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Country Report

Syria

May 2010

Economist Intelligence Unit 26 Red Lion Square London WC1R 4HQ United Kingdom

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ISSN 0269-7211

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Country Report May 2010 www.eiu.com © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2010

Syria

Executive summary 3 Highlights

Outlook for 2010-11 4 Political outlook 6 Economic policy outlook 8 Economic forecast

Monthly review: May 2010 11 The political scene 12 Economic policy 13 Economic performance

Data and charts 17 Annual data and forecast 18 Quarterly data 19 Monthly data 20 Annual trends charts 21 Monthly trends charts 22 Comparative economic indicators

Country snapshot 23 Basic data 24 Political structure

Editors: Rory Fyfe (editor); Robert Powell (consulting editor)

Editorial closing date: April 27th 2010

All queries: Tel: (44.20) 7576 8000 E-mail: [email protected] Next report: To request the latest schedule, e-mail [email protected]

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Executive summary

Highlights

May 2010

• The president, Bashar al-Assad, is expected to remain in power in 2010-11 and, despite some tensions within the regime, there is no significant threat to his rule. Some limited domestic political reform is expected.

• Relations with the US and leading Arab states are expected to improve, albeit gradually, although rapprochement will be overshadowed by ongoing tension between the US and Iran, Syria's closest ally.

• It is unlikely that Israel's hardline government will seriously negotiate to return the occupied Golan Heights during the forecast period, but Israel and Syria may both have an interest in being seen to resume indirect talks.

• As the global recession ends and gas production increases, Syrian real GDP growth will rise to 3.9% in 2010 and then 4.2% in 2011.

• Inflation will rise to an annual average of 6.7% in 2010-11 as global commodity prices increase slightly and VAT is introduced, although it will remain well below its 2008 peak.

• The current-account deficit will narrow slightly to around US$1bn (1.7% of GDP) in 2010-11, largely because of an increase in the non-merchandise surplus from booming tourism.

• The Syrian government has been accused of transferring Scud missiles to Hizbullah in Lebanon. Despite these accusations, which Syria denied, the US's policy of increased engagement with Syria is unlikely to be derailed.

• The government has announced some of the main targets of its new five-year plan, which includes ambitious plans for investment. The IMF has recommended that Syria show some fiscal restraint.

• The Central Bank has invited banks to bid for the financing of the purchase of aircraft by the Syrian government; the first time government financing has been raised in this way.

• Egypt has agreed to refit six Syrian Airbus aircraft. US sanctions previously prevented the refitting but it can now be done without using US parts.

• An exploration bid round has been launched. Although the blocks on offer have all been explored before with little success, the round is still attracting interest owing to a better outlook for oil prices and the Syrian oil sector.

• The government has negotiated a deal with Iraq to treat gas from the Iraqi Akkaz field, and Syria could benefit from Iraqi oil and gas developments.

• The oil sector trade deficit is likely to have reached a peak in 2008, owing to the effects of stabilised oil production and lower petroleum price subsidies.

Outlook for 2010-11

Monthly review

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Outlook for 2010-11 Political outlook

The Syrian president, Bashar al-Assad, and his ruling Baath party are expected to retain a secure grip on the country, supported by key elements in the security services. The core of the elite is drawn largely from Mr Assad's Alawi sect, and any move against him would risk endangering its hold on power. However, tensions within the regime persist, accentuated by external pressures such as the UN inquiry into the killing of Rafiq Hariri, a former Lebanese prime minister, the ongoing investigation by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) into allegations that Syria has a nuclear programme and accusations that Syria has been supplying the Lebanese militant group, Hizbullah, with long-range missiles.

Only limited progress is expected on political reform over the forecast period. Although some promised measures may be implemented, it is hard to envisage any steps being taken that would significantly diminish the Baath party's hold on power. Mr Assad initially advocated political reform when he came to power in 2000, but he has acknowledged that the pace of reform has been slow since then. He has pledged to increase popular participation in the political process by introducing a political parties law, which will create a second chamber of parliament, the Majlis al-Shura�in addition to the existing lower chamber (the Majlis al-Shaab). He also pledged to devise a local administration law to bring about greater decentralisation. Although there have been no visible signs of progress with these reforms in over two years, the reduction in international pressure on Syria will make it easier for at least a few cosmetic changes to be made at home during the forecast period. However, the security and intelligence services, which are pervasive and effective, will continue to clamp down on activists demanding democratic reform. The various opposition-in-exile groups and domestic critics are unlikely to pose a substantive threat to the government.

After a period of considerable diplomatic isolation in 2005-07, Syria has been developing steadily better relations with many Western and regional states�notably France, Turkey and Saudi Arabia�and this process is expected to continue over the forecast period. One consequence is that the EU is now ready to sign its long-delayed Association Agreement with Syria, and talks to resolve some outstanding issues with the agreement are expected to be resumed soon. The catalysts for the improvement in relations include the more constructive role that Syria is playing in Lebanon and a desire by Western and other Arab countries to weaken Syria's alliance with Iran. Syria would like to play the role of a bridge between Iran and the West, but this will be difficult if tensions increase further over the Iranian nuclear issue.

After a hiatus of five years, the US is in the process of confirming the appointment of a new ambassador to Syria. However, the US will still expect Syria to make concessions on a range of issues�in particular ending support for

Domestic politics

International relations

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Hizbullah and Hamas, a Palestinian group, and distancing itself from Iran�before sanctions (which are likely to be renewed in May 2010) are relaxed. Meanwhile, Syria will be looking for the US to take concrete actions that go beyond vague promises of a better relationship. There is a danger that these improving relations could be set back as a result of tensions arising from the IAEA's investigation or if the UN inquiry into the Hariri assassination formally charges senior Syrian officials with involvement, or if Israel takes military action against Hizbullah.

The rapprochement in 2009 between Syria and Saudi Arabia is widely believed to have facilitated the formation of a Lebanese government with Saad Hariri (the son of Rafiq) as prime minister. Mr Hariri's visit to Syria in December 2009 suggests that Syrian-Lebanese relations will be cordial over the forecast period. Relations with Iraq are likely to remain turbulent as long as some Iraqi insurgents continue to operate from Syria (which hosts a population of over 1m Iraqi refugees). Relations with Egypt were poor until recently, but the visit of an Egyptian trade delegation to Syria in March and reports of a proposed meeting between the Egyptian president, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia and Mr Assad in April point to the possibility of closer ties going forward.

Syria has expressed its willingness to resume Turkish-mediated peace talks with Israel, suspended since 2008, but only on the understanding that peace would be based on Israel's full withdrawal from the Golan Heights (captured from Syria in 1967). However, there is little popular or parliamentary support in Israel for a withdrawal and the Israeli foreign minister, Avigdor Lieberman, has rejected a resumption of talks. Any peace agreement would probably require Syria to end to its strategic alliance with Iran and its support for Hizbullah and militant Palestinian groups. This would be politically difficult, although not impossible, for Syria to deliver. A peace agreement is thus unlikely in 2010-11. Nonetheless, Syria and Israel may both decide that it is in their interest to be seen to conduct talks, without expecting an agreement to be reached.

In focus

Scud missiles

The Syrian government has been accused of supplying the Lebanese militant group, Hizbullah, with long-range missiles. Although the accusations are unlikely to derail the US policy of engagement with Syria, they are a clear reminder of the large obstacles that continue to hamper efforts to advance regional peace talks. The fact that the US official statements have given credence to the reports of the Scud transfers suggests that the administration harbours strong suspicions that Syria is involved in an effort to upgrade Hizbullah's military capabilities, and has persisted in such activity in spite of recent gestures of goodwill by the US president, Barack Obama. According to the 2010 edition of The Military Balance, published by the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies, Syria possesses at least 94 surface-to-surface missiles, including 18 Scuds (B, C and D) and 30 "lookalikes". The missiles that Hizbullah used in 2006 were mainly shorter-range Katyushas, which are not particularly accurate. The Scud B has a range of about 300 km, which would enable Hizbullah to reach Tel Aviv, Jerusalem and Dimona (the site of Israel's nuclear reactor) from launch sites in southern or central Lebanon. The Scud C and D

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have a longer range and are more accurate, and could reach all parts of Israel even if they were deployed in northern Lebanon. However, it is not clear to what extent the transfer of a few Scuds from Syria would of itself enhance Hizbullah's capabilities or justify Israeli alarm. Hizbullah's leader, Hassan Nasrallah, has said on several occasions that the group is now much better equipped than it was prior to the 2006 war, and its new weapons are thought to include long-range missiles supplied from Iran. Israel has developed the Arrow anti-missile system as a means to secure itself from attacks by ballistic missiles such as the Scud. The Obama administration has indicated that it wishes to persuade Syria to desist from actively supporting Hizbullah, and has sought to emphasise this position through raising the level of its diplomatic contacts, with the appointment of Robert Ford as the new ambassador, which will fill a position that has been vacant for five years (assuming he does eventually go to Syria), and the dispatch of William Burns, the assistant secretary of state for Near East affairs, to the Syrian capital, Damascus, in February. However, Mr Assad has made clear that he considers "resistance"�by which he means maintaining a credible military threat to Israel through groups such as Hizbullah and the Palestinian Islamist organisations, Hamas and Islamic Jihad�to be an integral part of Syria's regional strategy, which also envisages the possibility of negotiating a peace settlement with Israel. At the same time, Mr Assad has to take into account the risks of Syria becoming directly embroiled in a war with Israel. Assessing that risk has become more complicated in light of the development of the nuclear programme of Iran, Syria's main regional strategic ally. In the event of a military confrontation between Iran and Israel, Iran would expect Syria to offer some support. However, Mr Assad might be reluctant to do so, given the risk of exposing his country to massive Israeli retaliation. This could offer an explanation for Syria to consider transferring some of its Scuds to Hizbullah, as it would extend the range of options for supporting Iran from Lebanon, thereby improving the chances of Syria being insulated from any such conflict, assuming that Israel were prepared to play along by restricting hostilities to Lebanon�as it has done in the past. The Hizbullah Scud affair�whether real or an Israeli propaganda ploy�is unlikely to derail the US policy of engagement with Syria. Mr Ford said in his confirmation hearings that his appointment should not be perceived as a political reward for Syria, but rather as a means to provide a better channel of communication to address contentious issues.

Economic policy outlook

Syria is expected to continue the gradual liberalisation of its centrally planned economy, a process that has been led by the deputy prime minister for economic affairs, Abdullah al-Dardari. However, there remain influential officials who argue instead that socialist and protectionist policies should be retained, and these conflicting interests will inhibit the formulation and implementation of policy. There are also powerful members of the business elite who benefit from the current status quo and might resist certain changes that would threaten their advantages. The recent removal of Tayseer al-Reddawi as head of the State Planning Commission, apparently over public criticisms he made about policy implementation, indicates that the economic debate remains highly charged. The overriding policy challenge will be to offset the

Policy trends

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impact of the decline in oil production by developing other sectors of the economy, particularly those that can boost export earnings in the medium term, such as tourism. This will require making established state-owned and family businesses more dynamic and encouraging entrepreneurship and investment. Moves intended to increase domestic and foreign investment include expanding the Damascus Securities Exchange, relaxing foreign-currency restrictions and boosting bank lending.

Syria's fiscal deficit is expected to narrow to S£129bn (US$2.3bn), or 4.9% of GDP, in 2010 as oil prices and thus revenue increase, and to S£83bn in 2011 owing to stronger tax revenue. Fuel subsidies have been substantially reduced, but they remain a fiscal burden, as Syria imports a high proportion of the refined products it consumes. After much delay, a value-added tax (VAT) is likely to be introduced in 2011�probably at a rate of around 10%�boosting government revenue. The government may also receive windfall revenue from extending existing mobile-phone contracts and awarding a licence for a third operator. Plans to reform public enterprises�most of which are unprofitable�by transforming them into autonomous companies with their own budgets, should also have a net positive impact on the public finances. The government may consider privatising some firms, particularly if the Damascus Securities Exchange displays more vibrancy. Expanding revenue should enable the government to maintain relatively high investment spending while also reducing the budget deficit over the forecast period.

The Central Bank of Syria is expected to continue to implement monetary reform and gradually gain greater autonomy. It has experimented with issuing Treasury bills, but now seems to have scrapped plans to issue them on a regular basis and will instead only use them sporadically to finance specific develop-ment projects. Nonetheless, there are plans to launch a local bond market, increasing the number and sophistication of monetary tools. The Central Bank is likely to continue to reduce the restrictions on foreign-currency transactions, a process that it started in early 2008, in order to facilitate investment. These measures should also help to develop and modernise the banking sector, in which privatised banks (in which 60% foreign ownership is now permitted) are playing an increasing role.

Economic forecast

International assumptions summary (% unless otherwise indicated)

2008 2009 2010 2011

Real GDP growth World 2.8 -0.8 3.9 3.5

OECD 0.5 -3.4 2.1 1.6

EU27 0.7 -4.2 0.9 1.1

Exchange rates ¥:US$ 103.4 93.7 90.9 90.0

US$:� 1.470 1.393 1.358 1.393

SDR:US$ 0.629 0.646 0.651 0.642

International assumptions

Monetary policy

Fiscal policy

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International assumptions summary (% unless otherwise indicated)

2008 2009 2010 2011

Financial indicators � 3-month interbank rate 4.65 1.23 0.68 0.93

US$ 3-month commercial paper rate 2.18 0.26 0.19 0.50

Commodity prices Oil (Brent; US$/b) 97.7 61.9 77.0 73.0

Cotton (US cents/lb) 72.1 62.7 79.8 83.8

Food, feedstuffs & beverages (% change in US$ terms) 38.7 -19.1 0.1 -1.2

Industrial raw materials (% change in US$ terms) -5.1 -25.6 31.9 1.1

Note. Regional GDP growth rates weighted using purchasing power parity exchange rates.

The Economist Intelligence Unit forecasts that world real GDP growth (at purchasing power parity exchange rates) will be 3.9% in 2010�this is up from 3.8% previously as a result of a number of positive indicators, particularly in China, India and Russia�and 3.5% in 2011 as the effect of government stimulus packages fades. The benchmark dated Brent Blend is forecast to average US$75/barrel in 2010-11. Syrian crude, most of which is heavy, will trade at a discount to this, averaging about US$66/b.

We have revised up our estimate of 2009 real GDP growth to 3.6%�as new expenditure data suggests government consumption was higher than expected. We forecast that real GDP growth will average 4.1% in 2010-11. Foreign investment into Syria is likely to rise because of Syria's increasing economic openness and improving international relations, although it will be held back in the short term by the ongoing global squeeze on credit�Groundstar Resources of Canada, for example, relinquished an oil-development contract in September 2009 because of problems securing financing. Government consumption growth will be steady in 2010-11 as the fiscal stimulus is sustained but will slow slightly. Fixed investment will strengthen in 2010-11. Private consumption growth will pick up in both years, although if there is a significant improvement in security in Iraq (not our core scenario) following its election and the planned withdrawal of most US troops by late 2010, a sizeable number of the 1m or so Iraqi refugees in Syria may return home, thereby depressing consumption. Imports will pick up after contracting in 2009.

On the sectoral side, agriculture is forecast to grow steadily in 2010-11, assuming that the severe three-year drought in the north-east of the country eases. Water availability will remain a source of risk for the economy. Industry will be boosted by investment in new oil and gas projects, which will help to limit declining output in mature fields, as well as in electricity generation. Services will continue to expand, driven largely by a strong increase in tourist arrivals. Construction will also expand, although securing financing for some projects may be difficult and concerns will grow about the real estate market overheating.

Economic growth

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Consumer price inflation is expected to increase over the forecast period, as global commodity prices recover slightly, government subsidies on fuel are reduced and VAT is finally introduced. We forecast that annual average inflation will be 6.7% in 2010-11, up from just 2.6% in 2009, but well below the peak of 15.7% in 2008. If Iraqi nationals were to return home in greater numbers, this would have a deflationary effect, particularly on urban rents. However, this will only happen if security conditions in Iraq improve markedly.

The Syrian pound is projected to strengthen slightly against the US dollar in 2010-11, to an average of S£45.7:US$1, as the world economy moves out of recession and Syria's current-account deficit narrows slightly. The pound has been pegged to a basket of currencies based on the IMF's special drawing rights since October 2007 and, although this new regime is less rigid than the previous peg to the dollar, the authorities are unlikely to let the pound float freely, because they place a high priority on exchange-rate stability. The dominant position of the state-owned banks and the Central Bank's control over foreign-currency transactions (even as some laws are relaxed) mean that the regime is well placed to control the value of the currency. The Central Bank's foreign-exchange reserves are relatively healthy, at US$4.7bn (around four months of import cover) at end-November 2009. (The Commercial Bank of Syria also holds some foreign reserves.)

We forecast that export earnings will recover in 2010-11, to an average of US$11.7bn, below the oil-price-related peak of 2008. In recent years, drought has seriously constrained production and therefore exports of cotton and textiles. The drought has now eased, and our core scenario is that it will continue to do so in the 2010/11 season, although climatic trends are hard to predict. Oil production is increasing at a number of small fields but declining at the larger, mature fields, with the net effect that total production will be roughly flat, averaging around 377,000 barrels/day in 2010-11. The net impact of changes in oil prices on the trade balance is limited, because Syria's imports of refined products are about equal in value to its exports of crude oil. A domestic factor affecting the trade figures is the relaxation of foreign-exchange controls, which has led to more non-oil exports moving out of the black economy and being officially recorded. Overall, the trade deficit will widen slightly to an average of US$2.8bn in 2010-11, although as a proportion of GDP it will fall to an average of 4.6%.

After falling in 2009, most of the components of the non-merchandise account, both credits and debits, will rise again in 2010-11. In particular, tourism receipts will grow strongly as a result of improving international relations and a developing tourism infrastructure. The non-merchandise surplus is expected to widen over the forecast period, causing the current-account deficit to narrow slightly to an average of US$993m (1.7% of GDP).

Inflation

Exchange rates

External sector

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Forecast summary (% unless otherwise indicated)

2008 a 2009 a 2010b 2011b

Real GDP growth 4.3 3.6 3.9 4.2

Oil production ('000 b/d) 386.6 c 375.0 c 374.4 380.0

Gross agricultural production growth -8.7 5.5 2.2 2.8

Consumer price inflation (av) 15.7 c 2.6 7.1 6.2

Government balance (% of GDP) -3.1 -5.7 -4.9 -2.8

Exports of goods fob (US$ bn) 13.8 10.5 11.5 12.0

Imports of goods fob (US$ bn) 16.0 13.1 14.3 14.7

Current-account balance (US$ bn) -1.1 -1.0 -1.1 -0.9

Current-account balance (% of GDP) -2.2 -2.1 -1.9 -1.4

External debt (year-end; US$ bn) 7.0 7.0 7.2 7.3

Exchange rate S£:US$ (av) 46.6 c 46.7 c 46.0 45.5

Exchange rate S£:¥100 (av) 45.1 c 49.8 c 50.5 50.6

Exchange rate S£:� (av) 68.5 c 65.1 c 62.4 63.4

Exchange rate S£:SDR (year-end) 69.9 c 72.1 c 70.7 71.3

a Economist Intelligence Unit estimates. b Economist Intelligence Unit forecasts. c Actual.

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Monthly review: May 2010

The political scene

The Syrian government was accused by Israel and, indirectly, by the US in mid-April of stoking regional tensions by transferring part of its arsenal of North Korean-supplied Scud missiles over the Lebanese border to Hizbullah, a Shia political and military organisation. Syria, through its embassy in Washington, denied the allegations, and said that Israel had fabricated the reports in order to undermine the recent improvement in US-Syrian relations and so as to divert attention away from Israel's nuclear weapons. The US administration issued a number of statements indicating that it was concerned about the matter, but it stopped short of explicitly confirming that the Scud transfers had actually taken place.

The first report about the Scuds appeared in early April in Al Rai Al Aam, a Kuwaiti newspaper, which based its information on briefings from unidentified security sources in Washington. The report claimed that the US had decided to delay confirming the appointment of an ambassador to Syria owing to concerns about the issue. (Robert Ford, the ambassador designate, has been approved by the relevant congressional committees, but he still needs certification from the full Senate.) Israel's president, Shimon Peres, on April 13th directly accused Syria of having supplied Scuds to Hizbullah; the Israeli defence minister, Ehud Barak, speaking on the same day, was slightly more circumspect, saying that if the reports were true, this would be in violation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701 (which instituted a ceasefire between Hizbullah and Israel in August 2006) and would alter the regional balance of power in a dangerous fashion.

Other reports surfaced in Washington�attributed to unidentified security sources�suggesting that John Kerry, a senator and forthright advocate of US engagement with Syria, had discussed the Scud issue with the Syrian president, Bashar al-Assad, during a visit to the Syrian capital, Damascus, in early April. Both PJ Crowley, the US State Department spokesman, and Robert Gibbs, the White House spokesman, registered the administration's concern about the issue, although they refused to state whether the Scuds had been delivered or not. Haaretz, an Israeli newspaper, subsequently reported that US officials were sure that Syria had the intent to deliver Scuds to Hizbullah, but there was no hard evidence that any deliveries had actually taken place. On April 20th the State Department issued a statement condemning the transfer of any arms to Hizbullah and summoned Syria's senior diplomat in Washington, but still fell short of confirming that the transfer of Scuds had taken place.

Much ado about Scuds

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Economic policy

In focus

Ambitious investment and spending plans are announced

The government has announced some of the main targets of its new five-year plan, which will run from 2011 to 2015. According to reports in the state-controlled media, the plan will include a target of average annual real GDP growth of 8%, supported by total investment of US$130bn, of which US$77bn will come from the private sector. The plan will include a target of bringing unemployment down to 4%, from an official rate of about 9% now. These targets are similar to those set out in the current five-year plan. The actual performance in this period, between 2006 and 2010, has been creditable, even if it has fallen short of the ambitious targets: real GDP growth is likely to have averaged about 4.5% per year compared with a target of 7%. In its Article IV report, published in March, the IMF included a macroeconomic projection up to 2014 indicating that annual real GDP growth is likely to average about 5.5% over the next five years. The IMF reckoned that gross capital formation (total investment) would average 24% of GDP between 2010 and 2014. Projecting these figures over the period for the new five-year plan, the level of investment would work out at about US$100bn, based on the IMF's growth assumptions. This indicates that the government's targets, while ambitious, are not entirely unrealistic. The IMF's Article IV report was generally positive, acknowledging the progress that the government has made with its economic reforms and noting that Syria was only marginally affected by the global financial crisis and the ensuing recession. The IMF considers that Syria's economic performance is likely to improve, with a gradual increase in exports, remittances and foreign direct investment in 2010, supported by a recovery in agriculture after two years of drought. The IMF offered a few cautionary notes. In particular, it urged the government to show a measure of fiscal restraint after the more expansionary stance that it took to counteract the effect of the global recession.

Budget outturns, 2008-10 (S£ bn unless otherwise indicated)

2008 2009 2010

Budget Actuala Budget Actual b Budget Actualb

Revenue 408.1 491.2 459.3 533 577.9 592.4

Oil 90.3 131.4 85.7 111.2 148.8 148.8

Tax 317.5 359.5 373.3 421.5 428.8 443.2

Other 103.4 101.5 129.9 125.3 129.4 124

Expenditure 602.1 561.3 681.4 666.4 749.9 714.6

Current 420.7 388.3 406.4 415.8 422.9 451

Development 181.4 173.1 275 250.6 327 263.6

Overall balance -194 -70.1 -222.1 -133.3 -172 -122.2

Overall balance (% of GDP) -7.7 -2.8 -9.1 -5.5 -6.2 -4.4

a Preliminary. b Projected.

Source: IMF Article IV report, March 2010.

The 2010 budget envisages a significant increase in public investment spending, which the IMF said should be reassessed. In fact, the Syrian government has regularly undershot its investment targets, and the IMF projection for 2010 includes

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the assumption that actual spending will once more fall short, owing to capacity constraints. This would leave an overall fiscal deficit of 4.4% of GDP, compared with the budget figure of 6.2%. Developments in the oil sector have also been beneficial for Syria's fiscal accounts. If oil production had continued to fall, rather than levelling out, Syria would have been burdened with much higher budget deficits than actually transpired in the past two years. The government budgeted for oil revenue to fall to 3.6% of GDP in 2008 and 3.5% the following year. The actual figures, according to the IMF, were 5.2% and 4.6%, respectively. This played a big part (along with underspending on the investment budget) in moderating the fiscal deficit to 2.8% in 2008 and 5.5% last year.

The Central Bank of Syria has introduced a new mechanism for raising finance for state-owned enterprises, through inviting competitive bids from public-sector and private banks. Following a request from the transport minister for funds to enable Syrian Arab Airlines (SAA) to purchase two 70-seat ATR 72 aircraft for a total US$45m, the Central Bank invited all banks licensed to deal in foreign currency to submit their offers for a three-year loan. The Central Bank announced the results on March 9th, indicating that the response had been enthusiastic, with 13 banks taking part. The total amount pledged was US$350m, with a median margin of 212 basis points over the benchmark six-month Libor rate. The mandate was awarded to the state-owned Commercial Bank of Syria (CBS), which proposed the finest margin of 40 basis points. The gap between the rate at which the deal was struck and the median rate seems to reflect the advantage enjoyed by the CBS by virtue of its size�it is much the largest bank in Syria�and its public ownership.

ATR, a joint venture between France-based EADS and Alenia Aeronautica of Italy, makes turbo-prop aircraft designed for short-haul flights. Syria's national airline is now down to only four serviceable airliners, as it has been unable to modernise its fleet of Boeings and Airbuses owing to US sanctions (as even though the Airbus range is manufactured in Europe, the aircraft incorporate US-licensed technology covered by the sanctions.) Syria-News, a local Internet news service, reported in mid-April that the airline had found a way to get round sanctions through contracting EgyptAir to refit six Syrian Airbus 320s at its maintenance workshops in Cairo. It quoted Ghassan Sarkis, SAA's managing director, as saying that the contract specifies that no US-manufactured parts are to be used in the refit. Mr Sarkis said that the contract was worth �2.58m (US$3.5m). Syria's relations with Egypt have improved recently, following a visit to Damascus by a delegation led by the Egyptian trade and industry minister (April 2010, The political scene). Mr Assad is expected to visit Egypt soon, according to Syria's ambassador in Cairo.

Economic performance

The Ministry of Oil and Mineral Resources and the General Petroleum Corporation launched an exploration bid round in early April. The eight onshore blocks included in the bid round, which closes on September 15th, have all been explored previously, without notable success. Yet the bid round is attracting interest owing to a number of factors, including the global scarcity of

Egypt agrees to refit six Syrian Airbuses

Exploration bid round is launched

Central Bank tenders aircraft financing

14 Syria


opportunities for oil companies to negotiate production-sharing contracts, such as those on offer in Syria, the relatively robust outlook for oil prices, and the recent track record in Syria itself, where production from newly discovered fields has been sufficient to offset the decline in output from mature fields. The government is also courting investment in seven projects to enhance production from existing oilfields, with bids to be submitted by June 20th (March 2010, Economic performance).

Syria's last bid round, held in 2007, elicited no bids for the four offshore Mediterranean blocks on offer, but this was mainly because of oil companies' caution about venturing offshore, where no exploration has yet been undertaken. The previous round in 2005 aroused more interest, with offers received for nine blocks, although not all of these were turned into firm contracts. Royal Dutch Shell (Netherlands/UK) eventually signed two agreements, and one each went to Loon Energy of Canada and Maurel & Prom of France. Petro-Canada (since merged into Suncor) bid for several blocks in this round, but did not sign any contracts; it has indicated that it is still interested in further exploration opportunities, and two blocks that it previously bid for have been included in the new round. So far no significant discoveries have been announced from initial exploration work in the four blocks awarded from the 2005 round, but further wells are to be drilled, and the companies involved are likely to have been encouraged by the successes reported in blocks awarded in earlier rounds.

Syria's oil production averaged about 580,000 barrels/day (b/d) between 1995 and 2000, but went into decline thereafter as a result of the depletion of fields discovered and developed by Shell in the Euphrates basin. However, production has stabilised at 375,000-380,000 b/d since 2007, and the government says that it is confident that output can be maintained at about this level for some years to come. The stemming of the decline has resulted from increases in output from fields operated by the Syrian Petroleum Company (SPC), where foreign companies have applied enhanced oil recovery techniques, and from the output from a number of new fields, notably those operated by Gulfsands Petroleum (a London-listed firm), and the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC). These activities have added more than 50,000 b/d of production over the past two-three years. A further 15,000-20,000 b/d is set to come on stream over the next few months from fields discovered by ONGC Videsh of India (with London-listed IPR) and Tatneft of Russia.

The Syrian oil and gas sector has also witnessed some major acquisitions. This started in 2005 with Petro-Canada's sale of its minority stake in the Al Furat Petroleum Company (operated by Shell) to CNPC and ONGC Videsh. Last year a Chinese state-owned company, Sinopec, took over the Tishrin and Oudeh oilfields (the first to be subject to enhanced recovery) as part of its US$1.9bn acquisition of Canada's Tanganyika Oil Company, and another state-owned Chinese firm, Sinochem, acquired Emerald Oil of Ireland for US$880m in a deal that gave it a 50% stake in the Khurbet East oil-producing block, which is operated by Gulfsands. Two Indian oil companies have recently bid to acquire Gulfsands, but have so far been rebuffed.

Syria 15


Syria's natural gas production declined by about 14% between 2004 and 2008, but is now poised to increase rapidly as a series of new projects come on stream. Production of treated gas rose by about 10% last year to reach 6.1bn cu metres, and will increase by at least 3bn cu metres/year by 2012 as a result of the development of new fields, including two by foreign operators, INA of Croatia at Jarir and Suncor (formerly Petro-Canada) on the Ebla project.

Hydrocarbons production

Sources: BP, Statistical Review of World Energy 2009; International Energy Agency; Economist Intelligence Unit.

(a) Economist Intelligence Unit forecasts.

4.0

5.0

6.0

7.0

8.0

9.0

10.0

11.0

250

300

350

400

450

500

550

600

'000 barrels/day; right scalem cu metres/year; left scale

11 (a)10 (a)09080706050403022001

The government has also negotiated a deal with Iraq to treat a portion of any gas produced from the Akkaz field, just over the border. Akkaz has the potential to contribute to the supply of gas to Europe through tying into a pipeline from Egypt that now runs to Turkey through Syria and Jordan. Meanwhile, Syria is keen to resume its role as a conduit for Iraqi oil to reach the Mediterranean. The oil pipeline from Kirkuk in northern Iraq to the Banias oil terminal in Syria reopened in the latter years of the Saddam Hussein regime (after being closed in 1976 owing to political differences between the rival Baathist regimes), but has been out of action since the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq. Syria's oil minister, Sufyan Allaw, said at an oil and gas exhibition in Damascus in early April that Syria was ready to pump 300,000 b/d of crude from Iraq to Banias, but that repairs on the Iraqi side between Haditha and Kirkuk had still not been completed. Mr Allaw also said that Sinopec has carried out a study on building a new pipeline to export incremental production from the Rumaila field in southern Iraq through Syria. CNPC is working with BP on a project to increase oil output at Rumaila by almost 2m b/d.

The routing of Iraqi crude into Syria would provide better options for developing Syria's refining industry. The government has provided initial approval for several new refineries over the past few years, but as yet little progress has been made. The most serious of these projects was a proposal by a Kuwaiti firm, Noor Petroleum, to build a 140,000-b/d refinery in Deir al-Zor, in the Euphrates valley. However, Mr Allaw said that the project was no longer part of the government's plans for upgrading the refining sector. He indicated that the reason for the lack of progress was the escalation of costs. Two other refining projects are being considered with Chinese/Malaysian and Iranian/Venezuelan partners, but without any clear sign of concrete progress.

Syria can benefit from Iraqi oil and gas developments

16 Syria


The decline in oil production has meant that Syria is now a net importer of oil and petroleum products. However, the petroleum sector deficit (including royalties paid to foreign companies for their share in production) is likely to have peaked in 2008 at US$1.5bn, owing to the effects of stabilising oil production and reducing domestic petroleum price subsidies. The massive differential between prices of diesel in Syria and in neighbouring countries (in particular Lebanon, Turkey and Jordan) fostered extensive smuggling activity, leaving the government with a grossly inflated import bill. Diesel prices were increased sharply in 2009, with consumers compensated initially with subsidised quotas and subsequently through cash payments. According to Mr Allaw, this resulted in a one-third drop in the volume of diesel imports from 9.7bn litres in 2007 to 6.3bn litres last year; the cost of importing diesel fell by a larger margin from US$3.6bn in 2008 to US$400m in 2009, although this partly reflected lower international prices.

Syria's oil balance of payments (US$ m)

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010Exports 4,286 4,062 4,355 5,530 3,493 4,022

Imports -2,473 -2,884 -4,250 -5,654 -3,250 -4,102Oil companies' profits -1,088 -1,165 -1,085 -1,527 -1,213 -1,153Balance 725 13 -980 -1,651 -970 -1,233

Source: IMF Article IV report, March 2010.

Petroleum sector trade deficit is likely to have peaked

Syria 17


Data and charts Annual data and forecast

Pl ea se se e g ra p hi c b el ow

2005a 2006a 2007a 2008b 2009 b 2010c 2011c

GDP

Nominal GDP (US$ m) 28,210 32,786 40,376 49,193 50,329 56,851 63,873

Nominal GDP (S£ bn) 1,506 1,705 2,018 2,292 2,351 2,612 2,907

Real GDP growth (%) 6.2 5.0 5.7 4.3 3.6 3.9 4.2

Expenditure on GDP (% real change)

Private consumption 13.3 3.0 1.0 2.3 3.7 4.5 4.8

Government consumption 1.9 1.5 23.6 -0.5 6.5 4.7 3.7

Gross fixed investment 12.7 7.1 -8.3 -5.9 -0.4 4.4 5.2

Exports of goods & services -1.5 20.6 1.4 -2.3 -1.9 2.1 3.2

Imports of goods & services 26.0 -12.7 11.3 2.5 -3.5 2.5 3.5

Origin of GDP (% real change)

Agriculture 7.8 10.2 -13.5 -8.7 5.5 2.2 2.8

Industry -3.0 0.6 3.8 5.5 -0.6 5.3 5.0

Services 13.3 3.4 16.6 8.3 4.7 3.9 4.2

Population and income

Population (m) 19.1 19.8 20.5 21.2a 21.8 22.4 23.0

GDP per head (US$ at PPP) 3,999b 4,191b 4,398b 4,524 4,610 4,734 4,848

Recorded unemployment (av; %) 8.0 8.3 9.2 10.9a 8.5 a 8.3 8.1

Fiscal indicators (% of GDP)

Central government revenue 23.7 25.5 22.7 21.4 22.7 22.1 23.1

Central government expenditure 28.6 29.0 25.8 24.5 28.3 27.0 25.9

Central government balance -5.0 -3.5 -3.1 -3.1 -5.7 -4.9 -2.8

Net public debt 32.4b 33.9b 28.4b 27.0 31.8 33.2 32.4

Prices and financial indicators

Exchange rate S£:US$ (end-period) 54.85 51.10 48.10 46.45a 45.70 a 46.03 45.34

Consumer prices (av; % change) 7.2 10.0 3.9 15.7a 2.6 7.1 6.2

Stock of money M1 (% change) 14.4 -4.0 10.7 12.9a 10.5 a 4.9 6.4

Stock of money M2 (% change) 21.0 7.8 14.7 12.4a 9.3 a 5.7 7.6

Lending interest rate (av; %) 8.0 9.0 10.0 10.2a 10.0 a 8.7 9.0

Current account (US$ m)

Trade balance -140 886 -521 -2,188 -2,607 -2,816 -2,710

Goods: exports fob 8,602 10,245 11,756 13,789 10,498 11,454 11,950

Goods: imports fob -8,742 -9,359 -12,277 -15,978 -13,105 -14,270 -14,660

Services balance 551 404 849 1,051 1,388 1,507 1,580

Income balance -863 -935 -689 -910 -634 -647 -666

Current transfers balance 747 535 820 976 806 866 900

Current-account balance 295 890 459 -1,072 -1,047 -1,089 -897

External debt (US$ m)

Debt stock 6,508 6,502 6,732b 6,984 7,033 7,186 7,286

Debt service paid 205 187 189b 161 153 149 140

Principal repayments 144 130 126b 117 110 108 102

Interest 61 57 62b 43 43 41 37

International reserves (US$ m)

Total international reserves 4,716b 5,419b 5,968b 6,205 6,328 6,642 7,040

a Actual. b Economist Intelligence Unit estimates. c Economist Intelligence Unit forecasts.

Source: Central Bank of Syria; IMF, International Financial Statistics; World Bank, Global Development Finance.

18 Syria


Quarterly data Pl ea se se e g ra p hi c b el ow

2008 2009

1 Qtr 2 Qtr 3 Qtr 4 Qtr 1 Qtr 2 Qtr 3 Qtr 4 Qtr

Prices

Consumer prices (2000=100) 126.1 131.4 134.4 137.4 134.8 133.8 135.9 138.4

Consumer prices (% change, year on year) 9.6 18.6 18.2 16.7 6.9 1.8 1.1 0.7

Financial indicators

Exchange rate S£:US$ (av) 47.5 46.0 46.1 46.7 47.3 47.5 46.3 45.7

M1 (end-period; S£ bn) 755.7 792.0 842.4 825.9 823.9 843.4 926.3 912.6

M1 (% change, year on year) 9.7 9.1 13.8 12.9 9.0 6.5 10.0 10.5

M2 (end-period; S£ bn) 1,510 1,586 1,655 1,656 1,669 1,682 1,783 1,808

M2 (% change, year on year) 23.8 24.0 26.5 25.2 10.5 6.0 7.7 9.2

Sectoral trends

Crude oil production (m barrels/day) 0.37 0.38 0.39 0.41 0.38 0.37 0.37 0.37

Crude oil production (% change, year on year) -6.1 0.0 2.6 12.0 3.7 -1.8 -4.4 -8.8

Foreign trade (US$ m)a

Exports fob 3,639 5,034 4,732 3,633 2,305 3,226 3,202 n/a

Imports cif 6,114 7,533 7,796 7,089 4,816 5,533 5,976 n/a

Trade balance -2,474 -2,499 -3,065 -3,456 -2,511 -2,306 -2,774 n/a

a IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics estimates.

Sources: Central Bank of Syria; International Energy Agency, Monthly Oil Market Report; IMF, International Financial Statistics; Direction of Trade Statistics.

Syria 19


Monthly data Pl ea se se e g ra p hi c b el ow

Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec

Exchange rate S£:US$ (av) 2007 51.1 51.0 50.9 50.8 50.6 50.5 50.2 49.7 49.7 48.8 48.4 48.2

2008 48.1 47.9 46.6 46.0 45.9 46.1 45.9 46.2 46.3 46.4 46.9 46.7

2009 46.9 47.4 47.6 47.8 47.5 47.1 46.8 46.3 46.0 45.9 45.7 45.6

M1 (% change, year on year) 2007 0.3 4.7 8.3 10.5 7.7 12.8 13.8 15.1 15.3 16.6 18.1 10.7

2008 10.6 10.6 10.1 9.5 10.6 9.6 12.1 13.4 14.2 12.3 8.8 13.1

2009 10.0 11.1 8.4 7.6 7.1 6.4 8.7 8.1 9.6 6.0 13.5 10.3

M2 (% change, year on year) 2007 10.3 13.2 14.6 15.8 14.1 16.7 17.6 16.9 16.7 16.5 16.2 12.4

2008 23.7 24.2 24.2 22.8 23.4 24.0 24.7 26.6 26.5 24.8 22.1 25.2

2009 10.4 10.5 10.2 10.1 8.9 6.0 7.7 5.9 7.7 7.2 12.5 9.2

Consumer prices (av; % change, year on year) 2007 4.5 4.8 3.4 2.6 0.9 0.2 3.7 5.6 4.5 5.5 6.3 4.8

2008 7.0 9.3 12.4 15.2 20.0 20.8 17.9 17.5 19.1 19.2 16.3 15.5

2009 10.6 6.2 4.9 3.1 1.7 1.6 2.2 1.9 0.2 -0.7 1.3 1.7

Deposit rate (av; %) 2007 9.0 9.0 9.0 9.0 9.0 9.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 9.0 9.0 8.0

2008 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0

2009 7.0 6.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 6.0

Lending rate (av; %) 2007 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0

2008 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0

2009 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0

Total exports fob (US$ m) 2007 1,009 805 880 1,076 1,681 1,124 1,181 1,132 1,272 1,326 995 1,068

2008 1,290 1,028 1,321 1,601 2,018 1,414 1,646 1,320 1,765 1,444 1,210 979

2009 828 645 831 884 1,400 942 1,110 997 1,096 1,090 1,000 n/a

Total imports cif (US$ m) 2007 1,405 1,453 1,952 1,869 1,917 1,879 1,825 2,077 2,199 1,954 2,022 2,236

2008 1,791 1,885 2,438 2,507 2,522 2,504 2,413 2,629 2,755 2,462 2,184 2,442

2009 1,434 1,422 1,959 1,860 1,783 1,890 1,885 1,994 2,098 2,034 1,913 n/a

Trade balance fob-cif (US$ m) 2007 -395.3 -647.6 -1,072.6 -793.7 -236.2 -755.6 -644.4 -945.0 -927.6 -627.7 -1,026.5 -1,168.0

2008 -501.1 -856.6 -1,116.5 -905.9 -503.7 -1,089.7 -766.5 -1,309.0 -989.2 -1,018.2 -974.2 -1,463.6

2009 -606.0 -777.0 -1,127.7 -975.2 -383.1 -948.2 -775.5 -997.0 -1,001.6 -943.7 -913.4 n/a

Sources: Central Bank of Syria; IMF, International Financial Statistics, Direction of Trade Statistics; Haver Analytics.

20 Syria


Annual trends charts Pl ea se se e g ra p hi c b el ow

Annual trends charts

Source: Economist Intelligence Unit. Source: Economist Intelligence Unit.

Budget balance(% of GDP)

Current-account balance(% of GDP)



Real GDP growth(% change)

Consumer price inflation(av; %)

-3.0

-2.0

-1.0

0.0

1.0

2.0

3.0

4.0

5.0

6.0

7.0 World Middle East and North Africa Syria

11100908070620050.0

2.0

4.0

6.0

8.0

10.0

12.0

14.0

16.0

18.0 World Middle East and North Africa Syria

1110090807062005

-8.0

-4.0

0.0

4.0

8.0

12.0

16.0 Middle East and North Africa Syria

1110090807062005-5.0

0.0

5.0

10.0

15.0

20.0 Middle East and North Africa Syria

1110090807062005

Others 44.4%

Iraq 30.9%

Germany 9.4%

Lebanon 9.3%

Italy 6.1%

Others 66.2%

Saudi Arabia 12.9%

China 8.7%

UAE 6.3%

Italy 5.9%

Destination of exports, 2008(share of total) (share of total)

Origin of imports, 2008

Syria 21


Monthly trends charts Pl ea se se e g ra p hi c b el ow

Monthly trends charts

Exchange rate(S£:US$; av)

Consumer price inflation(% change, year on year)

Foreign trade(US$ m; goods only)

Oil: Brent crude price(US$/b; av)

Source: Economist Intelligence Unit.Source: Economist Intelligence Unit.

Source: Economist Intelligence Unit.Source: Economist Intelligence Unit.

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

OctJulAprJan09

OctJulAprJan08

OctJulAprJan07

OctJul2006

-5.0

0.0

5.0

10.0

15.0

20.0

25.0

OctJulAprJan09

OctJulAprJan08

OctJulAprJan07

OctJul2006

45.0

46.0

47.0

48.0

49.0

50.0

51.0

52.0

53.0

Jan10

OctJulAprJan09

OctJulAprJan08

OctJulAprJan07

OctJul2006

-2,000

-1,500

-1,000

-500

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

3,000 Balance Imports Exports

OctJulAprJan09

OctJulAprJan08

OctJulAprJan07

OctJul2006

22 Syria


Comparative economic indicators Pl ea se se e g ra p hi c b el ow

Comparative economic indicators, 2009

Gross domestic product(US$ bn; market exchange rates)

Gross domestic product(% change, year on year)

Consumer prices(% change, year on year)

Sources: Economist Intelligence Unit estimates; national sources.

Sources: Economist Intelligence Unit estimates; national sources.Sources: Economist Intelligence Unit estimates; national sources.

Sources: Economist Intelligence Unit estimates; national sources.

Gross domestic product per head(US$ '000; market exchange rates)

0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400

Jordan

Bahrain

Yemen

Lebanon

Tunisia

Syria

Libya

Sudan

Oman

Iraq

Qatar

Morocco

Kuwait

Algeria

Egypt

Israel

United Arab Emirates

Iran

Saudi Arabia

0.0 10.0 20.0 30.0 40.0 50.0 60.0

Yemen

Sudan

Egypt

Syria

Iraq

Morocco

Jordan

Tunisia

Algeria

Iran

Lebanon

Libya

Saudi Arabia

Bahrain

Oman

Israel

Kuwait


Qatar

-8.0 -4.0 0.0 4.0 8.0 12.0 16.0

Qatar

Iraq

Jordan

Morocco

Lebanon


Libya

Syria

Bahrain

Israel

Yemen

Tunisia

Kuwait

Oman

Saudi Arabia

Algeria

Sudan

Egypt

Iran

-4.0 -2.0 0.0 2.0 4.0 6.0 8.0 10.0


Kuwait

Saudi Arabia

Iran

Israel

Algeria

Bahrain

Tunisia

Jordan

Oman

Syria

Libya

Yemen

Sudan

Iraq

Egypt

Morocco

Lebanon

Qatar

Syria 23


Country snapshot

Basic data

185,180 sq km

20.5m (mid-2008 estimate)

Population in millions, 2006

Damascus (capital) area 4.01 Aleppo 4.23 Homs 1.59 Hama 1.44 Hassakah 1.33 Idlib 1.31

Subtropical on coast, arid in the centre, cold winters in the highlands

Hottest month, August, 18-37°C (average daily minimum and maximum); coldest month, January, 2-12°C; driest month, August, zero average rainfall; wettest month, January, 43 mm average rainfall

Arabic, French, some English

Sunni Muslim (72%); Alawi Muslim (14%); Christian (12%); Shia Muslim and Druze minorities

Metric system

Syrian pound (S£) = 100 piastres

GMT plus two hours

January 1st-December 31st

The dates of Islamic holidays are based on the lunar calendar and are therefore approximate. Mawlid al-Nabi (the birthday of the Prophet, February 26th 2010); Eid al-Fitr (September 11th); Eid al-Adha (Feast of the Sacrifice, November 17th); Islamic New Year (December 7th)

New Year's Day (January 1st 2010); Revolution Day (March 8th); Mother's Day (March 21st); Easter (April 4th); Orthodox Easter (April 5th); Independence Day (April 17th); Labour Day (May 1st); Martyrs' Day (May 6th); October Liberation War (October 6th); Christmas Day (December 25th)

Land area

Population

Main provinces

Weather in Damascus

Languages

Religion

Measures

Currency

Time

Fiscal year

Public holidays

Climate

Public holidays

24 Syria


Political structure

Syrian Arab Republic

Republic

Based on the constitution of 1973

250-member Majlis al-Shaab (People's Assembly) directly elected for a four-year term

Universal adult suffrage

Next legislative and presidential elections due in 2011 and 2014 respectively

President, elected for a seven-year term. The president appoints the vice-presidents, the prime minister and the Council of Ministers. Bashar al-Assad, the current president, is also the commander-in-chief of the armed forces and the secretary-general of the Baath party

The prime minister heads the Council of Ministers, a large number of whom are drawn from the ruling Baath party and its partners

The ruling National Progressive Front includes the Arab Socialist Baath Party; Arab Socialist Party; Arab Socialist Unionist Party; Communist parties; Syrian Arab Socialist Union Party; Unionist Socialist Democratic Party; Union Socialist Party

Prime minister Mohammed Naji al-Otari Deputy prime minister for economic affairs Abdullah al-Dardari

Agriculture & agrarian reform Adel Saffar Awqaf (Islamic endowments) Mohammed Abdel-Sattar al-Sayed Communications & technology Imad Abdel-Ghani Sabbouni Defence Ali Habib Economy & foreign trade Lamiya Assi Education Ali Saad Electricity Ahmed Qusay Kayyali Environment (minister of state) Kawkab al-Sabah al-Dayeh Expatriate affairs Joseph Sweid Finance Mohammed al-Hussein Foreign affairs Walid al-Muallim Health Rida Said Higher education Ghiath Abdel-Wahab Barakat Housing & construction Omar Ghalanji Industry Fouad Issa Jony Information Mohsen Bilal Interior Said Sammour Irrigation Nader al-Buni Justice Ahmed Hamoud Younis Labour & social affairs Diyala al-Hajj Aref Local government Tamer al-Hijjeh Petroleum & mineral resources Sufyan Allaw Presidential affairs Mansour Azzam Tourism Saadallah Agha al-Qalah Transport Yacoub Suleiman Badr

Adib al-Mayaleh

Amer Lutfi

Official name

Form of state

Legal system

Electoral system

Legislature

National elections

Head of state

Executive

Main political parties

Key ministers

Central Bank governor

State Planning Commission

country report - wikileaks report... · country snapshot 23 basic data 24 political structure...

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