courage and the spirited part of the soul in plato’s republic

volume15,no.26 october2015

Courage and the Spirited

Part of the Soul in

Plato’s Republic

Josh WilburnWayne State University

© 2015 JoshWilburnThis work is licensed under a Creative Commons

Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License. <www.philosophersimprint.org/015026/>

I nthefinalargumentofPlato’sProtagoras,Socratesattemptstodemonstrate—againstProtagoras’earlierinsistencetothecon-trary—that thevirtueofcourage isakindofknowledge.What

distinguishesthecourageousindividualfromthecoward,onSocrates’view,isnotthattheformeriswillingto“gotoward”whathefearswhilethelatterisnot,butratherthatthecourageousindividual,unlikethecoward,knowswhatistrulydeservingoffear.Infact,Socratesclaims,peopleneverwillinglychoosewhattheyknoworbelievetobeworstormostfearful.Allcasesofcowardice,therefore,turnouttobecasesinwhichtheagentisignorantormistaken(atleasttemporarily)aboutwhatistrulyfearfulandbad,whilecourageis“wisdomaboutwhatisandisnottobefeared”(360d).

IntheRepublic,Platoprovidesa“new”accountofcourageintermsofhisfreshlyintroducedtheorythatthesoulconsistsofthreedistinctsourcesofmotivation,or“parts”:thereasoning,thespirited,andtheappetitive.Anindividualpossessescourage,Socratessays,whenthespiritedpartofhissoul,orthumoeides,“preserveswhatisannouncedbyrationalaccounts”inthefaceofoppositionfromunrulyappetiteswithintheindividual’ssoul(442b–c).Onthesurface,atleast,thisnewaccount seems very different from that of the Protagoras. Indeed, adominantlineofinterpretationtakestheRepublic’saccountofthesoultodepartsharplyfromthatoftheProtagoras,andtodosoinwaysthathave important implications for understanding and comparing thetwo dialogues’ discussions of courage. According to this traditionalreading,oneofthecrucialinnovationsoftripartitepsychologyisthatitallowsPlatotocountenancecasesofakrasia —thatis,casesinwhichanagent’sappetitesforcehertoactinawaythatshesimultaneouslyjudgestobeworsethananotheravailablecourseofaction.1Ifthisviewiscorrect,thenontheRepublic’saccount,actsofcowardicenolongernecessarilyinvolveignoranceormistakenrationaljudgmentastheydid intheProtagoras.For it isnowpossible foranagent tocorrectlyjudge(orperhapsevenknow)2whichactionisbetterandlessfearful,

1. Iwillrestrictuseoftheterm‘akrasia’tocasesofthissort.

2. Reeve(1988:134)arguesthat“thereisnosuggestionthatitisimpossible”thatphilosopher-kingswithknowledgemightactakratically.Cf.Hare(1982:54).

ImprintPhilosophers’

joshwilburn Courage and the Spirited Part of the Soul in Plato’s Republic

philosophers’imprint –2– vol.15,no.26(october2015)

needforsomethinglikethespiritedelementofourpsychology.Ac-cordingtomyinterpretation,theRepublic’saccountofcourageisanelaborationorsupplementationoftheProtagoras’account,ratherthanarejectionofit.

Iwill begin inSection 1withbrief remarkson theProtagoras’ ac-countof courage and cowardice. Iwill thenoutline anddefendmyinterpretationof theRepublic inSections2through5.Finally, inSec-tions6and7,IwillreturntotheProtagorasinordertodrawattentiontoimportantpointsofcontinuitybetweenthetwodialogues.

1. Courage in the Protagoras

Theoccasion fordiscussingcourage in theProtagorasevolvesoutofSocrates’reactiontothetitlecharacter’s“greatspeech”indefenseoftheteachabilityofvirtue.SocratessaysthathefindsProtagoras’speechconvincing,butthathestillneedsjust“onelittlething”fromhim:hewishestohearmoreabouttherelationshipamongthevariousthingsthatProtagorastreatedas“virtue”inhisspeech—namely,justice,tem-perance, andpiety. In response toSocrates’questioning,Protagorasrevealshisviewthatwhatheconsiderstobethedifferent“parts”ofvirtue—andhenowincludescourageandknowledgeamongthemaswell—arealldissimilartooneanother,andthatitispossibletopos-sessonevirtuewithoutpossessingtheothers(329d–330b).Socratesresists this view, andunderpressure fromSocrates’ arguments,Pro-tagoraslateramendshisposition,admittingthat“whilefourofthemsomewhatresembleeachother,courageiscompletelydifferentfromalltherest.TheproofthatwhatIamsayingistrueisthatyouwillfindmanypeoplewhoareextremelyunjust,impious,intemperate,andig-norant,andyetexceptionallycourageous”(349d3–5).5Protagorasnowconcedesthatwisdom,justice,temperance,andpietyaremorecloselyconnectedthanhehadoriginallygranted,buthecontinuestoinsistthatcourageisentirelydistinctfromtheothervirtues.

5. TranslationsofthetextsarefromCooper(1997),withmodifications.

and tomaintain that judgmentwhile sheacts,butnonethelesswill-inglytochoosetheworsecourseofactionbecausesheisoverpoweredbyherappetites.3

IwillpresentanalternativereadingofcourageandcowardiceintheRepublic thatresiststhesharpdevelopmentalismofthetraditionalinterpretation.Onethingthatwilldistinguishmyapproachfromthatofpreviousworkisthatthelatter,inexaminingputativeshiftsinPla-tonicpsychology fromProtagoras to theRepublic,has tendedtocon-centrateon therelationshipbetweenreasonandappetitivedesires.4 Myinterpretation,whilecontinuingtoexaminethatrelationship,willinsteadfocusonthespiritedpartofthesoulanditsrelationshipwithreason.Myaccountwilldefendtwomainlinesofthought.ThefirstisthatPlatodoesnot,intheRepublic,abandontheProtagoras’viewthatallcasesofcowardiceinvolvemistakenjudgmentorignoranceaboutwhatisfearful.Rather,hecontinuestotreatcowardlybehaviorasanindication that, at least at the time of action, the agent lacked cor-rectbeliefaboutwhatisbestandleastfearful.Theevidenceforthisviewwillincludeanargumentthatwhatitmeansforthethumoeides to“preservewhatisannouncedbyrationalaccounts”intheRepublic is for it topreventthefluctuationorcorruptionofreasoningunderthedeceptiveinfluenceofappetite.Spirit’spsychicfunction,inotherwords,isnottopreventcasesofakrasia inthesensespecifiedabove,but rather toprovidenon-rational support for stable, correct beliefandknowledge. Second, Iwill argue that theProtagoras anticipatesthisaccountofcourageinimportantways.Inparticular, itdrawsat-tention to the problematic instability of belief and adumbrates the

3. Irwin(1977:198),forexample,advocatesaviewofthissort:“Abravemanre-tainshisbeliefthatthisisabraveaction,andactsonhisbeliefsdespiteplea-sures,pains,fears,andappetite.Theseconflictingdesirescancausesomeonetolosehisbeliefthatanactionisgood,orcausehim,likeLeontius,todowhatheknowstobebad,ortofailtodowhatheknowstobebest.”

4. Onesignofthisemphasisisthatthediscussion—e. g.inIrwin(1977:191–2);Penner(1971:103–11)and(1997:49–61);Carone(2001);andSingpurwalla(2006)—hasoftencenteredaroundthequestionwhethertheRepublic recog-nizesthepossibilityof“blind”or“good-independent”appetitesinawaythattheProtagorasdidnot.



Socratesoffersanalternativeexplanationof thephenomenon inquestion,however.Hesuggeststhatallallegedcasesofbeing“over-comebypleasure”areinfactcasesofignorance.The“powerofappear-ances”causesimmediatepleasurestoseemgreaterthanmoreremotepleasures,andasaresult,peoplemisjudgethevalueofshort-termin-dulgence.Knowledge,however—specifically,the“artofmeasurement”—hasthepowertoovercomethedeceptiveinfluenceofappearances:

While thepowerofappearanceoftenmakesuswanderallovertheplaceinconfusion,oftenchangingourmindsabout the same things and regretting our actions andchoices…theartofmeasurement,incontrast,wouldren-dertheappearancespowerlessbyshowingusthetruth,wouldgiveuspeaceofmindfirmly rooted in the truthandwouldsaveourlife(356d4–e2).

Thosewhohaveknowledgeofthetruebalanceoflong-termandshort-term pleasures and pains, therefore,will reliably be ruled by theirknowledgeandwillactaccordingly.Itfollowsthatthosewhowronglychoose to indulge in immediatepleasuredonotknow that theyareselectingtheworsecourseofaction.Theyare, inotherwords, igno-rant,havingbeendeceivedinsomewaybypleasureandthepowerofappearances.

CloselyconnectedtoSocrates’argumentisapsychologicalclaim,whichhemakes explicit after concludinghis response to theMany,andwhichprovidesanimportanttheoreticalresourceinhisrejectionof Protagoras’ understanding of courage. According to Socrates, noonewillingly acts in away thatheknows, or evenmerelybelieveswhenheacts, tobeworse forhim thananotheravailablecourseofaction. “No one goeswillingly toward the bad orwhat he believes(οἴεται)tobebad”,Socratessays.“Neitherisitinhumannature,soit

516,n.6) forcommentatorswhoadvocatesimilar readings.Foralternativeinterpretations,seeClark(2012:242,n.9,and245–54),Gallop(1964:118–9),Santas(1966:12–20),Taylor(1976:181–6),Woolf(2002:239–40),andVlastos(1956:xxxix,and1969:81–3).

The remainder of thedialogue serves Socrates’ ultimate repudia-tionofthischaracterizationofcourage.Socratesproceedsbyaseem-inglycircuitousroute,however.Hedoesnotinitiallydiscussthevirtueof courage itself, but rather invitesProtagoras toexaminewithhimthepopularnotionofbeing“overcomebypleasure”.AccordingtotheviewoftheMany,peopleoftenknowhowitisbestforthemtoactbut,despitepossessingthatknowledge,failtoactthatway,becauseofim-pulsessuchaspleasure,pain,andfear.Insuchindividuals,knowledgedoesnot“rule”butratheris“draggedaroundlikeaslave”(352b–c).InSocrates’rejectionofthisposition,heelicitsfromtheMany(bywayof their spokesperson, Protagoras) the admission that they identifythe goodwith pleasure (and the bad with pain).6 Given this hedo-nisticview,Socratesshowsthemthattheirpositionis“ridiculous”:itamountstosayingthatpeoplefailtoactinthewaytheyknowisbest becausetheyareovercomebythe good(355a–d).7 6. HereIattributehedonismtotheMany,alongwithProtagorasastheirspokes-

person.ThequestionoftherolethathedonismplaysinSocrates’argument,however, and to whom precisely we should attribute that position, has alonghistoryofcontroversy.AnumberofcommentatorsattributehedonismtoSocrateshimself(or,byextension,toPlato), includingAdam(1957:xxix–xxxiii),Bartlett (2004:82–3),Bentley (2003:85–6,n. 2 and 104),Crombie(1962:240),Grote(1864:87–9andnn.m,n,p),GoslingandTaylor(1982:47–56),Hackforth(1928:41–2),Irwin(1977:308–9,n.13,and1995:85–94),Nuss-baum(1986: 111),Taylor (1976:208–10),andVlastos (1956:xl,n. 50).Oth-ersadoptvariousad hominemordialecticalreadings,whichdenythateitherSocratesorPlatoendorses,oriscommittedto,hedonism.Forspecificargu-ments,seeBidgood(1983),Duncan(1978),Dyson(1976:44–5),Frede(1992:xxvii–xxix),Goldberg(1983:250,309–10,n.10),Grube(1933),Kraut(1984:266andn.37),McCoy(1998:36–7),Russell(2005:237–48),Sesonske(1963),Weiss(1990),Wolz(1967:217),andZeyl(1980).Althoughmyinterpretationisalignedwiththissecondgroup,nothinginthemainargumentsofmypaperdependsonthatreading.

7. Anotherpointofcontentionamonginterpretersconcernstheissueofwhatexactlyisshowntoberidiculous(γελοῖον,355a6)abouttheMany’sposition,andatwhichpoint in theargument it is shown.Again, Idonot thinkmypresentaimsareaffectedbythecontroversy,thoughmyownreadingofthe“ridiculousness”oftheMany’spositionisinlinewiththatofDyson,whocom-ments,“Whatisabsurd?Merelythat,onaverysimplelevel,thepopularthe-sisissilly.Onecannotexplainwhyamanwhocandosomethinggooddoessomethingwhichheknowsisbad,bysayingthatheisovercomebygood”(1976: 36).Cf. Ferrari (1990: 119,n.6),McCoy (1998:36), andWeiss (1989:



earlierclaim,then,courageisnotindependentfromwisdomandtherestofthevirtues.

Before turning to theRepublic’s account of courage, there is onepointinthisaccountthatIwouldliketostress,whichisthat,althoughSocrates evidently characterizes knowledgeor belief (at the timeofaction) as sufficient to guide an individual’s behavior on any givenoccasion, only the former constitutes virtue.10 That is, although theMotivationalThesisentailsthatanagentwhopossessesmerelytrue belief about the fearful at the timesheactswillbehave in the samewayas the courageousperson,Socratesdoesnotdefine courageasknowledgeortruebeliefaboutwhatistobefeared,butonlyasknowl-edge.Indeed,thepurposeofSocrates’engagementwiththeManyistodefendthesupremacyofknowledge —toshowthatitis“capableofrul-ing”inaperson—whereashedefendsnosuchclaimaboutbelief.11Ifnoonewillinglyactscontrarytotheirknowledgeor theirbeliefaboutwhatisbest,however,thenwhydoestruebeliefnotenjoythesamesupremestatusasknowledge?

Thereasonisthat,whereasknowledgeisimmunetothedeceptiveinfluenceofpleasureandappearances,merebelief—eventruebelief—isnot.Appearances,Socratesclaimsinthepassageabove,causeustochangeourmindsconstantlyandtoregretthethingswehavedone.This indicatesnotonlythatagents’beliefsabouthowtheyoughttoactfrequentlyshift,butalsothat,atleastsometimes,agentsholdtherightbeliefsabouthowtheyoughttoact.Presumably,thosewho“re-gret”theiractionsarethosewhojudgethevalueoftheiractionscor-rectlyafterthefact.Wecanassumethatmanyofthemalsojudgethe

10. TheoverwhelmingmajorityofcommentatorsacceptthatSocrates’psycholog-icalclaimappliestobeliefaswellasknowledge.SeeVlastos(1969:72–3andn.9)foradissentingview,however,andGulley(1971)forareplytoVlastos.

11. I followPenner (1997; cf. 1990: 45–8),Carone (2001: 109–16), and Segvic(2000:27–34)intakingtheProtagoras tobedrawingadistinctionbetweenthepowerofknowledgeandtherelativeweaknessandinstabilityofbelief.Somecommentators,however—e. g.Gulley(1965:92),Irwin(1995:237),andWolfsdorf(2006:131)—suggestthatbeliefistreatedasequaltoknowledgewithrespecttopracticalefficacy.Carone(2001:111,n.12)providesausefulnoteonthisissue.

seems,tobewillingtogotowardwhatonebelievestobebadinsteadofthegood.Andwhenheisforcedtochoosebetweenoneoftwobadthings,noonewillchoosethegreaterifheisabletochoosethelesser”(358c6–d4).8 In otherwords, Socrates accepts the followingMotiva-tionalThesis:

(MT)Ifanagentknowsorbelievesthatsomeavailableactionx isbetterorlessbadthananotheractiony,thenitisimpos-siblefortheagent,while maintaining that judgment, towill-inglychooseactiony instead.

Withthisprincipleinplace,SocratesrespondstoProtagoras’accountofcourageinawaythatparallelshisresponsetotheMany’saccountofbeing“overcomebypleasure”.Fear,Socratesandhisinterlocutorsagree,isanexpectationofsomethingbad.Sincenoonechooseswhatheexpectstobebad(orworse,whenthechoiceisbetweentwobadthings), it follows that neither the coward nor the courageous indi-vidualchooseswhathe(most) fears(358e).Rather, theybothavoidwhat they fear, andwhatdistinguishes them is that the courageouspersonrightlyjudgeswhatisdeservingoffear,whilethecowardjudg-eswrongly.Courage, therefore, is knowledge orwisdom about thefearful,andcowardiceisaformofignorance.9ContrarytoProtagoras’

8. Myaccountremainsneutralontwoissuesthatdividecommentatorsatthispoint: (1)whether thepsychological principle articulatedhere is apremise on which Socrates’ preceding argument against the Many relies, and (2)whetherthepsychologicalprinciplefirstappearshereat358b–d(followingtheargumentagainsttheMany),orwhetherithasalreadybeeninvokeddur-ingSocrates’exchangewithProtagorasastheMany’srepresentative(e. g.at356b–e).Fordiscussionoftheseissues,seeClark(2012),Dimas(2008:268–70),Dyson(1976:33,n.3),Gallop(1964:128–9),Gulley(1971:120–1),Hub-bardandKarnofsky(1982:146–7),Morris(2006:199–205),Moss(2006:506),Santas(1966:17–20andn.21),Sullivan(1961:19–20),Taylor(1976:189–90),Vlastos (1969:72–3andn.9,83–5),Weiss (1989:519–20andn. 11),Woolf(2002),andZeyl(1980:258–9).

9. Cf.Nicias’proposeddefinitionof courageatLach. 194e–195a. IwillnotbeconcernedwiththeLachesinthepresentpaper,thoughitisworthnotingthatIdonottakethatdialoguetobeintensionwithmyconclusionshere.



They’llwatchoverittoseethatitisn’tfilledwiththeso-calledpleasuresofthebodyandthat itdoesn’tbecomesobigandstrongthatitnolongerdoesitsownworkbutattempts to enslave and rule over (καταδουλώσασθαι καὶ ἄρχειν)theclassesitisn’tfittedtorule,therebyoverturn-ing everyone’s entire life.… Then, wouldn’t these twoparts alsodo thefinest jobof guarding thewhole souland body against external enemies— the one by plan-ning, the other by fighting (τὸ μὲν βουλευόμενον, τὸ δὲ προπολεμοῦν), following its leader, and carrying out theleader’sdecisionsthroughitscourage(τῇ ἀνδρείᾳ ἐπιτελοῦν τὰ βουλευθέντα)?…Anditisbecauseofthespiritedpart,I suppose, that we call a single individual courageous,namely,when itpreserves throughpainsandpleasureswhatisannouncedbyrationalaccountsaboutwhatistobefearedandwhatisn’t(ὅταν αὐτοῦτὸ θυμοειδὲς διασῴζει διά τε λυπῶνκαὶ ἡδονῶντὸ ὑπὸτῶνλόγωνπαραγγελθὲνδεινόντεκαὶμή)(442a4–c3).

Howwe understand this account of courage turns on two interpre-tive issues. First,what exactly is it that the spiritedpart of the soul“preserves”when the individual is courageous, and second, inwhatpreciselydoesspirit’s“preserving”ofitconsist?Iwilltakeupthefirstquestionbriefly in this sectionbefore turning to the second in Sec-tions3and4.

Commentatorsaregenerallyinagreementthatspirit’sjobisto“pre-serve”somesortofpracticalbelief,judgment,orapplicationofknowl-edge—thatis,somecognitiveassessmentofthevalueordisvalueofpotentialactionsandtheobjectsassociatedwiththem.(Inthefollow-ingSections2through4,Iwillleavethedistinctionbetweenbeliefandknowledgetotheside,butIwillreturntoitinSection5toconsideritsrelevancetoSocrates’accountofindividualcourage.)Commenta-torsdisagree,however,overwhetherthebeareroftherelevantjudg-mentisthespiritedpartofthesoulitselforthereasoningpart.Indeed,

valueoftheiractionscorrectlyatsomepointpriortoacting,butthattheirjudgmentsvacillateortemporarily“wander”becauseofthewaythingsappear.Whatallofthisshowsisthat,whileitistruethatthosewhomaintainthecorrectbeliefaboutwhatistobefearedwillactcor-rectly,itisalsotruethatthosewithmerelycorrectbeliefoftenfailtomaintainthatbeliefwhentheyact.12Thosewhoknow whatisfearfulandbad,ontheotherhand,willbeimpervioustothemisleadingforceof theappearances.TheProtagoras, then,while affirming thepowerofknowledge,atthesametimedrawsattentiontoaseriousconcernaboutmerebelief:itisweak,unstable,andunreliable.

InwhatfollowsIwillsuggestthattheRepublicremainscommittedtotheMotivationalThesis(atleastasfarascourageisconcerned),andthatasaresultitcontinuestotreatallactsofcowardiceasinvolvingatleasttemporaryignoranceormistakenjudgment.IwillalsosuggestthatwhereastheProtagorasleavesnoroomformerebeliefincourage,theRepublicoffersamorenuancedpicture.TheRepublic maysharetheProtagoras’ viewthattruecouragerequiresknowledge,anditcertainlysharesitsworryabouttheweaknessandinstabilityofbelief,butitalsoattemptstoprovideapartialsolutiontothatinstability.Itsproposedsolution,Iwillargue,liesinthespiritedpartofthesoul,which—givenappropriateeducation—providesanon-rationalbasisforstable,ratio-nalbelief.13

2. Reason and Belief

LetusnowturntotheRepublic’saccountofcourage,whichSocratesoffersintermsofthesoul’sthreeparts:

Thesetwo[thereasoningandspiritedparts]…willgov-erntheappetitivepart,whichisthelargestpartineachperson’ssoulandisbynaturemostinsatiableformoney.

12. Cf.Meno97e–98a.

13. MyapproachowesmuchtotheaccountsofHobbs(2000)andMoss(2005),bothofwhomalsoexplorewaysinwhichthepsychologicalandethicalac-countsofearlierdialoguesanticipatethespiritedpsychologyoftheRepublic.



someonebelieves thatan injusticehasbeencommittedagainst him, hisspiritbecomes“boilingandangry”andfightsforwhathebelievestobejust(440c–d).AlthoughSocratesattributesthebeliefsinthesecasesonlytotheperson (τις,440c1,440c7),andnotexplicitlytotheper-son’sspiritedpart,hispointclearlyillustratesthatourfeelingsofangerandotherspiriteddesiresappearalongsideourbeliefs.16Itistempting,therefore,tosupposethatthebeliefsofthe“person”arebeliefsofthespiritedpartoftheperson’ssoul.Kahn,forexample,drawsexactlythisinference:“Quitedefinitejudgmentsofamoralsortarecharacteristicoftheintermediatepartofthesoul,thethymoeides,whichgetsangrywhenitthinksit(i. e.,theperson)hasbeenwronged.”17

Despitetheaboveconsiderations,thereare,Ithink,strongreasonsforthinkingthatthebeliefsthespiritedpartissupposedto“preserve”inthevirtueofcouragearetheonesthatbelongtothereasoningpartof thesoul.18Note that this interpretiveclaim is independentof thequestionwhetherthethumoeidesalsoholdsbeliefsofitsown(and,ifso,whetherthosebeliefsincludejudgmentsaboutwhatisgood,just,orfearful).19Myargumentissimplythatevenifthespiritedpartdoes

16. Cf.Annas(1981:127)andCrossandWoozley(1966:122).

17. 1987:85.

18. Acontroversyinthesecondaryliteratureconcernsthequestionwhetherpsy-chicstatessuchasdesiresandbeliefsareproperlytobeattributedtothepartsofthesoulsthemselvesorsimplytotheperson.(See,forexample,discussioninLorenz[2006a:26–8andn.19]andPrice[2009].)Nothinginmyaccountturns on that issue, though Iwill freelymake references to “reason’s judg-ments”foreaseofdiscussion.

19. Itwouldbeconsistentwithmyview,forexample,toinsistthatspiritholdssuchjudgmentsaboutthejust,fearful,andgoodthatareinsomeimportantway informed by, or derived from, reason’s “announcements”. (Kamtekar[1998:327–8andnn.19,22]entertainsaviewofthissort.)Thoughnothinginmyinterpretationturnsonthispoint,Idothinkthereareobstaclestoattribut-ingsuchsophisticatedbeliefstothethumoeides.Foronething,ifPlatohadin-tendedtoindicatethatspiritholdsitsownbeliefsaboutgoodness,justice,orfearfulness,hesurelycouldhaveindicatedthatwithoutambiguity.Yetnoth-inginSocrates’remarkssuggestssuchapicture:allwearetoldisthatreasonmakesjudgments,andwhenitdoes,thespiritedpart’semotionsanddesiresappearonthepsychologicalscene.Theclaimthatspiritalsoholdsbeliefsofits ownunnecessarily duplicates a psychic task and involves complicating

many commentators attributebeliefs about the fearful, the just, thehonorable,oreventhegoodtothespiritedpartofthesoul,andtheyoften take thosebeliefs tobe theones that spirit “preserves” in thevirtueofcourage.14Thetextprovidesprima facie supportforthisview.TherearestrongindicationsthatPlatodoesmeantoallowsomeformofbelieftothespiritedpartofthesoulintheRepublic,15andspiritedmotivations,asPlatodepictsthem,arecloselyconnectedtoaperson’sjudgments concerningwhat is just.Whenadecentpersonbelieveshehascommittedinjustice,Socratespointsout,hedoesnotbecomeangrywith thosewhopunishhim justly.On the other hand,when

14. Itshouldbenotedthatmydisputewiththestandarddevelopmentalistread-ingdoesnothingeon this interpretive issue,but ratheron those Iwillex-ploreinSections3and4.Carone(2001:127),forexample,whoalsoopposesthestandarddevelopmentalistview,nonethelessattributesbeliefsaboutthegoodtothespiritedpartofthesoul.Forotherswhoattributesuchbeliefstothethumoeides,seeesp.Bobonich(1994:4,and2002:220),Burnyeat(2006:10),Cairns(385–8andn.131),Carone(2001),Cooper(1999b:135),Dorter(2006:117),Gill(1985:14),Irwin(1977:193–5,and1995:211–3),Kahn(1987:85), Kamtekar (1998: 325–34, and 2006: 189), Klosko (1986: 73–5), Lesses(1987:149–54),Moline(1978:12),Morris(2006:225),andMoss(2005:156,and2008:37).Cairns,forexample,writes,“Reasonsuppliesjudgmentsaboutthe better and theworse, spirit about the honourable and dishonourable”(386),andKamtekarexplicitlycitesSocrates’characterizationofcourageasevidenceforasimilarview(2006:189).Forsomecommentatorswhodoubtattributions of belief to spirit, seeAnagnostopoulos (2006: 176–7), Stalley(2007),andesp.Wilberding(2009:361–5and370,n.77).IamsympathetictotheargumentsofLorenz(2006a:209)andStalley(2007),bothofwhomsug-gestthatthe“beliefs”attributedtothelowerpartsofthesoulintheRepublic reflectarelativelylooseuseoftheword‘belief’(δόξα)byPlatointhetext.

15. In the cognitive division of the soul that occurs in Book 10, for instance,Socratescontraststherationalpartofthesoul,whichholdsopinionsonthebasisofmeasurementandcalculation, fromthepartof thesoul thatholds(opposed)opinionsonthebasisofappearancesalone(602cff.).Giventhatthelatterpartissaidtoberesponsibleforawiderangeofnon-rationalim-pulses,includingspiritedanger(606d),itisreasonabletosupposethatbothofthelowerpartsofthesoulshareinatleastsomeformofbelief.Moss(2008)providesacompellingargumentalongtheselines,thoughsheultimatelyat-tributesmoresophisticatedbeliefstospiritthanIthinktheevidencejustifies.SeeanexcellentreplytoMossinGanson(2009).FurtherevidenceofspiritedbeliefoccursinBook4,whereSocratescharacterizesmoderationasarelationamongthesoul-partsinwhich“boththerulingandtheruledagree[lit.‘sharethebelief’,ὁμοδοξῶσι]thatthereasoningpartoughttoruleanddon’traiseafactionagainstit”(442c11–d1).



Similarly,inSocrates’commentsfollowinghisintroductionofthethumoeides,hepointsoutthatwhenappetiteisforcingsomeonecon-trarytoreasoning,hebecomesangrywithhisappetite,“sothatofthetwofactionsthatarefightingacivilwar,sotospeak,spiritalliesitselfwithreason”(440a8–b4).Incontrast,hesays,weneverseespirit“allyitselfwithanappetitetodowhatreasonhasdecidedmustnotbedone(αἱροῦντος λόγου μὴ δεῖν ἀντιπράττειν)”(440b4–7).Again,thepicturewehave isone inwhich reasonmakesdecisions and judgments abouthowtheagentoughttoact,andspirit’sjobistojoinreasonin“fighting”disobedientappetites.(Notethatreason“fights”,too:itsjudgmentsareassociatedwithdesiresofitsown.)Theemphasisonthespiritedpart’sjobasanallied“fighter”suggeststhatitsroleislimitedtojustwhatIhavesuggested:supplyingmotivationalsupportforthepracticaljudg-mentsissuedbythereasoningpart.22

Thereisa furtherargumenttobemadehere, inconnectionwiththislastpoint.ItisimportanttonotethatSocrates’aimindiscussingtheconnectionbetweenspiriteddesiresandjudgmentsaboutjusticeistoshowthatspiritisthepsychic“ally”ofreason(σύμμαχον,440b3).23 AgainstGlaucon’sinitialsuggestionthatthepartofthesoul“bywhichwegetangry”mightbethesameastheappetitivepart(439e),Socratesseekstoshowthat,onthecontrary,thespiritedpartofthesoulhasa close affinitywith the reasoningpart.He is so successful in dem-onstrating their closeness, in fact, that hemust next prove that thespiritedandreasoningpartsarenotthemselvesidentical. I takethiscontextual consideration to be decisive in showing that the judg-mentsaboutjusticeinquestionbelongtothereasoningpart.ForifallSocratesweresayingat440a–dwerethatthethumoeidesisresponsivetoitsownbeliefsaboutjustice,thatwoulddonothingtoestablishits

22.Cf.Timaeus70a,wherethespiritedpartboils“whenreasonannounces(τοῦ λόγουπαραγγείλαντος)thatsomeunjustactionistakingplace”,andPhdr.253e–254e, where the good horse joins the charioteer in resisting the badhorse,butitisthecharioteerwhoisresponsibleforissuingthe“commandandreason”(κελεύσματικαὶλόγῳ,253d7–e1)thatthegoodhorsesupports.

23. ApointnotedinSingpurwalla(2013:44).

holdsuchbeliefs,itisnotitspreservationofits ownbeliefsthatcon-stitutescourage,butratheritspreservationoftherelevantjudgmentsof reason.Severalpointssupport thisconclusion.Tobeginwith, thelanguageSocratesemploysthroughouthisdiscussionof therelation-shipbetweenthereasoningandspiritedpartsconsistentlyattributesdeliberativeanddoxasticfunctionstoreason,whileemphasizingthenon-cognitive,motivationalcontributionofthethumoeides.Inhischar-acterizationofcourage,Socrates identifies “rationalaccounts” (λόγοι)asthesourceoftheannouncementsaboutwhatistobefeared,andheimmediatelymakesitexplicit(ifitwasnotclearenoughalready)thatthereasoningpartofthesoulisresponsibleforthoseaccounts20:“Andwe’llcallhimwisebecauseofthatsmallpartofhimselfthatrulesinhimandmakesthoseannouncementsandhaswithinittheknowledgeofwhatisadvantageousforeachpartandforthewholesoul”(442c5–8).The “announcements” thatarepreserved in thevirtueof courage,therefore,unquestionablyoriginate in thereasoningpartof thesoul.Likewise,wealsofindintheabovepassagethatreasonandspiritjoint-lyguardtheindividual’sbodyandsoul,“theonebyplanning(τὸμὲν βουλευόμενον),theotherbyfighting(τὸδὲ προπολεμοῦν),followingitsleaderandcarryingouttheleader’sdecisions(ἐπιτελοῦν τὰ βουλευθέντα)”.Hereitisclearlyreasonthatdoesthedeliberatingandjudging,whiletheroleofspiritis,asfaraswecantellfromwhatSocratessays,limitedexclusivelyto“fighting”insupportofreason’sjudgments.21

Plato’spsychological account inaway that isunder-supportedby the text.Moreimportantly,though,andasIhopetoshowinwhatfollows,inhischar-acterizationofcourage—andofthespiritedpart’sfunctionasreason’s“ally”—Platoexclusivelyemphasizesspirit’smotivationalrole.Thissuggeststhat,re-gardlessofwhetherPlatomeanstoattributeanysophisticatedbeliefstospirit,thosebeliefsarenottherelevantonesthatthecourageousperson’sspiritedpart“preserves”.Fordiscussionofthecognitiveresourcesofthespiritedpartofthesoul,seeWilburn(2014a).

20.Onemanuscript,preferredbyAdam(1902:260)(thoughnotBurnet[1902]),actuallyreadsὑποτοῦλόγουinsteadofὑπὸτῶνλόγωνat442c2.

21. This is also consistent with Socrates’ introduction of spirited impulses inthe text: he says that spirit is “invincible and unbeatable” (ἄμαχόν τε καὶ ἀνίκητον,375b1).



outline of the programs ofmusical and gymnastic training.Havingdeterminedhowtheyoungguardiansaretobeeducated,heandhisinterlocutorsmust next determine who among the young are well-suitedforbecomingrulers—the“trueguardians”ofthecity.Socratesclaims that rulers are distinguished by their exceptional commit-ment to certain kinds of civicbeliefs, and in particular, to thebeliefthattheymustalwaysdowhatisbestforthecityasawhole(412d–e).Evaluatingwhich citizens should rule, therefore, requiresobservingthemthroughouttheirlivestomakesurethattheydonot“abandon”(ἐκβάλλουσιν,412e7)theircorrectbeliefs.Socrateselaborates:all“aban-donment” of truebelief is involuntary, he says, and it occurson ac-countofoneofthreecauses:theft(κλαπέντες),compulsion(βιασθέντες),ormagicalspell(γοητευθέντες):

By“thevictimsoftheft”Imeanthosewhoarepersuadedtochangetheirmindsorthosewhoforget,becausetime,inthelattercase,andargument,intheformer,takesawaytheiropinionswithouttheirrealizingit.…By“thecom-pelled”(βιασθέντας)Imeanthosewhompainorsufferingcauses to change theirmind (μεταδοξάσαι).… The “vic-timsofmagic”,Ithinkyou’dagree,arethosewhochangetheirmindbecausetheyareunderthespellofpleasureorfear(μεταδοξάσωσιν ἢ ὑφ’ ἡδονῆς κηληθέντες ἢ ὑπὸ φόβου τι δείσαντες)(413b4–c3).

Inordertodeterminewhichcitizenswillbe“goodguardians”oftheirbeliefs,Socratesproposesthatcontestsandcompetitionsbedevisedto “test” them.Thesewill includenotonly subjection to laborsandpains,butalso,andmostimportantly,exposuretopleasuresandfears—thatis,totestsagainstabandonmentthrough“magicalspell”.Thecit-izensmustbetested“morethoroughlythangoldistestedinfire”,andthosewhoproveimmunetothespellofpleasureandfearthroughouttheirliveswillbeselectedascandidatestobecomerulers.

close relationshipwith reason.24 Likewise, Socrates prefaces his dis-cussionof couragewith a reminder that spirit is supposed to serveasan“ally”that“obeys”reason.Thatcharacterizationmakesthemostsenseifthespiritedpartofthesoulanditsdesiresarebeingdepictedassupportiveofthereasoningpartanditsjudgments.

Ifthisinterpretationisright,thenreasonisthebearerofthejudg-ments aboutwhat is good, just, or fearful that the courageous indi-vidual’sspiritedpart“preserves”.

3. “Preserving through Pains and Pleasures”

Thenextissuethatmustbeaddressediswhatpreciselyitmeansforthespiritedpartto“preserve”reason’sjudgments.InthissectionIwillarguethatits“preservation”ofthemconsistsinensuringthatreasonmaintainsthosejudgmentsinthefaceofappetitiveimpulses.Accord-ingtothereadingIwilldefend,theRepublic— attheveryleastinitscharacterizationof courageandcowardice— remains committed totheMotivationalThesisandcontinuestotreatakrasiaasanimpossibil-ity.Itishere,then,thatmyinterpretationwilldepartmostclearlyfromthestandard,developmentalistpicture.25

Ibeginmyargumentbypointingoutthat442bdoesnotrepresentthe firstmention of “preservation” in the text. Rather, Socrates pre-paresthewayforhisdistinctivecharacterizationofindividualcourageintwoimportantpassagesfromBooks3and4thatpointtotheread-ing I amproposing.Thefirst passage immediately followsSocrates’

24.Kamtekar(1998:326–7)recognizesthatthispassage“isintendedtoempha-sizespirit’spartisanshipwithreasonanditsjudgments”,yetshenonethelessattributesjudgmentsaboutjusticetothespiritedpart.

25. Some commentators seem temptedby the sort of reading I amproposing,butnonethelessstopshortofacceptingitoutright.Kloskoprovidesausefulexample(1986:79):“Thecourageoussoulislikewoolwhichhasbeentreatedtoholditsdye.Insuchsouls,beliefsareheldfast,immunefrompleasureandpain,appetiteandfear.ThusPlatoholdsthatcouragecananchortrueopin-ionstothesoulthroughameansquitedifferentfromconvertingthemintoknowledge.”ThissoundsstrikinglysimilartotheaccountIwillofferbelow,yetKloskoinsiststhatthepsychologyoftheRepublicis“significantlydifferent”fromthatoftheProtagoras,inthatitacceptsthepossibilityofakrasia(70).



ofjudgmentthrough pleasures and pains.Byfillingoutthedetailsofthewaysinwhichpleasuresandpainsthreatenjudgment,then,theearlierdiscussionprovidesinsightintothekindof“preservation”neededinthefaceofsuchimpulses.Whattheearlierpassageshowsisthatcou-rageous“preservation”referstostableretentionofcorrectjudgment.

A second passage confirms this reading by establishing an evenclearer linkbetween theBook3discussionofbelief “abandonment”andthelateraccountofindividualcourage.InBook4,beforeturningtothevirtuesof the individual,Socratesfirstexaminesandoutlinesthevirtuesof thecity,anticipating that the latterwill illuminate theformer.Heclaimsthatthecity’sfightingclasswillberesponsibleforthecity’spossessionofcourage.Morespecifically,thecitywillbecou-rageouswhen its auxiliary class “has thepower topreserve (σώσει)through everything its belief about what things are to be feared”(429b8–c1).29Courage,Socratessays,is“acertainsortofpreservation”

apartfromtheirbehavior,whichrulesoutthepossibilitythatanakraticwouldpassthetestsasheunderstandsthem.

29. It isworthaddressingapossibleobjection tomyaccount thatconcernsadisanalogybetweenindividualcourageandcourageinthecity.Thecityiscourageous not when the auxiliaries ensure that the rulers maintain their judgments,butratherwhentheauxiliariesmaintaintheirown (law-andrul-er-informed)judgments.Byanalogy,wewouldexpectthatanindividualiscourageousnotwhenherspiritedpartensuresthatherreasoningpartmain-tainsitsjudgments(asIhaveargued),butratherwhenspiritmaintainsitsown judgments.Iacceptthatthereisadisanalogyhere,thoughIdonotfinditproblematic,foranumberofreasons:(1)First,becausecitiesandindividu-alsarenotthesameineveryrespect,weshouldnotexpecteverydetailofSocrates’analysisofthecitytobeapplicabletotheindividualsoul.(2)Oneobviouswayinwhichcitiesandindividualsdifferisthatcitiesarecomposedofindividuals,whereasindividualsarenotcomposedoffurtherindividuals.Thatis,whereaseachmemberofacitypossessesherownsoulwithitsownreasoning,spirited,andappetitiveparts,itisnotthecasethateachpartofanindividual’ssoulhasitsownreasoning,spirited,andappetitiveparts.Weshould expect that this importantdifferencewill be responsible for somelimitationsofthecity-individualanalogy,andindeed,thedisanalogyinthecaseof courage seems to reflectprecisely this sortof limitation.For if (a)individualseachhavetheirownreasoningparts,butthespiritedpartdoesnothaveitsownreasoning,andif(b)reasoningisresponsibleforaperson’sbeliefsaboutgoodness, justice,etc., thenwewouldexpectcourage inthecitytoinvolvetheauxiliaries’retentionoftheirown(rational)beliefs,butcourage in the individual to involve the spirited part’s support of reason’s

Thispassageprovidesarevealingcharacterizationoftherelation-ship between non-rational impulses and rational belief: the formerprevailoverthelatternotbycausingtheindividualtoactagainstherconcurrentlyheldbetterjudgment,butratherbycausingher(atleasttemporarily)toabandonherjudgment.Inotherwords,thosewhoholdtherightbeliefsabouthowtheyshouldactpriortoactingbutnone-thelessbehavewronglyundertheinfluenceofpain,pleasure,andfeardonotdosoakratically,butratherbecausethoseimpulseshavecausedthemto“changetheirminds”abouthowtheyoughttoact.26 Indeed,Socrates’proposalpresupposesthesufficiencyofstabletruebelieffordetermininganindividual’sbehavior,becausehetreatshistestsasre-liableforthepurposesofsortingcandidatestobecomerulersfromtherest of the auxiliaries. If akrasiawere possible, however, then akrat-icswouldpass the tests alongwith theenkratic and the temperate;for,giventhepossibilityofakrasia,itwouldbepossibleforcitizenstobehaveviciouslydespiteneverwavering in their correct judgmentsabouthowtheyoughttoact.27ClearlySocratesdoesnotconsidersuchpeoplefittobecomephilosophers,however.Onthecontrary,hispro-posal clearly implies that thosewho succeed in retaining their cor-rect judgmentswill alsoact on them,and thus that failure toact inaccordancewithacorrect judgmentbetraystheabandonment of thatjudgment.28Thisisimportantbecause,aswehaveseen,Socrates’laterconceptionofindividualcourageappealstotheideaofpreservation

26.Carone(2001:131–2)alsoemphasizesthispassageandcitesitasevidenceofPlato’scontinuedcommitmenttoa“Socratic”viewofmoralpsychology.Cf.remarksinCornford(1912:249–50)andO’Brien(1967:138,n.21).

27. Itshouldbenotedthatpassingtestsagainstbeliefabandonmentisevidentlynotsufficient forbecomingarulerintheKallipolis,despitewhatSocrateshim-selfimpliesat413e–414a.InBook6,Socratesindicatesthat,inadditiontotheearliertests,therewillbeexercisestodeterminewhethertheauxiliariesareabletoendurethemostimportantstudies (503d–504a).Presumably,thelatterkindoftestisdesignedtoevaluatetheauxiliaries’intellectualabilities(goodmemory,facilityatlearningmathematics,etc.),whilethetestsagainstbeliefabandonmentaredesignedtodeterminewhethertheirnon-rationalmotiva-tionsaresufficientlywell-trained.

28.Thatis,Socratesgivesusnoreasontothinkthathehasinmindanyothercri-terionfordeterminingwhethertheyouthsmaintainorabandontheirbeliefs



ismadeexplicit: itmeansmaintainingastablebelief in the faceofnon-rationalimpulses.Crucially,moreover,Socratesidentifiesfailing topreserveone’sbeliefinthiswaywith“abandoning”it,aclearrefer-encetohisearlierdiscussionofthevariouswaysinwhichbeliefsare“abandoned”.31 By the timeSocrates offers his account of individualcourageattheendofBook4,then,hehasalreadyestablishedwhatkindof“preservation”couragerequires.Non-rationalimpulsesthreat-en to destabilize our rational judgments, and the courageous indi-vidual is someonewho, despite the psychological pressures posedbysuchimpulses,continuestomaintainhercorrectreasoningaboutwhat is valuable and how she ought to act.When Socrates identi-fiesindividualcouragewiththespiritedpart’s“preservation”ofwhatisannouncedbyreason,therefore,wehavestrongreasontobelievethat thatpreservation consists inpreventing the “abandonment”ofrationaljudgment.

4. The Threat of Appetite

Thereisafurtherargumentinsupportofmyinterpretation.OnPlato’smoralpsychologicalpicture,thegreatestdangertoreason’sruleinthesoul,andtothesuccessfulcarryingoutofitscorrectjudgments,istheappetitivepartof the soul and itsdesires.Socrates characterizesex-actlythisdangerinhisaccountofcourage:thereasoningandspiritedpartsmust jointlywatchoverappetite tomakesurethat itdoesnotbecome“sobigandstrong”thatit“attemptstoenslaveandrule”theotherparts.AlthoughSocrates’ languagemightbe taken to suggestthatappetite’sdominationof the soul involvesbrutepsychic “force”,

contrastmakesthemostsenseifheistakingSocratestobeattributingakindofcouragetoproperlyeducatedpeople.Idonotthinkmyaccountdependsonthisinterpretation,however.Whatmattersformypurposesissimplythatthelatercharacterizationofindividualcourageat442b–cisclearlymodeledon,andinformedby,thecharacterizationofpoliticalcourage,andthatthispoliticalcourageisunderstoodintermsofstablebelief.

31. InmartialcontextsfamiliartoGreeks,cowardiceisparadigmaticallydemon-stratedby“throwingaway”one’sweapons(oftenrenderedwithἀποβάλλω,e. g. atLaws 943e5 andff.). Plato seems to be appropriating that imagebycharacterizingcowardiceasthe“abandonment”(ἐκβάλλειν)ofbelief.

(σωτηρίαν, 429c5).WhenGlaucon askswhat sort of preservationhehasinmind,Socratesresponds,“Thatpreservationofthebeliefthathasbeenproducedbylawthrougheducationaboutwhatthingsandwhatsortsofthingsaretobefeared.Andbypreservation(σωτηρία)ofthisbelief‘througheverything’Imeanpreserving(διασῴζεσθαι)itandnotabandoning(ἐκβάλλειν)itbecauseofpains,pleasures,appetites,orfears”(429c7–d1).Socratesprovidesananalogy:thosewhodyewoolaimtodosoinsuchawaythatthecoloriscompletelyabsorbedandcannotbewashedout.Inprovidingmusicalandgymnastictrainingtotheyoungguardians,hesays,theywereaimingtodosomethingsimi-lar—namely,ensurethattheyouthswould“absorb”lawfulbeliefssothoroughlythat“evensuchextremelyeffectivedetergentsaspleasure,pain,fear,andappetitewouldn’twashitout.…Thispowertopreservethrougheverythingthecorrectandlawfulbeliefaboutwhatistobefearedandwhatisn’tiswhatIcallcourage(430a1–b4).

ThischaracterizationofwhatSocrates(moreprecisely)calls “po-liticalcourage”(ἀνδρείαν πολιτικήν,430c2–3)anticipateshisaccountofindividualcouragebyidentifyingthevirtuewithakindofpreserva-tion.30Inthisearliercontext,however,whatismeantby‘preservation’

retentionofbelief.Finally,(3)Platocallsjusticeinthecity“asortofimageofjustice”,while“true”justiceistheindividualjusticeinthesoul(443c–d).ThissuggeststhatPlatohimselfrecognizessomelimitationsofthecity-indi-vidualanalogy,andthatthevirtuesofthecityarenotintendedtobeperfectreplicationsofindividualvirtues.Cf.Adam(1902:263).

30.BobonichnicelycharacterizesanambiguityinSocrates’referenceto“politi-cal”courage:“Itis…unclearwhetheritattributesaqualifiedsortofcouragetotheauxiliaries(i. e.‘politicalcourage’)orwhetheritmerelyclaimsthatthepreservationbytheauxiliariesoftheopinionhandeddownbythephiloso-pherrulersmakesthecitycourageouswithouttakingapositiononwhatthisconditionintheauxiliariesistobecalled”(2002:44–5).Cf.Irwin(1977:329,n.26)andAnnas(1981:114).Myown(tentative)positionisthatSocratesdoesmean toattributeaqualifiedcourage to theauxiliaries themselves, for twomain reasons:First,Socratesstatesat429b7–c1 that thecity is courageous“becauseof”(διά)theabilityofitsauxiliariestopreservetheirlawfulbeliefs.Hethen addressesthequestionwhatthatabilityconsistsin—namely,notal-lowingone’sbeliefstobe“washedout”—anditisthatabilityof the individuals that Socrates then calls “political courage”.And second,Glaucon contrasts“politicalcourage”with“thecorrectbeliefaboutthesesamethingswhichyoufind in animals and slaves, andwhich isnot the result of education”.This



corruptedundertheinfluenceofappetite.32Becauseappetitehascometodominatehissoul,theoligarchicindividualbelievesthatwealthisthegreatestgood,andasaresulthedevoteshisrationalresourcestoschemingabouthowtomakeaprofit.33Theoligarchic individual isnotakratic,therefore,butsomeonewithmistakenvalues.34

The second key passage occurs in Book 9. Socrates asks, “Whydoyouthinkthattheconditionofamanualworkerisdespised?Isitforanyotherreasonthanthat,whenthebestpart isnaturallyweak(ἀσθενές)insomeone,itcan’trule(μὴ δύνασθαι ἄρχειν)thebeastswith-inhimbutcanonlyservethemandlearnthethingsthatflatterthem(ἀλλὰ θεραπεύειν ἐκεῖνα, καὶτὰ θωπεύματα αὐτῶν μόνον δύνηται μανθάνειν)?”(590c2–6).Reason’s“weakness”hereclearlyconsistsnotinitssuscep-tibilitytobeingforciblyovercomebythelowersoul-parts,butratherinitssusceptibilitytobeingcorruptedbythem.Whenreasonisweak,itbecomesa“servant”tothelowerpartsofthesoul,justasitdoesintheoligarchicindividual,anditusesitsrationalcapacitiesforthesakeofnothingotherthanlearninghowtopleasethem.35

Whatthesepassagesshowisthatappetite’s“strength”inthesoulconsists in its ability to destabilize and corrupt rational judgment

32.Cf.interpretationsofnon-rational“rule”inthesoulinBrown(2012:68–9),Cooper (1999b: 127, n. 13), Johnstone (2011), and especiallyCarone(2011:135),whocitestheoligarchicyouthinsupportofconclusionssimi-lartomyown.

33. Socrates emphasizes similar corruptions of belief due to appetite in thedemocraticandtyrannicalindividuals(e. g.at560b–cand574d).Significantly,alongsidechanges in the rationalbeliefs,wealsofindchanges in the indi-viduals’senseofshameandotherspiriteddesires:theoligarchicindividual’sthumoeides “admires”and“honors”onlywealthandthewealthy(553d);thedemocraticindividualcomestoconsider“shamelessness”tobe“courageous”(560e); and the tyrannical individual “destroys” any beliefs or desires thatcontainasenseofshame(573a–b).

34. Theoligarchisevencharacterizedasenkratic at554c–e,wherehe“masters”his“dronish”,spendthriftdesires.

35. BrickhouseandSmithproposeasimilaraccountofthewaysinwhichnon-rationalimpulsesaffectreasoninginearlier“Socratic”dialogues(2010:71;cf. 2007), though theycontrast suchanaccountwith thatof theRepublic (2010:107).

careful examination of the text shows that is not how Plato under-stands it.Thethreat theappetitivepartposes,onhisaccount, isnot thatitwill“bully”reasonandforcetheindividualtoactakratically,butratherthatitwillinvariouswayscorruptorchangetheagent’srationaljudgment.Thefactthatthatisthespecificsortofdangerthatappetiteposes,andagainstwhichthespiritedpartmustguardasreason’s“ally”,addssupporttomyreadingofcourage.

Wehave already seen that, inBooks 3 and4, Socrates character-izespleasureand fearas “detergents” thatcausepeople toabandontheircorrectandlawfulbeliefs.Thereare,moreover,twokeypassagesthatmakeitexplicitwhatitmeansforappetitetobecome“sobigandstrong”thatit“rulesandenslaves”thereasoningpartofthesoul.Mostsignificantly, during Socrates’ discussion of the various kinds of de-generatepsychicconstitutionsinBooks8and9,heoffersarevealingaccountoftheoriginoftheoligarchicindividual:

Don’tyouthinkthatthispersonwouldestablishhisap-petitiveandmoney-makingpartonthethrone,settingitupas thegreatkingwithinhimself (ἐγκαθίζειν καὶ μέγαν βασιλέα ποιεῖν ἐν ἑαυτῷ)[?]…Hemakesthereasoningandspiritedpartssitonthegroundbeneathappetite,oneoneitherside, reducing themtoslaves(καταδουλωσάμενος).Hewon’t allow the first to reason about or investigateanything except how a little money can be made intogreatwealth.Andhewon’tallowthesecond toadmireorhonoranythingbutwealthandwealthypeopleortohaveanyambitionotherthantheacquisitionofwealthorwhatevermightcontributetogettingit(553c4–d7).

In the young oligarch’s soul, appetite is the ruler and “king”, whilereasonand spirit are the “slaves”of appetite.Whatwe can immedi-atelysee,however, is that reason’senslavement toappetiteconsistsnotinitsbeing“forced”togoalongwithappetitecontrarytoitsownjudgmentsandvalues,butratherinhavingitsjudgmentsandvalues



appetitesometimesdoesforcesomeonetoact,akratically,contrarytoastablerationaljudgment.38

There are several lines of response to this objection.Thefirst istopointout thatneither theLeontiuscasenor the remarks that fol-lowareasclearlyindicativeofakrasiaastheyarestandardlytakentobe.Tobeginwith,Leontiuscountsasanakraticagentonlyif,attheprecisemomentheactsonhisappetite,healsorationally believesthatheshouldnot.YetunlikeinthetwoothercasesofpsychicconflictinBookIV—thethirstyindividualsandOdysseus—wearetoldnothingaboutthestatusofLeontius’reasoninginthestory.Indeed,Leontiusissupposedtoillustrateconflictbetweenappetiteandspirit,andthoseare theonlypartsofhis soul that are explicitly said tobe involvedin the struggle.39 Furthermore, while it is true that Socrates’ subse-quentremarksindicatethatappetitesaresometimesengagedinpsy-chic“civilwar”againstspirit and reason,theydonottakeapositiononhowthatconflictbetweenthetwopartiesisactuallyresolved.Indeed,

38.ThisreadingreflectsalongtraditionaccordingtowhichPlato’stripartitethe-oryofthesoulisintroducedlargelyin order tobeabletoexplaincasesofakra-sia.SomesupportersofvariousversionsofthisviewincludeBobonich(1994:3,5;2002:219–47;and2007:41–2,51),BrickhouseandSmith(2007:16–7;and2010:200),Cooper(1999a:74–5),Dorion(2007:125–6;and2012:37–8,48–9),Frede(1992:xxix–xxx),Gardner(2002:200,203),Gill(1985:6),Gos-ling(1990:20–1),Hare(1982:53–4), Irwin(1977:191–5;and1995:209–11),Klosko(1986:70),Lesses(1987:148;and1990:144),Lorenz(2006b:147–8),Miller(1999:96),Penner(1971:191–5;and1990:49–61),Reeve(1988:134–5),andRowe(2003;and2007:25).Commentatorswho(foradiverserangeofreasons)rejectordoubttheprevalentinterpretationincludeCarone(2001),Ferrari (1990: 139, and 2007: 168–9), Kahn (1996: 243–57),Morris (2006),Shields (2001: 139, and 2007: 82–3, 86), Singpurwalla (2006: 243, 254–5),Stalley (2007:80–3),andWhiting (2012: 175). IprovidemyownresponsetothetraditionalviewinWilburn(2014b).ThepresentaccountisespeciallyindebtedtotheworkofCaroneandFerrari(1990).

39.Cf.Crombie(1962:346).Itisworthaddingthat,ifreasoningisinvolvedwithspirit throughout the struggle against appetite, that seems to undermineSocrates’conclusionthatLeontius’psychicconflictnecessarilydemonstratesthedistinctnessofaspiritedpartofthesoul(ratherthanservingasaseconddemonstrationofconflictbetweenreasonandappetite).Thestandardread-ingthusleavesPlatomorevulnerabletothesortofcriticismofhisaccountofspiritthatisofferedinHardie(1936:141–5),Penner(1971:111–3),andRobin-son(1995:44–6).

(while, conversely, reason’s “weakness” consists in its vulnerabilityto that influence).Appetite “rules” and “enslaves” reasoning, inoth-erwords,notby forciblydragging it along,but ratherby leading itastray.36 That isthethreatofappetiteagainstwhichthespiritedpartofthesoulmustguard.37

There is, however, a potential objection to this account, whichconcernstheMotivationalThesis.TheinterpretationIhavedefendedevidently leavesno room for akratic action in theRepublic. If some-one successfullymaintains her rational judgment in the face of ap-petitiveimpulses,Ihavesuggested,thenherstablejudgment(alongwithheralliedspiritedmotivations)willeffectivelydetermineherac-tions.ThecaseofLeontius,however,asmostcommentatorsinterpretit, representsanapparentcounterexample to thisclaim.Socrates re-ports thatLeontius,uponnoticingsomecorpses lyingbythepublicexecutioner, “hadanappetite to lookat thembut at the same timewasdisgustedandturnedaway.Foratimehestruggledwithhimselfandcoveredhisface,but,finally,masteredbytheappetite,hepushedhiseyeswideopenandrushedtowardsthecorpses”(439e9–440a1).Itisgenerallyassumedbycommentatorsthatinbeing“mastered”byhisappetites,Leontiusactsakratically,andthecommentsthatimme-diately follow the story seem to provide further support for this in-terpretation.Socratesasks,“Don’tweoftennoticeinothercasesthatwhen appetite is forcing (βιάζωνται) someone contrary to reasoning,hereproacheshimselfandgetsangrywiththat inhimthat isdoingtheforcing(τῷ βιαζομένῳ)?”(4408–b2).Thisapparentlyindicatesthat

36.Klosko (1986: 69–75) nonetheless interprets the kind of rule that appetitethreatensat442a–basaformofakrasia.

37. ConsideralsoSocrates’ likeningofappetitivepleasures to “leadenweights”that“drag”reason’svisiondownwardtowardtherealmofbecomingandforceittoserveevilends,“sothatthesharperitsees,themoreevilitaccomplishes”(519a–b).ThisimageechoesSocrates’claiminthePhaedothatpleasuresandpainsarenailsthat“rivet”thesoultothebodyandmakeitsharethebody’sbeliefsanddesires(83c–d).Whatbothpassagessuggestisthatappetitesandtheirassociatedpleasuresunderminereasonnotbyforcingtheindividualtoactakraticallybutratherbydivertingrationalattention,judgment,anddesiretothewrongkindsofobjects.



Itmightbeobjectedthatthelanguageof“force”tellsagainstthesuggestion that appetite’s victory over reason, if it should occur, in-volvesdestabilizingthelatter’sjudgment.Inresponse,weshouldnote,firstly, thatevenifappetitescharacteristicallyprevailoverreasonbycorruptingit,itisstilltruethatprevailingoverappetitesoftenrequiressomething likebrutepsychic force.OnPlato’sview, it isnotalwayspossible to achieve victory over one’s appetites by “persuading” ap-petite,changingitsdesires,orgettingittoacquiesceinreason’scom-mands;rather,sometimesactingcorrectlynecessarilyrequires force-fullyacting“againstappetite’swill”,sotospeak(see,e. g.,Rep. 554d,Tim. 70a,andPhdr. 254d–e).Ifthatisright,thenthelanguageof“physical”strugglewhendescribing conflicts involvingappetite is appropriate,whetherornotappetite’s“victory”overreasoninvolvesakraticforce.

More importantly, though, Plato often characterizes the corrupt-inginfluencethatappetitiveimpulseshaveonreasoninviolentterms:they“force”ustochangeourminds(βιασθέντας,413b9);they“enslave”reason(καταδουλωσάμενος, 553d2); they “compel” it to serveevilends(ἠναγκασμένον,519a4);they“forcefullydragit”(ἑλκομένη βίᾳ,577e3);andthey“compel”ittochaseafteralienpleasures(ἀναγκάζειν,587a4).41Yetattentiontothecontextsofthoseexpressionsconsistentlyrevealsthatthekindof“force”Platohasinmindinvolvesthecorruptionanddesta-bilizationofbeliefsandvalues.Thisshouldgiveuspausebeforeassum-ingthat,eveniftheappetitesat440a–bdosucceedin“forcing”some-onecontrarytoreasoning,theirdoingsonecessarilyinvolvesakrasia.

ThereisafurtherlineofresponsetotheLeontiusobjection,how-ever,whichistoacknowledgethatperhaps,afterall,Platodoesacceptthepossibilityofakrasia in the text,and thatLeontius isan impliedakratic.Idonotthinkanythinginthetextcanrule outthatinterpreta-tion.However,Ialsothinkthat,whateverPlato’sviewsonakrasiaatthetimehewrotetheRepublic,heshowsnointerestindrawingatten-tiontoitspossibility,andheatleasttreatsstabletruebeliefatthetime

41. In the Laws, the Athenian Visitor even says that appetitive pleasure “per-suadeswithforcefuldeception”(πειθοῖμετὰ ἀπάτηςβιαίου,863b8)inordertogetitsway.

Socratesusestheconativeorprogressivepresenttenseandparticiple(βιάζωνται, βιαζομένῳ),whichcanbetakentoindicateastrugglethatiscontinuingandhasnotyetbeendecided.Whathisstatementindicates,then,issimplythatsometimesappetitesarein the process of using force againstreasoningandspirit.Allwecanconclude,inotherwords,isthatatsome pointpriortoacting,theagentrationallyjudgesthatheshouldnotindulgehisappetite,andthatbothreasonandspiritresistappetiteatthattime.Thatisconsistentwiththedenialofakrasia,how-ever.ForallSocratestellsus,itcouldbethatif the reasoningpartcon-tinuestomaintainitsjudgment,thenreasonandspiritwilleffectivelyovercomeappetite,andthat,ontheotherhand,ifappetiteovercomestheothers,itwillbebecauseithascausedtheindividualto“abandon”—foratleastamoment—hisrationalbelief.40

40.Oneobjection to thiswayof interpreting the casemight be that Leontiusrebukeshimselfwhilegazingatthecorpses(IamgratefultoHalParkerfordrawingmyattentiontothisworry):“Lookforyourselves,youevilwretch-es,takeyourfillofthebeautifulsight!”(440a2–3).Theuseofspeechmightbe taken as an indication that reason is, after all, involved in the strugglethroughout.Idonotthinkthisconclusionisrequired,however.Textualevi-dencesuggeststhatPlatoacknowledgesthepossibilitythatindividualsmightmakeuseoflanguageevenwhenreasonisinactive:(1)Platocontraststheappetitivepartofthesoul,whichisactiveduringsleep,withthereasoningpart,which “slumbers” (Rep. 571c)or is “boundby sleep” (Tim. 71e)at thattime.Platowas,however,nonethelessawarethatpeoplemakeuseofspeechintheirdreams(Tim. 71e–72a).(2)IntheLaws,theAthenianVisitorsuggeststhatwhenindividualsbecomedrunk,theirreasoning“completelyabandons”them,whiletheirnon-rationalimpulsesbecomeintensified(645d–e).Suchindividuals are characterized by “complete license of speech (παρησσία)”,however(649b3–4).The implication, then, is thatPlatodoesnot think themereuseofwordsshowsthatthereasoningpartofthesoulissupportiveofthespeech-actandanyotherbehaviorassociatedwithit.(Inthiscontext,wemightalsoconsiderAristotle’sremarkatNE 1147a18–9that“sayingthewordsthatgoalongwithknowledge” isnosignof theknowledge.) If that is thecase,thenLeontius’useofspeechdoesnotshowthathehasmaintainedhisrationaljudgmentatthetimeofaction.(ItshouldalsobenotedthatfailuretomaintainhisjudgmentatthetimeofactioncouldmeaneitherthatLeontius’reasoncomestoholdadifferentjudgmentabouttheactionatthatmoment,or that it simply stops holding any judgmentat all about itmomentarily.)Carone(2001:136–9)advocatesareadingoftheLeontiuscasethatissimilartomyown.BrickhouseandSmith(2010:206–10)provideareplytoCarone.



of, correct rational judgment.43As a result,when reasonmakes “an-nouncements”abouthowtheagentoughttoact,thespiritedpartpro-videsadditionalmotivationtobehaveasreasoncommands.44 Ifspir-itedmotivationsaresufficientlystrong,thenthereasoningpartofthesoulwillmaintain its judgments and the agentwill act accordingly.Why,then,doesthestrengthofsupportivespiriteddesiresimpactthestabilityofreasoninginthisway?Presumably,becausespiriteddesirescaninfluencereasoninthesamewayappetitesdo.Wehaveseenthatstrongappetites,whentheypulltheagenttowardanactionopposedbyreason, threaten tocorrupt theagent’s rational judgments.Likewise,wecanexpectthatstrongspiriteddesires,whentheypulltheagenttoward the action recommended by reason,will influence the agent’sreasoning inaway thatpushes it further,andmoresecurely, in thedirectiontowardwhichitisalreadyinclined.45

Concerningthesecondandthirdquestions,thereareatleastfourdistinctinterpretativeoptions:

1.Spiritpreservestruerationalbeliefsat442b–c,andpreserva-tionoftruerationalbeliefissufficientfortruecourage.

2.Spiritpreservestruerationalbeliefsat442b–c,buttruecour-agerequiresmorethanthepreservationoftruerationalbe-lief(e. g.thepreservationofknowledge).

43. DiscussionsoftheeffectsofearlyeducationonthespiritedpartofthesoularefoundinCairns(1993:386–8),CrossandWoozley(1966:123),Gosling(1973:42–5),Hobbs(2000:58–9),Moss(2005),Lear(2006),Singpurwalla(2013),andWilberding(2009).

44. Notethatmyinterpretationtakesnopositiononthequestionwhetherearlyeducationtrainsthespiritedpartofthesoultosupplymotivationsthatsup-portcorrectrationaljudgmentsbecausetheycomefromreason,orwhetherittrainsspirittosupplymotivationsthat,asamatteroffact,supportrationaljudgments,butforindependentreasons(say,becausespirithasbeentrainedtofindthesortsofactionsprescribedbycorrectreasonattractive).

45. Moss (2005)provideswhat I take tobea congenial account, according towhichspiritedmotivationshave theeffectofdrawingreason’sattention towhatisgoodaboutthebettercourseofaction.

ofactionasifitweresufficientforbehavingcorrectly.Thisisespecial-ly trueofhischaracterizationofcourageandcowardice throughoutBooks3and4:whetherakrasia ispossibleintheRepublic ornot,itdoesnotseemtobeinthepictureinSocrates’accountofcourage.Myclaimissimplythis,then:evensupposingPlatohadcometoacceptthepos-sibilityofakrasia (or,forthatmatter,hadaccepteditallalong),hisearlyeducational proposals— including the tests against belief abandon-ment—andhisaccountofcourageinBook4,alongwithhisemphasisthrough thedialogueon the corruption of reasonbyappetite, eitherignoreortrivializeitssignificance.

5. Courage in the Republic

According to this account, spirit’sprimaryfunctionasreason’sally,anditsroleinthevirtueofcourage,istoensurethatreasonretainsstable,correctjudgmentinthefaceofappetitivestatesandimpulses.Threefurtherquestionsmustbeaddressedconcerningthedetailsofthisac-count.First,how preciselydoesspiritcarryoutthefunctionPlatoassignstoit?Second,arethe“announcements”thatthethumoeidespreservesat442b–cmerelyrationalbeliefs,oraretheyapplicationsofrationalknowl-edge?Andfinally,doesspirit’spreservationofthose“announcements”constitutetruecourage,onPlato’sview,ordoesthegenuinecouragepossessedbythephilosopherrequiresomethingmore?

Althoughmyinterpretationdoesnotturnonanyparticularanswerto thefirstquestion,myownproposal is the following:Platodistin-guishes the spiritedpartof the soulby itsdesire forhonor, andheassociatesitwithhonor-relatedemotionalstatessuchasshame,anger,admiration,anddisgust.42Earlymusicaleducationconditionsthethu-moeides anddirectsitsloveofhonorinsuchawaythatitsemotions,desires, and attitudes become aligned with, and hence supportive

42. Fortextualsupport,seeesp.Rep. 401d–402a,439–440a,441c,549a,550b,and581a;Tim. 70a–d;andPhdr.253d–254a.Cf.characterizationsofspiritanditsdesiresinBrennan(2012:109),Burnyeat(2006:9–13),Cairns(1993:383–4),Cooper(1999b:130–6),Hobbs(2000:7–37),andKamtekar(1998:323–34).



andugly things”, and that thebest of themare “blind” (506c).Sincewecancertainlyassumethatgenuinecourageissomethingnobleandgood,onPlato’sview,genuinecouragecannotconsistmerelyinthepreservationoftruebelief.47Thatleavesoptions(2),(3),and(4).Givenanyofthoseinterpretations,itisclearthatthevirtueoftruecourage,forPlato,eitherprominentlyrequires,orisidenticalwith,lastingandstableknowledge.

6. The Stability of Belief

IftheinterpretationIhavedefendediscorrect,thentheaccountsofcourageofferedintheProtagorasandRepublic haveagreatdealmoreincommonthanhas typicallybeenacknowledged. In theProtagoras, courageisknowledgeaboutwhatisandisnottobefeared,andcow-ardiceconsists in falsebeliefor ignorance.Likewise, in theRepublic, courageinvolvestheretentionofcorrectreasoningaboutwhatisandisnottobefeared,whilecowardicecontinuestoconsistinaformof(at least temporary) ignorance: the “abandonment” of correct belief.Similarly,boththeProtagoras andtheRepublictreatcorrectbeliefandknowledge at the timeof action as equally sufficient for acting cor-rectly,thoughthedialoguesalsoagreethatmerebeliefisproblematicinbeingsubjecttofluctuationandcorruptionundertheinfluenceofpleasure,pain,andappetitiveimpulses.

It is in their responses to this lastproblemthatwecanperceiveadiscrepancybetweenthetwodialogues.IntheProtagorasSocratesevidentlyleavesnoroomformerebeliefinthepsychologyofvirtue:courageiswisdomaboutwhatistobefeared,whilebelief—evencor-rectbelief—istreatedasanirredeemablyunstablesourceof“confu-sion”and“regret”.IntheRepublicthepictureismorecomplex.Whiletruecourageevidentlycontinuestoinvolveknowledgeorwisdom—namely,theknowledgethatgroundsthewisephilosopher’spracticaljudgments—thetextalsoattemptstoprovideabasisforthestabilityofmerebelief:thespiritedpartofthesoul.Whenproperlyeducated

47. SeeafurtherargumentforthesameconclusioninCarone(2001:130,n.47).

3.Spiritpreservesknowledgeable rationalaccountsat442b–c,andpreservationof knowledgeable accounts is sufficientfortruecourage.

4.Spiritpreservesknowledgeable rationalaccountsat442b–c,but true courage requiresmore than the preservation ofknowledgeable accounts (e. g. the continuous pursuit ofnew beliefsandknowledgethroughcourageousstudy).46

Itakeitthatallfouroftheseinterpretationsarecompatiblewithmyproposed account of courage.What is important formy account issimply that the “courage” Socrates describes at 442b–c is achievedthroughmotivational support by the thumoeides that ensures stablereasoning.Thequestionsofwhetherwhatheisdescribingconstitutestrue courage or some inferior approximationof it, andwhether thereasoningbeingsupportedthereistruebelieforknowledge,donotdirectlyaffectmyinterpretation.Iwillnot,therefore,insistonanyoneofthefourinterpretationsforpresentpurposes.Ido,however,wishtoruleoneofthemout:option(1)doesnotseemtobeatenablein-terpretation.OnthereadingIhaveadvocated,consistentlystabletruebeliefissufficientforacting as the courageous individual would—andforthepossessionof“political”courage—butthatdoesnotentailthatthepersonwhoconsistentlyactsinthatwaytherebycountsaspossessinggenuine courage. Indeed, Plato provides strong signs in theRepublic thatmerecorrectbeliefisinsufficientfortruevirtue.Anotableexam-pleisSocrates’remarkthat“beliefswithoutknowledgeareshameful

46.Onemightwanttorecognizetwofurtheroptions:(5)Spiritpreservesrationalbeliefs(whethertrueorfalse)at442b–c,andpreservationofrationalbeliefsissufficientfortruecourage;and(6)Spiritpreservesrationalbeliefs(whethertrueorfalse)at442b–c,buttruecouragerequiresmorethanthepreservationofrationalbeliefs.However,itisimplausiblethatSocrates’accountofcour-ageismeanttoallowcourageousindividualstoincludethosewhosespiritedpartpreserves falsebeliefs.First, theaccountof “political” courageat430bmakesitexplicitthatthe“preserved”beliefsarecorrectones.Andsecond,theaccountofindividualcouragemakesitclearthatthecourageousindividualissomeonewhosereasoningandspiritedpartsarenot“enslaved”and“ruled”byappetite,butratherhave“learnedtheirownroles”.Itisnotclearhowsuchapersoncouldincludethosewithfalsebeliefsaboutwhattheyoughttodo.



his discussion. When he initially asks Protagoras whether to livepleasantly is good,Protagoras adds the caveat that it is goodonlyif the pleasures taken arehonorable ones (351c). Socrates feigns of-fenseattheideathatsomepleasuresaregoodandothersbad,andhesubsequentlyteasesthehedonisticidentificationofpleasureandthegoodoutofProtagoras.Later,whenSocratesturnstohisaccountofcourage,heaskswhethergoingtowarishonorableandwhether,beinghonorable,itmustalsobegoodandtherefore(onthebasisofhedonism) pleasant (359e–360a). Although Protagoras agrees, theexchangeclearlypointstoaweaknessoftheMany’saccount,whichcommentatorshaveoftennoted:50 according to theirhedonism,anactionthatispainfulintheshorttermcannonethelessbeconsideredgoodandpleasantifityieldsgreaterpleasureinthelongterm.Theproblem,however,isthatfightinginwarisapainfulexperiencethatinvolvestheriskofpersonal injuryordeath.Thosewhodieinwar,whileachieving theheightofhonor,neverachieve long-termplea-sure.Thissuggeststwothings:first,thatthepleasantandthehonor-ableareinfactdistinctfromoneanother,andsecond,thatwhencou-rageousindividualsrisktheirlivesfightinginwars,theyareseekingthelatterratherthantheformer.Ifthatisthecase,thenitalsosug-geststhatthereisanelementofournature—onethatisespeciallyprominent during displays of courage— that desires honor ratherthanpleasure.51Itsuggests,inotherwords,thatsomethinglikethehonor-loving thumoeides of theRepublic plays an important role inourpsychology,andinparticularinthepsychologyofcourage.52

50.SeediscussioninDenyer(2008:185),Dimas(2008:259–60),Duncan(1978:222–23),Goldberg(1983:313,n.22),Klosko(1980:321),Moss(2006:509),Sesonske (1963: 79), Sullivan (1961: 20), Taylor (1976: 208–9), and Wolz(1967:216).Cf.AristotleNE 1115a26–7.

51. Hobbs(2000:113–36)offersaratherdifferentreadingoftheProtagoras(onethatattributesakindofqualifiedhedonismtoSocrates),thoughherconclu-sionissimilar:theProtagoras showsthatcourageandtherestofthevirtuescannotbeunderstoodwithoutamorecomplexmoralpsychology,andinpar-ticular,withoutanappealtothethumoeidesanditscharacteristicconcerns.

52. A further point seems to confirm this: Socrates had earlier suggested thatwhat makes war good (on the Many’s account, at least) is that it brings

throughearlymusicalandgymnastictraining,thethumoeidescanpro-videmotivationsthatsupport,andensurethe“preservation”of,cor-rectandlawfulbelief.TheRepublic thusevidentlyadoptsasomewhatmoreoptimisticattitudethandoestheProtagoras aboutwhatmerebe-liefcanaccomplish.Itsoptimismservesanimportantfunctioninitsaccountsofmoral education anddevelopment,moreover.Thepos-sibilityoftruebeliefmadestablebyaneducatedspiritedpartofthesoulmakesitpossibleforthosewhohavenotyetachievedwisdom—especially theyoungand theauxiliariesof thecity— tocultivateandpracticeanimportantprecursortocourageproper.Thatprecur-sor,whichSocratescalls“politicalcourage”,representsanindispens-ablestageinindividualmoralprogress—astagebetween“confusion”and“wandering”,ontheonehand,andtheperfectwisdomofthephi-losopher,ontheother.48

Eventhisseemingdiscrepancybetweenthetwodialoguesmasksamore subtle continuity,however. It has alreadybeennoted,firstof all, that by pointing to the problematic instability of belief, theProtagorasdrawsattentiontothepsychologicalandethicalneedforsomething like the thumoeides of theRepublic. TheProtagoras doesmore than that, though: it hints at the presence of a spirited ele-mentofourpsychology(though itmakesnomentionof “parts”ofthe soul, of course). This is clearest in the dialogue’s treatment ofthekalon —thehonorableornoble—inSocrates’finalargument.49 Socrateshimself,followingtoitsconclusionsthehedonisticpositionheattributes to theMany, casually subsumes thehonorableunderthe pleasant (which themany identifywith the good) throughout

48. Kamtekar(1998)andWilberding(2008)bothexplore,andprovideilluminat-ingaccountsof,waysinwhichthespiritedpartofthesoulmightgrounda“second-best”sortofmoralityforPlato.Cf.remarksinVlastos(1969:72–3,nn.7,9)andKlosko(1986:76–9).

49.Wemightalsopointtotheimportantroletheemotionofshame(whichPlatolaterassociateswith spirit; seeesp.Phdr. 253e–254a)plays in thedialogue,e. g.at312a,322c,333c,and352c.Also,at351b1,Protagorasidentifiesspiritedanger(θυμός)asasourceofconfidence(θάρσος),whichhedistinguishesfromcourage,thoughhethinksallcourageousindividualsareconfident.(SeediscussionofProtagoras’argumentinDevereux[1975].)



externaloneposedbypeoplelikeProtagoras,butrathertheinternaloneposedbyappetite,whichthreatenstocorruptourreasoningaboutwhatisvaluableandhowweshouldliveourlives.Thefunctionofthespiritedpartofthesoulistopreserveandprotectreasonagainstthis“sophist”within.54

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7. Conclusion: The Deinon

TheProtagorasdefinescourageas “wisdomaboutwhat isand isnottobefeared”.Significantly,perhaps,thewordtranslated“tobefeared”,deinon, isonethatappearsinthedialogueintwoearliercontextsinwhich it is applied to sophists and sophistry. First, when SocratespushesHippocratestoexplainwhatthesophist’swisdomconsistsin,he replies that a sophist is “expert atmakingpeople clever (deinon)speakers” (312d). Later Socrates reports, “Prodicus correctsmeeachtime Iuse theworddeinon topraiseyouorsomeoneelse,as forex-ample,‘Protagorasisawiseanddeinosman’.WhenIsaythat,heasksmeifIamnotashamedtocallgoodthingsterrible.Forterrible,hesays,isbad”(341a6–b2).Itishardnottosuspectabitofironyhere,andthatSocratesknowsperfectlywelltheimplicationsofhisuseofdeinon.Af-terall,SocrateswarnsHippocratesearlyinthedialoguethatsophistsare like “peddlers”whowill try to “deceive”people intopurchasingtheir teachings,regardlessofwhether thoseteachingsarebeneficialorharmfulforthesoul.ForSocrates,andforPlato,whatistrulydeinon is deception about theGood— the only “real” kindof faringbadly,Socratessays,isthelossofknowledge(345b)—andthatispreciselythekindofharmonerisksbyexposingoneselftotheinfluenceofasophist.53IntheRepublic,wehaveseen,couragecontinuestoinvolveknowledgeorcorrectbeliefaboutwhatisdeinon.Theprimarythreatagainstwhichthecourageousindividualguards,however,isnotthe

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53. EarlyintheProtagoras,SocratesclaimstohavenoticedHippocrates’courage(310d).Asitsubsequentlyturnsout,however,inseekingtheinstructionofasophistwithoutknowingwhateffectitwillhaveonhissoul,Hippocratesprovesignorantaboutwhatistobefearedandhencenottrulycourageousafterall.



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