country report egypt - greasegrease.eui.eu/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2019/11/egypt...egypt country...

CountryReport

Egypt

H.A.Hellyer

November2019

http://grease.eui.eu

This Country Report offers a detailed assessment of religious diversity and violentreligiousradicalisationintheabove-namedstate.PublishedbytheGREASEproject,thisreportispartaseriescovering23countriesonfourcontinents.EachreportintheserieshasacorrespondingCountryProfile(issuedseparately)offeringmorebasicinformationaboutreligiousaffiliationandstate-religionrelationsinthegivencountry.BoththereportsandprofilesareavailableontheGREASEprojectwebsite.Countriescoveredinthisseries:Albania,Australia,Belgium,BosniaandHerzegovina,Bulgaria,Egypt,France,Germany,Greece, Italy,Hungary, India, Indonesia, Lebanon,Lithuania,Malaysia,Morocco,Russia,Slovakia,Spain,Tunisia,TurkeyandtheUnitedKingdom.

TheGREASEprojecthasreceivedfundingfromtheEuropeanUnion'sHorizon2020researchandinnovationprogrammeundergrantagreementnumber770640

EgyptCountryReportGREASE

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WhatistheGREASEproject?Involving researchers from Europe, North Africa, theMiddle East, Asia and Oceania,GREASEisinvestigatinghowreligiousdiversityisgovernedin23countries.Ourworkfocusesoncomparingnorms,lawsandpracticesthatmay(ormaynot)proveusefulinpreventing religious radicalisation. Our research also sheds light on how differentsocietiescopewiththechallengeofintegratingreligiousminoritiesandmigrants.Theaim is to deepen our understanding of how religious diversity can be governedsuccessfully,withanemphasisoncounteringradicalisationtrends.Whileexploringreligiousgovernancemodelsinotherpartsoftheworld,GREASEalsoattemptstounravel theEuropeanparadoxofreligiousradicalisationdespitegrowingsecularisation. We consider the claim that migrant integration in Europe has failedbecausesecondgenerationyouthhavebecomemarginalisedandradicalised,withsometurning to jihadist terrorism networks. The researchers aim to deliver innovativeacademic thinking on secularisation and radicalisation while offering insights forgovernanceofreligiousdiversity.TheprojectisbeingcoordinatedbyProfessorAnnaTriandafyllidoufromTheEuropeanUniversityInstitute(EUI)inItaly.OtherconsortiummembersincludeProfessorTariqModood fromTheUniversityofBristol (UK);Dr.H.A.Hellyer from theRoyalUnitedServices Institute (RUSI) (UK); Dr.MilaMancheva from The Centre for the Study ofDemocracy (Bulgaria); Dr. Egdunas Racius from Vytautas Magnus University(Lithuania); Mr. Terry Martin from the research communications agency SPIA(Germany);ProfessorMehdiLahloufromMohammedVUniversityofRabat(Morocco);Professor Haldun Gulalp of The Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation(Turkey); Professor PradanaBoy ofUniversitasMuhammadiyahMalang (Indonesia);Professor Zawawi Ibrahim of The Strategic Information and Research DevelopmentCentre (Malaysia); Professor Gurpreet Mahajan of Jawaharlal Nehru University(India);andProfessorMicheleGrossmanofDeakinUniversity(Melbourne,Australia).GREASEisscheduledforcompletionin2022.ForfurtherinformationabouttheGREASEprojectpleasecontact:ProfessorAnnaTriandafyllidou,[email protected]

http://grease.eui.eu/GREASE-Radicalisation,SecularismandtheGovernanceofReligion:BringingTogetherEuropeanandAsianPerspectives


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Table of Contents

ReligiousdiversityinEgypt:socio-demographiccontext,institutionalframeworkandradicalizationchallenges......................................................................................................4Introduction:AnOverviewofEgypt.................................................................................................4

Egypt’sSocialMakeupandChallenges:.....................................................................................5Socialcomposition:................................................................................................................................5Thebirthandchallengeofradicalisation......................................................................................6

HistoryandCurrentStructureofState-OrganizedReligionRelations:.........................8Egypt’sregulatoryframeworkasarepublicunderAbdel-Nasser:.......................................8

Egypt’sregulatorycurrentframework:....................................................................................8

ReligiousExtremismChallenges:...............................................................................................11State’sCounter-RadicalizationEfforts:CasesandResponses.........................................13Lawandthejudiciary:Firstlinesofattack..................................................................................13ReligiousinstitutionsinEgypt’sWaronTerror........................................................................15Non-statealliances...............................................................................................................................16Regionalcooperation..........................................................................................................................17Militarycampaigns..............................................................................................................................17

Conclusion..........................................................................................................................................18

TimelineofmaineventsthataffectedreligiousdynamicsinrecentEgyptianhistory:................................................................................................................................................19References..........................................................................................................................................21


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Religious diversity in Egypt: socio-demographic context, institutional framework and radicalization challenges Introduction: An Overview of Egypt

Asacountrywithapopulationof108millionandahistorystretchingbackto7000BC,Egyptnaturallyhasalongmulti-layeredandrichhistoryofreligiousdiversity.1ButthereligiouslandscapeofmodernEgyptisfarlesslayeredincomparisontoitspast.

About90percentofEgyptiansfollowSunniIslamandtheremaining10percentfollowCopticOrthodoxChristianity.OtherconfessionsofChristianityandShi’iMuslimshaveamoredifficulttimefindingspacewithintheexistingregulatoryframework.Anyandallmembers of other religious faiths are not recognized by the state. Judaism remainsrecognizedbutonlyahandfulofitsEgyptiansfollowersareinthecountry.23

ThemostseriousthreattoreligiousdiversityinEgyptatthemomentstemsfromthepolarisation in the country following the 2011-2013 period, which ended with themilitary overthrow of the country’s first democratically elected president,MohamedMorsi of theMuslimBrotherhood (MB), in July2013 amidmassprotests against hisshort,divisive rule.4Thiswas followedbyan intensesecurity crackdown,potentiallycontributingtothevulnerabilityofthecountrytonarrativesvis-à-visextremism.

A flurryofextremist Islamistorganizationsemergedstronger in theaftermathof thecoup,includingJundal-Islam,al-Murabitunand,mostimportantly,WilayatSinai:theso-called“IslamicState”resilientaffiliateinNorthSinai.ThelattertargetedChristiansandSunniMuslimswho practice Sufism,whom they view as heretics, on top of securitypersonnelandstateofficialswithdevastatingefficiencyinrecentyears.567

TheoverthrowofMorsicontributedtoadangerousschisminEgyptiansociety,wherehis supporters began to deeply resent those sectors of society opposed to Morsi,particularlyChristians,whoparticipatedinmassagainstMorsi’sruleintheleaduptotheoverthrowandblamedthemforthestateviolencethatensued.HundredsofMorsisupportersrespondedbyattackingover220churchesandChristianpropertiesacross

1Pérez-Accino,José,"AncientEgyptgaverisetooneoftheworld'soldestChristianfaiths",NationalGeographic,19April2019,https://on.natgeo.com/2ZNgaRF2EgyptSurvey2017.Egyptiangovernment.https://www.capmas.gov.eg/Pages/Publications.aspx?page_id=7195&Year=234483ElGergawi,Sherry,"EgyptmilitaryrestoringchurchesdestroyedfollowingMorsi'souster",AhramOnline,7February2016,english.ahram.org.eg/News/185985.aspx4Speri,Alice,"Egypt’sRabaaMassacreof1,000MorsiSupportersWent‘AccordingtoPlan’",VICENews,12August2014,https://news.vice.com/en_us/article/yw4k87/egypts-rabaa-massacre-of-1000-morsi-supporters-went-according-to-plan5“LiwaaAl-Thawra”,TahrirInstituteforMiddleEastPolicy(TIMEP),29March2017https://is.gd/TSrihB6“Hasam”,TIMEP,29March2017,https://is.gd/iLangP7Awad,Mokhtar;Hashem,Mostafa,“Egypt’sEscalatingIslamistinsurgency”,CarnegieMiddleEastCentre,21October2015https://is.gd/qVZM6I


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thecountry inresponsetothemassacresof thepro-MorsiprotestcampsofRaba’al-‘Adawiyaandal-NahdainAugust2013.Egyptiansonbothsidesoftheconflict,withhelpfromrelentlesspropagandafromstate-controlledandpro-MBmediaoutlets,cametoseeeachotherasterroristswhowereexistentiallyintentondestroyingtheother.8

The military-dominated regime has repeatedly dismissed the idea of reconciliation.WhatisleftofEgypt’sdifferentpoliticalgroupsremaininshockwhilemutualfeelingsofanimosity and distrust continues to grow unabated between Egypt’s religiouscommunities.IncidentsofcommunalviolenceagainstChristianshavebeenontheriseinUpperEgypt;membersofSufiordersremainharassedbyIslamistextremistsinNorthSinai; and citizens who have non-conformist views are reluctant to air their viewspublicly.

Egypt’s Social Makeup and Challenges:

Social composition:

Totalpopulation: 99,363,807

Muslims 90.00%

Christians 10%

Bahais N/A

Non-believers N/ASources:EgyptSurvey2017,CentralAgencyforPublicMobilizationandStatistics,Egyptiangovernment.https://www.capmas.gov.eg/Pages/Publications.aspx?page_id=7195&Year=23448 and El Gergawi,Sherry.“EgyptmilitaryrestoringchurchesdestroyedfollowingMorsi'souster”,AhramOnline.(2016.)EgyptistheArabworld’smostpopulouscentre,withapopulationof108million.9SunniMuslimsmakeupabout90percentofthispopulation,whiletheremaining10percentareChristian.10TheCopticOrthodoxChurchaccountfor90percentofEgypt’sChristians,whiletherestincludeAnglicanorEpiscopalianandProtestantdenominations;Jehovah’sWitnesses;Mormons;GreekandSyrianOrthodox;andArmenianApostolic.Thecountry,whichhasBahai11,Shi’iMuslim,andJewishcommunities,alsohasatheistandagnosticpopulations.However,therearenoreliableestimatesorfiguresforthesegroups.

8Coleman,Jasmine."EgyptelectionresultsshowfirmwinforIslamists,"TheGuardian.21Jan.2012.https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jan/21/egypt-election-clear-islamist-victory9EgyptSurvey2017.Egyptiangovernment.https://www.capmas.gov.eg/Pages/Publications.aspx?page_id=7195&Year=23448 10ElGergawi,Sherry,"EgyptmilitaryrestoringchurchesdestroyedfollowingMorsi'souster",AhramOnline,7February2016,english.ahram.org.eg/News/185985.aspx11TheBahai’sareanoffshootofShi’iIslam–thereligiondatesbacktothe19thcentury.ItisnotrecognisedasapartofShi’ismbyShi’iMuslims,nordoBahai’sconsiderthemselvesassuch.


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Accordingtogovernmentfigures,closeto28percentofEgypt’spopulationearn$28.6amonth,fallingbelowhalfoftheinternationalpovertylineof$1.9aday.12TheaverageEgyptianfamily,consistingoffourpeople,earnsabout$2600ayear.Furthermore,only56percentofhomesarelinkeduptothecountry’ssanitationsystem.13

TheaverageEgyptianfamily’seconomicwoesare,unsurprisingly,closelycorrelatedtotheauthoritarianruleunderwhichthecountryfellthroughoutitshistory.Pre-1952,thepopulationconsistedlargelyofpeasantswhogrewgrain,thecountry’smainsourceoffoodandexport.

WiththeriseoftheFreeOfficersmovementin1952,ledbytheArabnationalistGamalAbdal Nasser, a welfare systemwas introduced, and the government promised freeeducationforall,andpublicsectoremployment.Thesepoliciesresonatedwidelywiththemasses,whose social contractwith the statemandated political acquiescence inexchangeforupwardsocialmobilityformillionsofEgyptians.However,corruptionandmismanagement of state funds eroded these benefits. For instance, the quality ofeducationdeterioratedmassivelythatareportdescribedAbdalNasser’spromiseasa“falseentitlement,especiallyforthepoor,”saying“theeducationavailabletothemhasbeenofsuchpoorqualityastomakeitoflittlerealeconomicbenefit.”14

Furthermore,therapidlygrowingpopulation,whichmorethanquintupledsince1952,meantthatthegovernmentbecameunabletocreatejobsattherequiredpace.

The birth and challenge of radicalisation

Egypt’s President Sisi often describes extremism as the biggest challenge facing thecountry today. Members of Egypt’s religious minorities tend to agree, calling it anexistentialthreattothediversityleftinthecountry.15

Undertheguiseofcombattingextremism,Sisi,asthedefenceministerin2013,ledthemilitaryoverthrowoftheIslamist-ledgovernmentandthefollowingcrackdown.Overthecourseofthefollowingweeksandmonths,therewasaspikeinattacksonchurchesandChristianproperty–particularlythedayofandfollowingtheforcefuldispersalofthepro-Morsisit-ins–leavingover220churchestorched,andprovidedanarrativethatledtoamilitantgroupinSinaicalledAnsarBaytal-Maqdisgainingmoreprominencethanhitherto.OpponentstothemilitaryanditscrackdownagainstMorsi’ssupportersfalsely considered Christians to be disproportionately responsible for the military’smove,whichlikewisefedintodiscoursethatproblematisedthemfurtherviahatespeechandincitementtoviolence.

12CentralAgencyforPublicMobilizationandStatistics’graphshowingpercentageofthoseunabletoaffordthecostofobtainingfoodonly(costofsurvival)https://www.capmas.gov.eg/Pages/IndicatorsPage.aspx?Ind_id=112113ibid14Birdsall,Nancy,"PuttingeducationtoworkinEgypt",CarnegieEndowmentCenterforInternationalPeace,25August1999https://carnegieendowment.org/1999/08/25/putting-education-to-work-in-egypt-pub-685%20Car 15 Sayed, Ashraf, “Countering terrorism is the most dangerous issue for 2018: Sisi follows the Comprehensive Military Operation in Sinai”, Veto, 9 February 2018, https://www.vetogate.com/3062805


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Theseeventstappedintoanexistingcrisisofradicalisationwithinthecountry,whichispartially connected to the spread of purist Salafism in Egypt from the 1970s. Largenumbersofmostlyblue-collarworkersmigratingtothenascent,oil-richeconomiesoftheArabianGulf,ledtotheintensificationofthepresenceofSaudi-stylepuristSalafism,invariousforms,someofwhichweremoreextremethanothers.16Thiscombinedwithotherfactors,includingtheglobalpost-9/11surge,furtherprovidedtheenvironmentformorereceptiverecruitstoradicalismincountrieslikeEgypt.17

The“ArabSpring”periodincluded,alongsidemovementsagainstauthoritarianregimes,themeteoricriseofISIS.Withitsflashyandshockingpropagandavideos,itcapturedtheimagination of some of Egypt’s extremist Islamist-leaning youths. These youthwereencouragedbymanyfactors,bothonthemacroorindividuallevel,totakeuparmsandjoinmilitants.

One such factor, thathasproved significant innarrativesof extremists, is the state’srestrictive policies.Since 2013, human rights organisations report that the stateoversawviolationstobasicrightsinitsquesttocrackdownondissent,withmassarrestsandabuses.18With state laws criminalizingmost formsofpeaceful opposition,manyyouthsbecame receptive to the narrative that violence is their only option. Inmanycases,youths claimed they were motivated by the desire to retaliate against staterepression,eveniftheywereoriginallyapolitical.

Geopolitical factors also facilitate theexistence and adaptionof violent actorswithinEgyptianborders,aswiththecasesofnorthernSinaiandtheWesternDesert.InSinai,geopolitics intertwineswith structural grievances, includingpolitical and economicfactors.

Fallingontheborder,wherethecentralgovernment’ssecuritygripisfragile,theNorthofthepeninsulabecameahotbedformilitantstotakeuprootandtorecruitaminorityof the disgruntled population.Also,the region was idealforcriminal and illegalpractices, which provided resources for militants and secures their survival in thepeninsula.

Lack of proper religious education aids in the recruitment process of youth byradicals.Mediareportsonjailsanddetentioncentresshowthatthosewithoutsufficientreligiousknowledgearevulnerabletoradicalbrainwashing.

AccordingtoanotedresearcherontheMB’strajectories19,policiesofdetentioncentresthemselveswork in favour of radicalisation.Withmanynon-violent prisoners facingterrorism-related charges, scores endup jailedwith radicals in the same cell,wheredebatesanddiscussionsbetween inmates can result in the successful recruitmentofyouth,eitherbypressureorpersuasion.

16Rock-Singer,Aaron,"Islamicmediaandreligiouschangein1970sEgypt",MPCJournal,23January2017,https://mpc-journal.org/blog/2017/01/23/islamic-media-and-religious-change-in-1970s-egypt/17ByersD.,Bryan;JonesA.,James,"Theimpactoftheterroristattacksof9/11onanti-Islamichatecrime,"JournalofEthnicityinCriminalJustice,5:1,2007,p43-5618Roth,Kenneth,“Egypt:Eventsof2017”,HumanRightsWatch,https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2018/country-chapters/egypt19Ayyash,Abdelrahman,“Strongorganization,weakideology”,ArabReformInitiative,29thApril2019,https://is.gd/34SxEH


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Oneofthefactorsattractingmanyyouthstomilitantgroupsistheirneedtofulfilasenseofachievementandaccomplishment.Armedgroups’propagandasuccessfullymarketstheirvictoriesagainstofficialtroopsontheground.Withanoutreachandqualitythatareunprecedented, thispropaganda isunmatchedbyplayersofmainstreampoliticalIslamism,whocanneitherafford,noraretechnicallyequippedtocounterit.

Regional developments and foreign policy are also very importantdeterminants inradicalisation.20After all, it is the common element between the post-2011wave ofviolence and the ones that followed the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan andAmerican occupation of Iraq.Amidst the 2011 uprisings, Iranian andRussianinterventions supporting theSyrian regimeagainst themostly-Sunni insurgentshavespurredmanyEgyptianyouthtotakesidesintheconflicttosupportciviliansandthevulnerable.21

History and Current Structure of State-Organized Religion Relations:

Egypt’s regulatory framework as a republic under Abdel-Nasser:

With Egypt becoming a republic in 1952, its three-star flag resembling its diversepopulationwasreplaced,andanArabnationalistidentityoverpoweredanyother.Eventhough the state claimed it was a neutral protector of Egypt’s three main religiouscommunities -- theMuslims,Christiansand Jews -- its securityagenciesandpoliticalelitepursuedJewsand,toalesserextent,ChristiansforallegedtiestoIsrael.

AstheEgyptianstatewaspreoccupiedwiththestruggletotakebacktheSinaiPeninsulafromtheIsraelisandtransitionfromamonarchyintoarepublic,littleattentionwaspaidtorelationsbetweenreligiouscommunities.

ThischangedslightlyafterAbdel-Nasser,Egypt’snewruler,survivedanassassinationattemptandblameditonIslamistmovements liketheMBandoversawacrackdownagainstthemin1956.Theepisodeendedwiththeexecutionoftheirfounder,Hassanal-Banna,andthearrestandabuseofmanyofitsfollowers.

Egypt’s regulatory current framework:

Since the latePresidentAnwarElSadat’s1971constitutionaladjustments, Islamhasbeenamainsourceof legislation,presumably towinoverconservativesupport.Thecurrentconstitution,passedin2014andamendedin2019,isinlinewiththis.Likeitspredecessors, itacknowledgesthethreeAbrahamicreligion,and its thirdarticlesays

20Drevon,Jerome,“EmbracingSalafiJihadisminEgyptandMobilizingintheSyrianJihad”,MiddleEastCritique,25:4,18July2016,pp321-339,p9-1021Ahmed,NouranS.,“Towardunderstandingviolenceandrevisingcounter-violencepoliciesinsouthernMediterranean”,Euromesco,April2019https://is.gd/wJCITU


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thatJudaismandChristianityarethesourcesoflegislationforpersonalstatuslawfortheiradherents.

With time, relations between religious communities became a more sensitive issuedomesticallyandanissueofinternationalconcernastheextremistIslamistcrisisbegantodevelopfromthe1970s.

New rounds of repression in the 80s and 90s followed the 1981 assassination byextremistsofAbdel-Nasser’ssuccessor,AnwarElSadat,formakingpeacewithIsraelin1973. Stories of torture and killings in Egypt’s detention centres helped both theBrotherhood and Salafi groups, like Ansar al-Sunna and al-Gama’a al-Islamiyaa, gainsome sympathy in Egyptian society. This paved the way to the current chargedatmosphereofmistrustthatEgyptsuffersfrom.AsefBayatargues:

“The major difference lay in the fact that Egypt began to develop a fairly powerfulIslamistmovementsincethepresidencyofAnwarSadatwhopaidlipservicetotherising“Islamic Associations” in the universities as a way to undermine the Nasseristnationalists and communists as he was drawing close to the West. These IslamicAssociationsgrewand, intheprocess,gotradicalizedbythe1980sduring(PresidentHosni)Mubarak’srule,turningintotheinsurgental-Gama’aal-Islamiyyaandal-Jihad.TogetherwiththepowerfulMuslimBrotherhood,whohadmaintainedtheirnon-violentstrategy,andotheremerginggroups,Egyptexperiencedastrong“Islamicmode”duringthe1990sandearly2000s.Egypt’s Islamismdevelopedbasicallyoutsideandeveninoppositiontoal-Azharortheinstitutionoftheulema.”22

TheEgyptstate’sapproachtoreligiousdiversity,since1952,wasandcontinuestobereactionary and largely dormant,meaning the state only acts in order to contain anoutburstofviolenceorissueperfunctoryreassurancesthatallEgyptianswereseenasequalperiodically.

Egyptians falling outside of the three Abrahamic religions - like atheists, Bahais,agnostics-haveandcontinuetobeunacknowledgedbythestateanditslaws.

The regime, however,maintains that article 64of the constitution,which states that“freedomof religion is absolute,” has and still doesprovide sufficient guarantees forEgyptianstopracticeandholdothernon-Abrahamicbeliefs.

Butthisspecificationhasnotremovedbureaucraticlimitations,someofwhichdatebackto the Ottoman-era, which restrain Copts’ ability to build places of worship, forexample.23Upuntil2016,Egypthadalaw,issuedin1934bytheinteriorministry,thatforbade the building of churches near schools or railway stations.24In 2016, Copticleaderspraisedthepartial liftingofsomeofits limitations, likeomittingthepreviousrequirementofobtainingpermissionfromsecurityagenciesbeforebuildingchurches.

22Gokmen,Ozgur,“FiveyearsaftertheArabuprisings:AninterviewwithAsefBayat”Jadaliyya,30April2016https://www.jadaliyya.com/Details/3322223Abouelenein,Ahmed;Abdellah,Mohamed,"Egyptianparliamentapproveslong-awaitedchurchbuildinglaw,"Reuters,30August2016https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-politics-religion/egyptian-parliament-approves-long-awaited-church-building-law-idUSKCN1152KK24Mazel,Zvi,“AnewlawaimstomakebuildingchurchesinEgypteasier–Butwillitwork?",TheJerusalemPost,6September2016,https://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/A-new-law-aims-to-make-building-churches-in-Egypt-easier-but-will-it-work-466890


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The2016lawdoesmaintaintheauthorities’righttochoosethesizeofthechurchbasedonthenumberofChristiansinitsarea—acalculationthatisdifficulttoassesssincethegovernmentdoesnot accept independent tallies of Christiansby church leaders, nordoesitcountthemitself.25

Other constitutional articles that do providemore protections, like article 65,whichguarantees freedomof expression, is constrained by the vaguelyworded penal codearticlesof98(f),160and161.26Eventhoughtheconstitution’slegalauthorityoverridesthat of the penal code, the aforementioned vaguely-worded articles are routinelyemployedbyauthorities toprosecutepeople for theirexpressedviews.27Since2011,therehavebeenatleast63suchcases,andin2017theUSCommissiononInternationalReligiousFreedomrankedEgyptsixthintheworldforharshblasphemylaws.28

Even when there are no penal or civil codes obstructing the application of liberalconstitutionalarticles,likearticle53thatcriminalisesreligion-baseddiscrimination,thestatehasfailedtoapplythem.Forexample,itisextremelydifficultforMuslimstochangetheirreligionstatusontheirnationalID,butitispossibleforChristianstochangetheirstoIslam.TheBahaiswere,accordingtopressreports,theonlynon-AbrahamicreligiousminoritytoevercomeclosetogettingrecognitionintheirnationalID.Aftersuingthegovernment, all that they managed to achieve in 2009 was replace their religiousidentificationwithadash(-).29

Outsidecivilrightsmatters,article2,whichstatesthattheprinciplesoftheShariaaretheprinciplesourceoflegislation,hashadlittleimpactonEgyptianlaws,whoseFrenchorigins(intermsofcivillaw)arearelicofthe19thcenturyFrenchoccupationofEgypt.Article2actsasa restrainingmechanism in termsof legalprecedent, rather thananactivepositivelaw-makingmechanism.

Thereare,however,signsthatthestate’sapproachtogoverningtherelationsbetweenreligiouscommunitiesmaychangeorbecomemoreproactiveinthenear-ormedium-term.PresidentSisihasbeenattendingChristmasmasscelebrationssince2016,whichsentanobjectivelysmallbutrareandsignificantmessageofinclusiontothepublicasheisthefirstEgyptianpresidenttodoso.30Atthesametime,theincreaseinprosecutionsofperceivedinsultstoreligionsignalledtomanyachangeofstate’spolicyofindifferencetowardsnon-conformiststhatwaspresentpriortotheriseofIslamistradicalisation.31

25Abouelenein&Abdellah26Barsoum,Marina."Egypt'santi-blasphemylaw:Defenceofreligionortoolforpersecution?"AhramOnline,15May2016,english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/151/216896/Egypt/Features/Egypts-antiblasphemy-law-Defence-of-religion-or-to.aspx27Ibid28"Rankingcountriesbytheirblasphemylaws",TheEconomist,13August2017,https://www.economist.com/erasmus/2017/08/13/ranking-countries-by-their-blasphemy-laws?fsrc=rss29"Egypt:DecreeEndsIDBiasAgainstBaha'is",HumanRightsWatch,15April2009,https://www.hrw.org/news/2009/04/15/egypt-decree-ends-id-bias-against-bahais30"Egypt'sSisiattendsCopticChristmascelebrationamidtightsecurity,"Xinhua.7January2018.www./xinhuanet.com/english/2018-01/07/c_136877006.htm31Darwish,Passant."Egypt's'waronatheism',"AhramOnline.15January2015.english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/151/120204/Egypt/Features/Egypts-war-on-atheism.aspx


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Religious Extremism Challenges:

i) Violentnon-jihadi32current:Segmentsof thewiderMB-inspireduniversewhich tookuparmsafter2013, are theprincipal representative of this category.Those armed groups are knownas the“QualitativeCommittees”(QC),andcametolifeofficiallyandorganizationallyin2014,withthesupportofMohamedKamal.AmemberoftheMB’sGuidanceBureau,KamelledacurrentwithinthewiderMB-universethatendorsedamore‘confrontational’attitude,whichappearstohaveincludedcertaintypesofviolence.AstheMBfragmented,KamalemergedasthegodfatherandengineerofQC,andhispoliticalwingwasreportedlyableto consolidate control oversome provincial bureaus along the Nile Delta, includingFayoum, Alexandria, BaniSoueif,Minya, Giza, Cairo,QalyoubiaandMunifiya,withfluctuatinginfluenceonsomebureaus.33ThefirstsuchgroupreportedlyfoundedunderKamal’s supervision to deploy such violence was the Popular Resistance andRevolutionaryPunishmentgroup(PRRP)in2015.Kamelwaskilledbysecurityforcesin2016.

Other groups includeLiwa’al-Thawra, which claimed the assassination ofGeneralRegai, commander of the ninth armoured division in Dahshur in2016.34Hasm(Sawa’idMisr) is another group thatwas established in 2016 and hasconducted both explosive attacks andtargeted policemen.It also attempted theassassinationoftheformergrandmufti,AliGomaa,andthedeputyprosecutor,GeneralZakariaAbdelAziz.35

Othersmaller,short-livedgroupswerepossiblyexperimentsleadingtotheemergenceofQC.TheseincludeMaghouloun(Anonymous),Wala’a(SetonFire)andMolotov,whichprovided instructionsonhowtouseMolotovcocktailsagainstpolice forces.Anotherentity,called‘Edam(Execution),aimedatassassinatingpolicemenandthugshiredbysecurity forces to chase and beat demonstrators. Finally, there were theHelwanBrigades,whoweremostlyarrestedshortlyafterseveraloperations.36

Thesecurrents,madeupmostlyofMBsupporters,usedminimalreligiousinterpretationtojustifytheiruseofviolence,emphasizingontherighttouseviolencetodefendtheirlivesandagainst those who kill the protesters.Generally speaking, this category’sdiscourse focuseson conceptsof “resistance”, “revengeon stateapparatusdue to its

32Weuse‘jihadi’hereasatermthatisusedgenerallyintheliterature,whilenotingthat‘jihad’isusedwidelyinIslamicliteratureinthesamewaythat‘justwar’isusedinCatholicdoctrines.Inotherwords,whilethewordhasbeeninstrumentalisedbyextremists,ithasaverynormativebasiswithinIslamicthought,anddoesnotautomaticallymeanextremism.Indeed,Muslimsofallnormativetypesviewthewordinapositivefashion.AsoneIslamicscholarmentioned,‘terrorismistojihadwhatadulteryistomarriage’.33Hamama,Mohamed,“InteriorministrypolicyinkstheendoftheQualitativeCommittees’Engineer”,MadaMasr,4October2016,https://is.gd/zORpss34“LiwaaAl-Thawra”,TahrirInstituteforMiddleEastPolicy(TIMEP),29March2017https://is.gd/TSrihB35“Hasam”,TIMEP,29March2017,https://is.gd/iLangP36VideopublishedbyAl-MasryAl-YowmallegedlyshowingHelwanBrigadesfightersintheirfirstappearancehttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-OQMPeJk60U


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violations”and“restoringtheIslamicruleofMohamedMorsi”.37However,recentpublicstatementsissuedbythePRRPrevealashiftinthediscourseandthetechnicalaspectsof the videos, which could imply the influence of extremist actors or a possiblecollaboration.38

Theseviolent,non-jihadi groupsmainlyoperate in themainlandand, apart from theaforementioned human targets, theyalso attackedproperties, infrastructure,andeconomicinterests.

ii) ViolentSalafi-Jihadicurrent:ThiscategorycomprisesofSalafi-JihadiactorsaffiliatedeitherwithISISorAl-Qaeda,orsomerelativelylocaljihadiactors.WhileitisknownthatbothISISandAl-Qaedamainlyoperateinremoteandborderareas,eitherintheSinaiPeninsulaortheWesternDesert,theyarealsoactive in themainlandtosomeextent.Bothgroupsareknownfor theirhighly advanced training, strategies and equipment as militias, and are togetherresponsibleforsomeofthedeadliestoperationsagainstsecurityforces.

WithregardstoISIS-affiliatedactors,thisconsistsofAnsarBaital-Maqdis(ABM)whichdeclared allegiance to ISIS in 2014 andrenamed itself asWilayatSinai (the SinaiProvince).Mainly operating in Sinai, the group’s scope of targets has significantlybroadened following the 2013 overthrow ofMorsi, from primarily targeting the gaspipelinesbetweenEgyptand Israeland IsraelisnearSinai, to thenattackingsecurityforces, civilians accused of aiding security forces, and more recently tourists, likedowningtheRussianpassengerjetin2015;Christians,throughkillingthemorforcingthemtofleetheirhomesinSinai;andSufigroups,throughthe2017attackonamosquethatleftover305worshippersdead.Theyhavetakenhostages,mainlyforeigners.39

Thereisalsotheso-called“IslamicStateinEgypt”(ISE)(i.e.,ISISinEgypt),whichlikelymaintainsconnectionswiththeSinaiProvince.ISEismainlyactiveinthemainland,andsomeanalyststhinkitismostlycentredinCairoandGiza,withlesspresenceinothergovernorates.40IthasclaimedmajoroperationslikebombinganItaliangovernmentalofficeinCairo,andattacksonCopticchurchesinCairoandAlexandria.41Theirversionof Salafi-Jihadism is derived from that of Al-Qa’eda, which regards the state and itsapparatusasapostates.

As forAl-Qaeda-affiliateactors, theseareactive inbothSinaiand thewesterndesert.One of their major armsisJundAl-Islam, which conducted several attacks on statefacilitiesinSinai.42However,Al-Murabitun,whichwasfoundedbyformerspecialforcesofficerHishamAshmawywhowaspreviouslyamemberinABM,isthemostprominent

37Awad,Mokhtar;Hashem,Mostafa,“Egypt’sEscalatingIslamistinsurgency”,CarnegieMiddleEastCentre,21October2015https://is.gd/qVZM6I38Mcmanus,Allison;Green,Jake,“Egypt’smainlandterrorismlandscape”,TIMEP,7June2016https://is.gd/kCS9mj39“WilayatSinai”,TIMEP,23July2014https://timep.org/esw/non-state-actors/wilayat-sinai/40Mcmanus&Green,ibid.41“IslamicStateInEgypt”,TIMEP,8May017https://is.gd/hEnWWX42“JundAl-Islam”,TIMEP,22July2014https://is.gd/KY67z3


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armed group believed to be affiliated with Al-Qaeda.It is active in thewesterndesertandLibyaandisreportedtoincludesomeformermilitaryofficers.43

Otherlower-profileviolent groupswith ties to Al-Qaeda andAshmawy are Ansar al-IslamandJabhatal-Tahrir.44Theformerisrecognisedforits2017attackinthewesternoasis which left 58 officers andsoldiers killed. 45 Itcameback to the scenebydeclaringnew attacks oneconomic propertiesof American corporation forpetroleum“Apache”, by using IEDs, whilst threatening British Petroleum, Italiancorporation(ENI)andApachetoleavethecountryandtowithholdalltheiroperationsonEgyptland.46Anotheraffiliateofal-QaedaisAnsaral-Sharia,whichhasbeenactiveinEgyptsince2011.SomeofitsleadershavetieswithMuhammedal-Zawahiri,longbeforethe2011uprising.47Regionallinkswerepresentobviously,whetherwithSalafi-JihadigroupsinGazaorwithSalafi-JihadionesinMaliviaLibya.48

Ahomegrownjihadigroupthathassetitselfapartfrombothregionalandglobalactorslike IS and Al-Qaeda, is AjnadMisr (Egypt’s Soldiers). 49 The short-lived groupdisappearedafteritsleaderHamamAttiya,whooperatedinIraqintheearly2000s,waskilledbysecurityforces.Thegroupwasflexibleinopeningitsdoorstomemberswhohold no strong connections to other jihadi factions, and shared the same principletargetsofpolicemen,militaryforcesandjudges.50

State’s Counter-Radicalization Efforts: Cases and Responses

Law and the judiciary: First lines of attack

EgyptwitnessedanunprecedentedlegislativeexpansionafterJune2013toconsolidatethecurrentregime’spriorities,andtoalsocontainallthreatstothatordercausedbyJanuary2011uprising.

Thefirstlegal-legislativetrackincludesthepresidentialdecreeontheTerroristEntitiesandListsLawno.8of2015.Thislegislationregulateslistsofthoseaccusedofterrorism-relatedcharges,basedonarequestsubmittedtotheAttorneyGeneral,pendingtheirtrial before courts. Security services’ investigations alone are enough to get a nameaddedtotheterroristlist,withouttheneedtointerrogatethesuspect.Yet,thedecisiontolistsuspectsarefinalandisnotappealable,andbasedontheserequests,theassetsofthoselistedarefrozenandsuspectsarebannedfromtraveling.Thislawwasfollowedby theTerrorist FundsLawno. 22of 2018,which tasks anewly established judicial

43Zahran,Mostafa,“RegionalJihad:ContemporaryJihadistmovementsinEgypt”inbook:“WhatispoliticalinIslam?”(Maal-seyaseyfeal-Islam?),DarMaraya,2018,p13644Ibid45Walsh,Declan;Youssef,Nour,“MilitantsKillEgyptianSecurityForcesinDevastatingAmbush”,NewYorkTimes,21October2017,https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/21/world/middleeast/egypt-ambush-hasm.html46https://www.facebook.com/ahmed.mawlana.16/posts/656155831520140?__tn__=K-R47Ibid48Verdictincasepubliclyknownas“MadinatNasrCell”,Manshurat,22October2014https://manshurat.org/node/128949“AjnadMisr”,TIMEP,22July2014https://timep.org/esw/non-state-actors/ajnad-misr/50Zahran,p138-140


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committee with creating lists of terrorist individuals and entities. The committeeconfiscatesalltheprivatepropertyofthoseintheaforementionedlists,addingthemtostatecoffers.Thecommittee’sdecisionsinthisregardarealsofinal.

Later, the Countering Terrorism Law (no. 94/2015) was issued, providing a broaddefinition ofwhat constitutes a terrorist act,whichmade the expression of politicalprotestsusceptibletoprosecution.

Furthermore, the law includes unprecedented indicators of the state’s retaliatoryapproach.Itshieldsalltroopsenforcingthelawfromanycriminalresponsibilitywhenexhibitingforceinconfrontations.

Thelawalsopenalisestheconcealmentofterrorism-relatedinformation;theprovisionoflogisticalsupportforterroristoperations;andthefacilitationofperpetrators’escapewhetherbeforeoraftertheexecutionofterroristattacks.Onlyfirstdegreerelativesoftheaccusedareexempted.Aimedtoeliminateallbreedinggroundsforterrorism,thisprovision, however, can be used to easily undermine the guarantees of justice andimpartiality.

Amendments toexisting lawshavealsobeenratifiedwitha focuson terrorism.ThisincludesArticle102aof thePenalCode,whichpenalizes firstdegreerelatives if theywithheld information about the existence and use of explosives. The law intensifiespenaltiesforarmedforcesandpoliceofficersgettinginvolvedinterrorism,aspreviousperiodsrevealedthepresenceofmanyofthemwithintheranksofsomegroupsthatemergedintheaftermathof2011,especiallyafter2013.

Despitethisspreeofterrorism-focusedlegislations,Sisicriticizedthetraditionalcourseofjusticeasinsufficientandfutilewhenhandlingterrorism,andthatitrequireswideramendmentstoensureswiftnessinadjudicatingsuchcases.Thisswiftnesswasrevealedinthespeedwithwhichindividualsareaddedtolistsofterroristentities:thiscannowtakenomorethansevendays.Also,newamendmentstotheCodeofCriminalProcedurehaveensuredthatswiftnessofadjudicationintrialsandsentencingarecodified.Thiswasachievedbyensuringthatrulingscanbeissuedinabsentia.Swiftnesshasalsobeentangible in authorities’ conduct of death penalties, eliminating any chance ofbacktrackingorappealsincaseswherenewevidenceemerges.

Beyond the civilian judiciary system, military courts have also been pivotal inprosecuting suspects of terrorism charged with targeting army establishments ormembersofthearmedforces,includingarmyconscripts.

Imposingastateofemergency,andtheenactmentoftheemergencylaw,particularlyinNorth Sinai and following thebombingof SaintMark'sCopticOrthodoxCathedral inAlexandriainApril2017,hashelpedtheregimereproducetheCourtsofStateSecurity,characterizedbytheirhastytrialsandunappealablesentences.

Furthermore,Law25of2018usheredthecreationoftheSupremeCouncilofCombatingExtremism,whose task is todevelop counterterrorism strategies at thenational andregional levels, including the drafting of developmental schemes for marginalizedregions,andtheputtingtogetherofeducationalcurriculathatservethesegoals.Securityapparatusesdominatethecouncil,andsecrecyengulfsitsdeliberationsanddecisions,allowing for little tobeknownof its composition, role, and real impact.TheGeneral


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Intelligence Directorate, the Military Intelligence, the National Security Agency(formerlyStateSecurity)andtheAdministrativeControlAuthority–whichisdirectlycontrolledbythepresident-areallrepresentedinthecouncil.

Religious institutions in Egypt’s War on Terror

i) MinistryofEndowments(MoE)

MoE’splaysaparticularlyactiveroleincombattingterrorismbyvirtueofitsauthorityover mosques. The ministry’s main focus is to dismantle potential channels ofcommunicationbetweenorganizationsofextremist Islamismand lessradicalgroups,andthepublic,whichcantakeplacethroughmosquesandtheirfaculties.

As such, lawno.51of2014 stipulates that religious sermonsmustbeauthorizedbyimams of Al-Azhar, and delivered only by those appointed by the MoE. Temporarypermits issued for imams todeliver sermonsallow for the continuousmonitoringoftheircompliancetodistributedinstructions.

Informalprayerhalls,orsmallermosquesknownaszawaya,werebroughtundertheMoE’ssupervisionbydecreeno.64of2014.Since2013,theministryhasreportedlyshutdownnearly20,000zawaya.

The MoE also undertook initiatives to safeguard youth from being recruited byfundamentalists,whichincludethe"SchoolsofKnowledge"initiativethatwaslaunchedin 2017 and involves imams teaching religious curriculum to the public in schoolsoperatinginmajormosques.

Similarly,manyfemalepreachershavebeenappointedtotrackwomenwhoaccountforthemajorityofdonationmadetosupportextremistgroupsaswellaspoliticalreligiousgroupsthatopposethestate.Abanonsuchfinancialactivitybynon-governmententitiesinmosqueshasalsobeenimposedbyaMoEdecree.

ii) Al-AzharAl-Azhar,theworld’spre-eminentseatofreligiouslearningforSunniMuslims,isalsoactive incombatingextremism,albeitatapredominantlyglobal level.Oneof itsvitalinstruments is al-Azhar’s Observatory to Combat Extremism with its social mediaplatforms, which uses 12 languages to spread its interpretation of Islam and tracksterroristoperationsinvariouscountriesandstudiesthem.

As for its role at home, al-Azhar’s efforts include representatives holding communalsessions within local communities, which in large part targets university studentsnationwide.

That being said, al-Azhar’s biggest contribution to the war on extremism is theamendmentsitmadetotheinstitution’slearningcurriculaafter2013.Theobjectivewastoreviseandeliminateexcerptsofthecurriculawhichareseentoinciteviolenceandhatred,especiallyagainstChristians,ordeemed toooutdatedandclashwithmoderntimes.Theseupdatedcurriculaaresubjecttoassessmenteverythreeyears.


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iii) Daral-Ifta’(HouseofEdicts)Dar al-Ifta’ is another government institution that launched its own media-focusedMonitoringObservatorytoexamineradicalviewsandrefutethemonsocialmedia.

Theextenttowhichthesethreeinstitutionsimpactthefightagainstextremismremainsunclear. Similarly, their outreach among youth and other social groups cannot beaccuratelyassessed.However,it’slikelythattheireffortsonthegroundarelimitedinimpactbecauseofthemulti-layeredgapsthatseparatethemfromaveragecitizensandtheirdailyhardshipsandconcerns.

Non-state alliances

AlthoughtheEgyptiancounterterrorismstrategyisa‘statist’one,thereareotherfactorswhichmustnotbeoverlooked.Thisis,forinstance,howthestateanditsbodiesco-optednumbersofcommunityforcesintheborderprovinces.This isevident inthewesternpartsofEgypt,whereSalafismhassignificantinfluenceandwherethestatereachedanunderstandingwiththetribestheretofacilitatethearrestofwantedterroristswhorelyon logistical support from locals of these regions. Thus, the state achieved a tightercontroloverthewesternborderswithLibya,andalsosucceededinreleasingsecurityofficerswhowerekidnappedbyoutlawedterroristgroups in theseregions.Suchco-optationoftribesinvolvedpledgesofdroppinglegalchargesagainsttheirleadersandpayingcompensationtovictimswhofellduringclashesbetweengovernmenttroopsandarmedmilitants.Inexchangeforthat,tribesmenmustassistauthoritiesinenforcinglawandorderintheirregions,andincontrollingtheflowofweaponsacrossborders.

A similar pactwas achievedwith thepopulationofNorth Sinai, althoughon amuchlarger and more complex scale. The state bodies and the local tribes in Sinai havereachedcertainunderstandings,manifestedinthe‘UnionoftheTribesofSinai,’anentitybringingtogetherpro-statetribesmen.

The state-tribes cooperation in North Sinai plays a role more similar to that of theAwakeningmovementinIraq.Thiscanbewitnessedthroughthepartakingoftribesmenincombat,andtheirinvolvementininspectingandinterrogatingterroristscapturedbythesecurityforces.ThiscooperationhasledtheABMterroristgrouptotargetleadersandmembersofpro-armytribes.

Inrecentyears,suchallianceswithSinai localshavebeenonthedeclinebecausethearmy’s security strategy shifted to relying primarily on evacuating entire cities,demolishing many residential areas and agricultural land. Unsurprisingly, this hasseverelyimpactedthelivesandlivelihoodsoflocals.Therehavealsobeenreportsonabusesandviolationscarriedoutbysecurityforcesagainstlocalcommunities.

ElsewhereinEgypt,particularlyintheNewValley(oral-Wadial-Gedid)Governorate,such forms of communal alliance completely vanished as the state uses pureauthoritarianismtocontrolbothsecurityandadministrativeaspectsoftheregion.Asidefrom the aforementioned rare incidents of communal collaboration, Egypt’s war on


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terrorhasbeenpredominantlystate-controlled,andtwospecificexamplesofthestate’srejectionofcommunalcollaborationstandoutthemost.Thefirsttookplacein2014bythe Salafi al-Nour Party and Da’wa movement, under the banner of ‘Egypt WithoutViolence’,whichwasrejectedandstoppedbythestateunderthepretextofit lackingcoordinationwiththeauthorities.

Similarly,asetofinitiativesputforthbytheConstructionandDevelopmentPartyofAl-Gama’aAl-Islamiyya,callingfornonviolencefrombothstateandanti-stategroups,failedtogainanytractioninEgypt’spoliticalsphere,andwasshunnedbythestate.

Regional cooperation

Onaregionallevel,theEgyptianstatecoordinateswithseveralneighbouringcountriesinthewaronterrorism.TheHamasmovement,anoffshootoftheMBwhichgovernstheGazastrip,hascometoaidtheEgyptiangovernmentthroughcommittingtoclosingjointbordersduringthecourseofthemostrecentmilitaryoperation.Hamasalsoprovidedintelligence to the Egyptian military relevant to the fight against armed groups.Furthermore,thegovernmentoftheGazaStripestablisheda100mdeepbufferzone,extendingalongthe13kmbordersitshareswithEgypt.

To the south andwest, Egypt coordinatedwith Sudan, andwith theLibyanNationalArmy(LNA)underKhalifaHaftarintheiroffence,whichalsotargetsmilitantsassociatedwithIS.TherecentarrestofAl-Murabitun’sleadingfigureHishamAshmawi,theformerEgyptian special forces officer,marks thepeakof this alliancebetween theEgyptianstate,Haftar’sforcesandthegovernmentinTobruk.

Withinthiscontext,theEgyptianstatehasuseditsmembershipinthepan-ArabAnti-Terrorism Convention to push forth its classification of theMB as a terrorist group,whichwaspassedin2013.

Military campaigns

Inrelationtosecurityandmilitaryconfrontations,Egypt’sarmedforceshaveconducteda series of military confrontations, mostly focusing in North Sinai as the hotbed ofmilitarygroups,butwhichalsoincludedpartsoftheDeltaanddesertswestoftheNilevalley.

Throughout these operations, official military statements frequently announce thesuccessofadvancesmadeagainstextremists,aswellaslossesinflictedintheranksofsecurityforces.However,itisdifficulttoverifyorchallengetheaccuracyofsuchdata,since theanti-terrorism lawpenalises thepublicationof falsenewsorstatementsonterrorist acts or counterterror operations contrary to official Ministry of Defencestatements.


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Inasimilarvein,thestatepledgesdevelopmentprojectsinNorthSinaionadministrativeandeconomiclevels,butthesepromiseshavenotyetborneanyfruit,andthereisnotalkaboutprogramstorehabilitateradicalizedindividuals.

Conclusion

Althoughthestatemayhavemadeprogress in its fightagainst terrorism, thewaronterrorisnotover,andfutureroundsarelikelytobefiercer.Anti-terrorismpoliciesareunlikely to be less political, while strategies would benefit from involving moresubstantialsocietalinvolvement.

Egypt’s counter-radicalisationpoliticshavebeen fully state-dominated,which canbeunderstood within the context of the current regime’s rise. According to the state’snarrative, Sisi’sregime saved the state and society from the post-2011 chaos andterrorism,forwhichitblamessignificantfactionsofthesocietyfor.Withinthatcontext,societalefforts,initiativesorrecommendationsareexcluded;thestatedoesn’tseekanypartnership with societal groups. Efforts to combat terrorism are politicizedandpopulist, aimedat consolidatingpowerdynamics that favour the currentwaronterrordynamic.

Capitalizingoninternationalcommunity’sfearofterrorism,theauthoritiesfocusonthewaronterrornarrativetoextendandexpandthelimitsofexception,makingitthenormforeverydaypolitics.Initswaronterror,thestateusesalltools.Thejudiciarysystemhas become entangled in the politicized war on terror, leading to accusation ofunderminingitsownperceivedcredibilityandindependencewithnewlegislation.

Aspreviouslydiscussed,approximately90percentofEgyptiansareSunniMuslimsandthevastmajorityoftheremainderarefollowersofCopticOrthodoxChristianity.EgypthasahandfulofJews,Bahais,atheistsandMuslimsfromothersects,thatnumberinthelow thousands. This, combinedwith the fact that Egypt has been run by a stronglymilitary-influencedNasseriterepublicanmodelsince1952,limitspublicdiscussiononsuchasensitiveissueasreligiousdiversity,exceptinthemodesthatthestatesupports.(Between the 2011 uprising and 2013, Egyptian activists interested in the matterexperienced an opening in such discussions). Society cannot address bigotry andsectarianismeffectivelywhendoingsomaybeperceivedaschallengingpublicorder.

Thecredibilityof therolesofreligious institutionsrolewasalsoskewedbyrelationswiththestate.ThisdecreasedtheirlegitimacyastrustedbodiescapableofdeliveringindependentandunbiasedviewsonreligiontoMuslims.State-approvedeffortsontheirpart have often been perceived as unlikely to resonate with the masses. While theMinistry of Islamic Endowments and Dar al-Ifta’have become subordinate to statenarratives,Al-Azharcontinuestovieforindependence,whichisonlymetbymorestatelimitations.Itisdifficulttogaugetheseinstitutions’impactontheground.

Ironically, actors who engaged in violence in 1980s and 1990s, like al-Gamaaal-IslamiaandAl-Jihad,aremorelikelytohaveacounter-radicalisationimpact.Theirpreviousexperienceand their revisionsvis-a-vismodern jihadinarrativesasa


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conceptpossiblyworksintheirfavour.ThishistoryofjihadismenablesfactionsliketheSalafi Call and Al-GamaaAl-Islamiyya to engage in intellectual debates with Salafijihadists on modern discussions on jihad and relations with state and the society.However, the credibility of these groups among hard-linemainstream Islamistswasimpactedbytheirpoliticalpositionspost-2013.

Onthemilitaryfront,thestate’ssecuritysurveillanceinthemainlandclaimsuccessesagainstmilitants,announcingcountlessraidsanddeathsininsurgents’ranks,andthefoilingofterroristattacksandplots.Theseclaimsaredifficulttoindependentlyverify.Coordinationwithneighbouringcountriesoverbordersprovedeffectiveincontrollingtheinfiltrationoffightersandweapons.

Non-statecircumstanceshavealsoworkedinthefavourofcombattingterrorism.ThisincludeddivisionswithintheMB,inwhichthetraditionalparthasbeenrumouredtocooperatewiththeauthoritiestocontainradicalizedMByouths,andrestricttheflowofmoneyintotheroguearmedgroupwhichwasledbyseniorMBleaderMohamedKamal,whowaskilledbysecurityforces.

TheextenttowhichadeclineinradicalismamongIslamistyouths,mainlytheMB,insideprisonsremainsunclear.Therearecontradictoryobservationsinthisregard,withsomevoicingtheopinionthatthere isa fall inISIS’sappealamongtheseyouth,andothersassuming that many youths were radicalized within prisons. With many of thoseimprisonedbeingofayoungage,theycouldcompletetheirjailtermsof10to15yearsandbereleasedintothesocietywiththeriskoftakingonanewroundofviolence.51

Successesclaimedbysecurityapparatus inNorthSinaiaredifficult to independentlyverify.Thearmy’sfrequentstatementsofvictories,albeitwelcomedbysupporters,aredoubtedbycriticswhocitecontinuedattacksonsoldiersandcivilianswhocollaboratewiththemilitaryinitswaronterror.Someconcludethatmilitants’replicationofattackstrategy on checkpoints and soldiers’ inefficient weaponry are reflective of flawedmilitarypolicies.

Meanwhile,thesituationinNorthSinaiforcivilianscontinuestoworsen,astheybearthebruntofwar.Therefore,althoughterroristnetworksfacelossesatthehandsofthemilitary,therootcausesforradicalisationstillexist,anddon’tseemtobeabatingsoon.

Timeline of main events that affected religious dynamics in recent Egyptian history:

1) 1948: Following the establishment of Israel in mandated Palestine, varioussentiments abound in Egypt, among both officials and the public, particularlyaboutperceivedsupportIsraelreceivedfromEgyptianCoptsandJews,resultingtensionsamongMuslimandnon-MuslimEgyptians.Nationalisticsentimentandresultingmeasuresleadstomanyinhistoricallynon-Arabcommunities(suchasJewish-Egyptians,Greek-EgyptiansandLatinEgyptians)todepart.

51 “Made in Prison”, Arij, https://arij.net/made_in_prison/


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2) 1952:Military endsmonarchy and takes over, andbegins campaign to co-optMuslim,Christiansandnon-religiouspublicfigures,movementsandinstitutions.

3) 1954: President Gamal Abdel-Nasser survives an assassination attempt andblamesitontheMuslimBrotherhoodgroup.Hebansthemandcracksdownonthemovement,whichisusedasarecruitmenttoollateron.

4) 1971:PresidentAnwarElSadatmakesIslamtheofficialreligionoftheStateinanapparentbidtogainconservativesupport.

5) 1981: President Sadat is assassinated by extremist Islamists; his successor,PresidentHosniMubarak,tightensstatecontroloverreligiousinstitutions,whichleadstotheunderminingoftheircredibilityandinfluenceinEgypt.CrackdownonIslamistsisheightened,andradicalizationnarrativesarestrengthened.

6) 2001:US-ledwaronterrorbegins,whichinturnisfollowedbyasurgeinappealofextremistideologyinEgypt,aidedbygrowingeconomichardships.

7) 2011:OverthrowofHosniMubarakleadstoanenvironmentofpoliticalfreedomandopenness,whichontheonehandallowsforextensivemediafreedom,andon the other means that populist sectarian rhetoric becomesmore visible incertainpartsofthepro-Islamistpublicsphere.

8) 2013:Morsi supporters fixateon roleof the church in supportof themilitaryoverthrow, particularly after the crackdown; violent backlash that sees thedestructionofover200churchesandChristianbusinesses.

9) 2014-todate:Militarytightensgripovermosques,closingunlicensedonesandoutlawing non-state-sanctioned Friday sermons. ISIS group rises to moreprominence, targeting Christians in different parts of the country, facing amassivecounter-terrorismeffortbythestate.


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TahrirInstituteforMiddleEastPolicy(TIMEP),“LiwaaAl-Thawra”29March2017https://is.gd/TSrihB:“Hasam”,29March2017,https://is.gd/iLangP“WilayatSinai”,23July2014,https://timep.org/esw/non-state-actors/wilayat-sinai/“IslamicStateinEgypt”,8May2017,https://is.gd/hEnWWX“JundAl-Islam”,22July2014,https://is.gd/KY67z3“AjnadMisr”,22July2014,https://timep.org/esw/non-state-actors/ajnad-misr/TheEconomist,"Rankingcountriesbytheirblasphemylaws”,13August2017,https://www.economist.com/erasmus/2017/08/13/ranking-countries-by-their-blasphemy-laws?fsrc=rssWalsh,Declan;Youssef,Nour,“MilitantsKillEgyptianSecurityForcesinDevastatingAmbush”,NewYorkTimes,21October2017,https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/21/world/middleeast/egypt-ambush-hasm.htmlZahran,Mostafa,“RegionalJihad:ContemporaryJihadistmovementsinEgypt”inbook:

“WhatispoliticalinIslam?”(Maal-siyasifial-Islam?),DarMaraya,2018


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