fence and viewing stand had been built and seem to be used, but were in poor condition.

Overall, relevance and needs orientation of tennis courts for Liberia in 2005 is highly questionable. According to former project staff, the original intention had been to use the courts as a source for “income generation” for the Liberian Tennis Federation. However, fees were never collected.

The stated purpose for the tennis court (see on left: “improve Liberia’s eligibility for hosting international tournaments”) seems seriously out of touch with the realities of post-conflict Liberia. If anything, this project seems to demonstrate the challenges of the EC to ensure the appropriate use of its funds in and around 2005. Although the project “took a long time to get approved”242 it is hard to believe that it was approved at all.

Number of jobs in 2010: None

Morris Rubber Farm, Support to under brushing and taping of new rubber trees (Contract No. 8.ACP.LBR.02/40)

Purpose: “Underbrush and open for the first time 400 acres of newly establish rubber farm within the Morris farm thereby increasing the income earning capacity of the farm owners and the community at large.”

Intended results: 400 acres of matured rubber farm brushed and cleaned using community based casual labour; recruitment of at least 65 workers recruited and orientated; 3 rapid latex collection tanks constructed; farm brushing, cleaning and rubber harvesting and collection materials delivered to the project / farm site; farm-based tapers recruited and based on farm.

Budget: US$ 23,699 (grant)

Intended number of jobs to be created: 65 casual workers; 20 permanent tappers (in addition to the regular farm staff and farmer family)

Duration: 12 weeks

Farm is a large scale industrial rubber operation243 that is being heralded as a Liberian entrepreneurial success story, among other things by President Johnson Sirleaf. Area that was opened for rubber tapping accounts for approximately 9% of the total area under rubber production on the farm. “Morris American Rubber”, the mother company of the farm, has started to produce “tire grade rubber” on-site, using an IMF-backed credit from the Liberian Bank for Development and Investment (LBDI).

Number of jobs in 2010: Approximately 170 tappers are needed to tap the rubber trees on the 400 acres244, receiving a daily wage of US$ 3.75.

Relevance and needs orientation of project: The Morris Rubber Farm and the Morris American Rubber Company are industrial operations of considerable size. The EC funds were used to fund part of the operations of the business. Arguably, the company would have made these investments (i.e. opening up of already planted, matured rubber trees for production) with or without EC support.

Parker Oil Palm Farm Rehabilitation Project (Contract No. 8.ACP.LBR.02/40 – 34)

Purpose: No project description available

Intended Results: Brushing, pruning and ring weeding

Farm had stopped production in 2005/06, after “one year of operation”. It had not been open during the war, was only re-opened when EC assistance arrived in 2004/05. Oil palms are relatively old



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and of entire farm (300 acres); procurement of tools, payment of 150 casual workers at least once (for brushing); 50 casual workers paid off for harvesting and processing during project period; 50 permanent workers identified and recruited; refurnishment of oil processing mill & repair of equipment

Budget: US$ 23,095 (grant)

Intended number of jobs created: 50 permanent jobs; 200 casual jobs (with estimated one-time duration of 2-3 months for brushing and harvesting)

Duration: 20 weeks

(according to information of former workers approximately 30 – 40 years old245). No sign posted to identify the EC support to the farm. Farm buildings, equipment and processing facilities were neglected and dilapidated.

Number of jobs in 2010: None, farm had not been operational for the last 4 years. During one year of production, the farm employed approximately 50 to 75 permanent workers246. Former workers indicated that they had received a daily wage of L$100 (US$ 1.40); Former manager claims daily wage of L$ 200 (US$ 2.80)247.

Pipeline Women Bakery Development Project (Contract No. 8.ACP.LBR.02/40 – 44)

Purpose: No project description available.

Intended results: Construction of bakery building: “concrete walls raised to roof level (20%), roof and ceiling structure constructed, inner and outer walls and floor plastered, doors and windows installed, electrical and plumbing materials purchased and installed, generator purchased and installed, painting and finishing complete, hiring of seven additional bakers and 4 sale agents”

Implementation: Not specified in available documents

Budget / Contract Amount: US$ 7,655.00 (grant)

Duration: 12 weeks

Bakery was still operating; bread had been baked on day of visit. Bakery was employing 4 women and four young men, who received salaries ranging from L$ 900 (about US$ 12.0) to L$ 3,000 (about US$ 40.0) per month248.

However, bakery building (constructed with EC support) was in bad physical condition and appeared unkempt, with holes in the storage room, exposing bread to rain and pests.

According to bakery owner, bakery was in difficult financial situation, with revenues from bread sale often not sufficient to buy ingredients in bulk and difficulties in getting credit. Husband of owner, who had been in charge of business side operation, had died around time of building completion. Widow has had difficulties keeping the bakery financially afloat.

Number of jobs remaining in 2010: 4 women; 4 young men

The following factors suggest that these kinds of challenges might well have affected also other, similar SSPs:

• The implementation period of individual SSPs was extremely short, ranging only from 12 to 20 weeks. This short duration did not allow to adequately accompany SSP beneficiaries throughout the set-up of their business, also in view of possible challenges they might encounter.

• The programme offered no follow up support to help the newly created businesses with overcoming possible problems they might have faced in the first months and years of their existence. Once a project was finished, the beneficiaries were essentially left to their own devices in solving possible problems, such as broken down machines or the lack of sufficient business knowledge.

• Moreover, the issue of “sustainability” was only considered from a purely financial point of view during project selection, i.e. with regard to the consideration of recurrent costs in the project proposal249. The appraisal did not include any information on the individual or organisational capacities of the beneficiaries or any other in-depth consideration of other factors that might determine the sustained success of the supported operations.

County Development Programme (EDF9):

• Due to delays in programme identification and programming (see EQ10, judgment criterion 10.1), implementation of income-relevant programme components had not yet started by the end of 2009. Therefore, the County Development Programme (CDP) has not yet made any contribution to the improvement of income generating opportunities in Liberia.

Rough estimates of the total number of jobs / emplo yment opportunities created:

• Table 32 shows rough estimates for the number of jobs created by the two programmes (EDF8 Reintegration; EDF9 “Post-Conflict Rehabilitation”). The numbers have to be treated with extreme caution, and should only be seen as indications of the “order of magnitude” at which the EC-assistance was able to create income generating opportunities.

� NOTE: The figures in Table 32 do not include any project staff / positions that have been created directly in connection with the implementation of support projects or programmes, such as Liberian staff of NGOs, etc.



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Table 32: Rough estimates of number directly create d permanent / casual jobs, 2005 – 2008.

Calendar Year Program / Program Component

2005 2006 2007 2008

EDF8 Reintegration (Small Scale Projects, “Permanent” Jobs) 3,659250 2,018251 1,110252 610253

EDF8 Reintegration (Small Scale Projects, “Casual" Jobs)254 297 99 0 0

Post-Conflict Rehabilitation (“Casual” Jobs)255 0 0 77 77

Total 3,956 2,117 1,186 687

Estimated "Cash-inflow" per year (at US$3.26 / day 256) $12,907 $6,907 $3,871 $2,241

• The figures suggest that income EC-supported generating opportunities would have become scarcer in the later years of EC assistance, i.e. between 2007 and 2008, mainly because

� The EDF8 Reintegration Programme had come to an end in 3/2006; and the jobs that had been created were of limited sustainability (between the end of 2005 and June 2006, only approximately 55% of the originally created jobs still existed).

� The EDF9 “Post-Conflict Rehabilitation” Programme only contributed a significantly smaller number of jobs (in the form of “cash-for-work” in the construction of small scale and medium scale infrastructure as part of the “Community Rehabilitation Component” of the Programme).

• This means that between 2005 and 2007, the EC contribution to income generation is likely to have decreased significantly, almost certainly by over 50%; and possibly by over 70%.

• No numbers are available for the period before 2005.

� Indicator 6.1.2: % of youth / ex-combatants / returnees / internally displaced people in EC-financed “quick-impact” Income Generating Activities (IGA) within 6 months / 1 year / 2 years after signing of CPA

Findings at indicator’s level: In relation to the total number of individuals in the vulnerable groups (ex-combatants, returnees, IDPs, youth), the numbers of people that did receive permanent or casual employment are very small. Based on the figures for 2005 (see Indicator 6.1.1), the number of people placed in jobs account for a maximum of approximately 1% of all the internally displaced people257. In relation to the total number of people who were expected to return to Liberia from surrounding countries258, the EC-created number of jobs would have been able to merely reach about 1.5% of all returnees. Had all EC-supported jobs gone to ex-combatants, the share of EC-supported workers would have accounted for 7.5% of all ex-fighters. In relation to the entire Liberian population between 15 and 64, the number of EC-created jobs would have provided employment for approximately 0.2% of all individuals in that group.

Data, sources, extracts : NOTE: It is difficult to get reliable demographic data on Liberia’s population. All figures should therefore be treated with extreme caution, and should only be seen as an indication of an overall “order of magnitude” of any EC-contribution to income generating opportunities in Liberia.


• A number of EC-financed interventions that focus on income generation exist:

� The “Reintegration Programme for Returnees and Displaced People” (EDF8), in particular its “Small Scale Projects” that were implemented between 2005 and 2006

� The “Post-Conflict Rehabilitation and Capacity Building Programme (EDF9), in particular the labour-intensive small, medium and large-scale investment projects of its “Community Rehabilitation Component” (CRC).


• The number of jobs created is very low, in relation to the overall need, i.e. the number of youth, returnees, ex-combatants, IDPs who in principle are in need of employment:

� It is not possible to ascertain, how the estimated number of “jobs” created (see Indicator 6.1.1) is distributed over the different demographic groups, i.e. “youth”, “IDPs”, “returnees”, “ex-combatants”, etc. The following numbers therefore only show, what percentage of the total number of persons in each of these groups had received employment, if all of the EC-created jobs in the year 2005 had been filled by individuals from that particular group.



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Table 33: Comparison of number of jobs created with EC-support in 2005 to various demographic groups

Demographic Group

Estimated number of Individuals in

demographic group in 2004/05

“If all EC-financed jobs in 2005 had gone to individuals from

this group, this would account for X% of all people in this

group”

Returnees 250,000 1.58%

Ex-combatants 53,000 7.46%

Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) 490,000 0.81%

Liberians between 15 - 64 1,757,290 0.23%

� Indicator 6.1.3: Difference in income levels with / without EC-financed quick-impact IGAs

Findings at indicator’s level: Employment in EC-financed investment projects259 generated daily wages that ranged from US$ 2.0 to US$ 3.0. However, the created employment was often only temporary (i.e. limited to one year or a few years at best).

Data, sources, extracts : • Information from the Community Rehabilitation Component (CRC) of the Post-Conflict Rehabilitation and

Capacity Building Component suggests that small, medium and large scale infrastructure projects have injected a total of US$125,800 over the approximately two years that those project were being implemented.

• This translates to approximately US$42,000 per county260, at an average rate of about US$1,740 per month.

• The final report of the CRC indicates that the programme funded a total of 38,560 “employer days” with the total amount.

� This translates into a daily wage of US$3.26.

• Jobs created by the Small Scale Project (SSP) component of the EDF8 Reintegration Programme for Returnees and Displaced People have translated into similar daily wages:

� According to information from former employees of the Parker Oil Farm project, labourers would receive daily wages of about US$ 2 to US$3 (LR$100 to 200). This information was confirmed by documentation for this project that assumed a daily wage of initially US$2 and eventually US$3, when the lower wage had proven insufficient to attract enough workers.

� Employees of the Pipeline Road Women’s Bakery earned between US$ 0.5 per day and US$ 2.0 per day261.

JC 6.1: Increased availability of EC-financed “quic k-impact” income generating opportunities (including cash-for-work, public work s programmes),

Statement upon JC: EC-financed support of income generating opportunities helped to create about 4,000 permanent and temporary positions in 2005, and a decreasing numbers of positions in the following years, i.e. from 2006 until 2008. The programme that made the biggest initial EC contribution to creating income generating opportunities was the EDF8 Reintegration Programme for Returnees and Displaced Persons. Over 90% of all EC-financed income generating opportunities were created by that programme. However, the created positions were not sustainable: Nearly 50% of the initially created jobs disappeared again within two years of the end of the project. Contributing factors were the absence of continued support to the fledgling, newly created businesses and an exceedingly narrow and exclusive focus on “recurring costs” as the only possible sustainability threat during project selection. A weak needs and poverty orientation of the project selection process and the misplaced use of grants as private sector funding instruments are likely to have exacerbated these shortcomings. The “follow-up” programme, the “Community Rehabilitation Component” of the “Post-Conflict Rehabilitation and Capacity Building Programme” was even less effective in this regard, having created the equivalent of full-time employment equivalent for only 77 people per year for 2007



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and 2008.

In relation to the total number of individuals in the vulnerable groups (ex-combatants, returnees, IDPs, youth), the numbers of people that did receive permanent or casual employment are still very small. Based on the figures for 2005 (see Indicator 6.1.1), the number of people placed in jobs account for a maximum of approximately 1% of all the internally displaced people262. In relation to the total number of people who were expected to return to Liberia from surrounding countries263, the EC-created number of jobs would have been able to merely reach about 1.5% of all returnees. Had all EC-supported jobs gone to ex-combatants, the share of EC-supported workers would have accounted for 7.5% of all ex-fighters. In relation to the entire Liberian population between 15 and 64, the number of EC-created jobs would have provided employment for approximately 0.2% of all individuals in that group.

Between 2005 and 2008, EC-supported employment generated approximately US$ 2.0 to US$ 3.0 in daily wages for those working in these positions.

Judgment Criterion 6.2: EC-financed interventions h elped to increase access to productive assets and inputs for target groups

� Indicator 6.2.1: Increase in presence of credit institutions in targeted communities (Alternative: Increase in # of EC-financed credit institutions that are operating and providing credit)

Findings at indicator’s level: The EC did not make a contribution to increasing availability of credit and credit institutions in communities. The only programme that was meant to offer this type of support, the EDF8 Reintegration Programme for Returnees and Displaced People, did not implement any of the originally intended activities, to a large extent due to time pressure after the programmes significant delay during the conflict years between 2001 and 2003.



• Only one EC-financed programme intended to provide support to credit / micro-finance (see below). However, the corresponding component of that programme eventually was not implemented.

Reintegration Programme for Returnees and Displaced People:

• The programme did not provide support to micro-credit schemes or any other kind of project that could have increased community access to finance, although the establishment of micro-credit schemes is specifically mentioned in the Financing Agreement for the Programme:

� Excerpt from the FA: “Implementation of a micro credit scheme. This will be done along the following lines: first, a call for proposals will be held. On this basis the Commission will negotiate a series of contracts with NGOs that have acquired experience in the sector. These NGOs will manage small amounts of capital in conjunction with local community groups. The amount of capital made available will depend on appraisal case by case of the experience and programme presentation by the partner. A TA with good track record in this sector will be recruited within the local community TA team to advise the Commission and to supervise and control these projects.”264

� The final evaluation of the programme is lamenting the absence of any kind of micro-finance scheme and is recommending the introduction of this kind of scheme in any follow-up programme.

� One of the main factors that contributed to the absence of the micro-credit scheme from the programme seems to have been time pressure: When operations resumed after the end of hostilities in 2003, the programme was much delayed and programme managers did not consider it to be feasible le to organise a micro-credit scheme under these conditions265, although the EC Delegation had specifically requested the inclusion of a micro-credit scheme into the programme from the team leader of the programme.

NOTE: None of the other EC-financed programmes in the period from 1999 to 2008 contained a micro-finance or micro-credit component. The “Substantial Completion Report” of the “Second Liberia Rehabilitation Programme”266 mentions the “provision of production credit to subsistence farmers” and the “provision of credit to vulnerable groups for income generation”. However, these activities are not really “micro-credit” activities, but consist rather of the mere distribution of productive assets, such as tools or seeds.



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� Indicator 6.2.2: Increase in proportion of households with access to credit (Alternative: Increase in % of households serviced by EC-financed credit institutions)

Findings at indicator’s level: The EC did not offer support in the area of credit or finance (see Indicator 6.2.2) and therefore did not have any effect on the number of households with access to credit in Liberia.


Detracting evidence: • As explained above (Indicator 6.2.1), none of the EC-financed programmes in the period 1999 – 2008

actually supported micro-credit or micro-finance schemes that could have had any effect on the availability of credit to Liberian households. The planned micro-credit scheme under the EDF8 Reintegration Programme for Returnees and Displaced People was never implemented.

� Indicator 6.2.3: Increase in proportion of households with improved cultivation equipment/ tools

Findings at indicator’s level: Apart from food security interventions (see EQ5 on food security), the EC made the largest contribution to improving the proportion of households with improved cultivation equipment or other kinds of tools through its 2nd and 3rd contribution to the UNDP DDRR trust fund. Approximately 40% (an absolute number of 5,750 individuals) of all ex-combatants who had gone through the trust-fund sponsored vocational skills training received tool kits at the end of their training that were meant to enable them to use their newly acquired skills for income generation purposes. Despite a number of problems and delays in the procurement and distribution of these toolkits, the recipients appreciated this support.


Supporting evidence: • One EC-financed programme supported the provision of tools and equipment for the purpose of income

generation, i.e. the contributions of the EC to the DDRR trust fund (UNDP-managed):

� In the logic of the programme, “the provision of tool kits is an important component of this support which enables program graduates to use the skills obtained for gainful employment” (UNDP, 2007a). EC-financing was used to provide US$150 tool kits to a total of 5,750 trainees, who had gone through vocational training under Liberia’s DDRR programme (see table 34).

� The number of 5,750 trainees / ex-combatants who received the tool kits with EC-funding represents about 40% of all the ex-combatants who have received vocational skills training financed by the UNDP DDRR trust fund (Transtec, 2007, p.15).

� Recipients of the kits were largely positive about the tool kits they received, although less positive than about the training courses that qualified them for the use of these tools: 74.7 present of trainees rating the tool kits as "very good" or "good"267.


• The procurement and distribution of tool kits under the DDRR trust fund programme was affected by some delays: “However there have been long delays in procuring the materials and some of the participants interviewed who graduated two months ago from training are still expecting their toolkits. While in some cases IPs are also to blame for such a situation (e.g. a poultry training course decided to sacrifice the hens given the avian bird flu risk, and finally gave pigs to the graduates…), there is one thing that needs to be remembered for ex-combatants : never make promises that are not kept on timely basis”268



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Table 34: Overview of tools and cultivation equipme nt provided through EC-financed programmes

Programme Tools / Equipment provided

2nd Liberia Rehabilitation Programme (EDF8)

• Several inputs in agriculture, aquaculture with relevance to food security.

• All of these inputs were made between 1996 and 2001.

Reintegration Programme for Returnees and Displaced People (EDF8)

• Number of “Small Scale Projects” (SSPs) focusing on agricultural production. SSPs helped to repair existing cultivation equipment and to provide new tools. Low sustainability of supported projects.

Post-Conflict Rehabilitation and Capacity Building Programme – Community Rehabilitation Component (EDF9)

• No document provision of tools / equipment to local communities, i.e. in connection with the EC-financed small, medium and large scale infrastructure projects

Post-Conflict Rehabilitation and Capacity Building Programme – DDRR

• EC-contributions to the UNDP DDRR trust fund were used to purchase and distribute “tool kits” for the various trades that ex-combatants received training in:

� “2nd Contribution”: Toolkits for approximately 400 trainees / ex-combatants, each valued at US$150. Total value of EC-contribution: US$62,530 (€52,108)269

� “3rd Contribution”: Toolkits for approximately 5,350 trainees / ex-combatants, each valued at US$150. Total value of EC contribution of tool kits: US$1.07m (€887,101).

NOTE: In addition to the above-mentioned programmes, the EDF funds and funds from thematic budget lines (FSBL) also were used to support food security and other humanitarian interventions. Although these also might have implications for income generation, they are being treated in EQ5 on Food Security and EQ4 on “LRRD”.

� Indicator 6.2.4: Increase in average cultivated area for EC target groups

Findings at indicator’s level: After 2003, i.e. the signing of the CPA, the only EC-financed programme outside of EC Food Security and humanitarian assistance that offered support for the rehabilitation of agricultural land was the EDF8 Reintegration Programme for Returnees and Displaced People. Under its “Small Scale Project” (SSP) facility, the programme helped to rehabilitate a total of 23,000 acres of tree crop plantations and rubber tree plantation as cash crops, which represents approximately 0.5% of Liberia’s land area that is being cultivated on a permanent basis (i.e. land with “permanent crops”). Unfortunately, in many cases, the supported plantations seem to be in bad condition, even just a short while after programme closure, despite the previous EC support. In addition, the selection criteria did neither specifically consider the socio-economic status of applicants nor mention and IDP or returnee specific concerns, with the result that proprietors of at least some of the supported farms fell clearly outside of the target group of returnees and IDPs.



• The PMU claims that the programme helped to implement approximately 100 agricultural projects under its “Small Scale Project” (SSP) facility. With these 100 projects, the programme:

� Rehabilitated 13,058 acres of tree crops plantations

� Rehabilitated 9,938 acres of rubber tree plantations.

� The SSP component of the EDF8 Reintegration Programme therefore helped to rehabilitate a total of approximately 23,000 acres (approximately 93km2),270 representing about 0.5% of Liberia’s land with “permanent crops”.

• Rubber plantations in relatively remote areas that had received support seemed to be maintained “relatively well”:

� “[P]lantations were better maintained in Bong and Nimba, areas far away from Monrovia where the owner was mostly living on the farm”271



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• Condition of supported rubber plantations often poor, even only a short time after programme came to an end:

� “[M]any rubber plantations (slaughter tapping by illegal tappers during the war) even after receiving grants within the SSP's are in a very bad shape, tree stumps are lying around, tappers have not been adequately trained and 'spoil the trees.”272 Poorly maintained plantations were mainly located in Montserrado, Bomi and in Margibi, counties, i.e. “close to Monrovia where in 80% of the cases the owner of the plantations is not living on the farm.”273

� The final evaluation of the EFD8 Reintegration Programme estimated “that 30-40 % of the visited tree plantations are not sustainable and might face serious problems in due course.”274

• According to the rationale of the Reintegration Programme, its “Local Community Development” (LCD) component was meant to “contribute to the improvement of livelihoods of returnees and internally displaced people.”275 Although it is not possible to conclusively determine which groups benefitted primarily from the rehabilitation of this land276, there are a number of factors that indicate that needs-based targeting in the SSP component has been weak:

� The selection criteria for individual SSPs277 do not specifically consider the socio-economic status of applicants. Proposals were merely evaluated based on the extent to which they “clearly expressed and demonstrated [...] the linkage between the project and the particular needs and constraints of the local community”. This was a very broad criterion that did not mention any IDP or returnee specific concerns and thus left a lot of room for the programme to select SSPs from a wider pool of proposals.

� At least some of the tree farms that were eventually selected for support are owned by members of well-established and well-off Liberian families that clearly fall outside of the group of IDPs and returnees. The Parker Oil Farm and the Morris Rubber Farm278 are two examples that illustrate this circumstance279. In both cases, any benefit for IDP’s or returnees would have been indirect and would have depended on the willingness of the proprietors to employ workers from either of these groups and would have accrued in the form of wages (see Judgment Criterion 6.1), not in an improved access to productive assets.

NOTE: Interventions financed by the EC Food Security Thematic Budget Line (FSBL) and humanitarian support implemented by ECHO are not considered under this question. Instead, they are treated in EQ5 (Food Security) and also indirectly in EQ3 (LRRD).

� Indicator 6.2.5: Increased proportion of household with access to the cash economy


In particular EC-financed road projects succeeded in improving the access to cash for the communities along the new road. With transportation infrastructure particularly weak in Liberia, the creation of improved access to markets provided villagers with the means to make the transition away from mere subsistence agriculture to a mixed system, where surplus products could be sold for a small cash-income. Thanks to the inflow of cash, community members were able to buy their own vehicles, send children to college in Monrovia, establish savings schemes and to renovate existing houses or build new houses. Other “income generating projects”, such as the ones under the EDF8 Reintegration programme, often targeted beneficiaries who already had been integrated into the cash economy.


• EC-financed road (Suakoko-Yaendewon) helped residents along the road to move beyond subsistence agriculture and to enter the cash-economy:

� Before construction of the road, access to Suakoko from Yaendewon was severely restricted, with only a footpath connecting the village to the nearest road that led to Suakoko, the place of the market. As a result, villagers would routinely only go to the market once a week, walking along a footpath to the next town, and then, if available, with motorcycle taxi to Suakoko. The trip would take 4 hours one way.

� It was not possible to haul any excess agriculture products to the market, because no transport vehicles were available to read the village. A lot of food would spoil in the village.

� The road has cut the travel time down to 30 minutes, depending on the availability of transport. Now, motorcycle taxis go all the way to Yaendewon. Since the road was completed, villagers started to go to Yaendewon more often, to sell their goods, but also in case somebody in the village fell ill.

� Yaendewon itself has become a market place (the large number of market stalls that are scattered all throughout the village confirm this statement). Now, Yaendewon residents do not have to go to Suakoko anymore to sell their products, they can do it directly in their own village.

� People point to a number of changes in the village that were possible thanks to the infusion of cash into



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the village:

� There is a car in the village that can be used by villagers. Villagers also have the needed money to have the car repaired, in case it breaks down.

� Many villagers started to build new houses with some of the money they earned by selling their products.

� Children of at least two villagers had been sent to Monrovia to attend secondary education. School fees were being paid with the money from the marketing activities.

� The women of the village were able to start a savings club to periodically collect money and to make disbursements individual members on a rotating basis. (Focus Groups with villagers (men and women), Yaendewon, Bong County).


• Sustainability of many “income generating projects” too limited to improve access of beneficiaries to cash economy in the long term.

• Selection and targeting procedures also tended to favour individuals who already were part of the cash economy and used the EC resources merely to finance operating or expansion costs of existing businesses (see also Judgment Criterion 6.2; Indicator 6.2.4).

JC 6.2: EC-financed interventions helped to increas e access to productive assets and inputs for target groups

Statement upon JC: EC support after 2003 (i.e., after the signing of the CPA) made only a relatively small contribution to increasing the access of vulnerable groups (i.e. IDPs, returnees, ex-combatants) to productive assets. Most significantly, the EC did not offer any assistance to increase the availability of credit in rural communities that could have allowed beneficiaries to finance any update of physical assets on their own volition. Outside of the field of DDRR, the only other significant contribution made with respect to productive assets was the rehabilitation of approximately 93 square kilometres (23,000 acres) of rubber and fruit tree plantations, also under the EDF8 Reintegration Programme. This area represents about 0.5% of Liberia’s land area with permanent crops. Unfortunately, IDP and returnee specific targeting of this programme component was weak. At least some of the supported tree farms were in the hands of well-established Americo-Liberian families. In these cases, benefits for IDPs, returnees and youth accrued only indirectly, i.e. through the payment of wages, and did not help to improve the access of the IDPs, returnees and youth to productive assets and inputs. Many of the supported plantations, especially those in relative proximity to Monrovia and with “absentee owners” seemed to remain in fairly poor conditions, despite EC support. The condition of supported plantations in more remote areas (e.g. Bong and Nimba Counties) was better. Overall, the EC practice to provide free grant money meant that the supported farm proprietors had neither strong incentives to ascertain the profitability of the investments before the fact nor good reasons to recoup the invested amounts after the projects, i.e. by capitalising on the improved assets. This allowed proprietors to discontinue farm production in reaction to relatively minor operational hurdles, such as the breakdown of individual pieces of equipment.

The EC financed the procurement of toolkits for approximately 40% (5,750) of all demobilised ex-combatants who had chosen vocational training to aid in the economic reintegration into their communities. The tool kits represented a monetary value of approximately €940,000. This support was appreciated by the majority of the recipients, despite several problems and delays in the distribution of the kits.



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Judgment Criterion 6.3: EC-financed interventions i mproved access to skill-building opportunities for target groups

� Indicator 6.3.1: Increased % of youth / ex-combatants / returnees with vocational degree (formal and non-formal) supported by EC

Findings at indicator’s level: In particular EC contributions to the UNDP DDRR trust fund seem to have helped to improve the educational status of ex-combatants, i.e. their access to vocational training and other skill-building opportunities.

Data, sources, extracts : "Several evaluations and ex-combatant surveys, conducted by various stakeholders since 2006, confirm that the DDRR programme, with financing through the EC 3rd contribution, has made a significant contribution to economic and social reintegration by providing ex-combatants with marketable skills, knowledge and formal education."280

Findings on the socio-economic situation of ex-combatants:

Employment: 25% of the sample of ex-combatants reported that they were unemployed. The findings show a strong entry into the formal employment sector by the DDRR program completers as compared with the non-participants.

Occupations: 28% of the respondents indicated that they were farmers.281 The next three most often reported occupations were “student” (17%), “petty trader” and “home duties” (both at 11%).

Education 51% of the sample population reported having a junior high or better education while only 18% reported that they never attended school.

Source: Compiled from UNDP: Key Findings from the Nation Wide Survey of Ex-combatants in Liberia, 2006c, p.3

� Indicator 6.3.2: Increased # of youth / ex-combatants / returnees enrolled in EC-financed skill-building activities (vocational schools, apprenticeship, etc.)

Findings at indicator’s level: UNICEF provided skills training and apprenticeship to a total of 3.106 children, thereof 2.043 male and 1-063 female participants. The NCDDRR reported that almost 11% of the disarmed combatants were children.

In addition, funds from EC contributions to the UNDP managed DDRR trust fund was used to place ex-combatants into vocational training institutions and other training providers.


Supporting evidence: "A total of 11.780 children (9.042 boys and 2.738 girls) were demobilised through the disarmament and demobilisation programme that was completed in 2004. Of these, 11.773 children were reunified with their families. The rest were placed under temporary foster care arrangements."282

Through the UNICEF support a total of 3.280 children enrolled for training. From these, 2.043 male and 1.063 female participants completed the training and graduated from the skills placement and apprenticeship placements. UNICEF states that the EU funds contributed to a 60% of the whole training programmes supported by the UN agency.

"78% of the graduates report that their incomes had improved as a result of the training. The children were working both, individuals and in groups. 44% of the children interviewed were in groups (susu or cooperatives). The assessment also shows that 7% of the children had registered businesses. ... Half of the children (50%) despite doing business were back in school.”283

Detracting evidence: "Funding support for systematic follow-up of the trainees and for mentoring and coaching graduates who wanted to set up businesses was inadequate. Reaching child mothers and retaining them in the reintegration programmes was complex, as these girls had a number of problems that needed to be addressed at the same time to time."284



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„... many women and children, if they were not able to qualify as combatants by presenting an arm, whether theirs or not, were able to benefit from lax criteria on being associated with armed groups. ... However, the manipulation of lists and the lack of prior information disproportionately harmed women combatants, perhaps a majority of whom were left out of the process.”285

"During the first phase only 424 women disarmed and 1,404 children as compared to 11,296 adult men. Percentage wise women represented only 3% of 13,125 people disarmed, and children 11%. In phase II with a total of 51,469 disarmed, the percentage of women rose to 21% (with 5,310 children still representing around 10%), and in phase III of a total of 38,425 women represented 29% of the total number of people disarmed. From virtual exclusion in the first phase the number of women exploded to 29% in the final phase, showing the difficulties of the screening process and the understanding of the eligibility criteria.”286

JC 6.3: EC-financed interventions improved access t o skill-building opportunities for target groups

Statement upon JC: In particular EC support of the DDRR trust fund and also some of the parallel programmes, i.e. the UNICEF CAFF programme have helped to improve access to skill-building opportunities of ex-combatants and children associated with fighting forces. The European Commission did not offer skill-building support outside of the DDRR programmes. Women and youth were initially underrepresented in the pool of DDRR applicants, i.e. in particular in the first two phases of the DDRR process. This meant that during the years immediately following the conflict, women and also children and youth were at a significant disadvantage when it came to access to skill-building opportunities.

Judgment Criterion 6.4: Environmental concerns flow into planning and implementation of EC-financed income generation ini tiatives

� Indicator 6.4.1: EC-financed projects aiming at income generation have conducted / are conducting environmental impact assessments

Findings at indicator’s level: EIAs are only mentioned as a regular practice for one component of one programme, i.e. the agricultural “Small Scale Projects” of the EDF8 Reintegration Programme for Returnees and Displaced Persons. According to information from the TA team, the possible environmental effects of SSPs are assessed during the pre-qualification visits; and in case of systemic effects on the environment (e.g. increased demand for firewood), certain “countermeasures” would be taken and monitored (e.g. “sensitisation” for the importance of planting trees). However, even for this programme, the practice of conducting EIAs does not seem to be widely established; neither the PMU nor the evaluation mentions anything in this regard.

None progress reports or evaluations of the other relevant programmes287 make any mention of EIAs or discuss the effects of income generating activities on the environment.


Reintegration Programme for Returnees and Displaced Persons (EDF8)

• The final report of the Interface Partners for the Implementation of Agricultural Small Scale Projects (SSPs) of the “Local Community Development” Component claims that the TA conducts Environmental Impact Assessments before projects are designed (i.e. during pre-qualification visits)

� For example, the report states that “[i]n the case of Fisheries projects funded under the programme for example, impact assessment reveals that there will be an overwhelming demand for fire wood to process the fish”, which led the TA to emphasise “sensitisation programmes on replanting the vegetation/trees around the environment to maintain the balance” and to “monitor to ensure compliance.”288



• Neither the programme evaluation not the three-year completion report of the programme PMU makes any



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mention of the practice of conducting Environmental Impact Assessment or of adjusting programme / project planning on the basis of any such assessments.

Post-Conflict Rehabilitation and Capacity Building Programme – Community Rehabilitation

• The final report for the Community Rehabilitation Component makes no mention of environmental monitoring or impact assessments.289

County Development Programme (EDF9)

• Neither the inception report for the Technical Assistance to the Implementation of the County Development Programme nor the first programme estimate (PE) make any mention of the importance of assessing effects of income generating activities on the environment (EIAs).290

� Indicator 6.4.2: M&E systems are designed to track the effects of the financed

interventions on the natural environment


Only the final report of the EDF8 Reintegration Programme notes the negative environment effects of large-scale tree monocultures on the natural environment and suggests to the EC to consider these effects in their selection of worthy investments. However, no data are offered to underscore the claim of negative environmental effects. None of the other programmes, i.e. related progress reports and evaluations, make any mention of data collected to track the effects of the financed income generating activities on the natural environment.



• The final report of the TA to support the implementation of agricultural SSPs notes the negative environmental impacts of large-scale tree monocultures that also would affect the quality of life of Liberians living in those areas. The report encourages the EC to consider these negative impacts and to “reorient its funding to palm-oil project investments which create better employment opportunities than those generated by the pre-civil war type of oil palm monopoly plantations”291



• The final report of the TA supporting the implementation of agricultural SSPs does not offer any monitoring data on the environmental effects of EC support to large-scale palm oil cultivation, and thus makes it difficult for the EC to act on the claim that past support might have had significant adverse environmental effects.292

Post-Conflict Rehabilitation and Capacity Building Programme – Community Rehabilitation

• The final report for the Community Rehabilitation Component makes no mention of environmental monitoring or impact assessments.293


• Neither the inception report for the Technical Assistance to the Implementation of the County Development Programme nor the first programme estimate make any mention of the importance of monitoring environmental effects of income generating activities financed under the programme.294

� Indicator 6.4.3: Data on environmental changes used to revise implementation of EC

financed interventions, where necessary


No documented cases of programme or project adjustments to respond to environmental changes brought about by EC-financed projects.

Data, sources, extracts : No data or information was found to suggest that EC-financed projects or programmes were changed or adapted as a response to findings of positive or negative environmental changes from the interventions.



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JC 6.4: Environmental concerns flow into planning a nd implementation of EC-financed income generation initiatives

Statement upon JC:

The lack of regular Environmental Impact Assessments in most programmes that support income generating activities in Liberia, along with the absence of evidence for any environmental monitoring suggest that environmental concerns play a very small role in the planning and implementation of EC-financed income generating activities. The only exceptions to this overall picture seem to be the small scale projects that had been funded under the EDF8 Reintegration Programme for Returnees and Displaced Persons and certain projects financed under the Food Security Budget Line. Here, programme documents contained both references to ex-ante EIAs and ex-post consideration of adverse effects on the environment. However, even here, the level of detail provided was very low.



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1.7 Infrastructure EQ7: In how far has EC support contributed to the reconstruction or expansion of social and economic infrastructure in Liberia, including power, roads, water and sanitation?

Judgment Criterion 7.1: Health facilities in EC-sup ported areas in good condition

� Indicator 7.1.1: Increase in the number of rehabilitated / reconstructed health facilities

Findings at indicator’s level: The European Commission financed the construction and rehabilitation of a considerable number of health facilities in the years from 1996 to 2000, under the Second Rehabilitation Programme that had been launched to respond to the needs of refugees and IDPs displaced by the violent conflict and civil war at that time. The programme funded the reconstruction of 18 clinics in three counties (Grand Bassa, Montserrado and Sinoe) in those years. In the years following the signing of the CPA in 2003, the Commission contribution to the physical rehabilitation of health infrastructure declined considerably. The Post-Conflict Rehabilitation and Capacity Building Programme / CRC funded the rehabilitation or construction of only 6 health facilities, which includes the construction of nurse’s quarters295.

A positive example for a highly sustainable impact of the EC's contribution is the Phebe hospital, where the complete water infrastructure has been constructed with EU funds (mainly through ECHO contributions). The hospital is even able to produce their own medical infusions and distribute them to other hospitals in Liberia.

Data, sources, extracts: Second Rehabilitation Programme – Health Facilities (1996 – 2000)

Table 35: Rehabilitated Health Facilities, Second R ehabilitation Programme, 1996 - 2000 296

Source: Agrisystems Limited, 2001, p. 54.

Reintegration Programme for Returnees and Displaced Persons:

The health component of the programme provided a series of inputs to the improvement of access to health care services. It is not clear at this point; however, to what extent these included investments in the rehabilitation of physical health infrastructure. The services that were provided include:

Technical Assistance to the National Drug Service, working on a cost-recovery scheme.

Technical Assistance to monitor NGO implementation of health projects.

Support to Phebe Hospital

Funding of a revolving fund to finance the National Drug Service (NDS) and additional TA to the NDS.

Post-Conflict Rehabilitation and Capacity Building Programme / CRC:



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Through small and medium grant financing, the programme helped to provide six new health facilities within the targeted counties (Nimba, Lofa). Table 36 lists the 3 health facilities that are mentioned in the final report of the CRC programme. It is not clear where the discrepancy of the 6 facilities mentioned in the main body of the report and the 3 facilities mentioned in the Annex of that same report originates from.

The final report of the contractor estimates that this has reduced travelling time to basic health services to an average of 4 hours; an improvement of about 50%.297

Table 36: Clinics and other health-related faciliti es constructed by the CRC / PCRCBP

Project Implementing Partner Period Cost Location

Wormbuwonbu Clinic Construction Project

Fassavolu Citizen Development Association

Jun 3- Oct 4 2007

10,789.00 Wormbuwon Town, Kolahun District, Lofa

Kparyaquelleh Clinic Construction Project

Gbarlain Bu-Gna Development Association

June 3 – Oct 2 2007

11,205.00 Kparyaquelle Town, Salayea District, Lofa

Karnplay Nurses’ Quarter Construction Project

Karnplay City Development Council

Feb. 15 – May 10, 2007

11,780.00 Karnplay City, Gbehlay District, Nimba

Source: Cardno Agrisystems, 2009, Annex 8.

General remarks on the indicators 7.1.2 to 7.1.5: The team assumed that more statistical data on the improvement of the health situation for specific target groups could be acquired during the field phase. It got clear then that the government has no sufficient capacities to conduct nation-wide assessments nor has a functioning system for health statistics been implemented. Officially reported or estimated numbers vary widely from independent assessment, where available. The given answers to the indicators therefore rely more on information retrieved in interviews and site visits and have no representative character nor are they sample-based.

� Indicator 7.1.2: Reduced # of patients per health facility

Findings at indicator’s level: Liberia has seen a dramatic destruction of its health infrastructure during the war period. The few remaining facilities had to cope with an extreme demand and provided mainly emergency assistance. The construction of new clinics, hospitals and rural health centres has improved the coverage and the quality of the services provided, although the coverage is still insufficient and the demand for health services is higher than what the existing structures can cope with. Consequently, the number of patients per health facility has not reduced, but increased. However, the quality of services provided has increased at the same time as a result of the reconstruction of existing facilities and the improvement of services provided by professional health staff.

Data, sources, extracts : The team conducted a field visit to the Phebe hospital in Bong county and was able to assess the improvements of the physical infrastructure that was done with EC support. As a result of the improved conditions at the clinic, the number of patients for this specific hospital has increased, not decreased, as other medical facilities in the province and in surrounding provinces are not available or only provide a very basic service.298

The same phenomena could be identified for hospitals in Monrovia, where due to the improved services of newly constructed clinics the number of patients increased.299 This phenomenon is based on the simple fact the creation of health facilities leads to an increased number of patients per facility as long as the quotient between demand and supply is imbalanced, as the provision of services can still not cope with the high demand.

� Indicator 7.1.3: Increased immunization coverage among one-year olds

Findings at indicator’s level: A key problem for the analysis is the unreliability of data and information on the existing immunization coverage in Liberia. The immunization coverage has been increased as a result of immunization campaigns of the donor community, in particular through the largest immunization campaign against Yellow Fever ever conducted in Liberia by UNICEF. The campaign targeted around 90% of the population and was implemented with the help of over 2.000 health teams that gave injections in schools, community centres and clinics.

The government is still not on the position to provide sufficient immunization coverage for Liberia's



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population. In 2008, only a total of 4% of routine EPI vaccines were financed by the GoL. Only the support of the donor community can actually guarantee basic immunization coverage for the indicator target group.

Data, sources, extracts : Phebe hospital reported generally a larger number of immunizations undertaken for children around the age of one during the last years, although no specific datasets or statistics could be provided. The total number of immunizations could theoretically be calculated on the basis of the number of vaccines provided by the hospital's own pharmacy, but these data were not at hand. The gap between country-reported data and independent survey data was particularly wide in Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Niger, and Pakistan. In some of these countries, such as Niger and Mali, officially reported DTP3 coverage was almost 100%, while survey data for these countries showed that immunization coverage was closer to 50%. "We don’t know exactly why there is such a striking gap between the survey data and the country-reported data when it comes to over reporting - or in some cases under reporting - the number of additional immunizations," said Stephen Lim, co-author of the study. "It could be due to incorrect or incomplete recording in health centres or pressure on health care workers to meet supervisors’ targets for immunizations. What we do know is that there is a clear correlation between when those gaps start to widen and when GAVI started funding these countries."300 The WHO and UNICEF data for the immunization coverage for Liberia show a similar mismatch between officially reported statistics and WHO/UNICEF estimated data. It is also important to understand that the official as well as WHO/UNICEF data are based on estimates, created through sampling. 301 Estimates show an increase in immunization coverage, although for specific immunizations no data was generated to assess infant's immunization. Statistical data on the Immunization rate for 1-year old children in Liberia: 302

Source: UNICEF



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� Indicator 7.1.4: Increased % of children who received anti-malarial treatment for fever

Findings at indicator’s level: Liberia has been one of eight countries that are tackled by the 1, 2 billion USD worth Anti-Malaria Initiative. Additionally, the country receives 37 million USD to fight malaria in the framework of the Global Fund to fight Aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria. Thus, it is extremely difficult for the team to attribute the EC's contribution to the reconstruction of the health infrastructure with the improvement of anti-malaria treatments for children with fever. Indicators show that only about 17% of children with symptoms receive an adequate therapy within 24 hours of onset of fever. The lack of access to health facilities and the use of traditional medicine in rural areas without clinics or access to health centres complicates the estimation of given improvement or decline of the situation. What can be assumed is an improvement of treatment in Monrovia, based on the simple fact that more facilities with an improved service actually exist.

Data, sources, extracts : The 2009 MIS showed that only 17% of children under-five received an artemisinin-based combination therapy

(ACT) within 24 hours of onset of fever. Currently, only 45%1

of the population has access to a public facility where ACTs are stocked. Chloroquine is still widely available in private facilities and pharmacies, and 16% of children under-five received chloroquine within 24 hours of onset of fever, according to the 2009 MIS.303 Countries that received the most health aid for malaria programs – including Kenya, Liberia, Rwanda, and Zambia – had the fastest scale-up of bed net distribution.304 UNICEF-statistics on malaria prevention show a different picture for malaria treatment for the target group, although the data focus on the percentage of children (0-4 years) who were ill with fever in the last two weeks and received any appropriate (locally defined) antimalarial drugs: 305

� Indicator 7.1.5: Decreased under 5 mortality rate

Findings at indicator’s level: The GRID database shows an indicator of 235/1000 live births for the years 1990-2003, whereas the latest figures for UNICEF show a number of 110/1000 live births. It was not possible to verify data or make a wider quantitative analysis for this indicator. What can be stated is the increase in quality of birth attendance for the hospital visited in Bong county, staff stated a decrease in under-5 mortality rate, although the statement cannot be substantiated with reliable data from the hospital. On a general level, Liberia remains one of the countries with the highest under-5 mortality rates in the world.

Data, sources, extracts : It was not possible to make a clear link between EC investments in health infrastructure and a subsequent decrease in under 5 mortality rates. The information gathered in the field could not fill the attribution gap, the statement is based on the visit to one major clinic in Bong county and the discussion with medical staff there.

Liberia’s under-five mortality rate remains among the five highest in the world, and more than 15% of children die before reaching their first birthday, according to UNICEF. ... Besides having one of the five highest infant mortality rates, maternal mortality rates nearly doubled to 994 deaths per 100 000 live births between 2000 and 2007, and fewer than half of births in Liberia are attended to by health professionals.306



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JC 7.1: Health facilities in EC-supported areas in good condition and within reach of population

Statement upon JC: Between 1996 and 2001, European Commission assistance helped to rehabilitate 18 clinics in 3 of Liberia’s counties: Grand Bassa, Montserrado and Sinoe. However, since the signing of the CPA in 2003, the direct contribution to the physical rehabilitation of health facilities and clinics in Liberia has been low. Only 6 new facilities have been constructed in this time period, under the Community Rehabilitation Component of the Post-Conflict Rehabilitation and Capacity Building Programme. This assessment does cover EC support that is not infrastructure, related, such as the capacity building support to the Ministry of Health and other interventions.

Judgment Criterion 7.2: Increased access to electri city in urban and rural EC-supported areas

� Indicator 7.2.1: Implementation of High Voltage / Medium Voltage (HV/MV) transmission grid reconstruction

Findings at indicator’s level: The European Commission was able to finance three small, generator powered electricity grids (in Congo Town, Kru Town, Paynesville suburb) in time to serve as showcases of progress after the election of President Johnson-Sirleaf. These networks were inaugurated around the annual celebrations of Liberia’s independence day, and therefore served as important, albeit largely symbolic, signs of progress in Monrovia. However, EC support of the larger scale rehabilitation of Monrovia’s electricity grid experienced significant delays of about three years, counting from the initial launching of the first tender for the works in March 2006 until the start of actual construction in May 2009. Reasons behind the delays were difficulties in finding enough interested parties to respond to the tender, lengthy evaluations of the received bids and negotiations between the EC office in Monrovia and the Delegation in Ivory Coast on the application of “negotiated procedures” for the award of the contract. Upon start of the construction in early 2009, the works seem to have progressed well, and as of February 2010, the biggest part of the EC-financed work on the electricity grid seems to have been completed. The EU support for the rehabilitation of the electricity infrastructure is valued as timely, but upcoming crisis and unpredictable changes in the security situation have hampered the implementation of the reconstruction efforts. Parts of the EC commitment for installing power lines from the EPP I and II was not fulfilled, so USAID took over the responsibility and completed the installations. Despite the non-fulfilment, the professional capacities of EU contractors were rated very positive by LEC authorities.


PCRCBP – Emergency Power Programme (EPP) I (Volta River Authority / Ghana) 307

• “Two minuscule MV/LV networks have been constructed. One loop is in Congo Town and one originating from LEC [Liberia Electricity Company] site in Kru Town. Both are fed by separate 1250-kVA diesel generator set”.

� The Congo Town loop was completed in July 2006, “for the Independence Day celebrations”.

� The Kru Town loop was completed on September 18, 2006.

PCRCBP – Emergency Power Programme II (Volta River Authority / Ghana)

• Network has been constructed to the Paynesville suburb under EPPII.

• Total of 14km of medium voltage lines; and 25km of low voltage lines are completed (under EPP I and EPPII together). 308

Electricity Grid Rehabilitation in Monrovia

• In a separate commitment, the EC had provided funds (€14.4m) for the rehabilitation of parts of Monrovia’s electricity grid309: � The financing agreement was signed already in May 2006, but the contract with the provider of the works

(ELTEL) was only signed approximately two years later, in March 2008. As of January 2009, none of the construction of the overhead lines had started, yet. � The timeline underlying the delay from May 2006 seems to be as follows:



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• Procurement of a works contract launched on in March 2006 with the publication of a Specific Procurement Notice in the Official Journal of the European Union (OJ S 56); deadline for offers: July 10, 2006310. Site Visit was held on the 24th of May 2006.

• In June 2006 deadline for submission of tenders was extended to September 2006. Public opening 14th September 2006

• Two bids were received. Both bids were well over the budget of 6.5, requiring realignment of the finances. After negotiations with the EU Delegation in lvory Coast (NAO function) the evaluation was finalised in March 2007 (period of 6 months); upon which tender was cancelled and permit for “Negotiated Procedure” sought from EC/lvory Coast; In May 2007 (2 months later) the situation was still the same.

• (Contract with ELTEL was eventually signed in March 2008; presumably two years after tender had been launched (see above).

� According to a progress report from Louis Berger, the supervising LTTA for the works, one reason for this delay was a “delay in EC signing the long agreed contract amendment” for ELTEL that would “result in commissioning of the work being delayed until at least the end of March 2009”.311

� Three years after signing the financing agreement, merely 18% of the planned 12.6km of medium voltage lines and none of the planned 26.8km of high voltage lines had been built or renovated.

� However, progress reports suggest that the work has progressed well since then: By February 2010, all of the medium voltage lines had been built and 70% of the high voltage lines had either been built or reconstructed.

� Indicator 7.2.2: Increased # of working streetlights and public lighting

Findings at indicator’s level: Ahead of the 2005 elections, the European Commission supported the rehabilitation of streetlights under the “Street light Project” of the Reintegration Programme for Returnees and Displaced People. In comparison to the intended scale of the rehabilitation the sustained success was small: out of 226 lights that were supposed to be repaired, only 87 were in fact worked on. Within months of completion, only 38 of these lights were still working. The EC's contribution to the re-establishment of public lighting in Monrovia after the 2005 elections consisted of relatively small scale, but politically significant, Projects around small scale, generator powered medium to low voltage electricity networks in three areas of Monrovia (Congo town, Kru town and Paynesville suburb). As of May 2007, a total of 535 street lights have been installed. It is not known, how many of these street lights were still operating at the end of 2008.


Reintegration Programme for Returnees and Displaced People – Streetlight Project (2004)

• It was planned to rehabilitate 226 street lights out of an existing 379

� Eventually, only 87 street lights were rehabilitated

� As of 2006, only 38 street lights were still working.312

PCRCBP – Emergency Power Programme I – Streetlights (Volta River Authority, Ghana)

• “Streetlights have been installed along main streets of each network”, i.e. along “two minuscule MV/LV networks” in Congo town and one originating from LEC site in Kru town. Both are fed by separate 1250-kVA diesel generator sets”.313

PCRCBP – Emergency Power Programme II – Streetlights (Volta River Authority (VRA), Ghana)

• “VRA constructed approximately five kilometres of street lighting along main road of Paynesville suburb. These are fed by two 400 kVA generators from EPP I supply contract (9ACP LBR 03/47). The installation of generator sets are to be completed late April-07” (Jacobs, 2007, p.1).

• Total of 535 units of street lights have been insta lled (under EPPI and II together, i.e. in Kru Town, Congo Town and Paynesville Suburb).



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� Indicator 7.2.3: Increased # of hours of electricity supply per day

Findings at indicator’s level: There were no recent data on the hours of electricity supply per day available, but the overall reconstruction of the electricity infrastructure has increased the potential for LEC to connect to the West African Power Pool with the option for an increased power supply for the capital Monrovia and the improvement of the rural electricity supply. The latest statistical data from LEC date back to 2006 and give no representative picture of the electricity supply / hours per day. Another factor which influences the supply of energy is the repetitive loss of cable through theft. One of the main connection cables in Monrovia installed alongside the bridge that connects the industrial area and the city has been interrupted due to cable theft. Despite the difficult estimation of daily energy supply, it can generally be reasoned that the overall supply of energy has continuously increased as a result of the completion of EPP I and the on-going EPP II programs.

Data, sources, extracts : " ... [B]eyond the Emergency Power Program (EPP), plans are underway to install a 10MW diesel plant at Bushrod Island. He said further discussions are going on to increase generation to about 30MW with independent power producers. As part of the Economic Community of West African States’ (ECOWAS) regional energy program, Mayah said, LEC, through the Government of Liberia, will benefit from the West African Power Pool (WAPP) following the construction of a transmission line to be operated at 225kV to interconnect Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea through the Ivorian network." 314

"The estimated potential generation capacity ... for large-scale hydropower is about 1,300 MWe, of which barely 6% has been previously developed. The technical potential for electricity production is estimated at 11 TW-hours per year. The Mt. Coffee Hydro Plant, with an installed capacity of 64 MWe, was damaged during the war. In 1990 the intake dam was breached and a significant part of the intake dam was washed away. The gas turbine units (2 x 15 MW, and 2 x 19 MW Brown Boveri units) were vandalized and looted during the war and subsequently decommissioned and scrapped. Large-scale hydropower could be the backbone for grid power in Liberia, and the hydro resource needs to be assessed as a prelude for development of hydropower facilities."315

"The distribution network consisting of 12km of medium voltage (MV) and 18km of low voltage (LV) network have been constructed and commissioned; spanning parts of Congo Town / Sinkor and Central Monrovia/West Point under EPP-I with 430 streetlights installed. ... In 2006, the total number of 340 customers of various categories, namely, schools, hospitals,, clinics, residential, businesses and Public facilities have been connected to the EPP-I grid. ... The Combined total energy billed is 1,639,485kWh, amounting to a dollar value of USD$ 622,863.00, including GOL bills."316

JC 7.2: Increased access to electricity in urban an d rural EC-supported areas

Statement upon JC: The contribution of the European Commission to increasing access to electricity in Monrovia consisted of a number of earlier small scales, but politically important installations of generator powered electricity loops and associated streetlights and significantly delayed works on a larger portion of Monrovia’s electricity distribution network. In 2006, the European Commission was able to finance three small, generator powered electricity grids (in Congo Town, Kru Town, Paynesville suburb) in time to serve as showcases of progress after the election of President Johnson-Sirleaf. These networks were inaugurated around the annual celebrations of Liberia’s independence day, and therefore served as important, albeit largely symbolic, signs of progress in Monrovia. As of May 2007, a total of 535 street lights had been installed in connection with these three isolated loops. It is not known, how many of these street lights were still operating at the end of 2008. EC support of the larger scale rehabilitation of Monrovia’s electricity grid experienced significant delays of about three years, counting from the initial launching of the first tender for the works in March 2006 until the start of actual construction in May 2009. Reasons behind the delays were difficulties in finding enough interested parties to respond to the tender, lengthy evaluations of the received bids and negotiations between the EC office in Monrovia and the Delegation in Ivory Coast on the application of “negotiated procedures” for the award of the contract. Upon start of the construction in early 2009, the works seem to have progressed well, and as of February 2010, the biggest part of the EC-financed work on the electricity grid seems to have been completed. Long assessment periods (e.g. the evaluation of PMC took over 2 years to be finalized) and the overburdened bureaucratic procedures have caused severe delays and could have been prevented if a more efficient steering structure would have been in place. The complicated and time-consuming set-up, comprising of the LEC, the donor steering committee, the board of the LEC and the ministry has complicated the communication and caused delays for necessary decision making processes. Ahead of the 2005 elections, the European Commission supported the rehabilitation of streetlights



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under the “Street light Project” of the Reintegration Programme for Returnees and Displaced People. In comparison to the intended scale of the rehabilitation the sustained success was small: out of 226 lights that were supposed to be repaired, only 87 were in fact worked on. Within months of completion, only 38 of these lights were still working.

Judgment Criterion 7.3: Improved conditions of rura l and feeder roads in EC supported areas

� Indicator 7.3.1: Kilometres of rehabilitated / constructed rural and feeder roads

Findings at indicator’s level: Over the period from 1999 to 2008, EC-financing was used to rehabilitate, reconstruct or construct an estimated 2,300 km of feeder and main317 roads. If all of these roads were still intact and passable in 2008, this would have accounted for an estimated 47% of Liberia’s main roads and 21% of feeder roads. However, a dominant share of the length of road was rehabilitated before signing of the CPA in 2003, by the “Second Rehabilitation Programme” that expired in 2001. It is more than likely a large percentage of the roads that were repaired in those early years again have fallen into disrepair in the meantime, due to war and lack of maintenance. Without the contribution of the “Second Rehabilitation Programme”, the EC’s contribution to the physical reconstruction of roads is significantly smaller, shrinking to a total of 563 km of rehabilitated main and feeder roads. This accounts for an estimated 21% of all feeder roads; but only 5% of main roads. The biggest contributing programme to this total for the period after 2003 is an NGO-run labour intensive infrastructure programme (see Table 37). This programme alone accounts for 505 km of the total of 563 km of roads that have been reconstructed since 2003. The CRC component of the Post-Conflict Rehabilitation Programme of the EDF9 only contributed 47km of road, partly because many of the medium-scale road construction projects, with a combined budget of over €237,000, could not be implemented due to the significant delays in grant processing that affected the programme (on this, see also EQ10 on aid modalities and cooperation frameworks).


• Between 1999 and 2008, the EC reconstructed, rehabilitated or constructed an estimated 2,300 km of Liberia’s road network. However, over 1,700 km are likely attributable to one single programme, the “Second Rehabilitation Programme”318.

• In order to get a picture of the EC contribution to road rehabilitation in Liberia, it therefore is necessary to exclude the contribution of the “Second Rehabilitation Programme”. Without this programme, the EC contributed to the rehabilitation / reconstruction / maintenance of approximately 552 km of roads.

� The programme with the biggest contribution is a relatively small NGO run programme, a labour intensive work programme implemented in South-eastern Liberia (Maryland, Grand Cru, Giver Gee)319. This programme alone rehabilitated 297km of Liberia’s feeder roads, and 208km of main roads320

Table 37: Approximate KM of roads constructed and r ehabilitated with EC-assistance/ 1999 - 2008321

Km of roads constructed or rehabilitated

% of Road Network (Estimate) 322

Program

Feeder Roads

Main Roads

Feeder Roads

Main Roads

Period of Implementation

Second Rehabilitation Programme 1772 41% Approximately 1999 - 2001

Post-Conflict Rehabilitation and Capacity Building Programme (CRC)

47 1% 2005 - 2008

Labour Intensive Work Programme (DRC) 297 208 21% 5% 2005 - 2006

Total 297 2027 21% 47%

Total - Excluding "Second Rehabilitation Programme" 297 255 21% 6%

Sources: Programme documents of mentioned programmes.



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Post-Conflict Rehabilitation and Capacity Building Programme (CRC)

• The contribution of the second programme that aimed at road rehabilitation is far smaller than that of the labour-intensive works programme (above). The CRC programme, part of the PCRCBP, rehabilitated 47km of main roads, an estimated 1% of Liberia’s “main road”323 network.

• One significant reason why the CRC / PCRCBP contribution is small are the delays that occurred in programme implementation. 5 out of planned 14 medium scale projects that the CRC programme should have implemented were related to road construction or repair. However, none of these projects was implemented, “due to time constraints” (see table 38). The total amount of unused funds for these five projects adds up to 237,255. Taking the total budget of the DRC programme as a yardstick, this money could have been used to build or rehabilitate at least an additional 140km of roads324.

Table 38: Overview of unused road and bridge constr uction funds; Community Rehabilitation Component of PCRCBP (medium-scale projects) 325

Project Name Total Cost of Action (Euros)

NGO Status at end of Programme

Improvement of Sanniquelle – Gehwee access road Trial Project in Nimba County

€ 33,271 ARS “Not awarded due to time constraints”

Improvement of Gaiyea Access Road Trial Project in Bong County

€ 20,537 CATALYST “Not awarded due to time constraints”

Employment creation and capacity building in community-based road and bridge maintenance i� Nimba County

€ 133,881 DRC “Not awarded due to time constraints”

Improvement of Leilei Access Road project in Bong County

€ 17,740 LECO “Not awarded due to time constraints”

Improvement of Sodu Community Access Road Project in Lofa County

€ 31,826 REDE� “Not awarded due to time constraints”

Total of unused funds € 237,255

� Indicator 7.3.2: Appropriately managed road maintenance fund in place

Findings at indicator’s level: Provisions for the maintenance of roads that have been rehabilitated with EC support are weak and their functioning contingent on a number of external factors that have been left outside of the scope of the programmes that funded the rehabilitation of the roads in the first place. The Community Rehabilitation Component of the CRC attempted to develop locally owned road maintenance schemes following a “learning by doing” approach that also included the supply of tools to the local authorities in Bong and Nimba, the two counties where this approach was tried.

A scheme seems to have taken hold only in Bong county, but was still in its infant stages when the CRC programme ended. It is not clear if the scheme received the “close monitoring” that it required, according to the final report of the CRC. The NGO run labour-intensive infrastructure programme in Maryland, River Gee and Grand Kru (Southern Liberia) relied on the continued willingness of local communities to maintain the roads in exchange for food-for-work support. The project did not identify where the food-for-work support was meant to come from.


PCRCBP / CRC – Road Maintenance Schemes

• One of the activities under the CRC in the tree supported counties was to “[in]stigate a road maintenance scheme that will be facilitated, coordinated and regulated by local authorities that will involve fund raising, training, institutional capacity building and road maintenance activities with local organizations”.326 The activity contained:

� “Engagement of labour based service providers in training and determination of institutional frameworks for community roads” and contracting of “two international consultancy groups, (Hydroplan, GOPA) to carry out six months consultancy (January 2007 to June 2007) to train community road maintenance practitioners and develop a sustainable institutional framework to operationalize the maintenance scheme”.

� “Direct training by CRC’s staff of six community groups (four in Bong County and two in Nimba County) in routine road maintenance and establishment of fund raising scheme on the Suakoko – Kafilee –



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Yaindedewon Road in Bong County”.

� “Road maintenance equipment and tools support to the three counties”.327

• The report also claims that regarding road maintenance (i.e. as a result of the “learning by doing” set-up of the road maintenance scheme, local authorities in Bong County had taken on specific coordination and regulatory roles in the roads maintenance. However, even the final report of the project team itself cautions that the maintenance scheme was “still in its infant stages and needs close monitoring to determine its future relevance”:328

PCRCBP –Rural Road Maintenance System Development and Training (COWI)

• Funds from the “Post-Conflict Rehabilitation” Programme (EDF9) were also used to fund a short-term TA regarding road maintenance, i.e. the “Rural Road Maintenance System Development and Training”.

DRC – Labour Intensive Works Programme

• The final report of the programme acknowledges that “continuous maintenance is needed and the conditions of the roads and bridges deteriorate very quickly due to abundant rain, heavy traffic, erosion and floods”.

• Information on the provisions made for ensuring this “continuous road maintenance” is vague, however. According to the final report of the programme:

� “36 workers have been trained in bridge construction techniques. 56 communities have been involved in the project, and the village authorities have been entrusted the EC/DRC project tools and encouraged to continue the road maintenance. 12 communities have agreed to carry out continuous maintenance on a portion of road assigned to them if food-for-work support is provided”.329

• This suggests that no firmly established scheme for road maintenance had been established as part of the programme. It also is not clear, if the required “food for work” was in fact provided after the programme came to an end to provide incentives for communities to remain involved in the maintenance of the roads.

� Indicator 7.3.3: Roads maintained and passable during rainy season

Findings at indicator’s level: Due to the travel time for the evaluation, the team had no possibility to assess the maintenance and conditions for passing roads during the rainy season. We relied on statements collected during interviews and inspection of roads during the field visit to regions outside Monrovia. In the case of Suakoko district / Bong county, where a toll system for road maintenance had been set up, the collection of fees did not work as a result of weak management capacities (supervisory board) and disagreements on payment schemes. The system finally failed and the road was not maintained. Community members The same experience was made by members of Yeandawon village, where the maintenance system failed for similar reasons. Despite the reconstruction of main and feeder roads, rural areas suffer still from the difficult travel conditions during the rainy season because of the lack of passable roads. The increased travel time has in particular negative effects on the health situation of pregnant women.

Data, sources, extracts : "But there were two flaws in the system: the board was not functioning – it would not meet (i.e. never met), because people “didn’t receive sitting fee”, i.e. an amount of about L$250 to reimburse them for their costs (e.g. transport) and provide an incentive. Also, there was a dispute between the road maintenance people and the county commissioner, because the community-based road maintenance people wanted to be paid before they made the repairs (i.e. without the letter), while the agreement had said that the repair crew first had to submit this letter, and then they would receive the funds. So, the road was not maintained. The collected fees for a while (trucks with load: L$500, empty trucks: L$ 250 (and some other fees for buses, cars). But many people did not pay that much – wanted to pay L$200 at most. Some instances of where the toll gate was damaged, thrown away, boys who were collecting tools were beaten. They replaced the toll gate with a rope, tried it again. We were collecting toll until January 2010, but then for a month now on market days (Fridays), now not at all anymore."330

"The EC trained about 40 people in road maintenance – this group should be responsible for maintaining the road [Note: the person speaking was the chairman of this community-based road maintenance crew]. But there was a problem: many of these people did not find it attractive and worth their while to work on maintaining the road – many of them moved away, now there are about 18 people left, from different villages along the road. Also, we have problems in that we do not have tools; for example we do not have a compactor – without it we cannot fix the road right. Many of our shovels are broken and our wheelbarrows, too. This is why we haven’t been able to do the work."331

"Liberia is still rebuilding a health and transportation infrastructure that was destroyed by war between 1989 and 2003. The reconstruction efforts are hindered during wet season, between May and November, when Liberia receives on average 4300 millimetres of rain. It’s one of the wettest countries in the world. Travelling becomes especially difficult as torrential downpours create huge potholes and wash out roads entirely. Streams and creeks overflow their banks, making footpaths impassable."332



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� Indicator 7.3.4: Reduced travel time on rural road network / improved access to goods and services / economic benefits

Findings at indicator’s level: The EC-financed rehabilitation of roads has likely produced a number of benefits, with regard to reduced travel times, increased economic opportunities and access to services, such as hospitals or markets. Examples include increased timber extraction, sawn timber production and increased production and sales of palm oil and rubber (all in Bong County). The construction of bridges as part of road rehabilitation has decreased travel times; e.g. the reconstructed “Beh Bridge” (also Bong county) is said to have reduced travel times to the seat of the county administration (Gbarnga) from surrounding areas by two hours.

There is an important linkage between the reconstruction of the road infrastructure and the delivery of humanitarian aid. The focus on main roads has facilitated the access to urban areas and thus improved the provision of support for refugees and IDPs during their return. The huge migratory movements in particular between 2003 and 2006 have impeded a development process, as humanitarian needs took continuously the highest priority on the donor's agenda.


Post-Conflict Rehabilitation and Capacity Building Pr ogramme (CRC): Economic benefits:

• “The Suakoko – Yaindewon road in Bong County opened up a new frontier for timber extraction which has greatly improved economic capabilities of more than 6,000 beneficiaries”.333

• “The Beh Bridge, the Sanniquelle to Ganta road and the Suakoko to Yaindenwoun road have been completed and contribute now to economic activity within Nimba and Bong counties, due to the improved and cheaper access to production areas and markets they guarantee”.

• “As a result of the construction of the Suakoko – Yaindenwoun road several new economic enterprises have been set up. These include sawn timber production with an estimated turnover of €200,000 per year and employment for an estimated of 40 local people”.

• Palm oil production and sale from more remote areas has also been boosted with more than three times original sales output (from less than Liberian Dollar 100/gal to more than Liberian Dollar 300/gal). This has increased profit to more than three times before the road was done.

• “[The Beh Bridge] has contributed to the start of different new businesses in the area which are in turn providing new jobs for local people and putting an estimated €100,000 into the local economy (estimate derived from interviews of villagers, following observation that rubber sales tripled thanks to road access).

Reduced travel time:

• “The Beh Bridge is now carrying an average of 10 small vehicles and 5 large commercial vehicles per day with a peak on Fridays of three times the number. The construction of this bridge has reduced the travel distance between Gbarnga and Botota by an estimated 2 hours and an annual saving of €6,500 in fuel and maintenance costs for each vehicle.

Access to services

• Thanks to the Beh Bridge, access to hospital and health centres has been greatly improved from Botota to Gbarnga with reduction in mortality rates. NGOs and other development partners are now having easy access to the communities that they are working hence increasing their coverage of providing basic services.334

Labour Intensive Work Programme – DRC (DDRR)

• “The opening of feeder roads previously closed to motorized vehicle traffic played an important role in stimulating commerce and empowered local communities to access markets and services in urban centres along the main road. The impact was felt in particular in Grand Cru which had previously been isolated from the rest of the country because of the poor condition of Pleebo - Barclayville road, which was rehabilitated by DRC”.

• “Another example for the vital role of infrastructure rehabilitation is the road linking Harper to the border of Cote d'Ivoire which has stimulated the export of rubber to the Ivorian port of San Pedro”.

• The price of a pair of slippers in Wlowien had dropped from L$45-50 to L$35 when to the road to the regional market in Pleebo was in good shape, showing the correlation between the price of goods and the available road infrastructure”.335



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JC 7.3: Improved conditions of rural and feeder roa ds in EC supported areas

Statement upon JC: Over the period from 1999 to 2008, EC-financing was used to rehabilitate, reconstruct or construct an estimated 2,300 km of feeder and main336 roads. If all of these roads were still intact and passable in 2008, this would have accounted for an estimated 47% of Liberia’s main roads and 21% of feeder roads. However, a dominant share of the length of road was rehabilitated before signing of the CPA in 2003, by the “Second Rehabilitation Programme” that expired in 2001. It is more than likely a large percentage of the roads that were repaired in those early years again have fallen into disrepair in the meantime, due to war and lack of maintenance. Without the contribution of the “Second Rehabilitation Programme”, the EC’s contribution to the physical reconstruction of roads is significantly smaller, shrinking to a total of 563 km of rehabilitated main and feeder roads. This accounts for an estimated 21% of all feeder roads; but only 5% of main roads.

The biggest contributing programme to this total for the period after 2003 is an NGO-run labour intensive infrastructure programme. This programme alone accounts for 505km of the total of 563km of roads that have been reconstructed since 2003. The CRC component of the Post-Conflict Rehabilitation Programme of the EDF9 only contributed 47km of road, partly because many of the medium-scale road construction projects, with a combined budget of over €237,000, could not be implemented due to the significant delays in grant processing that affected the programme (on this, see also EQ10 on aid modalities and cooperation frameworks).

Provisions for the maintenance of roads that have been rehabilitated with EC support are weak and their functioning contingent on a number of external factors that have been left outside of the scope of the programmes that funded the rehabilitation of the roads in the first place. The Community Rehabilitation Component of the CRC attempted to develop locally owned road maintenance schemes following a “learning by doing” approach that also included the supply of tools to the local authorities in Bong and Nimba, the two counties where this approach was tried. A scheme seems to have taken hold only in Bong county, but was still in its infant stages when the CRC programme ended. It is not clear if the scheme received the “close monitoring” that it required, according to the final report of the CRC. The NGO run labour-intensive infrastructure programme in Maryland, River Gee and Grand Kru (Southern Liberia) relied on the continued willingness of local communities to maintain the roads in exchange for food-for-work support. The project did not identify where the food-for-work support was meant to come from.

The EC-financed rehabilitation of roads has likely produced a number of benefits, with regard to reduced travel times, increased economic opportunities and access to services, such as hospitals or markets. Examples include increased timber extraction, sawn timber production and increased production and sales of palm oil and rubber (all in Bong County). The construction of bridges as part of road rehabilitation has decreased travel times; e.g. the reconstructed “Beh Bridge” (also Bong county) is said to have reduced travel times to the seat of the county administration (Gbarnga) from surrounding areas by two hours.

Apart from immediate economic effects such as the access to markets and the reduction of transport time and costs, large road or bridge reconstruction has a high visibility on the peace process. The population associates the positive effects with a strategic engagement of the donor community for peace and stability in the post-war situation.

Judgment Criterion 7.4: Increased access to Water a nd Sanitation services in EC supported areas

� Indicator 7.4.1: Number / length of rehabilitated / constructed water delivery networks in cities and counties

Findings at indicator’s level: The European Commission supported the reconstruction of several water pipelines, reservoirs and other components of Monrovia’s municipal water supply system between 1999 and 2008. Maybe most significantly, the EC provided “stop-gap” funding to maintain a basic level of service in the year immediately following the signing of the CPA in 2003, by paying for operating costs of the existing system. After this stop-gap funding, however, a long time passed, i.e. approximately 3-5 years, before EC support to Monrovia’s water system was again felt on the ground. Between 2003 and 2005, the EC funded a number of technical and legal studies on the rehabilitation of water supply in Monrovia and



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funded some organisational capacity building / training in the Liberian water authority, spending an amount of €642,077 on these contracts. In October 2004 and July 2005, the EC contracting partner initiated two procurement and TA/works contracts: a) for the installation of replacement pumps at Liberia’s only water purification plant and White Plains and b) for reservoir and main trunk rehabilitation. Both of these contracts were delayed until at least 2006.

In the case of the replacement pumps for White Plains, the water purification plant, it is not clear if they were actually installed by the end of 2008. End-of-project reporting for the water infrastructure component of the EDF8 Reintegration Programme suggests that many of the works projects that had been targeted by this programme had to be carried over into the next relevant programme, the Post-Conflict Rehabilitation Programme (EDF9). It is not clear at this point, what percentage of Monrovia’s water supply and distribution system the infrastructure components represent that this programme financed between 2005 and 2008. However, even at the time of the evaluation, not all of the finished components, including a constructed pipeline337, are operational, due to the delayed commencement of related installations, in this case a Booster Station338 that should have been included in EDF9 support, but had to be handed over to the World Bank, when works under the Post-Conflict Rehabilitation Programme ceased.

Outside of Monrovia, the EC had the biggest effect with the works done under the EDF8 “Second Rehabilitation Programme” that ended in 2001. The project rehabilitated or constructed a total of 1,600 water sources in 8 counties, mostly wells and hand pumps. In the years from 2003 to 2008, the contribution of the EC to the provision of safe water decreased significantly. The CRC programme under the Post-Conflict Rehabilitation Programme only financed the construction of 33 water sources (also wells and hand pumps). The Reintegration Programme for Returnees and Displaced Persons added water sources for approximately 1,000 people (see Indicator 7.4.4) according to a conservative estimate.


Support to water infrastructure in Monrovia

Reintegration Programme

• Little (any) investment from the programme prior to 2003:

� “Prior to the arrival of the PMU in January 2003 the water projects were being managed independently by the consulting company Geoscience. Their project started in November 2001 and was due to finish in 2003 but the signing of the work plan was delayed until February 2003”.339

� “It was reported in the Mid Term Review Report (May 2004) that the Liberia Water and Sewage Company (LWSC) were not happy to continue with the Geoscience project partly due to the non-consultative approach that was taken by the Consultants and hence there was no element of sustainability. The other factor was the high costs of the Consultants to the EC”.340

• In 2003, upon return of the PMU from Abidjan, where it had been located during the intense fighting in Monrovia, the PMU oversaw the launching and implementation of a series of water-related contracts (see table 39).

Table 39: Water-relevant projects financed under ED F8 Reintegration Programme in Monrovia

Title Amount € Start Date Content

Wa�er Stop Gap TA

374,208 16th October 2003

Rehabilitation / Hardware: salaries water production, distribution; supplies (spare parts, gas oil and water & sanitation consumables); salaries / supplies for wells sanitation in Mo�rovia; office running cost

Sustainable Water Production in Liberia, including leakages sub-report

72,669 1st January 2004

Study: Review & Analysis of the situation; Strategies for re-organisation of drinking water production and distribution Monrovia; Proposal for implementation and financing

Leak Detection and theft

44,875 5th April 2004

Study

Transitional Support to the Water Privatisation Process

137,093 12th May 2004

Overview of Studies: Monitoring, initiation, control of Studies; Regulatory framework and legislation; Tender preparation; “Confidence building among investors; Tender negotiation assistance.



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Market Study for Water

69,425 21st July 2004

Study: overview of economic framework of country; water demand study and Water business sector analysis in Monrovia; willingness to pay study; Supply analysis of the current demand; local water market overview; investment analysis.

Water Resources 93,562 21st July 2004

Study

Water Authority & Legal Act

109,860 13th October 2004

Study / Capacity Building: Phase 1: Legal framework; review legislation; develop legislative amendments, Phase 2: Establishment of working Water Authority; develop recruitment procedures for qualified personnel; Negotiations for financing the Authority and fund raising; Training, Public Relations; Clarification and publication of stakeholder responsibilities; Legal justification of assets (Water rights)

Engineering Study 114,593

6th October 2004

Study: technical diagnosis of water supply system.

Provision of two vertical pumps

65,592 23rd October 2004

Hardware / Rehabilitation: supply two replacement pumps at White Plains.

TA to the rehabilitation of the trunk mains

253,300 31st July 2005

Rehabilitation: Ensure average production of 18,000 cubic meters per day at white plains; Rehabilitate reservoirs; existing main trunks in Monrovia (16", 24" and 36" pipelines) are reliable to meet basic demand; Training of staff at LWSC

TA Water Works - Specs for the rehabilitation of 16'' pipe

800,000 September 2005

Study / rehabilitation: Prepare the specifications for the 16" pipe line from White plains to Somalia Drive Junction (and implement the works)341

Total (Euro) 2,135,177

• Effects on the physical condition of water infrastructure from these projects materialised with significant delay, apart from the initial “stop-gap” measure:

� With approximately €370,000, the EC financed operating costs and maintenance of the water system in Monrovia right after signing of the CPA, i.e. starting in October 2003, to ensure a basic supply of water to the city. This emergency measure was deemed to be “highly satisfactory” by the 2006 programme evaluation.342

� Delays in two contracts for works and infrastructure rehabilitation meant that no further direct effects of EC investment on water infrastructure materialised from 2003 until at least January 2006:

� A TA assignment that should have overseen and ensured the rehabilitation of the White Plains water treatment plant and of additional existing water reservoirs was delayed from December 2004 until at least January 2004, when the inception report for the assignment was written (Klein, et.al. 2006, p.20).

� The procurement of two pumps to replace existing pumps at the White Plains water treatment facility was also delayed by at least two years:

• “The LWSC requested these pumps in June 2004 and the specifications for these pumps were supplied in October 2004” (Klein, et.al. 2006, p.21).

• As of the end of March 2006, these pumps had not been delivered yet. At the time of the final evaluation of the Reintegration programme, delivery of these pumps was planned for April 2006 (Klein, et.al. 2006, p.21). It is not clear at this point, if the pumps have now been procured343.

• Also, at least 30% of the total sum spent was invested in various technical studies, i.e. a sum of at least €642,077.

• At this point it is not clear, which – if any – of the intended physical rehabilitation of water supply infrastructure in Monrovia could be built before the end of the programme344. It seems at this point that at least part of the infrastructure projects had to be taken up and continued by the EDF9 Post-Conflict Rehabilitation Programme.

Post-Conflict Rehabilitation Programme / Louis Berger

• Under the PCRCBP programme, through a series of contracts with Louis Berger, part of the water-related infrastructure works that had begun under the EDF8 Reintegration programme, plus additional work in Monrovia was meant to be completed. The following is a list of works / pipelines that was included in these projects:



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� Rehabilitation of Caldwell Drive Pipeline; Contract No: - 9 ACP.LBR 03/34, Contractor: - Pump and Tank.

� Rehabilitation of Atlantic Drive Pipeline; Contract No: - 9 ACP.LBR 03/34, Contractor: - EADECON.

� Rehabilitation of Ducor and Mamba Point Reservoirs; Contract No: - 9 ACP.LBR 03/34, Contractor; - EADECON.

� Rehabilitation of Somalia Drive Pipeline; Contract No: - 9 ACP.LBR 03/34; Contractor: - Atlantic Engineering and Construction Co. Inc.

• In addition to the above completed projects, the contract with Louis Berger had included a number of additional works that could not be completed before the contract expired. These include:

� “Non-commenced works at White Plains and Bushrod Island Booster Station”.

� “Incomplete works at Atlantic Drive pipeline, Mamba Point and Ducor reservoirs”

� The EC / Louis Berger was meant to discuss with the World Bank, how these projects would be finalised (Louis Berger, 2008, p.23).

• As of 2008, at least parts of the installed infrast ructure was not operational, partly due to the “non -commenced work” under the Louis Berger contracts:

� The “non-commenced works” at the Bushrod Island Booster Station meant that not all of installed pipelines could be charged, i.e. filled with water. Currently, without the booster station, only the Atlantic Drive (UN Drive) pipeline or the Somalia Drive pipeline could be charged. This circumstance had also created problems for the appropriate testing of the Somalia Drive Pipeline upon completion of the work (see World Bank, 2009a, p.6).

� The first progress report of the EC co-financed “Agriculture and Infrastructure Development Project (AIDP) still mentions the need to “help restore the [White Plains Water Treatment Plant] to 50% of their pre-war capacities”, and announces work that includes the “procurement and installation of two high lift pumps at White Plains” (World Bank, 2009a, p.5). It is not clear if these are the same two pumps that should already have been procured in 2004, under the EDF8 Reintegration Programme.

Rehabilitation of water infrastructure outside of M onrovia

Second Rehabilitation Programme (EDF8)

• The “Second Rehabilitation Programme” improved a large number of water sources in 8 of the 14 counties of Liberia. However, the work on these wells was done between 1998 and 2001, i.e. before the signing of the CPA. It therefore is uncertain that many of these wells and pumps are still operational at this point.

Table 40: Number of water sources improved; 2 nd Liberia Rehabilitation Programme

County

# of

wel

ls

reha

bilit

ated

# of

old

han

d pu

mps

re

habi

litat

ed

# of

wel

ls

cons

truc

ted

# of

new

ha

nd p

umps

in

stal

led

# of

wel

ls

chlo

rinat

ed /

mon

th

Bomi 22 0 0 0 0

Grand Cape Mount 1 7 0 0 0

Grand Gedeh 3 33 32 38 84

Grand Kru 0 48 0 0 0

Maryland 0 117 13 10 127

Montserrado 20 0 1 6 0

Nimba 45 150 39 35 435

Sinoe 170 53 26 15 80

Total 261 408 111 104 726 Source: Cardno Agrisystems, 2001.

Post-Conflict Rehabilitation Programme / CRC

• The CRC component can claim the rehabilitation of 33 water sources, including town wells and hand pumps. The final report states that these water sources provide safe water for an estimated 6,000 people in the surrounding communities:

� “The construction or rehabilitation of thirty three water sources has improved access to safe drinking water for an estimated six thousand people. It has been observed, during field visits that this has also reduced the average distance to access a water source point” (Cardno Agrisystems, 2009, p.24).

• 3 out of 14 “medium term grants” focused on the improvement of water supply in rural areas, i.e. in Bong



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County.

� No medium grant projects in water were funded in Lofa or Nimba counties

� Only 1 out of the 3 intended medium grant projects was eventually implemented by the programme (Cardno Agrisystems, 2009, p.6).

Table 41: CRC medium grant projects with relevance for rural water supply

Project Name Total Cost of Action (Euros) Implementing NGO Status

1. Provision of Safe Drinking Water Supply for rural Communities in Bong and Lofa Counties

63,400.01 AQUIFER Project was

awarded and implemented

2. Community Mini Hydro Construction Project in Gbarnga Bong County

35,000 CAID Not awarded due to time constraints

3. Water supply system renovation and planned redundancy in Phebe Hospital Bong County

111,000 Phebe Hospital

Documents prepared but

transferred to ECHO for funding

Source: Cardno Agrisystems, 2009, p. 22

• Table 42 lists the small scale grant projects (funding up to €10,000) that were supported by the CRC programme.

Table 42: CRC small grant projects with relevance f or rural water supply

Projec � Implem �nting Partner Durat�on Grant

Am�unt (US$)

District / Community

Ban�kpallah Delivery Home with Latrine and Hand pump Construction Project

Banakpallah Project Management Committee

Feb. 15 – May 10, 2007

11,783.50 Banakpallah Town, Nimba

Melekie Town Wells and Latrines Construction Project

Quapaigai May 29 – August 15, 2008

10,530.47 Melekie Town, Jorquelleh District, Bong County

Gbonota Water and sanitation Project

Gbonota Development Association

April 26 - October, 2007

11,799.00 Gbonota, Menquelleh Clan, Sanoyea District, Bong

Community Water Supply Project

Foya Community Diomplor Development Association

April 17 –October, 2007

11,788.00 Foya Town, Foya District, Lofa

Source: Cardno Agrisystems, 2009, Annex 8


• EC-managed work in the County Development Programme had not started as of 2008 (i.e. the inception report for the LTTA to manage the programme was only published in November 2009).

� However, already in 2008, the EC had signed contribution agreements with the World Bank to co-finance the already on-going “Community Empowerment Project II” that also foresees the construction of 28 wells around Liberia345 .

� Also, the EC signed a contribution agreement with the World Bank for co-financing of the Liberia Agriculture and Infrastructure Development Project (AIDP) in February 2009, ensuring continued support to water infrastructure projects in Monrovia346 .



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� Indicator 7.4.2: Increase in # of waste water treatment plants

Findings at indicator’s level: Reconstruction of wastewater treatment facilities was not implemented with EC funding, the services contract with Louis Berger under the 9th EDF 9.ACP.LBR.07 "Technical Assistance for the Supervision of Electricity and Water rehabilitation, Liberia" did not include the reconstruction of wastewater treatment plants.

Data, sources, extracts: "Monrovia’s wastewater treatment plant and all pump stations are non-operational. Sewerage and drainage channels and pipes in Monrovia have not been cleaned for years."347

"Between 1948 and 1970, there was no sewage treatment in Monrovia. LWSC operates a Sewerage System, which was developed as far back as 1948. The raw sewage was discharged into the Messurado River or the Atlantic Ocean. In 1970, a conventional Sewage treatment plant was constructed and collection network extended to cover Sinkor, part of Congo and part of Bushrod Island. Over the years, the system has been upgraded and expanded to meet the need of 250,000 inhabitants in Monrovia. Since 1983, no major maintenance work has been carried out. The post-war rehabilitations, including the EU / Geoscience project neglected the sewerage system, meaning that it did not cover it."348

„The only functioning sewerage system is in Monrovia. However, the sewage treatment plant has under-capacity and was only intended for a population of 130 000 people, whereas the current population is approximately 800 000. The plant was designed to provide sedimentation and secondary (biological) treatment with trickling filters. Although the system is designed to handle sanitary wastewaters, the influent is supplemented with storm water due to illegal connections with drains and from infiltration of ground water. The plant and the pumping stations have not functioned consistently for over ten years due to disrepair and a shortage of electricity, hence raw sewage has been frequently allowed to flow directly into lagoons, rivers and the sea. It was reported that a small number of Monrovians (1, 3 per cent) still use the sewer system, causing a build-up of sewage within low-points in the pipeline. Occasionally, the mains are fractured causing outflow on to the streets or into the sea and local rivers."349

� Indicator 7.4.3: Increase in # of households with access to improved water source

Findings at indicator’s level: Outside of Monrovia, an estimated 6,000 people in three counties gained access to safe water – from hand pumps and wells – from the 33 water sources that had been constructed under the “Community Rehabilitation Component” of the “Post-Conflict Rehabilitation and Capacity Building Programme”. No data have been available yet to assess how many households are benefiting from the water infrastructure support in Monrovia.

Data, sources, extracts: Water infrastructure support outside of Monrovia Post Conflict Rehabilitation and Capacity Building Programme:

• According to information from the final report of the CRC component of the PCRCBP, an estimated 6,000 people gained access to safe water as a result of the 33 constructed water sources in Bong, Nimba and Lofa counties. “Improved water sources” include in this case hand pumps and wells.

� Indicator 7.4.4: Increased % of households with access to hygienic sanitation facilities (a toilet or latrine without faeces on the floor or seat and with only few flies)

Findings at indicator’s level: Between 1998 and 2001, EC assistance helped to improve access of Liberian to improved sanitation facilities in 5 counties (Nimba, Grand Gedeh, Sinoe, Maryland, Grand Kru). Overall an estimated 12,504 people benefitted from these facilities. Numbers for the period after the signing of the CPA, i.e. during the years 2003 to 2008, seem very unreliable. According to low estimates, only an approximate total number of 1,200 people gained access to improved sanitation services with EC assistance between 2003 and 2008. The high estimate would put this total number at approx. 16,000 people.


Improvements of Sanitation Infrastructure outside Mo nrovia:

Second Rehabilitation Programme:



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Table 43: Sanitation Projects under the Second Reha bilitation Programme / EC

County Latrines Constructed Beneficiaries % of

Population 350

Nimba 637 5,096 1.1%

Grand Gedeh 231 1,848 1.5%

Sinoe 552 4,416 4.2%

Maryland 96 768 0.6%

Grand Kru 47 367 0.6%

Total 1,563 12,504 1.4%

Source: Agrisystems, 2001


• The EDF8 Reintegration Programme financed the implementation of 42 “Water and Sanitation” Small Scale Projects in rural counties outside of Monrovia351. Post-project monitoring showed the average number of beneficiaries to be approximately 760 per project (see table 44)352. Extrapolating this number from the 6 WatSan SSP projects that were considered in the final evaluation of the Reintegration Programme to the total number of WatSan SSP projects (42) suggests that overall a total number of approximately 32,000 people benefited from improved water supply or improved sanitation services.

� Assuming that the beneficiaries were evenly distributed between water and sanitation projects, this means that approximately 16,000 people benefited from improved water; and another 16,000 people from improved sanitation services.

� However, the sustainability of the projects seems to have been low. The final evaluation (conducted in 2006, three months after programme closure) found that only one of the six WatSan projects was still operating at the time of the evaluation. This yielded an average number of beneficiaries of 45 per project. Again, extrapolating to all 42 WatSan SSP projects, this means that the total number of people benefiting from the infrastructure had decreased to 1,890 people.

Table 44: Selection of Water and Sanitation “Small Scale Projects” of the EDF8 Reintegration Programme

Post-Conflict Rehabilitation and Capacity Building Programme / CDC

• Access to clean, safe latrines has been improved by the construction of 19 latrine blocks in communities.

• This has provided latrines for an estimated 200 people

• Improved access in terms of reducing distance to a latrine to an average of 50 metres from 200 metres (Cardno Agrisystems, 2009, p.24).

� This only accounts for 0.02% of the total populatio n of the three targeted counties (Bong, Lofa, Nimba).



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JC 7.4: Increased access to Water and Sanitation se rvices in EC supported areas

Statement upon JC: The European Commission supported the reconstruction of several water pipelines, reservoirs and other components of Monrovia’s municipal water supply system between 1999 and 2008. Maybe most significantly, the EC provided “stop-gap” funding to maintain a basic level of service in the year immediately following the signing of the CPA in 2003, by paying for operating costs of the existing system. After this stop-gap funding, however, a long time passed, i.e. approximately 3-5 years, before EC support to Monrovia’s water system was again felt on the ground. Between 2003 and 2005, the EC merely funded a number of technical and legal studies on the rehabilitation of water supply in Monrovia and supported organisational capacity building / training for the Liberian water authority, for an amount of €642,077. Two procurement contracts that were initiated in October 2004 and July 2005 were delayed until at least 2006.353 In the case of the replacement pumps for the water purification plant at White Plains, one of the contracts, the installation seemingly was still not complete by the end of 2008. Many of the works projects that had been targeted had to be carried over into the next relevant programme, the Post-Conflict Rehabilitation Programme (EDF9). At the time of the evaluation, not all of the finished components, including a constructed pipeline354, are operational, due to the delayed commencement of related installations, in this case a Booster Station355 that should have been included in EDF9 support, but had to be handed over to the World Bank, when works under the Post-Conflict Rehabilitation Programme ceased.

Outside of Monrovia, the EC had the biggest effect on water and sanitation with the works done under the EDF8 “Second Rehabilitation Programme” that ended in 2001. The project rehabilitated or constructed a total of 1,600 water sources in 8 counties, mostly wells and hand pumps. The programme also helped to improve access of Liberian to improved sanitation facilities in 5 counties (Nimba, Grand Gedeh, Sinoe, Maryland, Grand Kru). Overall an estimated 12,504 people benefitted from these facilities. In the years from 2003 to 2008, the contribution of the EC to the provision of safe water and reliable sanitation facilities decreased significantly. The CRC programme under the Post-Conflict Rehabilitation Programme only financed the construction of 33 water sources (also wells and hand pumps), benefitting approximately 6,000 people. The Reintegration Programme for Returnees and Displaced Persons added water sources for approximately 1,000 people (see Indicator 7.4.4) according to a conservative estimate. Numbers on sanitation installations for the period after the signing of the CPA, i.e. during the years 2003 to 2008, seem very unreliable. According to low estimates, only an approximate total number of 1,200 people gained access to improved sanitation services with EC assistance between 2003 and 2008. The high estimate would put this total number at approximately 16,000 people. Information from post-monitoring visits and evaluations suggest, however, that the low estimate (1,200 people) is likely to be more accurate.

While a strong focus was put on the reconstruction of the strategic infrastructure, the EC has not taken into account the necessity to provide resources for the rehabilitation of the administrative infrastructure. The case of the Liberia Water and Sewer Corporation illustrates the importance of supporting the reconstruction of the physical means for a functioning administration. The LWSC's capacity to deal with the reconstruction efforts is significantly hampered by the disastrous working conditions in an office building that since the end of the war has not seen major reconstruction efforts so far. Funding is also being valued as insufficient for the National Water Policy,as funding is only calculated with 0.7 Mio USD, an insufficient amount which does not allow for running the LWSC's country offices.



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1.8 Capacity Building EQ8: To what extent has EC support to institutional reform and capacity development helped the Liberian Government to increase its capacity for adopting a legitimate role in providing key social services and infrastructure to the Liberian population?

Table 45: Direct beneficiaries of EC capacity devel opment at national level (Economic Governance) 356 Direct Beneficiary

Organisations Type of support (Relevant Programme) Main Outputs

Bureau of Customs and Excise (BCE) / Ministry of Finance

Institutional Support Programme (ISP): • Management Study of BCE to determine

future support (2005) • Short-term TA (2006)

• “Contribution to” preliminary strategy for services outsourcing357

Bureau of Maritime Affairs (BMA)

• Management study of BMA as revenue collection agency

• Independent systems and financial audit of the BMA

• Management study report • Audit report

Central Bank of Liberia Institutional Support Programme (ISP) • Financial Audit of the Central Bank

• Audit report



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Direct Beneficiary Organisations

Type of support (Relevant Programme) Main Outputs

General Auditing Commission (GAC)

Institutional Support Programme (ISP) • Imprest Account to finance staff • Management Study to identify long-term

support • Short-term consultancy, supporting the

selection of personnel for GAC • Long-term TA, i.e. to support drafting the

Capacity and Institutional Building Plan (CIBAP)358

• Financing position of “Auditor General” Institutional Strengthening and Capacity Building Programme (ISCBP)

• Recommendations of GAC management study: � Adoption of “Capacity Building Action Plan (CIBAP)” & subsequent LTTA, � Training programme, supporting structure and operations of the GAC � Undertaking & completing necessary Iegislative changes for the GAC359

• Comprehensive restructuring and reorganization of staff; competitive recruitment of 107 auditors and 41 administrative staff. Human Resources policies and procedures produced and distributed.

• Training of GAC staff in audit techniques and procedures, to increase compliance with international auditing standards; i.e. customisation and adoption of International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI) standards.

• Establishment of Certification Scheme (SC); selected staff have entered into the SC according to agree upon conditions.

• Audit manual and training manual developed and distributed to every staff of the GAC to serve as daily guides when conducting audits.

• 1972 auditing law revised; “submitted to President as consultative draft”. • “5 year strategic plan” of GAC

State-Owned Enterprises (Liberia Petroleum Refining Company, National Port Authority, Roberts International Airport)

Institutional Support Programme (ISP) • Short-term TA • Organisational and financial audits

Audit Reports for • Liberia Petroleum Refining Company, • National Port Authority, • Roberts International Airport

Liberia Institute of Statistics & Geo-Information Services (LISGIS)

• Salary for Statistician

NAO (Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs (MPEA))

Institutional Support Programme (ISP) • Various TA (LTTA and STTA)

assignments, including for preparation of start-up / second programme estimates

(a): Institutional Support Programme (ISP); (b): Institutional Strengthening and Capacity Building Programme (ISCBP)



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Table 46: Direct beneficiaries of EC capacity devel opment at local level Direct Beneficiary

Organisations Type of support Main “capacity development” outputs

• Workshops (district, county, regional) for design of “County Development Agendas” (CDAs) in three project counties

• “County Development Agendas” (CDAs) as inputs into Liberia’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP)

• CRC Advisers at County Offices

• Trainings, i.e. in management and accountability for small grants

• “Learning by Doing”, e.g. in project M&E and other project activities (also supported by Project Management Team (PMT) support officer)

• County “Technical Steering Committees” formed to advise CRC on county priorities / “take major role in decisions on county priorities”.

• Skilled County & District Authority personnel, i.e. in project management

County / District Authorities, i.e. • District Commissioners • CRC “Project Management

Teams” (PMTs): Assistant Superintendents for Development, Project Planners, Engineers, Budget Officers

• “Learning by Doing” road maintenance schemes in supported counties

• Road maintenance: o Sustainable institutional framework for road maintenance at

county level o “6 community groups” (Bong, Nimba County) for road

maintenance o Fund raising scheme (Bong County o Road maintenance equipment / tools (Bong, Nimba, Lofa).

District Development Councils360 (DDCs)

• Trainings in management and accountability for small grants

• “Learning by Doing” Project Identification (evaluation of small CRC grants)

• “Learning by Doing” “day to day project monitoring” (discontinued, 7/2007)

• Organisational capacity of DDCs strengthened, e.g. in o Project identification o Preparing and managing grants o Project Monitoring and Evaluation



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Judgement Criteria 8.1: Increased portfolio of EC-s upported Government Agencies and Ministries

� Indicator 8.1.1: Relevant Ministries and Agencies are carrying out an increased number of tasks related to service provision and infrastructure provision


EC support at county level has not yet significantly contributed to increasing the number of tasks that supported county and district authorities are carrying out independently. County and district staff members worked alongside EC TAs throughout the life of EC-financed programmes and participated in separate capacity building activities, such as study tours or workshops. However, any learning that took place did not translate into the sustained adoption of new tasks by these staff members, largely because of the substantial organisational capacity bottlenecks that are persisting at the county and district level. These include lacking operational budgets to maintain equipment or finance travel within the county or district or the lack of electricity in administration building. In this type of environment, the supported county administrations have been unable to maintain and make use of any former programme equipment that was left with the local authorities, such as cars, computers and tractors. Integration of and coordination between County and National level Government structures remained week and therefore could not help to reduce these bottlenecks. The establishment of separate programme offices by the CRC component of the EC Post-Conflict Rehabilitation and Capacity Building Programme, contributed to these shortcomings in capacity development: During implementation, the well-equiped offices allowed the programme to progress with “accelerated speed”, i.e., to cover a large number of projects in relatively short time, in keeping with the tight time-table of the programme. Staff members of the county administration merely accompanied the work of the project team, but never were able to establish a portfolio of tasks that was independent of the timetable and the resources of the project team that they could have transferred back to their regular positions outside of the resource-rich world of the programme.

The UN-sponsored District Development Councils (DDCs) have played a temporary role in local development planning. However, these Councils exist and operate along- and outside the formal Governmental structures, their sustainability and continued significance are therefore not certain. At the time of the evaluation, the DDCs had been more or less defunct for the previous two years, i.e. approximately since 2008 and were not involved in relevant processes at county level, such as the allocation of “County Development Fund” money to different community projects. Although President Johnson Sirleaf has signed an executive order to give the DDCs a formal role in local administrations, in practice they are often perceived as in competition to the original local administrative structure, lack even the most basic resources to function properly and are side-lined in key political processes at district and county level.

At national level, EC support has allowed the GoL to expand the scope and quality of its auditing function, situated in the General Auditing Commission (GAC). Free from any operational responsibilities themselves (such as the production of audit reports), EC-financed LTTA were able to focus on establishing a fruitful working relationship with a committed GAC leadership, also drawing by drawing on their own well established professional networks in the African audit community. Apart from financing the improvement of infrastructure and salary for the GAC leadership, EC-financed STTA also oversaw the merit-based rehiring process of GAC staff. As a result, the EC helped to significantly increase the number of audits the GAC was able to carry out, from only two in 2005 to 14 in 2006. Despite these successes, the GAC, including its leadership is increasingly becoming the target of allegations that the Commission is publishing reports are of insufficient quality that often serious accusations on the basis of insufficient evidence.

Data, sources, extracts : Effect on local authorities (county, district) Supporting evidence

• The final report of the CRC component claims that the training “will enable [county and district level staff] to contribute to and coordinate future development initiatives and claims that “the Nimba County PMT has continued to develop its skills which have been used successfully in the formulation of project proposals for other organisations”.

� In particular in Nimba and Lofa Counties, “local authorities are now using the experience and resources they gained in working on CRC initiatives to plan and coordinate the activities of the County Development Fund, which is using a similar approach to identifying small projects.”361

� E.g., in Nimba County, CRC trained PMT is said to have “applied its learning to the application for project



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funding from Accelor-Mittal and has facilitated training in Bong and Lofa Counties.”362

• At least temporarily, local authorities in Bong County had taken on specific coordination and regulatory roles in a “learning by doing” roads maintenance scheme that had been introduced by the CRC:363

� The County Commissioner (Suakoko District, Bong County) was put in charge in managing the funds collected from the toll system for the new / rehabilitated road

� A supervisory board, consisting of, among other things, the Deputy Superintendent for Development, County Commissioner, representatives from the market association, etc.) Was established (at least on paper) to supervise the toll system and road maintenance (Interview with District Commissioner).

Detracting evidence

• Final report of CRC component concedes that CRC Training alone was not sufficient to allow the trained staff at county and district level to actually take on additional tasks in the planning and management of projects at county level, i.e. for a lack of other necessary resources, such as vehicles or computers: “Agreeing the allocation of tasks to individuals within the County Authority, and training them to undertake these tasks, is pointless unless these officers have access to the other resources necessary to fulfil the role.”364

� This challenge was confirmed in interviews during the country visit to Liberia (June 2010):

� Former PMC chairman (Bong County) appreciated the trainings, the Uganda study tour the EC had financed, and the opportunity to be part of the project. However, even during the project, the County Administration was never the “driving force” in implementing the projects. Among county staff, the impression persisted that the EC / CRC came with “readymade packages” from Monrovia and at least initially neither solicited community nor true cooperation and partnership from the county administration365.

� Since the end of the project, however, he has been unable to use any acquired skills or knowledge because of the overwhelming capacity shortcomings at the county administration. Now officially responsible for project supervision in the country, he has no access to a vehicle (neither car nor motorcycle), no regular operational budget, i.e. to finance taxi rides within Gbanga (district capital) or outside. The office has no electricity (not even by generator) (Interview with district staff, Gbanga, Bong County).

� Equipment (cars, computers, tractor) that were left by the CRC at the end of project have now mostly broken down or are standing in the offices unused. The exception is one Land Rover that initially was being used by the County Administrator and then had been given to the local electrical utility (Interview with district staff, Gbanga, Bong County).

• Final CRC report questions that the “Learning by Doing” approach as such was effective, saying that undoubtedly “some” learning by doing took place, but that there was insufficient time or specialist resources within the programme to allow this learning to be reflected on and consolidated.”366

• The final CRC report concedes that establishing CRC field offices “tended to divert the locus of activity away from the County Administrative building to the field office, and may not therefore be fully consistent with the local authority capacity building objective.”367

• A limited number of “targets” for capacity building at county level and the resulting “competition” between programmes such as the CRC and others focused on capacity development for possible trainees at the local level368 calls into question the added value of each of such interventions. “Competition for trainees” seems to signify that there was at times and overabundance of these kinds of interventions, given the small number of staff members that could be targeted with such a training at county level.

• Road maintenance scheme failed eventually, without really having done or commissioned any road maintenance work:

� The supervisory board for the maintenance scheme never met, i.e. never became operational, supposedly because there was disagreement over the eligibility of board members to receive “sitting fees”, i.e. small amounts to recognise their service and compensate them for travel expenses, etc. (Interview with District representatives, Suakoko)

� The district commissioner and the community based road maintenance crews disagreed which procedure to use to approve funds for road repairs: The district commissioner claimed that the MoU that had been drafted (with EC support) and signed by all parties stipulated that the road maintenance crew had to submit an proposal for specific work to be done, upon which the money would be released. The road maintenance crew, however, insisted on being paid first (Interview with District representatives, Suakoko).

� The toll system had to be abandoned after significant opposition of the population to the collection of fees for using the road. The opposition intensified when the road condition started to worsen and road users questioned if the money that was collected really was used for repairs. Toll gate was damaged repeatedly, toll collectors were beaten. In January 2010, toll collection was abandoned (Interview with District representative, Suakoko; members of maintenance crew).

• Ultimately, neither the district nor the county administration took on any lasting new tasks or responsibilities in connection with the road maintenance scheme.



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Effect on District Development Councils (DDCs)


• DDC members “continued to be enthusiastic about the role of the committee” (Risner, 2007, p.14).

� Confirmed in interview with former DDC chairman (Bong County, Kpaai District), who still identified as DDC chairman, and, despite very limited means, tried to stay in contact with former DDC members.

Detracting evidence: • CRC final report conceded the “general perception that the DDCs are a diminishing force in the absence of

renewed UNDP support.”369 This is also supported by an analysis of CRC’s capacity development specialist, who reports that “during consultations district and county officials showed a tendency to diminish the role of the DDCs, variously describing them as a "UNDP baby" or as being only consultative forums that needed to avoid the temptation to usurp the legitimate leadership position of the District Commissioner.”370

� This was re-affirmed in interviews with county and district administration staff, who referred to DDCs as “temporary structures” that might have fulfilled a role at some point, but were no longer needed (Interview with county administration staff, Bong County; District Administration staff, Bong County (Kpaai District, Suakoko District)).

� Interviews with former DDC members and county and district administration staff also confirmed that the DDCs were at times perceived as competition to already existing, but also newly developing administrative structures at local level. For example, in Kpaai District, the chairman of the DDC reported that a separate person had been appointed (not clear by whom) to manage the funds allocated to the district from the “County Development Fund” (Interview with chairman of Kpaai District DDC), a Government managed fund that channels resources to Liberia’s counties and districts, thereby assuming a role that would have fit in principle into the originally intended set of tasks of DDCs371.

� The low relevance and involvement of the DDCs in the distribution and allocation process of County Development Fund (CDF) resources is confirmed in interviews with staff from the County Development Support Secretariat (CDSS) that is responsible for management of the CDF: DDCs are referred to as a “UNDP creation” and a mere “stop-gap measure” to support its own operations at county level after the conflict. The fact that there was now this capacity outside of county administrations had contributed to “clashes” between district and county administrations and these bodies, including the DDCs (interview with CDSS management).

� According to this interview, CDF money is allocated to different community projects without the express involvement of the DDCs (note: this is in line with the above-mentioned statement of a former DDC chairman in Bong County). (Interview with CDSS management).

� Even if it is not clear, how typical this occurrence is on a national scale, it at least suggests that there are issues and possible conflicts that will have to be navigated and resolved if the DDCs are to become a permanent institution of local government.

• DDCs also were said to have a declining base of active members: “It was reported that numbers of active DDC members had usually declined to a small core group and that a re-election would probably see less volunteers coming forward as candidates.”372

� UNDP representatives and former DDC members confirmed that the DDCs had essentially been inactive from 2008 onwards (Interviews with UNDP staff members; DDC chairman, Bong County). Former DDC members and chairman confirmed that it was difficult to keep DDCs together in the absence of any funds for meetings or transportation. For example, the chairman of the DDC for Kpaai District / Bong County was in principle still committed to keeping the DDC alive, but was without on-going support from UNDP or other sources to make this possible. At the time of the interview, he was without transportation, since the motorcycle that had been provided to him by EC / UNDP was no longer operational, and he did not have the money to have it repaired.

• Negative CRC experience with trying to engage DDC members as paid project monitors – attempt was abandoned by CRC.373 Monitors lacked the mobility or capacity to meet programme monitoring requirements.374

Effects on economic governance – General Auditing Co mmission

Supporting Evidence:

• EC GAC support (LTTA, staffing support, among others) can be linked to increase in the number of audits carried out:

� In 2005, GAC conducted two audits in 2005 (the Liberian Embassy in Washington D, and Foreign Travel Accounts).

� In 2006, it completed 12 audits (a 500% increase) with another 14 in progress. These were compliance audits, investigative and follow-up financial audits, or special audits.375

� NOTE: These numbers are not entirely in agreement with the numbers from the 2008 final report of the Long-term TA to the GAC. The final report states that as of 2008 the GAC was in the process of conducting 11 audits.376



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• GAC is mentioned as “success story of GEMAP” (NOTE: by the EC-financed GEMAP mid-term evaluation), as “the institution had achieved significant milestones towards effectively performing its functions.”377

• In interviews GAC staff members and management stated the following key inputs of the EC-financed LTTA and STTAs:

� GAC management benefitted from their “professional and moral support” that was particularly valuable because both TA were very knowledgeable in their respective fields (audit and training) and also had strong regional background. In particular the EC-financed audit TA had a well-established network among African auditors and auditing bodies that he could mobilize to support the development of standards, etc. in Liberia.

� Both TA were really considered to be “part of the team”, not separate from the team & the staff. Behaved in ways that showed that they considered the success of GAC also in their very personnel interest. They worked with GAC management and staff, engaged in open discussion, which also included disagreements, which in the end were fruitful for the cooperation and the progress of the Commission (Interview with GAC Management and staff, Monrovia).

� GAC management and staff valued the large array of papers and guidelines the TA produced and help to produce, such as guidelines for hiring, personnel, human resource management, etc.

� Because of the high quality of the TA trainer (“The EC is one of the donors with the biggest training capacity in Liberia”); the GAC training was highly sought after, not just inside the GAC, but even outside. I.e., even from other institutions people came and wanted to take the “EU training”.

� A short-term TA team also supported the rehiring process for GAC staff: The team “led the interview process”, in order to allow the GAC management to remain in the background to avoid accusations of favouritism (interview with GAC management and staff).

• The ToR for the LTTA was focused on training and capacity building. Neither of the TA was meant to have any responsibility for conducting audits themselves or had the responsibility for producing a certain set of deliverables (such as completed audit reports) outside of their responsibility for developing the capacity of the organisation. Their job description focused on providing support to the institution and to the management (Interview with GAC management and staff).

Detracting Evidence

• GAC performance and reports have ignited numerous controversies; critics of the GAC and the acting General Auditor allege that reports are of insufficient quality and that often serious accusations are made on the basis of insufficient evidence (Interviews with EC staff)

• A large number of newspaper articles that have covered the different controversies surrounding the GAC confirm this impression. The examples below are only meant for illustration and do not represent a complete list of incidences:

� In a HIPC audit report covering July 1, 2007-June 30, 2008, the GAC linked Finance Minister Ngafuan to the disappearance of US$5 million from the MOF even though he (Ngafuan) took over as Minister on August 22, 2008. In return, the Minister of Finance described the GAC’s report as 'porous and paralyzed' and alleges political motives and lacking basic professional deities of the audit profession378

� Following an audit of the Ministry of Education payroll, the GAC had to revoke its classification of 136 MoE employees as “ghosts” on the payroll, i.e. people who are listed on the payroll and are receiving funds although they are not employed at the Ministry. Initially the GAC report had requested the removal of 178 of those “ghosts” from the payroll, but an inquiry by the Ministry showed that the majority of these people were in fact still working at the MoE379.

� Indicator 8.1.2: Increased number of staff positions with clearly delineated responsibilities


EC support has allowed the General Accounting Commission to increase its staff levels, improve its qualifications (based on competitive re-hiring of all staff and training) and to put in place elements of a more coherent human resource management system. With EC assistance also in the organisation of the re-hiring process, the GAC was able to hire a total of 107 auditors and 41 administrative staff. In addition, the EC has also financed the position of the current Auditor General for 24 months, starting in November 2006.

Delays in this support, however, led to an 11 month lag between the inauguration of the new Liberian Government and the eventual appointment of the Auditor General, contributing to a period of lacking leadership at the organisation.

No evidence exists that the EC has had any influence on increasing the number of staff positions at County level.



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Effects on economic governance – General Auditing Co mmission


• EC financed the position of the Auditor General (John Morlu II) under ISP, allowing his appointment in November 2006. Support was planned for 24 months.

• Under the EC-financed LTTA support programme and an associated STTA for GAC staffing, all previous staff were terminated and asked to reapply through competitive recruitment and an associated test.

� 1,400 Liberians registered to take the test, 998 people eventually took the test

� 256 of the applicants passed the exam.

� Out this group of 256, eventually, the GAC re-employed 107 auditors and 41 administrative staff.

� EC STTA led this process, in agreement with General Auditor, who preferred to remain at some distance to this process to avoid the impression of any political influence on the re-hiring process (Interview with GAC staff).

• The new staffing is supported by the introduction of a set of HR documents (e.g., application for employment form, declaration of conflict of interest, asset declaration form, authorization and consent for background check, professional code of conduct, HR performance appraisal system, etc.).380

Detracting evidence: • Long delay between “discussions with EC to support the GAC” and the actual appointment of General

Auditor with EC finances, leading to an 11-month lag (from 1/2006 to 11/2006) between inauguration of the new Liberian Government (1/2006) and appointment of John Morlu (11/2006). In this 11 months period, the GAC was led by a “caretaker” GA. � In this period, the GAC staff felt that it “desperately” would have needed strong leadership and

direction381 • The final report of the GAC LTTA states that

� The salary levels of the GAC staff remain relatively low, increasing the danger that GAC staff feel compelled to engage in rent-seeking as part of their work. Under the current salary structure, the lowest salary is US$15, while the highest is US$100. As a temporary correction for these low salaries, the auditor was able to pay one-time allowances tot the GAC staff “in the range of US$150 for the lowest and US$1200 for the highest”. The final LTTA report suggests that “in the medium term, these allowances will have to be converted into salaries so that they are budgeted for as such in the National Budget for sustainability.”382

� The low staff levels of the GAC, inadequate equipment of staff with computers to be able to work effectively (in 2008, 10 auditors had to share one computer) were still affecting the effectiveness of the organisation. The GAC was said to often have problems in covering its recurring costs, including staff salaries; due to low staff levels, some auditors were involved in 3 to 4 audits at a time.383 These issues also might be linked to low political support of the GAC, e.g. from the Liberian Legislature (see Indicator 8.2.4 on Client / stakeholder satisfaction with services of EC supported organisations). � As of 2008, the GAC was still in the process of negotiating fees to be charged to the audited

organisations – a possible contributing factor to GAC’s lack of adequate revenue to support it.384

� Indicator 8.1.3: Gradual transfer of responsibilities from parallel structures to Government agencies and ministries


EC support at County level has not led to any significant transfer of responsibilities from parallel structures to local Governmental bodies. This is consistent with the finding that EC support has so far not helped supported local authorities to take up an increased number of tasks in relation to service and infrastructure provision (see Indicator 8.1.1). EC-supported programme field offices (i.e. of the PCRBP Community Rehabilitation Component (CRC)) have acted as “parallel structures” to the offices of county and district authorities and may have inhibited the development of organisational capacity in those institutions. The effort to involve county and district officials in the management and supervision of a community-based road maintenance scheme failed, along with the maintenance scheme overall. Donor- and EC supported informal District Development Councils (DDCs) absorbed additional resources without helping to develop sustainable organisational structures within local Government at county level.


Effect on local authorities (county, district, Distr ict Development Councils (DDCs))




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[No supporting evidence]


• Lack of significant progress in developing the capacity of local authorities and of allowing enhanced portfolios of these institutions (see Indicator 8.1.1.) diminishes the chances that functions could be transferred from parallel structures to local authorities.

� The final CRC report concedes that establishing CRC field offices “tended to divert the locus of activity away from the County Administrative building to the field office, and may not therefore be fully consistent with the local authority capacity building objective.”385

� CRC final report and report of CRC institutional advisor find perception that the DDCs are a “diminishing force” with dwindling membership numbers (see above, Indicator 8.1.1). This limits the likelihood that DDCs will take over planning / coordination roles from other structures. In fact, the DDCs can be considered as a “parallel structure” themselves.

� The effort to set up a community-driven road maintenance scheme has failed. The district commissioner of the respective district and officials from the county administration were meant to take on supervisory roles, i.e. as members of a supervisory board, and the district commissioner was supposed to be responsible for the management of the collected toll money for use in road repairs. However, the board made of county officials never met, partly because the designated members expected the payment of “sitting fees” for board meetings that had not been foreseen in the MoU between county, district and communities (Interview with district official , Suakoko District, Bong County; see also JC8.1, Indicator 8.1.1).

JC 8.1: Increased portfolio of EC-supported Governm ent Agencies and Ministries

Statement upon JC:

At county level, the EC has made no significant contribution to increasing the portfolio of the supported local authorities. Any learning by county staff during the programme did not carry over into the sustained adoption of new tasks after the end of the EC support, largely because of the substantial organisational capacity bottlenecks that persisted at the county and district level. These include lacking operational budgets to maintain equipment or finance travel within the county or district or the lack of electricity in administration building. In this type of environment, the supported county administrations have been unable to maintain and make use of any former programme equipment that was left with the local authorities, such as cars, computers and tractors. Integration of and coordination between County and National level Government structures remained week and therefore could not help to reduce these bottlenecks. The set-up of EC-financed field offices (i.e. for the CRC component of the PCRCBP) contributed to these shortcomings in capacity development: During implementation, the well-equipped offices allowed the programme to progress with “accelerated speed”, in keeping with the tight time-table of the programme. Staff members of the county administration could merely accompany the work of the project team. However, they never were able to establish a portfolio of tasks that was independent of the timetable and the resources of the project team that they could have transferred back to their regular positions outside of the resource-rich world of the programme.

The decision to channel support to and through the informal District Development Committees (DDCs) has further detracted from the increased role of local authorities vis-à-vis these parallel structures. In the years directly following the signing of the CPA, the UN-sponsored bodies did play a temporary role in local development planning. However, at the time of the evaluation, the DDCs had been more or less defunct for the previous two years, i.e. approximately since 2008 and were not involved in relevant processes at county level, such as the allocation of “County Development Fund” money to different community projects. Although President Johnson Sirleaf has signed an executive order to give the DDCs a formal role in local administrations, in practice they are often perceived as in competition to the original local administrative structure, lack even the most basic resources to function properly and are side-lined in key political processes at district and county level.

At national level, EC support has allowed the GoL to expand the scope and quality of its auditing function, situated in the General Auditing Commission (GAC). Free from any operational responsibilities themselves (such as the production of audit reports), EC-financed LTTA were able to focus on establishing a fruitful working relationship with a committed GAC leadership, also drawing by drawing on their own well established professional networks in the African audit community. Apart from financing the improvement of infrastructure and salary for the GAC leadership, EC-financed STTA also oversaw the merit-based rehiring process of GAC staff. EC support has thereby allowed the General Accounting Commission to increase its staff levels to a total of 107 auditors and 41



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administrative staff, improve staff qualifications and to put in place elements of a more coherent human resource management system. In addition, the EC has also financed the position of the current Auditor General for 24 months, starting in November 2006. As a result, the EC helped to significantly increase the number of audits the GAC was able to carry out, from only two in 2005 to 14 in 2006. Despite these successes, the GAC, including its leadership is increasingly becoming the target of allegations that the Commission is publishing often making at times serious accusations on the basis of insufficient evidence.

Judgement Criteria 8.2: Target groups (incl. women / girls) benefit from increased quality of Government-provided services and infrast ructure

� Indicator 8.2.1: Gendered poverty diagnosis is in place in EC-supported GoL programmes that clearly identifies poor, vulnerable groups, and those lacking services.

Findings at indicator’s level: At county level, the Community Rehabilitation Component of the PCRCBP with its financial support to the community, district and county level consultations for the “County Development Agendas” (CDAs) is the most relevant intervention for ensuring that Government programmes are based on a “gendered” poverty diagnosis that clearly identifies poor, vulnerable groups, and those lacking services. All CDAs refer to returnees, ex-combatants and youth as groups that require particular attention, due to their vulnerable status, and their significance for maintaining peace and stability.

The fact that the relevant analytical sections are at times identical in all three of the CDAs suggests that the Agendas are not always based on a customised analysis of the particular challenges of these groups in each county. For example, the analysis of gender issues is again identical in all three documents, suggesting that these sections are not based on county specific discussions of the particular challenges and needs of women. This notwithstanding, the agendas do propose a few specific interventions that are geared at youth, women, returnees and ex-combatants. They range of the call for separate prison wings for women and youth (in all three counties), particular still training or the formation of cooperative societies for women and youth to the call for special workshops to ensure that young Liberian’s increase their participation in local governance processes.

As broadly formulated priority lists, the CDAs might have helped to shape the expectations at county level for the delivery of specific goods and services and also can be a useful tool to channel money from different sources to a widely sanctioned group of priority projects. However, the practical significance of the agenda is ultimately constraint by the continuously weak implementation and planning capacity at county and district level and the resulting threats to the impact and sustainability of any project that might be carried out from the CDAs.


Local authorities (county, district, District Devel opment Councils (DDCs))


• According to the final report of the CRC, the programme focused on the three counties of Bong, Lofa and Nimba, because they “suffered the greatest impact of refugees’ return”386, suggesting that the planning and targeting of this intervention took into account the particular situation of returnees as those among the most vulnerable in Liberia’s post-conflict society.

� In light of this assessment, it is peculiar, however, that according to figures from the 2008 County Development Agenda, returnees in Nimba County make up only less than 1% of the overall population. In Lofa and Bong Counties, returnees account for 36% and 53% of the overall population.

• The particular situation of women is considered in the “second round” of County Development Agenda (CDA) workshops that was organised by the CRC team in the three supported counties (Bong, Lofa, Nimba). The chosen approach for this second round of workshops gave women their own groups to express their views – with the result of a more even participation by both men and women as compared to the first round of workshops. I.e. “participation in the female and youth groups was vocal and lively.”387

� All “County Development Agendas” in the supported counties (Bong, Lofa, Nimba) contain a section on gender equity.

� The EC-supported (CRC / PCRCBP) CDA consultations in Lofa, Nimba and Bong counties led to County Development Agendas that reflect to a certain extent priorities that are in the interest of ex-combatants and returnees in those areas. The proposed interventions range from a survey to identify ex-combatants who had missed out on DDRR programming so far (Bong) to measures to ensure that



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returnees could repossess their land and property upon their return (Lofa)388.

� The CDAs of Lofa, Nimba and Bong Counties propose a few interventions that are directed specifically at the Counties’ youth:

� Encourage the formation of cooperative societies, with a special emphasis on women and youth (Lofa)

� Providing skills training and business development services targeting young women and men (Nimba)

� Constructing prison facilities with separate cells for women and juvenile offenders (Nimba, Bong, Lofa)

� Construction of youth centres (Nimba)

� Conducting special workshops for civil society groups, and in particular youth groups to increase their inclusion in governance processes (Lofa)389

� In addition the issues of education and lacking economic opportunities figure prominently in all of the CDAs in the three counties.

• Project supervisor at Bong County considers Bong County CDA to be important document that can in principle guide the allocation of resources, e.g. from the County Development Fund, for county investment projects.

� The supervisor was also able to point to a number of projects listed in the CDA that had been taken up over the last few years with funds from different sources (Note: the status of these projects could not be verified).

� Management representatives from UNDP re-affirmed the key role of CDAs for the agency in working with local government (Interview with UNDP management)


• As of 2007, CRC institutional development specialist found that CRC had paid “insufficient attention to considering the gender aspects of its programmes.”390 E.g.

� In the first round of workshops for the elaboration of County Development Agendas (CDAs), discussion groups mixed both men and women, with the result that the discussions were “dominated by senior men” – however, CRC changed this approach in the second round of CDA workshops.

• Although the County Development Agendas (CDAs) of Bong, Lofa and Nimba County that resulted from this consultative process all include a separate section on gender, the wording of these sections is in large parts absolutely identical (see Bong CDC, 2008, p.31; Lofa CDC, 2008, p.30; Nimba CDC, 2008, p.29), calling into question, to what degree it really represents a county-wide consensus on the importance of addressing gender issues. It seems more likely that this section was inserted into all three documents from a standard template. For example:

� Apart from the standardised section on gender equity, the CDAs of all three counties contain only little additional gender-specific content or objectives. “Gender” is only mentioned in the demographic section (detailing the county population disaggregated by gender), in a general way in a section on “Children and Youth”391, which, again, is verbatim the same in all three CDAs; and finally in the section on indicators, that requires that certain indicators are collected “disaggregated by gender”.

� The CRC final report questions the contribution of the “County Development Agendas” (CDAs) to establishing a framework for increased decentralised planning and planning capacity. The report finds that the CDAs remain “fairly ‘broad brush’ statements of development priorities” and would not reflect a well-established decentralised planning capacity. The report concludes that “the CRC objective of building such a capacity remains unfulfilled.” 392

� Feedback from interviewees is in line with this assessment: A representative of a key implementing agency that is chiefly involved in decentralisation considers the CDAs to be “good documents” with currently little practical significance. As broadly formulated priority lists, they might have temporarily shaped the expectations at county level for the delivery of specific goods and services. However, without implementation arrangements that are specifically tied to them, their practical significance was naturally constrained by the weak implementation and planning capacity at local level (Interview with decentralisation specialist of implementing agency).

� Planning capacity was also diminished because “liaison with lines ministries remains problematic” (Cardno Agrisystems, 2009, p.37), leading to wasted investments due to failure to secure prior commitment to operational resources (especially clinics).

• The final report of the CR Component393 only mentions gender twice: in relation to the production of a project operational manual on “gender mainstreaming”394 and in a section on corruption that suggests that “anti-corruption be treated as a cross-cutting issue in a similar manner to gender or HIV/AIDS” The main body of the final report does not mention the words “women” or “woman” at all.395

• Similar to the treatment of gender in the CDAs, the analysis in the Agendas regarding youth / young people is also the same in all of the three documents, i.e. the text in all three documents is essentially identical (see CDAs of Bong, Lofa and Nimba Counties).



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� Indicator 8.2.2: Well-defined and adequately funded interventions in place directed at assisting identified groups, in particular girls / women.

Findings at indicator’s level: For the most part, EC-financed activities that meant to bring essential services and infrastructure to local communities were driven by and associated with EC-supported programme teams. These teams either acted largely independently of the local authorities (e.g. in the case of the EDF8 Reintegration Programme), or were the main facilitator for the improved service delivery (i.e., in the case of the CRC / PCRCBP). The CRC / PCRCBP set up its own offices in the counties that were in essence “parallel” to the county authorities, even in the eyes of the programme team itself, and thereby diverted attention away from any role played by the local Government itself. Government officials were not equipped to operate independently of the EC-financed programme teams, neither during the duration of the programme nor afterwards. During the programme, they had to rely on the vehicles of the CRC to “get out of their offices” and to conduct project visits. Attempts to involve district and county staff in the supervision and maintenance of EC-financed investments, such as the Suakoko-Yaendewon road, were not successful. The designated local administration staff members never took up their designated posts over disagreements over the appropriate remuneration. At least some of the investments made by the EC, e.g. roads or clinics, etc. are likely to eventually be unsustainable because local communities were not able to mobilise additional support from the local authorities and national Ministries. The resulting phenomena of “clinics without doctors” or the gradual decay of newly constructed roads is diminishing the public profile of GoL representatives in relation to their importance for service delivery and infrastructure maintenance.


Effect on local authorities (county, district, Distr ict Development Councils (DDCs))


• The construction of the Suakoko-Yaendewon Road, a medium-scale project under the CRC component of the Post-Conflict Rehabilitation and Capacity Building Programme was started with the initiative of one of the District Commissioners of Bong County (interview with district commissioner). Communities that now lie along the road had pushed for the road even before the CRC programme component set up its operation in Bong County (Focus Group with Yaendewon residents).


• The interventions implemented under the CRC component of the Post-Conflict Rehabilitation and Capacity Building Programme was probably associated with the programme team as such, and not so much with the local authorities as service providers:

� The programme was run out of programme offices at County level. These offices in essence established “parallel structures” to the county authorities and therefore would have diverted attention away from the roles of local Government in providing essential service and infrastructure (see Indicators 8.1.1 and 8.1.4 on more information on these issues).

� The county administrations were not able to function independently of the programme team, for a lack of vehicles, computers and other complementary inputs (see Indicator 8.1.4 on more information on this issue)

� Interviews confirmed that county and district staff has been lacking very basic prerequisites for carrying out managerial, supervisory or other kinds of supporting tasks to continue to work on EC financed projects. The current project officer of Bong County, who had been PMC chairman during the time of the CRC / PCRCBP has neither access to a vehicle or working computer, nor any access to operational funds that would allow him to hire a taxi, etc. for project visits (interview with County staff, Bong County).

• In the case of the construction of the Suakoko-Yaendewon road, where local authorities had been asked to assume responsibility for the continued supervision of the associated road maintenance scheme, the scheme itself failed relatively quickly and the designated staff members never really got involved. Staff from county and district administration who had been asked to serve on an associated supervisory board never took up that responsibility, at least in part because they expected the payment of a “sitting fee” for each board meeting that had not been foreseen in the EC-facilitated MoU between the communities and the local authorities (Focus group (FG) with Yaendewon residents (men); Interview with District staff, Suakoko).

• In addition, problems to “liaise with lines ministries” (Cardno Agrisystems, 2009, p.37), led to wasted investments due to failure to secure prior commitment to operational resources (especially clinics), but also to schools without teachers or books.396

� “At present in Liberia the line ministries are unable to deliver assurances of continued support to



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community initiatives. The often assumed sequence of events at community level - "we will find support to build a clinic and then approach the Ministry of Health for help with trained staff and drugs" is the wrong sequence and if acted on is likely to lead to empty clinic buildings (or schools without teachers and books).”397

� “Notably, although projects involved line ministry liaison (for example via County level committees) and checks were made and assurances given that support would be provided once the clinic, school or road was completed, in several cases this was not the case.”398

• The County Development Agendas (CDAs) that the EC had supported in Nimba, Lofa and Bong provide a helpful priority list to argue for directing.

� Indicator 8.2.3: Clients and other relevant stakeholders of EC supported GoL Agencies / Ministries are satisfied with quality of service received (either quantitative or qualitative indicator, disaggregated by gender, where applicable)

Findings at indicator’s level: The financial and organisational audits of the EC-supported General Auditing Commission (GAC) are of reasonable quality, as evidenced by their appreciation of important international and national clients and stakeholders, including the IMF, GEMAP evaluators, UN reviewers and the Liberian public. At the same time, a number of stakeholders are increasingly expressing dissatisfaction with the performance GACs role and performance in financial audits. This includes the Liberian legislature, as the most direct “client” of GAC audit reports399 that refused to be audited by the GAC and to hand over key documentation that was needed for the audit. In 2010, the GAC also came under criticism for shortcomings in its quality review process and the professionalism of its auditors that have led to the publication of inaccurate audit results. In the case of an audit of the MoE payroll, the GAC had to correct its finding for 136 out of 178 MoE employees (over 75%) that it had labelled incorrectly as “ghost” employees. Questions on the accuracy of GAC findings have also been raised in other cases. It is likely that at least some of these allegations have to do with opposition against the increased public scrutiny in financial affairs that is imposed by a strengthened GAC.

Data, sources, extracts: Effects on economic governance – General Auditing Co mmission Supporting evidence:

• EC described the audits as “of reasonably good quality, unearthing serious cases of financial irregularities”; in particular in the case with the Foreign Travel Accounts audit.400

• Several publications, including reviews and evaluations of GEMAP consider the GAC support to be a “success story” of GEMAP – presumably also because of the improved quality of the audits.401

� In this regard, it is also significant that the GAC audits helped the GoL to move towards the successful completion of the HIPC Initiative Completion Point Trigger, which, if successful, will translate into international debt relief for the Government of Liberia.402 The IMF, as an important “client” or at least stakeholder in these audits regarded the reports to be of sufficient quality to count them as evidence for Liberia’s progress towards the decision point.

• In 2010, the GAC Communication Department was rated as a model communications department by the “African Organisation of English-speaking Supreme Audit Institutions” (AFROSAI-E) in the AFROSAI-E community403 for its performance.


• An EC financed short-term consultant (on macro-economic and public finance management) described the audits as “lacking substance”404

� There are also more recent events that at least suggest certain shortcomings in the GAC quality review procedures before publishing politically sensitive reports. In the case of an audit of the MoE payroll, the GAC had to correct its initial characterisation of MoE employees as “ghosts” in 136 out of 178 cases. Reviews of the payroll subsequent to the publication of the report had shown that in over 75% of the individuals on the “ghost”-list, the GAC had mislabelled these employees because of differences in spelling and other similar causes.405

� Critics of the GAC, i.e. institutions or individuals who had become targets of unfavourable audit reports but also other civil-society organisations (e.g. the “Coalition for the Sustainability, Transparency, and Accountability of Democracy” (COSTRAD), cite lack of professionalism and attentiveness as weak points of GAC performance (see, for example, coverage in the Daily Observer, e.g. “GAC Fails to Do Justice to Mines Ministry” (19.4.2010).

• The final report of the LTTA support to the GAC finds that “many political players have not accepted the creation of a strong and credible GAC”, suggesting that these stakeholders “would rather want the status quo to continue” which would undermine the creation of a transparent and accountable system.406 This lack



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of acceptance and resistance is cited not only for auditees of the GAC, but also for institutions that would need to be seen as important users of GAC auditing reports, for example:

� The Liberian legislature refused to be audited and to hand over key documentation to the GAC auditors. The final report warns that “if the legislature can refuse to be audited, what guarantee do we have that the committees formed from both houses as proposed in the draft law, will debate the Auditor General's report and recommend appropriate action?” (FinEurop, 2008, p.6)407

� The Liberian Senate indicted the Auditor General, in the view of the EC LTTA “for carrying out his constitutional duty of restructuring and reforming the GAC even after they approved the restructuring programme”. The case subsequently ended up in the Supreme Court and delayed the recruitment of new auditors and their training.408

• There also is a possible connection between low political support of the GAC and the fact that the Commission is still inadequately funded, equipped and staffed,409 in spite of the EC-financed hiring of new auditors and administrative staff (see Indicator 8.1.2 on staff positions above).

JC 8.2: Target groups (incl. women/ girls) benefit from increased quality of Government-provided services and infrastructure

Statement upon JC: At county level, EC capacity development assistance has not improved the level and quality of Government-provided services that Liberia’s youth, ex-combatants and refugees are receiving. For the most part, EC-financed activities that meant to bring essential services and infrastructure to local communities were driven by and associated with EC-supported programme teams, not with local authorities. EC teams either acted largely independently of the local authorities (e.g. in the case of the EDF8 Reintegration Programme), or were the main facilitator for the improved service delivery (i.e., in the case of the CRC / PCRCBP). The CRC / PCRCBP set up its own offices in the counties that were in essence “parallel” to the county authorities, even in the eyes of the programme team itself, and thereby diverted attention away from any role played by the local Government itself. Government officials were not equipped to operate independently of the EC-financed programme teams, neither during the duration of the programme nor afterwards. Attempts to involve district and county staff in the supervision and maintenance of EC-financed investments, such as the Suakoko-Yaendewon road, were not successful: the designated local administration staff members never took up their posts over disagreements over the appropriate remuneration through “sitting fees”. At least some of the investments made by the EC are likely to eventually be unsustainable because local communities were not able to obtain additional support from local authorities and national Ministries. Phenomena like the gradual decay of newly constructed roads are diminishing the public profile of GoL representatives in relation to their perceived importance for service delivery and infrastructure maintenance.

The “County Development Agendas” that were meant to become the strategic framework for “bottom-up” development propose a few specific interventions that are geared at youth, women, returnees and ex-combatants. They range of the call for separate prison wings for women and youth (in all three counties), particular still training or the formation of cooperative societies for women and youth to the call for special workshops to ensure that young Liberian’s increase their participation in local governance processes. As broadly formulated priority lists, the CDAs might have helped to shape the expectations at county level for the delivery of specific goods and services and also can be a useful tool to channel money from different sources to a widely sanctioned group of priority projects. However, the practical significance of the agenda is ultimately constraint by the continuously weak implementation and planning capacity at county and district level and the resulting threats to the impact and sustainability of any project that might be carried out from the CDAs (see above).

EC support to economic governance at national level, including support to the GAC and the BCE, are not directly aimed at the improvement of the situation of particular target groups of the EC. This notwithstanding, they have made important contributions to the improved functioning of the GoL in financial terms – which eventually can translate into an improved availability of resources for infrastructure and services investments. Youth, women, ex-combatants and other vulnerable groups therefore still stand to gain from this assistance, albeit in a more indirect way. EC support to the General Auditing Commission (GAC) has been one of the most successful EC-financed projects in this regard. However, apparent shortcomings in its quality review and assurance procedures have allowed the publication of a number of insufficiently substantiated claims of wrongdoing by Government agencies in the recent past. These occurrences have made the GAC vulnerable to criticism from other Government stakeholders.



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Judgement Criteria 8.3: Improved accountability of EC-supported Government agents vis-à-vis their constituents

� Indicator 8.3.1: Transparent and more effective revenue collection in place (translating in increased revenues)

Findings at indicator’s level: EC support in the area of economic governance has helped the Government of Liberia to raise the transparency and effectiveness of its revenue collection system. A series of financial and operational audits of 5 state-owned enterprises410 (SOEs) and Liberia’s Central Bank provided the evidential basis for galvanising the international donor community into joint negotiations with the (then) transitional Government of Liberia for the creation of a comprehensive joint programme with the aim of reforming a range of key economic governance organisations of the GoL. The negotiations eventually led to the signing of GEMAP in September 2005, i.e. the “Governance and Economic Management Assistance Programme”, a partnership between the NTGL / GOL and the international community to improve governance, enhance transparency and accountability. In the months and years following September 2005, GEMAP served as the umbrella for a cluster of donor-funded economic governance reform projects, some of which significantly increased the amount of revenues collected on behalf of the Liberian Government. For example, revenue from four of the five SoEs that had been audited by the EC411 in 2005 and that subsequently had been supported by USAID had increased by 90% in 2007, in comparison to the revenue levels during the era of the transitional Government (pre-2005). The final report of the EC-financed Long-Term TA team estimates that the GoL realised US$17m in additional revenues as a result of the EC-financed GAC support412.

Whereas the EC GAC support is at times considered to be a “success story” of GEMAP, the EC assistance to the Bureau of Customs and Excise (BCE) did not perform as well. Customs-related revenues are the single-largest contribution to the annual revenues of the GoL, so the relevance of BCE support for increasing revenue collection is high. However, the EC-financed technical assistant only contributed to a preliminary draft version of a strategy for temporary outsourcing of BCE functions to private providers during his tenure. Since the strategy was left unfinished, it had to be revised and finalised by a team of additional IMF-funded TAs that overall contributed more to the improved performance of the BCE than the EC-funded TA.


Significance of EC-financed audits of SOEs for creation of GEMAP:


• It is generally acknowledged that financial accountability between 2003 and 2005, i.e. during the years of the NTGL, was extremely low and that corruption was rampant. Against this backdrop, the 2006 Joint Review by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the World Bank’s Fragile States Group finds that the EC audits of the Central Bank of Liberia and five state-owned enterprises (Bureau of Maritime Affairs, National Port Authority, Roberts International Airport, Liberia Petroleum Refining Company and the Forestry Development Authority) that were completed in 2005 were “a significant catalyst for donor action”. The review considers the audit reports to be “the most comprehensive empirical evidence to date of the extent of corruption in Liberia; so dramatic were the data that the EC did not immediately release them for fear of the reaction they might provoke.”413

• Eventually, the EC shared the audit results with the IMF, the World Bank and the US, “joining a dialogue already underway between the US Embassy in Monrovia, and USAID, State Department and Treasury officials in Washington on how donors might respond to the gravity of corruption in Liberia.”414 The joint review finds that “the significance of the EC audits was the potential they raised for concerted multilateral intervention based on empirical evidence.”415

� The review also finds that the audit results were instrumental for preparing and initiating a discussion with ECOWAS and the United Nations on a possible donor response to the high level of corruption in Liberia. In anticipation, “the EC shared the audit results with both organizations, having already forwarded them, some weeks previously, to the NTGL Chairman.”416

• The ensuing discussions and negotiations eventually led to the signing of GEMAP, i.e. the “Governance and Economic Management Assistance Programme”, a partnership between the NTGL / GOL and the international community to improve governance, enhance transparency and accountability. The GEMAP Agreement was signed on September 9, 2005. The subsequent multi-donor interventions under the GEMAP umbrella led to a series of changes in financial and economic management in Liberia’s economic governance organisations417.



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� Among other things, donor support under GEMAP led to increases in state-revenues from Liberia’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs) (see table 47). It is important to note that these increases did not occur as a direct consequence of the EC-financed audits. Nonetheless, the EC contributed to this development through the catalysing effects of its 2005 audits of the SOEs (see above).

Table 47: Increase of Revenue from Liberian State-O wned Enterprises (2004 – 2007)

LPRC: Liberian Petroleum Refining Company; RIA: Roberts International Airport; NPA: National Port Authority; FDA: Forestry Development Agency. Source: USAID, 2008, p. 4.

Significance of EC-support to the General Auditing Co mmission (GAC):


• Final report of LTTA to GAC finds that in the financial year that ended 30th June 2007, “the GoL realized US$17m additional revenue”, maintain that this was “a direct result of the critical analysis of the National budget and exposition by the Auditor General.”418

Effects on Economic Governance – Bureau of Customs an d Excise (BCE)


• The “preliminary strategy for services outsourcing” to which the EC-financed short-term technical assistant contributed is one of several stepping stones that ultimately led to the issue of Expression of Interests for the temporary outsourcing of customs-related functions of the BCE to private providers – presumably in order to bridge capacity gaps in the BCE and to increase customs-related revenue collection419 quickly and in the short-term.420


• The GEMAP “Status Report : Year 1” suggest a fairly comprehensive portfolio of the EC-financed “Customs Operations Expert” (COE)421, including “assisting in reviewing and updating customs and administrative regulations with emphasis on identifying conflicts and providing implementation guidance; harmonization of customs tariffs to ensure that they agree with those of the ECOWAS region and also are compatible with the expectations of the World Trade Organization (WTO); and providing technical advice to future inspection regulations.”422 Assisting in “examining the possibilities for temporary outsourcing of the BCE customs and excise function” (GEMAP, 2006, p.4) is only one of many intended activities of this TA.

� In contrast to this comprehensive list, the actual outputs produced with the help of this expert are few. The 2008 GEMAP mid-term evaluation calls the performance of the COE “questionable” and finds that the expert was “not particularly skilled.”423 The evaluation report only mentions the experts contribution “to the preparation of a preliminary strategy for services outsourcing” as achievement, insofar as the EC-financed customs expert “paved the way” for the enlistment of additional IMF short-term advisors.

� The IMF financed experts were the ones who eventually “revised and finalized the [outsourcing] strategy” and prepared three calls for expression of interest to identify possible contractors. Based on this assessment, the GEMAP mid-term evaluation concludes that “the IMF contribution was much more relevant [sic] than the GEMAP [i.e., the EC-financed TA] support.”424



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� Indicator 8.3.2: Reasons for decisions on resource allocations, and their results and costs, are clear and communicated to the general public

Findings at indicator’s level: EC support to the General Auditing Commission has increased the performance of the Commission. The GAC has used its increased capacity to elevate its own public profile and the public profile of its audits. EC-support therefore likely has contributed to the transparent communication of resource use in the public sector to the Liberian public.

Data, sources, extracts : Significance of EC-support to the General Auditing Co mmission (GAC):


• The EC-supported “General Accounting Commission” (GAC) has invested considerably in communicating the results of its audits to the Liberian public. For this purpose, it uses radio addresses and press releases, and also publishes the reports of its audits on its website.

� In 2010, the GAC Communication Department was rated as a model communications department in the AFROSAI-E community425 by the “African Organisation of English-speaking Supreme Audit Institutions” (AFROSAI-E) for its performance.

• The increased profile of the GAC and its increased performance, coupled with the public interest that these PR campaigns have generated are likely to have improved the overall transparency of resource use in Liberia’s public sector.


• On the other hand the GAC has been faced with increasing criticism of premature reporting of audit results and of publishing damming? Reports without sufficient previous vetting (see JC 8.1; Indicator 8.1.1).

� Indicator 8.3.3: Tracking of spending on services and infrastructure (programme, category, region) in place

Findings at indicator’s level: The General Auditing Commission (GAC), and in turn, EC support to the GAC has played a significant role in ensuring adequate tracking of Government spending, including spending on services and infrastructure. As of 2008, the GAC had significantly increased its audit portfolio and was conducting audits of a number of GoL Ministries and Agencies that are central for the provision of social services and infrastructure in Liberia, including the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Public Works, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Lands and Mines and Liberia’s General Service Agency. The GAC’s progress also had been acknowledged by the IMF in its assessment of GoL progress towards the HIPC Initiative Completion Point Trigger.

Still, as of 2009, many GoL organisations that are central for service provision and infrastructure investments remain un-audited, including the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs and the Public procurement of Concession Commission.



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• The General Auditing Commission (GAC), and in turn, EC support to the GAC plays a significant role in ensuring adequate tracking of Government spending, including spending on services and infrastructure426. The GAC mission (elaborated in the process of EC-financed LTTA support) is to

� “Promote and defend the public interest. The GAC will bring integrity, accountability, transparency and fiscal probity to public service through the conduct of audits. We will restore public confidence in Government by fighting fraud, waste and abuse of public resources. We will work to end corruption.”427

• As of 2008, the GAC had significantly increased its audit portfolio (see Indicator 8.1.1.) and was conducting audits of a number of GoL Ministries and Agencies that are central for the provision of social services and infrastructure in Liberia, including: � Ministry of Public Works (2007/2008) � Ministry of Lands and Mines (2007-2008) � University of Liberia (2006-2007; 2007-2008) � General Service Agency428 (2006-2007; 2007-2008) � Ministry of Education (2007-2008) � Liberia Water and Sewer Corporation (2006-2008) � Ministry of Finance (2007-2008) � Liberia Produce Marketing Corporation (2005/06; 2006/07; 2007/08) � National Social Security and Welfare Corporation (2007/2008) � National Drug Service (2006/2007) � Ministry of Health (2007/2008) � Liberia Electricity Corporation (2006/07; 2007/08).429

• The GAC audits themselves have to be considered as an important GoL mechanism to ensure proper tracking of its revenues and expenditures.

• In 2009, the IMF found that the GAC had “made significant progress with 25 government department or agency audits completed, including an audit of the Ministry of Finance for FY2005/06 and FY2006/07.”430

� In addition, the GAC had finalised a first round of audits of 5 key Ministries (Health, Education, Public Works, Finance and Lands, Mines and Energy), and contribution and pre-condition for the HIPC Initiative Completion Point Trigger, which, if successful, will translate into international debt relief for the Government of Liberia.431


• As of 2009, a number of GoL organisations that are central for service provision and infrastructure investments remain unaudited, and “therefore remain unaccountable to the Liberian people simply because the Government has not made available funding for their audits”,432 including the following (list is not complete): � Ministry of Internal Affairs � Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs � Civil Service Agency � Liberia Institute of Public Administration � Bureau of State Enterprises � Public Procurement and Concession Commission � Liberia Anti-Corruption Commission � Monrovia Consolidated School Service � WVS Tubman Technical College � National Food Assistance Agency � Liberia Agency for Community Empowerment (LACE) � Ministry of Agriculture � Ministry of Transport



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� Indicator 8.3.4: Citizens can obtain government documents at no or very low cost

Findings at indicator’s level: Citizens can obtain GAC audit reports at no cost at the website of the General Auditing Commission (www.gacliberia.com). In addition audit results are also publicised on radio addresses and news releases. According to information from the EC-financed LTTA team that is assisting the GAC and the Auditing Commission itself, the publication of much of this information happened in response to public inquiries about the status of the GAC’s work. It is reasonable to assume that EC support enabled the Commission to publish results of its work in these ways. The main threat to the public availability of key GoL documents is likely to come from the resistance of some public institutions, such as the Liberian legislature or the Senate, to be audited by the General Auditing Commission.



• Finished GAC audit reports, information on on-going audits and a list of organisations that are “not yet audited” and “therefore remain unaccountable to the Liberian people simply because the Government has not made available funding for their audits”433 are available at the GAC website.434

• The final report of the EC-financed LTTA also claims that “key stakeholders like government officials and the Legislatures are now more aware about the need for public accountability” and that “the GAC has been able through radio programmes sponsored by the EC and UNMlL, press releases and conferences by the GAC communications department to educate the public on the role of the Auditor General as enshrined in the Law.”435

� On its website, the GAC claims that it published the list of unaudited institutions “response to massive public inquiries about the status of the General Auditing commission’s audit exercise.”436


• The experiences of the General Auditing Commission suggest, however, that public scrutiny – and with it the easy access to Government documents – is not greater in some areas of the Liberian Government than in others. For example, the Liberian Legislature refused to hand over key documents to the General Auditing Commission and overall refused to be audited.

JC 8.3: Improved accountability of EC-supported Gov ernment agents vis-à-vis their constituents

Statement upon JC: The General Auditing Commission (GAC), and in turn, EC support to the GAC has played a significant role in improving the financial accountability of Government agents vis-à-vis the Liberian public. A strengthened GAC is helping to maintain adequate checks for Government spending in the audited organisations, including spending on services and infrastructure. As of 2008, the GAC had conducted audits of a number of GoL Ministries and Agencies that are central for the provision of social services and infrastructure in Liberia, including the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Public Works, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Lands and Mines and Liberia’s General Service Agency. Still, as of 2009, many GoL organisations that are central for service provision and infrastructure investments remain un-audited, including the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs and the Public procurement of Concession Commission. GAC reports can be obtained from its website. Results of GAC audits are also publicised through radio addresses and news releases that meet with considerable interest from the Liberian public. The Communication Department of the GAC was rated as a model communications department by the “African Organisation of English-speaking Supreme Audit Institutions” (AFROSAI-E).

Apparent weaknesses in the quality review and assurance procedures of the GAC, as shown in the audit of the MoE payroll and the ensuing debate over the accuracy of the GAC findings, can have a negative impact on the legitimacy of the GAC and its ability to confront its critics and opponents and to continue to play an important role in improving the financial accountability of the Liberian Government.



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1.9 Education EQ9: To what extent has the EC helped to reduce the socio-economic marginalisation of vulnerable groups in the population, identified as one of the root causes of past violent conflicts, through its support to the education sector?

Judgment Criterion 9.1: Timely commencement of and progression through implementation of EC financed a ctivities in the sector

� Indicator 9.1.1: # of months from signing of the financing condition to commencement of implementation


The programme “EC Support to Education in Liberia” (ECSEL) has experienced repeated and multiple delays from the moment of its initial identification in August of 2005 (see table 48: Timeline of EC Support to Education in Liberia (ECSEL)). The signing of the Financing Agreement itself was delayed by about one year, in comparison to the originally foreseen date (i.e. from 11/2005 to 10/2006). Once the FA was eventually signed, it took another 28 months (i.e. 2 years and 4 months) until the recruitment of the Long-Term TA to run the programme (3/2009). As a result, a total of 41 months or 3 years and 5 months passed from the start of project identification (8/2005) until recruitment of the Long-Term TA team in March 2009. The delays were chiefly caused by staff bottlenecks in the European Union Delegation / Office in Monrovia, coupled with drawn-out attempts to mobilize floaters and other short-term help from Commission HQ in Brussels. As of September 2009, 4 years after the initial project identification and 2 years and 11 months after signing the financing agreement, none of the so-called “quick impact” activities had been started, including the “accelerated training” for up to 1500 teachers” and “text book production and distribution based on the material of the Accelerated Learning Programme (ALP, UNICEF) for primary schools.”437

Data, sources, extracts: Detracting Evidence:

• The construction of a timeline for the EC Support to Education in Liberia (ECSEL) shows that the project has experienced repeated and multiple delays from the moment of its initial identification in August of 2005 (see table 48).

Table 48: Timeline of EC Support to Education in Li beria (ECSEL)

Action Actual Date Intended Date Comment

Submission of Project Identification Sheet to the Office Quality Support Group (oQSG)

08/2005 08/2005 ToR of STTA and LTTA had to be updated in 2007 “given the long time that has passed since the programme was identified”438

Submission of Draft Financing Proposal to oQSG 05/2006 09/2005439 According to EAMR of February 2007, the financing proposal was sent to the QSG the Delegation in 05/2006, “but took 5 months in HQ to sign”440

Financing Decision 10/2006441 10/2005442 N/A Signing of ECSEL Financing Agreement 10/2006 11/2005443 A one year delay, according to the Delegation due to “late arrival of

technical assistance, understaffing in the Liberia office and procedural delays”444



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Mobilisation of STTA to “quick-launch” ECSEL activities (EC, 2007g, p.8) with help of “floater” from HQ. EAMR notes that STTA resulted in contribution agreement of €4.5m with UNICEF and the start of tendering process for the LTTA.445

2nd half 2007 N/A EAMR notes that “launching of Education programme [...] was delayed from the 1st to the 2nd semester due to staff constraints” and the needed update of STTA / LTTA ToR (see above).446 “The floater expected to come to assist with jump-starting the education project did not arrive [in] H1 2007, postponed the STTA, the LTTA and the PE under this program – the project has been dormant for almost a year due to understaffing447

Signature of Rider to ECSEL Financing Agreement, re-introducing the possibility for “application of flexible procedures under Art. 72 & 73 of the Cotonou Agreement”.

10/2007 N/A The possibility for flexible procedure had been attached to the original financing proposal, but was then removed, “contrary to the recommendation of the Delegation.448

Draft contribution agreement with UNICEF 2nd half 2007449

N/A Planned date for start of “essential implementation activities”: 1st half of 2008.

Failure of Contribution Agreement negotiations with UNICEF 05/2008 N/A According to the EAMR of 02/2009, the Delegation received on 17.05.2008 “information from UNICEF that there still was no clarity on whether their procurement office would agree to implement the action”.450 The difficulty for UNICEF seemed to lay with sole sourcing of the textbooks under their procurement rules.

ECSEL LTTA contract signed 12/2008 N/A N/A ECSEL LTTA to begin 03/2009451 03/2009452 N/A Signing of first specific commitments under ECSEL 10/2009453 N/A The first secondary commitments were signed within days of the

“D+3” deadline (signing of the financing agreement + three years). Failure to sign these commitments at this date would have let to the partial decommitment of the funds.

• From the begin of project identification (8/2005) until the begin of implementation, i.e. the recruitment of the LTTA to run the programme (3/2009), a period of 41 months (3 years and 5 months) passed

• From the signing of the financing agreement (10/2006) until the start of implementation, i.e. the recruitment of the LTTA to run the programme (3/2009), a period of 28 months (2 years and 4 months) passed.

• As of September 2009, 48 months (4 years) after the initial project identification / 35 months (2 years and 11 months) after signing the financing agreement, none of the initially labelled as “quick impact” activities, such as:

� “accelerated training” for up to 1500 teachers”

� “Text book production and distribution based on material of the Accelerated Learning Programme (ALP, UNICEF): for primary schools.” (EC, 2006a).



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� Indicator 9.1.2: EC-financed / -pledged inputs became available “on the ground” without significant delay (at expected time)

Findings at indicator’s level: In comparison to the originally intended signature date of the ECSEL FA (11/2005), the availability of EC-financed outputs “on the ground” has so far experienced at least a delay of 40 months, or 3 years and 4 months, even if one allows for a 6 months recruitment period for the ECSEL LTTA. As of 09/2009, neither the “quick-impact” activities (teacher training, provision of books) nor any of the other substantive results (curriculum development, infrastructure rehabilitation) had started. Even in comparison to the actual signature date of the FA (10 / 2006), the delivery of EC-financed support “on the ground” is significantly delayed: in total a period of 36 months passed between the signing of the FA and the assessment of the ROM mission in 09/2009. Allowing again a for 6 month recruitment period between signing of the FA, even the “quick impact” activities of ECSEL are still approximately 2 ½ years behind schedule.

Data, sources, extracts: ECSEL

Supporting evidence: [No supporting evidence at this time]


• According to the original Financing Agreement, the project was supposed to have duration of 36 months “from the mobilisation of the technical assistance”.454 The financing conditions do not give a date for the TA mobilisation. Assuming that the TA should have been mobilised within 6 months of the intended signing of the FA (Intended FA signature date: 11/2005), the TA should have been “on the ground” and mobilised by 05/2006

• When the LTTA team was eventually deployed in March 2009, the work during the first months work centred around developing an analysis of the situation with respect to primary education in the country and recommendations on the broad steps that need to be undertaken as well as preparing the Terms of Reference and bidding documents for the contracts of the four specific commitments.455 The ROM report finds that “no work on the ground has started on any of the other four results” that would have had a more visible and tangible effect at the level of the beneficiaries, including:

� R3) Strategic needs-based planning, policy-making and budgeting strengthened at all levels of the MoE;

� R4) Overall curriculum development and reform supported, including educational materials development;

� R5) Primary school teachers trained and continuously professionally upgraded on the basis of generic teacher competencies; and

� R6) Educational infrastructure rehabilitated and expanded.456

• This means that by the end of 2008 (the end of the period considered in the evaluation), the EC support of the Liberian education sector (ECSEL) has not had a tangible effect on the educational opportunities of the Liberia population “on the ground”.

� Indicator 9.1.3: EC financed activities progressed through implementation in accordance with work plan


It is not possible to gauge progress in the actual implementation of ECSEL, because of the significant delays of the programme. However, an assessment of ECSEL’s design showed that the intended logic, course and flow of the programme were in part overly optimistic and insufficiently precise and clear with regard to a number of key elements of the programme. Firstly, the implementation modalities for the intended “quick impact activities” were not clearly spelled out in the Financing Agreement. Secondly, ECSEL is based on contradictory conceptions of “organisational restructuring” and capacity development as “programme results” and at the same time as “programme pre-conditions”. In addition, the timeframe that is provided for restructuring at the MoE, one year, is too short to achieve the desired results, and the resources, including the human resources devoted to this issue are too few. These shortcomings pose a significant threat to the intended programme work plan and schedule.



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Data, sources, extracts : ECSEL: Implementation of ECSEL had not started at the end of 2008, therefore no data on the actual implementation of the programme are available. In lieu of assessing the actual implementation, Table 49 therefore considers the logical consistency of the programme design as presented in ECSEL’s Financing Agreement, in particular in relation to three key elements of the programme: The “Quick Impact Activities”, the capacity development intentions at the Ministry of Education and the way in which the FA has treated the risk and assumptions.

Table 49: Selected design features of ECSEL

Programme Element Design Features (according to FA) Comments

• FA foresaw the recruitment of a “separate short-term TA [...] to ensure a rapid preparation and launching of the implementation of the quick impact activities”.457

• FA also foresaw that quick impact interventions, should “capitalise on the existing materials, activities and organisation to expand immediate support to the target groups during the first year of the ECSEL, while preparing and integrating experience from the post-conflict phase into the mid-term strategy”

Qui

ck Im

pact

Act

iviti

es

• Quick impact activities were meant to be “linked directly to capacity development for policy making and strategic planning”, and thus were meant to “facilitate the transfer from an emergency [...] to a more sustainable (needs) oriented approach459.

• Linking “quick-impact” activities to “capacity development for policy making and strategic planning” (and thereby placing them within the scope of the MoE) is not consistent with the “lessons learned” in the FA that “data collection and use, and supervision and monitoring of schools, have come to a standstill” and that “emergency programmes are not properly managed or supervised”.458

• It also is not clearly stated, how ECSEL was supposed to address the “insufficient oversight of the existing emergency programmes”. This is significant since ECSEL’s quick impact activities were supposed to “capitalise on the existing emergency programmes”.

MoE

Cap

acity

Bui

ldin

g

• 3 out of 6 ECSEL results deal with MoE capacity issues: “reforming key institutional structures in MoE” (R1); “strengthening quality assurance, M&E” (R2); “strengthening needs-based planning, policy-making in MoE” (R3).460

• At the same time, “MoE restructuring” is also listed as one of three “conditions for reform” (i.e. under “risks and assumptions” in the FA) that, if not in place will risk “the overall effectiveness of the project”.461

• Treating MoE restructuring and capacity building both as a “results” and as “assumptions” / pre-conditions establishes a circular logic in the programme theory and blurs and muddles the relationship between cause (i.e. the programme) and effect (intended changes in the MoE)



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• “Proposing and agreeing” on organisational set-up” to be achieved within first six month of ECSEL (1st-2nd quarter)

• “Operationalizing organisational structure” achieved within second six months (3rd-4th quarter)

• Seemingly overly ambitious timetable for MoE capacity building. Although it is on the surface consistent with the notion of “organisational restructuring” as a precondition for programme success (see above), it at the same time contradicts the stated severity of capacity gaps under the “lessons learned” section of the FA.

• Overall, the timetable seems to be oblivious to the often protracted nature of organisational reforms, i.e. the agreement of organisational reforms and the implementation.

Ris

ks a

nd A

ssum

ptio

ns

• The FA proposes to counter the “key risk” that “the Government would not be able to meet its obligations in covering recurrent costs [...], particularly regarding the payment of salaries” by “reducing recurrent costs through providing support to the process of streamlining the organisational structure of the MoE”, , i.e. in terms of “staff reduction and the eradication of "ghost" teachers in the system”

• In combination with the cost saving effects of a functionally restructured MoE, the intervention therefore would seek “to ensure financial and economic sustainability right from the start”.

• The FA links the challenge to ensuring “financial sustainability” of the sector to the quick success of organisational restructuring and corresponding resource savings. This design does not allow a more protected course of reforms in the Ministry, as it would threaten the financial sustainability of the sector. Similar to the examples above, the FA is based on an overly optimistic view of the chances for a quick and effective organisational restructuring of the MoE.

The analysis in the above table suggests the following issues:

• The design of the programme was based on an overly optimistic assessment of the EC’s chances to quickly, i.e. in a matter of one year, put in place a more effective organisational structure at the Ministry of Education.

• In addition, the FA treats “institutional reform” and capacity development not just as a result of ECSEL (in fact three out of 6 “results” are related to capacity development), but even and in additional as a prerequisite for programme success. Apart from the fact that this blurs the cause and effect logic of the programme, it also suggests that the programme designers thought the organisational restructuring of the Ministry to be a relatively straightforward and quick undertaking that would not absorb a lot of time or effort.

� This conclusion is also supported by the fact that the original FA does not call for a designated “organisational development” expert, who should oversee the restructuring of the Ministry. This task is assigned to the team leader who, in addition to her team leader responsibilities should also “be responsible for providing advice to the restructuring of the MoE and for setting up a functional operational design”462

• The FA also remains unclear and unspecific about the implementation modalities of the so called “quick-impact activities”. The FA calls for the recruitment of a “separate short-term TA”, who should expedite the launching of these activities. At the same time, however, the agreement proposes to build these activities on the “existing materials, activities and organisations”, including, the MoE, when it had previously stated that the serious capacity gaps at the MoE at left the existing emergency without proper management or supervision.

• Interviews with EC stakeholders with knowledge of the programme’s design process reaffirmed that ECSEL was designed based on the assumption that in principle, “capacity was present”, in the Ministry as well as in the Counties, i.e., in the form of higher level staff who were knowledgeable about education as well as, albeit old, books (Interview with EC education expert). This assessment is in contradiction to the experience of the clear majority of donor organisations that are currently involved in the education sector (Interviews with representatives of main education donors in Liberia).

• Overall, the EC, in the Financing Agreement for ECSEL, has not adequately anticipated the challenges and operational demands for reforming an Education Ministry that had been suffered the effects of years of neglect during decades of armed conflict.



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JC 9.1: Timely commencement of and progression thro ugh implementation of EC financed activities in the sector

Statement upon JC: EC-financed support to education in Liberia (ECSEL) has experienced repeated delays throughout its programming, identification and formulation. A total of 3 years and 5 months passed between the intended dates for signing the Financing Agreement at the end of 2005 to the actual recruitment of the Long-Term TA team that would signify the beginning of ECSEL operations in March of 2009. Still, even at this point, none of the activities that would have made EC-assistance in education visible on the ground had started, such as the training of teachers, distribution of books and learning materials and reconstruction of schools and other physical infrastructure. This was still the case even in September of 2009, 4 years of ECSEL preparations had begun, and nearly three years after the Financing Agreement had been signed. The delay also includes a set of so-called “quick impact” activities that should have led the training of up to 1,500 teachers and the provision of learning materials within months of the signing of the Financing Agreement. Most of the delays during the identification and formulation of ECSEL that have contributed to the late start of the programme were caused by drawn-out internal EC procedures. Nonetheless, the design of the programme itself contained a number of characteristics that would have made it unlikely for the intervention to progress according to schedule: The intended logic, course and flow of the programme were in part overly optimistic and not sufficiently precise and clear with regard to a number of its key elements. ECSEL’s design contained contradictory conceptualisations of “organisational restructuring” in the MoE as “programme results” and as “programme pre-conditions” and overall were based on an overly optimistic perception of the existing organisational capacity in the MoE. The time that had been allotted to the restructuring at the MoE, i.e., one year, including planning and implementation of reforms, was too short to achieve the desired results. The resources, including the human resources devoted to this issue are too few. According to the original design, only the team leader was meant to be in charge of the organisational restructuring of the Ministry; i.e. part time, in addition to her other team leading duties. Also, the implementation modalities for the intended “quick impact activities” were not clearly spelled out in the Financing Agreement. These shortcomings pose a significant threat to the intended programme work plan and schedule.

Judgment Criterion 9.2: Increased involvement of EC -supported target groups / target communities in re-instalment of education services, in particular of women.

� Indicator 9.2.1: Parent Teacher Associations (PTAs) exist and are active in schools with a large percentage of students from vulnerable groups


Due to severe delays of ECSEL, the EC has had no effect on the representation of interests of Liberia’s vulnerable groups in PTAs at community level.


• Apart from ECSEL, none of the other EC-financed interventions between 1999 and 2008 provided any support to Parent Teacher Associations, or would have directly worked with PTAs. With ECSEL significantly delayed, no EC support had arrived on the ground, i.e. at the levels of the communities as of 09/2009. Therefore, the EC has had no effect on the representation of priorities from vulnerable groups in PTAs in this period of time.

� Indicator 9.2.2: Interests of returnees, ex-combatants, in particular of women and girls, are considered in PTAs and other fora


With ECSEL significantly delayed, the only EC support between 1999 and 2008 that is directly relevant for balanced political representation of vulnerable groups in county-level planning processes was financing of County Development Agenda consultations under the Community Rehabilitation Component (CRC) of the Post-Conflict Rehabilitation and Capacity Building Programme (PCRCBP). The significance of these consultations for the actual involvement of EC-targeted groups (women,



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returnees, ex-combatants) in educational planning depends on the overall weight and significance of the CDAs themselves. With the Agendas remaining “fairly ‘broad brush’ statements of development priorities” that do not “reflect a well-established decentralised planning capacity”463 the practical significance of the CDA consultation process alone for the balanced representation of concerns in the specific planning for educational support is therefore relatively small, as it is constrained by the continuously weak implementation and planning capacity at county and district level (see EQ8 on capacity development; and specifically JC8.2).

Data, sources, extracts: ECSEL



• With EC Support to Education in Liberia (ECSEL) severely delayed, the EC has had no direct effect on the balanced representation of interests from returnees, ex-combatants and other vulnerable groups in PTAs (also see Indicator 9.2.1 and Indicator 9.1.2, i.e. Judgment Criterion 9.1).

CRC – Capacity Development at County Level


• Under the Community Rehabilitation Component of the PCRCBP, the EC financed participatory workshops at district and county levels for the elaboration of County Development Agenda’s in three of Liberia’s 15 counties: Nimba, Lofa and Bong (see Indicator 8.2.2 on the existence of “gendered” poverty diagnoses). The population of two of the counties, Bong and Lofa is made up by a large percentage of returnees, including IDPs: In Bong County, 36% of the population were returnees; in Lofa County, over 53% were estimated to be among the returnees in 2007464.

• The CDAs in all of the three counties mention education as one of the priority issues to be addressed in the coming years:

� In Lofa County, the CDA priorities include “a university in the county seat, high schools in every district headquarters, free quality primary education for all, and professional education at affordable prices”. The county was said to have a “rapidly growing school-going population”, and was thought to face a “shortage of trained and qualified teachers”, resulting in poor quality education.465

� In Bong County, education was one of the priority needs, also since most of the school buildings in the County had been damaged or destroyed in the war. The CDA identified the need to “build or rehabilitate six high schools, 83 elementary schools [and] two teacher training centres” 466


• Unfortunately, no information is available on the extent to which the CDA consultations were tailored to ensure that returnee populations had a fair chance to express their needs and priorities.

• The concerns of women were considered in the CDA consultations, but at least the initial process was flawed, in that it did not provide for sheltered space for women to express their own concerns independent of men.

� In the first round of CDA workshops women and men were both consulted in the same workshop, with the effect that men dominated the discussions. Subsequent consultations organised separate workshops for men and women (see EQ8 on capacity building, JC 8.2).

� The practical significance of the CDA is constraint by the limited capacity at county and district level for everyday planning and implementation of projects (see EQ 8 on Capacity Development, i.e., JC 8.2.; in particular Indicator 8.2.1).

� Indicator 9.2.3: Existence of specific needs analyses targeted at youth / over-aged children, ex-combatants, returnees and women / girls

Findings at indicator’s level: Due to the delay of ECSEL, only the Community Rehabilitation Component (CRC) of the PCRCBP has offered support that was directly targeted at ensuring the political representation of interests and priorities of vulnerable groups (returnees, women) and ex-combatants in the local planning processes467 for education. The EC-supported CDA consultations in Lofa, Nimba and Bong counties led to County Development Agendas that reflect to a certain extent priorities that are in the interest of ex-combatants and returnees in those areas. However, none of these prioritised interventions are directly related to formal education. The proposed interventions range from a survey to identify ex-combatants who had missed out on DDRR programming so far (Bong) to measures to ensure that



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returnees could repossess their land and property upon their return (Lofa)468. None of the CDAs seem to contain any interventions specifically targeted at women and girls. The gender-specific “analytical” sections in all CDAs are virtually identical and therefore do not appear to reflect county-specific gender-based analyses of needs and priorities of women and girls in these areas.

Data, sources, extracts : ECSEL



• With EC Support to Education in Liberia (ECSEL) severely delayed, the EC has had no direct effect on the balanced representation of interests from returnees, ex-combatants and other vulnerable groups in PTAs (also see Indicator 9.2.1 and Indicator 9.1.2, i.e. Judgment Criterion 9.1).

CRC – Capacity Development at County Level


• The CDAs for the two counties with significant returnee populations (Bong, Lofa) that have received EC assistance under the CRC provide demographic data on the relative sizes of the returnee populations vs. the local population, disaggregated for each district within the counties.

• Also, the CDAs contain a few statements on development concerns that are specific to returnees and ex-combatants. For example:

� For Bong County, the CDA mentions that “the key security concern in the County is the return of ex-combatants that have not yet benefited from reintegration services. Thus the urgent need for more projects to assist the ex-combatants and the communities they have resettled in”.469

� The agenda foresees to “conduct a survey to identify ex-combatants who missed out on DDRR programming and link them with projects offering job opportunities to youth and ex-combatants”.470

� For Lofa County,

� The CDA provides information on the number of ex-combatants and “children associated with fighting forces” (CAFFs) had been disarmed and demobilised in the county (Lofa CDC, 2008, p.8). Among its strategic objectives, the Lofa CDA foresees to “establish vocational institutions for the 15,000 ex-combatants in Lofa County” in the period between 2008 and 2009, led by the Ministry of Labour.471

� The CDA also includes a brief section on the challenge of significant influx of returnees to communities in Lofa and the strain that this phenomenon is putting on the local population, also in form of an increased crime rate, linked to the lack of economic opportunities for the growing population.472 One of the intended interventions is to “ensure that returnees and former IDPs repossess their land and property, pending the confirmation of ownership”, under leadership of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.473 Although this intervention is not directly education related, its inclusion does suggest that the priorities of IDPs and returnees have been heard during the consultation process.


• The eventual sections on gender and the consideration of women’s issues in the final “County Development Agenda” reports are very general and to a large extent identical in all of the CDAs (see Indicator 8.1.1. for EQ8 on capacity development). They do not appear to reflect county-specific gender-based analyses of needs and priorities of women and girls.

• The practical significance of the CDA is constraint by the limited capacity at county and district level for everyday planning and implementation of projects (see EQ 8 on Capacity Development, i.e., JC 8.2.; in particular Indicator 8.2.1).



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JC 9.2: Increased involvement of EC-supported targe t groups / target communities in re-instalment of education services, in particular of women.

Statement upon JC:

Due to severe delays of ECSEL, the EC has had no direct effect on the representation of interests of Liberia’s vulnerable groups in PTAs at community level or in any other education-specific fora at community or county level. However, the EC did provide support to CDA consultations in Nimba, Lofa and Bong Counties under the Community Rehabilitation Component of the EDF9 Post-Conflict Rehabilitation and Capacity Building Programme (PCRCBP). The population of two of these counties, Bong and Lofa, have significant proportions of returnees, i.e. 53% and 36%, respectively. The final CDAs that resulted from these consultations prioritise a number of interventions that are aimed at either returnees or ex-combatants, but none of these interventions are related to formal education474. None of the CDAs seem contain any interventions that are specifically targeted at women and girls. Although women participated in the CDA consultations, the initial workshops were dominated by men. The gender-specific “analytical” sections in all CDAs are virtually identical and therefore do not appear to reflect county-specific gender-based analyses of needs and priorities of women and girls in these areas. The practical importance of the CDA consultations for the actual involvement of EC-targeted groups (women, returnees, ex-combatants) in educational planning depends on the eventual overall weight and significance of the CDAs themselves. Since the agendas remain fairly general and as of 2008 had not been backed up by a well-established decentralised planning capacity, their direct impact on the balanced representation of concerns in the specific planning for educational support is still very small.

Judgment Criterion 9.3: Improved and gender-balance d access to “emergency” and long-term educational opportunities at primary, sec ondary, tertiary and vocational level

� Indicator 9.3.1: % / number of learning spaces repaired or reconstructed within 2/3/4/5 years of signing of CPA

Findings at indicator’s level: By 2008, the EC had helped to reconstruct only 35 out of an estimated total of 894 schools that had been “partially”, “mostly” or “completely” destroyed during the war. The schools were built and repaired mostly in the early years after signing of the CPA; their number accounts for only 3% of the total number of destroyed schools (see Table 50). The schools were reconstructed with funds from the Reintegration Programme for Returnees and Displaced People (EDF8; 7/2001 - 3/2005) and the Post-Conflict Rehabilitation and Capacity Building Programme (EDF9; 11/2003 - 12/2011). The EC Support to Education in Liberia (ECSEL) had made no contribution to the reconstruction of educational infrastructure by the end of 2008, despite the fact that education had become a focal sector of the EC in 2006. At the same time, the reconstruction of school buildings in Liberia has made some progress, with the contribution of other donors. Between 2005 and 2007, at least 334 schools had been either repaired or built new. Between 2007 and 2008, donors other than the EC constructed at least an additional 154 new schools and renovated 58 pre-existing schools. However, the work of other donors in these years was also affected by the difficult working conditions and often insufficient donor coordination in the sector, which at least in some cases translated into delayed projects or low quality, i.e. in the construction of school buildings. Donors overall struggled with the challenge to adequately align themselves with the weak Governmental structures in the sector in ways that would maintain the principle of Government ownership and the donors’ ability to move forward their individual programmes and initiatives.

Data, sources, extracts : • Before signing of the CPA (i.e. between 1998 and 2001, see table 50), the EC financed the reconstruction of

48 schools, 29 of which were built or reconstructed in “Greater Monrovia” (see Agrisystems Limited, 2001, p.44), through the “Second Rehabilitation Programme” (EDF8). Unfortunately, conflict and civil war between the end of 2001 and 2003 affected in particular the area around the capital and Monrovia itself, so that it is highly likely that most of these schools have been again destroyed since then.

• After signing of the CPA, i.e. under the Reintegration Programme for Returnees and Displaced People (EDF8; 7/2001 - 3/2005), Post-Conflict Rehabilitation and Capacity Building Programme (EDF9; 11/2003 -



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12/2011) and EC Support to Education in Liberia (FA: 10/2006 - on-going in 2008), EC-financing helped to reconstruct only 25 schools, affecting an estimated number of approximately 4,400 students475.

� As of 2008, the EC Support to Education in Liberia (ECSEL) had not contributed to this number.

Table 50: Estimated number of schools rehabilitated / reconstructed with EC-assistance

EC-financed Programme

No.

of s

choo

ls

reha

bilit

ated

/ co

nstr

ucte

d

Est

imat

ed n

o.

of s

tude

nts

affe

cted

Counties

2nd Rehabilitation Programme (EDF8) (2/1998 - 12/2001)

48476 6,048 Bong, Grand Bassa, Grand Gedeh, Grand Kru, Greater Monrovia, Margibi, Maryland,

Montserrado, Nimba

Total # of schools rehabilitated before CPA 48 6048

Reintegration Programme for Returnees and Displaced People

(EDF8; 7/2001 - 3/2005) 20 2,520 No data on county level

Post-Conflict Rehabilitation and Capacity Building Programme (EDF9;

11/2003 - 12/2011) 15477 1,890 Bong, Lofa, Nimba

EC Support to Education in Liberia (FA: 10/2006 - on-going in 2008) 0 0 N/A

Total # of schools rehabilitated (mostly) after CPA 35 4,410

Total (before and after CPA) 83 10,458

• In relation to the estimated number of destroyed schools in 2003/04 (see table 51), the EC had therefore only helped to reconstruct 35 out of an estimated total of 894 schools that had been “partially”, “mostly” or “completely” destroyed during the war. This amounts to 3% of the total of destroyed schools.

Table 51: Findings of “Rapid Assessment of Learning Spaces” 2003/2004

Location Cosmetic Damages

Minor Damages

Partially Destroyed

Mostly Destroyed

Completely Destroyed Counties

N % N % N % N % N % N %

Bomi 73 5 6.8 15 20.5 15 20.5 17 23.3 21 28.8

G. Bassa 153 27 17.6 60 39.2 27 17.6 14 9.2 25 16.3

Margibi 142 43 30.3 52 36.6 29 20.4 5 3.5 13 9.2

G. Cape 24 3 12.5 2 8.3 13 54.2 2 8.3 4 16.7

River G. 71 5 7 5 7 15 21.1 13 18.3 33 46.5

G. Kru 56 - - 7 12.5 2 3.6 12 21.4 35 62.5

Gbarpolu 81 - - - - 2 2.5 10 12.3 69 85.2

Maryland 88 9 10.2 28 31.8 18 20.5 6 6.8 27 30.7

Montss. 807 117 14.5 238 29.5 335 41.5 48 5..9 69 8.6

Bong 34 3 8.8 16 47.1 7 20.6 6 17.6 2 5.9

Total 1,529 212 13.9 423 27.7 463 30.3 133 8.7 298 19.5

Source: UNICEF – RALS Note: Cosmetic repairs include: painting, glass for windows, plastering of walls; Minor damages: Leaking roof, requires painting, need of new doors and window repairs; Partially destroyed: Missing doors and windows, missing roof tiles or iron; Mostly destroyed: No roof, no windows, no doors, wall still standing; Completely stands for completely destroyed.



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• It needs to be acknowledged that until the end of 2005 / the beginning of 2006, the European Commission had not selected education as one of their focal sectors. Support to the rehabilitation of educational infrastructure was merely part of several larger-scope programmes that were directed at community rehabilitation, reintegration of returnees, etc. in general.

• However, from 2006 onwards, the EC had officially pledged to support the reconstruction of Liberia’s education sector, including the reconstruction of its physical educational infrastructure (Result 6 of ECSEL: Educational infrastructure rehabilitated and expanded). Due to the delays experienced in the identification, planning and implementation of the programme, however, ECSEL has as of the end of 2008 not made any contribution in this area.

Table 52: Changes in physical conditions of school buildings 478, Liberia (2005/06 to 2007/08)

Condition of Schools

Inta

ct/R

epai

red/

New

Min

or

Dam

age

Maj

or

Dam

age

Des

troy

ed

Uns

tate

d

Tot

al

School Census 2005 - 2006 867 1,724 630 764 0 3,985

School Census 2007 - 2008 1,201 1,761 413 583 256 4,214

Difference (2007/08 - 2005/06) 334 37 -217 -181 256 229

• At the same time, reconstruction of school buildings in Liberia, financed by other donors, has made some

progress. In the school-year 2007/08, a total of 1,201 schools were considered to be “intact”, “repaired” or “new”,479 up from 867 schools in the school year 2005/06 (MoE, 2007, p.17), a difference of 334 schools.

• In addition, the numbers of the two school census reports suggest compared to the school-year 2005/06, Liberia had an additional 229 schools in the school-year 2007/08 (i.e. a total of 4,214 schools).

� The EC has not financed any school reconstruction from 2006 until 2008, due to the delays of its ECSEL programme, and therefore did not make any contribution to this change.

• However, other donors active in the sector also have encountered various difficulties in making adequate progress in their programmes and projects.

� Donor representatives gave matching accounts of significant capacity gaps in the Ministry of Education. In particular, the MoE was said to be lacking sufficiently qualified staff at the middle level to operationalize decisions taken by MoE leaders, including the Minister. This situation was said to be exacerbated by insufficient communication among MoE leaders among themselves. This was said to result in a general lack of strategic leadership from the Ministry, often also described as the “inability to say no” to specific proposals from individual donors and eventually to a low level of ownership of donor proposals by the Ministry as such.

� The result of this strategic weakness of the MoE, as described by many of donor representatives, was that individual donors often would find it necessary to advance their proposals with individual people in the Ministry in competition with other donors, i.e. to secure the acceptance of their intended programmes and to allow for the use of their funds that had been committed to Liberia’s education. As a consequence, and exacerbated by the communication difficulties with the MoE itself, individual donor programmes and activities would at times interfere with each other, i.e. constrain each other’s effectiveness. Examples included:

� Different donors / implementing agencies would follow different and at times conflicting models for promoting ALP programmes in Liberia’s schools, in the absence of a clear ALP policy of the GoL / MoE. For example, different donors would pay differing amounts as incentives teachers for adopting the ALP curriculum in their classrooms, leading to the distortion of incentives between schools and regions (Interviews with donor representatives, education)

� The promotion of different models for teacher training by different organisations, where the leading model (promoted by one donor) is considered as “too expensive” by other donors and implementers in the sector (Interviews with donor representatives, education).

� Competition among two donors / implementing agencies over a building site to construct educational facilities. Both donors had laid their claims on the particular building site with the Ministry of Education and competed throughout the planning and building process with each other for the prerogative to complete their building (Interviews with donor representatives, education).

� Donors have tried different kinds of sector coordination fora over the last few years, none of which seems to have had satisfactory results in the area of coordination (Interviews with donor’s representatives, education).

• All donors, including the EC, also have encountered challenges to square the intention of letting the Ministry



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of Education lead as much as possible in different initiatives with the need to maintain certain externally imposed deadlines and schedules. In the case of the Education Sector Plan, as confirmed in interviews with a wide range of donor representatives, donors and their implementers started out with the intention of merely facilitating the writing of the paper, without too much substantive input provided by donor-financed experts. With the submission deadline for the Fast Track Initiative coming closer, however, the donor-financed expert began to take on a more active role in the authorship of the paper itself. As a result, the perceived ownership of the ESP, on the side of the Ministry as well as on the side of the donors, is now lower than it could have, and possibly should have been480.

� Indicator 9.3.2: Improved primary and secondary school net enrolment (%)

Findings at indicator’s level: With ESCEL significantly delayed (see the timeline in Indicator 9.1.1.) and none of the substantive support regarding curriculum development, teacher training or rehabilitation of educational infrastructure started as of 2008, the EC contribution to the rehabilitation of the Liberian education sector until the end of 2008 is limited to the reconstruction of approximately 35 schools under in EDF8 and one EDF9 programme. Even assuming that each these 35 schools would have enrolled the for Liberia average number of 126 students , the total number of students in these schools in any given school year would merely have been approximately 4,400 students and would have added only 0.4% to Liberia’s Net Enrolment Rate (NER). It is important to note that some figures show that the net enrolment rate in Liberia has actually decreased between 1999/2000 and 2007/08, suggesting that 4 years after signing the CPA less Liberian children start and carry on with their school careers at the grade-appropriate age than was the case during the conflict years. Moreover, this decrease in net enrolment rates between 1999/2000 and 2007/08 contrasts with the significantly higher gross enrolment rates in primary and secondary schools in Liberia, suggesting that 4 years after the signing of the peace agreement school enrolment is favouring older students, i.e. those who had missed out on their formal education during the conflict years and neglects the “appropriately aged” students for each grade level (see also the information on the gross enrolment rates in indicator 9.3.3). Improvements in enrolment rates have been better in primary school, while the secondary level is lagging behind. The MoE’s proposition to the donor community to redirect some of their support from primary to secondary schools has so far not been taken into account. Most if not all donor support is currently supporting Liberia’s primary education.

Data, sources, extracts: • With the ESCEL significantly delayed (see the timeline in Indicator 9.1.1.) and none of the substantive

support regarding curriculum development, teacher training or rehabilitation of educational infrastructure started as of 2008, the EC contribution to the rehabilitation of the Liberian education sector until the end of 2008 is limited to the reconstruction of approximately 35 schools under the EDF8 Reintegration Programme for Returnees and Displaced People (EDF8, 11/2003 – 3/2005) and the Post-Conflict Rehabilitation and Capacity Building Programme (EDF9; 11/2003 - 12/2011) (see Indicator 9.3.1 on the number of learning spaces rehabilitated).

� Even assuming that each these 35 schools would have enrolled the for Liberia average number of 126 students481, the total number of students in these schools in any given school year would merely have been approximately 4,400 students. With a total number of approximately 1.09m school aged children in Liberia482; these additional students would only have added 0.4% to Liberia’s gross enrolment rate (GER) in any given school year.

Table 53: Trend in the Net Enrolment Rate – Liberia (1999 – 2007/08) Net Enrolment Rates Primary

& Secondary Schools 1999 2007/08 Trend

NER Girls Primary (%) 34.1% 32.0% -2.1%

NER Boys Primary (%) 61.4% 34.0% -27.4%

NER Overall Primary (%) 46.0% 33% -13.0%

NER Girls Secondary (%) 25.6% 5.0% -20.6%

NER Boys Secondary (%) 42.4% 5.0% -37.4%

NER Overall Secondary (%) 34% 5% -29.0% Sources. 1999 figures from Joint Needs Assessment (GoL/UN/WB, 2004); 2007/08 figures from 2007/08 National School Census Report (MoE, 2008). World Bank Figures (from EuroTrends, 2009) show a similar trend.



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• Overall, the net enrolment rate in Liberia has decreased between 1999 and 2007/08, suggesting that 4 years after signing the CPA less Liberian children start and carry on with their school careers at the grade-appropriate age. This decrease in net enrolment rates between 1999 and 2007/08 contrasts with the significantly higher gross enrolment rates in primary and secondary schools in Liberia. As shown under Indicator 9.3.4 (gross enrolment rates),

� the overall GER for primary school is 89% (compared to 33% NER)

� the overall GER for junior secondary school is 40% (compared to 5% NER)

� the overall GER for senior secondary school is 20% (compared to 5% NER) (MoE, 2008)483

• This suggests that beginning with the end of the conflict in 2004, school enrolment has started to favour older students, i.e. those who had missed out on their formal education during the conflict years and neglects the “appropriately aged” students for each grade level.

� The older students include those that were supported by the donor community (including by the European Commission) in their efforts to “catch up” in their formal education, among other things by paying monetary incentives to the students and to the schools.

• Figure 5 and Figure 6 visualise the differences between NER and GER at county level.

Figure 5: 2007/08 Primary NER and GER by County

Source: EuroTrends, 2009.

Figure 6: 2007/08 Junior Secondary NER and GER by C ounty

Source: EuroTrends, 2009.

• The above figures also show that the discrepancy between NER and GER are bigger in secondary school than they are in primary school; and also that Liberia’s GER overall for secondary education is significantly lower than it is for primary education; and that GER disparities between the counties are much more severe for secondary education than is the case for primary education. This suggests that at least relatively, Liberia has made greater strides in improving access to primary education than it has made at the secondary level (see also the analysis and conclusions in EuroTrends (2009)).



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� It is therefore important to note that Liberia’s Minister of Education has stated the desire to channel more support into secondary education, in particular in light of the fact that currently all education donors, including the EC, are by and large only promoting primary level education. In the eyes of the Ministry, donors overall had so far not taken these priorities sufficiently into account in their strategic plans for Liberia (Interview with MoE officials).

� Indicator 9.3.3: Improved gross484 enrolment ratio (%) in primary, secondary

Findings at indicator’s level: The EC helped to place approximately 8,670 ex-combatants into formal education institutions across Liberia, a share of 5.6% of all students who were enrolled in secondary schools in 2007/08. In addition, the EC helped to make “final payments” for about 16,000 older students who had attended secondary school as “ex-combatants”, about 10.5% of all students enrolled in secondary education in 2007/08. About 54% of these 16,000 students were merely “proxy-beneficiaries”, i.e. older students who had not been associated with the fighting forces, but had received entitlement cards for schooling support from friends or family members who had been. It is not clear, how many of these students would have enrolled in and attended secondary school even without EC assistance. It is important to note that the gross enrolment rate (GER) in Liberia’s primary and secondary schools is significantly higher than the net enrolment rate (NER), i.e. the share of Liberian children that are enrolled in the grade-level that is appropriate based on their age. This suggests that the student population in Liberia’s schools is currently being “dominated” by the over-aged children, who had missed out on their formal education during the conflict years. Although this high representation of older children is encouraging, it raises the danger that the needs of younger, appropriately aged children are being neglected.

Data, sources, extracts : DDRR (UNICEF, UNDP contributions)

• During the implementation of the DDRR programme, €3.67m of the 3rd EC contribution, i.e. approximately 40% of the total €9.1m, was used to place 8,669 ex-combatants in 51 formal education institutions in 12 counties.485 Support provided to the beneficiaries included:

� Payment of registration and tuition fees, uniforms, footwear and copybook costs;

� Payment of West Africa Examination Council fees s for those attending 9th and 12th grades; and,

� Monthly stipend or subsistence of (with a requirement of 75% attendance):

� US$30 a month for the first year of assistance,

� US$15 a month for the second year of assistance.

� No subsistence support was provided during the third year of assistance.

• EC-supported ex-combatants were enrolled in

� Grade schools (71% of ex-combatants)

� Computer schools (14% of ex-combatants)

� Colleges and universities (13% of ex-combatants)

� Nursing schools (2%)486

• In addition, to make up for funding gaps in the DDRR Trust Fund, and apparently to diffuse the threat of social unrest, EC funds had to be used to make the “final payment”487 to schools and colleges that had enrolled ex-combatants for a total of 16,619 beneficiaries / ex-combatants. This final payment amounted to approximately €25 per student, or a total of €426,000 (UNDP, 2007a, p.11)488.



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Table 54: Summary of Final Formal Education Payment s by County – EC Contribution

Source: UNDP, 2007a, p.11.

• As shown in table 54, about 54% of the students who received the “final payment” of approximately €25 per student were not actually “ex-combatants”, but rather were students who were using the entitlement cards of family members who had been combatants to access the reintegration resources from the UNDP trust fund. When this practice became known (i.e. in 2007), the EC – after discussions with UNDP and other partners – decided to pay the money to these “proxy-beneficiaries” nonetheless, with the rationale that the resources would nonetheless be put to good use by allowing these “proxy beneficiaries” to get a formal education.

� From EC perspective, this means that some of the support offered under the DDRR programme also benefited the enrolment situation in formal education of Liberians overall, i.e. outside of the circle of ex-combatants.

Table 55: Junior High Gross Enrolment by Proprietor & Gender, 2007/08 Enrolment Percept

Proprietorship Male Female Total Male Female

Public 24,661 16,006 40,667 60.6% 39.4%

Private 14,755 13,461 28,216 52.3% 47.7%

Mission 13,932 12,159 26,091 53.4% 46.6%

Community 4,129 3,539 7,668 53.8% 46.2%

All 57,477 45,165 102,642 56.0% 44.0%

Source: MoE, 2008, p.36.

Table 56: Senior High Gross Enrolment by Proprietor & Gender, 2007/08 Enrolment Percentage

Proprietorship Boys Girls Total Boys Girls

Public 11,169 5,043 16,212 68.9% 31.1%

Private 9,191 7,390 16,581 55.4% 44.6%

Mission 11,177 9,158 20,335 55.0% 45.0%

Community 1,369 1,103 2,472 55.4% 44.6%

All 32,906 22,694 55,600 59.2% 40.8%

Source: MoE, 2008, p.50

• Table 55 and table 56 and table 57 show the total gross enrolment of Liberians in junior and senior high school489. Total enrolment of students in these two school levels was 158,242. EC-support under the DDRR



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trust fund therefore benefitted approximately 10.5% of the total number of students enrolled in secondary education in 2007/08 in form of a final €25 payment. The EC supported approximately 5.6% of secondary students in a more comprehensive form, i.e. through payments of registration and tuition fees, uniforms, footwear and copybook costs and monthly stipends for the first two years of enrolment (see above).

� It is not clear, how many of these students would have enrolled in and attended secondary school even without EC assistance.

• Table 57 shows the 2007/08 gross enrolment rates for the different school types.

Table 57: Gross enrolment rates by school level, 20 07/08

Gross Enrolment Rates School Level

Boys Girls Overall

Primary School 93% 85% 89%

Junior High School 45% 36% 40%

Senior High School 28% 20% 24% Source: 2007/08 National School Census (MoE, 2008).

� Indicator 9.3.4: Increased ratio of qualified teachers / students at schools attended by vulnerable groups (disaggregated by gender)

Findings at indicator’s level: Despite the fact the EC had intended to help train up to 1,500 teachers under one of ECSEL’s “quick-impact” activities, no teacher training had been implemented with EC support as of September 2009. Apart from ECSEL, none of the EC supported programme had targeted teacher training as an objective. The significant delays on the side of the EC notwithstanding, other donors and the GoL / MoE have made some progress in teacher training: According to the National School Census Report of 2007/08, some 8,952 primary teachers (out of a total of 22,253) had been trained by 2007, representing 40% of all primary teachers. By the end of 2008, a total of 9,276 teachers had been trained (representing 42% of the total teacher population of 22,253).

Data, sources, extracts : • Training of teachers was one of the “quick impact interventions” that the EC had intended to use under

ECSEL to “meet immediate demands for education opportunities”. The European Commission had wanted to offer “accelerated training (10 week pre-service, 34 in service, 2 week follow-up) for up to 1500 teachers”.490 However, because of delays throughout programme identification, planning and implementation (see Indicator 9.1.1 timing of programme planning and implementation), no activities (including the “quick-impact activities”) had actually started by the end of 2008 (see also Indicator 9.1.2).

• The significant delays on the side of the EC notwithstanding, other donors491 and the GoL / MoE have made progress in teacher training: According to the National School Census Report of 2007/08, some 8,952 primary teachers (out of a total of 22,253) had been trained by 2007, representing 40% of all primary teachers. By the end of 2008, a total of 9,276 teachers had been trained (representing 42% of the total teacher population of 22,253).

• Apart from the ECSEL, none of the EC supported programmes had targeted teacher training as an objective. As of 2008, the EC therefore had made no contribution to the training of teachers in Liberia.

Table 58: Overall progress towards the primary teac her training target (no EC contribution) Year No. teachers No. trained teachers % trained teachers

2007 22,253 8,952 40%

2008 22,253 9,276 42%

2009 22,690 10,271 45%

Source: Education Sector Review, 2009 (MoE, 2009)



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� Indicator 9.3.5: Increased pupil / textbook ratio available in schools attended by target groups (disaggregated by gender)

Findings at indicator’s level: Textbook production and distribution was the second “quick-impact” activity of ECSEL. Despite this, no textbooks or other learning materials had been produced or distributed with EC support by September 2009. This was in part the result of failed negotiations between UNICEF and the EC of a contribution agreement that would have channelled Commission funds into the provision of text books for Liberian schools. After negotiations of approximately 1 year, the draft contribution agreement was abolished, because of difficulties with the chosen procurement procedures for the textbooks. However, the EC, i.e. a short-term TA financed under ECSEL, did contribute to the development of the educational materials component of the Education Policy, capacity building and development of guidelines for a transitional textbook strategy, including textbook procurement and management.

Data, sources, extracts: • Text book production and distribution – also for Accelerated Learning Programmes (ALPs) was the second

“quick impact” activities of the European Commission (in addition to teacher training), according to the original FA of ECSEL EC.492 In addition, the development and provision of educational materials was one of the 6 main expected results of ECSEL, in addition to the effects of the quick impact activities.493

• As was the case with teacher training, the severe delays of the programme meant that as of the end of 2008, no activities with regard to the development and dissemination of educational materials have happened.

� This also was the result of failed negotiations of a contribution agreement between the EC and UNICEF for the provision of textbooks and learning materials. The EC had agreed a draft contribution agreement with UNICEF during the second half of 2007 (see indicator 9.1.1 for more details on the timeline). In May 2008, however, these negotiations were abandoned and the draft contribution agreement rejected. According to EC information, because of difficulties with the procurement procedures for the textbooks.494

� However, the EC / ECSEL-funded STTA who had drafted the UNICEF contribution agreement did successfully support the development of the educational materials component of the Education Policy, the drafting of capacity building and development of guidelines for a transitional textbook strategy, including their procurement and management.495

• Other donors and the GoL / MoE moved ahead in the provision of materials. According to the 2009 Education Sector Review:

� A new national curriculum has been revised and is ready for piloting at the beginning of the 2009 academic year. The curriculum has integrated issues such as HIV-AIDS, Human Rights, Peace Education, Girls Education (Gender) into the core subject areas.

� 1.2m text books and teacher’s guides have been procured from four international commercial publishers to be distributed to primary schools at the beginning of the 2009 academic year (with involvement of an EC STTA).

� An Instructional Materials Management Handbook has been developed for distribution to all primary schools (with involvement of an EC STTA).

� A Textbook Policy has been developed to inform all education stakeholders on policy issues affecting the development of new textbooks (with involvement of an EC STTA).

� A paper based audit trail has been prepared to track deliveries of instructional materials to county headquarters and individual schools, and a system to monitor the use of textbooks within schools has also been developed.

� The Ministry of Education developed a series of supplementary readers for grades 1-6. Supplementary materials have also been provided for grades 2 and 3 under the USAID-funded Early Grade Reading Assessment program.

� A School Grants Manual has been drafted to guide the distribution and monitoring of the grants the MOE will provide to schools to purchase educational materials and supplies.

� Provision of 26,760 MOE approved readers to public conventional primary schools (2nd and 3rd graders) have been distributed under the Early Grade Reading Assessment (EGRA) Plus – Liberia project. Additionally, 35,190 MOE approved MacMillan primary grade readers have been distributed to public ALP programs and Learning Resource Centres under the ALP PLUS project, and approximately 700,000 supplementary books have been distributed to school libraries under the Million Book March implemented by Visions in Action and Books for Africa.496

• Apart from the severely delayed ECSEL, none of the other EC-financed programmes had foreseen support for the development and distribution of learning materials.



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� Indicator 9.3.6: Increased % of children from vulnerable groups successfully completing primary, secondary, education (disaggregated by gender)

Findings at indicator’s level: It is highly unlikely that EC-support has had a significant effect on the completion rates of Liberian students. ECSEL is severely delayed, which means that as of the end of 2008, the programme has not delivered any support that would have been relevant for an improvement of the completion rates. Apart from ECSEL, EC support to the DDRR process, i.e. the support of approximately 8,670 over-aged students in their formal education has likely helped these students to complete their secondary education. The effect of EC support under the Reintegration Programme for Returnees and Displaced People (EDF8; 7/2001 - 3/2005) and the Post-Conflict Rehabilitation and Capacity Building Programme (EDF9; 11/2003 - 12/2011) is likely to be negligible: The EC did not provide any complementary resources for the 35 schools it helped to build. At least some of the schools were reported to have difficulties to secure these complementary resources, such as teachers, books or other learning materials from other sources, such as the Ministry of Education.

Data, sources, extracts : • Completion rates are only available for the 2007/08 National School Census. However, their analysis is not

included in the published report that was produced on the basis of the data. The report on the 2007/08 National School Census states:

� “[N]o data at grade level or school level has been analysed and no attempt made to compute intake rates, repetition rates, drop-out rates, completion rates, transition rates, survival rates, etc. although the database contains information that can be used for such computations.”497

• The desk review for this evaluation has shown that apart from the ECSEL, the EC has only financed very few interventions that could reasonably be expected to have any significant effect on the completion rate of Liberia’s students:

� The EC contribution to the DDRR trust fund (managed by UNDP) helped to place 8,669 ex-combatants in 51 formal education institutions in 12 counties (UNDP, 2007a, p.11; see indicator 9.3.4 on increases in gross enrolment). So far, there is no information available to tell, how many of these students completed their education.

� Under the Reintegration Programme for Returnees and Displaced People (EDF8; 7/2001 - 3/2005), Post-Conflict Rehabilitation and Capacity Building Programme (EDF9; 11/2003 - 12/2011), the EC financed the rehabilitation of 35 schools between 2001 and 2006. However, the EC did not provide any additional resources for these schools, such as support to teachers, learning materials, etc. Also, some of the counties and communities were the schools were built were thought to have difficulties in liaising with the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Education to secure these complementary inputs, leading to the relatively high risk for “schools without books” or teachers (Cardno Agrisystems, 2009; see also Indicator 8.2.3). Any proper schooling, let alone its completion would be unlikely under these circumstances.

• Overall, and also considering the delays of ECSEL, it is highly unlikely that EC-support has had a significant effect on the completion rates of Liberian students.

JC 9.3: Improved and gender-balanced access to “eme rgency” and long-term educational opportunities at primary, secondary lev el

Statement upon JC: The contribution of EC support to an improved and gender-balanced access to emergency and long-term education opportunities for the years 1999 to 2008 is very small. Any significant but still small effects are limited to the support of ex-combatants in “catching up” on their secondary education, i.e. through the sponsoring of materials, school fees, etc. for about 8,670 students under the UNDP DDRR trust fund. With respect to any of the other factors that would have played a role in increasing the access to educational opportunities, such as teacher training, school rehabilitation and the provision of learning materials for Liberian schools overall, the severe delay of the ECSEL programme has meant that as of September 2009 (and possibly later), only very little EC support had arrived “on the ground”. The only exceptions are a series of technical inputs provided by a short-term TA in the second half of 2007 to help in the development of the educational materials component of the Education Policy, capacity building and development of guidelines for a transitional textbook strategy, including textbook procurement and management. In relation to the overwhelming needs in Liberia’s education sector, the earlier EC funded reconstruction of about 35 schools (some of them community schools) across Liberia under the heading of “reintegration” and “post-conflict reconstruction” is negligible, in particular as for many of these 35 schools it is unlikely that the



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communities could mobilise any of the complementary “inputs” for effective education, such as teachers, books or regular maintenance of the facilities. It is concerning that between 1999 and 2007/08, the enrolment of Liberian children in the grade-levels that would be appropriate for their ages has actually fallen. The student population in primary and secondary schools seems to be dominated by older, “over-aged” students, who are trying to make up for the education they missed during the conflict years. Although this is encouraging from the perspective of these older students, raises the question if younger school children are being “crowded out” of the over-extended primary and secondary education system. Overall, progress has been greater at the primary than at the secondary level, in principles providing support to the MoE’s proposition to redirect some donor funding to help promoting Liberia’s secondary education. Currently, all donors are focusing their support at the primary level. While ECSEL was being prepared, donors other than the EC have made some progress in improving access to emergency and long-term educational opportunities in Liberia. However, their work in these years was nonetheless affected by the difficult working conditions and often insufficient donor coordination in the sector, which at least in some cases translated into duplication of efforts, delayed projects or low quality, i.e. in the construction of school buildings. Donors overall struggled with the challenge to adequately align themselves with the weak Governmental structures in the sector in ways that would maintain the principle of Government ownership and the donors’ ability to move forward their individual programmes and initiatives.

Judgment Criterion 9.4: Increased economic utility of education and educational content for economic and social advancement of lear ners, including improved employability (quality)

� Indicator 9.4.1: Increased completion rate (survival rates) of primary education / secondary education / vocational education (disaggregated by gender)

Findings at indicator’s level: Due to the delay of ECSEL, the programme will not have had any effect on educational outcomes by the end of 2008. As stated by the 2009 ROM report of the programme, “barring some preparatory work on the EMIS, no real activities [had] been initiated”498 by September 2009. Therefore, EC support will not have had any effect on the improvement of completion rates in Liberia between 1999 and 2008.

Data, sources, extracts : • As stated under Indicator 9.3.7, national data on completion rates are only available from the 2007/08

National School Census. However, this evaluation has shown that apart from the ECSEL, the EC has only financed very few interventions that could reasonably be expected to have any significant effect on the completion rate of Liberia’s students.

� Indicator 9.4.2: Women and men from vulnerable and excluded groups are attracted to formal education as a tool for socio-economic advancement

Findings at indicator’s level: Ex-combatants value formal education as a tool for socio-economic advancement. Currently, no information is available on the preferences of other vulnerable groups.

Data, sources, extracts: • During demobilization, 43% of the ex-combatants expressed preference for enrolment in formal

education, 50% expressed preference for vocational skills training, 4% for agriculture and 3% for employment opportunities. The vast majority of them had little or no skills and limited education at the point of disarmament.499

• Based on these expressed preferences, the EC support to approximately 8,700 ex-combatants is likely to have helped these Liberians to work towards their goal of socio-economic advancement.



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JC 9.4: Increased economic utility of education and educational content for economic and social advancement of learners, including impro ved employability (quality)

Statement upon JC: The delay of ECSEL has constraint any significant effect of EC aid on improved access to primary and secondary education and thereby also by and large has prevented any effect of EC aid on improved economic opportunity. An exception is the support to the education of ex-combatants that the EC had channelled through UNDP and the DDRR trust fund. The assistance offered to approximately 8,700 ex-combatants and other “proxy-beneficiaries” is likely to have helped these individuals in their socio-economic advancement. It is not possible at this point to quantify or even further qualify this advancement.



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1.10 Adequacy of Cooperation Frameworks and Impleme ntation Mechanisms

EQ10: To what extent have chosen cooperation frameworks and implementation mechanisms allowed adequate use of EC resources to facilitate the intended results of EC assistance to Liberia?

Judgment Criterion 10.1: EC organisational resource s and EC capacity in Liberia can respond to organisational demands of chosen coopera tion frameworks and implementation mechanisms on EC structures

� Indicator 10.1.1: Flow of secondary commitments and disbursements (signing of contracts) over time


Secondary commitments of EC funds to particular programmes clearly reflect the main milestones of EC-Liberian cooperation, including in particular the signing of the CPA in 2003, and, albeit with some delay, the first democratic elections after the conflict and the inauguration of the newly elected President, Hon. Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf. In 2006, the EC committed € 11.7 m to ECSEL, to support education. However, the bulk of this money would not be used until approximately 4 years later. Resources for the County Development Support Programme, and the Electricity Grid Rehabilitation were only committed about 1 year after the new CSP was signed, i.e. in 2007.

The disbursed, i.e. “contracted” amounts varied significantly throughout the 1999 – 2008 time period. After signing of the CPA in 2003, i.e. in the years 2004 and 2005, the amount of EC support that became available to implementing partners500 increase significantly. The money that was spent came largely from the 2003 “Post-Conflict Rehabilitation and Capacity Building Programme” (PCRCBP). Contracted amounts for 2006 and in particular for 2007 were significantly lower, however. In 2007, in fact, the EC signed contracts with implementers for only € 2.24 million. This “dip” in available money is particularly significant since the years 2006 and 2007 were arguably two of the more important years in the life of the newly elected Liberian Government. This period also coincides with the time-period, when the discontent among Liberian officials, including the President, with slow disbursements and delays in EC support was at its most intense. In particular the delay of ECSEL contributed to this bottleneck, but also the delays in planning and operationalizing the County Development Programme.

Data, sources, extracts : • Figure 7 shows the flow of commitments vs. disbursements of EC support to Liberia for the time from 1999

to 2008. For both, commitments and disbursements, the main cornerstones of EC-Liberian cooperation are clearly identifiable:

� In 2003, the spike in commitments is associated with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and the ensuing commitment of over € 45.0 million for the Post-Conflict Rehabilitation and Capacity Building Programme, and the Support to the Peace Process in Liberia, i.e. to support the ECOWAS peace mission.

� In 2006, the EC committed € 11.7 m to ECSEL, to support education, although the bulk of this money would not be used until approximately 4 years later. In 2007, EC commitments spiked again, when resources for the County Development Support Programme, and the Electricity Grid Rehabilitation were formally committed.

� 2008 saw the commitment of the first funds from EDF10.



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Figure 7: EC commitments vs. Disbursements, 1999 - 2008

0

10,000,000

20,000,000

30,000,000

40,000,000

50,000,000

60,000,000

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

€

Calendar Year

EC Commitments vs. Disbursements, 1999 - 2008

Total Commitments Total Payments

• It becomes clear both in Figure 7 and Figure 8 that the level of disbursements varied significantly over time:

� After relatively low disbursements (i.e. amount of “signed contracts”) between 1999 – 2001, the amount of resources that were actually contracted out increased, largely, because the EDF8 Reintegration programme came “online”. After signing of the CPA in 2003, and the commitment of the money for the PCRCBP, amounts contracted increased again in the years 2004 and 2005. Contracted amounts for 2006 and in particular for 2007, however, are significantly lower. In 2007, in fact, the EC signed contracts with implementers for only € 2.24 million. This “dip” in money becoming available is particularly significant since the years 2006 and 2007 were arguably two of the more important years in the life of the newly elected Liberian Government. This period also coincides with the time-period, when the discontent among Liberian officials, including the President, with slow disbursements and delays in EC support was at its most intense.

� The sources for the increased contracting in 2008 are currently not clear. For this year, the evaluators only had overall “disbursement” figures that were not broken down by primary commitment.

Figure 8: EC payments by main commitments, 1999 - 2 008

0

5,000,000

10,000,000

15,000,000

20,000,000

25,000,000

30,000,000

35,000,000

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Eu

ro

Calendar Years

EC Payments 1999 - 2008 - by main commitments

2nd Rehabilitation Programme EDF8 Reintegration

Other Post Conflict Rehabilitation / Capacity Building

ECHO



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Table 59: Distribution of payments among primary co mmitments, 1999 - 2008 Programme

Name 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Grand Total

2nd Rehabilitation Programme

3,123,652 5,195,593 1,485,546 9,804,790

Budget Lines 1,784,804 1,089,211 757,652 984,626 3,336,983 5,629,062 1,301,844 14,884,182 Demobilisation / Reintegr. (3rd UNDP Contr.)

9,100,000 9,100,000

ECHO 2004 3,360,566 855,591 4,216,157 ECHO 2005 2,613,457 2,613,457 EDF8 Reintegration 8,628,700 3,241,759 3,973,963 3,317,655 739,593 19,901,671

Other 22,398 1,371,081 176,000 14,700,000 1,569,479 Post Conflict Rehab. / Cap. Building

17,570,831 9,811,526 14,641,380 209,393 42,233,130

Support Peace Process Liberia

2,762,970 136,637 2,899,608

Technical Cooperation Facilities

557,448 557,448

Total Payments 4,908,456 6,284,804 1,485,546 9,386,352 7,011,753 28,378,981 31,327,291 16,752,053 2,244,685 14,700,000



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� Indicator 10.1.2: Project documents pass through / are processed by EC structures without delay (i.e., at anticipated rate)

Findings at indicator’s level: Most, if not all of the major EC-financed programmes in Liberia have experienced some sort of delayed processing on part of the European Commission, during identification, financing, contracting or implementation. Total procedural delays per programme range from close to a year on the low end (i.e. in the case of the Reintegration Programme for Returnees and Displaced People, EDF8) to 3+ years in the cases of parts of the EDF9 Post-Conflict Rehabilitation and Capacity Building Programme and, maybe most significantly, for the ECSEL Programme (EC support to Education in Liberia, also EDF9). In both of these last cases, the delays, approached the D+3 deadline for the de-commitment of the funds; in the case of the PCRCBP, a part of the funds were in fact de-committed as a result of the delays, causing political damage to the relationship between the European Commission and the Liberian President, who, just before de-commitment, had just endorsed and officially acknowledged the Commission projects that should have been financed with the withdrawn EC money. The most important reason for these delays was the difficult staff situation that had persisted in the Monrovia EU Delegation / Office for much of the period between 1999 and 2008. Projects had to be “suspended” or otherwise lay “dormant” because the Delegation / the European Commission did not have the needed staff to push the interventions forward. Floaters and other technical assistance that were supposed to alleviate the HR bottleneck often arrived later than expected, which further added to the delays. This was the case, for example, for the EDF8 “Reintegration” programme and the EDF9 ECSEL. The complicated administrative division of labour between the EC office in Monrovia and the Delegation in Abidjan also played a role.

Data, sources, extracts : Projects with delayed EC processing (selection – li sting not complete):

Table 60: Selected EC-financed programmes with sign ificantly delayed inputs from the European Commissi on

Project / Programme Delayed documents or processes Reasons for delay


• 1 year delay of implementation for Electricity, Water, Health:

� Early 2005: “Management studies” as basis for EC assistance finalised

� 06/2005: “nearly all projects suspended or stopped”501

� End of 2005: “programme implementation not progressed much”.502

• “Procedural delays”

� “Delayed commitment decisions”503

� “Pending imprest account replenishment” (EC, 2006b, p.2)

� Lengthy TA procurement process (10 months).

Post-Conflict Rehabilitation and Capacity-Building Programme for Liberia (EDF9)

• Various delays during implementation (programming, contracting, recruitment of experts)

� Financial and systems audits of the Central Bank of Liberia and State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) delayed by approx. 6 months

• “Lack of human resources and the absence of a contracts and finance unit within the Office of the European Commission in Liberia”



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• Delays in the processing of grant applications under the programme’s “Community Rehabilitation” Component504:

� “Communities were asked to submit applications for small grants, had their applications approved and were then left to wait up to eighteen months before receiving the grant.”505

� “The EU reputation in the country was negatively affected (both at national and local levels) and Delegation staff undoubtedly faced significant problems trying to respond positively to CRC pleas for timely funds release in the face of time consuming administrative complexity.”506

• Reasons not clearly stated.

• From the various EAMRs from that period, it can be deduced that staff

� Staff constraints at the EC office / Delegation in Monrovia; and

� The complicated division of labour between Monrovia and Abidjan were among the reasons for these kinds of delays.

• Delayed contracting of committed resources, leading to the de-commitment of €2.0 m in 2006 / 2007 (D+3 rule) (EC, 2007g, p. 5).

• “[U]nderstaffing of the Delegation”507

� De-commitment occurred “despite the fact that preparation and tendering has been completed and draft contracts [were] ready508

• Finalisation of the financing proposal / preparation of the financing agreement (overall 1 year delayed signing of FA)

• Delay in QSG process (5 months to sign finished FP)510

• “Late arrival of technical assistance, understaffing in the Liberia office and procedural delays”511

• Delay of 1 year between signing of the FA and preparations for programme “quick launch” (EC: “programme dormant” (EC, 2007f, p.7))

• Staff constraints in Delegation

• Late arrival of “floater” from HQ to assist in “quick-launching”512

• Redundancy in amending Financing Agreement:

� Initial proposal to apply “flexible procedures under Art. 72, 73 of Cotonou Agreement” (during preparation of Financing Decision between 8/2005 and 10/2006);

� Reintroduction of “flexible procedures” in rider to FA a year later (10/2007).

• Insufficient clarity in rationale for applying or denying flexible procedures;

• “Exclusion of “flexible procedures final FA (signed 10/2006), against recommendation of Delegation.

European Commission Support to the Education Sector in Liberia (ECSEL) (EDF9)509

• Signing of secondary commitments and contracting of funds

� Signing of first specific commitments under ECSEL in 10/2009 (three years after signing of FA; 4 years of intended signature date for FA).

• Failed negotiations of contribution agreement on learning materials with UNICEF over procedural issues (sole-source procurement).

� Failure, after “draft contribution agreement” had been in place for close to a year513

• “Dormancy” of ECSEL for 1 year after signature of FA, due to “staff constraints” at Delegation (see above).



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• Finalisation of financing decision (FD) and financing agreement (FA):

� Originally planned for 08/2005514

� Eventually signed in 9/2007,515 more than two years later than planned

• Refusal of Financing Proposal (FP) at two QSG (2005 and 2006).516

• Third submission of FP to QSG only in 2007517

County Development (EDF9)

• Delays of at least two years in contracting and start of implementation after signing of FA518

� Component 1: Community Driven Development: No transfer of funds / start of activities as of 9/2009 Component 2: Large scale infrastructure: no procurement of works for Monrovia water; decision on “how to undertake” feeder roads component still to be taken as of 9/2009

� Component 3: Institutional support and local governance: TA team started assignment in 9/2009

• Delays on the part of the implementing organisation in reviewing and signing the Contribution Agreement519

• Interviewees also linked the delayed processing of documents throughout planning and implementation of programmes to the cumbersome cooperation with the EC Delegation in Ivory Coast as the official NAO for EC cooperation with Liberia. While the assumption had been that, as Abidjan’s “sister Delegation”, the Liberian office would be adequately supported by the EC in Ivory Coast, the actual day-to-day cooperation proved to be difficult, not least, because the Abidjan Delegation had to oversee the Liberian affairs in addition to an already demanding workload (Interviews with EC Delegation staff, Monrovia).



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� Indicator 10.1.3: Counterparts and partners received support and other inputs from EC in adequate (previously anticipated) scope and scale

Findings at indicator’s level: Procedural delays have, at times significantly, affected the extent to which the Commission’s counterparts and partners received and benefitted from EC assistance. A notable exception is EC support to the General Auditing Commission (GAC) that was appreciated by the GAC itself, as well as other donors and members of the international community. The European Commission remained below the expected levels of deliverables in a number of important areas and sectors. Most severe is the gap in the education sector, where the Commission had not delivered any of the substantive support to schools, teacher training and learning materials 3 years after the decision had been made to choose education as an EC focal sector. This and other incidences of unfulfilled expectations cause the Liberian President to repeatedly chide the European Commission for the slow pace of its aid delivery. The opinion in donor circles is that EC projects are often delayed or even have come to a standstill. This also might reflect the fact that the EU Delegation for several month or years, had withdrawn completely from such dialogue platforms as the PRS consultations or other sectoral or general coordination meetings. Programming and programme identification and formulation of the EC in Liberia did not adequately take into account the limited organisational capacity of European Commission, i.e. its Delegation in Monrovia after the end of the conflict in 2003. The commitment of € 50.0m immediately after the signing of the CPA but also the ambitious design of ECSEL raised expectations with the Commission’s partners that the Commission’s inadequately resourced operational staff subsequently struggled to fulfil. In several cases, such as ECSEL, this led to serious gaps in the delivery of European Commission support that damaged the reputation of the Commission as a reliable development partner.



• EC support to the “General Auditing Commission” has been touted as the “success story” of support to economic governance under GEMAP (see Indicator 8.1.1, EQ8 and Morsiani, et.al, 2008, p.52).

• Several documents refer to the “catalysing” effects of early, EC-financed organisational and financial audits of Liberian SoEs that have provided the evidence base for the GoL-donor negotiations of GEMAP (see Indicator 8.1.1 and answer to EQ8 overall).


• Liberia’s President, Ellen Sirleaf-Johnson, has complained repeatedly about the delays in EC-financing and EC support, directly to the EU Commissioner for Development and also vis-à-vis the Delegation.520

� Upon de-commitment of part of her “dry season deliverables”, i.e. projects that had been officially acknowledged and endorsed by the President and that “did not make it through the N+3 deadline and could not be implemented”521.

� At the occasion of a joint mission between AIDCO C and RELEX K, accompanied by the cabinet of the EU Commissioner for Development.

• Numerous EC documents and sources point to serious implications of the lack of staff and overall low organisational presence of the European Commission in Liberia:

� Low staffing levels are cited as reasons for numerous delays in programme identification, programming and implementation (see Indicator 10.1.2 on timely processing of documents by the EC522)

� The 2007 EC-JAR finds that “[I]t is generally considered by Government and development partners that the EC projects and participation to the developmental process are considerably slowed down and / or delayed, not to say at a standstill523

� Disbursement levels were thought to be “falling way behind the United States Government, and the World Bank”524

� EC presence in the donor community and in Government circles was poor: � “The EC has not been able to participate to such important processes as the elaboration of the

PRS, the preparation of sector policies in the end of 2007 (infrastructure sectors) [...]”525

� In interviews the EU Delegation (preparatory visit), it was stated that around 2007, the Delegation was in “fire fighting mode” and had pulled out of “essentially all the coordination meetings” and



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other outside contacts, while staff members were “just trying to deal with EDF programming”, i.e. “Internal EC business”.

� According to the 2007 JAR, the “the Commission is falling way behind the United States Government, and the World Bank, as the major donors in terms of disbursements and certainly in terms of ‘presence’ (size of delegation, staff on the ground, participation to sector and strategy discussions, etc.).

• The direct political involvement of the EC in the peace negotiations in Accra led the EC to commit a considerable amount of money, i.e. € 50.0m, to support the Liberian peace process. The commitment of these € 50.0m was not accompanied by a corresponding increase of the operational capacity of the EC in Monrovia. The relative ease with which committing this money was possible therefore contrasts with the subsequent operational difficulties to actually spend the money appropriately (Interview with EC staff).

� The case of ECSEL illustrates a similar disconnect between the political aspirations and commitments of the EC – in this case as expressed in the Financing Agreement of the programme -, and the actual operational capacity of the European Commission on the ground. ECSEL was drafted and the FA for the programme was written largely without considering that the EC Delegation itself was facing serious operational bottlenecks in Liberia (Interview with EC ECSEL expert). As a result, the role that was envisioned for the EC by ECSEL’s designer went far beyond what the EC Delegation, with its limited organisational capacity, was able to deliver.

� Also note that the Delegation had to employ the help of floaters from HQ in order to get the programme of the ground. Please see EQ9 on how the related recruitment processes have contributed to ECSEL’s delay.

JC 10.1: EC organisational resources and EC capacit y in Liberia can respond to organisational demands of chosen cooperation framew orks and implementation mechanisms on EC structures

Statement upon JC: The European Commission, and in particular the country representation of the EC (i.e. the office and later the Delegation) has been overburdened and overwhelmed by the demands that the planning and implementation of EC aid has placed on it. The frequent use of contribution agreements with other implementing agencies and the attempts to bolster the human resources of the EU Delegation with temporary personnel from contractors or EC HQ in Brussels could not prevent that staff bottlenecks have considerably prolonged processing times during programme identification, programming and implementation. These delays contributed to a situation were important contributions from the EC did not become available on the ground at the time when they were expected. This was most prominently the case for ECSEL (EC Support to Education in Liberia), but also in other programmes. In the case of parts of the Community Rehabilitation Component of the Post-Conflict Rehabilitation and Capacity Building Programme (CRC / PCRCBP), this meant that a number of projects had to be cancelled due to D+3 de-commitment of the foreseen funds that just previously had been officially acknowledged and announced to the Liberian population by Liberia’s President. The availability of EC support suffered in particular during the years 2006 and 2007, two years that were particularly important for the newly elected Government to ensure that it could fulfil many promises from the election campaign. In 2007, the EC contracted only € 2.24 million. In particular the delay of ECSEL contributed to this bottleneck, but also the delays in planning and operationalizing the County Development Programme. This and other instances of unfulfilled expectations caused the Liberian President to repeatedly register formal complaints about the slow delivery of promised EC assistance. As a result of the overwhelming demands on EC staff in Monrovia, the EU Delegation felt forced to withdraw from essentially all of the bi- and multi-lateral coordination platforms, including the prominent donor-GoL consultations on the development of Liberia’s Poverty Reduction Strategy. Programming and programme identification and formulation of the EC in Liberia did not adequately take into account the limited organisational capacity of European Commission, i.e. its Delegation in Monrovia after the end of the conflict in 2003. The commitment of € 50.0m immediately after the signing of the CPA but also the ambitious design of ECSEL raised expectations with the Commission’s partners that the Commission’s inadequately resourced operational staff subsequently struggled to fulfil. In several cases, such as ECSEL, this led to serious gaps in the delivery of European Commission support that damaged the reputation of the Commission as a reliable development partner.



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Judgment Criterion 10.2: Choice of cooperation fram eworks and implementation mechanisms shows / allows adequate anticipation / response of / to external risks, i.e., resulting fr om political fragility

� Indicator 10.2.1: Existence of adequate risk analyses in financing conditions / agreements, contracts, project documents of implementing partners or other cooperation agreements

Findings at indicator’s level: The analysis of internal or external risks that could affect the planned implantation and could reduce the intended benefits of EC-financed programmes is weak for most of the Financing Agreements of EC support to Liberia that were signed between 1999 and 2008. Statements on “risks and assumptions” remain on a very general level and do not explore the external threats and challenges to the integrity of the intervention logic of the programme in any detail. Even Financing Agreements for programmes that were meant to build on one another, such as the Community Rehabilitation Component of the PCRCBP and the subsequent County Development Programme, repeat the same general assumption regarding key elements of the programme context that already had been proven insufficient during the implementation of its predecessor. The final report of the CRC / PCRCBP concluded in 2008 that line ministries were unable to deliver assurances of continued support to externally funded community initiatives, such as schools, after donor support had come to an end, for reasons of missing capacity and functioning coordination mechanisms between line ministries and local authorities. This negative assessment notwithstanding, the inception report of the County Development Programme repeats the same general assumption that Government and the Ministry of Internal Affairs remain committed to “decentralisation” and the “transformation of Liberian local Government”. Maybe more importantly, the report does not consider the possibility (i.e., formulate an associated risk) that despite the Governments overall commitment and any additional capacity building support from the EC, the GoL might eventually still not have the needed capacity to adequately sustain EC-initiated community-driven development projects. This is particularly significant since the Terms of Reference for the corresponding Long-Term TA offered a fairly nuanced and detailed analysis of the underlying political forces and incentives that might prevent the development of adequate local-national coordination mechanisms.

Data, sources, extracts : • Documentation of risk analyses is weak for many of the major EC-financed programmes. Risk and assumptions526 are for the most part treated only in two places of the

Financing Agreements: a) in the Annex A on “Risks and Assumptions” and; b) in the Logical Framework Matrix for the respective programme that is also annexed to the FA. In both places, however, statements on “risks and assumptions” remain on a very general level and do not explore the external threats and challenges to the integrity of the intervention logic of the programme in any detail (see table 61 for excerpts of the “risks / assumptions” columns of the Logical Framework Matrices of three different programmes).



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Table 61: Treatment of Risks and Assumptions in pro ject documents of EC-financed programmes in Liberia

Programme Risks / Assumptions in Financing Agreements (FAs)

Reintegration Programme for returnees and displaced people in Liberia (EDF8)

“The main risks are: The risk of political instability and armed conflict; The willingness on the side of the Government, particularly the Ministry of Planning / National Authorising Officer (NAO) to allow the Programme to be implemented efficiently; Poor legal environment with limited application of the rule of law; Delays due to long procedures.”

“The assumptions made are the following: [...] TA team will be able to work without undue harassment; [...] GoL will not interfere in the programme.”527

Post-Conflict Rehabilitation and Capacity Building Programme (EDF9)

“Stakeholders fully committed to Accra Peace Agreement; Donors willing to contribute to peace operations; Sufficiently well-equipped and led UN force; Sufficient donor funding; NTG in place and functioning; Effective stakeholder coordination; Sufficient regional stability”

EC Support to Education in Liberia (ECSEL) (EDF9)

“Government inaugurated in January 2006 is open to enter Into negotiations with EC and other development partners; All preconditions are met (see below); Political situation remains stable for the duration of the project; Security situation In all Counties and districts remains fairly stable for the duration of the project; MoE is actively cooperating in the restructuring, particularly regarding staff reduction and reappointment; MoE is meeting their budgetary Obligations, primarily regarding salary payments to teachers; Complementary actions under the integrated RFTF Humanitarian Appeal and the subsequent PRSP take effect.” 528

• Even the Financing Agreement of the County Development Programme (EDF9) that is meant to build on the earlier Community Rehabilitation Component of the “Post-Conflict Rehabilitation and Capacity Building Programme” repeats the same general assumption regarding key elements of the programme context that already has been proven insufficient during the implementation of its predecessor.

• Table 62 compares risks and assumptions in key documents of both programmes with each other, and also contrasts both with the “lessons learned” on the issue by the LTTA for the CRC / PCRCBP. The comparison shows that many of the earlier assumptions regarding “Government commitment to decentralisation”, “effective stakeholder co-ordination” (i.e. at and between national and local levels) and “deliberate government policies and strategies in community investment” may not have adequately captured the full range of challenges national – local coordination. At the end of CRC implementation, the LTTA team had to conclude that as of 2008, “line ministries are unable to deliver assurances of continued support to community initiatives”.529

� This assessment notwithstanding, the Financing Agreement of the County Development Programme seems to again reduces this central risk for the viability and sustainability for Community Driven Development (CDD) interventions to the general assumptions of “continued commitment to decentralisation” and to “the transformation of Liberian Local Government” (see Table 62), without analysis of the political and administrative dynamics that underlie the difficult challenge of ensuring that local and national planning processes are adequately linked.



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Table 62: Comparison of risks & assumptions on “dec entralisation” / linkages “line ministries” to “loc al authorities”, PCRCBP / CRC vs. County Development

Risks / Assumptions Post-Conflict Rehabilitation – ISP, CRC Lessons from CRC LTTA team Risks / Assumptions County Development

Relevant assumptions / risks in FA log-frame (PCRCBP):

• “NTG [transitional Government] in place and functioning”

• “Effective stakeholder coordination” (EC, 2003a).

Relevant assumptions / risks in CRC-specific log-frame (date: 10/2006):

• “Government committed to Decentralisation programme”

• “Effective stakeholder commitment and co-ordination”

• “Communities will be able to sustain activities with GoL or NGO support”

• “Availability of suitable national and local counterpart”

• “Deliberate government policies and strategies in community investment”530

“[A]lthough projects involved line ministry liaison [... to ensure that...] support would be provided once the clinic, school or road was completed, in several cases this was not the case”.

“[L]ine ministries are unable to deliver assurances of continued support to community initiatives. The [...] assumed sequence [...] - "we will find support to build a clinic and then approach the Ministry of Health for help with trained staff and drugs" is [...] wrong [and] is likely to lead to empty clinic buildings (or schools without teachers and books).531

Main relevant assumptions / risks of PCRCBP:

• “Government remains committed to deconcentration and decentralisation” (FA)

• “Continued commitment to decentralisation” and “Continued commitment of Ministry of Internal Affairs to transformation of Liberian Local Government” (Transtec Inception Report)532

Reaction to “assumptions and risks” in CDP-LTTA inception report:

• “Report the situation timely to the EU Delegation so as to assess, in particular with UNDP, about the relevance of the project and the need to postpone or delay actions” 533



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� Indicator 10.2.2: Projects and programmes have in place adequate risk management strategies to respond to (previously identified and analysed – see Indicator 10.2.1) risks


None of the financing agreements of the major EC-financed projects between 1999 and 2008 present any risk-management strategies or risk-response strategies to suggest how these interventions could be adapted to respond to any negative changes of the programme context. However, the EC Delegation anyhow has contracted out much of the oversight and day-to-day management of programmes to third parties. The extent to which external risks and risks-responses are considered in the approach of these contractors is therefore even more important.

In the case of the LTTA for the EC County Development Programme, the inception report neither acknowledges any of the specific risks that the EC had mentioned in the ToR for the assignment; nor does the contractor propose any “Plan B” to come into effect should any of these risks occur. This includes the lack of any back-up plan for the situation that county-line ministry alignment and capacity building support fail to produce the institutional conditions needed to ensure CDD project sustainability. The contractor merely suggests to “report [...] timely to the EU Delegation so as to assess [...] about the relevance of the project and the need to postpone or delay actions”. The case also illustrates how low staffing levels at the EC Delegation and programme delays and resulting time pressure can contribute to the omission of lessons learned in the work of EC contractors: Although the ToR for the CDP TA Team had been of high quality, high staff turnover and low staffing levels in the EC Delegation meant that the Delegation did not have the needed capacity to brief Ministry officials and the TA team adequately on the intricacies of the programme; i.e. to make sure that lessons that had already been compiled in the TA ToR would really find their way into the inception report of the assignment. In addition, the TA team for the CDP had only about a month to write the inception report, due to a one-year delay in their recruitment process. This time pressure compounded the “loss of tacit knowledge”, in that neither the TA Team nor the EC staff had the time that would have been necessary to “make sure” that any documented knowledge and lessons really were being picked up by the operationalization of the ToR, i.e. the inception report.


• None of the Financing Agreements of EC-financed projects contains actionable risk management strategies for the risks that had been identified either in Annex A of the FA or the “Risks / Assumptions” column of the logical framework matrix. This is consistent with the observation made under Indicator 10.2.1 that the risk analyses in most, if not all, Financing Agreements remain on a very general level (e.g., “The risk of political instability and armed conflict”) that do not lend themselves to a careful consideration what actions the programme should take if one of the adverse events occurs.

• With much of the oversight and day-to-day management of programmes contracted out to third parties, i.e. consulting companies, the EC overall, and the EU Delegation in particular, face the additional challenge of ensuring that the findings of a possible more detailed and comprehensive risk analysis that might have been prepared during the tendering process for a particular LTTA assignment is adequately reflected in the contractor’s eventual approach for that particular service.

� EXAMPLE: In the case of the County Development Programme, the ToR for the Long Term TA contain a fairly detailed and nuanced description and analysis of a number of specific risks (and related opportunities) that the CDP is likely to face. Among other things, the ToR discuss the challenge of creating adequate “linkages” between county authorities and line ministries. The document points out that the political dynamics of donor supported organisational reform at national level favour a process of mere “deconcentration” of posts and functions to the counties over a more complete “decentralisation”. In the case of “deconcentrated Ministries”, the local officials of the Ministries would merely form a “consultative ‘cabinet’” of the County Superintendent, since the traditional accountability chains from local Ministry representatives to the Ministry HQs in Monrovia would stay intact. The ToR argue that experience in Liberia had shown this kind of “deconcentration” to be insufficient to truly improve governance capacity at county level and conclude that there is the risk that “deconcentration creates a barrier to future decentralisation and that line ministry functions are insufficiently coordinated into the local planning framework” (ToR for County Development LTTA).

� This relatively nuanced analysis is not adequately taken up in the subsequent inception report (IR) of the selected contractor. The IR recognises that [t]he programme is meant to “enhance capacities in involving regional and local stakeholders in planning and implementing their own development initiatives, and to strengthen GoL administration / staff capacities to structure these initiatives”.534 However, the report:

• Does not specifically acknowledge any of the risks elaborated on in the ToR for the assignment, including the risk of deconcentration instead of decentralisation “creating barriers” to sufficient coordination of line ministries into local planning frameworks. In the “risks and assumptions” section535 the contractor merely picks-up on the far more generic risk statements



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of the original Financing Agreement (“continued commitment of the GoL to a policy of decentralisation”).

• The response the contractor proposes does adequately reflect the nuanced discussion of this challenge in the ToR.

♦ The proposed approach for aligning County / MIA priorities and structures with the priorities and administrative structures of line ministries seems to focus on “workshops” “awareness-raising”, “communication and outreach” on the principles and importance of “community-driven development” (CDD) and “local economic development” (LED)536. Although “raised awareness for institutional requirements for CDD” might play a role in reforming governance structures at county level, it is doubtful that awareness and exchange alone will be sufficient to overcome the multiple political and monetary incentives that, as suggested by the LTTA ToR, could end up favouring administrative deconcentration over comprehensive decentralisation.

♦ Maybe most importantly, the inception report does not propose any “Plan B” that could come into effect should the county-line ministry alignment fail to produce the institutional conditions that are needed to ensure CDD project sustainability (i.e. to avoid the same “schools without teachers” phenomenon that has affected the previous CRC programme). Under “Risks and Assumptions”, the contractor merely suggests to “report [...] timely to the EU Delegation so as to assess [...] about the relevance of the project and the need to postpone or delay actions”, should the (assumed) “continued GoL commitment to decentralisation” fade.537

• Interviews with EC-staff suggested that the low capacity of the EC Delegation to carry out even its supervisory roles and other functions related to quality assurance contributed to this outcome:

� The conceptual framework for the county development programme had been written by an external consultant, who had “taken a lot of care looking to look at lessons from past projects”, in particular also the CRC.

� The conceptual framework was then used to draw up the ToR (which are of high quality, see above, and the tendering process for the project TA was initiated. However, when the TA team finally was able to begin its work, many of the people who had been involved in project identification, in the Ministry but also in the EC Delegation, had moved on or had otherwise “forgotten” about the project and had to be reminded “what the project / programme was really all about”.

� However, high staff turnover in the EC Delegation, without sufficient overlap between individuals or staff “redundancies” in thematic areas to ensure that lessons can be passed on to a newly arriving staff member, meant that the EC Delegation did not have the needed capacity to brief Ministry officials and the TA team adequately on the intricacies of the programme; i.e. to make sure that lessons that had already been compiled in the TA ToR would really find their way into the inception report of the assignment.

� In addition, the TA team for the CDP had only about a month to write the inception report, due to a one-year delay in their recruitment process. This time pressure compounded the “loss of tacit knowledge”, in that neither the TA Team nor the EC staff had the time that would have been necessary to “make sure” that any documented knowledge and lessons really were being picked up by the operationalization of the ToR, i.e. the inception report (Interview with EC staff member).



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� Indicator 10.2.3: Projects and programmes react to risk events as they occur.

Findings at indicator’s level: In light of the missing risk-response strategies, many staff of EC-financed projects had to make relatively ad-hoc changes to the scope and approaches of their projects. In some cases, this resulted in a shift of the substantive focus of the project, not necessarily in negative ways. For example, in the case of the “2nd Rehabilitation Programme”, programme staff had to focus more on “mobilising and training community groups” then on the “implementation of complex technical designs”, when adequate implementing partners were not available. In many other cases, however, certain negative effects on quality or sustainability of benefits went along with any ad-hoc changes to the project. More than intended support or oversight from project staff for project counterparts (either Governmental or non-Governmental), for example, meant that only a small share of the originally planned number of community projects could be implemented (Reintegration, EDF8), or that “learning by doing” capacity building effects were negatively affected (Post-Conflict Rehabilitation, EDF9). Lower than anticipated support from Governmental partners often meant that the maintenance of constructed infrastructure was under threat (e.g., in Post-Conflict Rehabilitation).

Data, sources, extracts : • In the absence of detailed risk-analyses and risk management plans (see Indicators 10.2.1 and 10.2.2.), any actual programme responses to emerging constraints or risks

were largely “ad-hoc” and often affected the quality of quantity of assistance that could be offered (see table 62 for examples and illustration).

• In some cases, the need to develop ad hoc responses seems to have shifted the substantive focus of programmes, not necessarily in negative ways. For example, in the case of the “2nd Rehabilitation Programme”, programme staff had to focus more on “mobilising and training community groups” then on the “implementation of complex technical designs”, when adequate implementing partners were not available (see table 63 below).

Table 63: Selected programme constraints or “risks” and their management Progr. “Constraints” or Risks encountered Reactions of programme staff / EC Implications for the programme

• “Dearth” of implementing partners for programme: � INGOs not prepared to work with ex-

combatants � “Unwilling” to operate up-country, off

the main highways � INGOs considered available budgets

as too low (“derisory”); would not submit proposals

� Lack of INGOs skilled and experienced in “development projects” (all focused on emergency aid).538

• “Area Programme Co-ordinators (APC's) would identify and train suitable local staff in their areas of operation and, identify and implement projects directly through local community groups which they would help to formulate”539

• Apparent shift from “implementation of complex technical designs through other partners” to “mobilising community groups and training them” (i.e. capacity development at local / community level).540

2nd R

ehab

ilita

tion

Pro

gram

me

(ED

F8)

• “Cash flow problems imposed a major impediment to the number of projects that could eventually be implemented”, affecting, among other things, the provision of spare parts for operating equipments.541

• Problem was counteracted by “extremely competent and dedicated team” (Agrisystems, 2001, p.4).

• Otherwise no documented “management” of this constraint. Negative “coping mechanisms” from within the project, included, however: � “Cannibalisation” of operational programme trucks

• Number of implemented projects was smaller than planned.

• Project inputs could not be maintained • Reputation of programme and EC

suffered.



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for spare parts � Adoption of “emergency attitude” to keep trucks

running, running counter to “normal methods of preventive maintenance”.542

� Purchase of entire “used trucks” in Europe and their disassembly and shipment to Liberia.543

• High levels of corruption, i.e. attempts to misuse programme resources coupled with the “strong demand from communities that the funds [...] were not eaten by others.544

• “[A]dministrative and accounting procedures necessary to avoid misuse of programme resources imposed additional transactions costs and contributed to time delays”.545

• Financial responsibilities remained in the hands of programme staff to maintain control over fiduciary functions.

• “Ability to pursue the programme capacity building strategy of learning by doing was constrained”

• “Corrupt practices may have reduced programme benefits and impact”546

• “[M]ost of the county or district personnel did not have the skills to carry out their duties properly and did not have the means to visit most of the remote project sites” and thus to be full “implementing partners”547

• “Intensive support from the programme was [...] needed to enable local authority staff to effectively undertake delegated tasks”.

• Time consuming “accounting” exercises when local authorities were provided with “advance funds”, e.g., for workshops548

• Programme had to “balance supervisory and monitoring needs with [...] desire to delegate responsibility and to build capacity of national systems and processes rather than establishing parallel structures”

• More intensive monitoring by programme staff had cost implications: “process of direct supervision [...] more costly but less risky”. 549

CR

C C

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nent

of “

Pos

t-C

onfli

ct R

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ilita

tion”

P

rogr

amm

e (E

DF

9)

• “Local project ownership” and county-national liaison does not lead to project sustainability.550

• “[P]re-determined sustainability strategy did not therefore always yield the desired result and had to be supplemented with specific measures and further capacity building”551

• Limited sustainability of projects (schools, clinics, etc.)552



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JC 10.2: Choice of cooperation frameworks and imple mentation mechanisms shows / allows adequate anticipation / response of / to ext ernal risks, i.e., resulting from political fragility

Statement upon JC: The analysis of possible risks to the successful implementation of EC-financed projects has been weak; risk analyses in fundamental programme documents, such as Financing Agreement, have remained on a very general level and as such did not provide a good basis for preparing a nuanced strategy to respond to the identified risks. In addition, the extensive practice of contracting out the programme oversight and supervision to third parties, i.e. consulting companies and multilateral agencies adds another challenge for EC staff to ensure that possible “lessons-learned” in the area of risk analysis and risk response are adequately picked up and considered in the management of EC-financed interventions. In the case of the County Development Programme, the contractor’s awareness of the specific risks and challenges of the programme553 lagged behind the nuanced analysis and knowledge of past “lessons-learned” that had been demonstrated in the ToR for this assignment. This case also illustrates how low staffing levels and staff turnover at the EC Delegation can contribute to the loss of tacit knowledge and the subsequent the omission of this knowledge as “lessons learned” in the work of EC contractors. Time pressure can compound this challenge by constraining the ability of the Delegation staff ensure that at least all of the documented knowledge and lessons are being considered by EC contractors.

The low “risk preparedness” of many EC-financed programmes in Liberia meant that the staff of these projects had to make relatively ad-hoc adjustments to their interventions when their initial assumptions were not satisfied. Changes like “time consuming accounting exercises” to make up for lower than expected fiduciary standards of county administrations have increased the risk of reduced project benefits or smaller than expected sustainability of investments. In a few cases, the necessary shifts in project substance were possible without (documented) losses of project quality. However, without clearly formulated risk response strategies, these cases have to be attributed to factors like higher-than-usual dedication and ingenuity of project staff and other fortuitous circumstances.

Judgment Criterion 10.3: Adequacy of cost / output ratios (compared to country specific benchmarks)

� Indicator 10.3.1: Comparative average “unit costs” of selected EC-financed outputs, e.g. “cost per reconstructed learning space”; “cost per community well”, etc.


Unit costs for jobs created and classrooms constructed by the EDF8 Reintegration Programme and the Community Rehabilitation Component of the PCRCBP are relatively high, in particular when considering not only the actually invested amounts, but also the “administrative overheads” of the individual grants. For both programmes, adding the administrative costs more than doubles the cost per job created. In addition, it is also striking that the Community Rehabilitation Component has significantly higher unit costs for job creation than the EDF8 Reintegration programme. With investment costs of € 6,140.41 and overall per unit costs (i.e. including administrative costs) of € 12,557.29, the per unit costs of the CRC are more than 5 times as high as the unit costs of the EDF8 Reintegration Programme.


Table 64: Selected estimated unit costs for EC-fina nced programmes

Unit Cost Indicator

EDF8 Reintegration Programme for Returnees and

Displaced Persons

Community Rehabilitation Component /

PCRCBP

Investment cost per job created € 1,113.00554 € 6,140.41555

Total cost per job created € 2,813.00 € 12,557.29

Investment cost per classroom € 4,760.00 € 4,377.89556

Sources: Calculations based on numbers from Klein, et.al, 2006 and Cardno Agrisystems (2009)



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� Indicator 10.3.2: Ratio of “invested amount” to “overhead” (e.g. per programme)


For two of EC-financed small-scale grants programmes, the “operational” expenses are between 100% to 150% of the actual invested amount. For the case of the Small-Scale Projects of the EDF8 Reintegration Programme, this means that for grants of the average size of € 14,240, the “overhead”, i.e., administrative costs would be approximately € 21,700, bringing the total costs for this grant to about € 36,000. For the Small-Scale Grants of the Community Rehabilitation Component, the administrative, staff and other “overhead” expenses are approximately 105% of the invested amounts. E.g., for an average grant of € 8,755.77 incurred estimated administrative costs of € 9,149.99, bringing the total cost of the average investment to € 17,905.76. Unfortunately, no comparative figures are available from other programmes or other donors.


Table 65: Financial estimates for the LCD / SSP com ponent of the EDF 8 Reintegration Programme

Item Value

Programme Expenses (excl. PMU) € 19,661,466

Total PMU Expenses (entire programme) € 2,246,491

Share of PMU expenses for LCD Component € 697,746

SSP Share of Administrative & Staff Expenses LCD Team + Ips (80%)557 € 2,581,452

�SP Share of TA Expenses LCD (80%) € 833,837

"Investment" Expenses SSPs (as part of LCD) € 2,691,439

Expenses LCD ("Investment", Team, IPs, TA) € 6,106,728

Expenses LCD ("Investment", Team, IPs, TA) + PMU-Share € 6,804,474

Ratio LCD Admin+TA+IP / Investment 1.53

Number of SSPs 189

Average SSP Investment € 14,240

"Overhead" Costs per SSP € 21,762

Total average cost per SSP (Investment + Overhead) € 36,003

Calculations based on data extracted from Klein, et.al, 2006.

Table 66: Financial Information for Small Scale Gra nts, Community Rehabilitation Component, PCRCBP

Item Value

No. Of Small Scale Grants (SSG) 54

Total amount for Small Scale Grants (SSG) (€) € 472,811.76

Average Amount per SSG (€) (w/o training & admin) € 8,755.77

SSG share of Training Costs558 € 66,653.07

SSG share of Administrative Costs € 494,099.33

SSG share of Training & Admin. Costs € 560,752.40

Additional average cost (€) per SSG (training & admin) € 10,384.�0

Additional average cost (€) per SSG (training only) € 1,234.32

Additional average cost (€) per SSG (admin only) € 9,149.99

Total Average Cost per SSG (incl. training and admin) € 19,140.08

Total Average Cost per SSG (only admin, w/o training) € 17,905.7�

Ratio of Inve �tment / Administrative Costs 1.05

Source: Cardno Agrisystems (2009)



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� Indicator 10.3.3: EC and its partners used adequate processes (e.g. competitive tendering) to avoid misuse of funds and maximise results per € spent.


Use of competitive tendering was often not possible, because interest from potential bidders was too low. As a result, the Delegation often had to revert to negotiated procedures for selecting contract partners.

Data, sources, extracts : • Use of competitive tendering was often not possible, because interest from potential bidders was too low. As

a result, the Delegation often had to revert to negotiated procedures for selecting contract partners (Interviews with Delegation staff).

• The use of negotiated procedures was allowed for programmes that were governed by Art. 72 and 73 of the Cotonou Agreement.

JC 10.3: Adequacy of cost / output ratios (compared to country specific benchmarks)

Statement upon JC:

Unit costs for jobs created and classrooms constructed by the EDF8 Reintegration Programme and the Community Rehabilitation Component of the PCRCBP were relatively high, in particular when considering not only the actually invested amounts, but also the “administrative overheads” of the individual grants. For both programmes, adding the administrative costs more than doubles the cost per job created. The Community Rehabilitation Component had significantly higher unit costs for job creation than the EDF8 Reintegration programme: With investment costs of € 6,140.41 and overall per unit costs (i.e. including administrative costs) of € 12,557.29, the per unit costs of the CRC were more than 5 times as high as the unit costs of the EDF8 Reintegration Programme. For both of these programmes, the “operational” expenses are between 100% to 150% of the actual invested amount. In the case of the EDF8 Reintegration Programme, this meant that grants of the average size of € 14,240 would incur an administrative “overhead” of approximately € 21,700, bringing the total costs for each of these grants to an average of € 36,000. For the Small-Scale Grants of the Community Rehabilitation Component, the administrative, staff and other “overhead” expenses were approximately 105% of the invested amounts. For a the average grant of € 8,755.77, the EC and its partners incurred estimated administrative costs of € 9,149.99, bringing the total cost of the average investment to € 17,905.76. Use of competitive tendering was often not possible, because interest from potential bidders was too low. As a result, the Delegation often had to revert to negotiated procedures for selecting contract partners.

Unfortunately, no comparative figures are available from other programmes or other donors.



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Inter-Agency Task Force on HIV in Humanitarian Situations:Standing Committee (2007): Liberia - HIV Humanitarian Overview 2007, http://www.aidsandemergencies.org/cms/ index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=66&Itemid=137. Inter Press Service (2009): Rainy season deadly for pregnant women, 1 October 2009, http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=48673. International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2009a): Liberia: Second review under the three year arrangement under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility, IMF Country Report No. 09/177, June 2009. International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2009b): Liberia: Third Review under the three year arrangement under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility, IMF Country Report No. 09/332, December 2009. International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2009c): Liberia: Public Financial Management Systems Reform Priorities and Strategy for 2009-2011. International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2008): Joint Staff Advisory Note on the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper. International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2007): Joint Staff Advisory Note on the Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper. International Crisis Group (2009): Liberia: Uneven Progress in Security Sector Reform. International Crisis Group (2006): Liberia: Staying Focused. International Crisis Group (2006): Liberia: Resurrecting the Justice System. International Crisis Group (2006): Liberia’s Elections: Necessary but not Sufficient. International Crisis Group (2004): Rebuilding Liberia: Prospects and Perils. International Crisis Group (2004): Liberia and Sierra Leone: Rebuilding Failed States. International Crisis Group (2003): Tackling Liberia: The Eye of the Regional Storm. International Crisis Group (2003): Liberia: Security Challenges. Italtrend (2008): Monitoring and Management of the Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration Program in Liberia, April 2008. Jacobs (2007): Final Report – Technical Assistance for Supervision Co-ordination of Emergency Power Programme in Monrovia / Liberia, Contract No. 2006/120253/2, Report Date: May 2007. Klein, Jean Luc; Batzlen, Christof; Neale, Fred; Lunan, Dr. Burnett (2006): Final Evaluation of the Reintegration Programme for Returnees and Displaced People for Liberia – Final Report, A project implemented by HTSPE Ltd. In cooperation with GFA Consulting Group GmbH Kluczny, Peter (2008): Monitoring and Management of the Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration Program in Liberia, FINAL REPORT, Monrovia, April 2008, ITALTREND. Koddenbrock, Ka (2008): The Will to Bridge? European Commission and U.S. Approaches to Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development, in: Raising the Bar: Enhancing transatlantic Governance of Disaster Relief and Preparedness, April 2008. Koos, Richelle (2008): Service Delivery in Fragile Situations, Presentation at Marshall Centre, March 2008, Europe Aid. LeBlanc, Robert; et. al. (2008): Evaluation de la Stratégie Régionale de la Commission européene (CE) en Afrique de l’Ouest, Brussels, European Commission. Levitt, Jeremy (2005): The evolution of deadly conflict in Liberia – from paternalism to state collapse. Liberia Electricity Corporation (no date available): Website of the LEC - History, http://libelcorp.com/history.htm. Liberia Institute of Statistics and Geo-Information Services (2008a):2008 National Population and Housing Census: Preliminary Results. Liberia Institute of Statistics and Geo-Information Services (2008b): Liberia Demographic and Health Survey.



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Liberia Poverty Reduction Forum (2008): Communique 2008 Liberia Poverty Reduction Forum, June 26-27, 2008, Berlin, Germany. Lofa County Development Committee (CDC) (2008): Lofa County Development Agenda, Prepared by the County Development Committee, in collaboration with the Ministries of Planning and Economic Affairs and Internal Affairs, Republic of Liberia. Louis Berger (2009): Technical Assistance for the Management and Supervision of Electricity and Water Rehabilitation Liberia – PS 341; Quarterly Report March 2009 – May 2009. Louis Berger (2007): Monthly Progress Report for June 2007, PCRCBP procurement of water / electricity. Louis Berger (2008): Technical Assistance for the Management and Supervision of Electricity and Water Rehabilitation Liberia – PS 341; Quarterly Report June 2008 – August 2008. Mercy Corps (2008): Gbarpolu Agriculture, Infrastructure and Nutrition for Food Security (GAINS), Grant Application FSTBL, June 2008. Milbrandt, Anelia (2009): Assessment of Biomass Resources in Liberia; prepared for the US Agency for International Development (USAID) under the Liberia Energy Assistance Program Ministry of Education (MoE) (2009): Education Sector Review. Ministry of Education (MoE) (2008): A System in Transition – The 2007/08 National School Census Report, Government of Liberia. Ministry of Education (MoE) (2007): Liberian Primary Education Recovery Program (L-PERP) – Prepared for Fast Track Initiative; March 30, 2007, Republic of Liberia. Ministry of Internal Affairs (2004): District Development Committee (DDC); prepared by authority of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in collaboration with UNDP and UNHCR. Morsiani, Giovanni; Takawira, Gertrude; Jones-Demen, Annie (2008): Mid-term Evaluation of the Governance and Economic Management Assistance Programme (GEMAP). Newman Stephen (2009): Results-oriented Monitoring Report: Enhancing Agricultural Capacities and Economy in Southeast Liberia, Report date: 25.09.2009; MR-123247.01. Newman Stephen (2009): Results-oriented Monitoring Report: Lofa Livelihood Security Project, Report date: 25.09.2009; MR-123248.01. Nicolls, Martina, et. al (2007): Final Evaluation Building Recovery and Reform through Democratic Governance (BRDG) – Liberia. USAID/DCHA/OTI (2006-2007). Social Impact Nimba County Development Committee (CDC) (2008): Nimba County Development Agenda; Prepared by the County Development Committee, in collaboration with the Ministries of Planning and Economic Affairs and Internal Affairs, Republic of Liberia. OECD / WTO (2009): Aid for Trade at a Glance 2009. OECD (2008): 2008 Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration: Making Aid more effective by 2010. OECD (2008): Accra Agenda for Action: 3rd High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness. OECD (2008): New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD’s) post-conflict strategy within the ECOWAS strategic framework. OECD (2008): Orientations and Challenges of Economic and Social Reconstruction in Sierra Leone and Liberia. OECD (2008): Women and Post Conflict. OECD (2008): Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. OECD (2002): Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management, Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Working Party on Aid Evaluation. O´Keefe, Phil; et. al. (2009): Full Report of the Evaluation of the Liberia PRRO 10454.0. Rome, WFP. Parker, David (2010): Food Facility Technical Assistance for the EC Delegation in Liberia, Final Report, March 2010 PARTICIP (2004): Thematic Evaluation of Food-Aid Policy and Food-Aid Management and Special Operations in Support of Food Security. Brussels, European Commission.



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3 EC PORTFOLIO PER EVALUATION QUESTION

Table 67: Overview of EC portfolio (EDF financed) w ith specific regard to EQ2: DDRR

Decision reference

Budget (contracted)

Implementation period Contract title Category

FED/2001/015-489 €20,6m 2001 - 2005 REINTEGRATION PROGRAMME FOR

RETURNEES AND DISPLACED PEOPLE Reintegration

FED/2002/195-627 RESETTLEMENT PROGRAMME FOR

RETURNING REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PEOPLE IN LIBERIA

FED/2005/195-685

Cardno - TA FOR SERVICES OF INTERFACE PARTNERS IITHE

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REINTEGRATION PRG FOR REFUGEES

FED/2003/016-417 €43,1m 2003-2011 POST CONFLICT REHABILITATION AND

CAPACITY BUILDING PROGRAMME Rehabilitation

FED/2004/190-481 GRANT AGREEMENT LIBERIA DDRR

FED/2004/190-482

SHORT TERM T.A. FOR THE ACELERATED IMPLEMENTATION OF

POST DEMOBILISATION VOCATIONAL TRAINING AND EMPLOYMENT CREATION

PRO

FED/2004/190-494 UNDP - 2ND CONTRIBUTION AGREEMENT DDRR

FED/2004/190-498 Cardno - TA FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF THE DDRR COMPONENT IN LIBERIA

FED/2005/190-506 Cardno AGRISYSTEM FOR IMPLENTATION OF THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC REHABILIT.

FED/2005/190-512 DP PROGR.ESTIMATE COMMUNITY REHABILITATION (SOCIO-ECONOMIC)

FED/2005/190-517

Automotive Export Supplies Ltd - SUPPLY OF FOUR VEHICLES FOR THE SOCIO

ECONOMIC REHABILITATION COMPONENT

FED/2005/190-520 UNICEF - REINTEGRATION OF CHILDREN

FORMERLY ASSOCIATED WITH FIGHTINGFORCES IN LIBERIA

FED/2006/190-526 Cardno - OPERATIONAL PROGRAMME

ESTIMATE FOR THE COMMUNITY REHABILITATION COMPONENT

FED/2006/190-553 Italtrend - MONITORING AND

MANAGEMENT OF THE DDRR PROGRAMME IN LIBERIA

FED/2007/190-554

Transtec - EVALUATION OF THE EC SUPPORT TO THE

DISARMAMENT,DEMOBILISATION, REHABILITATION AND REINTEGRATION

PROCESS IN LIBERIA

FED/2005/017-819 €9,1m 2005-2011 DEMOBILISATION AND REINTEGRATION DDRR

FED/2005/194-577 THIRD CONTRIBUTION AGREEMENT WITH THE UNDP DDR TRUST FUND

FED/2006/195-697

HTSPE - FINAL EVALUATION OF THE REINTEGRATION PROGRAMME FOR

RETURNEES AND DISPLACED PEOPLE IN LIBERIA



Page 192

Table 68: Overview of EC portfolio (EDF-financed) w ith specific regard to EQ3: LRRD

Decision reference

Budget (committed)

Implementation period

Contract title Category

FED/1998/013-789 €25m 1998-2001

Second Rehabilitation Programme Cardno Agrisystems and others

Rehabilitation

FED/2001/015-489 €20.6m 2004-2006

Reintegration Programme for Returnees and displaced people: • Community Development

Component: Small Scale Projects, Cardno Agrisystems

• Integrated Nutritional Programme, ACF

• Livestock Development Project, VSF

• Rural Development, Cardno Agrisystems

Reintegration

FED/2003/016-417 €43.1m 2004-2007

Post conflict rehabilitation and capacity building Programme: • Child Protection Programme,

UNICEF

Rehabilitation, Reintegration

FED/2004/017/421

€4.3m 2004 Humanitarian Assistance to returnees, ECHO

Humanitarian Assistance

FED/2005/017-798 €2.7m 2005 Humanitarian Assistance to

returnees, ECHO Humanitarian

Assistance

FED/2005/017-819

€9.1m 2005-2008 Demobilisation and Reintegration DDRR Trust Fund, UNDP

Reintegration

FED/2006/020-713



Sources: CRIS and EC programme, EC Annual Reports and project documentation

Table 69: Overview of EC portfolio (non-EDF contrib ution) with specific regard to EQ3: LRRD Decision reference

Budget (committed)


DCI‐FOOD/

1997/002-372

€5m 1997-1999 Food Security Liberia 1997

12 NGO contracts Food Security Interventions

DCI‐FOOD/

1998/002-980

€2.4m 1998-2000 Food Security Liberia 1998

Commercial contracts Food Security Interventions

?? €1.7m 2002-2005 Grand Bassa Food Security Project Food Security Interventions

?? €7m 2003 Food Aid

WFP/UN Consolidated Appeal Process

Food Aid

?? €7m 2004 Food Aid


Food Aid

FOOD/2004/016-699

€2m 2006-2008

Food Security Programme 2004 - NGO Programme Liberia:

Agro economic Assistance to 6,460 rural farmers in Bong and Lofa

Food Security Interventions



Page 193

Decision reference

Budget (committed)



counties (Trocaire FOOD/2005/113-629

Sustainable Improvement of living conditions of the most vulnerable

populations of Bong county (Solidarité FOOD/2005/113-599)

DCI-FOOD/2008

/172-562 €1m 2008-2011

Gbarpolu Agriculture, Infrastructure and Nutrition for Food Security

Mercy Corps Scotland


DCI-FOOD/2008

/172-566 €1.6m 2009-2011

Enhancing Agricultural Capacities and Economy

Danish Refugee Council


DCI-FOOD/2008

/172-566 €1m 2009-2011

Lofa Livelihood Security Programme Concern Worldwide


REH/1999/003-528 €0.6m 1999-2002

Integrated Nutritional Programme for internally displaced children

Action contre la faim Nutrition

REH/1999/003-537 €0.6m 2000

Community Child Welfare System Liberia

Safe the Children Nutrition

REH/1998/004-316 €1.6m 1998-2001 Rehabilitation of Phebe Hospital,

Lutheran World Federation Health

REH/1999/003-526

€0.6m 1999-2001 Expanded Public Health Activities for Displaced, Returnees and Refugees

Health

NGOPVD/2000

€0.3m 2000-2002 Human Resources Development for

the Prevention of Blindness in Anglophone West Africa

Health

NGOPVD/2002/020-

351 €0.8m 2002-2004

Physical, social and economic rehabilitation of people living with

disability Social net

NGOPVD/2003/027-

220 €1m 2003-2004 Block Grant 2002 NGO support

NGOPVD//2004/

€1m 2004-2005 Block Grant 2003 NGO support

NGOPVD/2004/064-

386 €0.4m 2004-2006 Dealing with a health crisis among

war affected people Health

NSAPVD/2008/152-057

€0.9m 2008-2011 Supporting Youth Livelihoods in Liberia and Sierra Leone

NGO support


Table 70: Overview of EC portfolio (EDF-financed) w ith specific regard to EQ4: CPPB Decision reference

Budget (contracted)


FED/2001/

015‐489 €0,016m 2002 IRCL ‐ peace building and

reconciliation project

Population flows and human trafficking

FED/2001/

015‐489 €1m 2003-2006 Service contract ‐ technical assistance

for a local community development, DEVELOPMENT RESEARCHERS




Page 194

Decision reference

Budget (contracted)



NETWORK SRL FED/2001/

015‐489 €0,15m 2004 AT TO IDENTIFY A PROGRAMME OF SUPPORT FOR THE ELECTIONS IN

2005


FED/2001/

015‐489 €1,75m 2004-2005 Small scale projects, REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA


FED/2001/

015‐489 €1,12m 2005-2006 I.A. 2 FOR SMALL SCALE PROJECTS, REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA


FED/2003/

016‐344 €2,9m 2003-2004 SUPPORT TO THE PEACE PROCESS IN LIBERIA

Peace consolidation and prevention of

future conflict

FED/2003/

016‐417 €5m 2004-2005 2ND CONTRIBUTION AGREEMENT

DDRR, UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME


future conflict

FED/2003/

016‐417 €4,15m 2004-2005 GRANT AGREEMENT LIBERIA DDRR Peace consolidation

and prevention of future conflict

FED/2003/

016‐417 €1,86m 2004-2005 SUPPORT TO THE ORGANISATION

OF THE OCTOBER 2005 ELECTIONS IN LIBERIA


future conflict

FED/2003/

016‐417 €1,36m 2004-2005 VOCATIONAL EDUCATION AND

EMPLOYMENT CREATION PROGRAM, CESD INCORPORATED


future conflict

FED/2003/

016‐417 €1,09m 2004-2007

AT TO THE NATIONAL AUTHORISING OFFICER OF

LIBERIA, GFA CONSULTING GROUP GMBH


future conflict

FED/2003/

016‐417 €1,53m 2005-2006

ELECTIONS ‐ VOTER EDUCATION

PROJECT, ELECTORAL REFORM INTERNATIONAL SERVICES

LIMITED


future conflict

FED/2003/ €0,86m 2005-2006 PEACE AND STABILISATION Peace consolidation



Page 195

Decision reference

Budget (contracted)



016‐417

PROJECT IN SOUTHEAST LIBERIA, DANSK FLYGTNINGEHJAELP

and prevention of future conflict

FED/2003/

016‐417 €2,5m 2005-2007

REINTEGRATION OF CHILDREN FORMERLY ASSOCIATED WITH FIGHTING FORCES IN LIBERIA, UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN'S

FUND


future conflict

FED/2003/

016‐417 €1,45m 2005-2007

SUPPORT TO LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY,

KONRAD‐ADENAUER‐FOUNDATION


future conflict

FED/2003/

016‐417 €1,41m 2005-2009

AGRISYSTEMS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE

SOCIO‐ECONOMIC

REHABILITATION, CARDNO AGRISYSTEMS LIMITED


future conflict

FED/2003/

016‐417 €0,054m 2006

MANAGEMENT STUDY TO DESIGN SECRETARIAT COMMISSION OR

BODY RESPONSIBLE FOR LEADING GOOD GOVERNANCE INITIATIVES

AND MONITORING LBR


future conflict

FED/2003/

016‐417 €0,9m 2006-2007

EMERGENCY POWER PROGRAMME FOR SELECTED

NEIGHBOURHOODS IN MONROVIA, REPUBLIC OF GHANA


future conflict

FED/2003/

016‐417 €0,072m 2006-2007

RESEARCH ON PEACE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION AT THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION

COMMISSION


future conflict

FED/2003/

016‐417 €2,59m 2006-2009

OPERATIONAL PROGRAMME ESTIMATE FOR THE COMMUNITY REHABILITATION COMPONENT,

CARDNO AGRISYSTEMS LIMITED


future conflict

FED/2005/

017‐819 €9,1m 2005-2007 THIRD CONTRIBUTION

AGREEMENT WITH THE UNDP DDR TRUST FUND


future conflict

FED/2008/197-595

€0,18m 2008 SHORT TERM TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO THE TRC

CONFLICT MAPPING, TRANSTEC SA


future conflict




Page 196

Table 71: Overview of EC portfolio (non-EDF contrib ution) with specific regard to EQ4: CPPB Decision reference

Budget (contracted)


DCI‐ENV/2007/019‐346

€2,45m 2008-2013

Across the River – a trans-boundary peace park for Sierra Leone and

Liberia, NEDERLANDSE VERENIGING TOT BESCHERMING

VAN VOGELS

Environment & natural resources

DCI‐FOOD/2007/019‐676

€1,62m 2008-2012

Enhancing Agricultural Capacities and Economy (PEACE) in Southeast

Liberia, DANSK FLYGTNINGEHJAELP

Rapid intervention

DDH/2005/017‐581 €1,76m 2005-2006

ELE Election Observer Mission to Liberia 2005, UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME

Democracy, rule of law and civil society

IFS‐RRM/2008/020‐565

€0,69m 2008-2012

Political participation of women from Afghanistan, DRC and Liberia in

peace and security policy, MEDICA MONDIALE EV

Security sector (cross-country)

INFCO/2006/018‐739 €0,016m 2007-2008

Prosperity through Peace ‐ A radio series for Liberia on lessons from the

EU, SEARCH FOR COMMON GROUND VZW

Democracy, rule of law and civil society

RRM/2006/018‐761 €1,42m 2007

Support to Liberia National Police Training Academy, UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT

PROGRAMME

Security sector


Table 72: Overview of EC portfolio (EDF-financed) w ith specific regard to EQ5: Food Security Decision reference

Budget (committed)


FED/1998/013-789

€25m 1998-2001 Second Rehabilitation Programme Cardno Agrisystems and others

Rehabilitation

FED/2001/015-489 €20.6m 2004-2006

Reintegration Programme for Returnees and displaced people: • Community Development

Component: Small Scale Projects, Cardno Agrisystems

• Integrated Nutritional Programme, ACF

• Livestock Development Project, VSF

• Rural Development, Cardno Agrisystems

Reintegration

FED/2003/016-417

€43.1m 2003-2007 Post Conflict Rehabilitation and Capacity Building Project

Rehabilitation, Capacity Building

FED/2003/016-417

€43.1m 2004-2007

Post conflict rehabilitation and capacity building Programme: • Child Protection Programme,

UNICEF

Rehabilitation, Reintegration

FED/2004/017/421 €4.3m 2004 Humanitarian Assistance to returnees,

ECHO Humanitarian Assistance

FED/2005/017-798



FED/2005/017-819 €9.1m 2005-2008 Demobilisation and Reintegration

DDRR Trust Fund, UNDP Reintegration

FED/2006/020-713 €1.4m 2006 Humanitarian Assistance to returnees,

ECHO Humanitarian Assistance




Page 197

Table 73: Overview of EC portfolio (non-EDF contrib ution) with specific regard to EQ5: Food Security

Decision reference

Budget (committed)


DCI‐FOOD/1

997/002‐372 €5m 1997-1999 Food Security Liberia 1997

12 NGO contracts Food Security Interventions

DCI‐FOOD/1998/002-

980 €2.4m 1998-2000

Food Security Liberia 1998

Commercial contracts


?? €1.7m 2002-2005 Grand Bassa Food Security Project Food Security Interventions

?? €7m 2003

Food Aid


Food Aid

?? €7m 2004

Food Aid


Food Aid

FOOD/2004/016-699 €2 m 2006-2008

Food Security Programme 2004 - NGO Programme Liberia:

Agro economic Assistance to 6,460 rural farmers in Bong and Lofa

counties (Trocaire FOOD/2005/113-629

Sustainable Improvement of living conditions of the most vulnerable

populations of Bong county (Solidarité FOOD/2005/113-599)


DCI-FOOD/2008

/172-562 €1m 2008-2011

Gbarpolu Agriculture, Infrastructure and Nutrition for Food Security

Mercy Corps Scotland


DCI-FOOD/2008

/172-566 €1.6m 2009-2011

Enhancing Agricultural Capacities and Economy

Danish Refugee Council


DCI-FOOD/2008

/172-566 €1m 2009-2011

Lofa Livelihood Security Programme

Concern Worldwide


REH/1999/003-528 €0.6m 1999-2002

Integrated Nutritional Programme for internally displaced children

Action contre la faim

Nutrition

REH/1999/003-537 €0.6m 2000

Community Child Welfare System Liberia

Safe the Children

Nutrition

NGOPVD/2003/027-

220 €1m 2003-2004 Block Grant 2002 NGO support

NGOPVD//2004/

€1m 2004-2005 Block Grant 2003 NGO support

NSAPVD/2008/152-057 €0.9m 2008-2011

Supporting Youth Livelihoods in Liberia and Sierra Leone NGO support




Page 198

Table 74: Overview of EC portfolio (EDF-financed) w ith specific regard to EQ6: Income Generation

Decision reference

Budget (committed)


FED/1998/013-789

€ 25.1m 1998 - 2001 Liberia Second Rehabilitation Programme

Rehabilitation

FED/2001/015-489 € 20.1m 2001 - 2005

Reintegration Programme for Returnees and Displaced People • In particular the “small-scale

project” facility

Reintegration; Income Generation

FED/2003/016-417 € 43.1m 2003 - 2011

Post-Conflict Rehabilitation and Capacity Building Programme • In particular “Community

Rehabilitation Component” (CRC);

• Also: DDRR component

Rehabilitation, Income Generation

FED/2005/017-819

€ 9.1m 2005 - 2011 Demobilisation and Reintegration Demobilisation / Income Generation

FED/2007/020-795

€ 25.0m 2007 - 2013 Liberia County Development Income Generation /

Economic Rehabilitation


Table 75: Overview of EC portfolio (non-EDF) with s pecific regard to EQ6: Income Generation Decision reference

Budget (committed)



FOOD/2005/113-599 € 1.0m 2005 - 2007

Sustainable improvement of living conditions of the most vulnerable rural populations of Bong County

Food Security / Income Generation

FOOD/2005/113-629

€ 1.0m 2005 - 2009 Agro-Economic Recovery Assistance to 6,460 Rural Farmers in Bong and Lofa Counties


DCI-FOOD/2008/

172-566 € 1.6m To be determined

Enhancing Agricultural Capacities and Economy (PEACE) in South East Liberia



Table 76: Overview of EC portfolio (EDF-financed) w ith regard to EQ7: Infrastructure Decision reference

Budget (committed)



FED/1998/013-789 € 25.1m 1998 - 2001 Liberia Second Rehabilitation Programme Rehabilitation

FED/2001/015-489

€ 20.1m 2001 - 2005

Reintegration Programme for Returnees and Displaced People, e.g. • Supply contract with GEPCO Gasoil

Procurement for the Liberia Electricity Corporation

• Imprest account for the operation of “water stop-gap”

• Framework Contract with ECO Consultancy to assist the Liberian Electricity Cooperation (LEC)

• Electricity Management Studies (various providers)

• Transitional support for the water

Reintegration; Income

Generation



Page 199

Decision reference

Budget (committed)



privatisation process • Restoring street-lights in Monrovia • Long-term assistance in Electricity • Rehabilitation of the Electricity Grid in

Monrovia

FED/2003/016-417 € 43.1m 2003 - 2011

Post-Conflict Rehabilitation and Capacity Building Programme; in particular “Community Rehabilitation Component” (CRC), e.g.: • TA for the Rehabilitation of the water

infrastructure of Monrovia / Rehabilitation of the Water Infrastructure in Monrovia

• Supply of two vertical turbine pumps • Rehabilitation of Sanniequellie –

Ganta Road in Nimba County • Rehabilitation and Construction of

Suakoko-Kafilee-Yiandendewoun Road in Bong County

• TA for Management and Supervision of Electricity and Water Rehabilitation in Liberia

• Emergency Power Programme for selected neighbourhoods in Monrovia

• Studies on existing situation and implementation in rural road maintenance techniques

• Construction of new concrete deck bridge across the Beh Creek in Bong County

Rehabilitation, Income

Generation

FED/2005/017-819 € 9.1m 2005 - 2011 Demobilisation and Reintegration

Demobilisation / Income

Generation

FED/2007/020-795

€ 25.0m 2007 - 2013 Liberia County Development

Income Generation /

Economic Rehabilitation


Table 77: Overview of EC portfolio (non EDF) with r egard to EQ7: Infrastructure Decision reference

Budget (committed)



REH/1998/004-316

€ 1.57m 1998 - 2008 Rehabilitation of Phebe Hospital Health

REH/1999/003-526 € 0.7m 1999 - 2009

Expanded Public Health Activities for Displaced, Returnees and Refugees in Grand Cape Mount Country

Health

DCI-FOOD/2008/

172-562 € 1.02m 2008 – 2011

Gbarpolu Agriculture, Infrastructure and Nutrition for Food Security (GAINS)

Infrastructure overall




Page 200

Table 78: Overview of EC portfolio (EDF-financing) with regard to EQ8: Capacity Building

Decision reference

Budget (committed)



FED/2003/016-417 € 43.1m 2003 - 2011

Post-Conflict Rehabilitation and Capacity Building Programme, in particular “Institutional Support Programme” (ISP): • Identify a programme for electoral support

and subsequent electoral support • Short-term TA to various organisations,

including National Port Authority, Roberts International Airport

• TA Financial Review of Forestry Development Authority

• TA to undertake independent systems and financial audit, Bureau of Maritime Affairs

• Financial Audit of Central Bank • TA to the designated National Authorising

Officer • Support to legislative assembly • Long-term TA to Ministry of Finance /

Bureau of Customs and Excised • Long-term TA to General Audit

Commission • Management Study to design secretariat

commission or body responsible for leading good governance initiatives

• Also: Capacity Development elements of the “Community Rehabilitation Component” of the programme

Capacity Building

FED/2007/020-795

€ 25.0m 2007 - 2013 Liberia County Development Capacity Building

FED/2007/020-824

€ 7.4m 2007 - 2013 Institutional Support and Capacity Building Programme

Capacity Building


Table 79: Overview of EC portfolio (EDF-financing) with regard to EQ9: Education Decision reference

Budget (committed)



FED/1998/013-789

€ 25.1m 1998 - 2001 Liberia Second Rehabilitation Programme (rehabilitation of schools)

Rehabilitation

FED/2003/016-417 € 43.1m 2003 - 2011

Post-Conflict Rehabilitation and Capacity Building Programme • Small-scale rehabilitation of

schools under “Community Rehabilitation Component” (CRC);

• Also: DDRR component

Rehabilitation (small-scale school

rehabilitation)

FED/2006/020-717

€ 11.7m 2006 - 2012 EC support to Education in Liberia (ECSEL)

Education




Page 201

4 EFFECT DIAGRAMMES

Figure 9: Partial EC intervention logic, reconstruc ted from Technical and Administrative Provision (TAPs) of interventions between 1999 - 2005 EC activities ImpactsResults

Partial intervention logic 1999 –2005 (prior to CSP signature)

Legend

Element from TAPs of different interventions

Added elements (reconstructed )

Legend

Element from TAPs of different interventions


European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR)

ECHO humanitarian assistance €2M (1999-2003)


Food Security Budget Line

Post Conflict Rehabilitation and Capacity Building Progr. -Institutional Support- Supporting DDR (via NDDRRP)- Community Development(2003 – 2011, € 43.1M, EDF9)

Support to Peace Process (ECOWAS) (2003–2006, €8M, EDF9)

Demobilisation and Reintegration (contr. to UNDP DDRR trust fund) (2005–2011, € 9.1M, EDF9).

Reintegration programme f. Returnees and displaced people (2001 – 2005, € 20.6M, EDF8;)

“2nd Rehabilitation Programme”(1999 - 2001, € 25M, EDF8)

Emergency Power Monrovia (2003-2007, € 0.92M , EDF9)

Reintegration of returnees anddisplaced Liberians improved

Risk of further (also regional) conflicts reduced

Health status of beneficiaries improved

Access to WatSan, electricity improved

Living standards / food security improved, micro-credit functioning

Access to isolated areas improved

“Community capacity” for self-directed development improved

Delivery of basic health services / drugs improved

Small-scale infrastructure repaired

Piped water expanded (in Monrovia); wells (outside), family latrines

Peace, security,

governance improvedCease fire maintained and stabilised /

stability improvedCivilian ECOWAS office established and equipped

ECOWAS troops deployed / sustained

Basic infrastructure / services rehabilitated, including health, education, water

Demobilisation / social reintegration of fighters increased / Demobilisation completed

Key public Ministries / institutions , CSOs re-established; functioning improved

Income generating opportunities for ex-combatants strengthened (in Agriculture, craft, small businesses)

Severance pay to AFL soldiers paid

Humanitarian Aid resumed

Legitimacy of the state / Governmental organisations improved

Infrastructure in WatSan / Roads, others reconstructed / rehabilitated (NOTE: documentation not in CRIS )

Power Infrastructure in Monrovia reconstructed / rehabilitated

Humanitarian needs satisfied

Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development

Health infrastructure / services (PhebeHospital, nutritional programme, etc)

Free and fair elections (2005)

EQ2

EQ5EQ6

EQ3

EQ8

EQ7

EQ7



Page 202

Figure 10: Logically reconstructed diagram of expec ted effects, CSP and NIP for EDF9 (2006 - 2007)

Management capacity of county administrations

improved (p.25)

Coherence of planning in education improved (p.33)

Quality of Liberia’s education system improved (p.33)

County administrations more efficient, effective and democratic (p.33)

GoL implements JNA / CPA and respects democratic process

Poverty alleviated &

peace and dem

ocratic process consolidated

EC activities Impacts

County Development (€ 25M )•Institutional support to county authorities; •Interventions at “macro level”(including support to policy formulation) if necessary•Rehabilitation, construction infrastructure (health, education, roads, WatSan);•Support to delivery mechanisms / management; •Promoting rural economic. activities, agriculture;•Support to local actors to support decentralisation

Access to and quality of education, health services and WatSan increased / improved (p.30)

Uptake by GoL

LRR

D:

Moving from

relief, short-term rehab. to developm

ent (FS

BL); B

udget Lines:N

GO

Co-financing, H

uman R

ights

Results

Social / economic welfare in rural counties improved (p.33)

EC Intervention Logic Liberia, 2006 – 2007

Educational outcomes improved, in particular girls / women (p.33)

Agricultural productivity and non-farm employment increased (p.33)

Enrolment increased, in particular for girls (all levels) (p.33)

Graduation rates improved (p.33)

Relevance of curriculum for job-market, livelihood improved (p.33)

Availability of qualified teachers improved (p.33)

Livelihood opportunities improved (p. 30)

Health outcomes improved, incl. incidence of water borne diseases, HIV & AIDS (p.33)

GoL promotes Decentralisation (p.31)

GoL supports community-related activities of NSAs (p.31)

Education (€ 12M)•Support MoE: policy & institutional framework;•Development of primary, secondary, VET curricula;•Teachers / education officers training;•Essential teaching & learning materials;•Rehab. of primary , secondary schools, teacher training institutes, VET facilities.•Playing lead role in donor coordination / collaboration with UNICEF

Macro-econ. support (€ 3.4M)•Conditional clearing of EIB arrears, using B-envelope funds.

Non-focal sectors (€ 7.4M)•Establishing PFM system;•CSO support, women’s groups / transparency;•EPA negotiations;•Regional peace process;•Studies, evaluations, audits

Lowered exclusion of marginalised groups, girls, women (p.22)

Management systems for services and infrastructure introduced (p.25)

GoL / counties put in place policies, institutional structures in supported sectors (p.25)

Governance, PFM, fiscal system strengthened;

Planning, implementation capacity improved

Revenue collection / management improved (p.32)

GoL works with qualified providers to rehabilitate facilities, develop curricula, print books (p.34)

GoL increases education funding (p.34)

GoL tackles structural problems in sector, also in relation to teacher training (p.34)

Road infrastructure improved (p.30)

Role of Civil Society in gender / transparency strengthened

GoL promotes regional integration / EPA (p.32)

GoL facilitate, USE studies, evaluations, audits (p.32)

GoL helps create enabling environment for Civil Society

GoL promotes regional peace (p.32)

Coherence / quality of planning improved

GoL fulfills other preconditions for HIPC initiative and EIB support

Access to investment capital / revenue increased

Increased / improved investment infrastructure, services

Confidence in Government institutions increased (p.26)

(Initial direct support)

(Initial direct support)

Coherence of investment planning improved (p.25)

Budget Lines

Budget Lines

Legend

Element from CSP / NIP (page # in CSP)


Element related to organisationalcapacity

Legend

Element from CSP / NIP (page # in CSP)


Element related to organisationalcapacity

EQ5

EQ6

EQ7

EQ7

EQ8

EQ9EQ4



Page 203

Figure 11: Intervention Logic, EC support to Liberi a, CSP and NIP for 2008 – 2013


peace and dem

ocratic process consolidated (e.g. p.43)

EC activities Impacts

Electricity & Water (€ 55M)Electricity

Support establishment of legal / regulatory framework;Provision of generation capacity in Monrovia;Finalise construction of transmission & distribution network Monrovia;Generation capacity, rehab. in secondary cities;Support renewable energy (p.36)

WaterSupport establishment of regulatory framework;Rehabilitate water treatment plant; groundwater in Monrovia; finalise rehabilitation of trunk mains, reconstruct secondary, tertiary pipes (incl. some secondary cities);Study, pilot support arrangements (p.37)

Transport (€ 55M)Rehabilitation of at least one main axis road, several secondary roadsCapacity building at Ministry of Public Works & other agencies;Road maintenance fundLegal / institutional assistance, studies (p.37)

Uptake by GoL

LRR

D: M

oving from relief, short-term

rehab. (ED

F8, E

CH

O, F

SB

L) to long-term developm

ent;

Results

Quality of life of Liberians improved (p.43)

Regional Integration of Liberia improved (p.45)

Health Sector (€ 30M)“Consolidation and development of initial contribution provided through 9th EDF” (p.38)

Education Sector (€ 10M)“Main activities to centre on ECSEL project that embraces the organisational and institutional capacity aspects of current education sector strategy (p.39)

Governance, Institutional Support, Capacity Building (€ 20M)

“Deepening of support to key government functions, such as procurement reform, public financial management, anti-corruption, governance reform” (p.40)

Monrovia has piped water; service provision outside Monrovia (p.44)

Monrovia has sustainable and efficient grid-based electricity provision; service provision outside of Monrovia launched (p.43)

Regulatory framework, sector policy for road / transport, Energy, Water established (p.43)

One main axis road rehabilitated / constructed, Several secondary / feeder roads rehabilitated (p.43)

Road maintenance system established, MOPW staff trained (p.43)

Free movement of people, goods improved (p.45)

Access to essential inputs (water, energy) improved (p.45)

Health status of Liberians improved (p.45)

Health infrastructure rehabilitated (p.45)

Minimal equipment levels for prioritised training and administration facilities restored (p.46)

Decentralisation support (through support to Basic Health Package); support systems decentralised (p.46)

County Development Plans drawn up (p.51)

Increased number of trained health workers, including in particular women (p.46)

Coordinated approach to HR, planning and management installed (p.46, 48)

Access to basic healthcare (of acceptable quality) increased (p.45)

Coordination committees established; communication within MoE and reporting on achievements and indicators improved (p.49)

Procurement guidelines improved, financial management improved (p.49)

Ratio of male to female teachers improved; HR system include staff performance staff reviews established / improved (p.49)

HR and management of public education system improved (p.48)

Access to basic, primary and secondary education improved (p.48)

Education status of Liberians improved (p.47)

Accountability of public servants increased (p.43)Code of conduct for civil

servants established (p.44)Governance mechanisms decentralised (p.46)

Public service transparency improved (p.44)

More efficient use of financial and human resources within public sector (p.43)

National integration and economic recovery intensified (p.43)

NGoL promotes drafting of sector strategies, legal frameworks for roads, energy, water (p.43)

NGoL furthers restructuring of key Government agencies in sectors (p.43)

NGoL promotes set up of maintenance structures for infrastructure, including roads (p.43)

Financial contributions to health sector increased by NGoL(p.45)

NGoL can make use of EC inputs in capacity building / PFM.

NGoL promotes increased transparency in Governance in all sectors.

NGoL continues to promote priorities in national educational policy (improved financing, policy planning, restructuring, etc.) (p.44)

NGoL continues commitment to key crosscutting issues (equity, gender) across sectors (p.44)

NGoL continues to prepare ground for decentralisation of Governance functions (p.46)

NGoL remains committed to institutional reform process, including tackling corruption, building management capacity

EC intervention logic Liberia, 2008 – 2013

Legend

Elements from CSP / NIP (page # in CSP)

Legend

Elements from CSP / NIP (page # in CSP)



Page 204

Figure 12: Consolidated EC Intervention Logic, 1999 – 2007 (EDF8 and EDF9)

EC activities ImpactsResults

Consolidated EC Intervention Logic, 1999 – 2007 (EDF8 and EDF9)


The

mat

ic B

udge

tline

s (o

ther

than

FS

BL)

Post Conflict Rehabilitation and Capacity Building Progr. -Institutional Support- Supporting DDR (via NDDRRP)- Community Development(2003 – 2011, € 43.1M)

Support to Peace Process (ECOWAS) (2003–2006, €8M)

Demobilisation and Reintegration (UNDP DDRR trust fund) (2005–2011, €9.1M).

Reintegration f. Returnees and displaced people (2001 – 2005, € 20.6M)

“2nd Rehabilitation Programme”(1999 - 2001, € 25M)

Emergency Power Monrovia (2003-2007, € 0.92M)

Social / economic welfare improved

Risk of further armed conflicts reduced

Health outcomes of public health system improved; water borne diseases reduced


Governmental organisational capacity at community, county and national / federal level improved

Access to basic health, water and sanitation, electricity services improved

Road infrastructure improved


peace and dem

ocratic processes consolidated

Cease fire maintained and stabilised / stability improved






County Development (2007 –2013, €25M )

Education (2007 – 2013, €12M)

Macro-econ. support (€ 3.4M) clearing of EIB arrears

Non-focal sectors (2007 –2013, €7.4M) Capacity Building, PFM

Access to Education improved

Coherence of planning / implementation in Liberian public sector improved

Educational outcomes improved




Reintegration of returnees, ex-combatants, etc. improved

Income generating opportunities improved


EQ2

EQ3

EQ4

EQ6

EQ7

EQ8

EQ9

Food Security Budget Line Food Security ImprovedEQ5

EDF9 Activities (2006 – 2007)


Legend


Expected Results and Impacts




Legend




Legend


Expected Results and ImpactsExpected Results and Impacts




205

5 PERSONS MET

Name, First Name Institution/Unit Sector

Abdullai, Napoleon UNDP, Small Arms Control, Programme Manager DDRR

Aibinu, Adermi UNDP, Programme Manager; former DDRR Coordinator

DDRR

Aidoo, Harold Marvin Liberia Democratic Institute, Head of Programme

DDRR, CPPB

Akarin, Francis K. Liberia Water & Sewer Corporation, Technical Assistant MD

Infrastructure

Alves-Pereira, Zé European Commission / EU Delegation, Attaché & Mission Economst

Various

Andreotti, Elena USAID, Basic Education Advisor Education

Aslett, Carlton Ministry of Education / ECSEL, Team Leader

Education

Atta, Alwin Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs, Director of NAO office

NAO

Ballah, Jonathan Solidarité International, Agronomist Food Security / Agriculture

Ballayan, Amos M. WFP, National Programme Officer LRRD, Food Security

Bangalu, Martus W. Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs, Programme Officer, Social Sector

NAO

Bashir, Nadeem UNMIL: Humanitarian Affairs Officer Humanitarian Coordinator’s Support Office (HCSO)

HA / Food Security

Batitdzirai, Bernard R. UNICEF, Education Specialist Education

Battaglini Maurique de Lara, Carlos-Adolfo

European Commission, EuropeAid, EU Delegation Monrovia

Food Security

Bindah, Lawrence

Deutsche Welthungerhilfe, National Project Coordinator Urban Agriculture Project Tubmanburg, former Relief and Rehabilitation Welthungerhilfe Projects Bomi

HA / Food Security / Agriculture

Bloe, Diasmer

Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Acting Assistant Minister for Economic Affairs

NAO

Bolly, Jean-Louis Joint Evaluation Unit E03, European Commission

Evaluation



Page 206


Bouzigues, Claire Solidarité International, Country Director Liberia


Braedt, Oliver

World Bank Liberia Country Office, Senior Rural Development and Natural Resources Management Specialist

Food Security / Agriculture

Brown, Timothy UNESCO, Head of Office Education

Casanova, Joan European Commission, EuropeAid, EU Delegation Monrovia

Education, Health

Camuel, Arthur Kokoya Bakery, Former proprietor / co-owner Income Generation

Cires Alonso, Adolfo European Commission, EuropeAid, EU Delegation Monrovia

Food Security

Dorliae, Robert UNDP / Ministry of Internal Affairs, LDLD, programme officer

Governance

Dormea, Cammue N. Superintendent's Office, Administrative Assistant, Bong County

CPPB, DDRR

Dowah, Isaac S., Reverend Peace Council Chairman, Bong County CPPB, DDRR

Dukuly, Jacob, Z. Liberia Electricity Corporation, Engineer in Training

Infrastructure

Elms, Priscilla The World Bank, Health & Education Consultant Education

Flomokou, Pewee S. The Carter Center, Senior Project Coordinator

CPPB, DDRR

Freeman, Philip G. Liberia Electricity Corporation, New Service Manager

Infrastructure

Ganidolo, Henry B. Zebay (Bong County), CBO Chairman Governance / Capacity Development

Garcia-Alcazar, Alvara European Commission, EuropeAid, EU Delegation Monrovia

Contract and Finance Unit

Gardiner, Henric G. Phoebe Hospital, Monitor Phoebe Water Project

Infrastructure

Garkpeh, Daniel Liberian Tennis Federation, Assistant National Coach

Income Generation

Gayflowu, Thomas L. Catalyst Liberia Inc., Executive Director

CPPB, Food Security, Agriculture

Gbaie, Edwin J. Youth Coordinator Bong County CPPB, DDRR

George, Michael C. G. Ministry of Internal Affairs, County Development Support Secretariat, Program Manager

County Development

Golokai, Nessie UNDP Liberia, Programme Analyst Various



207


Gongar, Hon. Othello Ministry of Education, Minister of Education

Education

Gotogan, Eli Y. District Development Committee, Chairman

Governance / Capacity Development

Gould, Jeanne European Commission, EuropeAid, Unit C3

Geographic Focal Point Liberia

Halvala, Anna European Commission, EuropeAid, Delegation Monrovia, Political Section

Political Section (formerly governance, capacity building)

Harris, Edwin General Auditing Commission, Department of Governmental Affairs of the GAC, Department Director


Henckaerts, Koen European Commission, ECHO Liberia Food Security, LRRD

Hurbert, Lucia Assistant Superintendent for Development, Bong County

Various

Hintzen, Christiane GTZ, Team leader Global Program Development Oriented Emergency and Transition Aid (Lofa County)


Hofmann, Karin

International Committee of the Red Cross, Head of Mission Liberia

HA / Food Security

Jenner, Martin European Commission, EuropeAid, EU Delegation Monrovia, Head of Operations

Head of Operations

Jones, Manfred Morris-American Rubber Company, Financial Director

Income Generation

Kariuki, Livingstone UNMIL, Civil Affairs Expert, Bong County DDRR, LRRD, CPPB

Karlsson, Fredrik Eltel Networks TE AB , Site Manager Infrastructure

Keating, Maria Therese UNDP, Deputy Resident Representative

DDRR, LRRD

Kenneh, Abriham Representative Muslim Community, Bong County

CPPB, DDRR

Kesselly, Hon. Yonton B.

Ministry of Education, Deputy Minister for Technical and Vocational Education Training (TVET)

Education

Kiawu, Annette

Ministry of Gender & Development, Deputy Minister for Research & Technical Services

Gender

Koiwou, Tarnue

Ministry of Agriculture, National Coordinator Food security and NutritionJoint Programme




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Koiwou, Thomas

Catalyst Liberia Incorporated, former Technical Officer for swamp development in Nimba and Bong in the 2nd Rehabilitation Programme


Kolleh, Yusuf Bong County, Kpaai District, District Commissioner


Kollie, T. Calvin Ministry of Planning, County Development Officer, Bong County


Kparn, Philip Parker Oil Palm Farm, Manager Income Generation

Lewis, Henry Abiodu Liberia Electricity Corporation, Manager Corporate Planning Department

Infrastructure

Lokonga, Taban WFP, Deputy Country Director LRRD, Food Security

Magbollah, Cooper General Auditing Commission, Chief Financial Officer


Mayah, Joseph T. Liberia Electricity Corporation, Acting Managing Director

Infrastructure

Monger, Harold J. Liberia Institute of Public Administration, Director General DDRR,

Morlu II, John S. General Auditing Commission, Auditor General


Morris, Bill Morris-American Rubber Company, Proprietor

Income Generation

Motoskova, Katarina European Commission, DG Development

Desk Liberia

Mulbah, Edward K. Ministry of Internal Affairs - Liberia Peace Building Office, Senior Technical Advisor

CPPB

Nanka, Winsley S. General Auditing Commission, Deputy Auditor General

Governance, Capacity Development

Narma, Maran WFP, National Programme Officer Livelihood Asset Rehabilitation

LRRD, Food Security

Oldmeadow, Emily European Commission, EuropeAid, Unit E3

Education

Owadi, Bernard WFP, VAN-Officer LRRD, Food Security

Pacifici, Attilio European Union Delegation, Head of Delegation Various

Paivey, Emmanuel FAO, Coordinator for EC Food Facility Food Security / Agriculture



209


Pajibo, Jlateh

Post-Conflict Rehabilitation and Capacity Building Programme / Community Rehabilitation Component Former programme staff (Bong County)

County Development / Local Economic Development / Infrastructure

Pal, Sartak Safe the Children, Country deputy director and Head of Programme HA / Food Security

Palacios Valdecantos, Maria European Commission, ECHO, Unit 01 Evaluation

Parker, David MBE Equatorial Biofuels, formerly: 2nd rehabilitation programme, TA 2010 to EC Food Facility


Parawoo, Manuel Parker Oil Palm Farm, Headman Income Generation

Proprietor Pipeline Road Women’s Bakery, Owner and Proprietor Income Generation

Queelyme, Nathaniel Bong County Project Planner, former PMT Chairman for CRC / PCRCBP Various

Rennie, Clementina

Post-Conflict Rehabilitation and Capacity Building Programme / Community Rehabilitation Component Former programme staff (Bong County)

County Development / Local Economic Development / Infrastructure

Richards, Julia B. USAID, Education Advisor Education

Roberts, Prof. James Emmanuel Ministry of Education, Deputy Minister for Planning, Research & Development Education

Rudd, Geoffrey European Commission, Former Chargé D’Affair Liberia, 2003- 2006 Various

Saul, Clyde Bong County, Suakoko District, District Commissioner


Schwenk, Bernd Deutsche Welthungerhilfe, Regional Coordinator West Africa Coast


Smith, Paul European Commission, EuropeAid, EU Delegation Monrovia

Infrastructure

Smulders, Anna ECSEL / Ministry of Education, Education Management / M&E Expert

Education

Ssenyange, Edward Liberia Democratic Institute, Tiri PPI West African Coordinator

CPPB,

Stamm, John USAID – Governance Section (GEMAP) Governance

Stelder, André

Deutsche Welthungerhilfe, Coordinator of Urban Agriculture Project Bomi


Stella, Massimo Action Contra La Faim (ACF), Head of Mission HA / Food Security



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Stewart, John T. Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Commissioner

CPPB

Tarnue, Rufus Ministry of Lands, Mines and Energy, Director Energy Department

Infrastructure

Teage, Emmett Solidarité International, Food Security Programme Manager Assistant, Bong County


Thibaut, Bram Solidarité International, Food Security Programme Manager


Toe, Christopher Former Minister of Agriculture, Governent of Liberia, currently consultant to WFP

Agriculture

Tokpa, Alarik

Centre for Security an Development Studies, Associate Director for Research, Documentation and Publication; University of Liberia, Assistant Professor for Political Science

CPPB, DDRR

Tulay, Hung-Bu N. Liberia Water & Sewer Corporation, Managing Director

Infrastructure

Tunnacliff, Jeremy European Commission, EU Delegation Monrovia, Head of Political Section

Political Section

Valhum, H. Gloria General Auditing Commission, Director, Office of the Auditor General


Varlese, Francesca European Commission / EU Delegation, Desk Officer for Governance


Warner, Bill Liberia Water & Sewer Corporation, DMD / Technical Services

Infrastructure

Washington, Massa A. Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Commissioner

CPPB

Wellens, Francis

Former EC team leader of EDF8 Reintegration Programme for Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons

Income Generation, Infrastructure, Services

Wiesner, Lale European Commission, ECHO, Unit A2 Desk West Africa

Wille, Susanne Joint Evaluation Unit E03, European Commission

Evaluation

Wreh II, John Kofa Liberian Tennis Association, Facilities Manager

Income Generation

Yarkpazuah, Mulbah B.

Deutsche Welthungerhilfe, Agriculture Officer Urban Agriculture Project Tubmanburg, former Relief and Rehabilitation Welthungerhilfe Projects Bomi




211


York, Louis A. Norwegian Refugee Council , Field Office Coordinator Gbanga

DDRR, CPPB

Yorose, Karimu Bukari UNMIL, Head of UN Field Office, Bong County

DDRR, LRRD, CPPB

Youquoi, James F. Danish Refugee Council, Senior Regional Program Officer & Head of Office

DDRR, Income Generation

Zarzar, Hon. Mathew Ministry of Education, Deputy Minister for Administration Education

Zubahyea, Joejoe DEN-L, Executive Director Community Development, Food Security



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6 INVENTORY OF EC PROJECTS/ PROGRAMMES IN THE COUNTRY

Table 80: Inventory of EC Projects/Programmes, EDF- funding

Country code EDF No Status Title Starting Date

Closing Date

Amount (EUR) committed

Amount (EUR) contracted

Amount (EUR) disbursed

Not available FED/1998/013-779 CL Emergency Rehabilitation Not available Not available 1.950.000,00 0,00 0,00

Not available FED/1998/013-789 EC 2nd Rehabilitation Programme 27.02.1998 31.12.2001 25.042.358,67 25.022.131,67 25.022.131,67

8ACP/LBR/002 FED/2001/015-489 EC Reintegration Programme for

Returnees and Displaced People

13.07.2001 31.03.2005 20.623.157,37 19.901.670,51 19.128.525,38

Not available FED/2003/009-683 CL Reouverture Projet 5LBR31 –

Facture Finale Transroute Not available Not available 282.241,00 282.241,00 282.241,00

9ACP/LBR/002 FED/2003/016-344 CL Support to the Peace Process

in Liberia 18.09.2003 31.12.2006 2.899.607,86 2.899.607,86 2.899.607,86

9ACP/LBR/003 FED/2003/016-417 EC Post Conflict Rehabilitation

and Capacity Building Programme

25.11.2003 31.12.2011 43.135.461,35 42.736.773,39 37.880.109,52

Not available Not available CL Emergency Power

Programme for selected Neighbourhoods in Monrovia

25.11.2003 08.02.2007 925.719,00 925.719,00 810.588,00

Not available FED/2004/017-421 EC

ECHO/LBR/EDF/2004/01000 Humanitarian Aid Operation

to facilitate the Return of vulnerable People to their

Place of Origin

09.11.2004 30.12.2009 4.300.000,00 4.216.157,45 4.179.930,04

Not available FED/2005/017-798 EC

ECHO/LBR/EDF/2005/01000 Humanitarian Aid Operation

to facilitate the Return of vulnerable People to their

Place of Origin

24.06.2005 31.12.2007 2.700.000,00 2.613.456,70 2.608.716,36

9ACP/LBR/008 FED/2005/017-819 EC Demobilization and

Reintegration 05.10.2005 31.12.2011 9.100.000,00 9.100.000,00 9.100.000,00

Not available FED/2006/020-713 EC ECHO/LBR/EDF/2006/01000 Humanitarian Aid Operation

to facilitate the Return and the 24.08.2006 31.12.2008 1.400.000,00 1.371.080,53 1.371.080,53



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Closing Date




Reinstallation of vulnerable People

9ACP/LBR/015 FED/2006/020-717 EC EC Support to Education in

Liberia 21.10.2006 31.12.2012 11.682.053,79 11.109.520,79 1.121.632,13

9ACP/LBR/016 FED/2006/020-719 EC Technical Cooperation Facility 25.01.2007 31.10.2010 930.904,11 825.904,11 783.305,89

FED/2007/019-173 CA County Development

Program N/A N/A 0,00 0,00 0,00

FED/2007/019-174 CA Institutional Support and

Capacity Building Programme (ISCBP)

N/A N/A 0,00 0,00 0,00

FED/2007/019-175 CA Partial Payment of 9th EDF

EIB Arrears N/A N/A 0,00 0,00 0,00

FED/2007/019-176 CA EC Support to Education in

Liberia (ECSEL) N/A N/A 0,00 0,00 0,00

FED/2007/019-185 CA Technical Cooperation Facility N/A N/A 0,00 0,00 0,00

9ACP/LBR/09 FED/2007/019-186 EC Electricity Grid Rehabilitation

in Monrovia 15.05.2006 01.06.2011 14.000.000,00 13.188.566,00 6.030.235,74

9ACP/LBR/018 FED/2007/020-795 EC Liberia County Development 20.09.2007 31.12.2013 25.000.000,00 23.424.776,00 10.976.467,85

9ACP/LBR/019 FED/2007/020-802 CL Macro-economic stabilization through partial Payment of the

9th FED EIB arrears 18.06.2008 14.08.2010 3.439.733,08 3.439.733,08 3.439.733,08

9ACP/LBR/020 and 021

FED/2007/020-824 EC Institutional Support and

Capacity Building Programme 19.09.2007 31.12.2013 7.400.000,00 3.213.743,37 1.506.302,65

FED/2008/020-277 CA Support to AfDB arrears

clearance N/A N/A 0,00 0,00 0,00

FED/2008/020-334 CA 10th EDF Technical

Cooperation Facility (TCF) N/A N/A 0,00 0,00 0,00

FED/2008/020-335 CA 10th EDF Technical

Cooperation Facility (TCF) N/A N/A 0,00 0,00 0,00

FED/2008/020-336 CA Rider 2 for Grid Rehabilitation

Project in Monrovia N/A N/A 0,00 0,00 0,00

FED/2008/020-337 CA AfDB Arrears Clearance N/A N/A 0,00 0,00 0,00

FED/2008/020-506 CA 10th EDF Support to the N/A N/A 0,00 0,00 0,00



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Closing Date




National Health Plan of Liberia

FED/2008/020-550 CA Strengthening the General

Auditing Commission of Liberia

N/A N/A 0,00 0,00 0,00

FED/2008/020-561 CA Support to the Liberia

Reconstruction Trust Fund’s Roads Programme

N/A N/A 0,00 0,00 0,00

10ACP/LBR/01 FED/2008/020-995 EC Technical Cooperation Facility

(TCF – 10 FED) 14.12.2008 - 3.150.000,00 33.562,00 17.220,00

10ACP/LBR/03 FED/2008/021-003 CL Programme d’apurement des arrières sur fonds FED de la

Bei (PAAB) 14.12.2008 - 7.340.000,00 7.340.000,00 7.340.000,00

9ACP/LBR/920/SERV02

Not available EC Long-term TA for Capacity Development of the NAO

Liberia Not available Not available 1.399.970,00 1.399.970,00 365.876,00

Total EDF 187.101.206,23 173.044.613,46 134.86 3.703,70

Table 81: Inventory of EC Projects/ Programmes, The matic Budget Lines

Budget Line Programme No Status Title Starting Date

Closing Date




Budget line ENV (DCI)

ENV 2000/003-848 CL

A re-assessment of Forest Cover, Updating of the

Protected Forest System, Improvement of

Environmental Information

10.11.2000 16.06.2006 762.146,00 762.146,00 762.146,00

ENV 2005/082-386 EC Strengthening Forest

Management in Post-Conflict Liberia

30.11.2005 01.06.2010 1.833.659,00

Not available

1.115.573,00

ENV (DCI) 2008/151-577 CL Across the River – a

transboundary peace park for Sierra Leone and Liberia

03.12.2008 31.03.2013 2.447.286,00

Not available

517.220,10

ENV (DCI) 2008/151-770 CL Ensuring a seat at the table: supporting NGO coalitions to 04.10.2008 05.10.2011 960.000,00

Not available 288.000,00



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Closing Date




participate in FLEGT VPA processes

Total ENV 6.003.091,00 762.146,00 2.682.939,10 Budget line FOOD (DCI)

FOOD 1997/002-372 CL Food Security 1997 Liberia 17.11.1997 17.02.2006 4.967.856,15 4.967.856,15 4.967.856,15 FOOD 1998/002-980 CL Food Security 1998 Liberia 19.09.1998 31.12.2004 2.416.490,41 2.416.490,41 2.416.490,41

FOOD 2004/016-699 EC Food Security Programme 2004 – NGO Programme

Liberia 30.04.2004 31.12.2005 2.000.000,00 2.000.000,00 1.900.000,00

FOOD 2005/113-599 CL

Sustainable improvement of living conditions of the most vulnerable rural populations

of Bong County

31.12.2005 31.12.2007 1.000.000,00 1.000.000,00 1.000.000,00

FOOD 2005/113-629 EC

Agro-Economic Recovery Assistance to 6.460 Rural Farmers in Bong and Lofa

Counties

31.12.2005 01.01.2009 1.000.000,00

Not available

900.000,00

FOOD (DCI) 2007/019-252 CA Liberia Programme Sécurité

Alimentaire 2007 – Composante LRRD

N/A N/A 0,00 0,00 0,00

FOOD (DCI) 2008/172-562 EC

Gbarpolu Agricultural Capacities and Economy (PEACE) in South East

Liberia

22.12.2008 04.02.2011 1.027.357,00

Not available

583.615,00

FOOD (DCI) 2008/172-566 EC Enhancing Agricultural

Capacities and Economy in South East Liberia

Not available

Not available

1.624.000,00 1.624.000,00 691.174,00

FOOD (DCI) 2008/172-568 EC Lofa Livelihood Security

Programme Not

available Not

available 1.025.000,00 1.025.000,00 521.355,00

Total FOOD 15.060.703,56 13.033.346,56 12.980. 490,56 Budget line INFCO

INFCO 2006/018-739 CL Local Information Project

2006 – Liberia 05.12.2006 23.07.2007 15.960,93 15.960,93 15.960,93

INFCO 2007/019-678 CL Local Information 2007 –

Liberia 29.10.2007 13.05.2009 9.946,15 9.946,15 9.946,15

INFCO 2007/146-701 CL Prosperity through Peace – A

radio series for Liberia on 18.12.2007 19.05.2008 15.960,93 15.960,93 15.960,93



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Closing Date




lessons from the EU INFCO 2008/166-331 CL Helping Liberia helping itself 18.12.2007 19.05.2008 9.946,15 9.946,15 9.946,15

Total INFCO 51.814,16 51.814,16 51.814,16 Budget line NGOPVD

NGOPVD 2000/011-594 CL

Human Resource Development for the

Prevention of Blindness in Anglophone West Africa

15.12.2000 01.01.2003 327.065,42 327.065,42 327.065,42

NGOPVD 2002/020-351 CL

Physical, social and economic rehabilitation of people living with physical

disability

15.01.2003 30.06.2006 750.000,00 750.000,00 750.000,00

NGOPVD 2003/027-220 CL Block Grant 2002 25.02.2003 01.01.2006 984.625,79 984.625,79 984.625,79 NGOPVD 2004/063-921 CL Block Grant 2003 20.09.2004 21.09.2007 993.437,00 993.437,00 993.437,00

NGOPVD 2004/064-386 EC Dealing with a Health Crisis among war affected people

30.06.2004 01.07.2007 400.000,00

Not available

399.600,00

NSAPVD (DCI)

2008/152-057 EC Supporting Youth Livelihoods in Liberia and Sierra Leone

09.12.2008 19.12.2012 939.996,00

Not available

201.552,60

Total NGOPVD 4.395.124,21 3.055.128,21 3.656.280,81

Budget line REH

REH 1998/004-316 CL Rehabilitation of Phebe

Hospital 06.04.1998 28.07.2008 1.572.783,22 1.572.783,22 1.572.783,22

REH 1999/003-526 CL

Expanded Public Health Activities for Displaced,

Returnees and Refugees in Grand Cape Mount County

18.10.1999 08.07.2009 601.102,30 601.102,30 601.102,30

REH 1999/003-528 CL

Integrated Nutritional Programme for internally displaced persons and

refugees children in Montserrado, Bong, Gran

Bassa and Nimba counties

18.10.1999 08.07.2009 608.282,35 608.282,35 608.282,35

REH 1999/003-537 CL Community child welfare

system, Liberia 12.10.1999 20.07.2005 638.701,62 638.701,62 638.701,62



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Closing Date




Total REH 3.420.869,49 3.420.869,49 3.420.869, 49 Other Budget lines

RRM 2006/018-761 EC Support to the National

Police Training Academy 20.12.2006

Not available

1.420.000,00 1.285.882,95 1.285.882,95

SANTE 2004/080-276 CL Averting Maternal Death and

Disability 26.11.2004 14.07.2008 1.899.546,00 1.899.546,00 686.102,00

DDH 2005/017-581 CL ELE: Mission d’observation électorale en Liberia 2005

19.08.2005 13.06.2008 1.767.986,12 1.767.986,12 1.767.986,12

GENRE (DCI) 2008/153-667 EC Support for the International

Colloquium on Women’s empowerment, etc.

03.09.2008 04.01.2010 500.000,00

Not available

475.000,00



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7 SUPPORTING DOCUMENTATION TO FIELD METHODOLOGY

7.1 Evaluation Process Each evaluation question has a number of judgement criteria which cover components of the evaluation question in greater detail and which are the benchmarks (criteria) against which EC interventions have been assessed. Each judgement criteria has a number of indicators that cover the basic information necessary for judgement and answering the evaluation questions.

The evaluation methodology comprised:

a. For each judgement criteria and all evaluation questions supporting data and information has been assembled for the corresponding indicators by means of documentation, interview, analysis of specimen interventions and focus group discussions as appropriate; a mix of instruments will be used in order cross-check as far as possible adequate information (triangulation);

b. This collected information will be synthesised in the final report for each indicator in the evaluation matrices for each evaluation question;

c. The product has been reviewed for coverage, completeness, plausibility and adequacy of base data: in case of inadequacy action had been taken to obtain additional information, or a comment explains the reasons and implications;

d. Assuming adequacy of information, has been analysed, clustered and ranked according to priority and importance, and the combination of indicators allows a justified judgement for all judgement criteria;

e. Consideration of all component judgement criteria permits justified answers to all evaluation questions.

EC support to Liberia has been judged against the five DAC evaluation criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability impact and the 2 EC Criteria of Coherence/ Complementarity, and EC Value Added. The EC strategy for Liberia has thus been assessed on performance in these issues on the basis of answers to the Evaluation Questions.

Analysis considers relevance of EC response to the needs of the GoL, in particular with respect to the post-conflict context. It also assesses effectiveness and impact of interventions in focal and non-focal sectors, the extent to which intended results and outcomes have been achieved and how these have contributed to overall objectives. Transversal issues have been examined to identify any intrinsic EC value added to donor partnerships with the GoL in the context of EC global and regional cooperation policies, objectives and efficiency of EC implementation frameworks whilst cross-cutting issues have been examined in sector contexts.

7.2 Data Collection Documents, data and information have been collected in Liberia from the EU Delegation and the GoL at central and project levels, from stakeholders, beneficiaries and other donors, from EC HQ in Brussels, from international sources and web sites.

Annex 2 above contains a list of documents that have been used as references for the compilation of this report. Data and documentation has been collected from CRIS and the internet. Furthermore, a very intensive document research has been conducted during the preparatory mission in the field in order to access the EC documentation only available in the archives of the EU Delegation.



Page 219

Additional documentation and more detailed information on specific issues have been collected during the field mission from the EU Delegation as well as from implementing agencies and government entities. Data has been supported by qualitative measures in the field.

There have been two principal channels through which information was sourced:

• Analysis of relevant documents and web sites related to all sectors of EC assistance to Liberia, including Government policies and assistance of other donors and collection of project information for key projects of the EC portfolio;

• Field visit to Liberia for visiting projects and programmes for interviews. Several focus group meetings have been organised in the field with the main actors and stakeholders (for a documentation of focus group meetings see 7.3)

7.3 Focus Group Reports The evaluation team aspired to address the most important sectors and topics addressed by the EC with a more in-depth inquiry into typical results achieved and the quality of the engagement of the EC and its partners with beneficiaries. The chosen tool to collect this information were focus groups, i.e. discussions with small groups of beneficiaries that allowed the evaluators to explore in greater depth the results of the EC's assistance in Liberia. The evaluators decided to organise focus groups for the following sectors and topics:

• Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration and Rehabilitation; to reflect the strategic importance of the European Commission's support of this process. Also, not much written information was available on the long-term effects of EC support, due to weaknesses in the DDRR monitoring and evaluation system.

• Food Security / Humanitarian Aid; to reflect the fact these topics were of great importance in the EC portfolio after the end of Liberia's conflict in 2003 (i.e. among other things due to the funding of ECHO project with money from the European Development Fund), also with regard to attempts to link relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD).

• Income Generation, infrastructure and community development; to complement the limited written information on long-term effects of a number of infrastructure and income generation projects (i.e. specifically the construction of a road and a market hall in a rural community; and the construction of a school auditorium in another village) on the socio-economic situation of beneficiaries.

In most cases, the focus groups were organised with the help of EC implementing partners or other local organisations, in communities of the counties that were part of the country visit that had received relevant support. The organisation of the food security / humanitarian aid focus groups benefited from a very supportive NGO partner of the European Commission that allowed the team to access and to hold group discussions in a large number of communities. In the case of the DDRR focus groups, the evaluators could work with beneficiary organisations (e.g. the Bong County Motorcycle Union) and local authorities (e.g., the local office of the NCDDRR programme) to recruit participants for the focus groups. In the latter case, the team offered the additional incentive of a warm lunch at the end of the discussion. In order to organise the groups in Yaendewon (one of the communities benefiting from the road and market hall construction), the team made a preparatory visit to the village and then agreed on a time to return early in the next morning, in order to hold the focus group before the villagers left to tend to their fields in the middle of planting season.



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7.3.1 Focus Groups DDRR and Peace Building / Conflict Prevention

Date

21 June 2010

Place

FOCUS GROUP:

Management and members of the Bong Motorcycle Union

Bong county, Gbarnga

QUESTION LINE PARTICIPANTS

• To what extent did EC support contribute to the disarmament, demobilisation, rehabilitation and reintegration of ex-combatants in Liberia?

• EC-financed DDRR interventions have contributed to progress in resettlement of former combatants

• EC-financed DDRR interventions have increased the viability of livelihoods of ex-combatants and their families

• Value-Added of EC involvement in DDRR

Seven (7) members (all male) of the Bong Motorcycle Union, all war affected youth, beneficiaries of DDRR programs, now working as motorcycle taxi drivers in Bong county.

The meeting took place at 18:00h in the main office of the BMU in Gbarnga, Bong county.

ELEMENTS EMERGED

• The Union was created in 2005 as a reaction to the need for organizing the participants of the reintegration training for ex-combatants from several war factions.

• About five (5) members of the BMU have bought cars now to continue their transport business on a more expanded level; other members have bought additional motorcycles and run their business as leasing service.

• During the trainings for acquiring motorcycle licenses, participants were informed that they will receive the motor-taxi licenses after having passed the course. Due to an increase in the administration fee for issuing the licenses, there was the unresolved question of who will pay the 15 USD difference for the documents. Neither the training organisation nor the BMU have resolved the issue. The drivers themselves have not made any steps to pay the amount of 15 USD per license on their own.

• The participants pointed out that the security training as well as the peace building training was of use for them, they have in particular learned how to treat clients in a polite manner in case of problems or accidents.

• All participants stated that the motorbike taxi business has created a stable source of income for them, that they want to continue it and possibly safe some of the money to invest in additional bikes or a car. One participant is financing his education (high school) with the money he earns. All participants state that they can economically sustain themselves through the taxi business. BMU started to work with saving groups, but failed due to the large number of participants and the lack of an alternative approach

• The trainings were announced in the communities on posters, the participants signed up voluntarily for receiving the training course / motorbike training.

• Concerns were raised due to the security situation, in the last months 3 motorbike taxi drivers have been killed, the reasons are unclear. The killing of a motorbike taxi driver on June 6, 2008 led to a tense situation in Gbarnga, motorbike taxi drivers reacted violently and set up road blockades, the situation made necessary the engagement of UNMIL troops, deployed close to Gbarnga.

• A leadership crisis in late 2009 in the BMU has led to a new election of the Union's management, the election was observed by UNMIL, the National Elections Commission and the INGO Search for Common Ground.



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• BMU members have been trained (ToT) to undertake trainings in security and client-relations for new members of the Union.

• Needs expressed: - empowerment for management, business trainings, further education (grants / scholarships for high school); participants of the focus group also mentioned the necessity for trauma-healing measures, as nearly all of the BMU members have experienced war personally.

FINDINGS/OBSERVATIONS

• From the actually around 4.000 registered motorbike taxis, approximately 500 motorcyclists have received the training as part of the DDRR activities provided by YMCA in Bong County.

• The BMU is the only organisational structure that represents motorbike taxi drivers in Bong County.

• The BMU has suffered from internal problems, such as accusations of corruption and management gaps. Since the latest elections, the internal dynamics has calmed down, but funding remains a huge problem. BMU has not yet achieved to establish a financial sustainability and depends mainly on external donor funding.

• Problems of the taxi drivers (with local security forces, threats, registration of licenses) resemble very much to what participants in similar programs in Sierra Leone.

• Members of the local government explicitly stated the success of the motorbike taxis. A bigger problem was identified with still on-going personal revenge issues, remaining from the civil war.

• The beneficiaries of the motorcycle programme are exclusively male, women did not benefit from the programme.

• BMU and the UNMIS mission regional HQ (in particular through the UNMIL Sector 5 Bangladesh Battalion 14) have established a close cooperation to deal with security problems. BanBatt 14 intervened to prevent further violence during the protest of motor-taxi drivers in relation to the killing of one of their members in 2008. They also supported BMU through a small financial donation.

• BMU does not possess of technical office facilities, the office has no electricity and neither computer nor other technical equipment is available.

• The interviewees were aware of the EU as a donor in Liberia, although they have no detailed information of what is actually being financed or in how far the EU did contribute to support the DDRR process in Liberia.

Relevant for which EQs/ JCs/ Indicators?

• EQ 2 (DDRR): JC 2.1, Indicator 2.1.2 (medium to long-term development prospects); JC 2.4, Indicator 2.4.1 (combatants with employment, MEPs, sustainable income); Indicator 2.4.2 (Access of child soldiers to training and/or education); JC 2.5, Indicator 2.5.2 (Visibility).

• EQ 4 (CPPB): JC 4.2, Inidicator 4.2.1 (equal access to income generating activities); Indicator 4.2.2 (equal access to skill-building opportunities).

• EQ 6 (Income Generation) : JC 6.2 (in general); JC 6.3, Indicator 6.3.2 (enrollment in skill-building activities).

• EQ 8 (Capacity Building) : JC 8.2, Indicator 8.2.1 (gendered poverty analysis).

• EQ 10 (Adequacy) : JC 10.2, Indicator 10.2.2 (structures for risk management); Indicator 10.2.3 (risk response).



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Date

23 June 2010

Place

FOCUS GROUP:

Peace Council of the Gbarnga district

Bong county, Gbarnga


• To what extent has EC support to Liberia contributed to the consolidation of peace and a reduced risk of future violent conflicts?

• Effect of EC assistance on equalisation of access to economic resources

• EC assistance helps to strengthen / does not weaken the democratic culture legitimacy of Liberian State

Five (5) members (all male) of the Peace Council of Gbarnga district.

The meeting took place at 08:30h in the office of the Gbarnga District Superintendent in Gbarnga, Bong county.

ELEMENTS EMERGED

• The group pointed out the importance of the palaver hut as instrument for community reconciliation, which is also mentioned in the recommendations of the TRC report. Due to a lack of funding from government and agencies, these huts have not yet

• The Gbarnga Peace Council has managed to contribute to the mediation of the violent situation in the aftermath of the killing of a motorbike taxi drive in June 2008.

• The participants stress out the limitations of the local peace structures (peace committees and councils) due to the lack of attention and funding of the government for the reconciliation process.

• The lack of economic alternatives is identified as one of the major sources for possible instability in the region; apart from still existing networks of the war (including non-reintegrated ex-AFL members) are potential factors for violence.

• As major problems for a sustainable peace were identified: - lack of rule of law and the absence of a functioning judicial system, which leads to acts of personal vengeance; - land conflicts; - lack of economic opportunities and the total absence of a visible economic development in the rural areas; - the large number of small weapons, which are still existent in the communities; - the tendency to resolve conflicts with violent means and the subliminally high potential for violence at community level.

• The Council members reported several conflicts with the motorbike taxi-drivers on an individual level as well as with the institution BMU. The BMU is seen as a very strong actor on Gbarnga, the Council is actually trying to establish a closer relationship with the Union to avoid further tensions.

• Peace committees have been established in the 12 districts, they deal mostly with inter-personal conflicts. As part of a preventive approach, the Peace Council has undertaken an analysis to identify conflict issues and areas in the county. The Council focuses its work on young people, the establishment of a "Youth Peace Ambassador's Programme", which shall be extended to the primary schools in the district.

• The Council has also worked together with the local police to identify strategies for encountering criminality and the problem of male violence. Additional cooperation was undertaken with the "Liberian National Youth Volunteer Service Programme" for supporting dialogue activities between the different ethnic and religious groups in the district.

• UNDP and the Ministry of Internal Affairs have cooperated for the establishment of the reconciliation and conflict management framework (committees and councils), but the financial and political support is actually not sufficient to guarantee the sustainability of these structures.

• The interviewees pointed out that many of the young returnees did not participate in any kind of reintegration, education of vocational training activities. Reasons for the non-enrolment were unknown; the group assumes that a lack of information on the possibilities and offers might be a



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reason.

• The question of the legitimacy of the government was not associated to the support of the EU or the donor community, but to the person of the president and her accentuated role as first female president on the African continent.

• The group identified economic development and education as the key factors for reducing the potentials for violence, the Tubman High School in Gbarnga was mentioned as a key institution to provide basic and higher education. However, efforts for integrating CPPB topics in the curricula have not taken place.


• The interviewed group was quite critical about EC's interventions in the district, mentioning a low sustainability of some of the projects and wrong technical designs (in particular for the fish ponds).

• On the other side, EC's support for infrastructure (road and bridge construction) and to the Phoebe hospital was mentioned as milestones which will be long remembered and which are perceived as very positive examples.

• The absence of a female representative and the male domination of the Peace Council: Although the four male representatives claimed that women play an important role for peace building, dialogue and reconciliation, the council did not invite a female member to the meeting.

• The low political priority of the GoL to strengthen CPPB structures at local level is reflected at national level in the under-funding of the Liberia Peace Building Office in Monrovia, which should coordinate respective activities and develop strategies to implement the recommendations of the TRC report.

• Gbanga Peace Council has no office and only a provisional structure, although it should act as a service provider, capacities are not sufficient to guarantee this role.

• There is very little coordination or communication with the PBO in Monrovia, the Council does not have any close communication with the respective institution in the capital and vice versa.

• Activities of the PC are actually undertaken on an ad-hoc basis, as the district office does not possess of resources to finance activities or visits to the communities.

• There is very little dynamics in the approach; most of the success of the PC is related to the individuals who represent the institution (e.g. the reverend in his function as religious leader). An institutionalization of reconciliation or conflict management has so far not taken place.


• EQ 2 (DDRR): JC 2.1, Indicator 2.1.3 (linkages with relevant national initiatives); JC 2.5, Indicator 2.5.2 (Visibility).

• EQ 4: JC 4.2, Indicator 4.2.3 (access to land); JC 4.3, Indicator 4.3.1 (administrative procedures); Indicator 4.3.2 (accessibility of information).

• EQ 8 (Capacity Building) : JC 8.1, Indicator 8.1.1 (service provision).



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Date

24 June 2010

Place

FOCUS GROUP:

Owners of small businesses, former beneficiaries of vocational trainings as part of DDRR activities

Bong county,

Gbarnga






Four (4) beneficiaries (all male) of vocational trainings from which two have established small businesses in Gbarnga-city.

The meeting took place at 10:00h in the Tubman-Gray High School and Vocational Trainings Centre in Gbarnga city.

ELEMENTS EMERGED

• One of the participants of former vocational trainings has established a carpenter workshop where he is giving vocational training for two (2) male youth who are members of the actual EC financed Livelihood Programme, implemented by YMCA. This can be identified as a positive impact of the DDRR activities, as it is a clear indicator for a distribution effect (outcome and impact level) of the measures.

• One member of the interviewed group is working at the Tubman vocational training centre as caretaker and has not established a business on his own. Another member of the group works as computer assistant at the same training centre.

• All participants confirm that they have a small, but sustainable income. Those with small enterprises criticize that the competition is high due to the large number of small businesses that have been established in Gbarnga (not enough demand from the community).

• The diversification of vocational trainings provided was - from the group's point of view - not sufficient. Too many participants focused on the same training issues. This has created an unbalanced situation of demand and offer in the local market.

• All participants claimed that the training, which they had received, was not sufficient to capacitate them professionally. They could nonetheless establish businesses because of their former experience in their profession.

• The participants expressed their wish to receive further, more sophisticated trainings to increase their professional capacities, to enhance the quality of their products and thus to become more competitive.

• The group has not participated in any needs assessments, the trainings content was presented to them, from the several topics (carpentry, soap making, computer training) they could choose which one they would like to be trained in. Their previous working experience was not taken into account for the design of the capacity building activities.

• During the trainings, the participants received all necessary hardware and materials for practical exercise. This was positively acknowledged.


• It took various efforts to organize the small meeting, all participants where from Gbarnga city,



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participants from surrounding communities where not present at the meeting.

• The Tubman High School as a private training institution has a well-established infrastructure with internet facilities and a computer room. Nonetheless, vocational training is only given in case financial support from donor agencies is provided.

• Although the trainings were possibly not sufficient or perfectly adapted, they had a visible impact on the improvement of the economic situation of the group members.

• As with other focus groups, there was no female representative in the interview.

• The training centre does not make any follow-up after trainees completed the vocational trainings; neither does YMCA as counterpart have reliable information on the economic impact of the trainings.


• EQ 2 (DDRR): JC 2.4, Indicator 2.4.1 (combatants with employment, MEPs, sustainable income); Indicator 2.4.2 (Access of child soldiers to training and/or education).

• EQ 4 (CPPB): JC 4.2, Inidicator 4.2.1 (equal access to income generating activities); Indicator 4.2.2 (equal access to skill-building opportunities); Indicator 4.3.3 (feedback loops).

• EQ 6 (Income Generation) : JC 6.3, Indicator 6.3.1 (vocational degrees); Indicator 6.3.2 (enrollment in skill-building activities).

• EQ 8 (Capacity Building) : JC 8.2, Indicator 8.2.3 (satisfaction with public services).

• EQ 9 (Education) : JC 9.2, Indicator 9.2.2 (needs analysis); JC 9.4, Indicator 9.4.1 (completion rate).

Date

22 June 2010

Place

FOCUS GROUP:

War affected population (returnees and ex-combatants) of the Gbarnga district

Bong county,

Gbarnga






Twenty-one (21) inhabitants (war affected population, 10 female, 11 male) of Gbarnga city and surrounding villages who benefited from vocational training activities as part of reintegration programs.

The meeting took place at 11:00h in the office of the LRRRC in Gbarnga, Bong county.

ELEMENTS EMERGED

• The most critical aspect that has been mentioned frequently by different male and female members of the group was the low quality of the vocational trainings, which they received as part of their reintegration process.

• The group identified a lack of participative planning for the vocational trainings, there was no pre-assessment, the needs of the participants were not taken into account and the trainings had been provided on a preliminary developed scheme, which did not apply to the given situation.



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• The participants of the meeting were very critical with the approach, content and duration of the trainings. One female group member reported that she took over the training on management, as the course was of so low quality that a conflict between group and trainer evolved.

• It was remarked that the qualification of the trainers in general was low, an adequate skill-building was not provided and a monitoring of the quality of the trainings was not undertaken.

• The group reported that trainers took a 10% share from the grants provided to the training participants as fee for the hardware which was provided during the training session (materials, books, etc.). Receipts for this payment were not given.

• The vocational trainings were criticized as being too theoretical, most of the content for vocational training was taught through pictures and posters, without the possibility to train on existing objects and broken tools were not replaced.

• None of the group members participated in a follow-up training or an assessment on the effects of the trainings.

• Those participants who established their own business remarked positively that they have been provided with technical equipment and the necessary means to begin their economic activities.

• Participants of the meeting asked for small credits, there are no banks or institutions which could provide the necessary funds for investments. The group insisted on a credit scheme instead of loans for their private business.

• The group has started to work with savings groups, but did not succeed with this approach as there were too many members in the group.

• Some interviewees expressed the opinion that a 2-year period is not enough to achieve education or vocational training with a formal degree; they expected more support for education / formal training from donor agencies.

• LRRRC gave a number of 256 individuals from the returnees group who have graduated from university due to support through grants.


• The meeting was well prepared by the local LRRRC office. The Liberia Refugee Repatriation and Resettlement Commission are mandated to monitor and overview. The tasks of the LRRRC are management and support for reintegration, repatriation, refugee status determination, local integration, protection and capacity building. The local office instead does not possess of any technical facilities to undertake these duties.

• Some group members expressed their dissatisfaction with the weak role of the LRRRC for M&E of the trainings. Although the office knew about the problems, they did not intervene.

• Despite the criticism of the participants on the quality and appropriateness of the vocational trainings, the support had a positive impact and enabled a number of individuals to start or carry on their business activities.

• There are high expectations for concerted donor support to improve the economic conditions in the county, mainly targeted at the economic empowerment of community and individual level.

• Participants who run their own business defined their needs for continuous training in the fields of enterprise development and small business skills training.


• EQ 2 (DDRR): JC 2.2, Indicator 2.2.3 (M&E systems); JC 2.4, Indicator 2.4.1 (combatants with employment, MEPs, sustainable income); JC 2.5, Indicator 2.5.2 (Visibility).

• EQ 3 (LRRD): JC 3.4, Indicator 3.4.2 (Aid flow without interruption).

• EQ 4 (CPPB): JC 4.1, Indicator 4.1.3 (M&E reports assess effects); JC 4.2, Inidicator 4.2.1 (equal access to income generating activities); Indicator 4.2.2 (equal access to skill-building opportunities); Indicator 4.3.3 (feedback loops).

• EQ 6 (Income Generation) : JC 6.3, Indicator 6.3.1 (vocational degrees); Indicator 6.3.2 (enrollment in skill-building activities).

• EQ 8 (Capacity Building) : JC 8.1, Indicator 8.1.1 (service provision);



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JC 8.2, Indicator 8.2.1 (gendered poverty analysis); Indicator 8.2.3 (satisfaction with public services).

• EQ 10 (Adequacy) : JC 10.1, Indicator 10.1.3 (scope and scale of EU support).

7.3.2 Focus Groups Food Security and Humanitarian Aid

Date

22.06.2010

Place

FOCUS GROUP

Gbenquelleh (Bong County)


• How did EC support farmers in Gbenquelleh village in 2006/2007?

• How did the participants perceive quality and quantity of support?

• Increased use of improved plant material? Coverage and timely availability of improved plant material, appropriateness and performance of plant material delivered, establishment of village seed banks and selection of farmers in seed selection and storage

• Increased livestock population? Appropriateness of choice of animals, adapted races, availability of access to basic veterinary skills / services, Sustainability / Community organisation of “animal revolving funds”

• Increase in number of months of food stock

• What impact did EC support have on farmers’ livelihoods?

• Have there been interventions by other stakeholders influencing the development of the village and its inhabitants?

• How is today’s food security situation in the village?

8 Farmers (8 male) from Gbenquelleh village that benefited from EC assistance to Food Security (Solidarité International: Support Rural Development in Bong County, 2006/2007)

ELEMENTS EMERGED

• Gbenquelleh benefited from seed and tool distribution, swamp development, fish ponds, the blacksmith activity and pig breeding in 2006/2007. In later interventions a rice mill was given to the community

Swamp

• IVS died the moment the project support stopped (say that the harvest dropped in the second year and then they decided to wait for the nutrients to recover…), also mentioned the high work load involved that demotivated people and reduced the group

• The project is starting swamp development now under the EC NSA budget line. • The present technicians think that crop rotation can improve soil fertility. They claim that well done

swamps would remain in production, but that 3-5 years are needed to develop a swamp so well that people will see the benefit and not abandon it

Fish ponds



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• The fish pond activity is also involved in the cooperative • The pond is obviously full of fish (became visible when they fed them with rice bran during the field

visit) and well maintained • They get the rice bran for free as “the mill came to the community because of us”) so they can use

the bran for the pigs and the fish (there was bran stored when we came for the field visit) • Fish ponds have been harvested three times (once by the project to supply other groups with

fishlings). That gave them 250 USD, they harvested well twice and sold, gave and divided the harvest, want to harvest a 4th time just before independence day

Pigs

• the pigs look very good with plenty of offsprings. All three compartments of the stable are full with piglets at different ages, well fed and kept

• 6 people in that group (4 female) • They are already in the third production cycle, have eaten pigs themselves, taken some home for

individual breeding, offered one as a Christmas present to the community and sold some so they regard it as a very good and profitable activity

• They have formed a small cooperative with the money, with some other groups from surrounding communities (everybody gave an amount that is now rotating as a credit with interests (for member less interest)

• They care for the pigs as a group, feeding them twice a day, the rice mill is giving them free rice bran

• One of the group has been trained in the ECHO project as a community health care worker, so he was able to treat the pigs (vitamins, de-worming) when they became sick, so up to now only one has died

• Actively exchanged pigs when their boar died, so they could continue to breed (paid with piglets)

Blacksmith

• It was not possible to assess the blacksmith activity, as the blacksmith has left the community. There is currently no active blacksmith and the beneficiaries met did not know about the tools, etc. There are local blacksmith products in the market as well as imported tools from Brazil and other countries

General

• Technical quality of fish ponds is good

• Improved plant material performed well, some was distributed rather late, generally adequate regarding seeds, tools, etc. distribution

• Some improved seeds are still within the village, but there is little management in that

• Fish pond generated some fish for consumption and for sale in good quantities

• Pig activity is very successful, several persons (group and non-group members) are already breeding on an individual basis

• No increase in number of months of food stock Most families from November to June/July / sustainable impact on food security compared to pre-war figures, but good development compared to the war situation


• 2006/2007 seed and tool distribution helped farmers to resume agricultural activities

• Most active and successful village of all three visited Solidarité interventions, impression: strong leadership

• Some of the longer term activities abandoned (blacksmith, swamps) others well developed (fish ponds, pigs) highlighting the potential of these activities

• Only example where organisational structures beyond the groups have been established (cooperatives)

• Visible stabilising effects through 2nd and 3rd projects (rice bran for pigs and fish through rice mill, better animal care through village veterinaries)

• It was not always possible for the beneficiaries to distinguish if a certain activity had occurred under the 2006/2007 intervention or during a later project implemented by Solidarité (under ECHO



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and NSA budget line)

• FS situation normalised (back to pre-war), same yields, same size of land under cultivation, but little impact that can be attributed to project intervention

• Activities target men and women, but mainly men seem to be in charge


• EQ 5 (Food Security): JC 5.1 (undernourishment) JC 5.2 (yields): Indicators 5.2.1 (yields), 5.2.2 (area), 5.2.3 (improved plant material), 5.2.4 (livestock), 5.2.6 (decrease of food aid), 5.2.8 (months of food stock), 5.3.2 (gender)

Date

21.06.2010

Place

FOCUS GROUP

Shillen-Ta (Bong County)


• How did EC support farmers in Shillen-Ta village in 2006/2007?








6 Farmers (5 male and 1 female) from Shillen-Ta village that benefited from EC assistance to Food Security (Solidarité International: Support Rural Development in Bong County, 2006/2007)

ELEMENTS EMERGED

• Shillen-Ta benefited from swamp development, fish ponds and the pig breeding activity in 2006/2007

Swamps:

• the swamp was developed in 2006 with support in terms of tools, rice seeds and food for work

• People left the swamp immediately after the project support stopped in 2007 and never returned to work the swamp.

• The group claimed to want to continue in the swamp this year, because Solidarité is assisting another group to develop the undeveloped upper part of the swamp. As the first group is afraid of



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losing the right to use the swamp to the other group, this is a motivation to come back (and also the hope of receiving some further NGO support in terms of tools, food, seeds, etc.)

• A technician from the local NGO supporting the development said that the swamp lay-out was not carried out professionally, so that might have been another problem. The group mentioned water back-logging

• They sold the rice from the swamp activity and bought zinc for a community guest house, kept some seeds for the following year

Fish ponds:

• The fish pond activity seems to be continuing at a relatively low level (see Solidarity assessment) • They harvested only once since that time 2006/2007 • Sold the bigger fish and divided the medium ones within the group for consumption • They consumed more than they sold (fresh or dried) • The group got smaller and smaller and reduced from 16 to 8 • They claimed to feed the fish daily (rice brand, potato green, termites) • They have to buy the rice brand for 150 LD per sack, but it is rather far as there is no rice mill in

the community • 1.500 LD income from sale • They are using this capital in a savings club to multiply • They use their own money to buy the food • Fish swam away as water flooded the pond • They complained about thefts • Seems to be hardly any profit in it regarding the work involved Pig breeding

• Pigs: they got 2 females and a male, pigs multiplied well, but then started to die • They currently still have only 3 (the 2 old females and one offspring male) • The pigs looked very badly nourished. It seems that people have difficulties feeding the pigs as

they compete with the food for human consumption, it might also be carelessness • The people had done a cassava field for the pigs and plan to repeat that • Feeding practices recommended by the project seem to be quite complicated, costly and

laborious • Pigs started to die so they panicked and sold most off for a low price • All profits from the very few sales go into the feed • The neighbour’s private pigs (offspring of the activities) look comparatively very healthy and well

fed (even though they are in a local stable. Probably it would be good to build only local stables (less expensive and also suitable)

• They are improved pigs • The people have no access to animal health care. The animal health worker trained in the 2.

programme lives far away and it is too expensive to call him as the transport fees, a fee for him and the medicine would come close to 1.000 LBD

• The only feed one could see there were some leaves, they seemed really hungry • There seem to be problems with the group and very little profit in the activity General

• Technical quality of swamp development not satisfying, problems of water back logging constrains impact of swamp development

• Fish pond flooding also due to technical problems

• Technical problems are being resolved with support of local specialised NGOs in the current NSA EC supported project



• Fish pond generated some fish for consumption, but in terms of quantities very little, many people became demotivated




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• No interventions by other stakeholders



• Longer term activities either abandoned (swamp development) or staggering on at a relatively unproductive level (fish ponds, pigs)

• Main incentive for swamp development was the support received, long term benefits either not visible enough or not attractive as related to a higher labour intensity

• There seems to be competition between human food consumption needs and the need to feed the animals

• Unavailability of veterinary structures is a risk to sustainability of livestock interventions

• Only a small number of people benefits from fish pond and livestock activities, no organisational structure to ensure extension of livestock activities, groups are losing members, success of group approach doubtful

• All activities requiring new skills and permanent management seem not well developed

• Weaknesses in quality and partly timeliness of technical support

• It was not always possible for the beneficiaries to distinguish if a certain activity had occurred under the 2006/2007 intervention or during a later project implemented by Solidarité (under ECHO and NSA budget line)




• EQ 5 (Food Security): JC 5.1 (undernourishment) JC 5.2 (yields): Indicators 5.2.1 (yields), 5.2.2 (area), 5.2.3 (improved plant material),5.2.4 (Livestock), 5.2.6 (decrease of food aid), 5.2.8 (months of food stock), 5.3.2 (gender)

Date

21.06.2010

Place

FOCUS GROUP

Zowienta (Bong County)


• How did EC support farmers in Zowienta village in 2006/2007?





5 Farmers (5 male) from Zowienta village that benefited from EC assistance to Food Security (Solidarité International: Support Rural Development in Bong County, 2006/2007)



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ELEMENTS EMERGED

• Zowienta benefited from seed and tool distribution, fish ponds and the blacksmith activity in 2006/2007. In later interventions a rice mill was given to the community

Blacksmith

• Under the blacksmith activity existing blacksmiths, often inactive because of the war, were identified and supplied with a tool kit and some initial material. The project did supply farmers with tickets they could exchange for tools with the blacksmiths. This was to re-establish local blacksmith activities and replace foreign tools with locally made tools and support the local economic cycle. The blacksmiths were obliged to take on local apprentices.

• In Zowienta a blacksmith who was already active in a remoter area was motivated to move to the town and become active there. This worked out well until the project came to an end. Then the community got into an argument with the blacksmith (the community wanted a share of the profits) and took away the tools with the argument that this belonged to the community (even though there was a MoU stating rights and responsibilities that should have prevented this event). It was not possible to clarify if the community is still with the tools or sold them. The blacksmith returned demotivated to the area he originally worked and continues to work there with his old equipment. There is no currently active blacksmith in Zowienta.

Rice mill

• The rice mill is from the successor project (ECHO) and therefore not part of the evaluation. Nevertheless as rice mill committee members attended the focus group, some relevant issues came up

• There seem to be some problems between the rice mill committee operating the mill and the community who is the owner. Group members state that there is some money coming in through the milling activity, but there is no transparency or no plan how to manage the funds

• The rice mill is supplying the fish pond group with free rice bran

Fish ponds

• The fish pond activity is continuing

• The two ponds are dry and grassy and there are currently only fish in the reservoir

• They did make money with the sale of the fish, so that the group is currently with 13.000 LBD

• The group is saving the money as they have a plan to start an oil palm business for income generation. Their calculations are that they need 30.000 LBD to start the business

General

• Technical quality of fish ponds is satisfying



• Fish pond generated some fish for consumption and for sale, but in terms of quantities very little, still the group is continuing




• Longer term activities either abandoned (blacksmithry) or staggering on at a relatively



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unproductive level (fish ponds)

• Only a small number of people benefits from fish pond and

• All activities requiring new skills and permanent management seem not well developed

• It was not always possible for the beneficiaries to distinguish if a certain activity had occurred under the 2006/2007 intervention or during a later project implemented by Solidarité (under ECHO and NSA budget line)




• EQ 5 (Food Security): JC 5.1 (undernourishment) JC 5.2 (yields): Indicators 5.2.1 (yields), 5.2.2 (area), 5.2.3 (improved plant material), 5.2.6 (decrease of food aid), 5.2.8 (months of food stock), 5.3.2 (gender)

Date

19.06.2010

Place

FOCUS GROUP Humanitarian Aid for Returnees

Beafini (Bomi County)


• How did EC support farmers in Beafini village in 2004/2005?





• How do participants assess their development perspectives?

11 Farmers (about 7 male and 4 female) from Beafini village that benefited from EC Humanitarian Assistance (ECHO with EDF funds) in 2004/2005

ELEMENTS EMERGED

• Beneficiaries stated as most important support by Ecin 2004/2005: food aid combined with distribution of seeds and tools (through ticket system for households), hand pumps for safe drinking water, establishment of two CBOs for joint activities (cassava and animal restocking with sheep)

• Beneficiaries did not metion specific activities targeted towards women, but stated that the hand pumps did alleviate women’s work of fetching water. The villagers decided two have two CBOs, one for the men and one for the women and both groups decided which activites they wanted to take up

• Quantity and quality of support was satisfying. Seeds came on time and in sufficient quantity and performed well

• Returnees arriving after registration had to wait for the next registration period. In the meantime their extended families supported them

• No other stakeholders supported the village up to today

• Support of implementing partner DWHH continued up to 2009



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• Food aid plus agricultural inputs facilitated return as people coming from the refugee camps to assess the situation saw that they would be supported until they could harvest from their own fields

• As people returned without any assets, tools and seeds were crucial to resume agricultural production

• Villagers estimated that most of the former inhabitants that survived the war already returned to the village.

• Especially cassava seedlings were unavailable for farmers after the war and given its importance in the farming system (wide harvesting window, famine reserve) farmers were eager to plant cassava

• The food security situation has normalised to the standard of pre-war food security. Yields are about the same as they were before the war. This means that some of the farmers with larger farms (few) are able to produce sufficient rice to sustain their families, keep some rice on stock as seed rice and sell parts of their harvest. The majority of farmers is able to produce rice to sustain their families for about 7-8 months. After June usually stocks are exhausted and farmers have to purchase rice on the local markets and/or rely increasingly on roots and tubers for their nutrition

• Farmers farm the same acreage of land as before the war. The main limiting factor for farm sizes is currently the availability of labour

• Farmers claim that the CBOs continue to function. The men are continuing to have a large cassava field. Up to know the yields of the field were divided, but for this year they are planning to sell the cassava and build a town hall, so that the youth can meet there

• The women sheep group did not seem to work properly. The chairwoman of the group was present, but had difficulties in relating the development of the activity. No sheep had been passed on so far

• Farmers do not report about changes in agricultural practices. Improved seeds received are still kept as seed rice, but with a tendency to mix them instead of keeping these seeds separately and distribute them in order to establish new varieties in the village


• 2004/2005 humanitarian assistance accelerated return to villages and kept people food secure until they were able to harvest their own crops

• HA was functioning smoothly and was carried out professionally by the implementing agency

• Village cohesion seemed to be weak

• It was not always possible for the beneficiaries to distinguish if a certain activity had occurred under the 2004/2005 HA or during a later project implemented by DWHH

• FS situation normalised (back to pre-war), same yields, same size of land under cultivation

• It could not be verified if the CBOs are still functional, there remained doubts whether the sheep group activity is still a group activity

• No gender disaggregated targeting of beneficiaries, intervention on household level. Women Community-Based organisation (CBO) established on village initiative

• No evidence on long term increase of yields based on improved farming methods, an increased use of improved varieties, etc.

• Utilisation and good performance of improved varieties, but no visible seed management

• Food aid for returnees up to 2007, after that only with regards to school feeding





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Date

19.06.2010

Place


Beajah (Bomi County)


• How did EC support farmers in Beajah village in 2004/2005?






10 Farmers (about 4 male and 6 female) from Beajah village that benefited from EC Humanitarian Assistance (ECHO with EDF funds) in 2004/2005

ELEMENTS EMERGED

• Beneficiaries stated as most important support by Ecin 2004/2005: food aid combined with distribution of seeds and tools (through ticket system for households), establishment of CBOs for joint activities (e.g. vegetable production, animal restocking with sheep and with chicken)

• Beneficiaries did not metion specific activities targeted towards women. The CBOs had male and female members




• Support of implementing partner DWHH continued up to 2009 (hand pumps, further support to CBOs, establishment of farmer resource center for demonstration and training purposes)



• Villagers estimated that many of the former inhabitants that survived the war already returned to the village. Other displaced people, who have their origin in other parts of the country, have also settled in Beajah, so that the ethnic composition of the community is mixed



• Farmers farm the same acreage of land as before the war. The main limiting factor for farm sizes



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is currently the availability of labour

• Farmers claim that the CBOs continue to function, but there seems to be little ongoing activities • The livestock restockiing was only partly successful as the chicken were attacked by Newcastle

and died. The sheep group is still continuing to hand over offsprings to other group members, but it seems that reporductin rates are low and that several animals have died.

• The farmer resource center was handed over to the MoA in 2009 when the former project came to an end. The MoA put some village people there to take care of the center, but as MoA did not paid (as promised) villagers abandoned the site and the center imbruted





• Village cohesion seemed to be weak (may be due to the fact that there seems does not seem to be an active village leadership and that the community consists entirely of inhabitants originating from different parts of Liberia)


• It could not be verified if the CBOs are still functional

• It was not always possible for the beneficiaries to distinguish if a certain activity had occurred under the 2004/2005 HA or during a later project implemented by DWHH

• No gender disaggregated targeting of beneficiaries, intervention on household level






Date

19.06.2010

Place


Vokor (Bomi County)


• How did EC support farmers in Vokor village in 2004/2005?




• How is today’s food security situation in the

12 Farmers (5 male and 7 female) from Vokor village that benefited from EC Humanitarian Assistance (ECHO with EDF funds) in 2004/2005



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village?


ELEMENTS EMERGED

• Beneficiaries stated as most important support by EC in 2004/2005: food aid combined with distribution of seeds and tools (through ticket system for households), bridge rehabilitation facilitating vehicles’ access to community and the rehabilitation of the primary school, establishment of CBOs for joint activities (e.g. vegetable production)

• There were no specific activities targeted towards women. As the community is entirely muslim, villagers claimed that there are no female headed households as widows are either remarried or move to the households of male relatives

• Hand pumps were not done in 2004/2005 as the village already had two hand pumps functional and the implementing agency gave priority to villages without access to safe water (in a later project phase another hand pump was installed)




• Support of implementing partner DWHH continued up to 2009 (hand pumps, further support to CBOs)



• Villagers estimated that about 85% of the former inhabitants that survived the war already returned to the village. They claim that more people might still return with some staying in the capital as they have build another life and have no attention to become farmers again


• The bridge provides access to the village by vehicles. This supported food aid distribution in the early years after the peace agreement was signed and today facilitates commercialisation. As the village is close to Monrovia and close to the main road, their market day attracts clients from Monrovia. This is particularly important for the vegetable producers


• Farmers farm the same acreage of land as before the war. The main limiting factor for farm sizes is currently the availability of labour

• Farmers claim that the CBOs continue to function (e.g. the vegetable production group)


• Farmers were optimistic regarding village development. They indicated the changes already visible: safe water, a school, regular market days with clients coming from Monrovia, zinc roofs on most of the houses. The village elder predicted that the village houses would ”all have zinc roofs in a couple of years from now” and that the village is making some efforts to obtain a rice mill.



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• Village cohesion seemed to be quite strong (may be due to the fact that there seems to be a strong and active village leadership and that the community consists entirely of Muslims with most of the inhabitants originating from the village)


• Hand pumps look well maintained, hand pump village committee is functional, water fees are being charged

• It could not be verified if the CBOs are still functional

• Bridge improves market access

• No gender disaggregated targeting of beneficiaries, intervention on household level





• EQ 5 (Food Security): JC 5.1 (undernourishment) JC 5.2 (yields): Indicators 5.2.1 (yields), 5.2.2 (area), 5.2.3 (improved plant material), 5.2.5 (market access), 5.2.6 (decrease of food aid), 5.2.8 (months of food stock), 5.3.2 (gender)

7.3.3 Focus Groups Income Generation / Infrastructure

Date

23.6.2010

Place

FOCUS GROUP Yeandewon Market Association / Road Construction / Maintenance (men)

Yeandewon / Bong County


• Means of travel before road was built, length of trip, frequency of trip;

• Biggest problems / challenges from lack of road;

• Initiation of road construction / role of village to initiate road construction

• Situation after completion of road / greatest changes for each person individually

� Probe for specific issues, including income generation, health, market access, etc.

• History of market structure in Yaendewon and use of market hall

• Challenges with maintenance of road and market hall

• Plans for the future (individually and for the village)

16 men from Yeandewon village, most of whom had been present in the village when before, during and after the road was built.

ELEMENTS EMERGED

• Villagers started road construction in self-help effort in 2003 (doing de-stomping, moving sand and surveying surround communities on interest in being connected to road. In 2006, Deputy Super-



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Intendent for Development [Note: was also involved in CRC team] took an interest and put communities in touch with the EC

• Before road was constructed, village access to market, health services, eduation, etc., was extremely limited; travel only possible by foot to next road and then, if available by motorcycle taxi. Not possible to sell surplus products on market. Typical trip to Suakoko (next market town) would take 4 hours.

• Impact on health was big problem, it was very difficult to get sick people to the doctor. People died on the way; also difficult and dangerous during pregnancies; no medical person resided in village

• Construction or road changed situation in village in multiple ways. A trip to Suakoko now only takes between 30 minutes to an hour, depending on what transport is available.

• Yeandewon now has a medical practitioner living in the village, who can treat simple diseases, like temporary diahrrea, sometimes also Malaria; for more complicated cases, like chronic diahrea. Patients can be transferred to Phebe Hospital].

• Villagers were able to start earning money, initially by selling surplus products at the market in Suakoko; eventually, Yaendewon itself become a market town, frequented by people from surrounding villages. Villagers have started to sent children to secondary school, paying the tuition from money earned from selling their products. Some children from the village now have started gone gone to Monrovia, going to college. Yaendewon also now has access to a car, owned by one of the villagers; Less food is spoiling, because surplus can be sold on market.

• Although EC had trained about 40 people in road maintenance, i.e. a group that should have assumed responsible for physically maintaining the road, many of these people did not find it attractive and worth their while to work on maintaining the road. Many of them moved away, now there are about 18 people left, from different villages along the road. Also, problems with the whereabouts of the EC-financed tools; many of the shovels are broken, so are wheelbarrows. Community is missing a compactor to make repairs more permanent.

• Money from the toll-system was supposed to be used in maintaining the road, but at some point there were riots at the tool booth, because the truck-drivers and others were still asked to pay money, although the road was getting worse and it was not being maintained. Want to know what happened with the money we paid as toll559?

• Money should be used for its intended purpose: to fix road. What is keeping this from happening? Let us use the money to buy tools, to make a start – it does not make sense for the money to just sit in the bank. There were people who have been trained in road maintenance – then they should maintain the road. Expect them to star doing their work.

• We, the community have to mobilise our people to take charge of maintaining the road. We live with this road every day, we walk along it, back and forth, every day, the road is so central for our lives. And it is up to us now to take care of it. There are things we as community can do: Fill in potholes with stones, take some sand to fill it in.

• Toll gate was hindrance to solving the problem. People saw: You get money for maintaining the road, so this is what you have to do. This made them not want to invest into maintaining the road themselves.

• Propose to make different villages along the road responsible for maintaining different portions of the road. Yaendewon would be responsible for a certain part, and Karfalre town for another part. This way, ”we would know who to go to if a certain part of the road is not in good shape”.

• Disagreement within the village if the EC financed building was a ”market hall” or a ”storage facility”. Finally, apparent consensus that it was meant to be storage facility were people from elsewhere could store their goods when they came back from Suakoko – so that they then would be able to organise transport from here to their villages; Open area of hall was meant to be for village women to sell their goods on daily basis – which was not sustained.

• Problems with collecting fees from people who are storing their goods; disagreement over the eventual use of the little money that was collected; supposedly the money was collected in safe place, but ”clerk who collected money was not in the village”. Not all people were willing to pay money (heated discussion among villagers).

• Market has not been officially opened. So right now, village is not really getting any benefit from the market being here [some discussion about this]. People from other villages using the stalls [note: there are many stalls in Yaendewon, along all major paths and roads] are not yet paying money for it. Normally, once the market is registered in Gbarnga, can sell market tickets to sell so



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that money stays in the village.

• Tried to register the market in Gbarnga. Gave L$5000 to the clan chief, to pay for the registration. But kept the money and did not register it.


• Infrastructure, and in particular roads, can have significant benefits for beneficiaries in terms of income generation, but also in other social areas, such as access to health care. Road Suakoko-Yaendewon fulfilled a real need in this regard. Villagers made use of the road as an “asset” for productive activities

• Relative strength of road as investment is the relative physical longevity. Villagers could make use of roads for 4-5 years, although maintenance scheme was not functioning. At the same time, the road will not be passable for much longer, if it is not maintained properly.

• Social changes, such as the establishment of a community-based road maintenance scheme can break down due to issues, such as mistrust in the communities regarding the proper use of resources, barriers to collective action. These challenges are not insurmountable, but require continued involvement of an external party, i.e. for facilitation.


• EQ6 (Income Generation), in particular JC 6.2, Indicators 6.2.3; 6.2.5; EQ7 (Infrastructure); JC 7.3; Indicators 7.3.2; 7.3.3.; 7.3.4.

Date

June 23, 2010

Place

FOCUS GROUP Yeandewon Market Association / Road Construction / Maintenance (women)

Yeandewon / Bong County


• Means of travel before road was built, length of trip, frequency of trip;

• Biggest problems / challenges from lack of road; • Initiation of road construction / role of village to initiate road

construction • Situation after completion of road / greatest changes for each

person individually • Probe for specific issues, including income generation, health,

market access, etc. • History of market structure in Yaendewon and use of market hall • Challenges with maintenance of road and market hall • Plans for the future (individually and for the village)

Twelve (12) women with age range between 18 and 60 (approximate)

ELEMENTS EMERGED

• The road started as a self-help project with the community members themselves.

• Women were actively involved with the process:duged stums, provided sand, rocks, and cooked food for the workforce.

• Before the road was build, women walked for about five hours to the market in Suakoko with farms produce on their head for sale. This made them sick and had to use the income from sale of produce to purchase medicine.



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• Maternal Mortality rate was high due to lelay in transporting pregnant women to hospital in hammock.

• There was much spoilage of farm produce due to inaccessible market.

• The women expressed concern about the lack of maintenance for the road. Promised to put a team together to ascertain the status of funds collected for the road maintenance from the men.


• The construction of the road and market is positively impacting on the lives of the community. There is reported reduction in child and mortality mortality due to easy access to the nearest hospital; NGOs are coming to the community to provide some needed services (women could not mention name of NGO); reduction in travel time to Monrovia and other places to transact business

• Although no clinic, a medical practiciner moved from Monrovia to the community to provide minimal health services. Difficult cases are referred to the nearest hospital.

• The market hall has enable community to sell their produce and purchase needed items.

• With the extra income earned in the community as a result of increase economic activities some parents are now sending their children to school (in monrovia), new homes are being built using zinc as roof instead of tatch, health workers are coming to vicinate children unlike before the road was built.

• Women are reluctant to speak about certain issues, but refer to the men. For example, when inquired about the usage of the storage in the market, no woman was prepared to discuss, but referred to the men.

• The area lacks a clinic and a school building


EQ8/JC 8.2: Target groups (incl. women / girls) benefit from increased quality of Government-provided services and infrastructure

7.3.4 Focus Group Community Development / Education

Date

21.6.2010

Place

FOCUS GROUP Teachers of Zebay school, Kpaai District, Bong County

Zebay, Kpaai District, Bong County


• How did the CRC become involved in community? / Things to be done to secure EC money?

• Interactions with main counterparts / description of the process of obtaining funds

• Organisation of the construction process / who was involved; which contributions did the community mobilise?

• Who carried out physical works?

• Role of the District Development Committee in bringing process forward

• Current use of the building

• Problems and challenges

6 teachers (all men), teaching at Zebay school, all of whom had been present before, during and after EC financed construction of school auditorium.



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ELEMENTS EMERGED

• Project started in 2006, when development superintended of Bong visited school, and ceremony was interrupted by heavy rains. Illustrated need for auditorium. Started to collect money, then EU came to Bong with a development package. School project received US$9,805 (Note: figure was cited from memory).

• Process for obtaining the grant: Community had to organise a CBO (Note: Community Based Organisation); had to organise an election to elect the members of the CBO. Much of the preparatory work was also done by third party contractor, community was told to work with them (name of contractor: Loilee Development Corporation). They filled in the necessary form on our behalf, and submitted them to the EC. Then, got letter from EC that decision had been taken to work without third party contractors – we should implement the project ourselves. (What was your reaction?) We were very happy about this – we wanted to implement the project ourselves.

• Main counterparts from the CRC were Lee Rogers, James Acola and Bai Rogers (Note: Lee Rogers had already mentioned by former CRC “team leader” here in Bong).

• Process that ensued: Were told that we had to do the project ourselves. But first, we had to go through a one-week training, on financial management (4 out of 6 people had participated in the training). The workshop treated basic things on how to run a business (probe on topics). For example accountability. What was made clear is how you purchase, for example, supplies for a project. Here in Liberia, what you would often do is to go to one shop to buy supplies. You get the supplies, hand over the money and that is it. We were told how to go to more to one shop, so that you know what shop is the best one, and what you can expect for your money. You are also encouraged to buy from an established firm. Also, you have to get and keep receipts to document how you used the money. This is all related to accountability.

• Next steps: When all this was done, the chair of our CBO could go to Monrovia to receive and sign for the check over US$ 9,805 dollars. We then took the check to Cuttington University (a small private college outside of Gbanga). There they had an agricultural bank – we opened an account, deposited the check, and could then make withdrawals from it.

• How did you then organise the construction process? We drew up a work schedule, estimating how long it would take to dig the foundation, lay the bricks, etc. Our estimate was that the whole building process would take us 3 months. And we kept to the estimate, we stayed within our own work schedule, the work was completed in three months.

• Who designed the auditorium? [Note: Nobody was sure at first] The design was done by the third party contractor – we took it over from them? (agreement)

• Who did the physical work, the construction? The community did. We were asked in the beginning by the CRC what our contribution would be, i.e. 10% of the project had to come from our community. So we said that we would contribute the manual labour. (Probe: Was there anything else you contributed?) The community also contributed dried mud-bricks, gravel and sand. We also fetched three men from Gbanga, because here, nobody had the technical skills. This was technical work that we needed to do here. We showed and explained what we wanted to do to our own young people, but they said “No thank you”. So we got these three men from Gbanga. But people from our community worked with them, carried bricks and sand and carried out the work as instructed by the three Gbanga men. We paid the three boys from Gbanga for their work (not clear how much). The others from the community were not paid – this was our contribution to the project (note: the 10% that had been mentioned earlier.

• What role had the DDC (the “District Development Committee”) played in this process? (Note: one of the participants, a teacher at the school, also was the DDC chairman, elected in 2006). DDC was in charge of monitoring the project. With the help and support of an NGO, there was an election, were 25 people from each of different regions of the district came together and voted who should be in the DDC. In the end, we had a group of 14 members as DDC – 5 women and 9 men. The DDCs discussed the different projects that had been proposed (note: the discussion of DDC involved was continued after the group discussion with the DDC chairman individually. See separate notes on this issue).

• How are you using the building now? We are using it for the school, but also rent it out to others who want to use it or need a space. When we submitted our papers to the project, we had initially said that we wanted to take fees for renting out the hall – this was our idea for sustainability. The form required that we would think about this. But it is hard to make sure that people pay. In the end, many of the beg and say: we cannot pay – we don’t want to pay. So many of them do not



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pay. This is not working the way we had thought we would.

• For the school, we are using the auditorium for assemblies (Note: When we arrived, at about 12:45pm, unannounced, the teachers and students (about 200 out of 482 students – not all where there, because exams were over (e.g. the 9th grade students were leaving the school).


• Community participation and community-led investment projects can be a viable model for Liberia. The use of third party contractors is not necessarily in the interest of communities. Communities can have the capacity to organise important aspects of such small scale development projects themselves.

• Leaders were also able to organise meaningful inputs to the project from the wider community

• EC-financed training conveyed at least some important messages that were retained by community members.

• DDCs used to play a role in planning and prioritising development projects.

• More complex issues (in this case also related to income generation) that require a more prolonged engagement on the part of the community, such as the collection of fees for use of the auditorium by outside parties, are more difficult to organise and sustain.

• EC-financed auditorium is responding to a real need in the community / school.


• EQ9, JC 9.2, Indicator 9.2.2, 9.2.3; EQ10; JC 10.3; Indicator 10.3.1; 10.3.2

7.4 Synthesis Phase The field phase was followed by the synthesis phase that deepened the analysis, finalised the judgements according to judgement criteria and provided answers to the evaluation questions. Overall conclusions on the country strategy have been drawn and recommendations drafted. The synthesis phase started with a Reference Group meeting shortly after returning from the field mission. The synthesis phase has terminated with a seminar in Monrovia presenting and discussing the findings of the evaluation. The results of the seminar have been taken into account in this final report; the detailed minutes and slides of the seminar are attached in this Annex below.



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7.5 Overview about Evaluation Questions, Judgment C riteria and Indicators

Table 82: Changes in Judgment Criteria and Indicato rs throughout the Evaluation Judgment Criteria / Indicator (changes) Changes / Justification

Indicator 1.1.2: EC objectives reflect the priorities identified in longer-term needs assessments, (including input documents for the 2007 Liberia’s Partners Forum)

Taken out. None of the available sources clearly identified the “long-term needs” of Liberians in ways that were sufficiently distinct from official priorities of the Liberian Government.

Indicator 6.2.5: Increased proportion of households with access to improved seeds - Changed to: Indicator 6.2.5: Increased proportion of household with access to the cash economy

No information was available to assess changes in access to improved seeds. Also, previous to this change, the indicator-set failed to reflect the importance of gaining access to the “cash-economy” for many Liberians.

Indicator 7.1.3: Increased % of birth attended by skilled health personnel

Taken out: There's no reliable data on the existing number of skilled health personnel in Liberia, some of the interviewees estimated that countrywide the number of medicals does not exceed 50. "International NGOs have begun to leave following the conclusion of their humanitarian assistance programmes. State institutions remain handicapped by the effects of long-term conflict, and the overall lack of capacity in the health and education sectors remains critical. There is no national monitoring and evaluation framework, and decentralization is still at its infancy. Current national capacity is very weak across all sectors."560 The team assessed the overall improvement of medical services and the reconstruction of health facilities and integrated the indicator into the general assessment of conditions and outreach of health facilities in EC supported areas. Although it can generally be assumed that due to a larger number of clinics the number of health workers has increased correspondingly, the statistics on education and the health situation in Liberia do not allow for a detailed quantitative and qualitative analysis of the existing number or the level of capacities of health workers.

Indicator 7.4.5: Increased % or # of households who receive more than 20 litres of water per day

Taken out. There are no data on the number of households which specifically receive more than the mentioned quantity of water per day. Existing basic data on the number of connected households do not allow a quantitative statement on the water consumption, as illegal water draw off and manipulation of counters are a common phenomenon. The team integrated this indicator into 7.4.3 and 7.4.4., where the increase of households with access to improved water sources and hygienic sanitation facilities allows a statement on the general improvement of access to water - but clearly without the possibility to measure on behalf of reliable sources the exact quantity of water being used and if this quanitity reaches the limit of 20 litres per day.

Indicator 7.4.6: Reduced % of children under 36 months with diarrhoea/ month

Taken out. Due to the extremely weak data census on health issues, it was impossible to collect sufficient information on this indicator to make a verifiable statement at national level. The change in the health situation for children under 36 months was integrated into the assessment of the improvement of the health infrastructure in general (see indicators 7.1.2 to 7.1.5). LWSC did not collect data on the health situation of this specific group.



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Table 83: Overview about all Evaluation Questions, Judgment Criteria and Indicators

Evaluation Questions Judgment Criteria Indicators

JC1.1: EC cooperation takes into account the short term and longer term needs of Liberia’s population in the conflict, post conflict, rehabilitation and development periods

I.1.1.1: EC objectives reflect the priorities set in needs assessments of the immediate post-conflict era (e.g., the 2004 UN / World Bank Joint Needs Assessment)

I.1.2.1: EC objectives reflect the priorities of short-term strategies of the Liberian Government (including the 2004 “Results Focused Transitional Framework” (RFTF), the 2006 “First 150 Day Action Plan”)

JC1.2: EC cooperation objectives are consistent with the policy priorities of the Government of Liberia

I1.2.2: EC objectives reflect priorities of medium- to long-term strategies of Liberian Government (including the iPRS)

I.1.3.1: EC staff or representatives have received regular updates on the evolving situation on the ground

I1.3.2: EC staff were in regular contact with the donor and humanitarian community to coordinate their programme coverage with that of others

JC 1.3: EC mechanisms and procedures for formulating cooperation objectives allow for their accurate and timely definition and revision

I.1.3.3: Significant changes in the situation of Liberia’s population (violent conflict, changes in the security situation, cease-fires) triggered revision of EC objectives

I.1.4.1: EC CSP objectives / objectives of pre-CSP programmes are a logical subset of objectives stipulated in other relevant global development and regional strategic documents

EQ1: To what extent did EC development cooperation objectives correspond to the needs of the Liberian population, GoL development priorities and other related objectives of the European Commission, taking into account the evolving situation in Liberia?

JC 1.4: Absence of conflict between EC development objectives in Liberia and EU global and regional policies and strategic frameworks I.1.4.2: EC-Liberia cooperation policy is in line with the main EU-policies

I.2.1.1: Objectives of EC-financed DDRR programmes are derived / flow from national priorities and strategies for Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration

I.2.1.2: Programming of EC-financed DDRR interventions is guided by medium- to long-term socio-economic development prospects of relevant sections of Liberia’s society

JC 2.1: EC-financed DDRR interventions tie into a nationally-owned integrated and comprehensive framework for peace-building and long-term development

I.2.1.3: Implementation of EC-financed DDRR interventions “create linkages” with relevant national initiatives in education / training, employment generation, reconciliation, security sector and governance reform

I2.2.1: Mechanisms to coordinate inputs of DDRR stakeholders (donors, GoL) exist

I.2.2.2: Programming of EC-financed interventions is based on comprehensive view of other DDR resources and programmes

EQ2: To what extent did EC support contribute to the disarmament, demobilisation, rehabilitation and reintegration of ex-combatants in Liberia?

JC 2.2: EC-financed DDRR interventions create and take advantage of synergies with corresponding interventions of other stakeholders (donors, GoL)

I.2.2.3: M&E systems in place and adequate for assessing programme synergies and



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effectiveness of coordination



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JC 2.3: EC-financed DDRR interventions have contributed to progress in resettlement of former combatants

I.2.3.1: Change of percentage of former combatants settled in their community of choice

I.2.4.1: Change of percentage of former combatants (in particular female combatants) with employment, micro enterprises or other sustainable income generating activities

JC 2.4: EC-financed DDRR interventions have increased the viability of livelihoods of ex-combatants and their families.

I.2.4.2: Change of percentage of child soldiers (in particular female child soldiers) with access to education and / or training

I2.5.1: EC involvement advances the use of a comprehensive range of instruments for security, stability, development, democratic governance and promotion of human rights in DDRR efforts

JC 2.5: Value-Added of EC involvement in DDRR

I.2.5.2: EC-funded projects are visible and the EU is recognized as an important contributor to peace, stability and development in Liberia

I.3.1.1: Partnership Initiative for Liberia established and functioning

I.3.1.2: Strategic Framework for country support agreed

I.3.1.3: Joint Assessment by Partnership Initiative of LRRD process

I.3.1.4: Internal EC inter-service steering group for LRRD support to Liberia in place and functioning

I.3.1.5: Linkage strategy for EC LRRD support to Liberia exists

JC 3.1: Appropriateness of coordinated strategic planning for LRRD, in particular between ECHO and Europe Aid

I.3.1.6: Clear linkage of DG ECHO exit strategies to start-up of rehabilitation and development interventions

I.3.2.1: Utilisation of flexible intervention instruments such as the Emergency Reserve, the B-Envelope of EDF and the thematic budget lines, in particular the Rehabilitation Line, the NGOs Co-financing line and the Food Security Budget Line

I.3.2.2: Acceleration of procedures by applying simplified decision-making processes such as selecting implementing bodies, tendering procedures, amendments of contracts

JC 3.2: Flexibility and timeliness to react to changing conditions during implementation

I.3.2.3: Punctuality of Implementation (start of implementation, timeliness of fund allocation, disbursement)

I.3.3.1: Decrease of Humanitarian Aid projects / programmes / budgets

EQ3: To what extent has the EC been able to create appropriate linkages between humanitarian and relief operations in Liberia and its rehabilitation and development support?

JC 3.3: Stepwise transition of EC cooperation with non-governmental partners to

I.3.3.2: Support to and facilitation of government capacity development



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governmental partners I.3.3.3: Government gradually assumes state functions: NAO function transferred to GoL, increasing provision of basic services

I.3.4.1: Stated objectives of humanitarian assistance (in particular women and girls) remain satisfied in transition to rehabilitation and development assistance

JC 3.4: Needs of recipients of humanitarian assistance (in particular women and girls) remain satisfied in transition to rehabilitation and development assistance I.3.4.2: Aid flow to former recipients of EC humanitarian aid, in particular girls and women,

continue during transition to rehabilitation and development without interruption

I.4.1.1: EC programming based on adequate analysis of root causes of conflict in Liberia

I.4.1.2: Designs of EC-financed projects / programmes based on adequate analysis of root causes of conflict in Liberia

JC 4.1: EC assistance is guided by conflict prevention principles

I.4.1.3: Project monitoring, progress and evaluation reports assess effects on conditions associated with root causes of conflict.

I.4.2.1: EC assistance improves equal access to income generating opportunities

I.4.2.2: EC assistance helps to equalise access to skill-building opportunities

JC 4.2: Effect of EC assistance on equalisation of access to economic resources

I.4.2.3: EC assistance helps to equalise access to land

I.4.3.1: Administrative procedures of EC-financed projects permit and encourage the participation of beneficiaries and other interest groups

I.4.3.2: Financial (and other) information on EC-financed projects are easily accessible by the Liberian public (i.e. at no / low cost)

I.4.3.3: EC-financed projects have feedback loops in place to ensure direct accountability to beneficiaries / the Liberian public

EQ4: To what extent has EC support to Liberia contributed to the consolidation of peace and a reduced risk of future violent conflicts?

JC 4.3: EC assistance helps to strengthen/ does not weaken the democratic culture legitimacy of Liberian State

I.4.3.4: EC investigates and reacts to reports of corruption, misuse of power and favouritism

I.5.1.1: Reduced prevalence of underweight children under-five years of age (boys and girls)

JC 5.1: Evidence of decreased undernourishment in counties with EU supported food security programmes

I.5.1.2: Proportion of population (disaggregated by gender) below minimum level of dietary energy consumption

I.5.2.1: Increase in crop yields / area for the main staple foods

I.5.2.2: Increase of area of cultivated land

EQ5: To what extent has EC support, and particularly support to Food Security, contributed to an increase in food security and in food production capacity based on sustainable rural development in Liberia?

JC 5.2: Evidence of an increase in crop yields / area for the main staple foods

I.5.2.3: Increased use of improved plant material (seeds and seedlings)



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I.5.2.4: Increased livestock population

I. 5.2.5: Increased connection to road network for market access

I.5.2.6: Decrease of food aid by WFP and INGO

I.5.2.7: Increased availability of local products in national markets

I.5.2.8: Increase in number of months of food stock

I.5.3.1: EC food security priorities are reflected in programming of interventions

I.5.3.2: Particular priorities and challenges of women and girls are reflected in programming of interventions

I.5.3.3: Phasing-in / phasing-out of assistance and choice of assistance instruments based on reliable information and sound, gender-sensitive analysis (e.g. information is obtained by using the Integrated Food Security and Humanitarian Phase Classification or other relevant data assessments)

I.5.3.4: Mechanisms and procedures exist to coordinate programming and planning between FSBL, FSTP, EDF, ECHO and other budget line funded interventions with food security relevant activities

JC 5.3: EC food security strategy and other EC policies on food aid / food security, gender mainstreaming are applied throughout the relief, rehabilitation and development phases

I.5.3.5: Analysis and documentation of lessons learned from food security interventions

I.6.1.1: # of jobs created by EC-financed cash-for-work and other quick-impact programmes within 6 months / 1 year / 2 years after signing of Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)

I.6.1.2: % of youth / ex-combatants / returnees / internally displaced people in EC-financed “quick-impact” Income Generating Activities (IGA) within 6 months / 1 year / 2 years after signing of CPA

JC 6.1: Increased availability of EC-financed “quick-impact” income generating opportunities (including cash-for-work and public works programmes),

I.6.1.3: Difference in income levels with / without EC-financed quick-impact IGAs

I.6.2.1: Increase in presence of credit institutions in targeted communities (Alternative: Increase in # of EC-financed credit institutions that are operating and providing credit)

I.6.2.2: Increase in proportion of households with access to credit (Alternative: Increase in % of households serviced by EC-financed credit institutions)

I.6.2.3: Increase in proportion of households with improved cultivation equipment / tools

EQ6: To what extent has the EC successfully contributed to sustainably increasing and improving the quality of income generating opportunities in urban and rural areas, in particular for Liberia’s youth, returnees and displaced people and ex-combatants?

JC 6.2: EC-financed interventions helped to increase access to productive assets and inputs for target groups

I.6.2.4: Increase in average cultivated area for EC target groups



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I.6.2.5: Increased proportion of household with access to the cash economy

I.6.3.1: Increased % of youth / ex-combatants / returnees with vocational degree (formal and non-formal) supported by EC

JC 6.3: EC-financed interventions improved access to skill-building opportunities for target groups

I.6.3.2: Increased # of youth / ex-combatants / returnees enrolled in EC-financed skill-building activities (vocational schools, apprenticeship, etc.)

I.6.4.1: EC-financed projects aiming at income generation have conducted / are conducting environmental impact assessments

I.6.4.2: M&E systems are designed to track the effects of the financed interventions on the natural environment

JC 6.4 Environmental concerns flow into planning and implementation of EC-financed income generation initiatives

I.6.4.3: Data on environmental changes used to revise implementation of EC financed interventions, where necessary

I.7.1.1: Increase in the number of rehabilitated / reconstructed health facilities

I.7.1.2: Reduced # of patients per health facility

I.7.1.3: Increased immunization coverage among one-year olds

I.7.1.4: Increased % of children who received anti-malarial treatment for fever

JC 7.1: Health facilities in EC-supported areas in good condition and within reach of population

I.7.1.5: Decreased under 5 mortality rate

I./.2.1: Implementation of High Voltage / Medium Voltage (HV/MV) transmission grid reconstruction

I.7.2.2: Increased # of working streetlights and public lighting

JC 7.2: Increased access to electricity in urban and rural EC-supported areas

I.7.2.3: Increased # of hours of electricity supply per day

I.7.3.1: Kilometres of rehabilitated / constructed rural and feeder roads

I.7.3.2: Appropriately managed road maintenance fund in place

I.7.3.3: Roads maintained and passable during rainy season

JC 7.3: Improved conditions of rural and feeder roads in EC supported areas

I.7.3.4: Reduced travel time on rural road network / improved access to goods and services / economic benefits

EQ7: To what extent has EC support contributed to the reconstruction or expansion of social and economic infrastructure in Liberia, including power, roads, water and sanitation?

JC 7.4: Increased access to Water and Sanitation services in EC supported areas

I.7.4.1: Number / length of rehabilitated / constructed water delivery networks in cities and counties



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I.7.4.2: Increase in # of waste water treatment plants

I.7.4.3: Increase in # of households with access to improved water source

I.7.4.4: Increased % of households with access to hygienic sanitation facilities (a toilet or latrine without faeces on the floor or seat and with only few flies)

I.8.1.1: Relevant Ministries and Agencies are carrying out an increased number of tasks related to service provision and infrastructure provision

I.8.1.2: Increased number of staff positions with clearly delineated responsibilities

JC 8.1: Increased portfolio of EC-supported Government Agencies and Ministries

I.8.1.3: Gradual transfer of responsibilities from parallel structures to Government agencies and ministries

I.8.2.1: Gendered poverty diagnosis is in place in EC-supported GoL programmes that clearly identifies poor, vulnerable groups, and those lacking services

I.8.2.2: Well-defined and adequately funded interventions in place directed at assisting identified groups, in particular girls / women

JC 8.2: Target groups (incl. women / girls) benefit from increased quality of Government-provided services and infrastructure

I.8.2.3: Clients and other relevant stakeholders of EC supported GoL Agencies / Ministries are satisfied with quality of service received (either quantitative or qualitative indicator, disaggregated by gender, where applicable)

I.8.3.1: Transparent and more effective revenue collection in place (translating in increased revenues)

I.8.3.2: Reasons for decisions on resource allocations, and their results and costs, are clear and communicated to the general public

I.8.3.3: Tracking of spending on services and infrastructure (programme, category, region) in place

EQ8: To what extent has EC support to institutional reform and capacity development helped the Liberian Government to increase its capacity for adopting a legitimate role in providing key social services and infrastructure to the Liberian population?

JC 8.3: Improved accountability of EC-supported Government agents vis-à-vis their constituents

I.8.3.4: Citizens can obtain government documents at no or very low cost

I.9.1.1: # of months from signing of the financing condition to commencement of implementation

I.9.1.2: EC-financed / -pledged inputs became available “on the ground” without significant delay (at expected time)

EQ9: To what extent has the EC helped to reduce the socio-economic marginalisation of vulnerable groups in the population, identified as one of the root

JC 9.1: Timely commencement of and progression through implementation of EC financed activities in the sector

I.9.1.3: EC financed activities progressed through implementation in accordance with work plan



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I.9.2.1: Parent Teacher Associations (PTAs) exist and are active in schools with a large percentage of students from vulnerable groups

I.9.2.2: Interests of returnees, ex-combatants, in particular of women and girls, are considered in PTAs and other fora

JC 9.2: Increased involvement of EC-supported target groups / target communities in re-instalment of education services, in particular of women.

I.9.2.3: Existence of specific needs analyses targeted at youth / over-aged children, ex-combatants, returnees and women / girls

I.9.3.1: % / number of learning spaces repaired or reconstructed within 2/3/4/5 years of signing of CPA

I.9.3.2: Improved primary and secondary school net enrolment (%)

I.9.3.3: Improved gross enrolment ratio (%) in primary, secondary

I.9.3.4: Increased ratio of qualified teachers / students at schools attended by vulnerable groups (disaggregated by gender)

I.9.3.5: Increased pupil / textbook ratio available in schools attended by target groups (disaggregated by gender)

JC 9.3: Improved and gender-balanced access to “emergency” and long-term educational opportunities at primary, secondary, tertiary and vocational level

I.9.3.6: Increased % of children from vulnerable groups successfully completing primary, secondary, education (disaggregated by gender)

I.9.4.1: Increased completion rate (survival rates) of primary education/ secondary education/ vocational education (disaggregated by gender)

causes of past violent conflicts, through its support to the education sector?

JC 9.4: Increased economic utility of education and educational content for economic and social advancement of learners, including improved employability (quality) I.9.4.2: Women and men from vulnerable and excluded groups are attracted to formal

education as a tool for socio-economic advancement

I10.1.1: Flow of secondary commitments and disbursements (signing of contracts) over time

I10.1.2: Project documents pass through / are processed by EC structures without delay (i.e., at anticipated rate)

JC 10.1: EC organisational resources and EC capacity in Liberia can respond to organisational demands of chosen cooperation frameworks and implementation mechanisms on EC structures

I10.1.3: Counterparts and partners received support and other inputs from EC in adequate (previously anticipated) scope and scale

EQ10: To what extent have chosen cooperation frameworks and implementation mechanisms allowed adequate use of EC resources to facilitate the intended results of EC assistance to Liberia? JC 10.2: Choice of cooperation frameworks

and implementation mechanisms shows / I10.2.1: Existence of adequate risk analyses in financing conditions / agreements, contracts, project documents of implementing partners or other cooperation agreements



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I10.2.2: Projects and programmes have in place adequate risk management strategies to respond to (previously identified and analysed – see Indicator 10.2.1) risks

allows adequate anticipation / response of / to external risks, i.e., resulting from political fragility

I10.2.3: Projects and programmes react to risk events as they occur

I10.3.1: Comparative average “unit costs” of selected EC-financed outputs, e.g. “cost per reconstructed learning space”; “cost per community well”, etc.

I10.3.2: Ratio of “invested amount” to “overhead” (e.g. per programme)

JC 10.3: Adequacy of cost/ output ratios (compared to country specific benchmarks)

I10.3.3: EC and its partners used adequate processes (e.g. competitive tendering) to avoid misuse of funds and maximise results per € spent.



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8 TOR FOR THE EVALUATION

EUROPEAN COMMISSION

Evaluation of the European Commission’s co-operatio n

with Liberia

Country Level Evaluation

TERMS OF REFERENCE

Final



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MANDATE AND OBJECTIVES

Systematic and timely evaluation of its expenditure programmes is a priority of the European Commission (EC). It is a key to account for the management of the allocated funds and for promoting a lesson-learning culture throughout the organisation. The focus is on the impact (effects) of these programmes against a background of greater concentration of external co-operation and increasing emphasis on result-oriented approaches , particularly in the context of the programmes of the Relex Family561.

The evaluation of the Commission’s co-operation with Liberia is part of the 2009 evaluation programme as approved by External Relations and Development Commissioners.

The main objectives of the evaluation are:

− To provide the relevant external co-operation services of the EC and the wider public with an overall independent assessment of the Commission’s past and current cooperation relations with Liberia ;

− To identify key lessons in order to improve the current and future strategies and programmes of the Commission.

BACKGROUND

EC Cooperation objectives

- The European Union's co-operation policy is based on Article 177 of the Treaty establishing the European Community (EC). It determines that the sphere of development co-operation shall have three objectives namely: fostering sustainable development of developing countries; assisting the smooth and gradual integration of the developing countries into the world economy and campaigning against poverty in the developing countries.

- These objectives have been confirmed and reinforced in Article 1 of the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement, signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000, which puts a major emphasis on the objective of reducing and eventually eradicating poverty. Co-operation between the Community and the Republic of Liberia shall pursue these objectives, taking into account fundamental principles laid down in Article 2 of the Agreement, especially the principle of encouragement of development strategies by the countries and populations concerned, and essential and fundamental elements as defined in Article 9.

- In November 2000, the Council and the Commission endorsed a Development Policy Declaration that identifies six priority themes/areas. These are: Trade and Development; Regional Integration and Co-operation; Support to Macro-economic Policies linked to Social Sector Programmes; Transport; Sustainable Rural Development and Food Security; and Institutional Capacity Building, Good Governance and the Rule of Law. Environment and Gender are considered as crosscutting issues, which need to be integrated into all these six themes in order to make development sustainable.

- The EC has made Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRS) the point of departure for its Country Strategy Papers (CSP) in all countries that have/produce a PRSP (Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper).

The PRSP approach, with its six principles (national ownership, results focus, comprehensive, prioritised, long-term, and partnership-oriented) forms the core for donor support, and the common framework within which all stakeholders supporting poverty reduction in a country are expected to work.



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- Furthermore the CSP is the culmination of a joint programming process, which started with the launching of the Cotonou Agreement in January 2001 and involved many actors (the European Commission, EU Member States, the Government, civil society and the private sector).

- The overall policy objectives towards Africa are stated in the 2005 Communication (COM /2005/489 final). The document gives a comprehensive, integrated and long-term framework for the EU relations with Africa.

- "The European Consensus "562 presents common objectives and principles for development co-operation (poverty eradication, ownership, partnership, delivering more and better aid, promoting policy coherence for development) as well as it sets out the renewed European Community Development Policy.

Context of the country

- The Republic of Liberia (capital Monrovia) is situated on the west coast of Africa, bordered by Sierra Leone, Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire and the Atlantic Ocean. The population is around 3, 5 million people (census 2008) and the area is around 110.000 square kilometres.

- This country has a hot equatorial climate with most rainfall arriving in summer with harsh winds in dry season.

- The Liberia economy depends heavily on iron ore and rubber exports, foreign direct investment and export of other natural resources such as timber

- The history is unique among African nations because of its relationship with the United States. Settlement of slaves from the US began in 1822.The Republic of Liberia was established by 1847.

- In 1980, a military coup led by Samuel Doe ushered in a decade of authoritarian rule. In December 1989, Charles Taylor launched a rebellion that led to a prolonged civil war in which Doe was killed. After a relative peace, major fighting resumed in 2000.In August 2003, a peace agreement ended the war. After 2 years of rule by a transitional government, democratic elections in late 2005 brought Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf (the sole women head of state in Africa) to power. She launched an ambitious transitional and development programme, stating transparency and anti-corruption as the main items on her agenda.

- The UN Mission (UNMIL) maintains a strong presence throughout the country but the security situation is still fragile and the process of rebuilding the social and economic structure of this war-torn country will take many years.

- However, Liberia’s conflict makes achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) a daunting challenge that will require more than the pre-war rates of growth and more rapid progress over the next ten years than anywhere else in the world. Moreover, the war essentially ended human capital formation and resulted in the mass exodus of skilled workers. The country’s infrastructure is completely destroyed and the state incapable, given the lack of financial and human resources, to provide basic services to the population. Despite richness in natural resources such as timber, iron ore or diamonds, government revenues will remain insufficient to meet the needs of the country.

- The New Government of Liberia (NGoL) launched, mainly for HIPC purposes, an Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy (iPRS) for a 24-month period starting July 2006 that is centred on consolidating national peace and positioning the nation on a path of sustained poverty reduction through economic growth and human development. A full PRS was adopted in



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June 2008 covering the period until June 2011. It has 4 pillars: (i) consolidating peace and security, (ii) revitalising the economy, (iii) strengthening governance and the rule of law (iv) rehabilitating infrastructure and delivering basic services.

- The country’s needs are enormous but donors are few, even if the interest is increasing at European and international level. National revenues are limited but the Government is actively encouraging the private sector. Capacity is in short supply given the post-conflict setting. It is clear that the country mainly remains in a rehabilitation phase and that various areas of the country still need to be viewed as being in an emergency situation.

Main features on evolution of the EC cooperation wi th the country

- EC support to Liberia since 1990 amounts to more than 184, 9 M€ committed under the 6th to 9th EDF and more than 55 M€ from the Budget which have been mainly directed towards humanitarian assistance, disarmament, support to ex-combatants reinsertion, and rehabilitation.

- Under the second financial protocol of Lomé IV (1996- 2001), the 8th EDF, the cooperation evolved away from the provision of essential supplies and services towards sustainable solutions based on institutional reform and cost recovery.

- A large Rehabilitation Programme (27 M€) providing post-humanitarian aid was funded between 1997 and 2001. In parallel, ECHO and the Food Security budgetary line, as well as some projects financed by NGO co-financing provided important support, focusing on humanitarian assistance, food security and rehabilitation mainly for the one million internally and externally displaced Liberians.

- A Reintegration Programme for Returnees and displaced people in Liberia (25 M€) was financed under Article 255. It aimed to find sustainable solutions based on institutional reform and cost recovery. It had 3 components: Health sector – Local Community Development – Electricity and Water.

- Support under the 9th EDF, currently under implementation, is detailed in the first Country Strategy Paper (CSP) including the National Indicative Programme (NIP) covering the period 2002-2007.The total amount was 68 M€ ( A envelope : 44 M€ and B envelope: 24 M€ ) There were 2 focal sectors :County development ( 25 M€ )and Education ( 12 M€ ). The balance of the A envelope was devoted to electricity and TCF (7 M€).

- On 25 August 2003, a Council decision made available another amount of 50 M€ for the 2003-2009 period to support the Liberian Peace Process following the signing of the Accra Peace Agreement. This amount is divided in 2 projects: Post-Conflict Rehabilitation and Capacity-Building Programme (45 M€) and Support to the Peace Process in Liberia (5 M€).

- Under the 10h EDF, the CSP, including a NIP, signed in December 2007, is covering the period 2008-2013 with a budget allocation of 161,8M€ ( A envelope : 150 M€ - B envelope : 11, 8 M€ ).

In line with the GoL development policy and the EU Strategy for Africa, under the 10th EDF, it is foreseen to follow a flexible approach of Linking Relief Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD) in the context of Post-Conflict fragile States.

Rehabilitation (basic physical infrastructure and provision of social services – 125 M€) and Governance (institutional support and capacity building – 20 M€) will be the key drivers of this needed flexible LRRD strategy. Furthermore, delivery in basic social sectors such as education and health should contribute to bridging the existing and wide gap between the



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emergency and sustainable development phases. For non-focal sectors (5M€), it is foreseen TCF and support for Non-State Actors.

Under the AAP 2008, € 3.15 million has been committed to a new TCF and € 8 million contribution towards multilateral debt arrears clearance to the AfDB. Under the AAP 2009, it is proposed to contribute €60.2 million to infrastructure, mainly road rehabilitation, through a Trust Fund with the World Bank, and € 20 million to support the national health plan.

Finally, the more flexible procedures (Article 73 of the Cotonou Agreement) applied to an immediate post-conflict country should always be considered in Liberia.

- EIB: Due the situation prevailing in this country, there was no support from EIB during the last 10 years.

- Regional Funds (West Africa Region): The country has received regional funds to support the West Africa Power Pool programme.

Other sources of information

More information on EC relations with Liberia and further details on projects and programmes are available on the website of the EC Delegation to Liberia.

SCOPE

Temporal and legal scope

The period to be covered by this evaluation is 1999-2008 (the last 10 years).

The scope of the evaluation is the Commission’s co-operation :

- Strategies during the period563, i.e. the two previous programming cycles and the current one.

- Implementation during the period 1999 -2008

The Consultants must assess:

– the relevance and coherence564 of the Commission’s co-operation strategies (all instruments included) for the period;

– the European Community value added of the Commission’s co-operation strategies ; coherence within the Commission's developments programme, the coordination/complementarities and coherence with the partner country's policies and with other donors' interventions (focus on Member States) for the same period; the consistency between programming and implementation for the previous programming cycle ;

– the implementation of the Commission’s co-operation, focusing on impact, sustainability, effectiveness and efficiency for the period 1999 - 2008 and on intended effects for the period under the current programming cycle 2008 – 2013.



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Thematic scope

The Consultants must assess the following co-operation areas:

• Programmes functioning through a civil war and a fragile state;

• Post conflict rehabilitation programme ( including county development and notably in the sector of education);

• Capacity building programmes;

• Support to Peace Process;

• LRRD ( coordination/continuity with ECHO actions);

• Specific actions devoted to a post crisis State (Post conflict programmes, humanitarian assistance, and food security).

A Thematic Evaluation of the EC support to Conflict Prevention and Peace Building is currently on process. The consultants will coordinate with this evaluation. They will assess if relevant instructions regarding "conflict prevention/peace building" are correctly applied565.

NB: All completed evaluations (incl. regional ones) in the country related to EC interventions at project and program level are important reference material to be taken into account. The Consultants should not deal with the points already covered by these evaluations, but build on them.

KEY DELIVERABLES

The overall methodological guidance to be used is available on the web page of the Europe Aid evaluation unit under the following address: http://ec.europa.eu/comm/europeaid/evaluation/methodology2/index_en.htm

Within 14 days after the reception of the ToR, the Consultants will present a launch note 566 which should contain:

• their understanding of the ToR;

• a methodological note including the implementation of the quality control;

• the provisional composition of the evaluation team with CVs567;

• a proposed budget568.

Following the launch note, the main key deliverables are:

• The inception meeting;

• The inception report;

• The desk report;

• The final reports and seminar in the country.

The inception meeting

Upon approval of the launch note by the Evaluation Unit, the Consultant proceeds to the structuring stage leading to the production of an inception report.

The main part of the work consists in the analysis of all key relevant documents regarding the Commission’s co-operation (past and present) with Liberia. The Consultants will also take into account the documentation produced by other donors and international agencies.

On the basis of the information collected and analysed, the Consultants will propose evaluation questions and prepare explanatory comments for each. The choice of the



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questions determines the subsequent phases of information and data collection, elaboration of the methods of analysis, and elaboration of final judgements. The consultants will also identify appropriate judgement criteria.

A meeting will be held with the reference group to discuss and validate:

- The evaluation's regulatory framework, its context, main users and expected uses;

- The evaluation's central scope;

- The scope extended to related policies;

- The intervention logic according to official documents;

- The evaluation questions;

- Explanatory comments associated to each evaluation questions (when possible, indicate judgement criteria).

Upon validation by the Reference Group, the evaluation questions become part of the ToR.

Inception report

At the end of the inception phase, the consultants must deliver an inception report, which finalises the evaluation questions and describes the main lines of the methodological design including the indicators to be used, the strategy of analysis and a detailed work plan for the next stage.

The inception report contains the following elements:

• the intervention logic;

• the validated evaluation questions;

• a limited number of appropriate judgment criteria per evaluation question;

• a limited number of quantitative and/or qualitative indicators related to each judgment criterion;

• a proposal containing suitable working methods to collect data and information in the Commission’s headquarters and delegations, including information coming from the country itself and other donors in the country;

• a first outline of the strategy and the methods used to analyse the collected data and information indicating any limitations;

• a chain of reasoning for answering the question;

• a concise description of the development co-operation context of the Commission with Liberia related to the evaluation questions;

• a detailed work plan for the next stage.

The report will also confirm if necessary:

• The final composition of the evaluation team and

• The final work plan and schedule.

The two latter points will be agreed and confirmed through a formal exchange of letters between the Consultants and the Commission.

This phase may include a short preparatory and exploratory visit of the Consultants to the field.



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Desk report

Upon approval of the inception report the Consultants proceed to the final stage of the desk phase. At the end of this phase, the Consultants will present a desk report setting out the results of this phase of the evaluation including all the following listed elements (the major part of the inception report will be in the annex of the desk phase report):

• the evaluation questions with the agreed judgement criteria and its quantitative and qualitative indicators;

• the first elements of answer to the evaluation questions when available and the hypotheses to be tested in the field;

• Progress in the gathering of data. The complementary data needed for the analysis and to be collected in the field have to be identified;

• methodological design, including evaluation tools ready to be applied in the field phase: (i) suitable methods of data collection within the country indicating any limitations, describing how the data should be cross-checked and specifying the sources, (ii) appropriate methods for data collection and to analyse the information, again indicating any limitations of those methods in Liberia;

• an exhaustive list of all the activities covered during the period and an exhaustive list of all activities examined during the desk phase, bearing in mind that activities analysed in the desk phase and the field phase (including ROM) have to be representative;

• A work plan for the field phase: a list with brief descriptions of activities, projects and programmes for in-depth analysis in the field. The consultants must explain the value added of the visits.

The field mission cannot start before the evaluatio n manager has approved the desk report. There is a newly installed full Delegation in Liberia. During the last years, the operations were followed by the Delegation in Ivory Coast. Therefore, it is necessary for the consultant to foresee in its offer a briefi ng and a debriefing mission in Abidjan at the occasion of the field mission in Liberia

Field reporting

The fieldwork shall be undertaken on the basis set out in the desk report and approved by the reference group (which includes the Delegation). The work plan and schedule of the mission are agreed in advance with the Delegation. If during the course of the fieldwork it appears necessary to deviate from the agreed approach and/or schedule, the Consultants must ask the approval of the Evaluation Unit before any changes may be applied.

At the conclusion of the field study the Consultants present the preliminary findings of the evaluation:

(1) Presentation during a de-briefing meeting with the Delegation;

(2) Presentation to the reference group shortly after their return from the field.

Final reports and seminar in the country

The Draft Final Report



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The Consultants will submit the draft final report in conformity with the structure set out in annex 2. Comments received during de-briefing meetings with the Delegation and the reference group must be taken into consideration.

The Consultants may either accept or reject the comments but in case of rejection they must justify (in writing) the reasons for rejection (the comments and the Consultants’ responses are annexed to the report). If the Consultants don't want to include them in the report, they must explain in a separate document the reasons why.

If the evaluation manager considers the report to be of sufficient quality (cf. annex 3), he/she will circulate it for comments to the reference group. The reference group will convene to discuss it in the presence of the evaluation team.

A presentation (ppt) presenting for every question 4-5 slides on:

• The theory of action (part of the intervention logic concerned) with the Localisation of the EQ;

• One table with Judgement criteria and indicators; • Findings (related to JC and Indicators) and their limits; • Conclusions and recommendations.

The Seminar

The Consultants will make the appropriate amendments based on comments expressed by the reference group and the Evaluation Unit. The revised draft final report will be presented at a seminar in Liberia. The purpose of the seminar is to present the results, the conclusions and the preliminary recommendations of the evaluation to the National Authorities, the Delegation as well as to all the main stakeholders concerned (EU Member States, representatives of civil society organisations and other donors).

The Consultants shall prepare a presentation (Powerpoint) for the seminar. This presentation shall be considered as a product of the evaluation in the same way as the reports and the data basis. For the seminar 60 copies of the report and 10 reports with full printed annexes (see annex 2 of the ToR) have to be produced.

The Final presentation will include slides for:

• Context of the evaluation; • Intervention logic and focus of questions; • Answers to the evaluation questions; • Conclusions and; • Recommendations;

The Consultants shall prepare the minutes of the seminar and provide them to the Joint Evaluation Unit one week after the date of the seminar.

The Final Report

The Consultants will prepare the final report based on the comments expressed at the seminar and on the basis of further comments from the reference group, the Delegation and/or the evaluation manager. The presentation (Power point) will be revised in accordance to the final report.

110 copies of the Final Main Report must be sent to the Evaluation Unit with an additional 10 reports with all printed annexes. A CD-Rom with the Final Main Report and annexes has to be added to each printed report.

The evaluators have to hand over on an appropriate support (electronic or paper) all relevant data gathered during the evaluation.



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The contractor shall submit a methodological note explaining how the quality control and the capitalisation of lessons learned have been addressed.

The Evaluation Unit makes a formal judgement on the quality of the evaluation (cf. annex 3).

EVALUATION QUESTIONS

The evaluation will be based on the seven evaluation criteria: relevance, impact, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, coherence and the EC value added. The first five correspond to the traditional practice of evaluation of development aid and have been formalised by the OECD (DAC). The following two apply to all EC policies. The criteria will be given different weightings based on the priority accorded to the evaluation questions.

In general, questions (to a maximum of 10) will refer to the following main areas:

• Relevance of the strategy/programme : this includes both relevance to the general objectives of the EC and relevance to the needs and priorities of Liberia (including the choice of target groups).

• Design and coherence 569 of the intervention strategy/programme: this mainly concerns the extent to which the resources foreseen were adequate in relation to the objectives set out in the programming documents.

• Consistency of the implementation in relation to th e strategy: the Consultants shall verify the extent to which the work plan, schedule and implementation of the activities (all types of interventions, geographical and sector distribution, instruments, aid delivery channels included) were consistent with the strategy. They shall demonstrate who were the real beneficiaries, direct or indirect, of the intervention and compare them to the target population(s) in the programming documents.

The Consultants will also verify the extent to which the intervention modalities (instruments, aid delivery channels, etc.) were appropriate to the objectives.

• Achievement of main impacts/effects: the Consultants shall identify all recorded results and impacts, including any unintended ones, and compare these to the intended results and/or impacts. The Consultants will also identify the changes, which occurred in the areas in which EC programmes were supposed to produce an impact.

� Efficiency of the implementation: for the activities which were effective, it will be necessary to question to what extent funding, human resources, regulatory and/or administrative resources contributed to, or hindered the achievement of the objectives and results.

• Sustainability of the effects: an analysis of the extent to which the results and impacts are being, or are likely to be maintained over time.

� Key cross-cutting issues: for example gender, environment and climate change, human rights, HIV and AIDS, poverty, institutional capacity building, etc. Verification should be undertaken, on the one hand, of the extent to which account has been taken of these priorities in the programming documents and, on the other hand, to what extent these issues have been reflected in the implementation modalities and in the effects of the intervention.

� The 3Cs (co-ordination, complementarities and coherence) : co-ordination / complementarities with EU Members States and other donors; coherence with EU policies (including the Member States' own policies and eventual interventions of the EIB) and complementarities/coherence of the Community’s instruments (centralised and decentralised) .

� Value added of the EC interventions: The extent to which the development intervention adds benefits to what would have resulted from Member States' interventions only in the



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partner country. The criterion is closely related to the principle of "subsidiarity" and relates to the extra-benefit the activity/operation generates due to the fact that it was financed/implemented through the EC.

There may be three practical elements to illustrate possible aspects of the criterion:

1) The EC has a particular advantage over Member States and how far is that visible;

2) The EC has a particular mandate in the framework of the '3Cs' and can draw Member States to a greater effort together;

3) EC cooperation is guided by a common political agenda embracing all Member States and how far is that visible.

RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE MANAGEMENT AND THE MONITORIN G OF THE EVALUATION

The Evaluation Unit (AIDCO 03) is responsible for the management and monitoring of the evaluation with the assistance of the reference group.

Information will be given to the Consultants after the signature of the contract concerning the documents referred in Annex 1.

THE EVALUATION TEAM

The evaluation team should possess a sound knowledge and experience in:

− evaluation methods and techniques in general and, if possible, in the field of development cooperation;

− Liberia;

− The following fields: Rehabilitation/ LRRD, conflict prevention, institutional support and local community development. It is not foreseen to assess the operations financed by ECHO in the frame of this evaluation

− the following language(s): English ( and French for the Team Leader)

The Evaluation Unit strongly recommends that the evaluation team should include consultants from the country or the region (notably, but not only, during the field phase) with in-depth knowledge of key areas of the evaluation. Consultants must be strictly neutral. Conflicts of interests must be avoided. It is highly recommended at least for the team leader to be fully familiar with the methodological approach set by the EC.

TIMING

After the approval of the launch note and the signature of the contract, the timing of activities will be set according to the following indicative work plan.

The dates mentioned in the following section may be changed with the agreement of all concerned.

Evaluation Phases and Stages

Notes and Reports Dates Meetings/Communications

Desk Phase

Structuring Stage

Short presentation (logical diagram and

Late Jan. – early Feb. 2010

RG Meeting



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EQ) Draft Inception Report First week of

March2010 Optional: Short preparatory visit of the consultants to the field.

Final Inception Report

April 2010 A formal exchange of letters between the Consultants and the Commission confirms the final composition of the evaluation team and the final work plan and schedule.

Desk Study Draft Desk Report May 2010 RG Meeting Final Desk Report June

2010

Field Phase June 2010 De-briefing meeting with the Delegation.

Presentation End June 2010 RG Meeting Synthesis phase (seminar in the country)

1st draft Final report Sept. 2010 RG Meeting Revised draft Final

report Oct. 2010 Seminar in Liberia

60 copies of the report and 10 reports with full printed annexes.

Final Main Report Nov. 2010 110 copies of the Final Main Report must be sent to the Evaluation Unit. Additional 10 reports with all printed annexes must be sent to the Evaluation Unit as well.

NB: A country level evaluation takes about 12 months between signature of contract and approval of the final report.



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COST OF THE EVALUATION

The overall costs include:

• The evaluation as such;

• 2.5% of the total budget excluding the costs of the seminar are to be used for quality control ;

• A seminar in the country.

The total of these 3 elements must not exceed € 200.000.

NB: The budget for the seminar (fees, per diems and travel) will be presented separately in the launch note.

Payments Modalities

The payments modalities shall be as follows:

- 30% on acceptance of the Inception Report, plus 2.5% of the agreed budget to be used for quality control;

- 50% on acceptance of the Draft Final Report;

- The balance on acceptance of the final report.

Seminar related costs are to be invoiced and paid separately.



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ANNEX 1: indicative documentation for the evaluation

General documentation

- Communications of the Commission;

- Various regulations.

Country

- CRIS570 (information on the projects and annual ROM571) and other databases concerning the financed projects, centralised projects, engagements, payments, etc;

- Cooperation strategies;

- Conclusions of the Mid-term and End-of-Term Reviews;

- Key government documents of planning and policy;

- Evaluation reports of the projects;

- Relevant documentation provided by the local authorities and other local partners, and financial backers, etc.

The three following documents are to be handed to the Consultants:

1- On access to the information contained by the ROM system for an evaluation;

2- Methodological note from Euréval concerning North-South approach to country level evaluations;

3- Template for Cover page.

In addition, the consultant will have to consult the documentation available on Internet (DAC/OCDE and EU Inventory websites in particular) as well as the documentation listed or available within the Evaluation Unit (AIDCO/0/3 Library).

Some websites:

- OECD: http://www.oecd.org/infobycountry

- WB: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXTN

- CIA: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos

Some recent documents on Liberia:

DAC:

http://www.oecd.org/infobycountry/0,3380,en_35038640_35039563_1_70582_35170118_1_1,00.html

World Bank:

http://web.worldbank.org/external/default/main?IegSimpleSearch=TRUE&menuPK=64855087&pagePK=51631225&piPK=64855131&theSitePK=1324361&query=liberia



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DG DEV:

http://ec.europa.eu/development/geographical/regionscountries/countries/country_profile.cfm?cid=lr&type=short&lng=en

Database MS:

http://ec.europa.eu/comm/dg/aidco/ms_ec_evaluations_inventory/evaluationslist.cfm?x_Country=123&z_Country=AND%2C%20%2C%20

Table "Countries visited":

http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/evaluation_reports/reports_by_country_region_en.htm#visited

Table "Sectors":

http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/evaluation_reports/reports_by_theme_sector_en.htm#sectors_covered

Annex 2: Overall Structure of the Final Report

The overall layout of the report is:

• Final report



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- Summary

- Context of the evaluation

- Answers to the evaluation questions

- Conclusions (1)

- Recommendations (2)

Length: the final report must be kept short (70 pages maximum excluding annexes). Additional information regarding the context, the programme and the comprehensive aspects of the methodology and of the analysis will be put in the annexes.

(1) Conclusions

– The conclusions have to be assembled by homogeneous "clusters" (groups). It is not required to set out the conclusions according to the 5 DAC criteria;

– The chapter on "Conclusions" has to contain a paragraph or a sub-chapter with the 3 to 4 principal conclusions presented in order of importance;

– The chapter on "Conclusions" must also make it possible to identify subjects, for which there are good practices and the subjects, for which it is necessary to think about modifications or re-orientations;

(2) Recommendations

– Recommendations have to be linked to the conclusions without being a direct copy of them;

– Recommendations have to be treated on a hierarchical basis and prioritised within the various clusters (groups) of presentation selected;

– Recommendations have to be realistic, operational and feasible. As far as it is practicable, the possible conditions of implementation have to be specified;

– The chapter on "Recommendations" has to contain a sub-chapter or a specific paragraph corresponding to the paragraph with the 3 to 4 principal conclusions. Therefore, for each conclusion, options for action and the conditions linked to each action as well as the likely consequences should be set out.

• Annexes (non exhaustive) - National background

- Methodological approach

- Information matrix

- Monograph, case studies

- List of institutions and persons met

- List of documents consulted

- List of centralised projects

- List of decentralised projects

NOTE ON THE EDITING OF REPORTS

- The final report must:



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� be consistent, concise and clear; � be well balanced between argumentation, tables and graphs; � be free of linguistic errors; � include a table of contents indicating the page number of all the chapters

listed therein, a list of annexes (whose page numbering shall continue from that in the report) and a complete list in alphabetical order of any abbreviations in the text;

� Contain one (or several) summaries presenting the main ideas. For example, the answers to the evaluation question and the main conclusions could be summarised and presented in a box.

- The executive summary has to be very short (max. 5 pages);

- The final version of the report shall be typed in 1, 5 lines spacing and printed double sided, in DIN-A-4 format;

- The font shall be easy to read (indicative size of the font: Times New Roman 12);

- The presentation shall be well spaced (the use of graphs, tables and small paragraphs is strongly recommended). The graphs must be clear (shades of grey produce better contrasts on a black and white printout);

- The main report shall not exceed 70 pages including the cover page, the table of content, the lists of annexes and abbreviations. The annexes shall not be too long;

- The content must have a good balance between main report and annexes;

- Reports shall be glued or stapled; plastic spirals are not acceptable due to storage problems.

For the Cover page, please use the template mentioned in Annex 1.

Please, note that:

- The Consultant is responsible for the quality of translations and their conformity with the original;

- All data produced in the evaluation are property of the EC.



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ANNEX 3 - QUALITY ASSESSMENT GRID

Concerning these criteria, the evaluation report is:

Unacceptable Poor Good

Very goo

d

Excellent

1. Meeting needs: Does the evaluation adequately address the information needs of the commissioning body and fit the terms of reference?

2. Relevant scope: Is the rationale of the policy examined and its set of outputs, results and outcomes/impacts examined fully, including both intended and unexpected policy interactions and consequences?

3. Defensible design: Is the evaluation design appropriate and adequate to ensure that the full set of findings, along with methodological limitations, is made accessible for answering the main evaluation questions?

4. Reliable data: To what extent are the primary and secondary data selected adequate? Are they sufficiently reliable for their intended use?

5. Sound analysis: Is quantitative information appropriately and systematically analysed according to the state of the art so that evaluation questions are answered in a valid way?

6. Credible findings: Do findings follow logically from, and are they justified by, the data analysis and interpretations based on carefully described assumptions and rationale?

7. Validity of the conclusions: Does the report provide clear conclusions? Are conclusions based on credible results?

8. Usefulness of the recommendations: Are recommendations fair, unbiased by personnel or shareholders’ views, and sufficiently detailed to be operationally applicable?

9. Clearly reported: Does the report clearly describe the policy being evaluated, including its context and purpose, together with the procedures and findings of the evaluation, so that information provided can easily be understood?

Taking into account the contextual constraints on the evaluation, the overall quality rating of the report is considered.



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9 PPT SLIDES FOR THE SEMINAR AND ITS MINUTES

Slide No. 1Monrovia, October 2010 Country Level Evaluation Liberia, Dissemination Seminar

Country Level Evaluation Liberia

Dissemination SeminarMonrovia, October 27, 2010

EVA 2007/GEO-ACP Consortium:

Country Level Evaluation Liberia, Dissemination Seminar Slide No. 2Monrovia, October 2010

Overview and purpose of the seminar

• Present– Findings for the 10 Evaluation

Questions– Principal and Complementary

Conclusions – Recommendations

• Discuss findings, conclusions and recommendations!

• Collect feedback to be integrated into final report


EC commitments to Liberia (2000 –2008)

EC Grant Commitments to Liberia, 1999-2008

0,35

22,34

5,33

65,24

24,82

54,4949,88

82,03

40,75

0102030405060708090

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

$ in

Mio


EC disbursements (payments) to Liberia (1999 – 2008)

0

5,000,000

10,000,000

15,000,000

20,000,000

25,000,000

30,000,000

35,000,000

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Eu

ro

Calendar Years

EC Payments 1999 - 2008 - by main commitments

2nd Rehabilitation Programme EDF8 Reintegration

Other Post Conflict Rehabilitation / Capacity Building

ECHO


Defining the scope of the evaluation (1)

Implement the Strategy

EvaluationCountry Strategy Evaluation

“How well was the strategy designed and implemented?”

„What lessons are to be learned for future strategy a

and programming?“

!

Country Strategy Paper


Defining the scope of the evaluation (2)

Analysis and “reconstruction” of EC cooperation strategy

Analysis of the context of EC cooperation

Identification of critical aspects to be assessed

Evaluation Criteria and

issues10 Evaluation

Questions

EC strategic docs.(Country

Strategy Paper, etc.)

Governmental strategy

documents

Analysis of activities of

other donors

Academic and “gray” literature

Other sources...


To what end joint

“contribution”was to be utilised by Liberian

stakeholders...

How EC contribution was to be

“taken up” by Government...

... to reduce poverty...

EC activities ImpactsUptake by Government

What the EC had pledged to do...

Results

How that was meant to help

Liberian society

overall...

Analysing and reconstruction the EC strategy

Slide No. 8Country Level Evaluation Liberia, Dissemination SeminarMonrovia, October 2010

Intervention Logic and Evaluation QuestionsEC activities ImpactsResults

Consolidated EC Intervention Logic, 1999 –2007 (EDF8 and EDF9)

Legend




Th

emat

ic B

udge

tline

s(o

ther

than

FS

BL)

Post Conflict Rehabilitation and Capacity Building Progr. -Institutional Support- Supporting DDR (via NDDRRP)- Community Development(2003 –2011, € 43.1M)

Support to Peace Process (ECOWAS) (2003–2006, €8M)

Demobilisation and Reintegration (UNDP DDRR trust fund) (2005–2011, €9.1M).

Reintegration f. Returnees and displaced people (2001 –2005, € 20.6M)

“2nd Rehabilitation Programme” (1999 - 2001, € 25M)

Emergency Power Monrovia (2003-2007, € 0.92M)

Social / economic welfare improved

Risk of further armed conflicts reduced

Health outcomes of public health system improved; water borne diseases reduced


Governmental organisational capacity at community, county and national / federal level improved

Access to basic health, water and sanitation, electricity services improved

Road infrastructure improved

Po

verty alleviated &

peace an

d d

emocratic

pro

cesses consolidated

Cease fire maintained and stabilised / stability improved






County Development (2007 –2013, €25M )

Education (2007 – 2013, €12M)

Macro-econ. support (€ 3.4M) clearing of EIB arrears

Non-focal sectors (2007 –2013, €7.4M) Capacity Building, PFM

Access to Education improved

Coherence of planning / implementation in Liberian public sector improved

Educational outcomes improved




Reintegration of returnees, ex-combatants, etc. improved

Income generating opportunities improved


EQ2

EQ3

EQ4

EQ6

EQ7

EQ8

EQ9

Food Security Budget Line Food Security ImprovedEQ5





Evaluation Questions: Overview

• EQ 1: Correspondence EC objectives & needs• EQ 2: Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation and

Reintegration (DDRR)• EQ 3: Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development

(LRRD)• EQ 4: Peace-Building and Conflict Prevention• EQ 5: Food Security• EQ 6: Income Generation• EQ 7: Infrastructure (Health, WatSan, Roads, Power)• EQ 8: Capacity Building• EQ 9: Education• EQ10: Implementation mechanisms / Cooperation

FrameworkCountry Level Evaluation Liberia, Dissemination Seminar Slide No. 10Monrovia, October 2010

Answering the Evaluation Questions

Indicator 1.1.1

Indicator 1.1.2

Indicator 1.2.1

Indicator 1.3.1

Indicator 1.1.3

Indicator 1.2.2

Indicator 1.3.2

Indicator 1.4.1

Indicator 1.4.2

Judgment Criterion 1.1




Evaluation Question 1: To what extent did EC support contribute to....


Approach to Triangulation in this Evaluation

▲= Primary Sources (Interviews, Focus Groups), O = Secondary Sources (Evaluations, studies, project reports)

Evaluation Question

Deleg

ation

Nationa

l

Gov

ernm

ent

Sub

-nationa

l

Gov

ernm

ent

Civil Soc

iety

Priv

ate Sec

tor

Ben

eficiarie

s

Other

don

ors

Data collection methods

1. Relevance ▲O ▲O ▲O O ▲O ▲ ▲O Document analysis, interviews

2. DDRR ▲O ▲O ▲ ▲ O ▲O ▲O Document analysis, interviews, field visits, focus groups

3. LRRD ▲O ▲O ▲O ▲ ▲ Data and document analysis, focus groups, interviews, field visit

4. Peace-building ▲O ▲O ▲ ▲ ▲ ▲ ▲O

Data and document analysis, interviews, field visits, interviews

5. Food Security ▲O ▲O ▲ ▲O ▲ ▲ ▲O Data and document analysis, interviews, focus groups, field visit

6. Income Generation ▲O ▲O ▲ ▲O ▲ ▲O

Data and document analysis, interviews, focus groups, field visits

7. Infrastructure ▲O ▲O ▲O ▲ ▲ ▲O Data and document analysis, field visit, interviews, focus group

8. Capacity Building ▲O ▲O ▲ ▲ ▲ ▲O

Data and document analysis, field visit, interviews

9. Education ▲O ▲O ▲O ▲ ▲O Data and document analysis, interviews

10. Cooperation Frameworks / Mechanisms

▲O ▲O ▲ ▲O

Data and document analysis, interviews


Data collection for the evaluation

• In-depth document analysis (project, evaluations, other literature...)

• Country visit (June 2010)– Interviews in Monrovia and beyond– Visited project sites in Bomi, Bong, Montserrado /

Greater Monrovia and Nimba Counties• 2nd Rehabilitation Programme (1999 – 2001)• Reintegration Programme for Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons

(2001 – 2006)• Post-Conflict Rehabilitation and Capacity Development Programme• Various Food Security Interventions (Food Facility, FSBL)

– Focus Groups with Beneficiaries:• Community Rehabilitation Component of Post Conflict

Rehabilitation Programme (Income, Infrastructure), Food Security, DDRR


Questions? Comments?


Answers to the Evaluation Questions (“EQs”)


EQ 1: Relevance with needs / Coherence with Governmental objectives

To what extent did EC development cooperation objectives correspond to the needs of the Liberian population, GoL development priorities and other related objectives of the European Commission, taking into account the evolving situation in Liberia?

Strategy

Needs and Priorities


EQ1: Relevance / Coherence: Findings

Judgment Criteria Findings

EC cooperation takes into account short term and longer term needs of Liberia’s population in conflict, post conflict, rehabilitation and development periods

• EC Objectives between 2003 and 2005 clearly and consistently reflect dominant needs of Liberia’s population

• Cross-cutting issues not consistently; Post-Conflict Rehabilitation Programme: no mention of environment, HIV / AIDS, human rights; Reintegration Programme for Returnees and Displaced People: no mention of gender

EC cooperation objectives are consistent with the policy priorities of the Government of Liberia

• EC cooperation objectives largely consistent with policy priorities of the Government of Liberia.

• EC “migration” to longer-term development too early in eyes of Liberian Government

• EDF10 CSP allows EC to “catch-up” on older LRRD-related needs that had not been fully addressed up to that point


EQ1: Relevance / Coherence: Findings (2)


EC mechanisms and procedures for formulating cooperation objectives allow for their accurate and timely definition and revision

• Changes in political circumstances and security situation between 2000 and 2003 prompted EC repeatedly to quickly adjust cooperation objectives (EDF8 Reintegration; EDF9 Post-Conflict Rehabilitation)

• In comparison, understated and slow strategic response to 2005 elections; use of 2-year old CSP to launch cooperation with President Johnson-Sirleaf

Absence of conflict between EC development objectives in Liberia and EU global and regional policies and strategic frameworks

• CSP objectives for both EDF9 and EDF10 are broadly in line with main principles of EU strategy for Africa

• EC development policy broadly consistent with other EU policies (“Everything But Arms”, Economic Partnership Agreement)


EQ1: Relevance / Coherence: Answer

Between 2003 and 2005, EC objectives were consistent with the priorities of the Liberian Government and the dominant needs of Liberia’s population. Fast reaction stands in contrast with much slower response to the democratic election of a new Government in 2005. The Commission acted quickly and appropriately by making available €50.1m in 2003 to support the terms of the 2003 peace agreement. In 2006, however, EC used outdated strategy to re-launch cooperation and did not recognize that incoming Government intended to focus efforts on meeting still unmet immediate needs of Liberians, instead of working on medium to long-term development.


EQ 2: DDRR

To what extent did EC support contribute to the disarmament, demobilisation, rehabilitation and reintegration of ex-combatants in Liberia?


EQ2: DDRR - Findings


EC-financed DDRR interventions tie into a nationally-owned integrated and comprehensive framework for peace-building and long-term development

• EC aligned DDRR support with defined priorities of GoL and the needs of Liberia after the war. Priorities were in line with the priorities defined in the JNA.

• Main challenge is the lack of capacity at national and local government levels to design and implement policies for a comprehensive and coherent DDRR approach

EC-financed DDRR interventions create and take advantage of synergies with corresponding interventions of other stakeholders (donors, GoL)

• EC support of UNDP-DDRR Trust Fund was appropriate.

• Lack of staff at Delegation level limited the Commission’s contributions to donor coordination (internal factor),

• Weak steering capacity on government side and parallel interventions to DDRR trust fund also hindered coordination (external factors)


EQ2: DDRR – Findings (2)


EC-financed DDRR interventions have contributed to progress in resettlement of former combatants

• First reintegration process (2003) suffered from serious under-funding. Instead of 30.000 individuals, 120,000 individuals required reintegration. Additional funding arrived slowly.

• Eventually, 58 % of the registered and eligible population has returned to their communities, but the rate of returns varied between regions (UNDP data)

• Assessment of resettlement success made difficult by unreliable data

EC-financed DDRR interventions have increased the viability of livelihoods of ex-combatants and their families.

• 90% of trainees found training economically useful; 50% reported that their work is “directly related to training”. 80% reported overall improvement in living conditions due to training

Value-Added of EC involvement in DDRR

• EC was most important donor for DDRR; TA for implementation of Visibility Guidelines improved perception of EC support among donors


EQ2: DDRR - Answer

The EC provided timely and much needed support to help demobilise and reintegrate former fighters after the end of the violence in 2003. Overall, the support had an important stabilising effect on Liberia’s population that helped to jump-start economic activity in war-affected communities.Commission resources helped to provide job-related training and pay for school education for ex-combatants. At times, the assistance was affected by difficulties to properly coordinate the efforts of the different organisations which were involved in this area and also suffered from delays and at times low quality of trainings.


EQ3: Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD)

To what extent has the EC been able to create appropriate linkages between humanitarian and relief operations in Liberia and its rehabilitation and development support?


EQ3: Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD) - Findings


Appropriateness of coordinated strategic planning for LRRD, in particular between ECHO and Europe Aid

• No strong evidence of coordinated strategic planning approach for LRRD or even deeper understanding on how to operationalize the LRRD concept as lined out in EC communications.

• Nonetheless, EC showed visible concern to utilise available instruments to avoid the transition gap.

Flexibility and timeliness to react to changing conditions during implementation

• Flexibility on political level to seize opportunity of supporting implementation of peace accord terms.

• After 2004/05 EC (EuropeAid) ability to remain flexible was constraint by serious understaffing and under-resourcing of Delegation, slowed arrival of EC development aid.

• ECHO’s willingness to “stay on” showed flexibility also by trying to adopt to “development mode”; helped to avoid bigger “transition gap”


EQ3: Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD) – Findings (2)


Stepwise transition of EC cooperation with non-governmental partners to governmental partners

• EC support relied mainly on non-governmental / private partners and parallel structures, which hindered the successive organisational development / capacity building of Governmental partners.

• Staying on of ECHO & delay of EDF support left focus on short- to medium term interventions w/o strong Governmental involvement

Needs of recipients of humanitarian assistance (in particular women and girls) remain satisfied in transition to rehabilitation and development assistance

• Clear concern to keep humanitarian situation from deteriorating during transition; interventions should continue to satisfy basic needs (food security, health care, drinking water and shelter)

• However, transition necessarily meant that level of support received had to be reduced


EQ3: Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD) - Answer

Transition from relief to rehabiliation and development primarily “ad-hoc”; was affected by delayed arrival of development (EDF) funds. Extending ECHO humanitarian assistance helped to avoid a substantial gap between EC ”relief” and ”development” . Delays were caused in large part by serious staff bottlenecks in EU representation in Monrovia. Between 1999 and 2001, both EuropeAid and ECHO provided mainly relief, ECHO partly by using money from the European Development Fund. ECHO-EuropeAid coordination not based on careful operationalisation of LRRD concept; relying instead on good informal coordination.


EQ4: Peace-building and Conflict Prevention

To what extent has EC support to Liberia contributed to the consolidation of peace and a reduced risk of future violent conflicts?


EQ4: Peace-building and Conflict Prevention - Findings


EC assistance is guided by conflict prevention principles

• EC strategies clearly identify root causes of conflict in Liberia, i.e. in particular the long-standing socio-economic marginalisation of a large part of the population

• Most programmes included components to address key concerns related to conflict prevention, such as improving security, expanding participation, enhancing social cohesion and improving social stability.

Effect of EC assistance on equalization of access to economic resources

• DDRR support facilitated initial economic reintegration of former fighters.

• Temporary project-related employment (e.g. for infrastructure construction) did not generate job opportunities in the long term.

• Skill-building suffered from wide range of deficiencies: varying curricula, weak local implementing partners, lack of steering body, no follow-up support.


EQ4: Peace-building and Conflict Prevention – Findings (2)


EC assistance helps to strengthen / does not weaken the democratic culture legitimacy of Liberian State

• EC support to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission has improved the reputation of the Government of Liberia internationally and, to a lesser extent, nationally.

• The work of the strengthened General Auditing Commission (GAC) is met with considerable interest from the Liberian public.

• Flow of EC resources was often opaque in the eyes of beneficiaries.

• Overall, only little information available on this issue.


EQ4: Peace-building and Conflict Prevention - Answer

Despite demonstrated awareness of conflict prevention principles at strategic level, EC support equalize access to economic resources (root cause of conflict) suffered from delays, weak targeting, low quality of trainings and insufficient coverage. Assistance to improve economic and democratic governance more successful, i.e. in particular strengthening of GAC and support the TRC. Weak monitoring and evaluation of the effects of EC projects on peace-building and the prevention of future conflicts made it relatively difficult for the European Commission to develop a sound strategy for this kind of interventions in Liberia.


EQ5: Food Security

To what extent has EC support, and particularly support to Food Security, contributed to an increase in food security and in food production capacity based on sustainable rural development in Liberia?


EQ5: Food Security - Findings


Evidence of decreased undernourishment in counties with EU supported food security programmes

• Mainly short term interventions under EDF ECHO support and the WFP support under the FSBL helped to satisfy people’s immediate food-related needs

• EC-financed distribution of seeds and tools did increase production and thus self-sufficiency of rural households; reduced undernourishment can partly be traced back to the resumption of agricultural production.

Evidence of an increase in crop yields / area for the main staple foods

• Increases in agricultural output mainly due to the improved security situation that allowed farmers to resume their agricultural activities (except seeds and tools, see above).

• Only few long term interventions implemented between 2002 and 2004; Projects too short and delayed to render sustainable results,

• Relief NGOs not prepared for development activities


EQ5: Food Security - Findings


EC food security strategy and other EC policies on food aid / food security, gender mainstreaming are applied throughout the relief, rehabilitation and development phases

• Projects focused on availability and access of food; few interventions aimed at balancing the main components of food security, participation, ownership and support of structural and institutional changes

• Despite general awareness on gender issues, specific priorities were not properly assessed; planning not gender based.


EQ5: Food Security - Answer

EC assistance helped to contain the most severe effects of the conflict-related food security crisis in Liberia, but so far could not adequately respond to challenge of ensuring long-term development of Liberia’s agricultural sector.ECHO and EuropeAid extended short-term food security support beyond the originally intended period and thereby helped to maintain a relatively stable food security situation without acute food shortages. In that sense, food security support helped to fill at least part of the ”rehabilitation gap” that had opened


EQ6: Income Generation

To what extent has the EC successfully contributed to sustainably increasing and improving the quality of income generating opportunities in urban and rural areas, in particular for Liberia’s youth, returnees and displaced people and ex-combatants?


Increased availability of EC-financed “quick-impact”income generating opportunities (including cash-for-work and public works programmes)

• EDF8 Reintegration Programme for Returnees and Displaced Persons ( 2001 – 2004) biggest relative EC contribution to creating jobs (90% of estimated 4,000)

• Lack of continued support to businesses, weak needs and poverty orientation and misplaced use of grants limited sustained job creation

• “Community Rehabilitation Component” of the “Post-Conflict Rehabilitation and Capacity Building Programme” only created equivalent of 77 full-time positions for 2007 and 2008.

EC-financed interventions helped to increase access to productive assets and inputs for target groups

• Only significant contribution: rehabilitation of approximately 93 square km (23,000 acres) of rubber / fruit tree plantations (EDF8 Reintegration)

• However, poor targeting! Eligibility not focused on vulnerable groups; many farms owned by well-established Liberio-American families

• Poor sustainability; no micro-credit!

EQ6: Income Generation - Findings



EQ6: Income Generation – Findings (2)

EC-financed interventions improved access to skill-building opportunities for target groups

• EC support of DDRR trust fund and parallel programmes (UNICEF CAFF) helped to improve access to skill-building opportunities of ex-combatants, including children.

• EC did not offer skill-building support outside of the DDRR.

• Women and youth underrepresented in the pool of applicants, in particular in first two phases of DDRR process.

Environmental concerns flow into planning and implementation of EC-financed income generation initiatives

• Lack of regular Environmental Impact Assessments in most income generation programmes.

• No evidence for any regular environmental monitoring; Exceptions: small scale projects of EDF8 Reintegration and Food Security Budget Line projects contained references to ex-ante EIAs and ex-post assessment of environmental effects.



EQ6: Income Generation -Answer

The overall effect of EC assistance on job creation and job placement of people from vulnerable groups was small. Only former fighters could clearly improve their chances for gainful employment with the help of EC support of their education and vocational training.The estimated 4,000 people placed in jobs directly created with EC assistance in 2005, accounted for less than 1% of all internally displaced people. Nearly 50% the jobs disappeared again within two years their creation. Indirect employment effects of EC support from the improvement and supply of economic assets also small.


EQ7: Infrastructure

To what extent has EC support contributed to the reconstruction or expansion of social and economic infrastructure in Liberia, including power, roads, water and sanitation?


EQ7: Infrastructure - Findings


Health facilities in EC-supported areas in good condition and within reach of population

• Between 1996 and 2001, EC helped rehabilitate 18 clinics in Grand Bassa, Montserrado and Sinoe.

• Since 2003, contribution to physical rehabilitation of health facilities / clinics has declined: Only 6 new facilities constructed (CRC / PCRCBP)

• Support to Phebe Hospital significant, successful and important.

Increased access to electricity in urban and rural EC-supported areas

• Various earlier small-scale, but politically important installations of generator powered electricity loops and associated streetlights

• Significantly (approx. 3 years) delayed works on larger portion of Monrovia’s electricity distribution network. (First tender for works: 03/2006; start of construction: 05/2009)

• Upon start of construction in 2009, works have progressed well. Biggest part of the EC-financed work on the electricity grid is completed as of 02/2010.


EQ7: Infrastructure – Findings (2)Judgment

CriteriaFindings

Improved conditions of rural and feeder roads in EC supported areas

• After 2003, biggest contributor was NGO-run labor intensive infrastructure programme (accounts for 505km of the total of 563km roads reconstructed since 2003).

• CRC component of the Post-Conflict Rehabilitation Programme only contributed 47km of road, due to significant delays of in grant processing for projects.

• Weak provisions for maintenance in all programmes.

Increased access to Water and Sanitation services in EC supported areas

• EC provided “stop-gap” funding to maintain a basic level of service in the year immediately following the signing of the CPA in 2003 (payment for operating costs of existing system).

• Between 2003 and 2005, EC merely funded technical / legal studies and capacity building / training for the Liberian water authority; two procurement contracts, initiated in 10/2004 and 07/2005 were delayed until at least 2006.

• Lack of support for the rehabilitation of the administrative infrastructure in water sector.


EQ7: InfrastructureAnswer

”Emergency” and ”stop gap” support helped to maintain basic levels of water and power in Monrovia after 2003. Support of long-term rehabilitation of Monrovia’s electrical and water-related infrastructure severely delayed and produced few tangible results until 2008. Outside of Monrovia, EC helped to construct and repair small number of roads, clinics and water / sanitation systems. Took 3.5 years from initial stop-gap measures until EC support to Monrovia’s water and power again became tangible ”on the ground”. Outside Monrovia, the failed attempt to combine infrastructure rehabilitation with development of social / administrative structures unnecessarily reduced number of completed projects.


EQ8: Capacity Building

To what extent has EC support to institutional reform and capacity development helped the Liberian Government to increase its capacity for adopting a legitimate role in providing key social services and infrastructure to the Liberian population?


EQ8: Capacity Building - FindingsJudgment

CriteriaFindings

Increased portfolio of EC-supported Government Agencies and Ministries

County: • Well-equipped offices allowed EC programmes to progress

with “accelerated speed”, but GoL staff merely accompanied” project team, without establishing own tasks

• Lacking operational budgets to maintain equipment, finance travel, etc. prevented GoL staff from carrying over learning into own work after end of programmes.

• Support of DDCs further detracted resources from local authorities

National:• EC support allowed General Accounting Commission to

improve staffing, qualifications and human resource management

• Significant increased number of audits: 2 in 2005 - 14 in 2006.


EQ8: Capacity Building – Findings (2)

Judgment Criteria

Findings

Target groups (incl. women / girls) benefit from increased quality of Government-provided services and infrastructure

County:• EC-financed to bring essential services and infrastructure

to local communities were driven with TA teams, not local authorities

• Attempts to involve GoL staff in supervision and maintenance of EC-financed investments (e.g., Suakoko-Yaendewon road) not successful

National:• Youth, women, ex-combatants and other vulnerable groups

stand to gain from strengthened audit function; value signs of improved oversight.

Improved accountability of EC-supported Government agents vis-à-vis their constituents

• As of 2008, GAC had conducted audits of Ministry of Finance, Public Works, Education, Lands and Mines and Liberia’s General Service Agency.

• Weak quality assurance can have negative impact on legitimacy of GAC and its ability to confront opponents and to play role in improving financial accountability of GoL.


EQ8: Capacity BuildingAnswer

EC capacity development support succeeded, in particular by helping to create Governance and Economic Management Assistance Programme (GEMAP) and by strengthening General Auditing Commission (GAC). Helped to increase governmental accountability over the use of public funds. At county level, EC failed to make lasting differences in organisational capacity of local governments. EC-financed audits of five state-owned enterprises and the Central Bank (2004) galvanised donors into pushing for GEMAP. Use of parrallel TA offices in counties diverted attention away from county and district administrations; Government staff were in the end not able to take many skills or lessons back to their own positions after end of EC programme.


EQ9: Education

To what extent has the EC helped to reduce the socio-economic marginalisation of vulnerable groups in the population, identified as one of the root causes of past violent conflicts, through its support to the education sector?


EQ9: Education - Findings


Timely commencement of and progression through implementation of EC financed activities in the sector

• 3 ½ years passed between intended signing of Financing Agreement (end of 2005) & actual recruitment of Long-Term TA (3/2009).

• Main causes: drawn out EC procedures: “project dormant for 1 yr due to understaffing”; removal and subsequent re-insertion of “flexible procedures” (Art. 72 & 73 of Cotonou); floater from HQ arrived late.

• ECSEL design itself unrealistic: MoE reorganisation within one year (6 months for planning, implementation); quick impact interventions to “use on existing materials and organisation (of MoE)

Increased involvement of EC-supported target groups / target communities in re-installment of education services, in particular of women.

• Severe delays prevented ECSEL from having any effect on representation of interests of vulnerable groups in PTAs or other education-specific fora.

• CDAs in Bong, Lofa, Nimba (EC-supported) contain projects for returnees, ex-combatants, but none in formal education. CDAs have no education projects for women or girls; their consultation was weak.


EQ9: Education – Findings (2)


Improved and gender-balanced access to “emergency” and long-term educational opportunities at primary, secondary, tertiary and vocational level

• EC support to teacher training, school rehabilitation and the provision of learning materials delayed until at least September 2009.

Exceptions: • Short-term technical inputs by EC TA (2007) to help

develop “Educational Materials Component” of Education Policy and guidelines for transitional textbook strategy.

• Support of secondary education of ex-combatants (materials, fees for 8,670 students (UNDP / DDRR)).

Increased economic utility of education and educational content for economic and social advancement of learners, including improved employability (quality)

• No effect from ECSEL, due to delays• UNDP / DDRR: support for approximately 8,700 former

fighters (including proxies), however, without follow-up support for job-placement.

• Effect on employability likely to be small (but: no systematic follow-up monitoring of graduates)


EQ9: EducationAnswer

ECSEL delays of nearly 3 years have prevented the arrival of tangible benefits from EC education assistance “on the ground” as of 2008. Most delays were caused by drawn-out internal EC procedures and severe staffing bottlenecks at Delegation. Delays also affected so-labelled ”quick-impact” activities, such as the training of teachers and the supply of adequate learning materials. Design of ECSEL itself would have made a scheduled and timely implementation unlikely. The few advances of other donors in the sector in the last 5 years notwithstanding, the education-related needs of Liberia’s population remain severe. Swift support to education in Liberia remains as relevant now as it was in 2005.


EQ10: Cooperation frameworks and implementation mechanisms

To what extent have chosen cooperation frameworks and implementation mechanisms allowed adequate use of EC resources to facilitate the intended results of EC assistance to Liberia?


EQ10: Frameworks and mechanisms -Findings

Judgment Criteria

Findings

EC organisational resources and EC capacity in Liberia can respond to organisational demands of chosen cooperation frameworks and implementation mechanisms on EC structures

• Use of contribution agreements & “floaters” from HQ not sufficient to prevent staff bottlenecks from prolonging processing times (E.g., education, county development)

• Threat of de-commitment (ECSEL) and actual de-commitment (CRC / PCRCBP)

• In 2007 (critical year), slow-down of “contracting” to € 2.24 million.

• EU Delegation staff forced to withdraw from essentially all of bi- and multi-lateral coordination platforms (incl. donor-GoL consultations on Liberia’s Poverty Reduction Strategy)

• No systematic link between programming and programme identification / formulation and organisational capacity of EU Delegation

• Frequent complaints registered about slow delivery of EC support.


EQ10: Frameworks and mechanisms –Findings (2)

Judgment Criteria

Findings

Cooperation frameworks / implementation mechanisms allow response to external risks, i.e., from political fragility

• Risk analyses in programme documents (e.g., FAs) very general, not suited to develop nuanced risk response strategy.

• “Contracting out” of implementation no solution: contractors not able to “absorb” and “manage” all prevalent risks (e.g. “delays in decentralisation agenda”).

• EU Delegation was not able to ensure that important lessons from risk analyses were picked up in management of EC-financed interventions (e.g. County Development)

Adequacy of cost / output ratios (compared to country specific benchmarks)

• High unit costs (jobs, classrooms), especially with “administrative overheads” included (admin. costs more than doubles cost per job).

• EDF8 Reintegration: € 14,240 investment; total costs: €36,000; CRC / PCRCBP: € 8,755.77 investment; total costs: €17,905.76.

• Use of competitive tendering was often not possible, because interest from potential bidders too low.


EQ10: Frameworks and mechanismsAnswer

The demands that planning and implementation of EC assistance have placed on the EU Delegation have overburdened and overwhelmed its organisational and human resources. Together with cumbersome administrative exchanges with the Delegation in Abidjan, staff shortages have severely reduced the ability of the EC to properly manage the Commission’s aid portfolio and to deliver aid. Provisions to anticipate programme-related risks in Liberia’s volatile aid context were insufficient. Project staff often had to make ad-hoc adjustments when overly simple assumptions on the feasibility of projects were not satisfied. The EC faced challenges to adequately balance investments with adequate administrative costs, resulting in high unit costs, e.g., for job creation in key programmes.


Conclusions


Principal Conclusions

PC1: Capacity of EC in Liberia inadequate and EU Delegation too understaffed to respond to operational demands of large aid portfolio. Led to unfulfilled expectations among the Commission’s main partners.

PC2: Design of the EC’s cooperation strategy and commitment at political level of large-scale support during Liberia’s post-war years did not sufficiently consider the very limited implementation capacity of the EU’s own Delegation in Liberia.

PC3: European Commission’s procedures and mechanisms for design, planning and implementation did not adequately take into account the difficult conditions, vagaries, risks and operational constraints of Liberia’s post-conflict environment.


Principal Conclusions (2)

PC4: EC could successfully provide some relevant and important impulses for Liberia’s stabilisation, however, only in only a relatively small number of cases. Overall, EC contributions lagged significantly behind its real potential and value-added for assisting post-conflict societies and its commitment to focus support on the most vulnerable, marginalised Liberians.


Complementary Conclusions

Consequences of inadequate operational capacity (PC 1)C5: Procedural delays prevented the EC from providing

timely support in crucial post-war / post election years, affecting primarily education, but also infrastructure (electricity, water) and county development.

C6: Challenge of matching EC implementation capacity with organisational demands of aid portfolio is still current in the case of EDF10, especially considering the broad and all-inclusive layout of the strategy.

C7: In many sectors, EC-financed interventions and donor-financed programmes in general suffered from a lack of or at least insufficient coordination.


Complementary Conclusions (2)

Consequences of low capacity (PC1) (continued)C8: Choice of ”contribution agreements” as one of the main

vehicles for disbursing EC funds in Liberia was justified and helped to relieve some, but not all, of the pressure on the under-staffed EU Delegation.

Inadequacy of design, planning and implementation procedures (PC3)

C9: EC missed opportunity to use review of CSP in cooperation with the newly elected Government to establish clear strategic basis for its cooperation from 2006 onward, also in view of its own limited implementation / operational capacity.

C10: Technical knowledge & capacity of implementers and their familiarity with Liberia’s particular challenges often too low for EC to rely on their capacity alone to ensure the proficient implementation of projects.



Design, planning and implementation procedures (PC 3) (continued)C11: European Commission itself was not able to adequately ensure that lessons-learned and knowledge from previous programmes were transferred into follow-up interventions.C12: EC-financed programmes often lacked appropriate M&E of their outcome and impact, i.e. in particular in the case of Food Security Interventions and DDRR support.C13: EC reliance on parallel structures (programme offices, DDCs) and TAs with operational responsibilities to push county-level development projects detracted from strengthening of county level administrative structures.C14: Time horizon of many interventions too short to effectively establish or change social structures and behaviour that would have been needed to sustain benefits of EC-interventions.



Design, planning and implementation procedures (PC3) (continued)C15: Lack of systematic and appropriate follow-up and care for earlier achievements limited the extent to which fledgling achievements could be secured and consolidatedC16: In some sectors, long chain of broker institutions and other intermediaries made management and ”learning” / handling of lessons learned difficultC17: Mainstreaming of crosscutting issues, including Gender, was generally only treated as a formality without significance for making the issues count during beneficiary targeting and the implementation projects and programmes by the EC and its partners


Complementary Conclusions (4)Impulses emanating from EC support to Liberia (PC4)

C18: At policy level, the EC reacted speedily and decisively to chance of supporting stabilisation of peace process in Liberia. High level political involvement of EC in peace negotiations facilitated speedy adjustment of EC cooperation priorities to requirements.C19: EC support of the DDRR process helped to stabilise the post-conflict situation in Liberia, by signalling the availability ofpost-war livelihoods opportunities and by helping to jump-start the return of IDPs and refugees.C20: Provision of early ”stop-gap” support in water and electricity to help fend off serious interruptions of basic services in Monrovia in the immediate aftermath of the war was relevant and effectiveC21: Timely provision of technical competence, regional experience and TAs with exclusive responsibility for capacity building allowed the EC to make valuable contributions to the organisational development of Liberia’s General Audit Commission



Important omissions (PC4)

C22: Delays, targeting shortfalls and technical weaknesses of EC projects have led to the situation where EC support so far has for the most part bypassed the medium- to long-term needs of the most vulnerable and marginalised Liberians.


Recommendations

Recommendation 1: Strengthen operational and procedural linkages

between commitment of development resources and the allocation of operational capacities and resources to EU Delegations

� Require that CSP drafting process includes assessment of EC operational capacity (amend CSP Framework / Format)

� Require that Technical and Administrative Provisions analyse

a) tasks / responsibilities expected from EC (Delegation, HQ); b) estimated resource requirement (human and others) to carry out

tasksc) actual availability resources in Commission services

� EDF10: Conduct “capacity review” to determine gaps in EU Delegation staffing & develop fallback action plan

Priority: Very High


Recommendations (2)

Recommendation 2: Strengthen procedures and mechanisms that help

EC and its implementing partners to adequately anticipate particular risks and constraints of working in Liberia, and in post-conflict countries in general.

� Specify more stringent requirements for ”risk analysis”, ”risk management strategies” during project identification and inception phase.

� Invest more time and resources into inception phase; tighten criteria applied to judging quality of inception reports(EC Backbone Strategy).

� Create and manage database of experienced (external) personnel that can be called upon to be used in the planning and implementation of interventions.

Priority: Very High


Recommendations (3)

Recommendation 3: Refocus efforts to channel assistance to the

marginalised majority of Liberians, to make EC assistance count in particular for helping to reduce the socio-economic disadvantage of these population groups.

� Education: continue to pursue improvements of access to primary education through Liberia’s public education system. Seriously consider requests from the Liberian Government to extend support to secondary education.

� Infrastructure: Continue engagement in reconstruction of feeder roads; determined if additional support is needed in this sector, in time for EDF11.

� Food Security / Agriculture: back up considerable financial assistance with adequate strategy, adequately timed projects and highly skilled technical experts.

Priority: Very High


Recommendations (4)

Recommendation 4: Refocus and refine capacity development support

to Liberia to reflect EC’s lessons-learnt and sustain and expand capacity development support, particularly at local level.

� Revise and improve the ”Project Implementation Arrangements” (PIA) of ongoing and future EC-financed capacity development projects.

� Step up adoption of EC ”backbone strategy” for ”reforming technical cooperation” (mapping of major TC operations)

� Use TAs primarily for ”supporting internal country processes , NOT to support implementation and of EC cooperation.

� Base interventions that aim at changing established social structures on more realistically timed work plans.

Priority: High


Recommendations (5)

Recommendation 5: Improve strategic significance of sector

coordination (education, capacity development, food security) to increase coherence of support and alignment with Liberian structures

� Develop clear operational and strategic principles for donor coordination in main sectors, jointly assessing options for Government-led donor coordination.

� Prioritize issues that should be subjected to increased coordination efforts.

� Outline how responsibility for donor coordination will be transferred exclusively to Liberian Government.

� Realistically assess how much Delegation staff time EC will be able to devote to donor coordination; factor this into commitments to donor coordination mechanisms.

Priority: High


Recommendations (6)

Recommendation 6: Increase attention on supervision, monitoring

and evaluation of EC-financed projects, including those covered by contribution agreements with multilateral organisations.

� Make better use of potential of ROM missions and reports for results-oriented supervision and oversight of its programmes; followed ROM recommendations up more thoroughly and report progress.

� Limit the number of intermediaries involved in the delivery of EC-financed assistance in Liberia.

Priority: Medium


Recommendations (7)

Recommendation 7: Critically review “mainstreaming” of cross-

cutting issues in Liberia and refocus mainstreaming approach in important sectors (education, health, county development)

� Adapt the “gender” and other issues to particular post-conflict circumstances in Liberia, jointly defining “appropriate practices”.

� Jointly develop operational principles and guidelines for individual sectors.

Priority: Medium


Thank you for your attention!

Questions?Comments?

Minutes

Dissemination Seminar

Country Level Evaluation of the EC cooperation with Liberia (1999 – 2008)

October 27, 2010

Corina Hotel

Recorder: Annie Jones - Demen

Participants present: 36 (see listing attached)

Seminar was opened with Introduction Remarks as per the below excerpts:

Head of Delegation European Commission

It is good to stop for a moment and look at what the EC has done, to understand the way his predecessors saw the relationship, and the kind of cooperation the EC has with Liberia.

Secondly to learn from these experience to be in the position to better program the future strategy with Liberia.

The objective of the seminar is to discuss the relevance of what the EC has done in the past, and the outcomes for the cooperation from 1999 to 2008. He informed that from 2003, the EU has given 55 million Euros to restart the building of physical infrastructure in Liberia. After 2008, 68 million Euros was pledged, which led to the current portfolio. Few weeks ago, an addendum was signed to the cooperating financing to bring the EC contribution to 178 million between 2008 and 2013.

He informed that the Delegation and the NAO office of the Liberian Government are cooperating in a normal way like other ACP countries in the delegation of the EU cooperation. In the past, and up to a few months ago, Liberia did not have the power and mandate to take responsibility of the development cooperation cycle. On September 6 2010, the powers of the NAO were returned to the Government of Liberia.

National Authorizing Officer (NAO) of Liberia MINISTER AMARA KANNAH

The Minister of Planning and Economic Affairs, who is also the National Authorizing Officer for Liberia expressed happiness that the EU and the Government can sit together and look back at our interventions, the impact they have had and use the results to strategize ways of improving the cooperation, to inform EU’s current and future support to Liberia and its neighbors.

The purpose of this evaluation is to provide meaningful feedback to the European Commission, the Government of Liberia and the general public on the Commission’s achievements in its cooperation with Liberia between 1999 and 2008; these were critical years in our existence as a nation due to the violent conflict and this eventually coincided with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2003 in Accra and the first national elections after the war in 2005.

He hoped that the evaluators considered EC interventions during these periods from a variety of instruments, considering choices made by the EC to disburse aid under the 8th and 9th European Development Fund (EDF). These were the period of humanitarian aid and food security, support to disarm, demobilize, rehabilitate and reintegrate former fighters (DDRR), peace building, education and county development. Cutting across these sectors was the concern for gender and environmental issues.

The Commission had been an active participant in many of the key political events that helped to bring Liberia out of decades of conflict and violence. The European Commission’s willingness to back the peace agreement with a much-needed financial commitment that helped to keep the peace between the warring factions in the immediate aftermath of the conflict.

Liberia has made a transition from humanitarian assistance to long term development. The current development embedded in the ‘Lift Liberia’ strategy is intended to lay the foundation for institution building, for security sector

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reform, for economic revitalization, particularly focusing on external debt issue, Public Financial Management, and also focusing on agriculture, particular small holders’ farms. The Government of Liberia has managed to attract foreign direct investment to the tune of 18 million Euros.

For the ensuing General and Presidential Elections, the Government is responsible to ensure elections free of violence and free of fraud. He requested the EC to continue its support to the National Election Commission and the security sector including the Liberian National Police (LNP), and the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization (BIN). He furthered that it is only when the capacity of these organizations are built that an environment can be created for the NEC to have a space to conduct free elections. He asked donors to accelerate their commitment to the National Election Fund and to help the Government look for support for the LNP and the BIN.

Finally, the NAO stated that as a way forward, the outcome of the elections will not affect the partnership between Liberia and the EC. Therefore both parties must work together, like over the past five years, to put together a framework for long term sustainable development for the country.

Process of geographic evaluation Mr. Jean-Louis BOLLY Evaluation Manager

The Evaluation Manager started his remarks by giving the role and mandate of the Evaluation Unit of the EC. He said the Mission Statement of the Unit is to improve present and future EC external policies and actions and to provide transparency and accountability in reporting results of activities and policies to citizens. He showcased the various evaluations conducted in 2009, as well as the evaluations expected to be launched and finalized in 2010.

The present evaluation is part of the 2009 evaluation programme approved by the External Relations and Development Commissioners, and the first evaluation for Liberia. The evaluation has three objectives: 1) to assess the cooperation 2) to identify successes, and 3) to improve future strategy. He gave the TOR of the evaluation as: coordination, complementarity, cooperation efficiency and impact. The evaluation is for lesson learning to improve decision making, accountability through Informing the decision making process Informing the public Encouraging ongoing organisational learning. He explained the standard evaluation methodology from the reconstruction of the intervention logic, to when the answers are given through the judgement criteria and indicatiors.

Finally, the website: http//ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/ index_en.htm was given as the source of information on the methodology and to consult the full report.

The official opening program was followed by the presentation of the evaluation report.

Presentation of Evolution of EC cooperation with Liberia and Evaluation Framework by ECO Consult / Martin Steinmeyer (Evaluation Team Leader)

The evaluation team leader, Mr. Martin Steinmeyer, started his presentation by welcoming major stakeholders and thanked them for attending the seminar. He stated that the purpose of the seminar is to present and discuss the findings of the evaluation. He encouraged participants go ask questions as they come up in order to have a lively discussion. Feedback will be incorporated in the final report.

His presentation was structured into the following sections: Background of the EC support to Liberia; Findings for the 10 Evaluation Questions; Principal and Complementary Conclusions; Recommendations; Discussion of findings, conclusions and recommendations, and Collect feedback to be integrated into final report.

In the background, Mr. Steinmeyer gave an overview of the EC commitment to Liberia between 2008, and 1998, and walked participants through the commitments and disbursement made to Liberia during the evaluation period. The scope of the evaluation was to ascertain how well was the strategy designed and implemented, and what lessons are to be learned for future strategy and programming. He also explained how the EC strategy was analyzed and reconstructed.

He subsequently explained a graph of the EC commitment, and when the funds were made available on the ground to implementing partners. There was a gap between commitment and the time the funds were actually ready for use. In 2004 – 5, only 2.5 million Euros was ready to use, a fraction of what was committed. The CSP is a basis for what the Commission wants to do in Liberia. The relatively difficulty involved in cooperation and assisting a post-conflict county were considered to analyze what are the crucial elements of what the county wanted to do, and what the evaluation placed its attention on.

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He informed that the 10 Evaluation Questions were developed in collaborating with the EC, and explained that the reconstruction of the Intervention Logic was meant to help think in a systematic way what the EC intended to do in Liberia, what it wanted to achieve, and understand what are the integral parts, or important elements that the Commission tried to put in place to make a contribution to the reduction of poverty in Liberia.

The Intervention Logic diagram that led to the 10 evaluation questions (EQs) was explained. The EQs relates to the four pillars of the Poverty Reduction Strategy ( PRS). He explained the Judgment Criterion (JC), the measurable indicators, and the collection of data that led to the answers for each question. The evaluation methodology included: discussion with different stakeholders to include donors, the private sector, national government and the Delegation. Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) were held with beneficiaries in and out of Monrovia. The evaluation also utilized secondary sources.

General Questions and comments following the Background presentation

1. An ECHO representative was concerned that only 8 million disbursed in 2008 was mentioned. Mr. Steinmeyer responded that ECHO was mentioned only where it used EDF funds. It was recommended that the report should mention how much of EDF fund has been disbursed to ECHO.

2. Another question was if there was any other program fund that was not part of the evaluation. Mr. Steinmeyer responded that the evaluation was primarily an EDF evaluation.

3. How about debt relief? Was it part of the evaluation? Martin says it was only considered where EC had helped Liberia to reach HIPC Completion Point.

Synthesis of the answers to the Evaluation Questions by ECO Consult (Martin Steinmeyer)

EQ 1: To what extent did EC development cooperation objectives correspond to needs of the Liberian population, GoL development priorities and other related objectives of the European Commission, taking into account evolving situation in Liberia?

The presenter presented the answers to evaluation question one, by giving for each of them the relevance, the coherence and the findings.

The questions asked following the presentation of answers for EQ1 were:

1. The Program Officer at the NAO: wanted to know if the evaluation took into consideration the issue of Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Ex-combatants to highlight the impact of program on their lives.

Answer: Yes, the evaluators had 3-4 Focus Group Discussions with beneficiaries of the process and got their impression of the EC support on their lives.

2. NAO National Program Officer: what are lapses on matching up with govt. agenda in achieving developmental goals, given that the Government at the time was not really consulted? Was there any difference in matching up with the government agenda in achieving its developmental goals?

Answer: The assumption on which the cooperation was based was different on the government side and on the EC side. For example, the government was under more pressure to produce benefits for its people, and the way the cooperation sets up its strategy does not allow for quick impact, but a program for rolling out institutional change process for the Liberian government. At some point once the change was instituted, then it brings result at the base. For many reason this took long, but the intend of the program itself responded best to the urgency felt on the Liberian side as laid down in the 150 days plan to get results on the ground quickly

3. UNDPRR for Program: Unrealistic to expect EC to align CSP with government priorities, as Liberian Government itself had not identified priorities. County Development Agendas were participatory process without discrimination and supported by the EC in every county to see how population felt and what priorities were. After CDA process came iPRS. For example, after targeting 30,000 ex-combatants, 110,000 persons showed up for disarmament and demobilization. It was difficult to align and adjust; shortcomings not the fault of the EC. No counterpart to determine need and plans. UNDP revised its Development Assistance Framework four times to align it with the PRS.

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4. Dr. Boto Schaff, German Ambassador: The issue is only what the EC is providing. There are many European countries that contribute bilaterally and multilaterally. There is lot of money going into the UN for refugees program and others. He wanted to know if the EC pays to international bodies as well, for the example the UNDP

Answer: Yes, the EC contribution agreements with, for example, UNDP have been considered.

EQ 2: To what extent did EC support contribute to the disarmament, demobilisation, rehabilitation and reintegration of ex-combatants in Liberia?

Mr Steinmeyer presented the answers to Evaluation Question 2. The questions comments and observations were:

1. UNDP Deputy RR for Programs: Very generous to say that the DDRR process was satisfactory. She informed of other DDRR programs designed by the International Labor Organization, and the UNDP to take care of 9000 residual cases of ex-combatants who had been fighting somewhere in the region and spontaneously returned. Money was given for 30 thousand ex-combatants but got 120 thousand instead. As a result beneficiaries only got 5 days of psychosocial counseling. She agreed that there was insufficient sharing of information and duplication between the NGO and the UNDP. However the final case of DDRR is now considered as a best model for Liberia. Training was based on economic needs of the area of return, psychosocial counseling was conducted throughout the program, and there was strong private public partnership.

She emphasized that the DDRR was not a job creation program. It was simply to give an alternative if somebody wanted to start his/her own business. It was intended to encourage spontaneous return of refugees and Internally Displaced Persons ( IDP). She concluded that the EC contributions contributed to peace building, and the process of reconciliation in Liberia as well.

2. Comments from CARE Project Manager: There is a need to revisit Page 29 that mentioned CARE as National Coordinator. The information is not actually true because CARE started working in Liberia in 2008.

3. Was it easy to identify the right beneficiaries for the DDRR program?

Answer: There were many proxy beneficiaries. As the program progressed many fathers gave card to sons to benefit from the program. There was not a realization of 100% true beneficiaries. Community members and other war affected persons were also targeted later on in the program. Women were also under representative in first round of DDRR, but increased in the second round.

4. NAO Program Officer: estimate of 30,000 ex fighters was not realistic given the duration of the war, and the situation on the ground, and with multiple of fighting forces. He feels that the International partners’ statistics was not right for the DDRR process.

EQ 3: To what extent has the EC been able to create appropriate linkages between humanitarian and relief operations in Liberia and its rehabilitation and development support?

Question and Comments on EQ 3

1. NGO AICF Representative: If there was a capacity gap in this phase, there may be gap in subsequent phases of EC support. He expressed surprise that the evaluation did not consider whether a provision had been made for budgetary support. He stated that the EC should support more marginalized groups.

2. UNDPDRR for Programs: To say that partners did not work with local government structures shows a lack of knowledge, as there was no physical structure to work with. Decentralization is new in Liberia, and not part of the constitution. However, USAID and other EC donors supported the County Support Team (CST) structure that amongst other things, physical rehabilitation structures, which became county administrative buildings. The report should therefore state there was no functional local presence. She recommended that the EC have as part of its policy the introduction of development intervention after relief response.

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Response Martin Steinmeyer: In other instances, e.g., in the case of the Community Rehabilitation Component of the Post-Conflict Rehabilitation and Capacity Building Programme, the EC acted as if there was a local partner. The CRC tried to work with staff and representatives of the local authorities in three counties and stated that the intent was to build their capacity to play a meaningful role in local development. The EC also worked with the DDCs, but they are not part of the local administration structure.

Response NAO National Program Officer: The local government structure was in place, but their capacity needed to be built. The Program Officer also said that there was too much emphasis on relief and little on building capacity of nationals. This led to failure of any programs and no sustainability.

3. Why does the EC not have as part of its policy the introduction of development intervention after relief response?

4. George Francis NGO IWA DRC: Are there instruments to guide EU aid?

5. Looking at the funds made available and the lack of capacity in the Delegation to use the fund, has the evaluation been able to determine how critical judgment was made to release funds given the weak capacity to manage funds in Liberia?

Response Martin Steinmeyer: this is a central issue addressed in EQ10

EQ 4: To what extent has EC support to Liberia contributed to the consolidation of peace and a reduced risk of future violent conflicts?

Questions/Comments from EQ4

1. Is it possible to monitor the impact of peace building and conflict prevention?

Answer: No it is not possible, due to lack of sufficient and adequate data / information; but one can look at certain issues logically related with peace-building and conflict prevention.

2. NAO Project Officer: It would be good for the EC to work with Liberian Government for the Public Procurement and Concession Company (PPCC) to also be restructured like General Auditing Commission ( GAC). There are too many concessions agreement being signed with lot of questions. Concessions need to scrutinize for the ordinary citizens to enjoy the benefits from the county natural resources. This could help with peace building and conflict prevention.

3. Mr. Pavey (FAO): Did the evaluation team establish that the EC has a focus on monitoring and evaluation?

Response: For monitoring and evaluation to be good there is a need to have quality reports. There are many issues that one can focus on in monitoring and evaluation and peace building and conflict prevention was not an issue that was systematically assessed. Moreover, it is difficult to assess something that is relatively large and crosscutting. It is hard to say what contributes to it, what would changed, and why did it change.

4. Did we take into account the regional context of Peace Building and Conflict Prevention?

Response: It is difficult to monitor what is happening in the whole region of West Africa; Evaluation focused on national changes and EC involved in them.

5. UNDP DRR: Peace building behavior and change relates to mind set, but there was no baseline against which to measure the change in attitude and behavior. Donor should insist on baseline to know impact of interventions; The EU support to the GAC has been so important because it’s a wakeup call to other ministries and institutions that haven’t got the basis.

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EQ 5: To what extent has EC support, and particularly support to Food Security, contributed to an increase in food security and in food production capacity based on sustainable rural development in Liberia?

Questions and Comments from EQ 5

1. Comment: EC did not have a Technical Assistant on food security. It was therefore difficult to implement and monitor food security without that person. It was also difficult for NGO to fund local implementers to implement project. People were brought in from outside.

2. The evaluation only looked at production and not infrastructure and the marketing side of food security. Martin: On marketing issues, this is exactly one of the points we are making: we are saying that these things have not been addressed systematically

3. ECHO: Capacity issue a serious problem

4. Paivey (FAO): Differ on lack of skill on local market as the reason for bringing in foreign expert. There are qualified nationals but they have been absorbed in international organizations.

5. Paivey (FAO): It has become apparent that EC Monitors and Evaluators placed more emphasis on gender mainstreaming when conducting monitoring/evaluation but gender mainstreaming is not emphasized during EC project development/design. Therefore, there is no major focus on gender budgeting, gender specific objective setting, etc during project design. I consider it as a fundamental design problem which I suggest should be looked into. Most agencies such as FAO only rely on their gender mandatory procedures and policies to deliver on gender empowerment during the implementation of the project.

6. Paivey (FAO): Monitoring and Evaluation needs a critical consideration over and above what is obtained during the design and implementation of projects. EC should develop a Monitoring and evaluation format for the implementing agencies and insist on periodic M&E reports.

Paivey (FAO): EC should also reconsider the policy on end of project expenditure. There is a need for post

project implementation monitoring but there is no allowable fund to conduct end of project monitoring to

measure impacts. All funds under EC project agreement must be liquidated at the end of the project. If there

is provision for funds to be made available to facilitate movement of key government institutions such as

Ministry of Agriculture for example to continue the monitoring of agriculture projects beyond the end date,

this will enable us to generate impacts long after the project and it will also help us to build new projects on

old projects not necessarily from the same donor.

7. UNDPDRR: Was gender mainstreaming a requirement for food security project? Someone answered yes it is in most cases a fundamental requirement for CIDA and Danida projects.

8. EC: the implementation was not gender blind, but gender neutral

9. Recommendation: There is a need to give support to the University of Liberia college of Agriculture and Forestry

EQ6: To what extent has the EC successfully contributed to sustainably increasing and improving the quality of income generating opportunities in urban and rural areas, in particular for Liberia’s youth, returnees and displaced people and ex-combatants?


1. How types of jobs have been selected base on what?

Answer:. We looked at what the program itself identified as jobs related such as const of roads, rehabilitation of farms. Had to rely on the numbers in the final reports. Identifying the right kind of recipients for grants was a challenge of the programmme itself: strange beneficiaries like tennis association, Morris farm. Seems like a design issue. No follow up to ensure that funds were used correctly.

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2. Comment: Putting a short-term plan in place and not well funded was a recipe for projects to fail. Give example of water pumps and plantation abandoned. Vulnerable communities should be given not only seeds and tools but a longer term view which will look at all the components that will feed into that target area or community in an integrated way.

Martin agrees. That was the design problem.

3. UNDPDRR: Talking about micro finance, the NGO BRAC has an integrated approach where they give not only micro finance, but also build schools etc, BRAC is very successful worldwide.

4. Was any cost benefit analysis conducted by the evaluation for rice mills?

Answer: there was no cost benefit analysis, but the evaluation tried to put the administrative cost associated with the grant. What the evaluation found is that the administrative cost was 100 – 150 percent more than foreseen It was a very expensive venture to manage.

5. Why was micro finance not done?

Answer: It has been intended, and the EC Delegation asked for it; however, there was no time, therefore the element was dropped.

EQ 7: To what extent has EC support contributed to the reconstruction or expansion of social and economic infrastructure in Liberia, including power, roads, water and sanitation?

The Questions and Comments from EQ7 were

1. ECHO: We rehabilitated over 60 health centers, this is why EDF funds might not have been used for that purpose as much.

2. Attorney James Jensen (GAC): sees seminar important. The trickled down effects of EC support have not reached the vulnerable people. There is a need to put emphasis on monitoring and supervision. Need annual evaluation. He suggested evaluation every 2 years instead of every 10 years.

Reponse EC: This is only one type of evaluation the EC is doing; there are other monitoring and evaluation exercises that complete the picture.

EQ 8: To what extent has EC support to institutional reform and capacity development helped the Liberian Government to increase its capacity for adopting a legitimate role in providing key social services and infrastructure to the Liberian population?


1. Paul Smith EU: Too much emphasis is being placed on the GAC. There were other programs that combined capacity building with infrastructure but failed.

2. Is it not a problem of salary between public and private sector? Liberia pays its civil servants more than most African countries. For example, the Ministry of Health pays doctors 1400 United States Dollars, a lot more that what is paid in Sierra Leone, for example.

3. Alvin Atta (NAO Office): Some capacity building efforts at the county level have not been successful. If capacity building is embedded within the project, and the individuals are not available, in the county or district, the Project Manager implements the project work him/her self without local support. Is it possible to separate capacity building from other components of the project to give it more prominence?

4. Another problem is failure of the government to organize the counties. Almost all recruitments are done in Monrovia and not in counties. There is a need to empower the communities to make them better their lives.

5. GAC: Most of the counties don’t have a strategic plan/goal like GAC. EC should emphasize this to be eligible for assistance.

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EQ 9: To what extent has the EC helped to reduce the socio-economic marginalization of vulnerable groups in the population, identified as one of the root causes of past violent conflicts, through its support to the education sector?

Questions/comments to EQ 9

1. GAC: Having realized inadequate donor coordination to the extent that it affected your desire to help our education system. What measure is being put in place to improve coordination?

Martin: Donor had to figure out a way to coordinate themselves in line with the ministries, while the ministry was weak. Impression is that donors had their own priorities and approached the relevant ministry for approval. There was no line in what actually was sanctioned by the Ministry. It was a situation where you try to resist the temptation to see that your priorities matter and do not roll over weak ministry.

2. Was there any project linked to the Millennium Development Goals?

3. There were considerable delays and the priorities of the government have changed

Answer: Yes, the project is focusing on primary education, but due to the delay in the start of the educational project, the Ministry of Education priority had changed from primary to pre-primary education. There were series of meeting to resolve the issue. He mentioned that coordination is still a challenge. For example, there is aid coordination at the Ministries of Finance and Planning. It was suggested a marriage into one aid coordination office like in Sierra Leone. Want donors to be more flexible in their procedures.

EQ 10: To what extent have chosen cooperation frameworks and implementation mechanisms allowed adequate use of EC resources to facilitate the intended results of EC assistance to Liberia?

Questions and Comments

1. How can we understand if 10 components/ questions are interlinked with one another? Looking at them individually, it is difficult to understand the broad picture. Would like if the evaluation considered the synergy between projects or the effect of one activity on the other.

2. On cost, only administration and cost to implement the project. Also good to look at the effectiveness. An idea to see what impact has been achieved for the money spent.

3. Any clarification why the Delegation was understaffed?

Response Martin Steinmeyer: There is no systematic link between decision on committing money and ensuring that delegation has the capacity to implement. The link is neither expressed in the CSP (at the strategic level), nor in the Financing Agreements (the programme level).

Principal Conclusion and Recommendations

PC1: Capacity of EC in Liberia inadequate and EU Delegation too understaffed to respond to operational demands of large aid portfolio. It can lead to unfulfilled expectations among the Commission’s main partners.

PC2: Design of the EC’s cooperation strategy and commitment at political level of large-scale support during Liberia’s post-war years did not sufficiently consider the very limited implementation capacity of the EU’s own Delegation in Liberia.

PC3: European Commission’s procedures and mechanisms for design, planning and implementation did not adequately take into account the difficult conditions, vagaries, risks and operational constraints of Liberia’s post-conflict environment.

PC4: EC could successfully provide some relevant and important impulses for Liberia’s stabilisation, however, only in only a relatively small number of cases. Overall, EC contributions lagged significantly behind its real potential and value-added for assisting post-conflict societies and its commitment to focus support on the most vulnerable, marginalised Liberians.

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COMPLEMENTARY CONCLUSIONS

Consequences of inadequate operational capacity (PC1)

C5: Procedural delays prevented the EC from providing timely support in crucial post-war / post election years, affecting primarily education, but also infrastructure (electricity, water) and county development.

C6: Challenge of matching EC implementation capacity with organisational demands of aid portfolio is still current in the case of EDF10, especially considering the broad and all-inclusive layout of the strategy.

C7: In many sectors, EC-financed interventions and donor-financed programmes in general suffered from a lack of or at least insufficient coordination

Consequences of low capacity (PC1) (continued)

C8: Choice of ”contribution agreements” as one of the main vehicles for disbursing EC funds in Liberia was justified and helped to relieve some, but not all, of the pressure on the under-staffed EU Delegation.

Inadequacy of design, planning and implementation procedures (PC3)

C9: EC missed opportunity to use review of CSP in cooperation with the newly elected Government to establish clear strategic basis for its cooperation from 2006 onward, also in view of its own limited implementation / operational capacity.

C10: Technical knowledge & capacity of implementers and their familiarity with Liberia’s particular challenges often too low for EC to rely on their capacity alone to ensure the proficient implementation of projects

C11: European Commission itself was not able to adequately ensure that lessons-learned and knowledge from previous programmes were transferred into follow-up interventions.

C12: EC-financed programmes often lacked appropriate M&E of their outcome and impact, i.e. in particular in the case of Food Security Interventions and DDRR support.

C13: EC reliance on parallel structures (programme offices, DDCs) and TAs with operational responsibilities to push county-level development projects detracted from strengthening of county level administrative structures.

C14: Time horizon of many interventions too short to effectively establish or change social structures and behaviour that would have been needed to sustain benefits of EC-interventions.

C15: Lack of systematic and appropriate follow-up and care for earlier achievements limited the extent to which fledgling achievements could be secured and consolidated

C16: In some sectors, long chain of broker institutions and other intermediaries made management and ”learning” / handling of lessons learned difficult

C17: Mainstreaming of crosscutting issues, including Gender, was generally only treated as a formality without significance for making the issues count during beneficiary targeting and the implementation projects and programmes by the EC and its partners

Impulses emanating from EC support to Liberia (PC4)

C18: At policy level, the EC reacted speedily and decisively to chance of supporting stabilisation of peace process in Liberia. High level political involvement of EC in peace negotiations facilitated speedy adjustment of EC cooperation priorities to requirements.

C19: EC support of the DDRR process helped to stabilise the post-conflict situation in Liberia, by signalling the availability of post-war livelihoods opportunities and by helping to jump-start the return of IDPs and refugees.

C20: Provision of early”stop-gap” support in water and electricity to help fend off serious interruptions of basic services in Monrovia in the immediate aftermath of the war was relevant and effective

C21: Timely provision of technical competence, regional experience and TAs with exclusive responsibility for capacity building allowed the EC to make valuable contributions to the organisational development of Liberia’s General Audit Commission

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Important omissions (PC4)

C22: Delays, targeting shortfalls and technical weaknesses of EC projects have led to the situation where EC support so far has for the most part bypassed the medium- to long-term needs of the most vulnerable and marginalised Liberians.

Recommendation 1:

Strengthen operational and procedural linkages between commitment of development resources and the allocation of operational capacities and resources to EU Delegations

� Require that CSP drafting process includes assessment of EC operational capacity (amend CSP Framework / Format)

� Require that Technical and Administrative Provisions analyse

a) tasks / responsibilities expected from EC (Delegation, HQ);

b) estimated resource requirement (human and others) to carry out tasks

c) actual availability resources in Commission services

� EDF10: Conduct “capacity review” to determine gaps in EU Delegation staffing & develop fallback action plan

Recommendation 2:

Strengthen procedures and mechanisms that help EC and its implementing partners to adequately anticipate particular risks and constraints of working in Liberia, and in post-conflict countries in general.

� Specify more stringent requirements for ”risk analysis”, ”risk management strategies” during project identification and inception phase.

� Invest more time and resources into inception phase; tighten criteria applied to judging quality of inception reports (EC Backbone Strategy).

� Create and manage database of experienced (external) personnel that can be called upon to be used in the planning and implementation of interventions.

Recommendation 3:

Refocus efforts to channel assistance to the marginalised majority of Liberians, to make EC assistance count in particular for helping to reduce the socio-economic disadvantage of these population groups.

� Education: continue to pursue improvements of access to primary education through Liberia’s public education system. Seriously consider requests from the Liberian Government to extend support to secondary education.

� Infrastructure: Continue engagement in reconstruction of feeder roads; determined if additional support is needed in this sector, in time for EDF11.

� Food Security / Agriculture: back up considerable financial assistance with adequate strategy, adequately timed projects and highly skilled technical experts.

Recommendation 4:

Refocus and refine capacity development support to Liberia to reflect EC’s lessons-learnt and sustain and expand capacity development support, particularly at local level.

� Revise and improve the ”Project Implementation Arrangements” (PIA) of ongoing and future EC-financed capacity development projects.

� Step up adoption of EC ”backbone strategy” for ”reforming technical cooperation” (mapping of major TC operations)

� Use TAs primarily for ”supporting internal country processes , NOT to support implementation and of EC cooperation.

� Base interventions that aim at changing established social structures on more realistically timed work plans.

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Recommendation 5:

Improve strategic significance of sector coordination (education, capacity development, food security) to increase coherence of support and alignment with Liberian structures

� Develop clear operational and strategic principles for donor coordination in main sectors, jointly assessing options for Government-led donor coordination.

� Prioritize issues that should be subjected to increased coordination efforts.

� Outline how responsibility for donor coordination will be transferred exclusively to Liberian Government.

� Realistically assess how much Delegation staff time EC will be able to devote to donor coordination; factor this into commitments to donor coordination mechanisms.

Recommendation 6:

Increase attention on supervision, monitoring and evaluation of EC-financed projects, including those covered by contribution agreements with multilateral organisations.

� Make better use of potential of ROM missions and reports for results-oriented supervision and oversight of its programmes; followed ROM recommendations up more thoroughly and report progress.

� Limit the number of intermediaries involved in the delivery of EC-financed assistance in Liberia.

Recommendation 7:

Critically review “mainstreaming” of cross-cutting issues in Liberia and refocus mainstreaming approach in important sectors (education, health, county development)

� Adapt the “gender” and other issues to particular post-conflict circumstances in Liberia, jointly defining “appropriate practices”.

� Jointly develop operational principles and guidelines for individual sectors.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Questions

1. Is there a monitoring focal point in the delegation? The answer was not, but the EU has a well structured and systematic monitoring system. There were 3 monitoring missions last year. Monitoring is part of the different units’ job.

2. NAO Project Officer: there is a need to mention the role of the EC to Liberia VIA THE NAO Office.

3. Recommendation: there is a need to develop a simplified and uniformed format to monitor partners.

4. How were the recommendations prioritized as high or low? Capacity building needs to be in high priority.

5. Paul Smith: A principal conclusion has to do with how Brussels manage aid. How will conclusions be disseminated in Brussels.

Answer: There are a number of recommendations that will need to be addressed at HQ level; but it is still important to point these out, and to make them, hoping that at a systemic level, the EC will realize that action needs to be taken. However, there are also other recommendations that can be addressed directly at country level.

6. George F. Ville: Merci Corp: has a concern. A period of 10 years to do evaluation. Current grant falls short of some of the issues being address. How can these recommendations be filtered into the current grant? Martin says some are being addressed in EDF 10, for example giving more time to set up, to be ready. Certain things can be done relatively quickly, but some take time.

While some recommendations will be carried to EDF 11, some will be harder to implement. The EDF funds will be managed by NAO.

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Closure of the Seminar

The Seminar was closed with the below remarks:

EU: thanks all participants. The evaluation has focused on the post conflict situation, the challenges of implementation aid in a post conflict situation, the challenges of capacity building, and delivering aid to the most vulnerable groups. The actual recommendations will be taken into account for the 11th EDF.

NAO: the Deputy National Authorizing Officer thanked all, including the evaluation team. The seminar could not have been held at a better time with the start of the 11 EDF. The picture is clear of where the gaps are. He requested to have for the final copy.

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List of participants (in order of arrival)

No. Name Ministry / Agency Telephone

1 Alvin Attah MPEA / NAO 06992226

2 Cristin Matnman LTTA / NAO 063733987

3 Paolo Girlando LTTA / NAO 077166654

4 Francesca Varlese EU Delegation 077731777

5 Moses Zinnah MDA 06420955

6 Jean-Louis Bolly Joint Evaluation Unit, EC Brussels

0032299256

7 Annie Demen AEDE / Independent 06571375

8 Martin Steinmeyer EC Evaluator / Independent

001 919 321 8520

9 Attilio Pacifico EU / Ambassador 077731760

10 A Nimely NAO / MOPEA 06968747

11 Paula Vazquez EU Delegation 077731759

12 George F. Viller, Jr. Mercy Corps (NGO) 06592864

13 Carlos Battaglio EU Delegation 077731780

14 George Ozongi Merlin (NGO) 06444290

15 Dr. Bodo Schaff German Ambassador to Liberia

16 Alberto Giani Care (NGO) 06136546

17 Joan Casanova EU Delegation 077731761

18 George Francis IWA Danish Refugee Council (NGO)

06664203

19 Massimo Stella Action Contre La Faim (NGO) (ACF)

06847284

20 Koen Henckaerts ECHO / EU Delegation 06546337

21 Alice Vahawian MON 06543135

22 Mark Kane Concern (NGO) 06642557

23 Maria Keating UNDP 06930218

24 Paul Smith EU Delegation 077731724

25 Christine Cheng Care (NGO) 06797959

26 Adolfo Cires EU Delegation 077731774

27 Sidui Bah Oxfam (NGO) 077536554

28 Aloysius C Heagbetu Lisgis 06539562

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29 Letla Mosenene FFI Liberia 06484198

30 James N. Jensen GAC 06542275

31 Calvin Brooks Liberty Radio 0777066377

32 Serena Oaviccy World Bank 06977424

33 Martus Kl. Bangalu MOPEA / NAO 06548390

34 Mr. Jackon Trocaire (NGO) 06904603

35 Emmanuel Pavey FAO 06510436

36 Rajesh Singh Concern Worldwide (NGO)

06498502