HodgesFoundationforPhilosophicalOrientation

ThreeGuidestothePhilosophyofOrientation

C.

CourageousBeginnings:

25SituationsofNewOrientations

intheHistoryofPhilosophy

byWernerStegmaier

HodgesFoundationforPhilosophicalOrientation

Nashville,Tennessee

2019

2

Contents

Introduction–4

I.AntiquityandMiddleAges–7

1.AlternativeLimitationsoftheInfinite:AnaximanderandPythagoras–8

2.TheAlternativeofeitherExcludingTimeorGettingInvolvedwithIt:

ParmenidesandHeraclitus–9

3.AlternativeDesignsoftheTemporalBlendingandDecompositionofMattersin

PreservingtheOneTimelessBeing:Empedocles,Anaxagoras,andDemocritus12

4.TheAlternativeofRelyingonIndividualAbilitiesofOrientationinDecisionSitua-

tionsoronaCommonReasonandaSharedTruthIndependentofSituations:

TheSophistsandSocrates–14

5.AlternativeConceptualFramingsofBeing,Becoming,andEvaluating:

PlatoandAristotle–16

6.AlternativesintheArtofLiving:HellenisticSchools–20

7.AlternativePhilosophicalConclusionsfromChristianFaith:

Augustine,AnselmofCanterbury,ThomasAquinas,WilliamofOccam,

andNicholasofCusa–22

II.Modernity–28

8.AlternativeSecularizationsofPhilosophy:

Machiavelli,Bruno,Montaigne,Bacon,andHobbes–29

9.AlternativeFoundationsoftheSelf-ReferentialOrientationinSubstances:

Descartes,Spinoza,Leibniz–33

10.AlternativeCertainties:Pascal–41

11.AlternativeConceptualizationsofLawfulness:

Locke,Berkeley,Hume,andKant–45

12.AlternativeConceptionsofMorality,Politics,andEconomy:

Smith,Rousseau,Kant,andBentham–56

13.AlternativeWaysofConceptualizingHowOneCanOrientOneself:

Mendelssohn,Kant,andHerder–69

14.AlternativeSurveysofKnowledge:

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TheEncyclopediasbyd’Alembert&DiderotandbyHegel–78

15.AlternativeCompositionsofKnowledge:

Hegel’sandSchleiermacher’sDialectic–91

III.Postmodernity–102

16.AlternativesintheRevaluationoftheUniversalandtheIndividual:

EmersonandStirner,SchopenhauerandKierkegaard–103

17.AlternativesintheMoral-PoliticalCommitmentofPhilosophy:

MarxandMill–116

18.AlternativeWaysofLiberatingPhilosophyfromMetaphysics:

Dilthey,Nietzsche,andJames–122

***SectionstofollowinaSecondEdition***

19.AlternativesinDesigningPhilosophyinViewofTime:

Nietzsche,Bergson,andWhitehead

20.AlternativesinDesigningPhilosophyinViewofLanguage:

Frege,Wittgenstein,andAnalyticPhilosophy–PeirceandPhilosophiesofSign

21.AlternativesinScrutizingthe‘Given‘:PhenomenologyandHermeneutics22.AlternativesinConceptualizingHumanBeing:

Anthropology,ExistentialPhilosophy,andStructuralism23.AlternativesinConceptualizingSociety:

SociologicalSystemsTheoryandCriticalTheory,CommunitarianismandLiber-alism

24.AlternativesinConceptualizingEthics:

TheoryofJustice(Rawls),DiscourseEthics(Habermas),Metaethics,andEthicsStartingfromtheOther(LevinasandDerrida)

25.AlternativesinCourageouslyReversingOne’sOwnOrientation:

WittgensteinandHeidegger

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Introduction

Allthinkinghasaprehistory.Theprehistoryofthephilosophyoforientationisthe

historyofWesternphilosophy.Mostoftenthishistoryisportrayedasaprogressin

increasing and justifying knowledge. However, acquiring knowledge is only one

among othermeans of human orientation.Orientation is the attempt to, time and

again,findone’swayinaworldthatchangescontinually.Knowledgerequiresorien-

tation,andphilosophyhasalwayslookedbeyondthemereincreaseandjustification

of knowledge. In new historical situations, philosophy has repeatedly re-oriented

itself.Thefollowingsketchoutlinesinstancesoffundamentalphilosophicalreorien-

tation and realignment, which have been efficacious down to the present day: as

pathsleadingtoaphilosophyoforientationintheworldoftoday.

Ifonelooksbackonhistory,onedoessofromtheperspectiveofthepresent,

inevitably. At the beginning of the 19th century, the pinnacle of German idealism,

GeorgWilhelmFriedrichHegel,wasthefirsttodraftaphilosophicalhistoryofphi-

losophy.Hewanted to substantiate that philosophy, as he comprehended it in his

day,alsoevolvedinhistory.TherebyHegeltriedtocatchupwiththecourseoftime

andtoretrieveitinthepresent:philosophywassupposedtoproceedconsequently

from its beginnings inGreek antiquity until thepresentwithout anyhazards, sur-

prises,orcontingency.Butthiseffort,too,haditstime:inthecourseofthe19thcen-

tury,one learned toobservehowhistory factuallyoccurred,andby theendof the

19th century, most of all Wilhelm Dilthey and Friedrich Nietzsche radically ques-

tioned philosophical systems like Hegel’s: history could be interpreted in many

ways,andthefutureappearedtobeopenagain.Byandlarge,thisisstillthecasein

the21stcentury,eventhoughthehistoryofphilosophyhasremainedabattlefieldof

ideologies and ideological criticism. History itself as well as historiography have

turnedintoanopen-endedprocessoforientation.

History, however, is interesting and relevant for the present day only if the

ongoingprocessoforientationcanbedescribedaswell;otherwise,historyisnoth-

ingbutthecollectionofpiecesofdeadknowledge.Weareheretryingtoprovidea

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briefsynopsisofturningpointsinthehistoryofWesternphilosophy.Thissynopsis

isthehistoricalcounterparttoFearlessFindings:25Footholds forthePhilosophyof

Orientation; yet correlations cannot be traced item by item. Instead, we highlight

alternativeorientationdecisionsinthehistoryofWesternphilosophy.

ThesealternativedecisionsappearalreadyinearlyGreekphilosophy,firstof

allinthedefiningcontrastbetweenthethinkingofParmenidesandthethinkingof

Heraclitusinthe6thcenturyBC–thealternativeofeitherexcludingtimeorputting

everything under its command. In elaborating on this alternative, that which has

beencalled‘philosophy’sincethetimeofSocratesandPlato,hasformedtheunityof

anacademicdisciplineandrefined itselfaccording to itsownstandards.However,

thesestandardshaveneverbeenwithoutalternativeones;onthecontrary,thefact

that alternative standards have always been possible provoked self-reflection and

self-criticism, thereby coercing philosophy to develop further, though this has not

alwayshappened in a consistentmanner. This surveymarks those orientingdeci-

sions that have led to additional self-reflection and self-criticism in the history of

philosophy. The alternative to count on such decisionswould be to disregard the

conditionsoforientationandtoinsistonfixedtruthsintheformofmetaphysics.

Asitisneitherintendednorpossibletoelaborateonthehistoryofphilosophy

indetail, the surveyathand isnot comprehensive.Thehistoryand thepresentof

philosophyislikethesea:onecaneasilygetlost.Forthisreason,wetrytosteerthe

course and stay on target by limiting ourselves to 25 situations of orienting deci-

sions,whichseemtobelong to themost importantones in thehistoryofWestern

philosophy.Ofcourse,otherchoicesarepossible,too.

Great reorientations in philosophy are strikingly often connected with new

forms of philosophical writing. If one conforms to traditional genres such as dia-

logue, treatise, confession or meditation, one risks adopting unrecognized condi-

tions of orientation and losing a critical distance to one’s predecessors. With the

help of new forms of writing one can – if one succeeds – create new plausibility

standards. That which is new in the history of philosophy can often only be ex-

pressedinnewforms.Thisaspectwillbeanotherfootholdinthefollowingaccount.

Ourpresentation isorientedto thestateofrecentresearchonthehistoryof

philosophy,withoutthatitsresultscanbepresentedanddiscussedhere.Theoutline

isintendedtobeaccessibletolaypeople,too.Wepresupposeonlyacertainfamiliar-

ity with essential features of the history of philosophy, which can be acquired

6

through handbooks or the internet, e.g. throughWikipedia. Yet, sincewe develop

thissurveyofthehistoryof(Western)philosophyinlightofmajorinstancesofreor-

ientation,thefollowingmightinsomerespectsbesurprisingevenforexperts.

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I.AntiquityandMiddleAges

TheNeedforanOverview–CompetingOrientations

InGreekantiquity,themaritimetradeandatthesametimethecontactwithforeign

cultureshadexpandedsincethe8thcenturyBC;moreandmorecitiesandcolonies

were founded in the Mediterranean world. This increased the need for a wide-

ranginggeographicorientationintheGreeksettlementarea.Theconsciousnessofa

sharedHellenismwaspreservedacrossthesea,andtheneedforacommonintellec-

tualorientationhelpeddemocracytoadvanceandcreatetheexpectationofarelia-

ble social orientation. At the beginning, single ‘wise men’ at the periphery of the

Greekworldofferedcompetingoverviewsofwhatwashappeningintheworld;later

Athensbecamethepoliticalandintellectualcenter.Insteadofreferringtotheunob-

servableanduncontrollableinterventionofmanifolddeitieswithconfusingperson-

al relations to each other, one then created order through concepts like ‘the ele-

ment,’ ‘the infinite,’ and ‘number’ inorder tocreateanoverviewofoccurrences in

theworld.

Yet,theneedsforoverview,forobservation,andforreliabilityarefulfilledin

differentways, and therefore the new orientation remained problematic from the

verystart.Thus,newphilosophicalorientationsare forced toorient themselves to

eachotherandtoreflectupontheveryprocessoforientation.Self-reflexivephilo-

sophical orientation,which persisted next to the faith in gods, consolidates in the

courseoftime,becomesexemplary,andleadstotheemergenceofdivergingschools.

From the earlyGreekphilosophersbeforePlato, only few fragmentary testi-

moniesareconveyedintheformofquotesfromlaterauthors,andthesefragments

are open tomany interpretations.We understand them as sources that testify to

philosophicalreorientations.

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1.AlternativeLimitationsoftheInfinite:

AnaximanderandPythagoras

Intheage-oldseatradecityMiletus,whichwasdestroyedseveraltimesandrebuilt

in Ionia (Minor Asia), which was ruled by the Persian king, THALES (ca. 624/23-

548/44BC)daredtoconceiveofthefirstgreatphilosophicalthesisthateverything

emergesfromoneelement,namelywater.Thaleswascrediblebecauseofhismathe-

matical discoveries, astronomical predictions, and economic and political success.

Soontheelementwaterwasconfrontedwithotherelements(earth,air,fire),which

alsoseemedplausibleastheoriginofallthings.

ThiswasnotsatisfactoryforThales’presumablediscipleANAXIMANDERofMi-

letus(ca.610-547BC).Heisreportedtohavedraftedamapoftheinhabitedworld,

construed a sphaira, a celestial globe andmodel of the cosmos, and perhaps also

created a detailed description of all peoples living on the earth. If the reports are

true,hestrivedafteranorientationasweunderstandittoday,firstofallafterageo-

graphicorientation.Furthermore,heattempted themostcourageousphilosophical

beginningever:hedidnotpresuppose limitsor limitationsof somesort,noteven

betweenapparentelements,butratherassumedsomethingprincipallyunlimitedand

limitless, which defines itself in the generation and corruption of things, thereby

formingtemporaryconfigurations(Ordnungen).Accordingly,Anaximander isquot-

edtohavesaidthefollowing:“Butfromwherethingshavetheirorigin,intothattoo

their passing away occurs according as it is proper; for they pay recompense and

penaltytooneanotherfortheirrecklessness,accordingtotheorderoftime.”

Anaximander understands the always newly emerging and vanishing limits

within the unlimited (tò ápeiron – a word that possibly stems from Aristotle) as

‘knots,’ ‘holders,’ ‘pointsofattachmentandtransition’(peírata),thatis,asakindof

footholds,andtheápeiron incontrast to themastheunstablechangingof limits. In

theGreekepicpoems,theearthandtheseawereregardedasápeiron,astheirlimits

werenot in sight and couldbe reachedonlyby the gods.ThearchaicpoetHESIOD

(before700BC) also called the immeasurabledepthof the subterraneanabyss, in

whichonecannotevenhitgroundafterfallingdownforawholeyear,tòápeiron.

In the above quote, Anaximander ethically justifies the unlimited (in a very

broad sense): in the length of time, according to him, all limitation is unfair. He

seems not to distinguish something like thinking, neither in relation to theworld

9

processnoraspartoftheprocessitself.Thus,hisdiscipleANAXIMENESinterpretstò

ápeironasmatter,thoughthelightestandmostversatilematter,namelyairthatcan

condenseanddiluteand,inthisway,constantlydisplaceitslimits.

PYTHAGORAS(570-510BC),wholivedandtaughtontheothersideoftheHel-

lenisticworld,inLowerItaly,andalreadyestablishedaschool,seekstocapturethe

limits within the unlimited as numbers, thereby bringing them into a well-

structuredandcalculablesystemofordering.Numbers,too,setlimits–butaccording

to pregiven rules; and numbers can also be continuedad infinitum. Pythagoras is

abletomakethisnumberedorderplausiblebyshowingrelationsinwholenumbers

thatarevalidbothinmusicandintheorbitsoftheplanets;thus,hededucesahar-

monyofthespheres,which,however,onlyisheardbyhimalone.Possiblythishar-

mony is not so much based onmathematics but rather on numerical symbolism.

Nonetheless,Pythagorascreatesahighlysuccessfulmodelofhowtheworldprocess

asawholecanbesurveyedwiththehelpofmathematics.

The philosophy of orientation – likeAnaximander – keeps time infinitely open

for the becoming and passing away of things. It relies on orderliness and ar-

rangementsof things sorting themselvesoutover time.But thisprocesscan in

manycases–asPythagorasfirstassumed–beclarifiedmathematically.

2.TheAlternativeofeitherExcludingTimeorGettingInvolvedwithIt:

ParmenidesandHeraclitus

PARMENIDES(ca.540-470BC),wholivedattheoppositecoastofLowerItaly,inElea,

begantorefertohis(notexplicitlymentioned)precursorsandcontemporariesand

theirproposalsofhowoneorientsoneself–onlytorejectthemexplicitly.Hepress-

esforaradicalreorientation:hedegradeseverythingobservable,whichchangesin-

cessantly, to mere appearance in order to find an absolute hold in the non-

observable,abeing,whichisaccessibletopurethinkingalone.Parmenides’reorien-

tationbecomesthemostfatefulinthehistoryofWesternphilosophy.

Inordertomakehisphilosophicalreorientationplausible,heoutlinesagreat

scenariooforientation (which, again, is explicable inmanyways): fromHesiod,he

adopts thevenerable formof thedidacticpoemabout the fateofgodsandhuman

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beings, andhassunmaidsdriveayoungman toanamelessgoddesswhomhe in-

ventshimself.Thegoddessgiveshimthechoicebetweentwoways:oneleadingto

previous opinions, the other one to the truth, in front of which, however, lies a

yawningchasm,symboloftotaldisorientation.Themythicalgoddessshallauthorize

the new, unprecedented path of thought, which is praised as the only one that is

trustworthy,tenableandreliable.

Oneonlyhassignsorclues(sáemata)forthisnewpath,butlikestrongshack-

les, they delimit and define a clear leeway. The truth, which emerges within this

space,isnotsupportedwithreasonsbyParmenides(forifhecouldjustifythetruth,

anothertruthwouldprecedeitandleaditsway).Inhisview,it isself-evidentthat

onlybeing(tòeón)canbe,whilenon-beingcannotbe.Thisimpliesthat,accordingto

Parmenides,everythingtemporalbelongstonon-beingbecausethetemporalisnot

yetornotanymore.Therefore,timemustbeexcludedfromthebeingofthatwhich

trulyisbeing.

Consequently,thatwhichtrulyisbeingmustbenon-temporal.Ithasnotcome

intobeingandcannotperish;itmustbeindivisibleandimmovable.Assuch,itisan

absolutely stable and durable foothold of human orientation. It is not an individual

beingnext toother things,butrather thatwhichall thingshave incommon:being

itself (tò eînai).Being itselfmustbeconceivedwithoutanyempiricallyobservable

referencepoints,andtothisend,onemustthinkuppurethoughtthatcannotbeob-

servedandthatisnotdependentonconcretereferencepoints.Thisthinkingthinks

nothingbutbeingitself.Inthissense,then,thinkingandbeingarethesame(tògàr

autòvoeînestínkaíeînai),asParmenideshasit.Subsequentphilosophershavetaken

upParmenides’accountof‘purebeing’and‘purethinking’soappreciativelythatitis

oftentakenforgranteduptothepresentdaywithoutquestion.Ithasbecomeanew

plausibility standard,which is formulated in themostdifferentiatedwaybyHegel

(sec.14and15).

However,HERACLITUSofEphesusinIona(ca.550-480BC)showsthatthereis

analternativetothisapproach.Heraclitus,too,usesthemetaphorofthetwoways,

yetwithoutleadingustopredefinedgoals:onedoesnotreachlimits,hesays,even

thoughonefollowseachwayinquiringly.Headheresmuchmorecloselytotheeve-

rydayexperienceoforientation,thecharacteristicbehaviorofthehumanbeing,ashe

callsit:âethosanthróopoodaímoon(characterishumandestiny).Heformulatesdif-

ferentkindsofshortandconcisesayings,yetwithoutclarifyingtheirfactualconnec-

11

tion. He likewise pointedly dismisses other suggestions regarding human orienta-

tion;however,itisunclearwhetherhethereinreferstoParmenides(andParmeni-

destohim).Bothofthemspeakauthoritatively:theyclaimadecisivesuperiorityto

their audience inmatters of orientation, and this attitude becomes a standard for

philosophersthatwouldappealparticularlytoNietzsche.

Heraclitus’languageisregardedasdark,buthelooksfororientationprecisely

in thedarknessof language.Forexample is itpossible tospeakofnon-being,even

thoughthere‘is’nonon-being.NeitherHeraclitusnorParmenideseschewthepara-

doxality of thebeingofanon-being;onlyAristotle states theprincipleofexcluded

contradiction.Thelógos,Heraclitus’expressionfororderedrelationsinthecosmos,

whichcanbediscoveredbythought,andforthinkingitself,remainshiddeninsigns

andcanonlybeextrapolatedfromsigns:Heraclitusorientshimselfbysigns,being

wellawareoftheleewaysofinterpretationthattheyopenup.Furthermore,heuses

images and similes. He does not create concepts for pure thought or for theories

conceivedbypurethought.

AsHeraclitusdemonstrates, the lógos discriminates thingsaccording to con-

trasts,while both extremes are of equal value, not asymmetrical like Parmenides’

distinction between being and the semblance of beingwhere this very distinction

predetermineswhat is to be preferred. Instead, the contrasts persist in a reverse

harmony(palíntroposharmoníae)wheretheoneextremeholdsontotheother.For

thisreason,everythingcanalwaysberegardedfromdifferentangles,anditdepends

onone’sperspectivehowonedefinesthatwhichisbeforeone’seyes.

Thus,allknowledge isdependentondecisions.There isnopregivenprimalor

superiorunity;allseparatethingscanbecomeonething,andoneisconnectedwith

all others through certain ties or links (synápseis). All ordered structures arise

throughtheconflictor ‘war’betweenall things(pólemospántoonpatáer);andit is

thecourseoftime(aióon)that–justasachildatplay–createsexpectable,yetalso

surprising and unfathomable connections. However, there are various degrees of

insight into theseprocesses; the less insightful canagreewith themore insightful,

yetonecannotforceanyonetoagree.

Obviously,itisHeraclitus’greatestconcerntomovebetweenbothsidesofpo-

lar opposites.He iswell awareof thedecidability of all knowledge,whichhelps to

better understand reality and to orient oneself in it. Hence, orientation always

‘flows.’Waterthatdiffusesandcollectseverything,wavesapproachinganddepart-

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ing,andtheriverthatalreadyhaschangedwhenonewantstostepintoitagain(so

thatonecannotsteptwiceintothesameriver),isHeraclitus’mostpowerfulimage

forthefluxofallthings,andthisimagehassurviveduntiltoday.

Thephilosophyoforientationrecognizes–followingParmenides–theneedfor

a firmfoothold,yetwithout lookingfor it inabeingperse,which isaccessible

onlytoanalleged‘pure’thought.Atthesametime,thephilosophyoforientation

followsHeraclitus in regardingeverythingasbeingmediatedby signsandan-

tagonisms in thought,whichcompriseorientingdecisions.Allknowledge isde-

pendentonsuchdecisionsandthusremainsinflux.

3.AlternativeDesignsoftheTemporalBlendingandDecomposition

ofMattersinPreservingtheOneTimelessBeing:

Empedocles,Anaxagoras,andDemocritus

The last generation of the great early Greek, pre-Socratic or pre-Platonic philoso-

phers tries tounite the insightsof their ancestors innewandwidelydifferingde-

signs.WithParmenides, theycling to the imperishable, everlastingbeing,but they

pluralizeit,andasaresult,theycanconceiveofmovementandchange.

EMPEDOCLESofAkragas,aGreekcityinSicily,isenvelopedinmyth.Hisdatesof

birthanddeathareunclear.Hewantedtohavetraveledaroundasagodrebornin

humanshape,accompaniedbymanyfollowers.JustlikeParmenides,healsocreated

epic didactic poetry, but he assumed manifold sources or roots (rhizóomata) to

whichhegavethenamesofgods.Theyarenotsupposedtomergeintoeachother,

butrathertoagainandagainbecomeintermingledandseparated fromeachother

by the opposed forces of love and hate. Next to the elements, these interrelating

forcesareessentialforhim.Forthefirsttime,theworlddoesnotsomuchappearas

anaccumulationofmaterialsorthings,butratherasawebofrelationships.Therein

loveistocreatecalm(theAllbecomesspherical,asphaîros),whilehatecreatesun-

settlement(stirringuptheAll).Correspondingtoourordinaryorientation,thedis-

tinctionbetweencalmandunsettlementprecedesthedistinctionbetweentruthand

errororlie.ForEmpedocles,bothofitblazesthetrailforatheoryofbiogenesis,the

workingsofthesensesandapsychologyandanthropologythatmakessoulandbody

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closelydependentoneachother.AsEmpedoclesassumesthattheuniverseisinfinite

in regard to time, but finite in regard to space, he also becomes a pioneer of the

thoughtofaneternalrecurrenceofthesame.

ANAXAGORAS(ca.500-425BC),whowent fromClazomenae inIonatoAthens,

metawarmreceptionfromtheillustriouscirclearoundPERICLES(ca.490-429BC),

butwas charged of impiety (evenbefore Socrates). Anaxagoras contributes to the

ideaoftheaggregationanddisruptionofanindeterminablenumberofinfinitelydi-

visiblemattersthatintermixandinterpenetrate,sothatonecontainsmany,andall

ofthemisineverything(pántaenpantì),beingpartofeverything.Unityandmulti-

plicityarenotfixedperse. It isreason(nûs)thattakescareofconnectionsanddis-

connections. For Anaxagoras, reason is the finest matter that interweaves every-

thing,causesrotatingwhirlsinwhichentitiesdevelop(synkrisis),grow,solidify,and

differentiate(apókrisis,diákrisis).Thatway,alwaysnewworldsbecomepossible.

DEMOCRITUSofAbderainThrace(ca.460-380BC)extendsthedoctrinesoflat-

erlittle-knownLEUCIPPUSandbringsthemtoAthens,withoutpeoplethereknowing

himorwantingtoknowhim.Democritusdoesnotletthedivisibilityoftheintermix-

ingandseparatingelementsgoendlessly;hestops thisdivisionassumingsmallest

indivisible and impenetrable elements (átoma), which amount to formations that

canbeperceivedwhentheyclashorcollapse.Insteadofinterfusingeachotherina

complex manner, the atoms are thought to cohere and form a great sum. Thus,

Democritus’atomismoffersafirmbutunobservablefootingintheconfusingmixture

oftheworld.Theperceivingsenses, too,areformationsofatomsthat interactwith

theperceivedsothatnothingcanbeperceivedasitmaybeinitself–allentitiesper-

ceivedbecomequestionable.Democritushypothesizesthevoid(tòkenón)asbeing

aroundtheatomsinordertomaketheirspatialmovementconceivable.Therefore,

thevoidmustbepenetrable.Asaconsequence,theconceptofacompactbeingthat

prevailedsinceParmenidesbecomesrisky.

Thephilosophyoforientationadmitsvariousclassificationsof theworld’spro-

cessaccordingtomaterials,elements,forces,etc.,insofarastheymakeintelli-

gible the flexibility, alterability, and temporality of the world’s structures. In

whatever way one chooses concepts and classifications, they do not refer to

pregivenentities,butconstitutecalmingabbreviations,whichcanbeconnected

toeachotherindifferentways,therebyformingdifferentworlds.Theabbrevia-

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tions or short cuts themselves belong to the respective worlds through which

theyareformed.

4.TheAlternativeofRelyingonIndividualAbilitiesofOrientation

inDecisionSituationsoronaCommonReasonandaSharedTruthIn-

dependentofSituations:TheSophistsandSocrates

ThestepwisetransitionfromaristocracytodemocracyintheheydayofAthensen-

forced strong educational efforts for the citizens wanting to convince each other

with theirarguments in thedecretorypopularassemblies.That ishowtheprofes-

sion of wisdom teachers (sophists) emerged. In most cases they came to Athens

fromotherplaces,hadnocivilrightsanddidnotjointhefray.Instead,againstpay-

mentofa fee, theyhelpedcitizens toacquireavirtueorcapacity(aretáe) through

which they could distinguish themselves, above all an enhanced ability to orient

oneself,tojudgeanddecide.Therebythesophistsfreedtheirclientsfromhelpless-

nessandperplexity(amaechanía)intheircommunicationwithothers,andtheybe-

cameable tomaster theactual situation in thepopularassemblies.Theaforemen-

tionedvirtuewaspraisedasthepowertobringforwardspeciousarguments.Infact,

the sophistswere something likeprofessional teachers of orientation, without this

notionhavingexistedatthetime,someofthemwithhighearningsandcorrespond-

ing self-confidence. Men like Pericles and Alcibiades were greatly influenced by

them.

Thesophistscomingfromoutsideweremigratoryteachers,movedfromcity

tocity,becameacquaintedwithdifferentopinionsandmoralsand learned todeal

withtheminasuperiormanner.Theynotonlywrotespeechesforothers,butalso

enteredthepublicstage fortheirownpurposes.Fromamarkedlycriticaldistance

they developed first philosophies of cognition and knowledge, of language and

communication, of law andmorals, thereby exploring the societal and political di-

mensionofallknowledge.Theysetasidethequestionoftheoriginandorderofthe

world’s process and its truebeing, or they treated it ironicallywith the argument

thatsuchatruebeingisneitheridentifiablenorcommunicable.

In order to showcase the perspectivity of all assertions, they ostentatiously

tookupdifferentorevenantitheticalpositions.Competingwitheachother,theydid

15

notcommitthemselvestocommonstandsandteachings,butratherpreservedtheir

personalsovereignty.ParticularlyPROTAGORASofAbderainThrace(ca.490-411BC)

becamefamousformakingallassessmentsofthingsandpersonsdependentonthe

viewpointandsituationofthehumanbeingassuchandtherespectivestandpoints

ofsingleindividuals.GORGIASofLeontinoiinSicily(between490and485untilafter

396BC)didnotacceptstatementsandvaluationsequallybindingeveryone; instead,

heerectedagoldenstatueforhimselfinDelphi.PRODICOSofCeos(between470and

460until after399BC) advocated the thesis thatgodsare invented for the sakeof

one’sindividualneedsanddesires.Atthesametime,hewaswell-knownforhisme-

ticulous distinctions of concepts. Furthermore, Prodicos is said to have purported

thestoryaboutHeraclesatthecrossroads,whichbecametheparadigmofdecisions

onmoralorientation.

SOCRATES(ca.469-399BC),too,wasinhisdayregardedasasophistcompet-

ingwithotherssophists,thoughwiththeuniquefeaturethathedidnottakemoney

for his interlocutions and thus set the example of unselfish philosophizing that is

committedtothemorallygood.Accordingtothefewpiecesofinformationwehave

about him, hewas undemanding in his life with his (perhaps two)wives and his

three sons. He stemmed from Athens and practiced his civic rights and duties,

among them togo towar,whereheprovedhimself outstandingly, and toplayhis

part in the law courts,wherehe insisted on strict law-abidance.He respected the

lawsofhishometownevenwhenhewassentenced todeath,although theverdict

appearedclearlyunjusttohim.

However,heseemstobeassureofthegoodasParmenideswasofbeing.And

likeParmenides,Socratesisthereinsupportedbyhisgodlikedaimonion,whichpre-

ventshimfromevil,butdoesnotpositivelybringthegoodtohisknowledge.Coming

fromapoorbackgroundandbeingunhandsomebyGreekstandards,henonetheless

knowstofascinatethebestandmostbeautifulyoungaristocratsasnootherphilos-

opher, despite the fact that hedoesnot offer themknowledge.However, after the

oracleinDelphihasproclaimedthatnooneiswiserthanSocrates,hedarestocheck

this sentence on the grounds of the paradoxical premise that he, Socrates, knows

that he knows nothing. Hence, he questions everyonewho pretends to be knowl-

edgeableorwhomhepresumestobeknowledgeable, inordertofindoutwhether

thisknowledgeprovestrueinadiscussion.

16

Socrates is successful in his superiormoderation of the disputes by leading

everyoneintoirresolvableinternalcontradiction(aporía)ordisorientation.Heirri-

tatesandfascinateshisaudienceatthesametime.Therebyhecreatesareflexiveand

paradoxical orientation through disorientation: one knowsmore if one knows that

oneknowsnothing.

Theresultismostoftenthattheyoungmenwanttocontinuetheconversation

withhim.For,althoughitdoesnotproducetrueknowledge,theconversationmust

alwaysbeguidedbyaconcertedtruthandbeconductedonthegroundofacommon

reason–ofwhichonelikewisecannotknowanything.

SincePlatohasturnedSocratesintotheprotagonistofhisdialoguesandcon-

fronted himwith the other sophists, discrediting them severely, Socrates has be-

come the ideal type of the philosopher, andhis ethos of incessant self-examination

hasbecometherolemodelofallproponentsoftheEnlightenment.

The philosophy of orientation feels close to the sophists including Socrates, as

theyproceedfromthemerestatementofputativelytrueknowledgetoargumen-

tative disputes about inquiry and scholarly research in a sense that is still in

force today.Socrates’premiseofacommonreasonandaconcerted truthsup-

portsorientationsignificantly–providedthatoneshareshisknowledgethat,ul-

timately,thepromiseoftrueknowledgecannotbeproved.

5.AlternativeConceptualFramingsofBeing,Becoming,andEvaluating:

PlatoandAristotle

WhileSocratesknowsthatheknowsnothingandisconstantly involvedinanapo-

reticcommunicationof thatwhich isandshouldbe,PLATO(428/427-348/347BC)

partlyrenders,partlyinventshisdialogues.maintainingthathewillnotwritedown

hisown teaching.Plato’sworkconsistsofdialogues inwhichhehimself isabsent;

onceheexcuseshisabsencebyreferringtosickness.Hisworkisthefirstthatsur-

vivesona large scale.Plato’s dialoguesperformanddemonstratehowopinionsare

bound to individuals, how distinctions are introduced, and how one decides for or

againstthem.Inlettingothersspeak,Platoavoidsprofessingtruthsonhisown,too.

The ironyof thePlatonicSocrates liesprecisely inthe fact thatonedoesnotknow

17

whenhespeaksironically.Throughthemouthofhisprotagonists,Platononetheless

speakswithsuperiorauthority,yetwithout takinga theoretical standpoint ‘above’

things.At placeswherepositivedoctrines are expected, Plato’s protagonistsmake

do with unverified narrations (mythoi) including the famous parables. Here, too,

thereremainwidespacesfordiverginginterpretations.

Thus, Plato’s introduction of ideas that he puts into Socrates’mouth can be

understoodaspartofacomprehensivetheoryofprinciples,whichshallonlybeac-

cessible to Plato’s own school. But it can also be understood as ameremeans to

makeconceivablethecompatibilityofperspectivalorientationsintheapprehension

ofobjects:as freelyselectablepointsofview,whichcanbekept fora time, for in-

stancethetimeofadialogue.Thereisevidenceforthelatterapproach,sincePlato

hasSocratesintroducetheideasindifferentdialogues, i.e. indifferentsituationsof

communicationbetweendifferentpeopleandindifferentways.Thereby,heshows

thatSocrateswantstoconvinceeachdialoguepartnerinaspecificway,yetwithout

itbeingclearwhetherhealwayswantstoconveyoneandthesamemessage.

InsofarastheyoungSocratesfollowsParmenidesinattributingabeingperse

totheideas,PlatoletstheoldParmenidesinthesame-nameddialogueconsiderthis

asbeinguntenable,encouragingSocratestorehearsetheuseofideas.Insteadofaf-

firmingaconsistentandsustainabledoctrineoftheideas,whatthematureSocrates

brings toproof inPlato is thealwaysconvincinguseof ideas.Thus, it seems tobe

theirorientingusethatiscrucialforPlato.Consequently,thehighestideaofthegood

wouldthen,accordingtothePlatonicSocrates,betheideaofthegooduseofideas,

i.e.ofagoodorientation.

In times when democracy is constantly threated from outside by wars and

frominsidebypowerstruggles,philosophyestablishesitself intheformofschools

intowhichitwithdraws.Plato’shugepoliticalexperimentof,togetherwiththeruler

of Syracuse, creating a state governed by ideas fails spectacularly. Philosophical

schools like, forexample, thePythagoreanschooldeveloptheoriesconcernedwith

completeness, complexity, and internal consistency. Plato’s critical student

ARISTOTLE (384-322BC) creates themost impressive and influential theoryof this

kind.

While Plato descended from a highbred, upscale family in Athens, Aristotle

camefromelsewhere,namelyfromStagiraonthepeninsulaChalkidiki.Later,Aris-

totleassumedtheresponsibilityfortheeducationofAlexanderattheroyalcourtof

18

PhilipIIofMacedon,whoin338annexedAthensandotherGreekcitiestohisking-

dom.DuringAristotle’s lifetime,Philip’sson,AlexandertheGreat,createdhisgreat

empire, while Aristotle founded his own school in Athens and developed it as a

properresearchacademy.

Forhisowntheoryandhisacademy,Aristotleinventstheliterarygenreofthe

treatise,whichhasadetermininginfluenceonscience:thesober,purelyfact-bound

andlucidroundupofthoroughlyinvestigatedtruths,publishedinone’sownnamein

an ongoing calibration with other doctrines and the scientific consensus. Though

individual,thetreatiseshallnolongerberegardedasapurelyindividualintellectual

product.Rather,itissupposedtoallowforclearlyidentifiable,unequivocalbounda-

ries,not least inthequestionofbecoming,whichhadbeencontroversialsincePar-

menidesandHeraclitusandwasstillnotoriouslycontestedinPlato.AgainstAnaxi-

mander,Aristotlemaintainsthateverythingthat‘is’mustbesomethinglimited,for

otherwiseitcannotbecomprehended.Forthisreason,AristotlealsodiscardsPlato’s

ideas as ameansofdeterminingbeingandbecoming. For if ideas are rulesdeter-

mininghowtoseethings,oneinturnneedsrulesfortheapplicationoftheserules.

This leads into an infinite regress, which, for Aristotle, is an indication of their

wrongness. Thinking, by contrast, must be a determination of limits (horismós)

where it stops (anánkae stâenai). In Aristotle’s view, philosophy’s primary task is

thisdeterminationoflimitsorofprocessescomingtoastandstill.Hetherebypresup-

posesnatureasacosmosthatis internallylimitedandwell-guardedinsuchaway

thatallthinking,aswellasthethinkingofthinking,ispartofit.

Aristotle solves the problem of becoming in distinguishing between abiding

beingandshiftingqualities.Therebyhecapturestherelativityofmovement,oneof

the most important footholds of everyday orientation until today; when change,

movementorfluctuationisobserved,itmustbecomparedtosomethinginrelation

towhichitchanges,moves,orfluctuates.However,Aristotleatthesametimedraws

fast boundaries: he isolates that which abides during the apprehension of the

movementasanon-temporalsubstance(ousía)fromtemporallyalternatingattrib-

utes,whichhedevaluates asbeingonly accidental (symbebaekóta) and thusunes-

sential. In doing so, he establishes an asymmetry between that which abides and

thatwhichchanges.Inrankingtheabidingsubstanceabovethechangingattributes,

he introduces avaluingdistinction,where the higher value, i.e. the higher-ranking

substance,isregardedasprovidingsufficientfootholdfororientation.

19

Inordertograspthesubstanceasindependent(chooristón)fromthechange

of its environment, Aristotle furthermore determines it as the underlying cause

(hypokeímenon) of the change of its attributes. This under-lying substance (Latin:

standing-beneath:sub-stantia),however,turnsouttobeexplicableinmultipleways:

(a)asmerematterthatcanadoptevernewforms,itselfbeinginfinitelychangeable;

(b)asmaterialthat is formedtoindividualthingsthatabide,whiletheirattributes

change,withthegoalof their formationalreadybeing intrinsic inthem(enteléche-

ia);(c)astheformitselfthatshapesmatter(morpháe,eîdos)andthatbecomesvisi-

bleinabiologicalspeciesthatremainsthesameregardlessofindividualsbeingborn

anddyingaway;(d)astheultimategroundofthisformation,whichAristotleinhis

latercompilatedbooksofhislaterso-called‘metaphysics’definesasthedivineun-

moved mover. The changing determinations of the abiding substance show that,

paradoxically,theverydeterminationremainsinflux:itisitselffluctuant.

Aristotleconnectshismetaphysicswithhislogic,whichlikewisehasremained

relevantthroughthemillennia.Herethinkingis limitedbyaninterrelatedorderof

forms according towhichone concept canbededuced fromanother and, through

gradualabstractionofcontents,bepileduptoneatlyarrangedpyramidsofconcepts

derived from each other. Substances enter as subjects into propositions in which

characteristicsareattributedtothemaspredicates.Thatonecannotattributeanti-

theticalattributestothematthesametime(háma)inthesamerespect,thisprinci-

ple is Aristotle’smost solid ground of thinking (bebaiotátae tôon archôon), which

excludesHeraclitus’ approach to orientation.However, one can attribute opposite

characteristics tooneand the samesubstance– atdifferentpointsof time; for in-

stance,somethingcanrestrightnow,thenmove.Butinthingschangingtheirposi-

tionsandbecomingdifferent,theproblemoftimereturns.Yet,accordingtoAristo-

tle’smetaphysicsandlogic,timeinturnistobeconceivedonlyparadoxically:time

is,asAristotlehimselfdiscovers,simultaneouslyabidingandchanging;the‘Now’is

alwaysthesameandalwaysanother.Thus, theprincipleofnon-contradictiononly

applieswhentimeisexcluded.

Ashumanaction isperformed in timeand in changing situations,Aristotle’s

pointofdepartureisexpresslydifferentfromhisapproachinepistemology.Indefin-

ingthevirtues,hedoesnot,likePlato,startwithanideal,butratherwiththehabitu-

albehavior (éthos) common in a society shapedbymale aristocrats, andobserves

howamanisabletoexcelinit.Thereby,Aristotledifferentiatesbetweentypicalsit-

20

uations of action, for instancewar, appearing on the scene of assemblies, dealing

withlust,withmoney,withthetruth,andbehavingonsocialoccasions.HereAristo-

tleworksmethodicallywithleewaysofactioninsteadofabstractnorms.Theethical

leewaysare limitedatbothsidesbybadextremes,betweenwhichonehas to find

therightmiddle.Aristotledescribestheprocessofethicalorientationinshiftingsitu-

ationsinawaythatisplausibleuntiltoday.

The philosophy of orientationworks – like Plato’s Socrates in his dialogues –

withideasascommonpointsofviewthatcanbechosenandusedforthedeter-

minationofthatwhichisandshallbeinagivensituation,withoutanindepend-

ent being belonging to the ideas. Further, the philosophy of orientation starts

outfromAristotle’stheoreticalinsightintherelativityofmovement,yetwithout

bringing themovement to a standstill through substancemetaphysics. Aristo-

tle’sownattemptstodeterminetheconceptofsubstancedemonstratethatthe

content of this concept, too, is fluctuant. In his practical philosophy, Aristotle

providesamodelofhowonecanthinkinleeways.

6.AlternativesintheArtofLiving:HellenisticSchools

InthetimeoforiginallytheGreco-Macedonian,thenoftheRomanEmpire,philoso-

phycontinuedtoconsolidateinschools.Schoolsaretheexpressionforthefactthat

philosophicalorientationsaresharedbymanyandarehandeddownthroughmany

generations.TheHellenisticschoolsofStoicism,Epicureanism,andSkepticismhad

held their ground for centuries inwhich the Roman Empire steadily grew; it also

remainedstableduringinternalpoliticalfightsforitsleadership,andforthisreason,

it was experienced as a guarantor of order. Yet, although philosophy never orga-

nizeditselfasclearlyandwasneveraspopularasitbecameinthetimeofHellenism

– philosophy reached the tops of society up to an emperor of theRomanEmpire,

MARCUSAURELIUS(121-180)–nodoctrineemergesthatwouldbetheonlyvalidone;

rather,theschoolscontinuedtocompetewitheachother.

OnlylateandquasioutofcompetitionPLOTINUS(ca.204-270AD)daredtode-

velopanewphilosophicalgreatdesign.HecombinesPlatonic,Aristotelian,andStoic

doctrines in his idea of an all-encompassingOne andGoodwhose overabundance

21

emanatesprogressively,flowsintoharmoniousformsofspiritandmatter,andsolid-

ifies in them.This isonemore large-scalecomprehensionsuspending thecontrast

betweenParmenides andHeraclitus, nowpresupposingPlato’smetaphysicallyde-

fined ideasandobfuscatingallmaterial texture.Onthebasisof thisNeoplatonism,

Christianitycanallytophilosophy.

InHellenism (from the 3rd centuryBCuntil the 4th centuryAD), philosophy,

whichwaswell-establishedatthattime,differentiatedinaseriesofspecializedsci-

ences,amongthemmathematicsandmedicine,grammarandphilology.Greatlibrar-

iesweresetup.Unitywassoughtlessinalastgroundbutmoreincompilationand

overview.Mostnotably,philosophyturnedintoanartofliving,andtheartofliving

wasapartoftheartoforientation.Whilearationalitypervadingtheworldcouldbe

presumedjustasitcouldbecontested,acommonfocus,whichwasemphasizedes-

peciallybytheRomancitizenCICERO(106-43AD),wasthequestionofhowphiloso-

phycancontributetothelifeorientationofthesingleindividualintimeswhenfaith

inthedivinedeclines.

ThephilosophyoforientationisclosertotheEpicureanandSkepticalHellenistic

schools than to Stoicism. The Stoic assumption that reason presides over the

worldisnolongerplausibletoday,buttheStoicdistinctionbetweenthatwhich

is beneficial and that which is detrimental in appropriating the world is still

trustworthy,andsoistheStoiccriterionofreassuranceversusdisturbance.

FollowingEpicureanism, for thetimebeingthephilosophyoforientation

holdstotheobservableandtherebykeepsopenleewaysforbuildingandusing

conceptsdifferently.InanEpicureanmanner,theeverydayroutinesoforienta-

tiondealwithpeacefulnessandtheavoidanceoftrouble.Butorientationalways

beginswith‘skepticism,’whichliterallymeans‘tolookaround’forrelevantfoot-

holds ina situation,whichonegaugesand towhichone first commits oneself

when one is urged to act. Skepticismwith its ‘tropes’, i.e. ‘turns of cognition,’

preciselyreflectsthesituatednessandrelativityofknowing.Consideringthefact

thattherearemultiplestandpoints,thatasituationcanbeinterpretedinvari-

ousways,andthateachpersoncanrelyondifferentfootholds,orientationmust

alsobeskepticalinordertobesuccessful.

22

7.AlternativePhilosophicalConclusionsfromChristianFaith:

Augustine,AnselmofCanterbury,ThomasAquinas,

WilliamofOccam,andNicholasofCusa

Christianity that spread increasingly in the Roman Empire, organized itself as a

church, formulateddogmas suitable formission, establishedauthorities, conferred

holyorders, and canonized theHoly Scriptures, incorporatedmany thoughts from

prior philosophers, in particular from Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus. However, it

causedstrongforward-lookingrealignmentsinphilosophyaswell.Throughthebe-

lief in one almighty, omniscient and infinitely goodGodwho is beyonddoubt and

therefore gives human beings absolute security, Christian philosophy is able to

questionallotherfootholds.Inthisway,ithelpstoreorientphilosophyasawhole.

Its point of departure is the self-humiliation of the human being before God:

determinedbyHimanddependentonHimineverything,humanbeingsaresinners

before God and cannot live up to His commandments. Nothing is concealed from

Him,butHeisconcealedfromthem;alltruthisthankstoHim,butnobodycanun-

derstandHistruth.Christianphilosophystartsfromtheparadoxthateverythingis

to be comprehended in and through God without Himself being comprehensible.

Christianphilosophyshowshowtomakeparadoxesfruitful.Amongthemisthepar-

adoxthatChristianknowledgeisrevealedtofaithandyet istobeverifiedthrough

reasonandlogic:asthesourceofrevelation,theBiblecontainsanumberofobvious

contradictions;thus,humanreasonmustdecideabouttheveracityofdivinerevela-

tion.Thenewintertwinementoffaithandknowledgeopensupunforeseenpathsof

thought.

Humblefaith,however,questionshumanknowledgealtogetherand,ultimate-

ly,itself.Faithmustleaveitopenwhetherhumanbeingscanspeakadequatelyabout

Godandeverythingcomingfromhim,whetherhumanbeingscanspeakadequately

abouttruerealityatallinhumanterms,andwhetheronewouldnotratherdojus-

ticetoGodifonenegatedone’sconceptsofhim,speakingabouthimonlythrougha

negativetheologyorremainingsilentabouthim.Inthecertaintyoffaith,knowledge

becomesuncertain,includingtheknowledgeofone’sownfaith;onehastomistrust

notonlyone’sknowledge–muchmoreradicallythaninskepticism–butalsoone’s

23

faith,andonehastoabstain fromconcluding judgmentsabout it.Expressed in the

languageoforientation:onecanonlyhaveclues,hints,indicatos,signs,or,aswecall

them,footholdsofGod’sbeing,essence,work,andoftherightfaithinHim.AllChris-

tianphilosophyandalltheologymovewithintheleewaysofthesefootholds.

In the second and third century after Christ, the movement that later was

calledGNOSTICISM,whichfedonmultifarioussources,combinedahighlyspeculative

knowledge of God and his secrets in a comparatively unwarped manner. Then

AUGUSTINE(354-430AD),sonofapatricianoftheoldstyle,laterbishopofHippoin

Northern Africa and one of the church fathers, reflected in an exemplaryway his

route to Christian faith through the philosophical approaches that were well-

establishedinthosedays,butdisappointedAugustine,sohedelineatedthelongpro-

cessofhisownreorientation.Tothisend,hecreatedthenewliteraryformofConfes-

siones:paradoxically,heconfesseshis sinfulaberrations,whichhenowrecognizes

assuch,toGodwho,ofcourse,alreadyknowseverything.

TheinvestigationofhissinfulnessforcesAugustinetoturnawayfromthe‘ex-

ternal’worldand its footholds,whichareequallyobservablebyeveryone, and in-

steadtoconceiveofthatwhichsincetheniscalled‘theinward.’Thisinsideofwhich

we until today speak until today as if it were amatter of course is a paradoxical

placeandnon-placeat thesame time: it cannotbe localized.Butan innerbeing is

nowattributedtoeveryhumanbeing.Itisregardedassomethingwhichyoucanon-

lyobserveyourself:youexperienceitasthesceneofyourfeelings,yourconscious-

ness,yourwill,andyourconscience.Consciousness,will,andconscience,whichare

accessible only to yourself, become leading points of reference for philosophy in

modernity:theorientationintheworldopenforallisdeepenedbytheorientationby

one'sowninnerbeing.

Yet, forAugustine, ever newabysses of instability openup. For him, human

inwardnessisthe–alwaysquestionable–locusoffaith:onlyherecanGodbefound,

onlyherecanonespeaktoHim,onlyhereHewillrespond.However,thehumanin-

sideisonlygiveninmemory(memoria),andthismeansthat,basically,Iamtheone

whoremembersandwhomIremember(egosum,quimemini).Mymemory,though,

is idiosyncratic and unfathomable: something can come intomymind or not, and

sometimesIrememberitinoneway,sometimesinanotherway.Thishasreasonsin

lifeorientation:accordingtoAugustine,memoriaislikeastomachthatdigestsone’s

experiencessuchthatoneinnewsituationscanlivewithitinthebestpossibleway.

24

By thismeans, further self-examination can leadme to inner caves that aremore

andmoreconcealed(caveaeabditiores),andasaconsequence,Ineverreachastable

andconcludingconceptofmyself(necegoipsecapiototum,quodsum).The(sinful)

inward withdraws just like the horizons of my orientation when I try to approach

them.Hence,beforeGodIbecomeaquestiontomyself(mihiquaestiofactussum).

Thelackoffootingintensifiesinregardtotime.Inexploringmemoria,Augus-

tinerealizesthatthepastandthefutureareaccessibleonlyinthepresent(asthat

whichisrememberedorexpected),butthepresentitselfisonlythetransitionfrom

thepast tothe future.Thus,time itself iswithoutany firmfoothold,whichAristotle

stillfoundintheeternalorbitalmovementofthestars.Augustineconceivesoftime

inrelationtothehumaninterior,which,beingitselfsubjectedtotime,‘extends’time

(distentio).Thus, one cannot saywhat time is – andyetone canhandle itwithout

anyproblems(Sinemoexmequaerat,scio;siquaerentiexplicarevelim,nescio).Inhis

ConfessionsbeforeGod,Augustinediscoversanorientationabilitythatisindependent

ofconceptualknowledge.Ashe trusts in the incomprehensibleGod,hecan trust in

hisownorientation–byGod’sgrace.TheunfathomableandmercifulGodmeetshim

as voice (vox) and countenance (facies); he speakswith Him in love. Love entails

communicationbeyond concepts. Inhis face to face communicationwithGod,Au-

gustinediscoversloveastheconditionforsuccessfulcommunicationbetweenindivid-

uals.

Manycenturies later, thestrongestalternativephilosophicalconclusionfrom

Christian faith followed in a form comparable to the one Augustine had chosen,

namelytheformofprayer.ANSELMOFCANTERBURY(ca.1033-1109AD),whoalsoin

person turns toGod, conceives of God – paradoxically again – as “a being beyond

which nothing greater can be conceived” (aliquid quomaius nihil cogitari potest).

With thehelpof nothingbut this concept,which alsowaspreparedbyAugustine,

Anselm demonstrates that God really exists – if ‘real being’ is something greater

(maius)thanjust‘being-thought.’Thus,onecanbuildfaithinGodbasedonconcep-

tual thinking – and vice versa. Down to the present day, it is not finally settled

whetherAnselm’s so-called ontological argument forGod’s existence is tenable or

not.Itcouldbelogicallycorrectbutnonethelessmisleading.

Intheco-calleduniversalscontroversy,conceptsand ‘thegeneral’assuchbe-

camedoubtful.Thoseinvolvedinthecontroversycontinuedtoaskontologicalques-

tions:douniversalsexistindependentlyoftheparticularsexemplifyingthem(real-

25

ism), or only as conceptswithin themind (conceptualism), or are universals only

names, only words invented by human beings (nominalism)? All options were

thinkablewithin the framework of God’s creation, and this controversy is neither

settledtodate.Everyonewhoseeksafirmfootholdoforientationinuniversals–beit

concepts,laws,methods,norms,orvalues–willstilltendtorealism,butonlythen.

Themostponderousrepresentativesofso-calledscholasticism,thescholastic

ordidacticclarificationandconcatenationoftheguidingconceptsofChristianfaith,

namelyALBERTUSMAGNUS(ca.1206-1280AD)andTHOMASAQUINAS(1225-1274AD),

adopta conciliatoryposition in theuniversals controversy:universalsare, in their

view,ontologicallyat the same time in thedivine intellectbefore creationand the

existenceofparticulars(anterem); theymaybewithinthethingsofthisworld(in

re),orinhumanthoughtsubsequenttotheexistenceofparticulars(postrem).Espe-

ciallyThomas countson thephilosophyofAristotle,whichwashandeddownand

worked through by Islamic translators and commentators. Aristotle also provides

thelogicalmeansforthecouplingofconcepts.InAristotle,Thomasfindsthedeepest

andmostbroadlyelaboratedknowledgeofancientphilosophy.Inthisway,hecre-

atesthehithertomostcomprehensiveandtenableorientationthatenablesphilosoph-

icalthinkingonthebasisofbothfaithandknowledge.Hissystemoforientationcan

betaughtat thebloominguniversitiesasstandardizedbasicknowledge,whichthe

CatholicChurchofthe19thcenturyadoptsasthebasisofitsdogmatics.Thus,here-

siescanbeclearlymarkedoff,whiledeviatingobservationshavetobematchedwith

it.Tothisend,scholasticismcreatesanewspecialliteraryform,thequaestio,which

includesthecoherentweightingofargumentsfororagainstaspecificissue,andthe

summa, i.e. theexhaustiveandself-consistentcompilationofquaestiones –agenre

whichThomasperfected.

Few generations later,WILLIAM OF OCCAM (1280/5-1347/8 AD) continues to

holdontobothfaithandAristotelianlogic,which,forhim,pertainstoGod’sthink-

ing.Yet,heconcedesthatGodcouldalsohavewilledtocreatetheworlddifferently.

Asanalternativetothe ‘oldway’oforientation(viaantiqua),Occamconfessesthe

contingencyoftheworldaspartofthe‘modernway’(viamoderna).Logic,then,isno

longerameansofjustifyingtheAristotelianorderoftheworld,butratherbecomes

acriteriontoassesscontingentpossibleworlds;conceptsturnintonakednamesfor

the purpose of appellation,which saynothing about the essenceof things.William

also refrains fromprinciples: he introduces themethodical principleof renouncing

26

themultiplication of content-related principles, whichwere prevailing in scholasti-

cism.Therebyhecourageouslyopensupnew,eventhenmuch-noticedbutequally

combated ways that a contemporary philosophy of orientation still cannot tread

withoutoppositions.Williamalreadyfightsfortheseparationofecclesialandimpe-

rial power. Already during his lifetime, the university of Paris prohibits his doc-

trines.

InthelightofChristianfaith,NICHOLASOFCUSA(1401-1464AD)alsoquestions

logicinsofarasitisusedasacriterionforthecontentsofbelief.Ashelikewisedoes

nothopetorecognizeGodintheorderoftheworld,hedrawsuponthesourcesof

Neoplatonism, mysticism, and mathematics – and thereby works forcefully with

paradoxes.Hewasnotonlyawell-versed,accomplishedscientistanduniversitypro-

fessor,butalsoanundogmaticspiritualdiplomat,asignificantchurchpoliticianand

reformer,whoforatimebravelyantagonizedthePope,abishopwhohadtofightfor

the survival of hisdiocese alsomilitarily; hehad to subsist on it (andmanyother

benefices he knew tomake available for himself). Intermediately hewas a Curial

Cardinal.Heknewtheworldwell,alsoinpoliticalandeconomicrespects.

Philosophically,hestartsfromthepremisethateverycreatureintheworldis

other (aliud) than all other creatures, and that there is, in the final analysis, no

sameness,which iswhyonecandiscernonly similarities.This ispossible through

distinctions or contrasts,which at some point touch each other: a polygonwhose

nooks aremultipliedmore andmore draws closer to a circle, and themore it in-

creases in size, theperipheryof the circle converges toa straight line. Ina coinci-

denceofopposites,humanextremescollapse in infinity,beyondthisworld, inGod

(coincidentiaoppositorum).Ourknowledgeis learnedignorance(doctaignorantia).

Thefinitecanbedeterminedbyhumanreason(ratio)onlybykeepingawaythein-

finite.With thehelpofparadoxes,however, the intellect (intellectus)mightnotbe

abletocomprehendtheinfinite(and,consequently,God),butat leastborderonit;

thereby,theintellectcan‘fold’theworldintoGod(complicatio)and‘unfold’itfrom

Him(explicatio);andinperformingthisactivity,humancognitionitselfcanbecome

creative.

Ithastakenmanycenturiesuntilonelearnedtothinkinthiswayagain.Nicho-

las of Cusa already employed the imagery of orientation: the human spirit is de-

scribedasa‘cosmograph’that,inourlanguage,draftsmapsoftheworldontheba-

27

sisoffootholdswhichitgraspsinordertoorientateitselfintheworld.Complexge-

ographicmapswerelatercalled“Cusanus-maps.”

Thephilosophyoforientation findsstrong impulses in themedievalphilosophy

which often is unjustly by-passed. TheChristian philosophy of theMiddleAges

has vigorously expanded the possibilities of humanorientation: it demandsno

longerjusttograsptheincomprehensiblestartingfromthecomprehensible,but

at the same time tograsp theonly seeminglycomprehensibleproceeding from

theincomprehensible,whichispersonalizedasGod.Withthisdoublemove,one’s

owncomprehensioniscomprehendedinitsdecidability.

Onthegroundofalargelyunquestionedfaith,medievalphilosophycould,

on theonehand, constructabasicorientation that formanypeople is stillac-

ceptable;on theotherhand,medievalphilosophycouldalso radicallyquestion

thisbasicorientation:Augustinediscoversorcreates‘theinward’ofthehuman

being as the (non-)place of that which we call consciousness, will, and con-

science.Theuniversals controversy shows thatone candecideon the statusof

thegeneralanduniversal.WilliamofOccamopenstheorientationofthebeliev-

ersforthecontingencyoftheworldandthemethodologicaleconomyindealing

withmetaphysicalprinciples.NicholasofCusaallows fora creativeworkwith

paradoxes. In general, humanorientation remains reliant on faith evenwhere

“faithintheChristianGodhasbecomeincredible”(Nietzsche).Itneedskindsof

faithinordertoenjoysufficientcertaintiesforactingintheworldandshaping

the world despite all uncertainties of the world and even of the scientific

knowledgeaboutit.

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II.Modernity

Towardstheendofthe15thcentury,apathosofcompletereorientationemerged,ofa

freshstartbothintheconceptualizationofknowledgeandinthestylingandconduct

ofhuman life.Onedidnot turnagainstChristianbelief,butbroke resolutelyaway

fromitsmeanwhilehighlycontroversialpreceptsforphilosophizing.Thescholastic

knowledgewasbymanyregardedasobsoleteandoutdated.ProceedingfromItaly,

one orientated oneself afresh in the name of the human being (humanism) and

wantedtoregain the imageof thehuman,also in theshapeofbodilybeauty, from

antiquity,thetimeprecedingChristianity.Theworldlyconditionsofthehumanbe-

ingand,inadditiontonature,alsohistoryandlanguagegainedcenterstagetogether

with the individual.The individualorientinghim-orherselfbecame themiddleof

his orher respectiveworld andpursued the ideal of self-perfection (uomouniver-

sale)irrespectiveofcorporatistandclericalorders.

Manifolddiscoveries,inventions,anddesignsstirredandpromotedacompre-

hensivereorientation,firstandforemost

• the discovery of America and the circumnavigation of the Earth, which became

possible with the help of the (re-)invention of the compass (which was formerly

knowninChina):itopenednewhorizonsforgeographicorientation;

•therearrangementofcenterandperipheryintheastronomicalorientation:forthe

sakeofaneasiermathematicalcalculationoftheorbitsoftheplanetsandthestars,

COPERNICUSmoved the earth away from themiddle of theworld andmade it to a

merestandpointintheuniverse;

• the development of perspectival painting, i.e. the geometrical reconstruction of

naturalseeing:theseeminglynaturalimpressionintheperceptionofspaces,which

isimportantforsensoryorientation,wasthenproducedbycalculableillusions;

•theinventionofprintingenabledthedisseminationofknowledgeofallkind–in-

dependentofchanceriesandchurches,onanonymousmarkets,foranever-growing

audience: everyonewho learns to read (initially only very few) can expandhis or

herintellectualorientationasdesired,adlibitum;

29

•Protestantismincludingone’sownreligiousorientationbytheBible,whichevery-

onecouldreadinhisorherownlanguageinsteadofbowingdowntoecclesialdoc-

trines;

• the beginning capitalist organization of global trade, the economic orientation

guidedbymarkets;

• the political orientation to dominion as such, without any moral and religious

guidelines;

•themomentousinventionofgunpowderwithitsconsequencesformilitaryorien-

tation;

•thedesignofutopia,oflifeworldsandworldsoforientationasawhole,whichhave

ancientpredecessors,forinstanceinPlato,yetwerepresentedtentatively,playfully,

sometimessatiricallyasa‘non-place,’asdeliberate,thoughhardlypracticablealter-

nativestotheexistingworld;THOMASMORE(1478-1535),whoreinventedtheliter-

aryform,transferredhisvisionofthe“beststateofarepublic”toa“newisland.”

Thenewscientificknowledge isnowno longerbasedonessentialdetermina-

tions,asitwasinAristotle,butratheronmereobservationsandcalculations.Inex-

periments,onecombinesboth,whereverthisispossible.AsGALILEOGALILEI(1564-

1642)hasshown,observationsunderclearlydefinedcircumstances(i.e.underpur-

poseful exclusion of situational conditions) allow for accuratemeasurements and

mathematicalcalculations.Insteadofrelyingonreligiousandmetaphysicalassump-

tionsabouttheworldasawhole,onemethodicallyplacesone’srelianceuponown

selectionofparametersforexperimentsandconstruedphysicalvaluesinfunctional

dependencyfromeachother.Withthehelpoftheunambiguouslanguageofmathe-

matical symbols, limitedcertaintiesarecreated indemarcatedrespects,whichcan

alwaysbesupersededbynewtheoriesandnewexperiments.

8.AlternativeSecularizationsofPhilosophy:

Machiavelli,Bruno,Montaigne,Bacon,andHobbes

Philosophy participates in this huge reorientation with different, but spectacular

newapproaches.Philosophypansthespotlightinsweepingwaysuntilitfreshlyfo-

calizesandconsolidatesitselfinthemiddleofthe16thcentury.Allphilosophersthat

willbementionedinwhatfollowsbringnewexperiencesfromoutsidetheuniversi-

30

tiesalongwith themselves.Allof themare(moreor less)concernedwith thenew

confessionalconflictsintheirday.

NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI (1469-1527) revolutionizes the political orientation,

forcedbythehighlydynamicbalancesofpowerinItaly,wherethepopesalso,with-

outinhibition,actasworldlyrulers.Machiavelli,whooverdecadeshastorepresent

theinterestsoftheRepublicofFlorencewhichisoneofthestrongestandmostrisk-

takingrepublics,followsasrealisticallyaspossiblepolitics’own“law”infightingfor

thepreservationofdominion.MachiavellimakesthegovernanceoftheRepublicau-

tonomousinrelationtomoralityandreligion.NotonlyCesareBorgia,thesonofthe

Pope,but alsoMosesarehispointsof reference.Morality and religion themselves

turnintofunctionsofpolitics:onefollowsthemonlyinsofarasthey–ortheirpre-

tense–areusefulinthestruggleforpower.Rulersdonotshyawayfromlies,breach

ofpromise,cruelty,andthefearofit;whentheyavoidimmorality,thentheydoso

notformoral,butratherforpoliticalreasons.However,dominionisestablishedand

stabilizedmostsustainablythroughrespectfortheruled,fromwhateversourcethat

respectmayflow.Rulersaredependentoncareful,farseeingorientation:theymust

constantly reckon with situations that may threaten their existence, the more so

whentheyhaverecentlyacquiredrulership.Machiavellidistinguishesbetweensitu-

ationandorientationbymeansofthenotionsof fortuna, i.e. fortunatecoincidence,

and virtù, the ability to confidently master even the most difficult situations in

bravelytakingadvantageoftheopportunitiespresentingthemselves.

Personally,Machiavellistandsupforarepublicgovernedbyfreeandeffective

councils. Subsequently, the autonomy of the secular state authority, which he

demonstrated,isagainbasedondivine,natural,orrationallaw;therebythemodern

stateundertheruleoflawcomestothefore.Oncethestateoflawestablisheditself

inthecourseofthecenturies,suchrationales,whichalwaysremaindisputable,can

recedeagain.Thenpoliticsisentirelyreleasedtoitsautonomy.

GIORDANOBRUNO(1548-1600),whofirstwasamonk,butseveraltimesshifted

hisdenomination,gavelecturesatmanyEuropeanuniversitiesandcourtsandwas

expelledagainandagain.Hedirectlyattackstraditionalphilosophical thinkingand

ecclesialdoctrinesrestinguponit,andeventually,heisexecutedbytheRomanIn-

quisition. By contrast,MICHEL DEMONTAIGNE (1533-1592) –whowas raised a hu-

manist andbecameurbane through appointments andmany travels –manages to

accomplish intermittent peace during the fierce confessional wars in France. He

31

doessothroughpersonalencounterswiththeinvolvedkingsandthePope.This is

possiblesincehetakesupaskepticalstancetowardseverydogmaticphilosophyand

theology.Montaigne is the first “free spirit” inNietzsche’s sense. He unreservedly

faces the uncertainty of all knowledge and the insecurity of human existence, but

nonetheless,heshowshowonecansuccessfullyfindone’swayaroundintheworld

andfindfootinginit:throughorientationtooneself,toone’sownlifeexperiencein

allitsfacets(rightuptoMontaigne’storturingkidneystones).Heassureshimselfof

his orientation through Essais (attempts or experiments), whose literary form he

inventsespecially for thispurposeandwhichhe renewsconstantly. In contrast to

themedievalsummaeandtothelatersystems,essaysletthemindmeanderwithout

anypredefinedmethodorsystematicorderofthought.So,oneunbiasedlydiscovers

somethingnew,whichcanthenbedevelopedmethodicallyandorderedsystemati-

cally.Montaignelivedtheidealofasovereignpersonalorientation.

FRANCISBACON(1561-1626)madeit far inhispoliticalcareer:hebecamethe

LordChancelloroftheBritishCrownuntilhewasoverthrownbecauseofhiscontin-

uingaccumulationofdebtandaccusationsofbribery.Healsoresortedtotheliterary

formoftheessay,butparceleditin“aphorisms”thatcanberearrangedorextended

adhoc.Baconregardedthe fieldofscienceas fieldoforientation:anunfamiliarter-

rainthroughwhichonehastofindever-newwaysthatremainonlypreliminary.Ba-

con expressly assumed “the role of a guide” (indicis tantummodo persona) who

showsanew“way”(via)toscienceassuchandpromisesa“greatrenewalofthesci-

ences” (instauratiomagnascientiarum).Compared toAristotelian logicandanalyt-

ics, a “new tool” (novum organon) is needed. One no longer needs to deduce

knowledgeinascholasticmannerandthereby‘anticipate’theresultsoftheexplora-

tionbutratherfollowthecomplexityofnatureitself–Baconspeaksofits“subtlety”

(subtilitas).This shallbedone “empirically”and “inductively” ina tentative “inter-

pretation,”whichgeneralizesobservationscarefullyandprogressively,andrevises

itsgeneralizationsagainandagaininregardtodeviatingcases.Generalizationscan

havedifferentdegreesofcertainty.Thismeansthatoneonlyhasveritable“clues”or

“indications”(indiciavera)aspointsofdepartureforone’sinterpretationofnature.

This procedure can be hampered not only by conventional concepts, but also by

mathematical calculations, while diverse approaches can support it. Through this

cautiouslyandcircumspectlyorientingmethod,aswecall it,sciencecan,according

toBacon,gainrealpowerovernature(“knowledgeispower”)andcanhelptograd-

32

uallyimprovehumanlivingconditions.Moreover,natureisdefeatedbyobeyingna-

ture(naturaparendovincitur).

However,asorientation,thismethodhas,accordingtoBacon,alsoitslimitsin

theminditself:(1)theIdolsoftheTribe,i.e.logicalfallacieswhichareduetothena-

tureoftheintellectandthesensesofthehumanbeingpreferringincorrectconclu-

sions; (2) the Idolsof theCave, i.e. thestateofeverysinglehumanbeing including

individualpassionsandideologies;(3)theIdolsoftheMarketplace,i.e.thelinguistic

possibilities andproblemsof a society that canusewords tomislead; and (4) the

Idols of the Theater, i.e. the philosophical and scientific presuppositions of an era

that are held onto like dogmas.Humanorientationmust always be aware of such

constraintsandconstantlyworkagainsttheminordertoconqueritsleewayforre-

vealingthegivensofnatureandmakingthemeffectiveforone’sownuse.Baconis

thefirsttoseethatbothscientificandeverydayorientationtakesplaceinleeways,in

whichevernewvitalfootholds(signaturasatqueimpressiones)areobserved.Scien-

tifictheoriesandsystemscanthenconnecttothesefootholds.

THOMASHOBBES (1588-1679) came fromamodestbackground.He livedasa

hometutorinaleadingEnglishnoblefamily,andhencehadthepossibilitytotravel

extensively.Onsomeof these tripshegot toknow,amongothers,GalileiandDes-

cartes.TemporarilyhehadtofleetoFranceinordertoescapepersecutionsbecause

ofhiswritings;however,heenjoyedtheprotectionoftheBritishCrown.Histhought

was influenced by the severewars of his day.He combines the sober impulses of

particularlyMachiavelliandBacon(whosesecretaryhewasforashorttime)inde-

signing the first comprehensive philosophical system of modernity (Elementa

Philosophiae),whichhemodelsonEuclid’sworkonthefoundationofgeometry,the

Elements (Greek: Stoicheîa, Latin:Elementa). In hisElementa Philosophiae,Hobbes

rebuildsphilosophy from logic through toreligion,now inaharshandrealistic,of

hiscriticsso-called‘materialist’spirit.

Concerningcognitionandconcepts,headjoinsnominalism,whichisleastde-

mandingintermsofpremises;concerningthedeterminationofthehumanbeing,he

assumes simple self-preservation. Concerning ethics, Hobbes dismisses the belief

thatoneactsforthesakeofthegooditself;onedoesnotdesiresomethingbecauseit

is good, as Socrates has postulated, but rather something appears to be good be-

causeonedesiresit.Thus,Hobbesreversestheclassicmoralorientation.Inhisrealis-

tic view, humanbeings arenot goodbynature, but are rather (moreor less) in a

33

permanentwarofallagainstall(bellumomniumcontraomnes).Forthesakeoftheir

safety,theyaffirmabsoluterule.Here,however,Hobbesengageswiththeeuphemis-

ticfictionthathumanbeingsvolunteertoenteracontract(“Covenant”)thatisbind-

ingforeveryoneapartfromtheruler.Lateronehastimeandagaingratefullydrawn

onthisfiction,whileHobbesmarkeditasafiction:“Covenants,withouttheSword,

arebutWords.”Thismeans:thephilosophyoflawandofthestatecannotgetalong

withoutfictions.

Thephilosophyoforientationappreciates the senseof reality that thephiloso-

phersattheoutsetofmodernitydemonstrateforthesakeofclarity:theygloss

over nothing. Preeminent footholds are NiccolòMachiavelli’s disturbing expo-

sureofthehardcoreofpoliticalthinking,ThomasHobbes’paradoxicalthought

to safeguard freedom through the submission under an absolute rule, Francis

Bacon’s attempt to develop an orienting method of research that is always

awareofitscontingenciesinthesciences,andMicheldeMontaigne’ssovereign

personalorientationwhich isskepticalagainstallgeneralguidelinesandfinds

stabilityinitself.Fromhere,basicsoforientationarerevealed,forinstancethe

distinctionbetweensituationandorientation(Machiavelli’s fortunaandvirtù),

meandering thinkingas preparing regulative thought (Montaigne’s Essai), the

limitation of orientation through leeways, which can be expanded within lee-

ways again (Bacon’s Idola), and the necessity of fictions for societal issues

(Hobbes’socialcontract).

9.AlternativeFoundationsoftheSelf-ReferentialOrientation

inSubstances:Descartes,Spinoza,Leibniz

In the 17th century, the so-called ‘rationalism’ ofmodernity takes shape in closely

connected leading orientation decisions. Nations still have little significance; even

thoughonebegins topublishmoreandmore innational languages,Latin remains

thecommonlanguage.TheNetherlands,whichenduredferociousfightsforfreedom,

offeredaplaceofrefugewithahigh,thoughnotunlimiteddegreeoffreedomofreli-

gionandofthought.TheCatholicFrenchmanRENÉDESCARTES(1596-1650), theSe-

phardicJewBARUCHDESPINOZA(1632-1677),whosefamilyfledfromPortugaltothe

34

Netherlands,andtheProtestantGermanGOTTFRIEDWILHELMLEIBNIZ(1646-1716)all

livedalone,remainedunmarried,didnotteachatuniversities(justasBlaisePascal,

sec.10),toacertainextentundertookdiplomatictasks,andpaidfortheirlivingei-

therofprivatemeans(Descartes),throughskilledmanualwork(Spinoza,whowas

bannedbytheAmsterdamJewishcommunitybecauseofhiswritings,grindedlenses

forthenewtelescopes),orthroughemploymentatroyalcourts(Leibniz).However,

allof thembuiltuptightnetworkswithotherscholars,which isreflected inarich

exchange of letters. Leibniz visited Spinoza personally in order to hear his un-

publishedthoughtsandfelttheywere“paradoxical.”

DESCARTES,whose familybelonged to thenobilityofoffice, enjoyedanexcel-

lent school education at a prestigious Jesuit college. Initially, he led the life of a

young nobleman in Paris society, participated then in the Thirty Years’War as a

commissioned officer, traveled extensively through Europe, but then, after having

got toknowtheworld,withdrew into theNetherlands inorder todirecthis study

inward:“tostudywithinmyselfaswell”(étudieraussienmoi-même).IntheNether-

lands,too,helivedinhiding,warnedbytheprocessoftheInquisitionagainstGalileo

Galilei (1633). In view of the controversialness of all questions of faith and

knowledge, he wanted to put science on a radically new and unwavering ground

(fundamentum inconcussum). This was preceded by experiences of disorientation

andreorientation,whichshockedandunsettledhimtothecore.

In order to illuminate these experiences, he created multiple new literary

formsofwriting:first,thenarrativeofasequenceofthreedreamsthathedatedpre-

ciselyonNovember10,1619,andlocatedthematamilitarycampnearUlmatthe

Danube.Hedreamtthefollowing:Onthestreet,heisseizedbyawhirlwindoraver-

tigo,isalwaysafraidtofall,wantstoescapeinacollegewhosemembershecansee

standingfirmlyontheground;hethinksheispersecutedbythedevil,istheninhis

roomhauntedbythunderandsparksoffirethatheseekstoexplainwiththehelpof

availablescience,yetwithoutsuccess; finally, inabookofpoetry,hecomesacross

thequestionoforientationparexcellence:“WhichwayoflifewillIfollow?(Quodvi-

taesectaboriter)?”Inthisquestion,causedbyhis“heatedbrain,”the“spiritoftruth”

seemstoappeartohim,forwhichhethinkshehastothankGodalone.

Decades of widely spread research on physics, astronomy, physiology, psy-

chology,andmathematicsensue;amongotherthings,Descartesdevelopedtheana-

lytic geometry. About all this he reports in hisDiscourse on theMethod of Rightly

35

ConductingOne’sReasonandof Seeking theTruth in the Sciences.He calls thisdis-

courseastory(histoire)or fairy tale(fable). Introductorily,he tellsofhispersonal

waytoamethod,whichhehastriedouteffectivelyandwhichherecommendsasthe

foundation of a newuniversal science.WithMethods, human orientation becomes

autonomous fromspecificknowledgeand fromconcretesituations; itgives itselfa

specific direction that others in different situations can follow; it chooses its own

way.Descarteselucidatesthisthroughatraveler’sexperienceoforientation:having

losthiswayintheforestandwanderingarounddesperately,hedoesthebestinor-

dertoorienthimselfifhewalksstraightaheadinwhateverdirection;inthisway,he

will comeoutof thewoods sometimeand regainanoverview inopen country.At

that time, “forests” designated also loose collections of things to know;Bacon, for

instance,hadpresentedaworkentitledSylvaSylvarum.

Gaininganoverview in themidst of a confusing situation is another essential

feature of orientation. This is, as Descartes emphasizes, not inherent in reason as

such,aseveryoneobviouslygoes“differentways”(diversesvoies)withit.Therefore,

humanreasonneedsinstructionsforitsproperuse.Descartesinstructshisreaders

todivideandcompartmentalizecomplex,difficult,andthusinsolubleproblemsinto

somesurveyableandcompletelyevidentconnectionsuntiltheproblemsseemeasily

solvable,and thenrecombine theevidentconnectionsaccording toclearandcom-

prehensibleruleswhichonechoosesfreely.

Thisisthemethodofsurveyablerepresentation(übersichtlicheDarstellung),as

Wittgenstein latercalls it.Thereby,Descartesargues, intuitionsofrightandwrong

alsoplayarole;eveniftheymaybeerroneous,theycannotbequestionedanymore;

the philosophy of orientation calls them plausibility standards. According to Des-

cartes, the final criterion is the ease (facilité) of understanding. Thus, orientation

precedestruth.Descartesrevolutionizesphilosophybyrecommendingtofollowthe

“orderofone’sowndeliberations(ordredesraisons)”andbyrenouncingtosayany-

thingaboutthe“orderofthingsthemselves(ordredeschoses).”

In hisDiscours, Descartes designs related rules for the leading of one’s life,

whichhecalls“preliminary lifeorientation(moraleparprovision).”Whereonecan-

notidentifythetruestopinions(lesplusvraiesopinions),itisbesttofollowthemost

probableones(lesplusprobables)thathavestoodthetestoftime.Iftheycannotbe

identifiedwithsufficientclarity,oneshouldtakedecisionsdependingonhowfarthe

opinionsorattitudesinquestioncanbeappliedtopractice,andthenclingtothem,

36

followthemwithresoluteness.Onthewhole,oneshouldrathertrytoovercomeone-

selfthanfate(fortune),ratherchangeone’sownwishesthantheorderoftheworld

(l'ordredumonde).Whereverpossible,oneshouldmakeavirtueofnecessity(faire

denécessitévertu).Infact,weusetodosoineverydayorientation.

Thebasicprecondition for this is “toprovideacomprehensiveview(unere-

vue)ofthediverseactivitiesofthehumanbeinginthislife,inordertotrytomake

thebestchoice.”Firstandforemost,anorientationarisesfromtheoverviewofother

orientations:thismakesone’sownorientationdecisionseasier.

IntheMeditationesdeprimaphilosophia,DescartesdeepenshisDiscours toa

“FirstPhilosophy,”agroundworkofphilosophyingeneral,nolongerinFrenchfora

broadaudience,butinLatinforthephilosophicalexpertaudience.Hegiveshismed-

itationstheformofspiritualexercisesashegotthemtoknowattheJesuitcollege:

theroutineofconsequentlypressingforwardtoone’sinnermostinteriorityinorder

topurifyoneselfbeforeGodfromone’ssinful incentives.DescartesappliestheAu-

gustinianmodeltoscientificthinking,tracksdownallthatisdubiousinordertoun-

cover the indubitable.Hewants to, as hewrites, once in a lifetime (semel in vita)

turneverythingonitshead(evertere)fromthegroundup(funditus),inordertosta-

bilizethesciencesinsomethingfirmandabiding(firmumetmansurumstabilire).

Here, however, he sees himself slide down an abyssal vortex (in profundum

gurgitemeximprovisodelapsus);theexperienceofdisorientationincreases,heloses

thegroundunterhis feet,canno longersupporthimselfanywhereandmustwork

hardtoswimoutofthevortex(enîti).Thenewfootholdisthemereself-relationof

thinking,which cannotdoubt that it doubts –whichmeans that thinkingdoesnot

acceptanythingastruebesidesdoubtingitself.Theself-relationinthe“Ithink,Iam”

(egocogito,egosum)cutsoffeveryexternalrelation.Beingonone’sownisthestart-

ing point of so-called ‘rationalism.’ Descartes emphasizes that this self-relation of

thinking is always a temporal process: thereby orientation as awhole is put on a

temporalcertainty.

Methodically, Descartes turns this first temporal certainty of the pure self-

relationofthinkingintothegoldstandardofallfurthercertainties:everythingthat

istobeconsideredastruemustbecomparedwiththisprimarycertainty.However,

atthesametime,theAristoteliansubstancemetaphysicsremainsplausiblebeyond

questionforDescartes.Hence,inhiseyes,atemporalprocessmustbeanaccidental

quality of a firm substance, and self-referential thinking must exist as a thinking

37

substance (res cogitans). And since the process of thinking cannot be bodily and

physically extended, corporeality must be excluded from it. A separate extended

substance (res extensa) is opposed to the thinking substance. Thereby, Descartes

establishes a dualism of ‘reason versus nature’ and of ‘soul versus body’ allowing

himtodemonstratetheimmortalityofthesoul,theexistenceofGodandtherefrom

alsotheexistenceofbodilybeings.Yet,atthesametimethisdualismsplitshuman

orientation insuchaway that it for centurieshasdifficulties inunitingbothparts

andlosestheorientationaboutitself.

Finally,Descartesputsthesedeliberationsintotheliteraryformofatreatise,

thePrincipia philosophiae. Here the empirical judgment ego cogito, ego sum turns

into a syllogism connecting the cogitoand the sumwith ergo: “I think, therefore I

am” (cogito ergo sum). SPINOZA thenbegins to consequently construe thePrincipia

philosophiae deductively according to themethodofmathematics (moregeometri-

co),againalongthelinesofEuclid’sgeometry.Thereinallbasicprinciplesoforienta-

tionseemtovanishbecauseamathematicaldeductionexcludesallindividualpoints

of view and standpoints. However, Spinozawants to exclude allmerewishes and

specialpurposes fromphilosophical thinking, i.e. stopallwishful thinking.Theas-

sumptionofanabsolutefreedomofthewilliswishfulthinking,too,forhim.

However,theCartesianself-relationremains.SPINOZAtranslocatesittonature

assuch–orGod.TheAristoteliannotionofsubstanceandDescartes’ownconcep-

tionforcehimtodoso:toacceptonlyonesubstance.ForDescartes,thethinkingand

theextendedsubstancesareindependentofeachother,butbothofthemare‘finite

substances’and,assuch,dependentonthe ‘infinitesubstance’that isGodwhohas

creatednatureasawholeandpreservesall things intheirbeing.Yet,accordingto

theAristotelianconceptofsubstance,substancesmustbeindependententities,and

thatiswhy‘finitesubstances’becomeparadoxicalintheirdependencyonGod.Seen

from the Judeo-Christianpoint of view, the res cogitansand the res extensaare at

once substances and not substances, and there remains only one real substance,

which is God or nature (deus sive natura). Since everything depends on this sub-

stance,philosophymustbeginwithit.

However,theassumptionthatthereisonlyonesinglesubstanceisparadoxi-

calaswell,forthereremainsnothingfromwhichitcanbeindependent.Therefore,

this stand-alone substancemustbe the causeof itself (causa sui), andasnot even

time can precede it, God’s creation of theworldmust not be a temporal process.

38

However,ifGodiscoinstantaneouswithhiscreationandthecausecoincideswithits

effect,Godcannotbediscernedfromhiscreation,butisratheridenticalwithit:God

ornature.ThenonecanbythesametokensaythatGodiseverything(pantheism)

andthatheisnotatall(atheism).Godbecomesconfusinglyparadoxical,too,which

hastriggeredpassionatedebatesthat finallyhave ledtothephilosophyoforienta-

tion.

InthenotionofthecausasuiwithwhichSpinozabeginshisEthica,thedistinc-

tionbetweencauseandeffect isshort-circuited:whenbothsidescoincide, thedis-

tinctioneitherhasnothingtodifferentiatebetween,oreverythinginnaturecanbe

regardedasbothacause(naturanaturans)andaneffect(naturanaturata).Thereis

muchtobesaidforthis.Thelogicalfigureoftheparadox,whichSpinozauseswith-

outdesignatingitassuch,hereleadsbeyondthemechanisticunderstandingofna-

turethatprevaileduntiltheendofthe19thcentury:ifGodisindiscerniblefromna-

turecreatedbyhim,thennatureis justas incomprehensibleasGod.Toreachade-

quateknowledge is themeasureofallcognition,buthumanbeingsarenotable to

achieveit.

Ifthebodyandthespiritarenotindependentsubstances,accordingtotheAr-

istotelian model, they must be attributes (attributa) of the one divine substance;

theyareourperspectives(subspecie)onit;aninfinitenumberofattributesorper-

spectivesispossible.Infact,thebody-soul-oppositionisonlyaperspectivalcontrast,

andSpinoza initiatesperspectivism.Asaconsequence, individualsaremodi,varie-

tiesoftheattributesandtherebypartsofthewholenature.Forthesakeoftheirown

self-preservation,theymustbeinterestedinoverlookingnatureasawhole,sothat

theyareabletoconductthemselvessuccessfullyandpersistinit(conatusinsuoesse

perseverandi).However,modi of thewhole can survey thewholeonly to a limited

extent.AccordingtoSpinoza,thisfindsexpressioninemotions(affectus)directedto

somethingthateithersupportsone’sownself-preservation(thentheemotionsare

pleasant)orimpairsit(thentheemotionsareunpleasant).Inordertoactrationally,

whichheremeansprudentandconsiderate,itisinone’sowninteresttolearntoex-

plainnegativeemotionsandtherebydissolvethem.

Hence,Spinoza’smetaphysicsoftheoneandonlysubstanceresultsinthefol-

lowingethicalconsequence:ifitisGodwhoaffectshimselfinallpartsofnature,he

turnsallpartsandthusinprinciplealsoallhumanbeingstoeachotherwithoutres-

ervation.Hobbes’homohominilupus(manisawolftoman)turnsintohomohomini

39

deus(thehumanbeingisGodtothehumanbeing).Theparadoxofthecausasuiin-

ferred from Descartes’ Principia ultimately leads to the paradox of God’s rational

love tohimself (amorDei intellectualis): ifweconsider thingsrationally,wecan in

actual factonly loveeachotheras jointpartsofnatureandthusofGod; for inthis

love,Godloveshimself.Justastheconceptof‘cause,’Spinozaalsotracestheconcept

of‘love’backtoitself.Inhissystem,freedombecomesparadoxical,too,becauseitis,

as freedom from affects, insight in (divine) necessity. In the final analysis, human

conceptsandnormsofgoodandevilareinadequate.Spinoza’scontemporariesde-

scribedhimassomeonewhoactuallylivedinthisspirit.

LEIBNIZ,sonandgrandsonofprofessors,polymath, inventorof (amongother

things)acombinatorics,of infinitesimalcalculus(probablyinventedindependently

ofNewton)andacalculatingmachine,whooccasionallyworksasadiplomatonhis

own initiative, philosophizes only on the side, but also rigorously.He pursues the

way begun byDescartes and Spinoza and introduces the notions of ‘perspectives’

andof‘standpoints’intophilosophy.

LEIBNIZ abolishes the substantiality of the res extensa: since all corporeal

things are divisible, they cannot be substance. However,withDescartes, hemain-

tains thesubstantialityof thenon-corporeal substances.However, likeSpinoza,he

regards themnot as effectsof thedivine substance, butbrings them into apurely

logicalrelationto the latter.Heunderstandsthedivinesubstanceas thesubjectof

allpossiblepredicatesandthusofallpossibledeterminationsoftheworld(concep-

tusprimitivus,notioprimitiva),whichare limitedineachofthenon-corporealsub-

stancesinanindividualway.Theselimitedindividualsubstances(monades)are,in

thisway,mirrors (miroirs) of theuniverse (univers) orperspectives (perspectives)

on it, each takingadifferent standpoint (pointde vue).Eachmonadexpresses, ac-

cordingtoLeibniz,theuniverseinanindividualmanner(exprimerl‘Univers).

Hence, Leibniz no longer understands the substances through thinking (as

Descartes did), but more comprehensively as observations of the world (percep-

tions),whichmostoftenremainunreflectedorunconscious(petitesperceptions)and

only in special cases proceed reflectively or consciously (apperceptions). Leibniz’s

notionofobservation turns theoppositionbetweenperceivingand thinking intoa

merelygradualdifference.Asaresult,theworldconsistsofobservationsobserving

eachother: it is auniversal systemof observation inwhich the substancesbecome

40

merehubsofrelations.Thereby,spaceandtimearenothingbutorderparametersof

theobservations.

InLeibniz’ construction, themonadsdonotobserveeachother immediately

becausetheycannottranscendtheirrespectiveperspectivesandare,inthisregard,

“windowless,” that is,mere self-relation. Their self-relation, however, is not (as in

Descartes) the immediate self-relation of thinking, but includes a broadly deter-

minedrelationtotheother,astheself-relationrunsviathedivinesubstance(asin

Spinoza).Thisunityofself-relationandrelationtotheotherispossiblebecause,ac-

cordingtoLeibniz,thedivinesubstanceunitesallmonadsorperspectivesinitselfas

the “centralmonad”; ithas from thevery startdetermined thealgorithmsof their

interactionsandcommunicationsinapre-establishedharmony.

Hence, God is the perfect observerwho encompasses all observations of all

perspectives.Hehasalwaysalreadyaperfectoverviewoftheworld,andforhim,eve-

rythingfollowstheprincipleofsufficientreason.Hazards,surprises,reorientations,

anddistinctionsofgoodandevilexistonlyifseenfromlimitedperspectivesandlim-

itedstandpointswithinthelimitedsystemsofobservation.

TheoptimismencouragedbyLeibniz’s rationalisticdesignhas firstbeenad-

miredandthenbeenderided.Thisoptimismstandsandfallswiththemetaphysical

assumptionofaGodgivingussecurityineverything.Leibniz’designdisplaysaper-

spectivismoforientation,whichiscarriedoutwithlogicalcalculus–butwithoutthe

risksoforientation.

The philosophy of orientation does not seem to comply with the fundamental

featureof the rationalistic tradition in thephilosophyofmodernityand its in-

sistence onultimate, logically justified certainties. In fact, inDescartes it finds

the impressive description of profound experiences of disorientation and the

consequentreorientation fromtruth toaneligiblemethodof itsowncertainty

and itsownplausibility standards, that is,a radical changeover toorientation

decisions. In Spinoza, the philosophy of orientation finds the potential to gain

newreligious,philosophical,andscientificpossibilitiesofthinkingandacting–

bymakingparadoxicalthehithertostrongestfootholdofEuropeanphilosophy,

namelysubstancemetaphysics.InLeibniz,thephilosophyoforientationfindsa

logicallyandsystematicallyimplementedperspectivismonthebasisofbothself-

relatedandother-relatedobservations.

41

10.AlternativeCertainties:Pascal

WithBLAISEPASCAL(1623-1662),Augustine’sabsolutecertaintyoffaithreturnedin

earlymodernity. He questioned the new orientations ofMontaigne and Descartes

anew–andtherebyunveiledevendeeperconditionsoforientation.

Pascalhadallrequirementsforthis:healsobelongedtoahighlyrespected

familyintheserviceoftheKing,hisfathereducatedhimfollowingMontaigne’shu-

manisticprogram(nomathematics).Nonetheless,Pascalbecameabrilliantmathe-

maticianandexperimentalphysicist.Hedevelopedamongotherthingsacalculusof

probabilities(géométrieduhasard),andheshonebrightlyasadisputatiousauthor.

Asayoungman,hebecameso famous thatDescarteswent to seehimpersonally.

Forsomeyears,helikewiseplungedintothelifeofaParisian.Butthroughouthislife

hewastormentedbysomekindofparalysisandseverepain.Finally,hewithdrew

intoamonasteryasahermitor“solitary”(solitaire)andsubmittedhimselftostrict

penances. InFrance, thekingstillpursuedanausterepoliticsofreligionunderthe

influenceoftheJesuits.ThetreatisebytheFlemishbishopCorneliusJansen(1585-

1638)aboutAugustine,whichinflamedanewmovementofreformationwithinthe

Catholic Church andwhich also ignited Pascal’s religious consciousness,was soon

putontheindex.

AccordingtohisMemorial,datedfromthenightbetweenNovember23and

24,1654,PascalexperiencedasecondconversiontoGod,the“GodofAbraham,God

ofIsaac,GodofJacob,notofphilosophersandscholars.”HediscardsproofsofGod’s

existence:onecannotteachreligion,butonlymakeitvenerableandamiableagain.

Inhisperson,Pascalunitesthelargerangeofmathematical-scientific,religious,and

philosophical thought. He combines themethodical-mathematical certainty on the

onehandwiththeresolutecertaintyoffaith(certitude)ontheother,andin-between

them,heopensupnewphilosophicalhorizonsforthatwhichwetodaycallorienta-

tion,includinglifeorientation.

Pascalmakesuseofseveralgenresofwriting:thetreatise,theessay,and–to

greatsuccess–alsothe(fictive)letter.Lateron,andmoreorlessunintentionally,he

findstheformthatismostsuitableforhisthinking:notesorfragmentsofdifferent

length.SystemthinkingneitherdoesjusticetoGod’sworld,heassumes;confronted

42

to it, everyordersplinters.Pascalnotes individual thoughts (pensées) like random

ideas–asmerefootholdsforhimandhisreaders.Therebyheforceshisreadersto

orientthemselvesontheirown.

InhisPensées,Pascalspeaksasan“I”withoutpresupposingitsunity.Asan“I”

reflectinguponitself,itisself-referentialandexists.However,inPascal’sview,Des-

cartes’doubtsareonlythoughtup:nohumanbeingcanreallydoubtwhetherheor

sheexists.The“I” takescenterstage,as if ithada firmposition.Buttherebyitbe-

comesanuisance forothers,wants tosubjugate them, isunfair in itself (injusteen

soi)andhateable (haïssable). It isneitherpure thinkingnora fundamentum incon-

cussum,butonly,aswecallit,astandpointoforientation.

However, one can doubt logical contradictions: “Diverse secure things have

beencontradicted–diversefalsethingsareacceptedwithoutopposition.”Therules

ofmathematics(whichnooneatthattimeknewbetterthanPascal)are,intheend,

onlyroutines thathavedevelopedaccidentallyandtowhichonecould imagineal-

ternatives.Reasonadjuststoeverything,getsalongwitheverythingandfollowsthe

respectiveneeds(laraisonétantflexibleàtout).Thehumanbeingisathinkingwa-

ter reed (roseau pensant); and yet, human dignity (dignité) lies entirely in human

thought(pensée)andconstituteshumangreatness(grandeur).

Disorientationdeepens:itnotonlyconcernsthehumanknowledgeaboutthe

world, but also the human position in the world: the human being is a monster

(monstre), a chaos (chaos), something self-contradictory (sujet de contradiction), a

sewerofuncertaintyanderror;andyet,thehumanbeingjudgesallthings(jugede

touteschoses), isthegloryandscumoftheuniverse(gloireetrebutde l’Univers),a

paradoxforhim-orherself(paradoxeàvous-même).

Macro-andmicrophysically,thehumanbeingisplacedastheintangiblemid-

dle between two infinities: the infinite largeness of the universe on the one hand,

andtheinfinitesmallnessofitselementsontheother;thehumanbeinglooksinan

abyss(abîme)onbothsides.Theworldthatcanbeobservedscientificallyisaninfi-

nitesphere(sphèreinfinie)whosecenter(centre)iseverywhereandwhoseperiph-

ery(circonférence)isnowhere.Thehumanbeinggoesastrayinit(égaré),isanoth-

ing(unnéant)comparedtotheinfinite(l'infini),butanall(untout)comparedtothe

void, sort of in-between nothing and everything, infinitely far away from compre-

hending theextremes (comprendre les extrêmes). In termsof cognition,wehuman

beings drive on a vastmilieu (voguons sur unmilieu vaste), having neither secure

43

knowledgenorbeingcompletelyunknowing.Humanbeingsarealwaysinsecureand

wavering (incertains et flottants), pushed fromone end to the other (poussés d'un

boutversl'autre).Everyfoothold(terme,appui)whichwetrytoholdonto(attach-

er) andmake firm (affermir) fluctuates and withdraws from us (il branle et nous

quitte), and when we pursue it, it escapes our grasp (prises), slips away from us

(nousglisse) and flees in aneternal flight (fuite éternelle).Nothing stands still and

staysforus(Riennes'arrêtepournous).

Like no other, Pascal describes the basic situation of human orientation. He

concludesthatthepointcannotbetoseekassurance(assurance)andfirmness(fer-

meté).Heresolutelyshiftsfromcertaintytouncertainty:onehastoworkfortheun-

certain,goacrossthesea,rideonaboard(travaillerpourl'incertain;allersurlamer;

passersuruneplanche).Andhumanbeingsaretunedtothis:inalltheirmisery(tout

le malheur), they search for repose (repos), which, however, soon again becomes

unbearableforthem,sothattheyfallbackintorestlessness.

And yet, even in this abysmal disorientation, orientation is still possible – if

onebethinks of its scope (portée: the scopeof thrownobjects) in everyday life as

wellasinscience.Justasapointofacertainsizeseemsindivisibletothesenses,so

we dowe produce principles (principes) that appear as final ones to our intellect

without really being what they seem to be. Involuntarily, we draw horizon lines

whereourthinkingends;Pascalcallstheorientationthatcreatessuchlinesafeeling

(sentiment) and locates this feeling in the heart (coeur). He outlines a logic of the

heart (logiqueducoeur)as thebasisofhumanorientation.According to this logic,

we decide which principles and certainties we adopt in a given situation. These

principles can be felt, Pascal says, and from those principleswe have adoptedwe

deducetheorems(Lesprincipessesentent,lespropositionsseconcluent).

Theabilitytodisposeofprinciplesconstitutesthespirit(esprit).Accordingto

Pascal,whose experience extends further than anyone else’s in thesematters, the

spirit shows itself in threedegrees: initially as the “spirit of accuracyand correct-

ness”(espritdejustesse),whenitisabouttheuseoffamiliarprinciples;thenasthe

“spiritofgeometry”(espritdegéométrie)whenprinciplesneedtobeselectedspecif-

ically,whichdemandsalreadyacertainamplitudeofthespirit(amplituded'esprit);

andfinally,inthe“spiritoffinenessandsubtlety”(espritdefinesse),whenprinciples

firstofallneedtobefound.AsPascalventilatesinmanynotes,thisespritdefinesse,

whichcomprisestheskillsandvirtuesoforientation,isreliantonaconvenientenvi-

44

ronment,anappropriatepaceinobservingandthinking,afavorabledistancetothe

object,andasuitableperspective.Thesubtlespiritconsidersalternativetruthsnext

toeverytruththatitbelievestohavefound.Itmistrustsfictions,butreckonswithits

ownweakness(faiblesse).Itisexposedtodesires(concupiscence),whichmayleadto

correspondingphilosophies. It follows styles of cultureswithout being able to say

clearlywhattheyconsistin.Itorientsitselfwiththecommonsensewithoutrelying

onit.Itcannotbetiedtoaspecificprofession.

Just as Augustine before him, Pascal dares to look that far down into the

abyssesofhumanorientationbecausehestilloranewseesfaithinGodasgranting

thehumanbeing’struefelicity(vraiefélicité).However,inregardtoGod,too,weon-

lyhaveasign(marque)oranemptytrace(tracetoutevide)whichcouldbewilledby

Godhimselfinordertoengagehumanbeingstodecideinfavorofhim.Reasoncan-

not take this decision; reason can only prepare it by detaching the human being

fromhabitualwaysofthinkingwiththehelpofdoubts.Theforceofreason(force)is

abletodecidewhattodoubtandwhattotrust.Pascaldoesnolongeraimtoprove

God’sexistence.Rather,hewantstoshowthatitisarationaldecisiontosurrender

toreligion.Heregardsthisdecisionasabet,asagame(jeu)withhappenstanceand

hazard(hasard)thatonecanonlywindespitealluncertainty(incertitude):youcan

gaineternalbliss(béatitude)butcannotloseanythingapartfromthepresentmiser-

ablelife.Yet, inPascal’sview,everyonemustbeinterestedineternalbliss–this is

hisultimatecertainty.

Thephilosophyoforientation isconfrontedwith thedeepestabyssesofhuman

disorientation when encountering the mathematician, physicist, philosopher,

andstaunchChristianPascal.Pascalportraysthesituation,withwhichhuman

orientationhastocope,inthewidesthorizonand,atthesametime,verydense-

ly: the humanbeing’s intangible position in the cosmos; the “I” that is not the

firmsubjectofself-referentialthinking,butamerestandpointoforientation;in-

steadofanythingfirm,fluctuatingfootholdsandelusivehorizons;humanthink-

ingthatisinfinitelyflexible;mathematicallogicthatseemstoprovideultimate

certainty as well-practiced routine; the necessity of deciding between always

preliminary certainties; andmanifold conditions that facilitate or compromise

this.Thephilosophyoforientationcouldnearlyhavebeenwrittenasacommen-

taryonPascal.

45

11.AlternativeConceptualizationsofLawfulness:

Locke,Berkeley,Hume,andKant

InthetimeoftheEnlightenment,thesometimesstillprofoundreligiouspietybitby

bitgavewaytoapurelyrationalfaithina“Godofphilosophers”(Pascal)andfinally,

forsomepeople,tosheerdisbelief.Togetherwiththeamplesupernatural foothold

ofhumanorientation,theconjectureofaGod-grantedlawfulnessoftheworldbegan

tototter.Lawfulnessthenrequiredconfirmationbymeansofnewevidence.

Therapidlydevelopingnaturalsciencesofferedthemselvesasnewevidence,still

underthenameof‘philosophyofnature’;inmanyrespectstheywereirreconcilable

with thebiblical assertions.Thenewevidencebecame spectacular and irrefutable

with ISAACNEWTON (1642-1726/27). In hisPhilosophiae naturalis principiamathe-

matica(1687),hebasestheunderstandingofnatureonmathematicalprinciples,but

expressly dispenseswithmetaphysical presuppositions (hypotheses non fingo). In-

stead,heinsistsonexperimentalempiricalevidence.Inthisway,hecanconsistently

explainprocessesonearthandintheuniversethroughcommonlaws,especiallythe

lawsofmotionandthelawofgravitation.

WhileNewton,whowasquitedevout,stillsurroundshisdiscoverieswiththeo-

logical,butalsowithalchemicalandmagicalspeculations,whichhe,however,keeps

secret,thenewlawfulnessestablishesitselfasadescriptionofpurposelessregulari-

ties,whichmanifestthemselvesinexperimentsandcanbeusedinordertopredict

natural processes. As there are only minor and controllable deviations from this

lawfulness, it seems absolutely reliable to a hitherto unknowndegree of scientific

certainty.Thenatural lawsand the forces thatworkaccording to themcan justas

littlebeobserveddirectlyasParmenides’ ‘being’could;butnow,theyseemtocon-

stitutetherealbeingofallthings.Their ‘discovery’(nottheirconstruction)iscele-

bratedasthenewtriumphofreason,whichisequallyavailabletoeveryoneandap-

plied methodically to experience. Thereby, modernity creates – in Hans Blumen-

berg’swords–anew‘legitimacy’againsttheoldreligiousone.Theneedforanulti-

mate,unconditionalfootholdforhumanorientationisfulfilledinanew,purposeless

way:theforcesandthelawsaccordingwithwhichtheyworkareindifferenttoward

thehumanbeing,eventhoughtheycanbeutilizedmeaningfully.Hence,humanbe-

46

ingsfindthemselvesinanakedandcolduniversewithoutpurposeandhavetoori-

entthemselvesafresh.

Philosopherscanrelatetothisnewlawfulnessinalternativeways.However,at

the same time, national traditions develop in philosophy, especially an English,

French,andGermanone. Indifferent languagesandcultures,onethinks incharac-

teristicvariations;andexactly in theevaluationof theunconditional lawfulnessof

nature, the situatedness (Situativität) of philosophical orientation appears. In the

EnglandofWilliamofOccam,FrancisBacon,andThomasHobbes,butnowalsoof

Isaac Newton, the traditional skepticism against realism and abstractions persist,

andthusalsoagainstlawsofnatureassuminganindependentreality.Themostim-

portant French and German philosophers, however, still trust in the hold on con-

cepts,constructions,andsystemsbuiltofconcepts.

JOHNLOCKE(1632-1704),whoinitiallywasaFellowatChristChurchCollegein

Oxford,butthenlefttheuniversityinordertobecomethepersonaldoctorandadvi-

sorofaleading,yetalsothreatenedpolitician.Thisearnedhimalotofpoliticaland

economic experience, but also intermittently exiled him to Paris and the Nether-

lands.LockewasonfriendlytermswithNewton.

Hewantedtodescribehowourworldarisesintheideasofourmind.Usingprin-

ciplessparingly,heclungtotheassumptionofsubstances,whichhasbornetheAris-

totelianmetaphysicalandalso therationalistic lineof tradition fromDescartesvia

SpinozauptoLeibniz.However,unlikeDescartesandLeibniz,henolongerpresup-

poses“innateideas,”whichtheyassumedinordertoensuretruthandcertainty.On

theotherhand,alreadyDescartesdidnot limitconsciousnesstothemerethinking

ofthought,butincludedsensoryexperienceandimagination,feelingsandpassions,

appetiteandwill.With suchclassifications,differentoptionsofhumanorientation

aretraditionallyweighteddifferently.TheEnglish languageleavesa larger leeway:

withthehelpoftheconceptsofthe‘mind’andof‘understanding,’whichLockeuses

inasimilarway,thatwhichisconsideredassensualandspiritual,unconsciousand

conscious, receptive and spontaneous can be comprehended as a unity, while the

French notion of esprit and theGermannotion ofGeist clearly give precedence to

thinkingandsuggesttheattributionofspecifictruthstoit.Itisimpossibletoargu-

mentatively decide between the empirical evidence onwhich theBritish tradition

insists and the evidence of reason that the French and German tradition prefers.

Henceforth, they take root as lasting philosophical alternatives. The British ap-

47

proachmorestronglybearsinmindthefactualconditionsofeverydayandscientific

orientation.

Locke considers themind itself to be able to divide its ideas into those that

spring fromsomephysical causalprocesses,whichaffect thenervesand thebrain

andwhich he calls “sensations,” and those that themind reflects upon in its own

way,i.e.the“reflections.”Furthermore,Lockeconceivesofthemindasbeingableto

differentiate its ideas, regarded as “objects of the mind,” and decide from which

senses they stem, whether they are simple or complex, which of them represent

primaryandwhichofthemsecondaryqualitiesofthings,etc.Hereby,Lockeincludes

thedistinctionbetweensubstanceandaccidentintoempiricalevidence.Atthesame

time,hepaysattentiontosignsasmeanstocommunicate ideas; forhim,signsare

also products of the mind itself. The identity of a person rests upon his or her

memoryof such signs; this alone guarantees the continuity of consciousness.As a

result,thelawfulnessofnaturebecomesprecarious:accordingtoLocke,itispartof

theconnectionsofideasandcanbegrantedonlybyGod.

GEORGE BERKELEY (1685-1753), who also traveled extensively, finally became

bishopandmarried(whichwasstillarareexceptionamongphilosophers),drewthe

consequences from Locke’s reorientation: if one begins with consciousness, one

must abandon the assumption of an externalworld that exists independently. For

Berkeley, this assumption is the source of allmaterialism and atheism. He agrees

with Leibniz’ pioneering insight that being can only be conceived of as being per-

ceived(esseestpercipi).Themindthatperceiveseverythingingraspingitbyitside-

as candistinguishbetween these ideasonly through the criterionofhow livelyor

vivid–or,aswecall it:attractiveandstriking–theyare.Thesignsthroughwhich

themindregistersitsideascanbeusedmoreorlessgenerally;theyopenleewaysto

subsumemoreorlessthingsunderthem,andthisinturncreatesleewaysforacting

invarioussituations.However,signscaneasilydeceiveus,forideasare“mixed,asit

were,andblendedtogether”;signsthatsymbolize“abstractgeneralideas”arbitrari-

lyseparateandconnecttheseideasatthesametime.“Principles”areabstractcon-

structions and “general laws of nature,” with the help of whichwe try to explain

phenomena; principles are nothingmore andnothing less than “ruleswe take for

principles, which we cannot evidently know.” For Berkeley – who disputes with

Newtonwithoutmentioninghim–Godremainsthesupremeauthoritytoguarantee

theregularcorrelationofideasencodedbysigns.

48

Onegenerationlater,DAVIDHUME(1711-1776)deniedhimselftoresorttothis

authoritythatwouldsafeguardcertainty–andbecamethemostsignificantBritish

philosopher.DescendingfromimpoverishedScottishnobles,hedug,againstthewill

ofhisfamily,intothestudyofphilosophy.Hedidthatsointenselythatitmadehim

sick.He thenearnedhis living as anamanuensisof anEnglishmerchant; later, he

wenttoLaFlècheinFrance,whereDescartesattendedschool,and,inthedeceptive

hopeofrapidliteraryfame,workedonhisTreatiseofHumanNature.

Herehenotonlydescribes“humanunderstanding,”butalso“humannature”

on thewhole, consequently avoidingmetaphysical hypotheses. Proceeding from a

“freeconfessionofhisignorance”concerningan“originalandultimateprinciple,”he

strives for a “cautious observation of human life.”One can readHume’swork as a

withdrawalfromapparentphilosophicalscienceintoactualhumanorientation.Sure,

hetriestotransferNewton’sexperimentalmethodtophilosophy,butthismeansfor

himtobuildcompletelyontheevidenceofexperiencewithoutdrawingonmathe-

matics.For“thesciencesofmathematics,naturalphilosophy,andnaturalreligion,”

too,dependon“thescienceofman.”Humeproposes“acompletesystemofthesci-

encesbuiltonafoundationalmostentirelynew,andtheonlyoneuponwhichthey

canstandwithanysecurity”;foritspart,thenewscience’snewfooting“laidonex-

perienceandobservation”ispossibleonlyin“alandoftoleranceandofliberty.”

This has led to the strongest disillusionment of philosophy in the course of its

historysincetheancientskeptics.However,Hume’sphilosophicalskepticism,which

now focuses above all on “an original and ultimate principle,” pushes him into a

strongexperienceofdisorientation.Notbefore,butafterhiscomprehensivecritique

of knowledge in Book I of his Treatise, he sees himself “having narrowly escap’d

shipwreck inpassing a small frith” intowhich “thewretched condition,weakness,

anddisorder” of the faculties of understandingbrought him; “despair”makeshim

“resolvetoperishonthebarrenrock,onwhichIamatpresent,ratherthanventure

myselfuponthatboundlessocean,whichrunsoutintoimmensity.”Forinmostcas-

es,ourunderstandingis“foundedontheimagination,orthevivacityofourideas”;

but imagination is“aprincipleso inconstantandfallacious” that itmaycreate illu-

sions and contradictions everywhere. Then, “the question is, how farwe ought to

yield to these illusions”;butagain, there isno sufficient reason todecidebetween

them;thuswecan“onlyobservewhatiscommonlydone.”

49

In addition,Hume feels “affrightened and confoundedwith that forlorn soli-

tude,inwhichIamplac’dinmyphilosophy,andfancymyselfsomestrangeuncouth

monster.”Sincehehascontradictedallpreviousphilosophy,heexpectsforhispart

onlycontradiction, finding inhimself “nothingbutdoubtand ignorance”or “philo-

sophicalmelancholy and delirium.” However, after “all examination and enquiry,”

hismindreturnsto“thatassurance,whichalwaysarisesfromanexactandfullsur-

veyofanobject.”Hedecidestomaintainhisskepticismratherthanyieldtoreligious

superstition.Heoscillatesbetweentheunsettlementbyphilosophyandthereassur-

ancethroughthe“commonaffairsoflife”withoutfleeingintoallegedlyuncondition-

alcertainties,nomatterhowdesirabletheymaybe.Nordoesheexpressawishto

change theworld.He resolutely exposes himself to the conditions of life orientation

thatarealwaysuncertain.

In fact,heencounters fierceresistancewithhisTreatise.Thereupon,he tries

out a variety of literary formswhichmakehimmore andmore successful; but he

failswhenapplyingforprofessorialchairsinEdinburghandGlasgow.Fromthenon,

fora longtimehelivesonappointmentsbynoblemen.Laterheworksina library,

which gains him access to a plethora of literatures, and finally, he comes to fame,

mostnotablyinParis.Moreover,hebecomesrich–becauseofhissix-volumeHisto-

ryofEngland,whichheregardsbothassourceandasapplicationofhisscienceof

man. Before that, he has presented aNatural History of Religion inwhich he pro-

ceedsgenealogically,askingaftertheneedforthereligiousbeliefthathehasleftbe-

hind.Hecourageouslydefendssuicideagainstthewidespreadargumentthatsuicide

is a crime against God and one’s fellow human beings. Although Hume does not

commithimselftomattersofreligioninpublic,heisregardedasanatheist,andhis

workwasputontheindex.

Inexploringtheexperiencethatheassumestobesufficientforunderstanding

howhumanbeingscopewiththeirlife–whichinvolvesthesciences,morals,politi-

calinstitutions,andreligions–,HumefollowsBerkeleyinproceedingfrom“impres-

sions,” “passions” and “emotions,” which impose themselves in being particularly

vivid.The“ideas,”amongwhichHumecountsthoughts,memories,andfantasies,are

comparativelyfaintandineffective;theycopyimpressionsandassociateeachother

according to the criteria of resemblance, contiguity, and causation. Descartes’ and

Locke’ssubstancesandNewton’sabsolutespaceandabsolutetimebelongtothese

50

mere ideas,while the impressions sustain theundeniable convictionof situational

reality.

Humeholdson to theways inwhicheverydayorientation takesplace.Heob-

servesandrespectsthefactthatideasareassociatedindifferentwaysineachindi-

vidual,buthedoesnotyetdifferentiatebetweendifferentstandpoints,perspectives,

footholds,thedoublecontingencyofcommunication,etc.Hereducestheassumption

ofnatural laws to theobservationof regular sequencesofevents,whichare inter-

pretedaschainsofcausesandeffects.Thatis,hereducesnaturallawstocustomsof

observation and expectationor, if you like, to the regularity of routines.As things

canalwayshappen(orbeconceivedof)indifferentways,inferencesfromparticular

experiences, which constitute general rules, are always preliminary. Even if one

stronglybelieves in the lawsofnature, theyarenot themselvesgiven toempirical

observation.Hence,asHumeputs it inhisEnquiryConcerningHumanUnderstand-

ing, besides logic andmathematics “all other sciences are reduced to probability.”

Humetakesfundamentallynewphilosophicaldecisionsoforientationinordertoface

theuncertaintyofallhumanorientation.

Inhisinsistenceonexperience,Humealsorenouncesthehypothesisofapar-

ticularselfor“I”becauseonehasnoimpressionsofitanditisnoidentifiableentity

inthemind.Humeranksitas“abundleofperceptions”thatconstantlyre-organizes

itselfonthebasisofnewexperiences.Thisprocesscanbeobservedwiththehelpof

memory. Hume already uses themetaphor of a continually reconstructed ship to

designatefluctuantidentities.InhisDialogues,heplayswithidentitiesindeliberate-

lykeepingitopenwithwhichofhisprotagonistsheidentifies.

Askepticalempiricist likeHumeneedsnottodenythefreewill,butcancon-

ceptualize it non-metaphysically as the human leeway of decision in the natural

world, fornaturalprocessesareonlypartlyassessableandmanageable forhuman

beingswhononethelessmustrelyontheseprocessesintheirdecisions.Ifonewants

to consider someoneas accountable forhisorher action, onemust assumea free

will inthissense.Still,onecanobservethatreasoninfluencesactiononlytoa lim-

itedextent:“Reasonis,andoughtonlytobetheslaveofthepassions,andcannever

pretendtoanyotherofficethantoserveandobeythem.”

Bycontrast,morals,withoutwhichhumanco-existencewouldnotbepossible,

canbe empirically rooted inmoral sentiment,which includesmutual sympathyof

humanbeingsforeachotherandwhichisconstantlyschooledbyobservingandas-

51

sessingthebehaviorofotherpersons.Humeassumesthatmoralsandothersocietal

regulations–insofarastheyareusefulforeveryone–workoutandchangeonthis

basis,includingthestandardsforjusticeandreliability.

Hume’sHistoryofEngland,whichhe,despite the contemporary conflictsbe-

tween the parties, largely keeps impartial and inwhichhe includes literature and

science, is at heart a history of human freedom.When it comes to politics, Hume

supportsastrictseparationofpowersandtheruleoflaw.Onthewhole,hechampi-

onspoliticalstabilityand,wherenecessary,asconsideratereformsaspossible.He

advocatesAmericanindependence.Heturnsdowntheproposaltocontinuehisvery

successfulHistoryofEnglandonthegroundsthathehasbecometooold,toofat,too

lazy,andtoorich.Loyaltohisphilosophy,Hume’slifecamefullcircle.Hewasfond

ofcompanyandsociality.ThenewstreetinEdinburgh,wherehebuilthiscomforta-

blehouse,wascalledSt.DavidStreet.

Inhisearlyexperienceofdisorientation,Humearrivedat the followingcon-

clusion:“Wehave,therefore,nochoiceleftbutbetwixtafalsereasonandnoneatall.

Formypart, Iknownotwhatought tobedone in thepresent case.”WhileHume,

admitting the all-encompassinguncertainty of life, remembered and turned to the

good life among friends, IMMANUEL KANT (1724-1804 AD), by contrast, reacted to

Hume’sexperienceofdisorientationbywritingtheCritiqueofPureReason–where

reasonisjudgedbyreasonitself.KantholdsontotheCartesianself-referentialityof

thinking throughwhich thinkingquestions itselfand findshold in itself.Following

theexamplesetbyCopernicus,hestartsa“revolution”inthinking,agreattheoreti-

cal reorientation according towhichwe “we can recognize of things a priori only

whatweourselveshaveputintothem.”Kantassurestheefficiencyofreasonbylim-

itingit.Thisgivesrisetothemostconciseandconsistentphilosophyweknow.

Kanttenaciouslycarvedouthisuniversitycareer,whileLockehadgivenitup

andHumefailedtosucceedinit.Kant’sbackgroundwastheGermanuniversityphi-

losophy,whichhadbecomeestablished.Heremained(nearly)alwaysinKönigsberg

intheeasternmostGermany,acquiringhislargeknowledgeoftheworldfromtravel

storiesandbooks.Heexperiencedchangingreignsinhiscity,butwasnotinvolved

inpoliticsanddiplomacy.Beingrathersociable,hewasnotedforhisdinnerparties;

nonetheless, he lived alone for hiswhole life. Inspired byRousseau, hewelcomed

theFrenchRevolution, yetwithout concedingageneral right to incite revolutions.

Heresignedhimselftotheenlightened,butoftenstilloppressiveroyalruleinPrus-

52

sia;headmiredFredericktheGreat.Inhisnarrowsphereoflife,hededicatedhim-

selfentirelytotherenewalofphilosophyonthehighestacademiclevel.Accordingto

Kant’sownconfession,thecrucialincentivetothisrenewalwasduetoDavidHume;

heprefacedthesecond,moresuccessfuleditionofhisCritiqueofPureReasonwitha

quotefromFrancisBacon’sInstauratiomagna.LikenootherphilosophersinceAris-

totleandDescartes,Kanthasbecomeoneofthehighestauthoritiesinphilosophyto

thisday.

AsheelaboratesinthePrefacetothefirsteditionofhisCritiqueofPureRea-

son,Kant seesphilosophy involved in a “battle-fieldof endless controversies”pre-

ciselyatthepointwhereit,intherationalistictradition,hasbounditselftoreason.

Thus,Kantdraftsascenarioofreorientationforphilosophyitself.Humanreasonhas

precipitated itself “into darkness and contradictions.” As Kant announces in the

PrefacetothesecondeditionoftheCritiqueofPureReason,philosophymustthere-

fore,inthetreatmentofknowledgebyreason,finallyentera“securecourseofasci-

ence,”whichissomethingthat“cansoonbejudgedbyitssuccess.”Wherethetreat-

ment is stuck, onemust “often go back again and take another path.” In order to

avoid “mere groping about,” Kant intends to find the path that reason could take,

eventhoughmanythoughtsformedbeforewithoutthenecessarydeliberationhave

tobeabandonedasfutile.

Kantbelievessostrongly inreasonthatheassumesitcannotbedisposedso

unfortunatebynaturethatitcannotsolveitsownproblems.Hefindsthepathtothe

solutioninadheringtotheBritishtraditionthattrustsinexperience.Followingthis

path,hewantstodojusticetothelawfulnessofnature,whichNewtonhadexhibited

soconvincinglyandwhichwassincethen,accordingtoKant,a“fact.”TherebyKant

doesnothaverecoursetodivinehelp,which,sinceHume’stimes,hadbecomealto-

getherquestionable.Kant’ssolution isadmittedlycumbersomeanddifficult,and it

raisesnewproblemsoforientation.

Actually,Kantonlyshiftstheperspective–withfar-reachingconsequences:if

reasonshallcontributetotheknowledgeofnatureandmakeitslawfulnessintelligi-

ble, reasonmustconformtoexperience,but insuchawaythatreasondetermines

andshapesexperience.Asa result, reasonbecomes independentof thesituational

conditions of experience or, in short: unconditioned.Only in thisway can it claim

universalvalidity.

53

FollowingLocke,Berkeley,andHume,Kantdismissesthebeliefinmetaphysi-

calsubstances;atthesametime,however,hebuildshis“transcendentalphilosophy”

onAristotle’s equallymetaphysical distinction between form andmatter or,more

abstractly,betweenformandcontent.Downtothepresentday,Kanthasconvinced

manypeoplewithhisassumptionthatsensoryperceptiononlyprovidesunclassified

datawhichareshapedbytheconceptsoftheintellect(Verstand),whichisapartof

humanreason(Vernunft).Theseunclassifieddataare tobecomeobjectivelydeter-

minableforeveryone,alsoandpreciselyinthelawfulsequenceofcauseandeffect.

Onecanthenmake ‘transcendental’statementsaprioriaboutthisform-givingrea-

son.These ‘transcendental’statementsare independentofspecificexperiencesbut

nonethelessfirmlyfocusedonexperience–while‘transcendent’statementsleadus

beyondallexperience.Onthebasisofsuchtranscendentaldeterminations,Kantde-

velopsthe“system”ofa“purenaturalscience”thatshallbefundamentalforallem-

pirical science: it shall consistofprinciples that reasondoesnot readoff fromna-

ture,butthatit“prescribes”tonature.

Sincelawfulnessassuchisnotperceivable,reasoncanonlyspeakaboutlaws

throughitsownlawfulforms.Thatistosay,theprincipleofcausalitythatNewton’s

naturalsciencepresupposescanonlybeunderstoodasaninterpretationofnature

throughhumanreason.Yet,Newton’s(andother)lawsofnatureareempiricallaws,

determinedbyanexperimentalmethod.Incontrastto‘pure’lawsof(theinterpreta-

tionof)nature,theycanalwaysbeenlargedandcorrectedbynewobservationsand

experiments. Thus, transcendental philosophy only contributes the certainty that

naturecanbeunderstoodas lawfulatall, for,accordingtoanother formulationby

Kant, “reasonhas insightonly into thatwhich it itself createsaccording to itsown

design.” Expressed in contemporary terminology, this is professed constructivism:

weorientourselvesbyourownspecifications,alsoandespeciallyinthenaturalsci-

ences.InKant’sview,weneverdealwith“thingsperse”butonlywith“appearanc-

es,”andhumanreasonprescribestheconditionsofthelawfulnessoftheseappear-

ances.

Inordertoprovidea“system”ofprinciplesofapurenaturalscience,Kantde-

ducesthemina“transcendentaldeduction”fromthelogicalformofjudgmentwhich

entails that the subject of a judgment is determined by a predicate. From the in-

stancesofthis logical form,Kantextracts“categories,”which,undertheconditions

ofspaceandtime,canbeformulatedas“principles.”WhileNewtonconceptualized

54

absolutespaceandabsolutetimemetaphysicallyassensoriumDei,Kantapprehends

themasthehumanbeing’s“pureformsofintuition.”When,forinstance,thelogical

relationof“groundandconsequence”(GrundundFolge)istransposedintothepure

spatialandtemporalformsofintuition,itturnsintothecausalrelationofaspatially

separateandtemporallyprecedingphysicalcausetoatemporallysucceedingphysi-

caleffect(UrsacheundWirkung).Asaresult,thelawofcausalityprincipallyapplies

tohumanexperiencedeterminedby,ontheonehand,theformsofhumanreasoning

and,ontheotherhand,theformsofintuition.

TheconstructivismofKant’stranscendentalphilosophyremainsboundtothe

possibilityofexperience,eveninthe“pure”knowledge(orinterpretation)ofnature.

FollowingtheAristotelianconceptofform,theformmustalwaysbetheformofcer-

taincontents.AccordingtoKant,thesecontentsaretheexperiences,andtheseexpe-

riencesmustbegainedbya“consciousness,”an“I”ora“subject.”Insofarasthissub-

jectpredeterminesthe“conditionsofpossibility”orthe“forms”ofexperience,Kant

callsitthe“transcendentalsubject.”PickingupatermfromLeibniz,hedesignatesit

astheoriginal“syntheticunityofapperception.”ForKantjustasforHume,thesub-

ject is not a substance, but amere “function of the unity,” i.e. a “synthesis”which

turnslogicallydisparateideasintologicallycoherentideas.Thissynthesiscannotbe

justifiedanymore,itisthe“highestpoint”atwhichthe“transcendentalphilosophy”

istobe“affixed.”Tothisday,manypeopleaffixthewholephilosophytothispoint.

However,thesyntheticunityofapperceptionisonlya“conditionofpossibil-

ity”thatistomakeconceivableobjectiveknowledgeofnaturebeyondHume’sskep-

ticalempiricism.Assuch,itdoesnotgrantatruthofnature,whichremainsan“un-

knownX”alsoforKant.Kantprovidesforphilosophyitsowntranscendentalspace

ofcertaintybetweenthespacesofexperienceandtranscendence.Thespaceofmere

experience isa spacewithout laws,while thespaceof transcendence isa space in

which human reason runs intowrong conclusions (“paralogisms”) and paradoxes

(“antinomies”)andthusintotheaforementioned“endlesscontroversies”thatdiso-

rientit.Inregardtothe“I,”theworld,andGod,onecanapparentlyproveantithet-

icalcertainties;andKantprovesthat thesecertaintiesareunprovable. Inthisway,

certaintiesaresubjectsofuncertainty.Thisislikewiseparadoxical.Indeed,Kantuses

paradoxesforthesakeofaccumulatingevidence:

• In order to be able tomake statementsa priori about the “form” of knowledge,

Kant followsAristotle inseparatingthe formandthecontentofknowledge.Yet,at

55

thesametime,hestartsfromthepremisethatitisimpossibletoseparateformand

contentinrealempiricalknowledge.Forthinkingbecomesknowingonlyifitrelates

to experience (“Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts

areblind”).

•Kantusesthedistinctionbetweenformandcontentinsuchawaythatheclassifies

thepureformsofintuition(spaceandtime)alsoasthecontentofthepureformsof

theintellect.Hence,thepureformsofintuitionareatthesametimecontents,thus

beingparadoxical.

•Evenin itstranscendental justification, theobjectivityoftheknowledgeacquired

with thehelpof thenatural sciences isnota fact,butamereought: theempirical

subjectisaskedtode-subjectivizeitselfinordertobecomecapableofobjectiveem-

piricaljudgments.Thisde-subjectivizationoftheempiricalsubject,turningitintoa

transcendentalsubject,can,however,onlyproceedempirically;yet,thisispossible

onlytoalimitedextent,anditisneververifiableobjectively.

• If,according toKant’sCritiqueofPureReason,only that is toberegardedasreal

whichcanalsobeanobjectofexperience, thenreason itself,pursuing itsowncri-

tique,isnotreal,forreasoncannotbeanobjectofexperience.

However,thisdoesnotmeanthatTheCritiqueofPureReasonisinvalid.Orien-

tationcanalsobebasedonparadoxes.Onlywhenparadoxesaredebunkeddothey

increase disorientation. Kant seems to have noticed this. He was the first to ask:

WhatDoes ItMean toOrientOneself in Thinking? In this treatise, he also operates

withparadoxes(sec.13).

The philosophy of orientation cannot be formulated in laws, but precedes the

formulationoflaws.TheBritishtraditionontheonehand,whichreliesonexpe-

rience,andKantontheotherhand,whomakesreasonthecenteroforientation,

takeexemplarypositionsonthemathematicallyformulatedpurposelesslawsof

nature,whichsinceGalileiandespeciallysinceNewtonhavebecomefirmrefer-

encesofscientificorientation.

Humanorientationrequiresbothalternativeoptionsoforientation,empirical

evidence on the one hand and rational insight on the other. Yet, as the argu-

ments fromLocke toKant show, it is impossible todecideargumentativelybe-

tween these options. While Locke and Berkeley leave the certainty of natural

lawstoGodandwhileHumeholdstheircertaintyinskepticalsuspense,Kantde-

56

duces it from pure reason – at the same time delimiting the scope of rational

cognition to the sphere of experience in which there is no absolute certainty.

Bothalternativesconcurinonlyattributinglawstonaturewithoutbeingableto

ascertainwhether thesealsoare the lawsofnatureper se.Hence, they canbe

nothing but footholds for scientific orientation, albeit very strong ones. Kant,

who provides a specific space of certainty between empirical experience and

metaphysical transcendence in formulatingtranscendentalprinciplesofphilos-

ophy, runs into productive paradoxes when distinguishing between form and

content, subjectandobject, realityanduseofpure reason,which leadshim to

theproblemoforientationinthinkingassuch.

12.AlternativeConceptionsofMorality,Politics,andEconomy:

Smith,Rousseau,Kant,andBentham

In the secondhalf of the18th century, the living conditions inEuropeand in colo-

nized America, particularly Northern America, changed drastically: the economic

productivityandthewealthofnationsgrew,andwiththemtheattentiontothedis-

tribution of riches and the pressure on the old estate-based system that now ap-

pearedasunfair.Likewise,thepoliticalandmoralchallengesincreased:questionsof

socialjustice,ofthedemocratizationofsociety,ofslavery,andwiththemtheques-

tionoftheobligatorinessofmoralityingeneral.Bydevelopinghelpfulideas,philos-

ophybecamepracticallyefficientasneverbefore.Inconvertingtheponderousgov-

ernmental economy, so-called mercantilism, into the much more productive free

enterpriseeconomy, thereigningprincescould invokeAdamSmith; theauthorsof

theUnitedStatesDeclarationofIndependencecouldrefertoJohnLocke;theFrench

revolutionaries to Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and the Britishmembers of parliament,

who were concerned about distributive justice, to Jeremy Bentham. Just like Im-

manuelKant,allofthemproceededfromthefreedomofdecision.However,theydid

so in variousways; after all, onehad to philosophically decide on themodality of

orientationto freedom.Smith’s,Rousseau’s,Kant’s,andBentham’salternativecon-

ceptionsofpracticalphilosophyshowhowdifferentthescopesfordecision-making

canbeconceivedofandwhichnewpossibilitiesoforientationarisefromthem.

57

ADAMSMITH(1723-1790)grewupintheScottishschoolofmoralphilosophy,

whichwasleadinginGreatBritainattheendofthe18thcentury.Thisschoolslowly

brokeaway from theologicalprecepts; it supportedhumanbeingsdeveloping into

independent and enjoyable personalities. The ideal emanating from aristocracy,

formulatedbyANTHONYASHLEY-COOPER, the thirdEarl of Shaftesbury(1671-1713),

was the perfect harmony of right conduct. Smith’s teacher FRANCIS HUTCHESON

(1694-1746)placedthis idealwithinacontext,whichalsoembraceseconomyand

politics, while Smith himself, just as his predecessors, based them on a “moral

sense,”i.e.afeelingforthatwhichismorallycorrectandguidedbythe“sympathy”

withothers.Heintroduceda“politicaleconomy.”

Smithwasveryyoungwhenhebecameaprofessoroflogicandlaterofmoral

philosophy.Yet,hedidnot limithimself tophilosophy;rather,after thetraditional

multiannualgrand tour throughEuropewhenheaccompaniedayoungnobleman,

hewasappointedascommissionerof customs inScotlandandrefloated theailing

Scottishmonetary system.After his firstmajorwork in philosophy,TheTheory of

MoralSentiments(1759),whichhepublishedwhilebeingaprofessor,hewentdown

in history with his Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations

(1776).Being theclassic justificationof freemarketeconomy, this latterworkap-

pearedintheyearoftheUnitedStatesDeclarationofIndependence;itwasquickly

receivedandsuccessfullyimplemented.

AdmiringNewton,Smithconfigureshiscomprehensivemoralphilosophyasa

side piece of the philosophy of nature. He tries to express it in preferably simple

lawsofwhichtheagentneedsnotbeaware;theyareobeyedwhileremaininglarge-

lyindependentoftheagent’sgoodwill.Inhistwomajorworks,Smithbuildsonthe

plainobservationthathumanbeingsareinterestedintheexchangewitheachother,

both in perceivingmoral conduct and judgment and in economic copingwith life.

Putinthelanguageofthephilosophyoforientation,Smith’spointofdepartureisthe

orientation of human beings to other human beings, which is not yet guided by

norms.

ForSmith,thenotionof“sympathy”doesnotsomuchmeanmutualaffection,

butrathermutualempathyandbeinginterestedincommunicatingwitheachother.

Throughempathy,humanbeingsascertaintheproprietyoftheirmoralconductand

judgment insociety; if the latter is indeedappropriate, theywillberewardedwith

respect.Smiththerebyproceedstowhatwetodaywouldcallasociologicalorsoci-

58

opsychological description ofmorality,which he then extends to an observation of

theeconomicconductofhumanbeingsatmarkets. Inthisway,moralconductand

judgmentbecomediscernablealsoasmarketbehavior.Smithdoesnotelaborateon

this,yet,inbothcases,theorientationbythemarketprecedesthemoraldistinction

betweengoodandevil,betweenaltruismandegoism.

The observation of themoral conduct and judgment of others becomes, ac-

cordingtoSmith,allthemorerevealingthemoreonecanabsolveoneselffromone’s

ownmoralattachmentsandoccupy thepositionofan impartial spectator.Yet,God

aloneisacompletelyimpartialspectatorspeakingthroughconscience.Thatiswhy

Smith–differentfromhisfriendHume–stillseeksanultimatefootholdinreligion.

However,atthesametime,Smithreferstothefactthatonecandistinguishoneself

and one’s conscience by deliberately changing perspectives. In Smith’s view, one

therebylearnstorestrainandcontroloneself,becomesmoreindependent inone’s

self-assessment and thus in turn abetterobserver. Indoing so, one cannever ex-

cludeself-deceit;yet,independentobserverscandetectit.Bycontrast,factionalism

andfanatismmaketheobservationbiasedandone-sided.

Starting from mutual observation, Smith’s implicit transition to economic

thinkinginOntheWealthofNationsbecomesplausible.Inaneconomiccontext,itis

observedunderwhichconditionsothersoptfortheexchangeofgoodsorservices,

andthemarketconsistsexactlyinthemutualobservationoftheseobservations.In-

sofar as themarket isnot limitedby explicit rules, it is just asnon-transparent in

economicdecisionsasourfeelingsareinmoraldecisions.Onecanonlyorientone-

selfbyobservingtheireffectsonthebehavioroftheinvolvedpersons.Inbothcases,

thesedecisions’effectsaredependentonincalculableindividualneedsandinterests.

Justasrealorobservablemoralityconsistsintheinteractionofallindividualmoral

decisions,sodoesthemarketconsist inthe interactionorsynergyofall individual

economicdecisions.InSmith’sapproach,moralityis–toputininNiklasLuhmann’s

words–amarketofesteem,whileontheeconomicmarkettheneedsandinterests

ofanonymousothersareobserved,followed,andrespected.

Incontrasttothemoralmarket,theeconomicmarkethasnoclearfootholdin

pricing,whichresultsfromthemutualobservationofthefactualeconomicdecisions

oftheparticipants;whoandwhatisrespectedmorallycannotbescaledlikemoney.

But just as the price on the economicmarket rises or falls through the change of

supplyanddemand,sodoesthevalueofrespectonthemoralmarket, ifaspecific

59

moralachievementismoreorlessindemand.The‘natural’valueofaneconomicor

amoralgood,whichismeasuredbytheexpenditureaffordedforit,recedesbehind

themarketvaluedeterminedbysupplyanddemand.Thiscanseverelyinjuremoral

feelings.Yet,atthesametime,morallycontemptibleself-interestcangenerategrow-

ing affluence for everyone on the economicmarket, though only in the long (and

sometimestheverylong)runandnevertothesameextentforeveryone.

The presupposition of this is that, in a society based on labor division, self-

interest increases the productivity of this society on the whole. BERNARD DE

MANDEVILLE (1670-1733), aLondondoctorof Frenchorigin, hadalready calledat-

tention to the fact that, on a free economicmarket, private vices turn into public

benefits,i.e.evilturnsintogood.HedidsoinpolemicalandsatiricalforminTheFa-

bleoftheBees.Heargues:ifnoonewantstotakeadvantageoftheotheroutofmoral

consideration,nothingstimulatestheincreaseofproductivityandthewholesociety

becomesimpoverished.Inprinciple,thishasprovedtrue.

Mandevillepresentedplausibleexamplesfromeverydaylifethatheobserved

closely.Therebyheexposedmoralidealizationofallkinds,whilehisopponentsfu-

riously insistedon it. Smith, too, distancedhimself fromMandeville, resolutely re-

pudiating the blatant inferences Mandeville deduced from his thought. However,

Smithborrowedthe ideaof therevaluationof the(morallyspeaking)evil intogood

andelaboratedonthisidea.While,accordingtoHobbes,the“selfishsystem”leadsto

theenthronementofasovereign,accordingtoSmith,itentailstheincreaseofevery-

one’s freedomon a freemarket. In addition, the “commercial society” canbe con-

strainedbyruleswhichturnsitintoa“naturalsystemofliberty.”

Inthemarket,Smithdiscoversanovelkindofgeneralization.Thisisunprece-

dentedbythe(deductive)generalizationofmetaphysics,the(inductive)generaliza-

tionofBritishempiricism,andthemathematicallyformulatedgeneralizationofthe

experimentalphilosophyofnature.Thisnovelideaofgeneralizationarisesthrough

theinscrutableinteractionofindividualgivensbeingvolatileallthetime.Itcanonly

becomprehendedthroughcontinuouscomparativestudyand,therefore,itcanonly

begraspedprovisionally.What isat stakehere isnot truth,but ratherstatistically

determinableprobability.Thus, in everynew situation, onehas todecide anew to

whatextentonewantstorelyonit.Thegeneralizationonthemarket–i.e.economic

and moral generalization at the same time – can constantly change through the

changesoftheindividualcircumstancesanddecisions.Itisthegeneralizationofori-

60

entation, inwhichtherelativecertaintyofthepriceorthevalidityofcertainmoral

valuesisrelatedtotherelativeuncertaintyofwhetheritisworthdealingingoodsat

thispriceororientingone’smoralconductaccordingtothevaluesofrespect.Ona

freemarket,beittheeconomicorthemoralmarket,uncertaintybecomesproductive.

Smithhimself puts theparadoxof evil unwillinglyproducing something good into

thewell-establishedshapeorfigureofan“invisiblehand”–anundeterminedtheo-

logicalmetaphorthatissupposedtotideoversomethingdifficulttocomprehend.

Asanalternative,Smith’sFrenchcontemporaryJEAN-JACQUESROUSSEAU(1712-

1778)alsoproceededfromthepre-reflectivefeelingforthegood,butarrivedatthe

contraryconceptionofthemoral,political,andeconomic.WhileSmithlimitshimself

to sober observation and description, Rousseau projects ideal states. He does so

withapowerfullyeloquentmoralpassion.Inthefirst instance,heradically ‘resets’

reason–inordertothenturnitintoanunconditionalfootholdforeveryone’sorien-

tation.Heextremelyextendstheleewayoffreedomandobligationinsociety.Butfol-

lowing the French tradition of governmentalmercantilist economy, he leaps over

thepotentialoffreeenterpriseeconomytoformafreesociety.Instead,heimagines

astateofnatureofhumanbeingsinwhicheveryoneisself-sufficient,freeandequal

–aspeoplehappilycoexistinpeacelackinganyeconomicorsocialsystematall.But

thenthesocialorderweknowdestroysthishappypeace,andanewpeacecanonly

beestablishedwiththehelpofareasonablewillthatobligeseveryone.

Rousseau’sconstructionmayalsohavehadpersonalreasons.Heliveddiffer-

entlythanSmith:inunattached,unsecuredandunstablelivingconditions.Hegrew

upwithoutamotherandthenalsowithoutafather;hedidnotpassthroughregular

studies;heswitcheddenominationsjustasheinterchangedhislifepartnerships;he

didnotcommithimselftoonesingleprofession,butshoneasaphilosopher,educa-

tionist,writer,playwright,composer,andmusicologistat thesametime.Herisked

hisbooksbeingbannedandburnt,himselfbeingpersecuted;heconfusedandunset-

tledhisfriendsandnumerous,mostlyaristocraticpatrons;helongedforsolitude–

increasinglyembitteredabout thesocietyofhis times–andyetpushedhimself to

the fore and went public. He had a strong need for self-expression and self-

justification,andhesearchedandfoundholdinhimselfandhisownideasaboutthe

complete refounding of an egalitarian society. With these ideas he fascinated the

‘higher’educatedupper-classcirclesrightuptotheleadingphilosophersofhisday.

61

OnlyfewpeopleinWesternculturalhistoryhavecausedsimilarlystrongreorienta-

tionsashedid.

LikeSmith’s,Rousseau’sconceptionisnoteasytooverlookandthereforecon-

troversial.Rousseau’sconstrualofanamiable,yetunrealisticstateofnatureofthe

humanbeingiscondensedinhisearlydiscourses,namelytheDiscourssurlesscienc-

esetlesarts(DiscourseontheArtsandSciences,1750),whichRousseautracedback

toa great experienceof inspiration resembling thoseofDescartes andPascal, and

theDiscourssurl’origineetlesfondementsdel’inégalitéparmileshommes(Discourse

ontheOriginandBasisofInequalityAmongMen,1755):theanimal-likestateofna-

ture is supposed to have been disturbed just by themutual observation ofmoral

conductandjudgment,fromwhichSmithexpectedthedevelopmentofamoreand

moreappropriatemorality.InRousseau’sopinion,thelabor-divisionofcommercial

societyleadstoadestructivecompetitionthatmakeshumanbeingsmoreandmore

unequalandmostofthemunfree.

Rousseau’sopinion is justasplausibleasSmith’s.Thesetwoderiveopposite

conclusions from one and the same starting point: an original moral sentiment.

WhileSmithreckonswithamoralreversalofgoodintoevil,Rousseausupposesthat

thegoodturnsintoevilinsociety.Thus,forRousseau,anewradicalconversionbe-

comesnecessary.Heindicatestwopathstoit:oneofthemleadsviaeducation(the

individualshallre-acquire itsnatural freedom),theotherviathecreationofacivil

society(sociétécivile),whichisbasedonfreedomandequalrightsandinwhichthe

individuals,raisedfree,canburgeonequalbeforethelaw.Withthelatterideas,ap-

pealinguntiltoday,Rousseauhasexertedhisstrongestinfluence.

Inhis famoustreatiseDucontratsocialouessaisur la formede larépublique

(TheSocialContract,orPrinciplesofPoliticalRight,1762),heconceivesof thenew

society as one where everyone silently enters into a contract with everyone else

through which human beings commit themselves to politically act according to a

generalwill (volontégénérale).The ideaofa tacitsocialcontract isbasedonmere

reason: a goodand just society ispossibleonly if everyone shares the rational in-

sightintoacommongoodandjustice.Thus,inthepoliticalformofarepublic,pru-

dentpeoplearetheirownandonlysovereign.Representativedemocracyandmajor-

itydecisionsbecomesuperfluous.There isno space for individualorientations,nei-

therinthestateofnature,norinsociety’sstateofreason.Ideally,inbothofthemitis

perfectcertaintythatreigns.

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However,thisisnotpossiblewithoutparadoxes.InhiseducationnovelÉmile,

Rousseauexpresslyacknowledgesthem:“Theaveragemanmayforgivememypar-

adoxes–oneneedsthemforreflection.Andwhateverobjectiononemightbringup

againstme–Ipreferbeingamanofparadoxestobeingamanofprejudices.”Itfol-

lowsthat

• human beings are good only in a state of nature that cannot be observed; they

were turned into evil creatures by society – which they were and still are them-

selves;

•theseevilhumanbeingsshallcreateanewsocietythroughthetacitcompletionof

acontractaboutacommonlegalorder–yet, inordertocompletesuchacontract,

theymustalreadybelegalpersonsand,inaddition,personsfreefrompersonalin-

terests;

• through this contract, they shall secure their personal liberty in recognizing the

absolute sovereignty of the community, the people – they shall understand them-

selvesasfreepreciselyinfreelysurrenderingtoalawthatisbindingforeveryone.

Rousseaucallsthisthetotalalienation(aliénationtotale)oftheindividualwills(vo-

lontés particulières) from themselves for the sake of the general will (volonté gé-

nérale).Whensomeoneassertsaspecial,particularwill,hewillbeforcedtobefree

(onleforceraàêtrelibre).

In order tomake these paradoxes of humannature, the social contract, and

political freedommoreplausible–whichcontinues tohaveaneffectuntil today–,

Rousseauassumes

• that everyone concludes a contractwith himself in order to cling to the general

will. Yet, one cannot enter into contractswith oneself, and society as such cannot

utterageneralwillandcannoteffectuateitinaconcretesituationofaction.

• Since only individuals representing society can do so, these individualsmust be

chosencarefully.Inordertoestablishasuitablesystemoflaws,Rousseauthinksan

especiallywiselegislatorisnecessary.Yet,thisimpliesthattherearedifferencesin

theendowmentwithor theuseofreasonamong individuals. Ifwecannotpresup-

posecommoninsightsstemmingfromcollectivereason,wemustassumethatsome

individualsaresuperiorintheirorientation.

•Thecommitmentorbondcreatedbyrationalinsightinthegeneralwillofthepeo-

pleisnotsufficientinRousseau’seyes.Accordingtohim,arepublicneedsacivilre-

ligionwithdogmasinwhicheveryonemustbelieveunconditionally:dogmasofper-

63

sonal immortality, of God’s justice arranging punishment or reward, and the holi-

nessofthesocialcontract.Yet,ifonemustbelieveinsomethingspecific,itisonlyof

limitedcredibility.

•InÉmile,Rousseaurecommendsthefollowingforaneducationthatissupposedto

resultinfreedom:“Leadthepupilalwaystobelievethatheisthemaster,butinreal-

ity,youmustbethemaster.Thereisnosubmissionthatismorecompletethanthe

one thathas theappearanceof freedom. In thisway,youcanconquerandcontrol

thepupil’swill.”

•Rousseauconcealssuchongoingparadoxesbyusingtheancientmetaphorof the

body(corps):Ifallmembersofsocietyformanorganism,theyfulfillavitalfunction

in it; if they, by contrast, assert personal interests, they endanger the body as a

wholeandarethentobeconsideredassick.Yet,societyisnotabody.

While Smith andRousseau extended thehorizonofmoral orientation in the

transitionfromtheearliertotheirlaterworks,whichtheydidnotconnectsystemat-

ically with each other, Kant and Bentham begin with one single principle: Kant’s

pointofdepartureisthegoodwill,Bentham’sthebenefitofaction.

KANTdemandsunconditionality, also inmoralphilosophy, inorder to justify

hisclaimtooftheuniversalityofmorals.Forthisreason,themoralityofactionmust

notbebasedonfeelingsorobservations,needsorintereststhatcanvaryfromplace

toplace;rather,itmustbebasedexclusivelyonreasonitself–KantperformsaCo-

pernican revolution also in moral philosophy. As a consequence, reasonmust – as

reason–ignoreallsituationalcircumstances.Itmustignoreallconditionsandrami-

ficationsofhumanactionforwhichnoonecanbemademorallyresponsible.Reason

mustadheretonothingelsethantheintentionoftheagent.Thisintentioncannotbe

readoffanfromactionbecauseitisaninnercommitment.Justasreason‘prescribes’

itslawsinthetheoreticalcognitionofnature,sodoesdutyprescribethelawaccord-

ingtowhichweshallact.Tothisend,reasonmustpresupposea freewill thatcan

choosegoodorevil;itismoralwhenitchoosesthegood,andunconditionallymoral

whenitwantsthegoodforitsownsake,indeferencetothegood–eventhoughthe

goodisalwaysdeterminedbyaconfusingvarietyofcircumstancesframingasitua-

tionofaction, though itcanalwayshavebadconsequences,andthusthegoodcan

onlybethecomparativelybest.

Thegoodwillprescribeswhat is tobedone.Reasoncan, in itspracticaluse,

giveanapriori form toaction just as it, in its theoreticaluse, cangiveanapriori

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form to knowledge.Thisapriori form for action is the “categorical imperative.” It

commands unconditionally that one is to follow reason alone, notmore, not less.

Morality in the form of reason as an authoritative command is “themere form of

universallaw-making.”Thecontentsfittingintothisformcannotbeconcreteactions

thatalwaysdependonspecificcircumstances,butrathertheguidingintentionsthat

alwaysleadone’saction,or,asKantcallsthem,one’sown“maxims”or“subjective”

practicalprinciples.

Therebyeveryoneisdirectedtohim-orherself:onecanexperiencetheinner

coercionofdutyonlyasanindividual;others’reasonis,accordingtoKant,“foreign

reason”;inthelivesofdifferenthumanbeings,differentmaximscanarise.Thus,the

categorical imperativecommands toexamine the leadingmaximsofone’sownac-

tioninregardtothequestionofwhetheronecouldgivethemtheformofauniversal

lawat any time. If this is possiblewithout contradiction, one is allowed to act ac-

cordingtothesemaxims,forinstancethemaximalwaystobehonest.Ifacontradic-

tionarises,onemustrestrainoneselffromthemaxim.Forinstance,ifonereserves

therighttolieoccasionallyforoneself,onecannotcountonhonestyanywhereany-

moreonceoccasionallieshavebecomeauniversallaw.

Kanthasguidelinesforone’sactioninmindthataresupposedtobeinforcea

wholelifetime.However,healsoheredemandsde-subjectivization–inthiscontext

notforthepurposeofobjectivecognition,butratherforthepurposeofmoralaction

disregarding one’s own advantage and any exception for oneself. Kant’s most ex-

treme example is that of a suicidal person who despite of world weariness feels

compelled to go on living because suicide cannot become a principle of universal

legislation. The condition for de-subjectivization is not that others proceed in the

same way; otherwise the categorical imperative would not mean more than the

GoldenRule,i.e.theprincipleoftreatingothersasonewouldwishtobetreatedby

them.Kantexpresslydismissesthisinterpretationofthecategoricalimperative,for

thelatterwouldthenbeanobligationundercertainconditions,a“hypotheticalim-

perative.” On the other hand, the examination of one’s own maxims cannot set

norms forothers.Everypersonmust rationallycheckhisorherownmaxims.The

categoricalimperativedoesnotprescribehowothersshouldact;rather,itdelimits

one’sownaction inrelationtoothers.Asaresult, ithelpsmetodistancemefrom

myownmaximsandencouragesmetobecarefulwithmyownmorality.Putinthe

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termsofthephilosophyoforientation,thecategoricalimperativeopensupthetran-

sitionfrommoraltoethicalorientation.

From this starting point, Kant conceptualizes the law and politics. The law

regulatesthewaysinwhichwe,visiblyforeveryone,socializewithothers.Thelaw

referstoindividualactionsthatcanbeobservedbyothersinthe‘outer’worldand

does usually not take into account an agent’s intentions that cannot be observed.

Thelawpresupposesthatallhumanbeingsoftheageofconsentareequallyfreeto

actmorally,i.e.ofgoodwill.However,onecannotexpectthatallpeopleinfactactin

thisway.Therefore,inordertoprotecthumanbeingsfromeachother,externalco-

ercionisnecessary,sothatone’sownarbitrarinesscancoexistwiththefreedomof

othersaccordingtoalawthatisvalidforeveryone.

Kantdefinespoliticsas“executivejurisprudence”andobligesittocommitit-

selftomorality,knowingfullwellthatcommonwealthcomesintoexistencethrough

differentkindsofviolence.Kantsetsthe“moralpolitician”whoputshispoliticsun-

der the control of unconditionalmorality, against the “politicalmoralist”who– in

thesenseofMachiavelli(sec.8)–concoctsamoralitythatfitstohispurposes.Kant

alsotreatseconomyinhistheoryoflaw,yetonlyatthesidelines.Hedoesnotgointo

Smith’sconceptofafreeenterprisesystem,whichdoesnotbuildonthe‘ought.’

Ontheonehand,inhisCritiqueofPracticalReason,Kantdissolvestheparadox

oftheunrealityofreasonwiththehelpofterminologytakenfromtheCritiqueofPure

Reason(sec.11);yet,ontheotherhand,hecreatesnewparadoxes.Althoughthere-

alityofreasonisnotperceptibletothesenses,reasonissupposedtomanifestitself

in itspracticalusage,whichmustbeobservable inaway. Inorder todissolve the

paradox, Kant employs a bodily metaphor: in the categorical imperative and its

command (“Act like this!”), onehears the “voice”of reason.Kantunderstands this

beingcoercedbyaninnervoiceasa“fact”ofitsownkind,whichcannotbeturned

down,even less thanobservable factsofnaturethat, inhiseyes,aremereappear-

ances.Forthesakeofmorality,heintroducesanewkindoffact.

Thismeansthattheassumptionofafreedomofchoicebetweengoodandevil

isindispensable,despiteitsinconceivability.Thisfreedomofchoiceisproduced“by

thedeed”(eventhoughitcannotbeobservedinthedeed).ForKant,an“intelligible

world”opensuphere,whichhewiththehighestpathoscallsthe“reignoffreedom”;

Fichtewill fall into linewith this (sec.14).However,according toKant’snotionof

thegoodwill,thewillisnottochoose,butonlytowantthegoodmotivatingaction.

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Infact,oneonlyspeaksofthegoodwillwhenmoralactionhasproducedunpleasant

effectsorhasturnedouttobeuselessordetrimental.Thenthisactionisretrospec-

tively justifiedwith reference to the goodwill that provoked it. In thisway, Kant

viewsmoralactionfromtheverystartfromtheperspectiveofjustification.Thereby

heremovesalltaken-for-grantedness,naturalness,andeasefrommoralactionthat

mightprovokeothers’sympathy(inAdamSmith’ssense)andconsent.Thealterna-

tiveof ‘self-obligationversus sympathy,’ though, confrontsuswith thequestionof

theutilityofmoralactioningeneral.ThisisBentham’sstartingpoint.

JEREMYBENTHAM (1748-1832AD),whogrewupasamiracle child inapros-

perousfamily,studiedlaw,yetwithouteverhavingtopursueaprofession,develops

moral philosophy starting from the notion of usefulness – Kant’s and Bentham’s

conceptsofthemoralandthepoliticalareclassicalternativesinthehistoryofphi-

losophy.Bentham’s Introduction to thePrinciplesofMoralsandLegislationof1789

wassupposedtoserveausefulgoal:tosystematicallyoutlineapenallawforGreat

BritainthatcouldbepassedbyParliamentandthusbeofrealbenefittotheentire

population.Thus, themoral philosophywithwhichhe corroboratedhis penal law

hadtobeimmediatelyplausible;itisdifficulttodenythateveryonestrivesforhap-

piness.ThatwhichKantexcludedfrommorality,is,accordingtoBentham,itsend.If

needed, thepurposeof happinesswould justify amoral reorientation à laMande-

villeandSmith:even“ifhappinesswerebetterpromotedbywhatiscalledimmorali-

ty,immoralitywouldbecomeaduty;virtueandvicewouldchangeplaces.”

Happinesscansimplybegraspedasthepreponderanceofpleasureoverpain.

Notonlyhumanbeings,butalsoanimalswanttoavoidpainandfindpleasureinthe

longrun.Thus,Bentham,too,reliesonsentimentextendingfromtherethehorizon

ofmoralandlegalphilosophyinhisway.Atthesametime,hefocusesononesingle

principle,comparabletogravityinNewton’sphilosophyofnature.Utilityisnotonly

themeasureofevery individual’sorgovernment’ssuccessfulaction; instrivingfor

one’s own advantage, one also promotes others’ happiness insofar as one’s own

happinessdependsonthem.

According toBentham,onedoesneitherneed to interpolatea revaluationof

eviltogoodonthefreeeconomicmarketnorassumeasocialcontract.Benthamre-

gardstheindividualsdirectlyas“members”ofthe“fictitiousbody”ofthecommuni-

ty.Hence,inasimpletotaling,theinterestofthecommunityis“thesumoftheinter-

estsoftheseveralmemberswhocomposeit.”Inaddition,inBentham’sviewhappi-

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nesscanbescaledlikethepricesonthemarket.Inordertocreatethegreatesthap-

pinessof the greatestnumber, heproposes a “hedonistic orfelicific calculus”with

thefollowingvariablesorvectors:intensity,duration,certaintyoruncertainty,pro-

pinquityor remoteness, fecundity (doeshappinessbegetmorehappiness?),purity

(does happiness not havenegative consequences?), and extent (howmanypeople

enjoyhappiness?).Allpeopleshallcountequally.Thus,Bentham’sprinciple isuni-

versalaswell.

Finally,theconceptionofmoralactioninregardtohappinessincludesalsoan

‘ought’forBentham:thatwhichisusefulis“arightaction”andoughttobedone;this

is,inBentham’sview,theonlysenseofwhatwe’ought’todo.Themoralprincipleof

happinessorutilitycannotandneedsnottobeproven;instead,onecanproveeve-

rythingelsefromit.Theprincipleofhappinessorutilityisnotalwaysfollowedde-

liberately;oftenitisconcealedbyprejudice.Still,itcanonlybecombattedbybeing

assumednonethelessbecauseanyotherprinciplewouldalsohavetobe“goodfor”

something. Finally, this principle does not need any safeguardingwith the help of

religiousbelief.Benthamopenlyconfessedhisatheism.

Hisprincipleofhappinessorutilitycreatedadistance tocertainmoralsand

theircompulsions.Benthamadvocated liberalizationatall fronts,also inquestions

ofraceandsexuality.Hecampaignedfordemocratization, for thestateof law,and

against slavery. He wanted to supplement the three by then classic state powers

(legislative,executive,andjudiciary)withafourthandsupremepower:thepeople

or ‘theconstitutive’;however,hedidnotsucceedwiththispoliticalreform.Insofar

aswearenot reallyable tocalculate thesumofhappiness, since thehappinessof

onepersonisonlytoalimitedextentcomparabletothehappinessofanother,Ben-

thamhascreatedwithhisprincipleofthegreatesthappinessofthegreatestnumber

anewgenerality inorientingoneself:hisprincipleorientsasageneralbenchmark

instructingustodetectanddeleteinequality.LikeSmith’sgeneralityofthemarketis

itamorallyorientinggenerality.

Ofcourse,eventheprincipleofthegreatesthappinessofthegreatestnumber

turnsouttobeambiguous.Accordingto it,minoritiescaneasilybeoutvoted;Ben-

thamallowseven torture, if itbenefits thewhole. Insofaraseverysocietyneedsa

commonmorality,Benthamsuggestsamoraleducationofeveryonethroughasys-

temof sanctions including physical, religious, political, and public inconveniences.

Hearguesagainstacriminallawbasedonguiltandpleadsforacriminallawbased

68

ondeterrence. In the lackof idealisticguidelines, the freedomof thesinglehuman

beingconsistsonlyinsafetyagainsttheothers,whichisgrantedbythepoliceandby

the law,and inprotectionagainst illegalmeasuresof thegovernment.Without the

premiseofself-obligation,apowerfulgovernmentalsurveillanceandcontrolappa-

ratusbecomesnecessary,whichpermanentlymonitors thebehaviorofhumanbe-

ings (evenwith the help of informers and investigators) in order to punish every

wrongdoingwithsanctionsandcorrectit.Benthamwasmostinterestedinthepenal

system,for“themorestrictlywearewatched,thebetterwebehave.”Smith’sprinci-

pleofobservationhereturnsouttoberepressiveratherthaninspiring.

Thephilosophyoforientationgainsnew leewaysandalternative techniquesof

distinction through alternative conceptions of orientation that emerged in the

fieldofpracticalphilosophyattheendofthe18thcentury.Inthemoral,political,

andeconomic realms, the footholds fororientationarewidely spreadandam-

biguous;thatiswhytheneedforclearandreliablefootholdsforone’sactionde-

cisionsincreases.Ontheonehand,situationofactionsrequireahighsensitivity

ofobservationwhich,however,canbeangledindifferentdirections;ontheoth-

erhand,actiondecisionsare facilitatedbyprinciplesthatcanbebackedupby

differentkindsofevidence.

Smithcountsonthesensitivityofobservation,Rousseauonsensitivityand

reasonatonce,whileKantgroundspracticalreasonontheprincipleofthegood

will;Benthamputsallactiondecisionsunderthecontroloftheprincipleofhu-

mansearchforhappiness.Despitecontrarydistinctions,allofthemstillrelyona

benevolent nature. Smith and Rousseau drive forth contrary moral reorienta-

tions in extended leeways ofmoral orientation: according to Smith, one’s bad

owninterestspromotethewelfareofeveryoneinafreecommercialsociety;ac-

cording to Rousseau, human beings that are good by nature become evil in a

commercialsocietythatcreatesinequality;KantandBenthamfocusoncontrary

benchmarksofmoralorientation: thegoodwillof the individualor thehappi-

nessofall.

Smith upgrades observation to a second-order observation of observa-

tions.Thereby,hediscoversanewgenerality inorientation,which interrelates

uncertaintiessuchthattheybecomedynamicandproductive.Inmorality,thisis

proper behavior, on the economicmarket it is pricing. In this way, Smith can

69

movefrommoralestimationtoeconomicrating,tyingtogethermoralityandthe

market.RousseausupportstheFrenchRevolution,butalsoitsterror,byseeking

anunconditionalcertaintyinanewcivilsocietybasedonreason.Kantabstracts

fromtheindividualsituationofactionsinordertomakeconceivableauniversal

validity ofmorality, but can onlymorally appeal to politics. Bentham, by con-

trast, can give a concrete handle to the political legislative power in reducing

themotivationforactingtothepursuitofhappiness,butrunsintoalegallyau-

thorizedandgovernmentallyorganizedobservationofthepopulation.

Thepresentmoral,economic,andpoliticalorientationhastotakeintoac-

countallthesealternativeoptions.

13.AlternativeWaysofConceptualizingHowOneCanOrientOneself:

Mendelssohn,Kant,andHerder

The notion of ‘orienting oneself’ stems from geography and came to Germany

through the so-called pantheism controversy in philosophy. The Jew MOSES

MENDELSSOHN(1729-1786AD),nexttoKantoneoftheleadingphilosophersofGer-

manEnlightenment, tried to settle theconflictabout ‘faithversus reason’with the

helpof thenotionoforientation.DisputatiousChristians forcedhim into that con-

flict.Mendelssohnwasbornandrearedinhumblecircumstances.Hewasverysmall

instatureandinfrailhealth.Heworkedasahometutor,bookkeeper,Torahinstruc-

tor,writer,andmanagerofasilkfactory.HetranslatedRousseau’sDiscourseonthe

OriginandBasisofInequalityAmongMen intoGermanandupdatedLocke’sLetters

ConcerningTolerationforJudaism.Hewonascientificprizecompetitiontothedis-

favor of Kant, andwith numerous contributions, he rendered great service to the

recognition of Jews in society andphilosophy in thosedays.Mendelssohnwas re-

gardedastheGerman-JewishSocrates.HisfriendGOTTHOLDEPHRAIMLESSING(1729-

1781AD),themostprominentGermanpoetofEnlightenment,hadMendelssohnin

mindastheprototypeofhisprotagonistNathantheWise.Nonetheless,FrederickII,

KingofPrussia,whowasfamousforhispromotionoftheEnlightenmentandhistol-

erance,deniedhimadmissiontothePrussianAcademyofSciences.

InMendelssohn’seyes, Judaismcanbetolerantbecauseit isnotbasedondog-

mas,butratheronaformoflifewhoselawsitextractsfromtheTorah.Judaismori-

70

ents itselfby theTorahwithoutclaiming toeverbecapable tounderstand it fully.

Theword ‘Torah’meansdirectionandguidance, i.e.,orientation.AccordingtoJew-

ish tradition, the Torah is authored by God himself. Thus, the alternative of ‘faith

versusreason’doesnotariseatallinJudaism.

Yet,itispreciselythisalternativeonwhichthedecidedandinfluentialChristian

FRIEDRICHHEINRICH JACOBI (1743-1819AD) insistedwhenhe accused the deceased

LessingoffollowingthephilosophyoftheJewSpinoza(sec.9)andhence,according

tothecommoninterpretationinGermanyatthattime,ofcontemptibleatheism.Ja-

cobichallengedMendelssohntoacknowledgeChristianityandconfessitstheological

dogmas (several ofMendelssohn’s children did this later on). Through thismove,

Jacobi pointedly questioned the whole of Mendelssohn’s lifework. Under Jacobi’s

attack,Mendelssohn’sfriendshiptoLessingandhisservicetoJudaismandphiloso-

phygot tangledup. In thisseverepersonalemergencysituation,Mendelssohnwas

compelledtoreorientation,andthatwhichhelpedhimoutwastheconceptof ‘ori-

entingoneself.’

In regard to Spinozism,Mendelssohndistinguishesbetween soundhumanun-

derstandingand speculative reason, so thathe can concede thatSpinozawent too

farintermsofspeculativereasonwithhismetaphysicalconstructions;yet,amoder-

ate or refined “chastenedpantheism” is not to be condemned.He shows that, like

Lessing,onecanorientoneselfbySpinozismwithoutcommittingoneselftoit–and

thishappenedinGermanIdealism(sec.14).

However,Mendelssohndoesnotleaveitthere.Instead,hebeginstounderstand

reason itself in the senseof orientingoneself. Already inhis treatise on the senti-

ments (ÜberdieEmpfindungen),whichwasamuchdiscussed topicat the time,he

givesinapathbreakingmannerthoughttothesteeringofattentionintheexplora-

tionofobjects:putincontemporaryterms,onehastoselect,evaluate,andassociate

footholdsuntil theobtainedoverviewproducestheexciting“total impression”ofa

vibrantwhole.AccordingtoMendelssohn,thinkingisonlyoneoftheabilitiesthatis

inplayhere,andallofthisdoesnothappenconsciously,butonlysemi-consciously,

somnambulistically,asitwere.

Therefore,Mendelssohnexplicatesthenotionof‘orientingoneself’inanallegor-

icaldreamofreason,anarrationinwhichhetranslocatestheimageof“theparting

of theways”shapedbyProdicos (sec.4) to theSwissAlps.Thereby, the figuresof

“soundhumanunderstanding”and“speculativereason”appearasmountainguides.

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They come into conflictwith each other, so thewayfarers,whohave no sufficient

overviewofthesituation,areconfrontedwiththequestionoforientation.Mendels-

sohnputstheanswertothisquestionintothemouthofathirdperson,thefigureof

“prudentreason” that isequivalentwith the “I” in itsneed toorient itself.Hecon-

cludesthatonecantrustinprudentreason,whichreflectsuponbothsides.Onecan

holdontoitoronecantrustit.Prudentreasondoesnotcomeupwithprecepts;it

onlyrelatesthesignpoststoeachotherinsuchawaythatapassableroadappears.

AsMendelssohnhasit,prudentreason“orientsitself”bysoundhumanunderstand-

ing or common sense, and at the same time, it “corrects” common sensewith the

helpofthedeliberationsandconclusionsofspeculativereason.Thereasonableness

oforientationliesintheprudentweighingofbothsides.The“I”followingthiskind

of reasonableness changes constantly; inMendelssohn’s opinion, it has not a firm

apprehensionandconceptof itself; it is thecontinuously renewing self-referenceof

orientingoneself.Thus,whatevolvesoutof thecrisis inwhichtheChristiandispu-

tantJacobicasttheJewishenlightenerMendelssohn, isreasonasaself-referenceof

orientation.

WhenailingMendelssohndiedatthebeginningoftheyear1786,KANTwanted

tocometotherescueofthecaseandconcernofthisphilosopherofEnlightenment

whomhehighlyesteemed.He tookupMendelssohn’snotionof ‘orientingoneself,’

butrealigneditintermsofthepresettingofhisCritiqueofPureReason.

Kanthimselfwasalreadyclosetotheorientationproblem.IntheIntroductionto

his lectureon logic thathe gave regularly and thathisdisciple Jäsche later recon-

structed from Kant’s notes and his listeners’ transcripts, Kant places all insights

(mundaneones justasscientificandphilosophicalones) in “horizons” thatarenot

only“logically”determinedaccordingto“theinterestoftheintellect,”butalso“aes-

thetically,”accordingto“tasteinrelationtotheinterestoffeeling”aswellas“practi-

cally,”accordingto“utilityinrelationtotheinterestofthewill.”Inusingthemeta-

phorofthehorizon,heaffiliateswithadebatethatwaswell-establishedsinceLeib-

niz (sec. 9). Kant orients himself toward ALEXANDER GOTTLIEB BAUMGARTEN (1714-

1762AD)andGEORGEFRIEDRICHMEIER (1718-1777AD).Logic itselfdealswithun-

conditionallaws;yettheintroductiontologicisaboutrecommendablerulesormax-

imsthatorientordinaryandscientificthinking,i.e.aboutakindofpreorientation.In

this line,Kantsuggests“pre-determiningtheabsolutehorizonof thewholehuman

species(inregardtopastandfuturetimes)”andalso“definingthepositionthatour

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scholarshiptakes inthehorizonofknowledgeasawhole”;dependingonhowit is

categorizedandoriented, itbecomesanother character.Thismeans thatorienting

decisionsaretaken,forinstancetopredefinecognitioninthesenseofstrictlyobjec-

tiveorunconditionalknowledge,ormoralaction in thesenseof theunconditional

form of the categorical imperative.The preceding orienting decision conditions the

unconditional.However,accordingtoKant,thisdecisiononlyiscapableofconditioned

certainty. Thus, the decision for unconditional certainty is takenwithin the terms of

conditionedcertainty.

In his Introduction to Logic, Kant without further ado incorporates Mendels-

sohn’sdefinitionof‘orientingoneself.’Itisstatedapprovingly(inJäsche’srendition)

that philosophers shall “orient themselves in thinking,or in the use of speculative

reason throughcommonsense […]as a test toevaluate theveracityof speculative

reason[…]inordertodiscoverthemistakesoftheartificialuseoftheintellect.”Just

likeMendelssohn,Kantemphasizesheretheimportantroleofsoundhumanunder-

standing: the “judgments” of others can give one a “hint” so that one can review

one’sown“procedureof judging”withouthaving togive itup immediately incase

thata“contradiction”occurs.Saidinourlanguage:everydayorientationandschol-

arlyorientationareimprovedifotherorientationsareincludedinthem.

Kantcountersthescholasticconceptofphilosophy,accordingtowhichphiloso-

phersonlyturntootherphilosophersandexposethemselvestotheircriticism,with

a “worldly concept” of philosophy, according to which it delivers itself up to a

broaderpublicandthusalsotosoundhumanunderstanding.ForKant,thisworldly

conceptofphilosophyiscrucial.Foritis“essentialtocheckaninsightinthefaceof

humanbeingswhose intellect does not cling to any school.” Thosewho canmake

themselves understood to these publicly demonstrates “the complete insight in a

certainmatter.”Kantendorseseventhe“preliminaryjudgment”withwhichthede-

cisionabout the truthofa judgment ispostponedwhen it isnot (yet)clearwhere

the truth is tobe found.Commonsensemostoften judges itsmatters in thisway,

unless it is fooled by prejudices that it deems definitive judgments. According to

Kant, thepreliminary judgmentthat istypicaloforientationcanguidetheintellect

“inallmeditationand investigation”andshowmeansandways tomakeprogress;

moreover,itcan“sense”goalsthatcanbeachieved.Kantproposessomethinglikean

art of orientingoneself,withoutdesignating it such: “one couldevenprovide rules

abouthowtojudgeprovisionallyaboutanobject.”

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Yet, for Kant this does notmean that philosophers shall orient themselves by

commonsense.Inhistreatiseonthepantheismcontroversyof1786,whichisenti-

tledWasheißt: Sich imDenkenorientieren? (Whatdoes itmean toorientoneself in

thinking?),KantnotonlycountersJacobi,whomheconsidersareligiousenthusiast

or fanatic, but he also correctsMendelssohn’s understanding of what itmeans to

orientoneself.Kantdoessothroughhisowncritiqueofreason–withtheresultthat

heleadshiscritiquebeyond.InthediscussionofSpinoza,herestrainshimselfafter

somepeoplehadascribedSpinozismtohim,too.

Kantbeginshistreatisewiththeremarkthatnotionslike‘toorientoneself’are

good examples of how “pictorial representations (bildliche Vorstellungen)” make

conceptssuitableforusageandhow“manyausefulmaxim”canbewonfromthem

“even in abstract thinking.” In contrast, invoking common sense, in which all are

supposedtocoincide,isalwaysonlyafinal“emergencyrelief,”asKantnotedacou-

pleofyearsbeforeinthePrefacetohisProlegomenaintroducingintohisCritiqueof

PureReason.Whereitisaboutthepossibilitiesofphilosophyitself,“thestalestchat-

terer can take it on with the most thorough head.” Philosophymust insist on its

competence.AllthemoreisitKant’saimtodesignatereasonitselfasauthorityofits

orientation, whereas Mendelssohn has not drawn a sharp line between common

senseandspeculativereason.Therefore,inKant’sview,Mendelssohnfostered“the

completedethronementofreason”byJacobi.

Kant defines the notion of orientation starting from its original geographic

meaning:thefourcardinaldirections,orthefourpointsofthecompass,aredeter-

minedbythesunrise(soloriens).Butalreadyinhisearliertreatiseonthedifferenti-

ationbetweendifferentregionsinspace,OntheUltimateGroundoftheDifferentia-

tionofRegions inSpace (VondemerstenGrundedesUnterschiedesderGegendenim

Raume,1768),Kantcameacrosstheproblemofright-left-distinction.Thelattermay

appearself-evident,butthereisneitherasensorynora logiccriterionforthisdis-

tinction:onecanneitherperceivenordefinerightand leftwithoutentering intoa

circularargument.Therefore, thedifferencebetweenrightandleftconfusesKant’s

basic determination of cognition as a synthesis of sensory perception and logical

thinking.AsKantstatedelsewhere,thedistinctionofrightandleftis“givenwithout

being understood” (dari, non intelligi). One can only learn to distinguish between

rightandleftbypracticingthisdistinction.

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Beingcaught inthisquandary,Kanttriestofindawayout inhis1786treatise

on orienting oneself: he allocates the distinction between the four cardinal direc-

tions(andwith it theright-left-distinction) to “feeling.”Yet,onedoesnot feelany-

thinginemployingthisdistinction;rather,thisdistinctionisalsoa“subjectiveprin-

ciple”fillinginwherethe“objectiveprinciplesofreason”arenotsufficient.Toorient

oneselfisapreconditionintheusageofreason.

Reason,arguesKant,realizesthis“shortcoming,”whichinturninducesafeeling,

namelythe“feelingofneed.”Thisistheneedtoorientoneself.Thereby,reasonloses

its supposed autonomy and turns into aneedy reason. Here, reasonhas no longer

“freeinsight.”Instead,therightofsubjectiveneedwringsfromita“precondition”:a

“rational faith based on reason” (Vernunftglauben) rather than “rational insight”

(Vernunfteinsicht).

The term Vernunftglaube (literally: “reason-faith”) is obviously paradoxical: it

combines twoalternativeconcepts,betweenwhich Jacobi letMendelssohnchoose,

inonesingleterm.Thistermisinherentlycontradictory;withthisparadoxicalterm,

Kantreplaces the termof ‘orientingoneself’ thathelpedMendelssohntogetby; in

doingso,heerasestheleewaywhichMendelssohnwantedtogainthroughtheterm.

Kantproceedssystematically:heabstractsgraduallyfromgeographicorientationin

whichright-left-distinctioniscrucial,movesontoso-called“mathematical”orienta-

tion inwhichpositional relationships independentof theright-left-distinctionpre-

vail,andfinallyreaches“logical”orientationinwhichallconnectionswiththespatial

are transcended. In thisway,Kant arrives in the realmof the supernatural,which

wasthe“battleground”offormermetaphysicsandwhich,inKant’spracticalphilos-

ophy,becomes“thereignoffreedom”(sec.12).Here,whereorientationhasneither

footholdsnorleewaysforconsideration,reason’s“right”to“orientitselfthroughits

ownneed”(orthroughtheVernunftglaube)getsachance.Themeaningoforienta-

tionmergeswiththepracticalcertaintyofreasonanditsobligationtomoralaction.

Kantdoesnotusethenotionof‘orientingoneself’intheremainingchaptersofthis

treatiseandinhislaterwork.Reasonshalltriumph,albeitparadoxically.

The pureVernunftglaube is understood as faith in a Godwho rewards human

effortstobecomeworthyofhappinessbymeansofmoralaction,atleastinatrans-

cendentimmortallife.Vernunftglaubeisnotaformofknowledge,butratherfaithin

an “ideal of pure reason”whose conceivabilityKant has clarified in hisCritique of

PureReason(sec.11)andwhosepracticalsignificancehehasdefinedinhisCritique

75

ofPracticalReason(sec.12):theidealofa“highestgood”inwhichGlückwürdigkeit,

one’sbeingworthyofhappiness, andGlückseligkeit, one’s factualhappiness,unite.

Yet, this ideal servesasamere instrument for “orientingoneself in thinking,”pre-

cisely in the contextofmoral thinkingandacting, as a kindof “guidepostor com-

pass.”Ithelpsustoabandonthethoughtofanyadvantageorrewardformoralac-

tion, but it is notmandatory. At the end of his treatise on orienting oneself, Kant

mainlycampaignsforamoralconceptofGodinordertoforestallreligiousenthusi-

asm or fanaticism.With this inmind, he argues that reasonmust remain autono-

mous:thisispossibleifreasonorientsitselfthroughitselfalonewheneveritfeelsa

needfororientation.

JOHANNGOTTFRIEDHERDER(1744-1803AD), sonofapious teacherandastu-

dentofKant’sinKönigsberg,reactedpolemicallytoKant’streatise.Herdersoonbe-

cameacquaintedwith themostbrilliantmindsofhisday;heheldhighofficesand

posts in ecclesiastical and cultural authorities, and became one of the strongest

stimulators of his day in the fields of linguistic and literary studies, philosophy of

historyandofculture.Ashewrites inThisTooaPhilosophyofHistory for theFor-

mation of Humanity (1774), hewants to betake himself to the open seaswithout

abandoningthepolesaroundwhicheverythingrevolves:truth,consciousnessofbe-

nevolence, and happiness of humankind (Wahrheit, Bewusstsein desWohlwollens,

GlückseligkeitderMenschheit);yet,hoveringatseaonmassivewaves,inghostlight

andfoglightthatmightbeworsethantheblackestnight,hewantsto“diligentlytake

a look at these stars that point theway and givedirections, safety,and calm,” and

then steer the ship’s course “with devotion and industriousness.” In short: Herder

wantstoorienthimselfatanendlessanddangerousopensea.

Infact,heleadsphilosophybacktothefieldinwhichtheproblemsoforienta-

tion are most pressing, and he deliberately seeks situations of disorientation –

though starting from secure certainties of orientation. On thisway, he develops a

newunderstandingofhumanitywhosepointofdepartureistheexistingvarietyof

culturesandnations.Thereby,Herdermoreandmoregivesupontheuniversalism

ofEnlightenmentthinking.Fromthispointofview, inhis lateworkUnderstanding

andExperience:AMetacritiqueoftheCritiqueofPureReason(1799),heitembyitem

settles a scorewith Kant’s transcendental philosophy,more embittered than pru-

dent,andthusnotalwayswithconvincingarguments.

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TherehealsoinsertsanoteconcerningKant’streatiseonorientation.Herder

initiallyremindshisreadersoftheoriginallygeographicsenseofthenotionof‘ori-

entingoneself’–asensefromwhichKantaimedtoabsolvetheterm:“toorientone-

selfmeanstofindthefourcardinaldirectionsinspace(Weltgegenden)fororienting

maps,sails,etc.”ThenHerdermarksamistakeinKantwherethere isnone:hear-

guesthatthefourcardinaldirectionsarepresentevenwhennobodypaysattention

to them,and thatonecanneitherdeterminenorchange themthroughbeingposi-

tionedtotherightorthe left; forthechangeablehorizonofasinglepersondoes–

accordingtoHerder–notchangethe“firmhorizonoftheworld.”Herderisrightin

presupposingthatthereisaworldinwhichwemustorientourselves;yet,thedis-

tinctionsbetweeneastandwestorbetweenrightandleftobviouslyaredependent

on the standpoint or position that one takes up in the world. The notion of the

‘standpoint’wasingeneraluseatleastsinceSpinozaandLeibniz;Kantusesitoften.

Inthisrespect,Herderfallsshortofinsightsalreadygained.

HerdercontinueshisnoteonKantas follows: “Already thenotion that Ican

orientmyselfinthinkingimpliesthatImustorientmyself,thatis,thattherearefirm

pointsinsidemeandoutsideofmyselfthatIhavetobringintoaccord.”Thisisright

insofarastheonewhohastoorienthim-orherselfcoordinatespointsofreference,

which attract attention in his situation, putting them together to neatly arranged

patternsthatmakesense forhimorher.Still, thesearenot firmpoints,butrather

preliminary footholds that can prove tenable or not. There are no unconditioned

pointsorthingsinourhumanorientation.Herderhimselfadmitsthiswhenidentify-

ingorientingoneselfwith“findingoutwhereoneisintheworldandhowitrelates

tousandhowwerelatetotheworld.”

Yet,thenagainheonlylooksattheothersidedetachingtheself-referenceof

orientationfromitsreferencetotheworld:“IfIonlyorientmyselfwithmyself,this

meansthatIthrowallpartsoftheworldintomeanddefinetheminaccordwithmy

idiosyncraticegoism,and in thisway, I canbeverydisoriented in the trueworld.”

Forsure,thedisconnectionoforientationfromtheworldanditsfootholdsresultsin

disorientation. However, it is precisely the meaning of orienting oneself that one

doesnotdisconnectoneselffromtheworldanditschanges,butratherremainscon-

stantlyattentivetothem.Herder,bycontrast,drawsanabsurdconclusion,whichis

coherentonly forhimself: “WereI toorient theworldbymyself, Iwoulddisorient

theworldasIrevolvearoundmyself,orasIfeeldizzy.Theegoismorientingworlds

77

cannotendupotherwisethan inthe formofaphilosophyofvertigo;hereone isat

one’swit’sendwithallcertainty.”Herderplayswith theequivocalnessof theGer-

manwordSchwindel,whichstandsfor‘vertigo’andfor‘fraud,’inordertoinsinuate

thatKantattemptedtodefraud.Kantdidnotgointothatanymore.

Mendelssohn, Kant, and Herder were not yet ready to pose the problem of

‘orienting oneself’ in its whole breadth and depth. Kant’s distortion of Mendels-

sohn’s philosophical concept of ‘orienting oneself’ and Herder’s polemics against

Kant’sownuseofthisconcepthavenotbeenabletostopthe‘career’ofthisconcept

inthehistoryofphilosophy,though;onthecontrary,itscareerhasbeenaccelerated

throughtheirdispute.

Thephilosophyoforientationowesitsbasicnotionof‘orientingoneself’toacon-

troversyabout ‘faithversusreason.’Themostwell-knownthinkers inGermany

at theendof the18th centurywere involved in this controversy: thecombative

Christian Jacobi attacked the considerate JewMendelssohn because of his de-

ceasedfriendLessing’sunderstandingofSpinoza,whichwassuspectedofathe-

ism.Mendelssohn, theprototypeof Lessing’sNathan theWise, sought to coun-

terbalancethesituationofcombatwiththehelpoftheoldgeographicmetaphor

ofthecrossroads,animageofpausinginordertoorientoneself.Fromthis,Kant

extractedthenotionofanunconditionalVernunftglaube,throughwhichreason

orientsitselfintherealmoftheextrasensoryorsupernatural.

Herder, who with his philosophy of language, history, and culture went

beyondthescopeofaphilosophyshapedbyrationality,criticizedKantandre-

claimed the notion of ‘orienting oneself’ for the sensoryworld.Due to the fact

thatthenotionof‘orientingoneself’wasatthecenterofahistoricalcrisisofori-

entationthatwasaggravatedbypersonalpolemics,thisnotionbecamesoprom-

inentthatitsoonwonthroughinphilosophy,thesciences,andeverydaylifeand

gainedacceptanceintheformofthenoun‘orientation.’Theconceptoforienta-

tionhasthenforalongtimebeentakenforgranted,whichisthereasonwhyno

oneconsideredelucidatingitevenmore.

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14.AlternativeSurveysofKnowledge:TheEncyclopedias

byd’Alembert&DiderotandbyHegel

Whatisatstakeinorientingoneselfisnotonlytofindone’swayinacertainsitua-

tion,butalsotoobtainalong-termorientation–throughknowledge.Philosophersin

Franceinthesecondhalfofthe18thcenturywantedtoprovideasurveyofallavaila-

bleknowledge,alsoinordertopreparedemocracyandthegreatesthappinessofthe

greatestnumber.AFrenchgroupofpublishersgavethetaskoftranslatingandex-

tendingtheEnglishtwo-volumeCyclopaediaorUniversalDictionaryofArtsandSci-

encesbyEPHRAIMCHAMBERS(1680-1740AD)toDENISDIDEROT(1713-1784AD)and

JEANLERONDD’ALEMBERT(1717-1783AD). Inthecourseofthreedecades,between

1751 and 1780, these two volumes grew into 17 volumes of texts, 11 volumes of

plates,5supplementaryvolumes,and2volumescontainingindices.Allofthesevol-

umesconstitutetheEncyclopédieouDictionnaireraisonnédessciences,desartsetdes

métiers,parune sociétédegensde lettres, inEnglish:Encyclopedia, oraSystematic

DictionaryoftheSciences,Arts,andCrafts.Thisencyclopedia,whichwasworkedout

inacollaborationbetweenthebrightestmindsofFrenchEnlightenment,isratedas

the greatest achievement of French Enlightenment. In Germany, GEORG WILHELM

FRIEDRICH HEGEL (1770-1831 AD) alone created an encyclopedia in the form of a

philosophical “system” thatdevelops and justifies itself on its ownaccord, theEn-

zyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse. This Encyclopedia of

PhilosophicalSciencesinBasicOutlinehassetthehigheststandardinphilosophically

orderingandjustifyingknowledgeandmakingitsurveyable.

Probably it was the humanist and librarian at the French royal court,

GUILLAUMEBUDÉ(1468-1540AD),whointroducedtheterm‘encyclopedia.’Thisterm

combinestheGreekwordsenkyklios(enclosinginacircle)andpaideía(education);

justastheGermanwordBildung,itcomprisesboththeprocessandtheobjectofed-

ucation.TheFrenchenlightenersofthe18thcentury,whocalledthemselvesplainly

les philosophes (i.e. the philosophers) and their own times siècle philosophe (i.e. a

philosophicalage), integratedknowledgefromthesciencesandtheartsandcrafts.

Theeditorsof thisencyclopediawenttotheworkshopsof theworkers inorderto

receiveprecisedescriptionsoftheircrafts,tools,andmachinesinthepropertermi-

nology. According toDiderot, until thenmostworkers just followed their instinct,

79

but did not understand their machines; they work spontaneously and intuitively,

attending to the immediate situation. The Encyclopédie also describes routines,

whichguideordinary,artisanal,and technicalworks.Beingdescribedbyconcepts,

they can be comparedwith otherworks and thus be refined. The comprehensive

viewof all availableknowledge is supposed toprovideorientation in the senseof

creatingnewpossibilitiesofaction.

TheFrenchEncyclopédieistheresultofacollaborationofFrenchauthors(so-

ciétédegensdelettres), includingexpertsfromdifferentfieldsandtheleadingphi-

losophers of the day, among them as diverse thinkers as Montesquieu, Voltaire,

Rousseau,andd’Holbach.Manyofthemmetregularlyincafés,salons,theaters,edi-

torialoffices,andFreemasons’lodges;someofthembecamefriends,andallofthem

triedtoinfluencethemediaoftheirtimes:newspapers,stages,bookmarkets.Every

oneofthemwasanindependentthinker,yettheyorientedthemselvestowardeach

other.Asaconsequence,theFrenchEncyclopédiedidnotcomeintobeingontheba-

sisofknowledgethatequallyobligatedeveryone,butratherinthemodeofmutual

orientation.

Thatwhichconnectedthegroupofauthorswasfirstandforemostanantago-

nismagainsttheCatholicChurchinsofarasittriedtocontrolthepublicopinionby

imposing censorship. Voltaire called the group franc-penseurs, the free thinkers.

They constituted something like an intellectual scene that was in touch with the

highestsocialcircles.Despiteimpendingpublicationbansandincarceration,allau-

thorsenjoyedthebenevolenceoftheFrenchchiefcensorandofabsolutemonarchs

likeFrederickII.ofPrussiaandCatherineII.ofRussia.

Hence,theEncyclopédiespringsfrompersonalorientationswithoutanyinsti-

tutionalrestrictions.Theresponsibility for itwasnotplacedinasuperordinate in-

stitutionlikeanacademy,auniversity,oragovernmentaldepartment,butratherin

theeditors’hands:later,whend’Alembertvacatedhispositionbecauseofconstant

attacksontheEncyclopédie,Diderottookthetaskalone.Againstthewilloftheedi-

tors,onlythepublishersintervenedsometimesinordertopreventpublicationbans.

The editors complemented each other beautifully, although they were very

differentpersonalities.D’Alembert,illegitimatesonofacardinalandamarquise,an

outstandingmathematicianandphysicist,authoredarticlesmostlyfromthesefields.

He also authored the Preliminary Discourse of the Encyclopedia (Discours Prélimi-

nairedel’Encyclopédie),whereheinacalmandstraightforwardmannerexplicates

80

thecommonphilosophicalorientationofthewholegroupofauthors.Hewashighly

recognizedandbecamegeneralsecretaryoftheAcadémiefrançaiseforlife.Diderot,

instead, similar to Rousseau,withwhom hewas friends, led a dissipated life that

lackedanycleardirection.Tothedislikeofhisfather,amasterknifemaker,henev-

er lived in a stableposition,was temporarily imprisonedby the censors, followed

variousinterestsandgainednumerouscontactsandfriendships,whichhelpedhim

torecruittheauthorsfortheEncyclopédie.Hehadplentyofloveaffairs,fromwhich

hisfrankliteraryproductionbenefited.

Diderot’s thought was meandering, experimental, self-ironic, and he loved

paradoxes;heloathedstreamlinedrationalsystems;hewasvigilantagainstabsolute

claims, appreciated dissidents, and had the strength to leave things undecided.

However,duetohisbroadsphereofinterest,hegainedthereputationofbeingable

tooverlooktheknowledgeofhisdayandmakeitusefulforthegeneralpublic.Inthe

Encyclopédie,hefoundthetaskofhislifeandtheholdforhislife.Inthiscontext,he

workedconcentratedandaccordingtoschedule.

Hefacilitatedtheotherauthors’interestsandorientationsindeliberatelygiv-

ing them leeway for shaping the content and style of their articles on their own.

EvenhithertounknownresearchthattheauthorsoftheEncyclopédiehadconducted

forotherpurposes,wasallowed toappear.Theeditorsdemandednothingbutex-

actness,clarity,brevity,andoriginalityofeveryone.Thelatterrequirementwasdue

to the fact thatThe Comprehensive Universal Lexicon of All Sciences and Arts (Das

GrossevollständigeUniversal-LexiconAllerWissenschafftenundKünste),publishedin

1732-1754bytheGermanbooksellerandpublisherJOHANNHEINRICHZEDLER(1706-

1751AD), repeatedlywas accused of plagiarism.However, theEncyclopédie could

notavoidborrowingandadoptingsomearticlesfromothersources,forinstancethe

oneaboutorienter,s’orienter.

A large-scale endeavor like theEncyclopédie runs into the paradox that the

intendedsurveyofallup-to-dateknowledgegetslostagainduringthelongtimeof

preparation.Diderotstatedthat“ithasbecomenearlyasdifficulttofindone’sway

inalibraryasintheuniverse.”Forthisreason,asecond-ordersurveybecamenec-

essary:asurveyofthesurvey,andwithitanewself-referentialorientation.TheEncy-

clopédiecreatesitinafivefoldway:

(1.) Firstly, through thealphabetical order of the articles. Fordictionaries, it

datesbacktoAntiquity.Yet,thealphabeticalorderisnotmandatory,foradictionary

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couldalsobestructuredaccordingtowordfamiliesortofactualcoherencies.When

itcomestoencyclopedias,structuringthemaccordingtofactualcoherencieswould

bemoreobvious;here,thealphabetizationmeansrandomization.Theobjectiveco-

herenciesthatreallymatteraredissolvedand,attheirplace,anartificial,buteasily

achievableoverview isestablished;hereintheEncyclopédie followsoneof therules

ofDescartes’method(sec.9).Thearbitraryalphabeticalorder iseasyto learnand

fulfills thebasicneed fororientation: toquickly find information for a certainpur-

poseinacertainsituation.Thedecisionforthealphabeticalorderisadecisiononthe

wayoforientation:forfastfindingofknowledgeandagainstfactualcoherences.

Thisdecisionismomentous,forthealphabeticalorderenforcesthefragmen-

tationofknowledgein‘articles’(literally:smalllimbsorlinks)inwhichinformation

is condensed and abbreviated by a headword or catchword that shall capture or

channelattention.Diderotdiscussesindetailhowthefactualinterrelationshipsare

brokendowninthiswayintodifferentarticles.Atthesametime,the lengthofthe

articlesmustbe limitedsuchthattheycanbereadin limitedtimebecausethehu-

mancapacities fororientationcanonlygraspa limitednumberof informationina

limitedtimeframe.Theoverviewmustnotgetlostintheindividualarticles.Inaddi-

tion,thelengthofthearticlesmustcorrespondtotheimportanceofthesubjectmat-

ter, which becomes difficult if their authors have a huge leeway, as every one of

themconsidershisorherknowledgetobethemostimportant.Diderotreflectsthis

in detail, too. As there is no general law of how to produce an encyclopedia, he

thinks that specific virtues are demanded of the editor: power of judgment (juge-

ment), richnessof ideas (esprit), and thepenetrationof thematerial (pénétration),

that is,specificcapacities fororientation.Diderotalsodemandsaestheticsconcern-

ingthearticles:monotonyandboredomshouldbeavoidedasfaraspossible.

(2.) As descriptions and definitions hardly suffice in regard to handicraft

gadgets, and since they evenmight confuse the readers, the Encyclopédie supple-

mentsmanyarticleswithimagesandillustrationsthatshallhelpthereaderstocon-

structandoperate theappliances inquestion.As the illustrationsmustbe labeled,

theproblemof the rightnumberof orientingguideposts and roadmaps arises. For

Diderot, it isenoughtohaveguidepostsatplaceswhere travelersare indangerof

losingtheirway:“Wedidnotwanttolooklikeamanwhowouldplantguidepostsat

everysteponaroad,forfearthattravelerswoulddeviatefromit:itisenoughthat

therearesomeguidepostsattheplaceswheretravelersareatriskofgettinglost.”If

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therearetoomanyguideposts,hints,andfootholdsfororientation,onelosestrack

ofthem.

(3.)However, ina schematicgeneaology (arbregénéalogique), theeditorsof

theEncyclopédie trytoprovideanoverviewofthefactualcoherenceandinterrela-

tionof the articles.D’Alembert&Diderotheredivide theunderstanding (entende-

ment) into memory (mémoire), reason (raison) and imagination (imagination); to

memory,theyascribethehistoryofthecraftsdevelopingthroughtradition,torea-

son the sciences and to imagination the arts. After every keyword, theymark its

placeinthebranchesofknowledge.Yet,theyfreelyconfessthatotherdispositions

and systems would also be possible andmeaningful. A genealogy as such cannot

countasknowledge,butonlyasaprovisionalorientationaboutpossible factualco-

herencesinthesphereoftheknowable.

(4.) All the more significant becomes the internal concatenation (enchaîne-

ment)ofthearticleswiththehelpofreferences(renvoie).AsDiderothasit,concate-

nation transforms thewayof thinking (la façon communedepenser): “In scientific

treatises,theconcatenationofideasorphenomenagovernsthemethodologicalpro-

cedure; to theextent thatonemakesheadway, the themedevelops,generalizesor

diversifiesdependingonthemethodoneprefers.”Inordertodiscoversuchconcat-

enations,onealsoneedsspecificcapacitiesoforientationlike,forinstance,powerof

combination (esprit de combinaison), a sure feeling (instinct) if not genius (génie),

andinallofthis,oneneedshonesty(honnêteté)andcourage(courage).This isthe

casebecausethereferencesgrantampleleewaysandmultipleoptionsofinterpreta-

tion:theymayaimatthingsorwords,atnearbyordistantthings,oratdifferentas-

pectsofathing.

Over timeawidespreadsystemof referencesemerges.Diderothoped thata

properuseofsignswouldeventuallyenableconcatenationsjustaspreciseandtran-

sitionsjustasswiftasinmathematics.Plausibility(laforcedeladémonstration)in-

creasesinaccordancewiththedensificationofrelations(rapports,liaisons);ultimate-

ly, theencyclopedicorder(l’ordreencyclopédique) lies in theefficiencyof itsrefer-

ences,whichalsoshowsgapstobefilled.Whenevernewarticlescomeinaddition,

the editormust check anew the ‘parcours’ of references he established andmake

surethattheydonotatanyplacegraspatnothing.Inthisway,theencyclopedicor-

dercanbeimproved–untilitbecomesunsurveyable.

83

(5.)DiderotdedicatesaspecialarticleontheEncyclopédieintheEncyclopédie,

therebyprovidinganoverviewabouttheoverviewwithintheoverview,correspond-

ingtohoworientationaboutasituationtakesplaceintheverysituationinquestion.

Diderot’sarticlecontainsnotsomuchahistoricalandsystematicaccountof‘theen-

cyclopedia’ as a statement of accounts from thework at the present encyclopedic

project.Diderothereprovidesaphilosophyoforientationinanutshell.Alreadyinhis

Prospectus,hedescribestheorientationthattheEncyclopédieissupposedtogiveas

“aliteraryjourneyaroundtheworld[...]withoutgettinglost.”Expressedinourlan-

guage, one has to stick tomere clues that appear everywhere, under themost di-

verseconditions:“ifthereareanyfootholdsonthisseaofobjectsthatsurroundsus,

footholds like rocks that seem to pierce the surface and tower above other rocks,

this is onlydue toparticular systems, to vague conventions, and to certain events

thatareoutsidethephysicalunderstandingofbeingsandtothetrueachievements

ofphilosophy.”

InhisarticleontheEncyclopédieintheEncyclopédie,heemphasizesthisonce

againandaddsthat“thegenericencyclopedicorderis,asitwere,amapoftheworld

[…],thedetaileddescriptionofalltopics,thewellthoughtoutuniversaltopography

ofallthatwhichweknowintheintelligibleandthevisibleworld;andthereferences

serveasroutesbetweenthesetwoworlds,wherebythevisiblecanberegardedas

theoldworldandtheintelligibleasthenewworld.”

At the same time, oneneeds ideas regarding the goals of one’s research, i.e.

ideasof“firstandgeneralreasons”or,inshort:a“metaphysicsofthings,"whichcan

givedirectiontoonewhileoneisgropinginthedark,departingfromaccidentalbe-

ginnings.Inhisthirdcritique,theCritiqueofJudgement,Kantcalledthem“regulative

ideas”;wecallthemvanishingpointsoforientation.Yet,these“metaphysics”maybe

shapeddifferently:“Thewriter,thescholar,andtheartistleadthewayinthedark-

ness; when theymake progress, this is due to fortuity; they reach the goal like a

travelerwhohasgoneastrayandthengoestherightwaywithoutknowingthathe

doesso.”DuetothespiritofEnlightenment,onone’swaytothegoalonemustnot

just follow authorities, but also keep in sight the reasons forwhyoneprogresses,

and onemust remember one’s doubts – one has to distinguish between certainty

anduncertainty.TheEncyclopédieasawholeisorganizedasaneventoforientation.

Thethreestellar ‘Germanidealists,’ JOHANNGOTTLIEBFICHTE(1762-1814AD),

FRIEDRICHWILHELMJOSEPHSCHELLING(1775-1854AD),andGEORGWILHELMFRIEDRICH

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HEGEL(1770-1831AD),donotwanttoleaveitatphilosophycollecting,testing,and

orderingknowledgeabouttheworld.Theywanttosecureanunconditionalandtrue

knowledge that from the very start includes knowledge about God. Thereby, they

drawontheapriorideterminationsthatKant,inhisself-referentialcritiqueofrea-

son,hasworkedoutasnecessaryconditionsforobjectiveknowledgeandmoralac-

tion.Fichte,Schelling,andHegelbringthesedeterminationstogethertoa“doctrine”

or“system”of“philosophicalscience”thathasitsowntruth.SinceKanthasexclud-

edtherecognizabilityofthingsastheyareinthemselves,andtherebyalsotruthin

thetraditionalsense,Hegelstates inhisEncyclopediathata“stateofdespair”, that

is:akindofphilosophicaldisorientation,hasentered,whichneeds toberemoved.

That this ispossible throughreason’s self-reference is thekeypointof theGerman

idealists.

ForFICHTE,whooriginatedfrompoorcircumstancesandyetbecametherec-

torofthenewlyfoundedBerlinreformuniversity,reason’sself-referenceisthegate

tothat“reignoffreedom”thatwasamatterofinsightforRousseauandamatterof

the‘ought’forKant(sec.12).AlreadyforDescartes(sec.9),theself-referenceofthe

“Ithink”consistsinthinkingbeingperformed;forFichte,itisamatterofaction,of

thedeedorfact-act(Tathandlung):itisnotapre-givenobjectofknowledge,butra-

ther knowledge that the “I think” itself produces, and thus an unconditional

knowledgethatcannotbewrong.Fichtearguesthatthewholetheoryofscienceor

epistemology(Wissenschaftslehre)mustbuilduponthisknowledge. Itneedsnoat-

tentiontotheempiricalworldandthe individualityof the“I.”Fichtecomprehends

the“I”amereself-distinctionfromthe“non-I.”Ifoneappliesthisdistinctiontothe

distinction between “I” and “non-I” itself and so on, more and more knowledge

comes intobeing. In thisway,Fichtepreparedapurely constructive theoryofdis-

tinction.Thefactthattheconstructivelyprogressivefact-actofdistinctioncreatesits

own realm may have encouraged Fichte to always appear courageous and com-

bative,forinstancetoresolutelyraisehisvoicefortheFrenchRevolutionandlater

tofightjustasresolutelyagainstNapoleon’sruleoverEurope.

SCHELLING, already as a child conspicuously talented, was reared in an es-

teemedSwabianfamilyofpastors;intheTübingerStift,hestudiedProtestantThe-

ologytogetherwithHölderlinandHegel,andthroughGoethe’sintercession,hewas

appointedprofessorofphilosophyinJenaalreadyasa23-year-old. Inhis longlife,

Schellingpassedthroughavariedandinfluentialacademiccareer.Hewasatutorof

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Bavarian princes and finally became the successor of Fichte’s successor in Berlin,

namelyHegel.FollowingSpinoza(sec.9),heurgedtokeepnatureinmindinthedis-

tinctionsoftheself-referential“I”inordertomakenatureconceivableinthespirit

andthespiritinnature.Forthesamereason,heunderlinedtheunityoridentitythat

is eitherpresupposedorbroughtaboutbydistinctions.Asnotall things innature

canbediscernedconsciously,Schellingprobedintoaphilosophicalconceptionofthe

unconscious.ThereinheconvergeswiththeGermanromantics.

With hismost highly developed technique of distinction, his “dialectic” (sec.

15), HEGEL created the leading model of a self-contained system of philosophical

knowledge.Inthissystem,hewasabletobringallphilosophicalfieldsthatweredis-

cussedinhisdayaswellasallimportanthistoricalandcontemporaryphilosophical

positionsintoacoherentnexus,whichremainedconvincingfordecadestocome.He

expoundedthisnexusinhisEnzyklopädie,thephilosophicalalternativetotheEncy-

clopédieoftheFrenchenlightenerswhosepointofviewHegelalsointegrated.

Hegel’sacademiccareerwasslower thanSchelling’s.Grownup inaSwabian

family of civil servants and having studied theology in Tübingen, heworked as a

hometutor;thenhemovedtoJenabecauseofSchelling’s intercessionandcollabo-

ratedcloselywithhim.InNapoleoninvadingJena,hesawthenewspiritofthetime.

Hebecame themanaging editor of a newspaper inBamberg, the rector of an aca-

demichighschoolinNuremberg,andfinallyaprofessorofphilosophy,firstinHei-

delberg,theninBerlin.LikeFichteandSchelling,Hegelwasmarriedandhadseveral

children.

In 1801, Hegel started his publications with a comparison of Fichte’s and

Schelling’s philosophical systems. He wrote that he felt the “speculative need” to

gainanewunityoutofdifference.Tothisend,heintroducestheconceptofcompre-

hension(Begreifen),understoodascognizingcognitionorself-referentialknowing.In

thisshape,theprocessofcognitioncanhaveitsownunconditionaltruth.AsinPar-

menides(sec.2),thinkingandbeingturnouttobethesame.Inpositioningoneself

whollyonthesideof “speculative thought”andthemediationofconcepts thatare

independent of empirical evidence,Hegel from the outset excludesMendelssohn’s

andKant’squestionofhowtoorientoneself (sec.13). InHegel’sview,speculation

cancorrectcommonsense,butcommonsensecannotcontributeanythingtospecu-

lativethought.Inthereignoffreedomandtruth,theremustnotbeanyleewayorin-

determinationthatwouldrequireanykindoforientation.

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Hegeldoesnotwant to leave itatKant’spureandparadoxicalVernunftglau-

beneither.Rather,hewillfullycontinuestouseparadoxesor,asKantcallsthem,an-

tinomies,whichheturnsintoaprincipleofhistechniqueofdistinction.Heleavesbe-

hindthemereabstraction,i.e.themereomissionofdistinctions,forthesakeofever

more general and evermorehollow concepts throughwhich the concept of being

becomestheemptiestconcept;abstract“being”canbestatedofeverything,evenof

“nothing.”Spinozasublatedtheoppositionsbetweencauseandeffect,Godandna-

ture,partandwholebymergingthemintotheonedivinesubstancethatcontainsall

determinations in itself; in lieu of this substance, Kant placed the transcendental

subjectproducingallconceptualdeterminationsonitsown,eventhoughinspiredby

sensoryperception;Hegelnowsublatesthedistinctionbetweensubstanceandsub-

ject.Heusestheconceptof“system”inordertomakeconceivabletheunityofSpi-

noza’sdivinesubstanceandKant’s transcendentalsubjectasaunitythatproduces

itself.Onecanneitherimaginenorthinkthisunityabstractly;onemustgothedia-

lecticalwayofcomprehendingit.Andinordertodoso,oneneedsinstructions,one

needstobeorientedbyHegel–who,however,doeseverythingtomakethisprocess

look differently, namely in such away that the process of comprehending pushes

itselfforward.Theorientationthatseemstobecomesuperfluousinthecontextofphil-

osophicalknowledgeisneededagainonthewaytothisknowledge.

Inthefirstelaborationofhissystem,thePhenomenologyofSpirit(1807),He-

gel leads the individual out of its immediate situation and guides it to “absolute

knowing.” The individual departs from its “spiritless” and “uneducated point of

view”where itsconsciousness isnothingbut“sense-certainty”takingeverything it

perceives to be the real and true; underHegel’s guidance, consciousness becomes

aware of the fact that it is “self-conscious spirit.” Seeking formore certainty, con-

sciousnessexperiencesthatnewfootholdsturnouttobeuntenable,orthatonlythe

experienceofthesedisappointmentsiscertain.Thelattercontinuesuntilalldisap-

pointmentsaredealtwithintheprocessofcomprehension.Intheend,everythingis

clear;oneisfamiliarwithone’scertainties;oneisabletosovereignlydecidewhich

certaintyisappropriateinwhichsituation;andthisimpliesthatonecanorientone-

selfmasterfullyamongvariouscertainties. In the sovereignorientationof “absolute

knowing,”theneedfororientationdisappearsagain.Hegeloutlinesadialecticalway

thatleadstosovereignorientationthroughdisorientationandreorientation.

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Hegel’sEnzyklopädiewas first drafted for his pupils at the Nuremberg high

school.InHeidelbergandBerlin,heworkeditoutforhisstudents“fortheuseinhis

lectures”andreworkeditseveraltimesbeforehisdeath.ThetitleEnzyklopädieder

philosophischenWissenschaften im Grundrisse was already common in Germany. A

Grundrissisanoutlinethatistoprovideanoverview:Hegelwantedtogiveanover-

viewofthesystematicorderofphilosophicalconcepts.Beingitssingleauthor,hetried

toshowthathedidnotplayanyroleasaperson.

Hegelgivesanoverviewalreadythroughhistableofcontents,whichhecalls

an“indicationofcontents”(Inhalts-Anzeige).Thematerialsarenotregisteredinret-

rospectasinusualtablesofcontents;Hegelneitherleavesitatanapparentlynatu-

ralgenealogicaltreeofknowledge.Instead,hisencyclopediademonstratestheself-

differentiationoftheunityofphilosophicalknowledge,whichisasuccessionofphilo-

sophicalconceptsthatdevelopsitselfstepbystepatuptofivelevelsofdifferentia-

tion.Alllevelsaredividedintothreeparts,whichisduetothedialectic(sec.15).The

supremeandmostoverseeabledivisionisthatwhichconsistsofthefollowingthree

parts:TheScienceofLogic,ThePhilosophyofNature,andThePhilosophyofSpirit.At

the second level,The Science of Logic divides into the “doctrines” of being, of es-

sence, and of the concept itself;ThePhilosophy ofNature intomechanics, physics,

and organics; andThe Philosophy of Spirit into subjective, objective, and absolute

spirit.Atthethirdlevel,thesectionon“Theabsolutespirit”comprisesart,religion,

and philosophy. Hence, theway of comprehension leads to philosophy itself. It is

philosophy’s achievement to comprehend the entire systematic coherence of the

concepts throughwhichwe comprehend theworld. The system closes by leading

backtoitsbeginning,andphilosophyturnsouttobetheleadingscience.

Thedivisionof theEnzyklopädie into the threemainpartsmeans thatphilo-

sophicalthinkingfirstofallcomprehendsitselfinTheScienceofLogic,thoughnotin

aformallogicthatKanttakesasabasisforhisCritiqueofPureReason.Hegelinstead

developsalogicthatatthesametimeismetaphysics;forAristotelianlogiccanonly

beunderstoodinitscloseconnectionwithAristotelianmetaphysics.Thentheprob-

lemof the transition fromThe Science of Logic toThePhilosophy ofNature arises,

which is not immediately plausible and thus controversial: once one has compre-

hended(inHegel’ssense)thatbeing,asParmenidesthoughtit(sec.2),canonlybe

being-as-thought,thedifferencebetweenbeingandthinkingissublated.Thenthey

becomeaunityhavingthesamestructureasintuition,namelyimmediategivenness.

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Hegel calls thisunity the “absolute idea,” literallyan intuitionor representationof

thinking,which isabsolvedfromtheeffortsof thinking.Assuch, itappearsas“na-

ture.”

ThePhilosophyofSpiritcanthenbuildonThePhilosophyofNature:theHege-

lian“Organik”leadstothe“animalorganism,”whichinturnleadstothe“reproduc-

tive process” (Gattungsprozess). The “subjective spirit” begins with the “doctrine”

(Lehre)aboutthenaturalhumanbeing,i.e.with“anthropology.”Herefrom,the“spir-

ituality” (Geistigkeit) of the person emerges, thereafter the spirituality of social

structures, i.e. the law,morality, and the state. The “absolute spirit” embraces the

totalityofallstructuresthattranscendsociality,initiallyinworksofart,theninreli-

gious ideas,andfinally intheconceptsofphilosophy. Inthisway,theconceptsbe-

comemoreabstractandformahierarchyofsub-andsuperordinationsontheone

hand;buton theotherhand, theygraspbeing inevermorenuancedandcomplex

ways.Nowphilosophicalthinkingdoesnotonlyorientitselfmasterfullyaboutitscer-

tainties,butalsointherealmofbeingitself,whichconsistsofitsbeing-thought.

ThesectionsinHegel’sEnzyklopädiearenumberedparagraphs,whichcontain

a sequence of consequently successive steps of thought (altogether 577). Like the

articles of theEncyclopédie, the paragraphs can be read and thought trough inde-

pendentlyofeachother;forinstance,youcanlearnwhatisspaceandtimeorspirit,

morality, and civil society. But the paragraphs obviously belong to the systematic

totalityinwhosecontextalonetheycanbereallyunderstood.Thiscontextdispens-

eswithasystemofreferencesandwithmetaphysicalvanishingpointsliketheones

in the Encyclopédie. Still, occasional references can also be found in Hegel’s En-

zyklopädie.

HegelglossestheparagraphswithAnmerkungen,i.e.withnotesthataretypo-

graphicallydistinguished from the §§; afterhisdeath, therewere addedextensive

Zusätzeoradditions,carriedtogetherfromhisstudents’ lecturenotes.Theannota-

tionsandtheadditionsdobothoftenhelpusunderstandthepurelyconceptualcon-

nections in the §§; they can be short or long, and they give us hints pointing into

completely different directions. Inmost cases, the notes and additions are factual

remarks, often on current or previous scientific or philosophical discussions; now

andthen,misunderstandingsarewardedoff.Inthisway,thesystembecomescross-

linkedwithitsnon-systematiccircumstances.Thishappensinvariousways,without

systematic stringency.On thewhole, the annotationsmultiply the coverage of the

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Enzyklopädie – and threaten to, again,make it confusing. However, one is able to

concentrateontheparagraphsthemselvesduetotheclearseparationbetweenthem

and their annotations. Thus, crossing the borders of the system, theEnzyklopädie

createsagradedpracticeoforientation. It integratesthescholasticandtheworldly

conceptofphilosophypointbypoint,whileKantassignedthemtodifferentwritings

(sec.13).

Nonetheless,onemustsomehowenterintothephilosophicalsystem.Thatis,

onemustfindthewayfromtheindividualandempirical-scientificstandpointtothe

standpointofphilosophicalknowledge.Hegeloffersseveralapproachesfromdiffer-

ent standpoints (Standpunkte). The first is the aforementioned approach from the

“uneducatedstandpoint”of“sense-certainty”whichisexplainedinthePhenomenol-

ogyofSpiritof1807.Onthe“educatedstandpoint”of“absoluteknowing”orofThe

ScienceofLogic,whichHegelatfirstpublishedseparatelyin1812-1816intwovol-

umes, one proceeds from the insight that subject and object do not differ in true

knowledgetotheconcretephilosophyofnatureandofspiritintheEnzyklopädie.

Yet, theEnzyklopädie, the completed system, has its own Introduction.Here

Hegel starts from the ideas of religion andeveryday experience and the empirical

sciences. For him, they “incite” philosophical thinking altogether and convert the

accidentaltonecessity.Hegelexplainsthisasfollows:philosophyrelatestoexperi-

ence like eating to food: the former is there thanks to the latter, but it provesun-

grateful insofar as food is consumedby eating. In current terms: the environment

constantly irritates the autonomous system, and the system is motivated to inte-

gratetheenvironmentaccordingtoitsownconcepts.

AsHegelwrites in his Introduction to theEnzyklopädie, every philosophy is

duetoearlierphilosophies,thatis,tothehistoryofphilosophy.Hegel’sphilosophy

incorporateshistoryinsuchawaythatitrecognizesthestepsinhistoryasstepsin

hisownsystematicdevelopment;historyturnsouttobeasystematicprogresslead-

ingtomostrecentphilosophy.Hence,Hegelhasalsoportrayedhissystemasahis-

toryofphilosophy.

As a result, one can approach the system from one’s own individual stand-

point,fromthestandpointofreligion,fromthestandpointoftheempiricalsciences,

fromthestandpointoftheabsoluteknowledgeoflogic,andfromthestandpointsof

historicalphilosophies.However,onedoesonlyapproachthesystemifonehasthe

speculativeneed forphilosophical,unconditional,and trueknowledge.Conversely,

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thesystemisnotdependentonallthesestandpointsandapproaches.Hegelshows

thisby integratingtheminhisEnzyklopädie itself; thePhenomenologyofSpirit,the

ScienceofLogic,andtheHistoryofPhilosophybecome, inrevisedversions,partsof

theEnzyklopädie.Thelatterthusdisposesofapproachestoitself.

Still, theEnzyklopädie has, inHegel’s eyes, also a “standpoint” (Standpunkt).

HereHegel’smost famous sentence applies: “thatwhich is reasonable is real, and

thatwhichisrealisreasonable.”(wasvernünftigist,dasistwirklich,undwaswirklich

ist,dasistvernünftig.)Seenfromthestandpointofthe“uneducated”individualthat

observeshowitsworldconstantlychangesinmoreorlesschaoticways,thequoteis

nonsense;seenfromapoliticalstandpoint,thequoteisoutrageousbecauseitseems

to justify theexistingpolitical conditions, so thatonecouldsee thephilosopherof

the Prussian state in Hegel; yet, seen from the standpoint of philosophical

knowledge,thequoteistrue:simplybecause,inHegel’ssense,onecanonlyspeakof

‘reason,’‘reality,’and‘truth’ifonehascomprehendedtheminanunconditionalsys-

temofknowledge.Inthissystem,realityisreasonableandtrue.

It isno coincidence thatHegel’s systembeginswith the standpointofphilo-

sophicalthinkingbecausethecircleoftheself-referentialsystemreturningtoitself

has,strictlyspeaking,nostartingpoint;anystandpointisastandpointonlyfromthe

perspectiveofother, conditioned standpoints.Therefore, thebeginningof the sys-

temisnothingbutthedecisiontogetoneselfintophilosophyandtoorientoneself

by it. Yet, this is a decision. In the draft to his first Berlin lecture about the En-

zyklopädie,Hegelnoteddown:“Thedecisiontophilosophizecasts itself intothink-

ing like intoanendlessocean; all thebright colors, all the footholds (Stützpunkte)

havedisappeared, all the other friendly lights are extinguished.Only the one star,

theinnerstarofthespirit,shines;itisthepolarstar.”

Yet,Hegelisalsoawareofthefactthatphilosophyinevitablyisthephilosophy

ofacertainageandtakesthepointofviewofitsday.Healsowritesthatphilosophy

is“itstimecapturedinthoughts”andthat ithasbecometimeforphilosophytobe

elevatedtothestatusofscience.Hegelisnotasnaiveastobelievethatphilosophy

andtimewillendwithhisphilosophy.Sure,oncephilosophyhasachievedthetrue

philosophicalknowledgeinHegel’ssense,itwillnotbeabletodevelopitselffurther.

Buttimewillgoonandpassby.Afterhavingbeenintenselyefficaciousfordecades,

Hegel’sphilosophyhassimplybecomeoutdated.Fromvariouspointsofview,ithas

beendeclaredone-sided,incorrect,or“dead”–inmostcases,ithasnotbeenunder-

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stoodanylonger.Hegel’sphilosophyhaslostitsplausibilityinadifferentageorina

newsituation,withoutitbeingpossibletoadduceaclear,unambiguousortruerea-

sonforthat.Onehasorientedoneselfanew.

The philosophy of orientation finds alternativemodels of creating permanent

overviews of knowledge in d’Alembert’s & Diderot’sEncyclopédie ou Diction-

naire raisonné des sciences, des arts et desmétiers on the one hand, and in

Hegel’s Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse:

ZumGebrauchseinerVorlesungenontheother.

D’Alembert&Diderotprovideacollectionof scientific,artistic,andcraft

knowledgerelevant for thedevelopmentofall fieldsof society;aseditors, they

collaboratewithmanyotherauthors.Theyleaveampleleewayfortheircapaci-

tiesfororientation.Theystructureknowledgeaccordingtotheorientingprinci-

pleofrapidretrieval,i.e.throughanalphabeticalorderthatiseasytooverlook,

but in factarbitrary inregardto thesubjectmatter inquestion.Thisprinciple

enforces thedecompositionanddispersalofknowledge in (moreor less) small

articles.Thismakesa second-orderoverviewnecessary, i.e. anoverviewof the

overview: d’Alembert & Diderot try to create a schematic genealogy of

knowledge, a reference system among the articles, metaphysics as vanishing

pointforthesearch,andanoverviewoftheproductionofoverviewinaspecial

EncyclopédiearticlewithintheEncyclopédieitself.

InhisEnzyklopädie,Hegeloffersoppositiontotheattentioneconomyor-

ganizing theFrenchEncyclopédieasaprocessoforientation.Hegelcountson

the inner logicofasystemofphilosophicalconceptsdeveloping itselfoutof it-

self.Herethedialecticofconceptsistheorganizingprincipleaccordingtowhich

acomprehensive,reasonedandoverseeableunityofknowledgeiscreated.Hegel

aimstoenableunconditionalknowledgeinphilosophyandanindependentphil-

osophical truth. So, philosophy becomes sovereign and can fully follow its

“speculativeneed.”However,theneedfororientationarisesanewwhenitcomes

totheinterpretationofphilosophicalconceptsintheempiricalworldandtothe

approachoraccesstothesystemofknowledgefromdifferent“standpoints.”He-

geltakesthisintoaccount,too,throughagradedpracticeoforientationwithin

thesystem.However,hetherebycreatesanewparadox:thesystematoncepre-

supposesorientationandrendersitredundantinsublatingitdialectically.Hegel

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knows that the standpoint of his philosophy can only be a standpoint in time,

that it isdependentonnon-philosophicalorientation,and that theorientation

thathisphilosophyprovideshasitstimeaswell.

15.AlternativeCompositionsofKnowledge:

Hegel’sandSchleiermacher’sDialectic

Hegel’sdialecticwasalreadyinHegel’slifetimeconfrontedwithanalternative:one

thatstarts fromthe individual inneedoforientationandstayswith it,namely the

dialecticofFRIEDRICHDANIELERNSTSCHLEIERMACHER(1768-1834AD).Schleiermacher

wasa theologianand aphilosopher,who,on theonehand, implementeda radical

reformofProtestanttheology,whichheshapedformorethanacentury,and,onthe

otherhand,developedageneraloutlineof a realisticphilosophyoforientationon

thebasisofoneandthesamepivotal idea.BothHegelandSchleiermacherworked

with new, but alternative techniques of distinction. The meaning of Hegel’s and

Schleiermacher’svaryingkindsofdialecticisnotoriouslycontested;wetrytoclarify

itincontraposingtheiralternativetechniquesofdistinction.

Inhisdialectic,Hegel–likeFichte–setsoutfromthedistinctionitself inthe

formof ‘A iseitherXornon-X.’AccordingtoSpinoza’s formulaomnisdeterminatio

estnegatioquotedbyHegel,everydeterminationisthenegationofanother.Hence,

determinationsworkwithoppositesthatexcludeeachother;theyareexclusivedis-

tinctions.InthePhenomenologyofSpirit,thewayto“absoluteknowledge”(sec.14)

is away of negating all apparently certain determinations of truth; it leads to the

critical truthabout truth.Hegel labels this “wayofdespair” as “skepticismaccom-

plishingitself.”Hepresentsitasawayonwhichtheindividualispushedondespite

itself:a“necessarypassage.”Followingthis logic,which isnotpurely formal,para-

doxically,negationintheformofa“determinatenegation”bringsforthpositivede-

terminations.

Formallogicassumesthatconceptsretaintheirmeaningwhenbeingconnect-

edwitheachother.Therefore,theycanbeabbreviatedasformalsignslikeAandB.

Already Aristotle, the father of this logic, proceeded like this.Mathematics,which

doesnotknowanysemanticshiftsofitssigns,restsonthisassumption.Yet,infact,

conceptschangetheirmeaningwhentheyaretiedtogether,arguesHegel.IfIsayof

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arosethatitisred,thisisnotanabstractred,butratherthisveryspecificredofthat

concreterose,hardlydeterminable in itsnuances;and therosedeterminedby the

propositionofbeingred,isnotjustanyrose,butpreciselythisrose,whichisdeter-

mined such and such. In this respect, formal logic has an antinomic, paradoxical

premise:indeterminingitsobjects,itdeprivesthemoftheirdeterminations.

Thisparadoxcannotbeavoided,butonecanmakeitfruitful,whichHegeldid

throughhisdialectical logic. Itsaysthat, indistinguishinganobjectvianegationof

onesideof thedistinction,anewdeterminationemerges; yet, thereby thedistinc-

tionitselfchanges;thatiswhyitisnecessarytoalsodeterminetheunityofthedis-

tinctionaccording towhich thedetermination ismade.Subsequently, theobject is

determined inanewandricherwayandbecomespartofa largercontext, though

notsimplythroughabstraction,butratherthroughaconceptemergingfromthede-

terminatenegation.

Thesimplestexample is theonewithwhichHegelhimselfbegins inTheSci-

enceofLogic,thedeterminationofbeing.As‘being’canbestatedofabsolutelyeve-

rything(everything thatexists issomehow,andbe itasamere ideaor invention),

‘being’ itself cannot be determined by anything; thus, its determination is also its

negation:‘nothing.’Itfollowsthat‘being’immediatelytransitionsinto‘nothing,’and,

asmentionedabove,of ‘nothing’onecanalsosaythat it ‘is’(‘it isnothing’). ‘Being’

and ‘nothing’are,paradoxically,atoncedifferentiatedandnotdifferentiated.They

haveonethingincommon:theytransitionimmediatelyintoeachother.Theunityof

their distinction is becoming: ‘being’becomes ‘nothing,’ and ‘nothing’becomes ‘be-

ing.’Thenotionof ‘becoming’ abolishes theparadox, for in ‘becoming,’ ‘being’ and

‘nothing’areatoncepreservedanddisappear,or,asHegelputsit,‘being’and‘noth-

ing’are“sublated.”

However,theunityof ‘becoming’includesanewparadoxbecause‘becoming’

enduresanddisappearsincessantly.ForHegel,itis“anunstableunrestthatcollaps-

es into a calm result.” Its paradoxical determination can only be preserved if the

paradoxis,inturn,abolishedbyanotherdetermination:thebeing-there(Dasein)of

something(Etwas)thatcanbethiswayorthatwayortransformitself–withever

newparadoxespushingaheadthe“necessarypassage.”

Another,easilyaccessibleexampleisthenotionoffamilyinthechapterabout

“ObjectiveSpirit” inHegel’sEncyclopedia. In the family,naturally grownmoral life

(Sittlichkeit)canbedeterminedasfollows:allfamilymemberstrytrustfullyandlov-

94

inglytodojusticetotheindividualneedsoftheothers.Itbelongstothisnaturalde-

terminationofthefamilythatitmultipliesitselfinthisspirit.Yet,whenacertainde-

greeofmultiplicationisreached,thefamilymembersdriftapartandlosetheirnatu-

ralattachments.Inthisway,thefamilyentersintosociety(Gesellschaft)andthereby

intoanothersystemofneedssatisfaction:thecompetitiononmarketsbasedonthe

divisionoflabor,wherethenaturalvalueofthingsandtheconsensualparticipation

inthemgetslost.Everythingbecomesware,commodity,merchandise(sec.12,17),

andthemorallifeofthefamilyisnegatedbyanopposedmorallife.Yet,thisalsohas

an advantage: societal needs satisfaction is regulated by the state, which thereby

createsahigherandricherSittlichkeit.Boththefamilyandthecivilsocietyaresub-

latedinit.

ThecomparisonoftheseexamplesshowsthatthemethodofHegel’sdialectic

cannotbeformalized(forinstanceintheschemethesis–antithesis–synthesis),but

israther,asHegelsays,“theparticularmethodofeachsubjectmatteritself”;thede-

terminatenegation takesplace in a peculiarway in every situation, dependent on

themeaningsoftherespectiveconcepts.AndyetisitHegel’sclaimthatthedetermi-

natenegationtakesplaceina“necessarymovement”oftheself-referentialconcept

of the concept,whichmeans: an exclusively self-determined and insofar uncondi-

tioneddetermining-itself-further of the initial determinationof being.To this end,

thePhenomenologyofSpiritpresupposesanindividualconsciousness,whichdiffer-

entiatesitselfassubjectfromitsrespectiveobjects,orwhichdifferentiatesitscon-

ceptsfromthingsexistingbythemselves.Thesubjectobservesstepbystephowits

determinationsbecomeparadoxicalandhowtheparadoxesaredissolvedagainby

new concepts. Then, inThe Science of Logic and theEncyclopedia of Philosophical

SciencesinBasicOutline,thedistinctionbetweenconceptandobjectissublated,and

theself-referentialconceptoftheconceptmovesaheadbyitself.

However,Hegel researchhasevinced that thepathof this conceptualmove-

mentrestslessoninternalnecessitiesthanonparticulardecisions.Thetransitions

arenotwithoutanyalternative;rather,themeaningsoftheconceptsuseddepend,

asHegelhimselfpointsout,on leeways: “oneandthesameword”canbeused“for

twoopposeddeterminations.”Forexample, “becoming” (Werden) caneithermean

an incessantgenerationandcorruptionor the steadycontinuationof thisprocess;

theGermanwordAufheben can equallymean “to cease, to put an end to” and “to

preserve.” Within the semantic leeways of such words, different movements are

95

possible, for instancealternativesubsumptionsofpreviouslyopposedconcepts. In

thisway,movementcanbeclassifiedasresting(inthesenseof‘restingatacertain

placeineachmoment,’asZenon,astudentofParmenides,pointedout),andnecessi-

ty as freedom, and vice versa. Which path is taken must be decided, seemingly

throughtheself-referentialmovementoftheconceptoftheconcept,yetinfact,itis

decided by the author arranging this movement. The apparent necessity of the

movementarises through theresolutenessof theauthor,whoclings to thealready

achievedremovalof therespectiveparadoxes.That is,hedrawson thepreviously

accomplished conceptswherever this ismeaningful, butheno longer regresses to

thelesscomplexones.

ThetransitionsHegelcreatesrequiretheartofcombination,asurefeelingor

intuition, ifnotgenius– justasDiderot’sreferencesbeneaththelexiconentriesdo

(sec. 14). For the readers, dialectical developments first become plausible if the

nameofthenewconceptismentioned,whichisusuallyfamiliar,i.e.obtainedfrom

the previous everyday orientation and thus immediately understandable, but now

becomes relevant in its significance for the coherence of the system.According to

Hegel,wethinkinnames,andeventheapparentlypurelyself-referentialconstruc-

tionisthereforealsoareconstructionthatreferstootherthings,persons,andcom-

monly used concepts. The familiar names are the footholds of a pre-orientation

withoutwhichonecannotunderstandtheargumentationoftheEncyclopediaandits

dialectic.

SCHLEIERMACHER, sonofapastor, raisedaPietist,distancedhimself fromPie-

tism,workedaspreacherandprofessorat thenewly foundedUniversityofBerlin.

Hehadahugepublicinfluence.HecreatedthetranslationofPlatothathasbeenau-

thoritativeuntiltoday.Hewasmarried,verysociableandhighlyesteemedalsoasa

humanbeing.HemovedintheBerlinsalonsofintellectualsanddefendedascandal-

ousnovel justashedefendedtheemancipationoftheJews.Heachievedaffluence,

united the Protestant churches in Prussia, developed a progressive educational

movement,hadnumeroussuccessfuldisciples–andcompeted fiercelywithHegel.

This competition increased in his disciples. Schleiermacher’s philosophy, inwhich

he follows Spinoza, is similarly broad in scope asHegel’s, but deliberately not de-

signedasa system.Schleiermacher, aGerman idealistof another fashion, sparsely

interestedinpolemics,wantedtoleadKant’scritiquebacktolifeinsteadofconclud-

ing it through a system. In thisway, Schleiermacher came across the basic condi-

96

tionsoforientingoneself. Just likeFichte,heregularlyusedthenotionoforienting

oneself,butdidnotyetturnitintoatopiconitsownandneitherdevelopedhisthe-

ologyandphilosophyonthebasisofthisnotion.HegelandSchleiermacherdidnot

engageinadeeperphilosophicaldispute.

InhisSpeechesonReligionof1799(authoredlongbeforeHegel’sPhenomenol-

ogyofSpirit),SchleiermacherbeginswitharevolutionoftheunderstandingofGod:

insteadofbeingabletocomprehendGod,Godisexperiencedinthe“feelingofabso-

lutedependency”(Gefühl schlechthinnigerAbhängigkeit,asheput it inaphrasehe

coined later). The phrase “feeling of absolute dependency” is a deliberately non-

religious formulation designating religion. With this phrase, Schleiermacher ad-

dressestheundeniablefactthatone–despiteofallfreedomofthoughtandfreedom

of choice – all around remains dependent on circumstances and processes in the

worldfromwhichonecannotfreeoneself,butwhichoneexperiencesstronglywith-

outbeingable toput them intowords.Thisdependencycan,butneedsnotneces-

sarilyberelatedtoGod,whetheritbeaSpinozisticall-embracingorapersonalGod.

Thus,theascertainmentofthisdependencyisatthesametimeaphilosophicalbasic

statement,acourageousreorientationalso inphilosophy:Schleiermacherassumes

thefundamentalcontingencyorsituativityofallhumanthought,decision,judgment,

and action,which one can never understand completely, let alone comprehend in

Hegel’s sense; andone cannever freeoneself from this contingencyor situativity.

Seenfromaphilosophicalperspective,thefeelingofabsolutedependencyisthebasic

moodoforientationinviewofincessantlychangingsituations.

Asafeeling,itisthefeelingofanindividual.ForSchleiermacher,theindividual

is and remains the locus and the basis of all possible knowledge. Involved in the

conditionsoftheworldthatitcannotoverview,theindividualisforitselfasincom-

prehensibleasisGod,anditcanonlytoalimitedextentexpressitselfbythemeans

oflanguage.Schleiermacher’sdialecticproceedsfromthispointofdeparture,which

isalso,thoughinawhollydifferentmanner,thecoreofhisphilosophy.Helectured

aboutitagainandagainonthebasisoffewfootholdsinordertocontinuouslyenrich

it with new insights in vivid talks. In this literary form Schleiermacher’s dialectic

couldremaininflux;firstafterhisdeathwasitwrittenoutindifferentversionsand

editedasabook.Inthisformitcontinuedtobeinflux.

InKant,dialecticwasconceivedasaflawedformofthinkingorreason’slapse

intoillusions,whichappearsinevitablywhenreasondoesnotheeditscriticallimits

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andwhichcanonlyberectifiedthroughcritique.InHegel,dialecticbecameameth-

odofleadingtheself-referentialcritiqueofreason,andinthiscontext,thedialectical

methodacquiredaconstructivemeaning.Schleiermacher,bycontrast,drawsonthe

Platonic senseof dialectic anddefines it as “the art of holding talks in the field of

pure thinking” (kunstmäßige Gesprächsführung im Gebiet des reinen Denkens); he

bindshisdialectic to thedialogueamong individualswho canonly strive forpure

thinking, but unlike Kant and Hegel, he does not presuppose it. Schleiermacher

thereby radically questions the principles of knowledge or, if there is no definite

knowledge,ofknowledgeacquisition.Onemustalwaysstartfromthepremisethat

thereis“materialforundiscovereddispute.”Seenfromtheperspectiveoftheindi-

vidual,itisrealistictoassumethat“arbitrarybeginnings”arepossibleinallfieldsof

knowledge.

However,knowledgethatisconvincingalsoforothersemergesfirstwhenitis

broughtintosystematicshape,withoutithavingtobeasystemàlaHegel.Ifthecon-

ceptsthatindividualsputforwardshallconvinceothersandthuspossiblyturninto

generallyvalidknowledge,theseconceptsmust(incurrentterms)beconsistent,i.e.

compatible with each other; coherent, i.e. interrelated; and consequent, i.e. to be

brought intoa logicalorder. Inshort: theymust just fit togetherandsupporteach

otherinaway.Inphilosophy,thisdoesnotresultinabsolutelycertainknowledgein

Hegel’ssense;thereonlyremains“beliefinknowledge”(GlaubenandasWissen).In

linewiththisbelief,knowledgecanalwaysremaininbecomingandthereforemove

withthetimes.

AccordingtoSchleiermacher,too,the“construction”ofknowledgeworkswith

distinctions.However,heunderstandsdistinctionsotherwise:notasexclusive,but

ratheras inclusivedistinctions;hespeaksof “negative”and“positive”or “relative”

opposites:plausibledistinctionsarecontrasts.Theoppositesofacontrastmustbe

containedineachotherinordertorefertoeachotheratall,justasthehumanbeing

onlyishumaninthespecificcontrasttotheanimal(orforreligiousthinkersincon-

trasttoGod),andjustasawomanisawomanonlyinthespecificcontrasttoaman,

andtheNorthPoleistheNorthPoleonlyinthespecificcontrasttotheSouthPole.

Parmenides’(non-)distinctionbetweenbeingandthinking(sec.2)issuchaninclu-

sivedistinction–acontrastinwhichbothsidesemergefromeachotherandarenot

distinguishable from outside. The unity of a distinction, which, in Hegel’s view,

‘jumpsoutof’andexits thenegationofadetermination,must, inSchleiermacher’s

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view, already implicitly be contained in it. For this reason, Schleiermacher under-

standsoppositesas “poles”ofadeterminationbywhichone “orientsoneself”; fol-

lowingtheexampleofAristotle’spracticalphilosophy(sec.5),everydetermination

ofobjectsmoveswithintheleewaysofsuchpoles.Thus,determinationscanalways

remainprovisional, i.e. theycanandmustbedeterminedfurther innewsituations,

andthegeneralthatresults fromthem, issomethinguniversalonlyforthesakeof

orientingindividualswithindividualstandpoints.

Schleiermacher appraises the contrasts between being and thinking, nature

and reason, the real and the ideal, individuality or particularity (Eigentümlichkeit)

andidentityorcommunality(Gemeinschaftlichkeit)assuchpolarities.Thefactthat

the respective sides never occur ‘purely’ prevents their dogmatization and their

turningintometaphysicalopposites. Inthisway,Schleiermacher’sdialectic iscriti-

cal.Itsconstructivesideisthoughtwiththehelpofthepolarityof“chaos”(asmate-

rial of construction) and the “highest substantial force” of shaping this chaos; the

shapingorstructuringitselfisinturnconceptualizedwiththehelpofthepolarityof

practical“organizing”(Organisieren)andthetheoretical“discerning”(Erkennen)or

“symbolizing” (Symbolisieren),whichcannotbeseparated, since they intertwineat

alltimes.Seenfromatheologicalperspective,thepolarity“chaos”and“highestsub-

stantial force”(inSpinoza’ssense)aswellasthepolarity“fate”(understoodasthe

incalculabilityofoccurrences)and“providence”(understoodastotalpredictability)

can serve as divine names. Here God is understood in the context of pre-defined

leeways. Later on, the paradoxes or polarities involved here have become usual

techniquesofapproachingGodandtheworld.

Such equipped, Schleiermacher’s philosophy has substantially prepared the

present philosophy of orientation. The acquisition and composition of knowledge

movebetweenpolaritiesinan‘oscillatingprocedure,’sothattheconceptformation

cando justice toevernewsituationsandconcept constellations.Thereby thecon-

ceptsare continuallyadjusted to theobservedobjectsand theobservationsofob-

jectstotheconcepts.ThesameappliestoHegel’sdialectic.However,Schleiermacher

maintainsthatknowledgeacquisitiondoesnotworkwithfixedconcepts,butrather

with always preliminary ‘schemata’ that leave leeways for the choice of linguistic

fixation and thus also for displacements. Kant had introduced the notion of the

scheme as an auxiliary termmediating concept and intuition; for Schleiermacher,

this notion becomes central in the construction of knowledge. In the processes of

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oscillation, skepticismon theonehandand imaginationon theothergetachance,

too.

For Schleiermacher, the individuals’ need to get around to a general

knowledge that is valid in their living together is, ultimately, an ethical need. The

differencebetweentheoreticalandpracticalphilosophyis,inhiseyes,notanexclu-

sive,butratheran inclusivecontrast; the twocoalesce ina theoryofhuman living

together. Schleiermacher constructs the coexistence of individuals, too, through

crossingthepolaritiesoforganizingandsymbolizing,andofindividualityandcom-

munalidentity.Four“relativespheres”ofcoexistenceensue:(1)thecommunal,for

everyone identically organized,world of communicating and socializing (Verkehr)

whosemostimmediateareaofeducation(Bildungsgebiet)isthebodyoftheindivid-

ualandthegreatestthejointlyinhabitedworld;(2)theindividuallyorganizedworld

of conviviality, friendship, and hospitality, which lives on mutual recognition

(Anerkennung)andopening-upoftheindividuals(Aufschließung)intheirindividual-

ity;(3)thecommunal,foreveryoneidenticallysymbolizedworldofscienceinwhich

signs are used as unambiguously as possible; and (4) the individually symbolized

world of art and religion. The “relative” spheres aremutually dependent on each

otherwithouttherebeingahierarchyamongthem.Inthecurrentsociologicalsys-

temstheory,theyaretakenasfunctionalsystemsofsocietalcommunication.

ForSchleiermacher,justas(later)forNietzscheand(stilllater)forRorty,phi-

losophyisanartbeforeitcanbecomeascience.Philosophycanbebasedonrules,

but these rules require individual skills. Thus, in contrast to what Hegel tried to

makeusbelieve, it ismadeclear thatphilosophy– justasanyotherscience–can

neveracquireanydefiniteknowledge,sinceallknowledgeacquiredunderthefactu-

alconditionsofknowledgeacquisitioncanbecontestedagainorsimplybecomeob-

solete. But in philosophy, the differentiation between art and science (or, as one

would say today with reference to Thomas S. Kuhn: between revolutionary and

normal science) is only an orienting distinction. So, manifold scientific and philo-

sophicalsystemscansubsistafterandnexttoeachother.Progressioninknowledge

isalwaysprogressionviewedfromastandpointthatonecanchange.

To thinking as such, one can neither ascribe universal validity according to

Schleiermacher, since thinking occurs in various forms and in different languages,

andsince italsodiffersdependingonindividual livingconditions.However,differ-

entlanguagesandindividualstandpointsinknowledgeacquisitionarenottobeex-

100

ecutedanddeleted;rather, inSchleiermacher’sopinion, theyenrichknowledgeac-

quisition–andhumanorientationasawhole: even thealignmentwitha focuson

universalvalidityisonlyonepossibilityoforientationnexttoothers.Thequestionis

then:whocanconvincewhominwhatcasewithwhichargument;whoisinterested

inwhose thoughtsandmessages;andhowcanonedecideabout this fromcase to

case?Schleiermacherheredistinguishesbetween(1)“commercial”thinking,which

is directed to utility and power, (2) “artistic” thinking, which inspires others, but

leaves them free in their decisions, and (3) “pure” thinking, which – like Hegel’s

thinking–initselftriestoreachsomethingsteadyandfirminknowledge.Inallcas-

es,thinkingisanethicalhandlingof“foreignthinking,”anditis“signofamorelim-

itedmind”ifitseekstoinsistonitself.

Thephilosophyoforientationhas,inHegel’sandSchleiermacher’srespectivedi-

alectic,alternativemodelsofhowapermanentoverviewoforientationcanbe

achievedthroughknowledge; furthermore, ithasalternativemodelsregarding

theconstruction(Aufbau)ofknowledge.BothHegelandSchleiermacheraddress

alternativesasanissue:Hegeldoessobyconstrainingtheleewaysofalternative

trainsofthought,Schleiermacherbyexpandingthem.EventhoughHegel’sand

Schleiermacher’svocabularymaytodayappeartobecumbersome inmanyas-

pects, it can still advance the philosophy of orientation as awhole. Taken to-

gether, Hegel’s and Schleiermacher’s philosophies outline the leeway between,

ontheonehand,theidealofhumanorientation,andtherealityofhumanorien-

tationontheother.

Hegel’s dialectic, the logic of “the movement of the concept” that takes

place as a “determinatenegation” of everynewdetermination or definition of

theconceptofthinkingandbeing,or:ofthetruth,workswithgradualstepsin

creatingandovercomingparadoxes;inthisway,itmustnotfendoffcontradic-

tions,butcanmakethemfruitfulforasovereignorientation.However,Hegelob-

fuscatesthedecisionsthattherebycanbemadeinonewayoranother–tothe

benefitofatarget-aimed“necessity”withwhichthemovementoftheconceptis

meant to close itself into a self-explanatory and self-substantiating “system”

withoutanyalternative.

Schleiermacher,bycontrast,reckonsfromtheverystartwiththefactthat

conceptscanbedeterminedinalternativeways.Tothisend,healsodevelopsa

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newtechniqueofdistinction thatproceedsnot fromexclusive,but rather from

inclusivecontrasts,inwhichtheoppositesalreadycontaineachother;thatisto

say,heproceedsfrompolesinsteadofnegations.Theleewaysorscopesthatthey

extendarealreadyimpliedinthem.Intheoscillationbetweenconceptualpoles,

humanorientationcandecideineveryconcretesituationabouttheappropriate

determination;yet,thelatterremainspreliminary,i.e.,innewsituationsnewde-

cisionscan(orhaveto)betaken.Accordingtothecurrentstateoftheart,hu-

manorientationindeedseemstoworkinthismanner.

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III.Postmodernity

The alternative constructions of knowledgewe sawwithin German Idealism have

broughtphilosophical thought inanewsituation:Hegelprovidesthebroadestand

deepestphilosophicalaccesstotheworldaswellasthemostconsequentdifferenti-

ationandthemoststableindependenceofphilosophicalthought.Inintegratingthe

historyofphilosophical thought inhissystemand justifying it throughhissystem,

heinthemostsuccessfulmannerabsolvesphilosophicalthoughtfromthesituativity

and temporality ofwhat happens in theworld. Therein philosophy lives up to its

highestaspirationandgainsthegreatestprestige;philosophyappearsastheprom-

iseofguidingtheorientationofhumankindthroughsystematicallyreasoneddefini-

tions of concepts. In themidst of spectacular political upheavals in Europe – civil

revolution, regicide, nationalwars of conquest and liberation (so-called battles of

nations),politicalreformsandmonarchicalrestauration–philosophyofferedrelia-

bleorientationintheformofHegel’sencyclopediaandtheoptimisticcertaintythat

theworldwouldfinditstrueorderinthenearfutureifitlistenstothespirit.

Schleiermacher’salternativetheologyandphilosophy isno lessoptimistic than

Hegel’s.Yet, inthetraditionoftheology,Schleiermacherdrawstighterlimitstothe

powerofthinking.Accordingtotheformulaof“thefeelingofabsolutedependency,”

which ismeant to be religious, but can also be understood in non-religiousways,

thinking,too,isdependentonsomethingthatisnotatitsdisposalandthatitcannot

conceptualize definitively and neither shape spontaneously. Schleiermacher keeps

alivetheawarenessofthesituativityalsoofallphilosophicalthought.Thelattercan

nonetheless,withappropriatenewdistinctions,conceiveofthesituativityofhuman

orientationandalsoof the relocatabilityof its limits; it can integrate time in itself

withouttherebymakingitselfentirely independentoftime.Theparadoxicalsimul-

taneityofmasteringthesituationandtimeontheonehand,andofbeing-mastered

by it on the other, became the theme of the most courageous new beginnings of

philosophicalthoughtafterHegel;theyworkedthroughHegelwithoutalwaysmen-

tioningorrealizingit.

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The later 19th centurywas characterized by new and unprecedented scientific

andtechnical,politicalandsocialchangesinEuropeandtheUSA,andbythe(first)

industrialrevolution.Thisrevolutionoccurredfasterandinterfereddeeperwiththe

conditions of living and the orientation of human beings than ever before; it re-

quired totallyneworientationsalso in thoughtand in the thinkingof thought.For

the sake of these orientations, new distinctions and techniques of distinction had

firsttobedeveloped.Theymoreandmoreabsolvedthemselvesfromtheformerly

highest ‘foothold’ofadivinegovernanceoftheworld,andtheyweremorecontro-

versialthaneverbefore.Therefore,onecouldlessandlessbecertainoftheseorien-

tations;philosophybecame,asNietzsche thencalled it, “experimentalphilosophy.”

Whilethephilosopherswhowerepermanentlyappointedasprofessorsatauniver-

sityinmostcasessoughttoextendandcombinethedesignsoftheirgreatpredeces-

sors–firstandforemostKant,Schleiermacher,Fichte,Schelling,andHegel–itwas

againthroughoutsiderswhooftendidnotknoweachotherthatvitalneworienta-

tionswereinitiated.Modernitywasdrivenfurtherintothatwhichwe,inthelackof

amorepreciseterm,forthetimebeingcall‘postmodernity.’Inpostmodernity,are-

valuationoftherelationbetweentheuniversalandtheindividualisinthemaking,

andwith it the insight that individualorientationprecedesall constructionsof the

universal.

16.AlternativesintheRevaluationoftheUniversalandtheIndividual:

EmersonandStirner,SchopenhauerandKierkegaard

Largely independentlyofeachother, thefollowing individualthinkers initiatedthe

resolute revaluation of the universal and the individual: RALPH WALDO EMERSON

(1803-1882 AD) in the USA, and ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER (1788-1860 AD), MAX

STIRNER(1806-1856AD),andSØRENKIERKEGAARD(1813-1855AD)inEurope.Emer-

sonandStirneraswellasSchopenhauerandKierkegaardsketchedoutcharacteris-

ticallydifferentpaths:thetwofirst-mentioneddidsoinrelationtotheindividuality

ofallthinking,thetwolast-mentionedinrelationtothelimitsofthinkingingeneral.

EMERSONoriginated fromaChristian familyofpreachers,butdistancedhim-

selffromspecificdenominationsandchurches.Hewaswell-traveled,alsoinEurope,

andlivedasafreeorator,writer,andpoet.Hecountedlessontheorythanonrhe-

104

toricalpersuasiveness.Hewroteessaysandmadecircularizedhisphilosophyper-

sonally through lectures, first and foremost via popular education in the so-called

lyceummovement.Hewasengagedpoliticallyintheabolitionofslaveryanddeliv-

eredtheeulogyatAbrahamLincoln’sfuneral.HewasthoroughlyeducatedinEuro-

pean,particularlyGermanphilosophy.Bybreakingconsciouslywiththetraditional

themesthatwerediscussedattheuniversitiesandinaimingatthepersonalconduct

oflife,i.e.orientationinlifequitegenerally,hefoundedanewanduniquephilosoph-

icaltraditionintheUSA.Thistraditionbeganwithhis‘intellectualdeclarationofin-

dependence,’assomecalledit.

Atthattime–justasinthebeginningsofGreekphilosophy–anewoptimistic

spiritofawakeningprevailedintheUnitedStatesofAmerica:newlandwasinhabit-

ed;soonexcellentuniversitieswerefoundedthere;thepoliticalindependenceofthe

USAwassuccessfullydeclared;acomprehensive freedomofreligiouspracticewas

created;theUSAliberatedthemselvesdemocraticallyfromtheestates-basedossifi-

cationsofEuropeansocietiesandgeneratedgreatpersonalitiesforstateleadership.

Onegraduallyexpandedone’slivingspacethroughconquestorpurchase,onedealt

withaconstantlydisplacedfrontier,coulddisposeofgoodfarmlandandrichtreas-

uresofthesoil,andoneexperiencedagrowingeconomicprosperity.Venturesome

immigrants, capitalism thatwas unimpeded for a long time, industrialization, and

the extension of the infrastructure in grand style prompted the hithertomost dy-

namicandmostsuccessfuldevelopmentofastateintheworld.Eventhoughtherule

ofconflictingparties,corruptionandmoraldeclinespread,eventhoughstrongso-

cialcontrastsandeconomiccriseseventuated,moralvalueswereplacedaboveeco-

nomic interests: in a severe civil war, the hard-won liberation of the slaves was

achieved. Inallareasof life,onewasattunedtocontinualreorientationanddevel-

opedroutinesofreorientation.

Emersongivesaphilosophicalexpressiontothespiritofincessantreorienta-

tion. His thinking,which is close to poetry, appears improvising, preliminary, and

fluid.Heworkswith concepts that leavewide leeways for interpretation andpro-

gression.Hemasterstheartofaphoristicabbreviationandtheessayisticunfolding

of far-reaching thoughts. Just as Nicholas of Cusa, Spinoza, and Schleiermacher in

Europe,hecapturescontrastsaspolesthatincludeoneanotherandcreateleeways

fordynamicconceptualdevelopments.Heoftenchoosesalternativeviewsandloves

paradoxes.He speaks less out of philosophical erudition thanhis ownpersonality

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andlifeexperience;hedoesnotwanttoreservewisdomforscholars.HENRYDAVID

THOREAU(1817-1862AD)setsanexampleofthiswayoflife.

Without building on the concept of orientation itself, Emerson laysweighty

milestonesonthewaytoaphilosophyoforientation.AshestatesinhisspeechThe

AmericanScholar,heseeksa“nearerreferencetothetimeandtothiscountry.”“In-

steadofthesublimeandbeautiful,”heexploresandpoetizes“thenear,thelow,the

common.” He gives “the single person” a “new importance.” At the same time, he

stronglyintegratesthepersonintonature:natureflowsthroughhumanbeingsand

causesthemtospeak,tothink,andtoact.Assuchandasawhole,naturecannotbe

determinedtheoretically.Emersonexpressesthiswiththehelpofthenotionsofthe

“soul,”“over-soul,”and“God.”Insuch“transcendentalbeliefs,”theinprincipleidio-

syncratic and therein solitary standpoint of each one is always already connected

withthestandpointsofothers–withouttheneedoftheoreticaldefinitions.

Individualscan,likenatureitself,communicateimmediatelyinsignsandsym-

bolsthatneednofurtherdeterminationorexplanation.InNature,Emersonformu-

latesthisasfollows:“Iamnothing;Iseeall.”Thoughtisonlyfunctiontherein.Inthis

way,abasicattitudeofobserving,receiving,venerating,andobeyingarises,andthe

opennessfora“stairwayofsurprise.”Humanbeingssearchreassuranceinconcep-

tualdeterminations.However,identificationsandclassificationsarealwaysprelimi-

nary: “science is nothing but the finding of analogy, identity, in the most remote

parts,”asEmersonsaysinTheAmericanScholar.Everyonehashisorherownsight

ofprinciples;everyonecanmakethediversityofmeaningsfruitfulforhim-orher-

selfandbecreativeunderthespecificconditionsinhisorherownpresent–andthis

isnecessarybecausepracticalworkanddistressesforceourhand.Onemustdelib-

eratelyexposeoneself tounsettling.Over time, thecompulsion tocreativityoutof

adversityletsgrowhumanbeings’confidenceintheirownprogressandinthepro-

gress ofmutual understanding andpromotion of each other; in Emerson’swords:

humanbeingslearntotrustinvirtueandlove.Inourwords,whatgrowsistrustin

theability toorientoneself inregard toothers in lifesituations thatareuncertain

foreveryone.

The“genius”cangiveorientationtoothers;inhisorherorientation,thegeni-

uscancountoncompleteself-reliance.AccordingtoEmerson,single“representative

men”–personalities,philosophers,andpoets–setsignsforothers,i.e.footholdsto

whichotherscanadhereforthesakeoftheirownorientationandontheirowncon-

106

ditions.Yet, these footholdscannotbe theoreticallygeneralizedordogmaticallybe

predefined. Emerson describes such single individuals as complete human beings

whowiththeir lifecanexpressthewholeofnatureandhumanpossibilities. Inre-

gardtoreligion,theyfindGodinfindingtheirownmidpoint;therebyhighidealsof

truthfulness,clarityandsimplicitybecomelivedrealities.Emerson’s“representative

men”standoutdueto“courage”inmasteringdailyproblems.Courageisthemood

againstthecontrarymoodofanxiety.Inthepersistentinsecurityandendangerment

oflife,onemust,asEmersonputsit,“dayafterdayovercomeanxiety.”Knowledge,

custom, and reason may help; but courage also grows in repeated coping with

threatening situations, and in thisway, a “prophetic instinct that isbetter thanall

wisdom”develops,asEmerson lastlywrites inSocietyandSolitude.This is trust in

one’sownorientationabilities.

WithhisDerEinzigeundseinEigentumof1844(TheEgoandItsOwn,literally,

TheIndividualandHisProperty,alsoknownasTheUniqueandItsProperty),andits

motto“Nothingismoretomethanmyself!”(borrowedfromGoethe),STIRNERmarks

a philosophical extreme. He insisted radically and dogmatically on his claim that

everything,boththematerialandthespiritual,canultimatelyonlybetheproperty

ofindividuals–foronlyindividualscanrelatetosomethingelsefromtheirinevita-

bly individualstandpoint.StirnerstudiedwithHegelandSchleiermacher, livedun-

dernarrowcircumstances,committedhimselftothecircleofLeftHegelians,tookup

someoftheirideas,butalsoquestionedthem.Hehadtooncemorefaceprohibition

andpersecution,eventhoughheforphilosophicalreasonsdidnotparticipateinthe

politicalrevolutionthatwaspreparedalsoinGermanyinthetimesofpoliticalres-

tauration. Stirner translated, among other books, theWealth of Nations by Adam

Smith(sec.12).HehadtheworkDasWesendesChristentums(TheEssenceofChristi-

anity)byLUDWIGFEUERBACH (1804-1872AD) inmind,where the traditionaldeter-

minationsoftheideaofGodaredescribedashumanprojections,sothatthehuman

speciesitselfcanappropriatedivinity.Yet,Stirnertracesthehumanspeciesbackto

theindividual.Asasingleindividual,heappealstoothersingleindividualsincom-

mitted,pathetic,andpolemicalways.Initially,hecausesastir,andthenheisforgot-

tenforalongtime.Emerson’supbuildingkeynoteisinGermanynotconfrontedwith

anyother,morecriticalandmilitant,tonethanStirner’s.

Stirnerfightsagainsttheuniversalinsofarasitisbelievedtobesacrosanct,as

“holy.”Through the assumptionof something general oruniversal, the individuals

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expropriatethemselves,hebelieves.Thentheindividualsarereadytosubmitthem-

selvestosocietalandgovernmentalorderswithoutanyreservation,andtheycanbe

connectedandseparatedthroughdifferentgeneraltermssubsumingthem.Howev-

er,Stirnerthinksthatinallconstructionsoftheuniversal,egoismcontinuestohave

aneffect:throughgeneralterms,claims,andorders,humanbeingsshallbewonfor

somethingthatisintheinterestofcertainindividuals.Stirnerwantstofreetheego

from the fixation on such allegedly unconditional and unegotistical universalities,

andmakeapointof“egoism.”Forhimaswell,itistruethattheegoisnothingand

yetthereferencepointforeverythingelse;andforhimaswell,therearisesperfect

freedomofthoughtandactionandthecoerciontobecomecreative,alsoinregardto

conceptsforexistence.Hedoesnotwanttosimplyabolishthegeneraloruniversal,

whichwouldbeunthinkable,butrather,likeEmerson,allowonlyalimitedfunction

toit.Stirnerexpectedseriouslaborunrestinthenearfutureand,soonerorlater,the

breakdownofthestateasanorderofdependencies;thatiswhyhewasregardedas

adangerous“anarchist.”Intheremotefuture,however,heexpectedalifeofenjoy-

mentinsteadofalifeofsacrifice.

SCHOPENHAUERandKIERKEGAARDdonotfocusontherightandthestrengthof

individualthought,butratheronthelimitsofthoughtandthusofuniversalityalto-

gether. Their biographies showastonishing parallels. Both of them stemmed from

wealthymerchantfamilies,sothattheywereeconomicallyindependentalltheirlife

and not reliant upon the employment at a university; thus, they could distance

themselvesmore easily from traditional thought. Nonetheless, both of themwere

deeply rooted in tradition; on their own volition, they acquired a comprehensive

humanistic education.Bothof themwereheadstrong characters; they cultivated a

life that inmanyaspectsseemedstrange;manyanecdotestestify to that.Schopen-

hauer andKierkegaard appeared as knottedmaverickswith pronounced views; if

necessary, theywere ready todispute inpublic.Bothof themhadprecarious love

relations and shied away fromamarriage.Bothof thempresented theirmost im-

portantworkswhentheywerearound30yearsoldandfelttheydidnotreceivethe

recognitiontheydeserved;yettheydidnotlosecourageandcontinuedwriting.Both

KierkegaardandSchopenhauerresortedtopolemicswhenrationalesbecameprob-

lematic.Schopenhauer,at thattimea little-knownlecturerat theBerlinuniversity,

dared to compete openlywithHegel and failed; Kierkegaard, disappointed by the

BerlinuniversitywhereheattendedthelecturesofagedSchelling,competedinhis

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home town Copenhagen with the highly esteemed Copenhagen bishopMynster –

afterhavingbecomeapubliccaricatureinthecourseoffeudwithasatiricalmaga-

zine.

However, there are also conspicuous differences between Kierkegaard and

Schopenhauer:whileSchopenhauerearlyon (throughhismother, a successful au-

thorwhokeptasaloninWeimar)wasappreciatedbyGoethe,thehighestintellectu-

al authority of his day, Kierkegaard (who definitely loved the opera and theater)

was, like his old father, afflicted with melancholia. Schopenhauer was a staunch

atheistwhononetheless incorporated religiousdogmas like the one aboutheredi-

tarysininhisphilosophy,whereasKierkegaardwasajustasstaunchChristianwho

nonethelessstruggledagainsttheofficial,establishedChristendom,theChurchand

itsdogmas.

While Schopenhauer, in his philosophical authorship, clings to the literary

formofthetreatise(mostofhispopularAphorismsontheWisdomofLifeareminor

treatises),Kierkegaardinventsplentyofnewliteraryformsofwritingtoexpresshis

philosophical thinking; yet, in regard to religion, he cultivates devotional writing

called “upbuildingdiscourses.”With his clearly arrangedmainworkTheWorld as

WillandRepresentation,whichfirstbecamefamousafteraquarterofacenturyinits

secondedition,Schopenhauerbyand largeremainscaught in theold (particularly

Kantian)opposites,eventhoughherevaluatesthemresolutely.Kierkegaard,bycon-

trast, experimentswithin the short period of a decadewith new opposites as ex-

pressedinacascadeofworksrespondingtoeachother.Kierkegaard’sphilosophical

rankisrecognizedevenlaterthanSchopenhauer’s.

Intheirrespectivephilosophies,bothKierkegaardandSchopenhauerdethrone

self-aggrandizingreasononthebasisofafeelingofabsolutedependency.Asanathe-

ist,Schopenhauerregardsreasonasbeingdependentonablind,irrationalwillthat

instrumentalizesandpropelsreason;asaChristian,Kierkegaardregardsreasonas

beingdependentonthemoodofanxietythatisafraidofsin.Withouthavingknown

each other (Kierkegaard became aware of Schopenhauer at a late point of time),

bothofthemexperienceacontinual,unsettlingcompulsiontothink,whichreasonis

notabletosettleandappease.Inthisrestlessness,bothofthemrealizefundamental-

lyneworientationneeds,andbothofthemrelyonimmediatepersonalexperiences.

SCHOPENHAUERaddressesalsothebodilinessofthinking.Obviously,thebodyis

theorganofallcognition,theoriginofallideas,andthepointofdepartureofallori-

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entationintheworld.Thethinkingsubjectfindsitselfasabodyintheworld,beinga

partoftheworld;throughthebody,it isentangledintheworldandexposedtoits

influences.Thismeansthatthebodyisatonceaobservingsubjectandanobserved

object; thus, thesubject-object-distinction issuspended.Emerson, too,emphasized

thispoint.Yet,forSchopenhauer,thebodyis,firstofall,somethingthatincessantly

“wants to do” something, namely to live and to sustain and propagate itself; the

strongest testimony of thiswill is sexual desire,which has its bodily shape in the

genitals.Schopenhauerresolutelystoppedeuphemizingsexualdesire.

JustasEmersonintegratestheindividualinnature’scontinuum,Schopenhau-

erintegratestheindividualwillinauniversalwilltolive–whereitsuniversalityisa

naturalinsteadofaconceptualone.Inthisuniversalwilltolive,orjusttobethere,

hebelievestohavefoundthething-in-itselfthatKantvainlytriedtothink.Continu-

ingtothinkinKantiancategories,SchopenhauerturnstheX,whichwasabsolutely

unknowableforKant, intosomethingrealthatcanbeexperienced, infact intothat

whichismoststronglyexperiencedasreal.Thiswillcanbeexperiencedpreciselyin

the irrational being-driven of reason, and, according to Schopenhauer, this being-

drivendetermineshumanorientationintotal.The“blindwill”utilizesreasonasits

“tool”provoking“ideas”or“representations”(Vorstellungen)thatreasontakestobe

its own because it does not comprehend its own bodily causes. Therein Schopen-

hauerdiscoversanongoingplanlessself-deceptionandillusion;followingafamous

metaphor, “the strong blind one bears the seeing lamed one on his shoulders.” In

thisway, the human being never reaches the truth and cannot opt for it, because

evenbeforeonecandecideanythingconsciouslyandrationally,thewillhasalready

decidedon it.Schopenhauer’sresponseto thiscondition is therecourseto theno-

tion of orientation. He writes: “it is in the interest of the will that something is

thought at all, so that one is aswell-orientedaspossible for anyeventuality.”Yet,

thisorientation is stillkindofblind,andalsoSchopenhauerdoesnotelaborateon

thenotionoforientationitself.

In Schopenhauer’s thought, theblindwill is just as omnipotent asGod– yet

being unknowing, senseless, and planless instead of omniscient. This results in a

crucial change of mood in philosophical thinking: the idealistic “optimism” that

SchopenhauerwouldhavediscoveredalsoinEmerson’sphilosophyifhehadknown

it,giveswaytothedeep“pessimism”ofsenselesslybeingdrivenfromoneillusion-

ary wish to the next. In this context, Schopenhauer discovers the significance of

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moodsforphilosophy:in“theplayofthecontinuoustransitionfromthewishtoits

satisfaction,andfromthelattertotheformer”persistsonlythedisturbingchangeof

ideas. However, unlike Emerson, Schopenhauer does not experience this disturb-

anceasadynamic,butratherasanagonizingmalfunction,andtheso-called“clearly

consciousthoughts”asthemere“surface”ofanunclearandunconsciousstreaming.

LikeEmerson,Schopenhauerobservesthattheconsciousprocessofthoughtisme-

andering,floating,fragmentaryandsubjecttoshiftingmoods,andheregardsthisas

an “essential imperfection of the intellect”which requires to “orient oneself” ever

anew.Thinkinglacks,forSchopenhauer,firmfootholds.

Schopenhauer’s declaredpessimism, thenearlyunbearablemoodof just be-

ing-there,ofanexistencethatknowsthatitisledbyablind,meaning-andpurpose-

lesswilltolive,causeshimtocultivateideasofwhichhecanhardlyknowwhether

they are tenable, although he pretends to do so. Devaluating (1) life as a whole,

Schopenhauerconcedes(2)aneedforredemptionfromit,whichistobefulfilledby

thePlatonicideasinwhich“theonlyimmediateobjectivity”ofthewillappears;to-

gether with Kant’s thing-in-itself, these ideas shall constitute “the two great dark

paradoxes of the two greatest philosophers of the Occident.” The Platonic ideas

shall, inturn,becometheobjectof“pure”representationand, inthisway,stabilize

representation (Vorstellung) over against thewill; the power of thewill shall end

here and turn the “negation of thewill to live” into the “affirmation of thewill to

live.”Thesemetaphysicalhypothesesshallmakeconceivable(3)acalm,“contempla-

tive”philosophicalknowledgeofthenexusofideas,whichSchopenhauerclaimsfor

himself.

Inthisway,philosophicalinsightacquiresalsoinSchopenhauer(4)anewre-

ligiouscharacter:infollowingtheurgeofthewillinitsneedforredemption,philos-

ophybecomes,asSchopenhauernoteddown,the“truegospel,”namelythegospelof

“fatalism.”JustlikeEmerson,SchopenhauerfindsconfirmationofhisideasinIndian

Buddhism;bothof themdeliberately crossed thebordersofEuropeanphilosophy.

Yet,Schopenhauerbuildsethicsoncompassion,understoodasthecommonsuffer-

ingfromthewill,andinthisway,hefightsagainstmoralidealization.Moreover,he

praises(5)art,particularlymusic,asthe“quieting(Quietiv)ofthewill”andempha-

sizesitspoweroftransfiguration.Musicis,forhim,animageofthewillinwhichthe

will can calm down. Therefore, “the true philosophy”would be “a perfectly right,

complete, and detailed explanation of music.” Last but not least, Schopenhauer

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maintainsthathisteachingliberates(6)fromthefearofdeath,forinsufferingfrom

thewill,deathcomesas“grace.”

Graceistheforgivenessofguiltthatcannotbeundonethroughone’sowndo-

ing.ThedisbelieverSchopenhauershowsthedeepestappreciationforChristianity’s

“greattruth”of“hereditarysin.”Inhisview,Adamsymbolizestheaffirmationofthe

willtolive,andChristitsnegation,theredemptionfromthiswill.Ultimately,thisis–

forSchopenhauer–alsothetruthofphilosophy,the“transitionintotheemptynoth-

ing.”The latter isnotanabsolutenothing,whichwouldbeunthinkable,butrather

thenothing intheworldof ideas, the“nirvana”ofBuddhism,whereSchopenhauer

finds “that peace that is higher than reason.” Although Schopenhauer’s pessimism

wasforeigntoAmericans,hewasreceivedas“GermanBuddha” inthefieldofphi-

losophy,particularlybythetranscendentalistsfollowingEmerson.

InKIERKEGAARD, the anxiety of faithbeing afraidof sin corresponds to Scho-

penhauer’s disturbance caused by the blind will. Kierkegaard’s philosophizing is

bornebyChristian faith, but it is in nowayoptimistic. Seen fromaChristianper-

spective,sinisfreedomvis-à-visGod,thepossibilityofmissingGodduetowrongdo-

ing.AsGod’swillisconcealedtohumanbeings,theymustassumethatthispossibil-

ityisalwaysalreadyactuality.God’swillisnotblind,buthumanbeingsareblindfor

it,andtotheextentthattheyknowthis,theyliveintheanxietyofperishinginsin,at

least if they takeChristian faith as seriously asKierkegaard. Seriousness does not

consistincomprehendingsininHegelianterms.AccordingtoKierkegaard,onecan-

notdojusticetosinbycomprehendingit;onthecontrary:thetheoreticalstanceto-

wards sin is frivolous and reckless because it provides an apparent foothold and

creates a pervertedmood. The latter turns into earnestness only in acting, i.e. in

fightingagainstsin.

Inhisreligiousapproach,Kierkegaardobservesthatallconcepts,notonlythe

conceptofsin,acquireanewmeaningiftheyareusedinanothermood,forinstance

inhumor.However, thisaspect isoverlooked intheoreticaldeterminationsofcon-

cepts.Themood isthemostsituative, futile,andincomprehensivefeatureofthink-

ingand,likeoptimismandpessimismforSchopenhauer,atoncethatwhichpropels

andguidescomprehension.InKierkegaard’sview,too,thinkingisherestretchedto

itslimits.Yet,incontrasttotheblendingwillinSchopenhauer,Kierkegaardiananxi-

etyisrevealing: itclairvoyantlydisclosestheeffortstoconceal it.But justasevery

calmingsatisfactionofthewillagainrevertsintoanewunsettlingwillingforScho-

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penhauer,forKierkegaardeverycalmingofanxietyturnsintoanewanxietyofthe

constantly returning anxiety.Anxietybecomesdespair that cannotbe tranquilized

anymore,and this is thebasic situationof thehumanbeingbeforeGod:aperma-

nent, sometimesmore, sometimes less conscious vertigo, which – like the will in

Schopenhauer–turnsintohabitualdisorientation.

AnxietyanddespairareKierkegaard’sgreatreligiousthemes,whichencroach

on psychology and philosophy. Anxiety and despair can neither be appeased by

thinkingand itsuniversalitiesnorbysomeredeemingmetaphysics inwhichScho-

penhauerindulgedhimself.KierkegaardunsettlesChristianfaiththroughphilosoph-

icalthinking,andviceversa,andinthisway,headvanceswithgreatstridesthedis-

coveryofconditionsandpossibilitiesforhumanorientation:

(1) Thinking, which is habitually exposed to moods, becomes a passion for

Kierkegaard;itlosesthemasteryoveritself.

(2)Themoodsof anxiety anddespairmake all thingsquestionable and am-

biguous.Conceptsbecomemeresignsthatcanalwaysbeunderstoodinonewayor

another.InChristianfaithàlaKierkegaard,thisappliesfirstandforemosttoChrist

himself:heactsasthe“God-man”withoutanyonebeingabletoseeanddefinehim

assuch;heappearsincognito.Philosophically,thesignis,accordingtoKierkegaard,

thecontradictionof“negatedimmediacy”:italwaysmeanssomethingotherthanit

is(otherwiseitwouldnotbeasign).However,onecanonlyinterpretsignsthrough

signs, in amoveof “double reflection” that also allowsdoublemisunderstandings.

Thus,signsconfrontuswiththechoiceofwhetherwewanttobelieveinthemornot.

Assuch,theyremainaperpetual“offense,”andthisisexactlywhatChristwantedto

be,accordingtoKierkegaard,foronlyinthiswaycouldhepreventdogmaticdeter-

minationsofChristianfaith,whichsootheandreassure,whereasChristianfaithre-

quiresustoexisttroubledandconcerned.

(3) Logically, theoffense is theparadox. Kierkegaard turns theparadox into

thebasicfigureofthoughtinordertoconfrontthinkingwithitstrueexistence.Itisa

logicaloffenseornuisancethatoneshallbelieve insin inordertobe forgivenand

redeemedfromdespair.TheannoyingparadoxopensupChristianityandclosesitat

thesametime.Logicalthinkingcanrefutetheparadox,butitcannotdissolveitand

thusitcannotevadeit;ingettingannoyedattheparadox,onepreciselyshowsone’s

interest in it. Philosophy is always facedwith a paradoxwhen it shall understand

how the supratemporal,withwhichneither theological nor philosophical thinking

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candispense,canbepresentintime.Itis,asKierkegaardputsit,“thehighestpara-

dox”ofthinking“thatitwantstodiscoversomethingthatitcannotthink.”Thus,the

paradoxexcitesthe“paradoxicalpassion”ofthought.

(4)ThetitleofKierkegaard’sbookTheConceptofAnxiety(1844)isparadoxi-

calaswell, insofarasthemoodofanxietydisturbsourconceptswithoutadefinite

conceptofanxietybeingavailabletous.Thesubtitle,ASimplePsychologicallyOrient-

ingDeliberationontheDogmaticIssueofHereditarySin,indicatesthathereditarysin,

whichprovokesanxiety,isnotanotionthatwouldbeimmediatelydogmatic;rather,

it ispresent inan indirectway, in the formofsimple footholds thatare implied in

severalotherperspectivessuchaspsychological,philosophical,andtheologicalper-

spectives. Inourcurrent terminology,onewouldalsosay,asKierkegaarddid, that

hereditarysinisapproachedinanorientingdeliberation.

Kierkegaard practices a deliberately confusing philosophical “authorship”

withthehelpofshiftingpseudonyms,behindwhichheisclearlyrecognizableas“edi-

tor”–andyet,hispseudonymsarenotidenticalwithhimself.Hispseudonymsare,

ashecalledthem,pseudonymsin“psychologicallyvarieddifferencesofindividuali-

ty.”Kierkegaardletsthemrespondtoeachotherjustasindividualsdo;heletsthem

interact. Subjectivity is reflectedbyanother’s subjectivitywithout this resulting in

objectivity.All themoreso,as thepseudonymscreate freedomforthoughtexperi-

ments:theytouchonanemptycenterthatKierkegaarddeliberatelykeepsfree;for,

inrelationtofaithand,particularly,inrelationtosin,noonecanbeobjective.

‘Thepseudonyms allow the authornot to have to commit himself to certain

opinionsand,bycontrast, tobeable togivevoice toopposingstandpoints (for in-

stance with the help of the inversely related pseudonyms “Climacus” and “Anti-

Climacus”).Withhisoftensaltatory, light-footed,apparentlysuperficial style,Kier-

kegaardrejectsallclaimsforultimateauthority.Healsobreakswiththeauthorityof

the author towhich Schopenhauer still clung.This is a nuisance for all thosewho

expectunambiguousnessofawriter–anexpectationthatwasstillself-evident for

Schopenhauer.Kierkegaard,bycontrast,wantstoavoidall“immediatecommunica-

tionofparagraphsinthemannerofprofessors.”

(5)Inanxietyanddespair,theselfalsolosesitsfootholdandself-reliance.In

his latebookTheSicknessuntoDeath (1849),Kierkegaard– likeSchleiermacher–

graspstheselfexclusivelythroughrelationsliketherelationbetweensoulandbody,

infinityandfinitude,temporalityandeternity,freedomandnecessity.Whatmatters

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forhim is themereself-relationof theselfbehindwhichthere isnosubstance,no

subject,andnostableconfidenceinone’sownorientationabilities.ForKierkegaard,

itiscrucialto‘balance’theserelations.Thisfigureofbalancemakesconceivablethat

theselfcanalwaysbethrownintoturmoilandmustfinditsbalanceanew–morein

anxietythan,asEmersonhasit,incourage.Duetoitsunstableself-relation,theself

canreacttodisturbancesandcopewiththem,but it isalsoalways indangertobe

destroyedby them.Philosophically, this is theduplexity fromwhich theself’sdes-

pairarises.ForKierkegaard,theChristian,thehighestformofdespairisthedespair

ofinsistingonwillingtobeoneself–againstandwithoutthehelpofGod,onwhom

one in fact depends in everything, following Christian faith. Kierkegaard believed

that true Christian faith must pass through such despair. The deliverance from a

dogmatic philosophy on theway to a philosophy of orientation requires a similar

transition.

Thephilosophyof orientation is, in the transition frommodern topostmodern

philosophy, facedwith newand completely different footholds in its investiga-

tionoftheconditionsandstructuresofhumanorientation.Thefirstpathbreak-

ingalternativesinorientingoneselfrefertothelimitsofthinkingasawholeand

revaluetheuniversaltothebenefitoftheindividual.EmersonandStirner,Scho-

penhauerandKierkegaard saw themselvesasheroic lone fightersand therein,

theybuiltresolutelyontheirownexperience.Theyinvokedmoods,whichphilos-

ophy hitherto had excluded; yet, all thinking and acting is co-determined by

moods,whichgiveanewmeaning to commonconcepts, for instancemoodsof

courageandcombat,ofwearinessandanxiety,optimismandpessimism.

Emersonconsciouslycallsbacktoone’spersonalorientationandprovides

uswithpioneeringfootholdsforitsinvestigation.Whoevertrustsinthesuccess

ofone’sownorientationcanbecomeasignandstandardforotherorientations

–EmersondidsofirstandforemostforNietzsche.However,hestill(inanideal-

isticor transcendental fashion) reliesona friendlynature sharedbyeveryone,

which inspiresand supports thinkingandacting thatprovesadvantageous for

everyone. Stirner,by contrast,whowants to secure the individual’s right to its

ownaccesstotheworld,assumesaratherdefiantattitudeagainstallseemingly

pre-givengeneralorders.ForSchopenhauerandKierkegaard,Emersonandlat-

erNietzsche,ablindurgeofthewill,distressoranxietyfuelthinking;thedistinc-

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tionbetweencalminganddisturbance(ordespair)becomesmoredecisivethan

thedistinctionbetweentruthand falsity.Schopenhauer’sdethronementofrea-

son results in thewish for permanent rest in nothingness; Kierkegaard, in his

certaintyoffaith,triesinsteadtomakethehandlingofanxietyfruitfulforanew

determinationoftheself-relationinthesenseofamere‘keepingone’sbalance’–

inwhichonecansucceedorfail.

WhileSchopenhaueradherestotheconceptofphilosophyasa“complete

repetition,amirroringof theworld inabstractterms,as itwere,”Kierkegaard

asksafter theeffectofphilosophicalconcepts,whichcandeprive thedescribed

relations of their earnestness in rendering themmerely in abstract terms. The

despairoverastablebeing-able-to-be-oneself,understoodashabitualanxietyin

thesenseofa fearofsinor“sicknessuntodeath,”bringsusclosetodeath.But

forthisveryreason,italsocoercesusintocommittingourselvestonewprojects

of thought or philosophical reorientation. While Schopenhauer still professes

sovereigninsightsofanewmetaphysicsthatisexpresslyintendedtoredeem,i.e.

lesstoconvincethantoconsole,Kierkegaardrenouncesallpowerofauthorityin

thinkingwiththehelpofanetworkofpseudonymspresentingdifferentopinions

fromdifferentperspectives.Heseeksparadoxesandworkscreativelywiththem.

BothSchopenhauerandKierkegaardconceptualizetheconcreteuniversal

ofanimalsandthehumanspeciesinanewway,namelyasatemporalkindofa

generaloruniversalbeing,whichemergesthroughthepropagationofindividu-

alswithindividuals,staysforsometime,andperishesagain.AccordingtoScho-

penhauer, individualsandthespeciesmutuallygenerateeachother;according

to Kierkegaard, “hereditary sin” can, within a Christian framework, only be

thoughtinsuchawaythatAdamdoesnotbeartheblameforallsin,butrather

that all otherhumanbeingshave to take responsibility for it in their thinking

and acting. They have to do so ever anew in their respective situation. In this

way,evenbeforeDarwin,theconceptofatemporal,alwayschanginggeneralor

universalbeingispreparedphilosophically:theconceptoffluctuance.

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17.AlternativesintheMoral-PoliticalCommitmentofPhilosophy:

MarxandMill

After the FrenchRevolution, a seething revolutionary atmosphere held sway over

Europe.Theindustrialrevolutioncreatedmassivenewsocio-economicrealities:the

capitalistmarketeconomyon theonehand,whichgeneratedgreat riches,and the

impoverishmentof theworkingclass,whichwasusedtoproducetheserichesand

resources,ontheother.Theextremelyunevendistributionofrichesprovokedphil-

osophicalstatements.InGreatBritainandtheUnitedStates,oneurgedinthetradi-

tionof JeremyBentham’sutilitarianismtomakepossiblethegreatesthappinessof

thegreatestnumber(sec.12). InGermany,Hegel’sphilosophyprevailed.However,

afterHegel’sdeath,hissentence,“thatwhichisreasonableisreal,andthatwhichis

realisreasonable”(sec.14),wasinterpretedintwoalternativeways:eitherasback-

ingtheexistingstateofPrussiaandjustifyingthecurrentsocial,economic,andpolit-

ical conditions,orasanappeal to change theseconditions, since the reasonable is

yettoberealizedinsociety.

BothinEuropeandinAmerica,theworkers’povertycausedamoralcommit-

ment inphilosophytobecomepracticalphilosophyas longaseconomyandpolitics

accepted that the social conditions deteriorated further. Philosophy began to be-

comethemoralconscienceoftheworld,andthereinittookoverataskofthedisap-

pearingreligion.Insofarasphilosophydidnotbecomepractical,i.e.insofarasitdid

not urge to put its thought into action, philosophy appeared as mere theory, as

somethingmadeup;ithadtoandwantedtoregainitscredibilitythroughapractical

test.With itscritiqueof theexistingeconomic, social, andpolitical reality, it at the

sametimeexposeditselftoacritiquebythisreality.Philosophyturnedfromanob-

serverintoafellowplayerinhistory,inwhichitcanpersistorperish.Intheend,itis

historythatprovesitrightorwrong.Themostaccentuatedexampleshereofare,in

the19thandthe20thcentury,thephilosophiesofKARLMARX(1818-1883AD)onthe

onehand,andofJOHNSTUARTMILL(1806-1873AD)ontheother.

MARX, thegrandsonofrabbis,sonofabaptized lawyer,studied lawandphi-

losophy, and as a journalist, he learned how to make use of the media. He cam-

paignedpoliticallyintheorganizationoftheinternationalworkers’movement,and

finally, together with his friend FRIEDRICH ENGELS (1820-1895 AD), he dedicated

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himselfmoreandmore toasocio-criticalphilosophy.Engelswas thebroad-gauge,

economically(amongotherthings,throughstocktrading)successfulsonofatextile

factoryownerwhosupportedMarxfinancially.Strickenwithdisease,Marxwasnot

able to complete his large-scale magnum opus,Das Kapital (Capital). Perpetually

persecutedforpoliticalreasonsand,timeandagain,beingexpelledfromtheStates,

MarxlivedunderpoorcircumstancesinBrussels,Paris,andfinallyinLondon.

Philosophically,Marxproceeds fromHegel’s dialectic philosophyon the one

hand, and fromFeuerbach’s anthropology on the other,who in the essence of the

ancientGodrecognized the trueessenceof thehumanbeing,whichwasonlypro-

jected onto God. ForMarx and Engels, both Hegel’s and Feuerbach’s philosophies

haveremainedpuretheories;nowtheythinkthetimehascometotransformthem

intorevolutionarypractice.Tothisend,MarxandEngelssharpenHegel’sandFeu-

erbach’sphilosophies:unlikeFeuerbach,theydonotbasetheessenceofmanonits

bodily-sensory, but rather on the comprehensive societal production of means to

live,andtheyturnHegel’sdialecticintoamethodofdemonstratinganecessaryse-

quenceinthehistoryoftheproductionofmeansto live;thissequenceshouldalso

allowforprognoses.Withthehelpofmasterfulreversalsintheirformulations,they

wanttoturndialecticupsidedown,sothatitisput“fromtheheadtothefeet.”How-

ever, the scientific, propagandistic, and agitating commitment ofMarx and Engels

firsthasitsfulleffectwhenVLADIMIRILYICHLENIN(1870-1924AD)createsanideolo-

gywithmassimpactforthepurposesoftheRussianRevolution.

MarxandEngels,whoregardshimselfas “secondviolin” inrelation toMarx,

directphilosophy’sattention to the fact that thematerialhardshipsandneedsde-

terminehumanlifetosuchanextentthattheyalsodominatemorals,religion,poli-

tics, and even philosophy itself. Where the practical coping with life is at stake,

thinkinglosesitssupposedautonomy;purethinkingbecomesamereappearance;in

fact,thinkingistheorganandfunctionoftherespectivecircumstancesoflife.Think-

ingorientshumanbeingsundertheseconditions;iftheychange,thiswillresultalso

inradicalreorientationsinthinking.Whereseverepovertyobtainsobviously,such

as the poverty of the workers descending into misery, reorientation is triggered

morally: others’ emergency coerces human orientation into helping these others

immediately,andnowthishelpmustbeimplementedpolitically.

Marxaimsforemancipationinthesenseofenlightenedhumanism,forthelib-

eration of the human being as such, now above all from the hardships and con-

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straintstowhichthecapitalistmarketeconomysubjectsthemajorityofhumanbe-

ings:dayafterday,theyhavetofightforsubsistenceminimumbyworkingpainstak-

inglyhardintheserviceofotherswhoprofitfromtheirwork.Marxalsoemploysthe

meansofuniversalization,totalization,andradicalization.Firstofall,heonesidedly

declareslabor(Arbeit)asthecoreandcriterionofsocietalconditionsandprocesses

togainbettermeansof life. Forhim, thismeans that laborpower turns into com-

modity(Ware)andtherebylosesitsdignityinthecapitalistmarketeconomyandits

moreandmoredifferentiated labordivision.Due to the fact that theownerof the

meansofproduction,thecapitalist,skimsthe“surplusvalue”(Mehrwert)createdby

laborers, the laborers are alienated from theobjects of thework, from theirwork

itself, and finally from themselves as human beings. Capitalism engenders human

self-alienation.

ForMarx, this becomes evident in the laborers’ increasing pauperization as

proletariatthathasnothingbutitslaborpower,whichtheymustsell,anddescend-

antswho,again,musthirethemselvesoutas laborers.Thisanti-humanisticecono-

mymust,according toMarxand thehistorical lawfulnessheprofesses, lead to the

revolutionoftheproletarians,whointheendwillcreateaclasslesscommunistsoci-

etyofcompletelyemancipatedhumanbeingsandcancelallalienation.Inmakingthe

laborvaluetheorytheprincipleofnationaleconomics,Marxmarginalizespricefor-

mationonthemarketandthepossibilitythatmarketeconomy,asAdamSmith(sec.

12)argued,offersthelong-termenhancementofthegoodofall.Thisenhancement

ofgeneralwelfarehasoccurredinhistory,eventhoughtoaveryvariableextentand

after long times of increasing exploitation of theworkers, of economic crises, and

outrageousmiseryallovertheworld,justasMarxhaspredicted.Marxism-Leninism,

however, historically failed as the real existing socialismwhichmany countries in

theworldexperienced.Inthisregard,philosophyhasnotpassedthepracticaltest.

MILL’swaytothebecoming-practicalofphilosophywasdifferent,eventhough

it,timeandagain,overlapswithMarx’sway.MilldidnotreacttoMarx,albeitbothof

themlivedinLondonfora longtime;Marx,however,respondedtoMill.Following

theBritishtradition,Millworkslesswithdeductionsfromgeneralpropositionsthan

with inductions from concrete observations; he foregrounds not so much groups

thatfightjointlyfortheirmoral,social,andpoliticalright,butrathertheindividuals

andtheir freedom.Millbears inminda“Civil,orSocialLiberty”whichdevelops in

the individuals’ leeways over against the power of society involving its economy,

119

politics,publicopinion,andmorality.AccordingtoMill,theseleewaysweighheavy

forthe“weakermembersofthecommunity.”Eventhoughthepowerless,inthefirst

instance,havelittleusefortheseleeways,theycanbeextendedovertime;according

toMill,theyshouldnotbesecuredthroughrevolutionarypropagandaandviolence,

butratherparliamentarily,throughlegislation.

Thestateoflawregulatestheuseofpoliticalpower,whichisinevitablealsoin

ademocracy.Inademocracy,however,nogeneralwillinRousseau’ssense(sec.12)

needstobepresupposed.Onthecontrary,theindividualmustbeprotectedagainst

the “tyranny of the majority”; and ultimately, all individuals must be protected

againstassaultsoneachother.Therefore,asocietymust finda “fittingadjustment

betweenindividualindependenceandsocialcontrol”throughthelawandmorality.

Millpresupposes thateveryone’s “standardof judgment ishisown liking.”There-

fore,everyoneshallbefreetoachievehisorherownwellbeingaccordingtohisor

herown ideas, since the individual isbestat that,provided thatno-elseelse is in-

jured.

Millconcedesthatthisthoughtisnotoriginal.ComparedtoMarx’sandEngels’

social-revolutionarypathos,Milladherestoacalmsenseofreality,whichweighsall

circumstances,alsoinmoral-politicaldedication.Educatedbyhisfather,JamesMill,

intheteachingsofhisfather’sfriendJeremyBentham(sec.12),Millregards“utility

as theultimateappealonallethicalquestions.”Alreadyasa small childunder the

guidanceofhis father,Millhasbeguntoacquireacomprehensiveeducation inthe

spiritofacoolrationalism,andsincethen,hehasworkeduntilhesufferedanervous

breakdown anddepression. This causes him a severe personal disorientation that

awakesinhimimportantnewphilosophicalperspectivesbeyondtheclassicutilitar-

ianism.He reorients utilitarianism: the greatest happiness of the greatest number

must not occur at the expense of the happiness of the individual; rather, it must

summarizethehappinessoftheindividuals.

Just likehis father,Mill is for decades employedby theEast IndiaCompany,

oneof themightiestcapitalistorganizationsofhisday.However,healsoperceives

themisery of the working class and seeks to combat it, for some years also as a

MemberofParliament,throughgradualreforms.InspiredandsupportedbyHarriet

Taylor,hislaterwife,headvocatesequalrightsofmenandwomen.Hefightsagainst

the privileges of the land-owning aristocracy, believes in democracy, and tries to

strengthenitbyextendingtherighttovote.Atthesametime,hefearsthedemocrat-

120

icdriveforequityanddemandsthatthepublicspiritandfactionalismmustnotwin

through.LikeMarx,he regards the stateasprovisional in the transition toamore

liberalsocietywithoutstrongleadershipstructures.Hedoessounderthebannerof

liberalism:thestateshallprotectthefreedom,security,andwelfareoftheindividu-

als–andrestrictthemaslittleaspossible.Societyshallnotdominateovertheindi-

viduals,andtheindividualsshallnotdominateoversociety;rather,societyandthe

individualsshallrealignandcoordinatetheirinterests.

Mill mistrusts not only tradition and habits, but also the masses’ power of

judgment.Withoutillusions,heorientshimselftothatwhichisrealizablepolitically

andavoidstodebateprinciples.Inordertolaunchnewdevelopments,hespeaksup

forcompetitionandinnovationnotonlyineconomy,butalsoinregimes;however,

hedoesnotendorseunlimitedgrowth.Millwants tocharge independentandedu-

catedpersonalities(likehimself)withthegovernmentofthestate;thesepersonali-

tiesshallrepresentthepeoplealsointheparliaments.Heexpectsthegreatestwel-

fareofall fromeveryone’sactiveparticipationintheshapingofsocietyontheone

hand,andfromthecompetenceoftheelectedrepresentativesandtherulersonthe

other.Thewisdomofthepeoplelies,forhim,intheelectionofwiseleaders.Putin

thelanguageofthephilosophyoforientation:asfaraspossible,Milltriestotiepolit-

ical power to fact-orientation and personal superiority in orienting oneself and

providing orientation for others; for him, the party system and the antagonismof

governmentandoppositionindemocracyareoflowerinterest.

Even in regard to Mill’s approach to social problems, the practical test re-

vealedlimits,betheyinstitutionalorpersonalones.Nonetheless,GreatBritain,the

atthattimepremiereconomicpoweroftheworld,succeededinavoidingaradical

socialupheavalinthecountry–despiterepeatedlyflamingupprotests–bycarrying

outgradualreformsoflawsandoftheparliament,towhichMillpersonallycontrib-

uted. However, Britain enjoyed rich earnings from a worldwide colonial empire,

whichdidnotenjoycomparableparliamentaryrights.ButneitherinGermanynorin

France,therevolutionoftheworkingclassproclaimedbyMarxcametopass;ithap-

penedonlyinRussia,whichMarxdidnotdeemmatureforitandwherethedesired

freedomofallcouldnotberealized.

ThephilosophyoforientationcaninviewofMarx’sandMill’salternativeorien-

tationdecisionsexploretheleewaysinwhichphilosophycancommititselfmor-

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allyandpoliticallyand,inthissense,becomepractical.Sincethejustificationof

Christiandogmatics in theMiddleAges and thedesignof the state of law, the

marketeconomy,anddemocracyinmodernity,Marx’sandMill’spracticalpro-

jectshavebeenthehithertomostcomprehensiveandinfluentialonesinthehis-

toryofphilosophy;bothprojectshave changed the societal circumstances ina

sustainedmanner.

BothMarxandMillregardsocietyasasocietyofindividuals:theindividuals

aredependentonasocietyinordertobeabletoliveasindividuals,andsociety

isdependentondifferentindividualsinordertobeabletomakeprogress.While

Mill targets the good of the individual, Marx targets the good of society as a

whole, though at first the good of themajority in a society, but both of them

wanttoenhancethegoodofall.Further,bothofthemfindindemocracythepo-

litical form toachieve this end, andbothof themadvancepolitical economics,

yetinalternativeways.

Mill builds democracy on themutual restriction of leeways,which can be

determined anew in new situations, i.e. be changed through reforms. This re-

quiresacomparativelylowdegreeofideology,whichunitestheindividualstoa

community,andahighdegreeof individualorientationabilitiesandvirtues in

order tounderstandandsupport theconstitutionaldemocratic structures that

becomemoreandmorecomplex.

Marx, on the other hand, observes that in societalmisery, revolutionary

transformationsarerequiredfromamoralpointofview.Hepredictsthatthese

transformationsoccuraccordingtoeconomicandhistoricallaws.Still,therevo-

lutionary upheavalmust be carried out by human beingswho suffer from the

situation,andforthispurpose,theyneedguidingideasthatunitethemandmo-

tivatethemtofight,i.e.,theyneedastrongideology,asLeninhaspronouncedit

plainly.Throughan ideology, the individualorientationsaredeterminedbyan

assertivepoliticalprogramwithmassimpactsubordinatingtheindividuals’ide-

as and aims to common interests.When a society suffers bitter hardships, the

orientationtowardsthebenefitof thewholecommunityprevailsoverthe indi-

vidualorientations.

Itmaybeforsituationalreasonsthatcommunismfailedhistoricallyasan

attempttofreeallmembersofasocietyfrommisery;incountrieswherepolitical

leaders still cling to the communistic ideology, it can only be upheld by force.

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However,thefailureofcommunismcanalsobeduetothefactthatphilosophy

overestimatesthegeneralwhenitbelievesitcandeveloppoliticalprogramsac-

cordingtowhichanentiresocietycanbechangedrevolutionarily;toallowsuch

programs tobe successful, the livingconditionsofa society seemtobe far too

complex,andindividualorientationsseemtovarytoomuch.

Yet, suchastatement, too, isundersuspicionof ideology ifwe followthe

Marxian theoryaccording towhichphilosophymust bea criticismof ideology

(Ideologiekritik). The reason is that philosophy cannot completely refuse the

suspiciontobearepresentativeofindividualorsocietalinterestsand,sinceone

can orient oneself about a situation only in this situation, one cannot explore

one’ssituationintotal.Philosophyis,forMarx,alwayspartofa“superstructure

(Überbau)”whose “base (Basis)” it comprehends only to a limited extent. The

philosophy of orientation is aware of the fact that every philosophy inevitably

springs fromasituatedstandpoint.Yet, thisentails thattheorientationofphi-

losophers,too,isalwaysalreadypracticalbecausetheyreflect,correct,andcon-

tinuously reform their ideas in regard to relevant footholds of new situations.

Therefore, philosophy as orientationmust prudently abstain from exceedingly

universalizing,totalizing,andradicalizing.

18.AlternativeWaysofLiberatingPhilosophyfromMetaphysics:

Dilthey,Nietzsche,andJames

WILHELMDILTHEY(1833-1911AD),FRIEDRICHNIETZSCHE(1844-1889/1900AD)and

WILLIAMJAMES(1842-1910AD)consciouslydriveforwardanepochalchangewithin

the field of philosophy. They proceed largely independently of each other, but go

ahead in the samedirection.They insiston theirownorientationdecisions and in-

clude themalso into theirphilosophies. In this context, they resolutelybreakwith

metaphysics and begin to investigate the conditions and structures of orientation

decisionsassuch.

Their curricula vitae resemble each other inmany aspects, and yet, Dilthey,

Nietzsche, and James represent different types of personalities. Nietzsche, whose

father died early, originated from narrow circumstances, while Dilthey stemmed

from a prosperous, and James from awealthy family. Dilthey andNietzschewere

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sonsofpastors,whoturnedawayfromtheologyandremainedcriticalagainstChris-

tianreligion throughout their life; James,bycontrast, atall timeskepthisways to

Godopen.Allthreeofthemattendedtheverybestschoolsandweredeeplyrooted

inEuropeanthought;JamescametoEurope13timesinhislife,particularlytoGer-

many,whileDiltheyandNietzscheneverreachedbeyondEurope.

Allthreeofthemwereuniversityprofessors.Dilthey,whobecameaprofessor

ofphilosophy first inBasel, then inKiel,Breslau,andBerlin,and James, forwhom

HarvardUniversity established anewprofessorial chair, enjoyed a successful aca-

demiccareer,whereasNietzsche,whowasappointedtoaprofessorshipinBaselal-

readyasastudentofclassicalphilology,hadtoresignhispositionaftertenyearsfor

reasonsofhealthandbecauseheinthemeantimehadturnedcompletelytophilos-

ophy.Sincethen,Nietzsche livedatchangingplacesprimarily in ItalyandSwitzer-

landasastatelessmigrant.Hehadtofindplaceswhoseclimatewasendurablefor

him; yet, also for the sake of his intellectual freedom, he never settled down. All

three of them entered philosophy starting fromdifferent disciplines:Dilthey from

theology,Nietzschefromclassicalphilology,andJamesfrommedicineandpsychol-

ogy. This facilitated their break with tradition. Each of them was tormented by

chronicailmentsthatbroughtthemperiodsofdepressionandhamperedtheirabili-

tiestocarryouttheirduties.Theirailmentsmadethemawareofthefactthatthink-

inginlargemeasuredependsonphysicalconditions.Nonetheless,DiltheyandJames

werehappilymarried,whileNietzschetriedtomarry,butthenrefrainedfromdoing

soandremainedalone.

Diltheywasthetypeofagentlescholarwhointenselycarriedouthisresearch

and was closely interconnected with his colleagues. He was cautious in valuing,

avoidedeverythingtoopersonal,andpresentedhisprofoundphilosophicalreorien-

tations inclassic treatises.Hedidso insereneandcomposed trust inhis research

andwiththeauthorityofamanofletters;hecultivatedaclosephilosophicalfriend-

shipwiththearistocratPAULYORCKOFWARTENBURG(1835-1897AD).James,whose

godfatherwasRalphWaldoEmersonandwhosebrotherwas the likewise famous

author Henry James, synchronizedwith his friend CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE (1839-

1914AD),withJOHNDEWEY(1859-1952AD),andF.C.S.SCHILLER(1864-1937AD)in

ordertoadvancepragmatismasajointundertaking.Nietzsche,bycontrast,cultivat-

edhisimageasasolitarygenius–againstthetypeofamerescholarandtothedis-

may of Dilthey and James. To this, Schopenhauer (sec. 16) encouraged him as his

124

intellectualteacher,andhisearly,closefriendshipwiththeillustriousRichardWag-

nerandhiswifeCosimaenhancedit.

Nietzscheenteredintophilosophyinaverypersonal,pathetic,andpolemical

waywithhispathbreakingtreatiseTheBirthofTragedyfromtheSpiritofMusic(Die

GeburtderTragödieausdemGeistederMusik),whichturnedupsidedowntheclassic

view of the ancient Greeks, and with his Untimely Meditations (Unzeitgemäße

Betrachtungen) that challenged the scholarlyworldofhisday.Nietzschecreateda

hitherto unknown diversity of literary forms for his philosophy and learned pro-

gressivelyhowtodeepenandatthesametimequestionhisphilosophicalteachings

byusingthese literary forms.Throughthe“subtler lawsofhisstyle,”Nietzsche,as

author,madeamysteryofhimself,sothatonenevercantakehimimmediatelyathis

word,but is forced intodecisionsof interpretationandorientation. In this regard,

NietzscheremindsusofPlato.

Nexttotreatises(likeTheBirthofTragedy)andessays(likeUntimelyMedita-

tions),Nietzscheonabigscalecreatedvolumescontainingaphorisms, for instance

Human,AllTooHuman(Menschliches,Allzumenschliches),TheGayScience(Diefröh-

licheWissenschaft),andBeyondGoodandEvil(JenseitsvonGutundBöse),wherehe

presentshisthoughtsfromvariousperspectives.Inaddition,heauthoredevermore

polemicpapersandpamphletslikeOntheGenealogyofMorality(ZurGenealogieder

Moral), Götzen-Dämmerung (Twilight of the Idols), and The Antichrist (Der Anti-

christ), but also poems likeDionysian-Dithyrambs (Dionysos-Dithyramben). InEcce

homo,whichcontains thegenealogyofhisown thinking,Nietzschehighlightedhis

didacticpoemThusSpokeZarathustra (AlsosprachZarathustra),whichunitesepic

anddramatic,dialogicalandlyricalfeatures.HereNietzscheletshisprotagonistfail

becausenoonecansufficientlyunderstandhisteachings.

Nietzscheraisedasensationthroughstartlingformulalike“thedeathofGod,”

“nihilism,” “the will to power,” “the overman” (earlier translated as “superman”),

and“theeternalrecurrenceof thesame,”whichhedidnotconnectsystematically.

Such formula easily conceal the richness and depth of his philosophy, and it took

decades beforeNietzschewas discovered as a great philosopher. In contradistinc-

tion toDiltheyand James,andalso tohisownwork inclassicphilology,Nietzsche

offered little hard-earned knowledge in his philosophy; on the contrary, he often

used secondhand knowledge. So much the more, he always anew surprised (and

surprises) people with interesting perspectives, sharp evaluations, and trenchant

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judgments.Nonetheless(orexactlyforthisreason)heremained,otherthanDilthey

andJames,largelyunsuccessfulwithhiswritingsaslongashismentalfacultieswere

unimpaired; however, when he suffered from insanity, he quickly was known

worldwide. His impact went far beyond philosophical professional circles, and it

continuesunabatedlydowntothepresentday.Nietzschehas–afterSocrates–wide

appealasthetypeofgeniusphilosopherassuch.

Allthethree,Dewey,Nietzsche,andJames,turnedawayfrommetaphysicsina

productivewaybyalsofreeingthemselvesfromalltranscendentandtranscendental

doctrines.Theyregardallphilosophicaldoctrines,whichclaimtobeunconditionally

certain,asmetaphysics. Inobserving thatmetaphysicsandreligionare in thepro-

cessofdissolution, theynoteven try todisprove them,butonlyput them,asNie-

tzsche and James say, “on ice.” Instead, theywant to reveal “thewhole, full, non-

mutilatedexperience,”asDiltheyputsit,inalltheabundancewithwhichthisexpe-

rienceprovidesus,startingfromnaturalbodilylifeandtheindividualconsciousness

rightthroughtoculture,history,andthecommunicationsystemsofsocietythatde-

pend on each other inmanifoldways.What is revealed here is the reality by and

largeignoredandconcealedbymetaphysics:therealityofeverydayorientation.

Dewey, Nietzsche, and James consider metaphysics as a historical and thus

bygone phenomenon. In his first main work, Introduction to the Human Sciences

(Einleitung in dieGeisteswissenschaften,published in 1883),Diltheypresents a de-

tailed history of the “rule” and “decay” ofmetaphysics; he calls its historicization,

against whichmetaphysics always has strived, its “euthanasia.” Dilthey’s result is

that “metaphysics cannotovercome the relativityof the circleof experiences from

whichitsconceptsaretaken.”Thiscircleofexperienceschangesallthetimeandis

“unpredictable,relative,andrestricted;”itcannotbeunderstoodmetaphysicallyasa

“logical coherence of theworld.” This isNietzsche’s view, too. For sure, hewrites

thatmetaphysicsitselfwasa“stepintheprocessofliberation”–namelyfromreli-

giousclaimsassertinganultimatecertainty,andtherein,metaphysicshasits“histor-

icalandpsychologicalright.”Inthemeantime,however,metaphysicshasbecomea

signofweakness ifonestillwants torelyona “science” that “dealswith thebasic

errorsofhumankind–thoughinsuchaway,asiftheywerebasictruths.”

That which Dilthey and Nietzsche address as “metaphysics” includes, for

James, the continental tradition of rationalism. To bid adieu to rationalisticmeta-

physicsiseasierwhencomingfromtheBritishandAmericantraditionthatfollows

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nominalism,empirism,andutilitarism,anditcanappealtocommonsense,whichis

not possible in the German tradition. That which James calls “pragmatism” turns

away “fromabstraction and insufficiency, fromverbal solutions, frombadapriori

reasons,fromfixedprinciples,closedsystems,andpretendedabsolutesandorigins.”

Instead,pragmatismturns “towardsconcretenessandadequacy, towards facts, to-

wardsaction,andtowardspower.”Inhis“disbeliefintheAbsolute,”Jamestakes,as

he says, “moral holidays” in which he leaves metaphysics behind. Nonetheless,

Dilthey,Nietzsche,andJamesacknowledgethatonecandrawonmetaphysicswhen

nothingelseleadstothetargetedobjective,forinstanceconcerningtherelationbe-

tweenconsciousnessandbrain,ortheethically inevitableproblemofthefreewill.

However,onemustthenbeawareofthefactthatoneonlydealswithmetaphysics

andmust acceptmetaphysical paradoxes. Yet, for James, pragmatismdoesnot ex-

cludethesearchforGod.

In James’ view, when investigating concreteness, our state of the art corre-

spondstotheoneofphysicsbeforeGalilei:everythingisprovisionalandremainsin

needofrevision.AstoDiltheyandNietzsche,thedissolutionofmetaphysicsleavesa

generaldisorientation.AsNietzschestatesinaposthumousnoteofJune10,1887,in

whichhesought toacquireanoverviewof thestatusofphilosophy ingeneraland

hisownphilosophyinparticular,lifebecomes“uncertain,accidental,nonsensicalin

ourEurope”;onecannolongerappreciatetheoldandhasnotyetlearnttoappreci-

atethenewthatonestillknowstoolittle.Nietzscheconcludes:“Oneinterpretation”

–namelythemetaphysical interpretation–“perished;since itwasregardedasthe

interpretation, it seems as if existence was meaningless, as if everything was in

vain.”Nietzschecallsthis“nihilism.”Fromthisnihilismresultsa“revaluationofall

values,” which challenges humanity to create new values. Dilthey confirms Nie-

tzsche’s diagnosis, speaks of the “perplexity of the spirit about itself” or a “con-

sciousnessofanarchyloominginalldeeperconvictions,”andcontinues:“Maybethe

ultimate suppositions of human life and actionhavenever to such an extent been

exposedtodisintegration.”

James,by contrast, remainsoptimistic.Withhispsychologyand thephiloso-

phyofpragmatism,hehasalreadyfoundanewfoothold.Hetruststhatthesuccessful

orientationofthinkingmanifestsitselfinaction.Thisimplies,inhisopinion,thatwe

have to look “away from first things,principles, ‘categories,’ supposednecessities”

and instead “toward last things, fruits, consequences, facts.”Moreover, he recom-

127

mends “linking things satisfactorily, working securely, simplifying, saving labor”

and,indoingso,maintaininga“maximumofcontinuity.”Truthsarevalidonlyfora

timeincertainsituations.Theyfirstappearastruthsandstandthetestwhenandas

longtheymakeadifferenceinaction,orwhenonecanmakeuseoftheminsucha

waythattheresultsaresatisfactory.

Jamesarguesthattruthscanhavea“functionofagreeableleading,”i.e.anori-

entingfunction.Thetruthsthatprovesuccessfulinorientation,areconsultedagain

incomparablesituations:“Trueideasarethosethatwecanassimilate,validate,and

verify.False ideasare those thatwecannot.”This is their “cashvalue,”andwith it

arises something like a “credit system” of truth. Something is regarded as true as

longassomeonedisagrees;justasmoneyisvalidaslongasitisnolongeraccepted.

However,somewheretheremustalsobe“directface-to-faceverifications”;without

them,“thefabricoftruthcollapseslikeafinancialsystemwithnocash-basiswhat-

ever.Youacceptmyverificationofonething, Iyoursofanother.Wetradeoneach

other’s truth.” In this exchange, orientation finds a sufficient foothold,withoutde-

mandingunconditionalcertainties.Thisisagooddescriptionoffundamentalstruc-

turesandprocessesofeverydayorientation.

Justlike,longago,Newton’sphysics(sec.11)createdanewsituationforphi-

losophy,sodidalsoDarwin’sevolutionarybiology.Dilthey,Nietzsche,andJamesaf-

firmedit–whileraisingspecificobjectionsandwithoutplacingDarwin’stheoryin

thecenterof theirphilosophies.Darwin’sOriginofSpecies (1859)wasphilosophi-

cally significant insofar as Darwin empirically demonstrated that the apparently

constantbiological speciesonwhichAristotleprimarilyhadbuilthismetaphysical

conceptoftheconcept(sec.5)changeincessantlyinmoreorlesslonglapsesoftime.

Strictly speaking, there are no biological species with invariable attributes or no

steady forms that only changematter. Instead, individuals always beget different

individualswithdifferent individuals underdifferent circumstances. The apparent

substancesthatAristotleregardedas‘beingitself’are,inthelanguageofthephilos-

ophyoforientation, in fact fluctuances. Inaddition,whileNewton’s lawscould, fol-

lowingKant,stillbeunderstoodphilosophicallyinthesensethattheyareconstrued

by thehuman intellect itself, theDarwinianevolutionof livingbeingsoccursocca-

sionally. Asmatters stand in the 19th century, the evolutionary process cannot be

construedandpredicted,butonlybedescribed.

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Dilthey,Nietzsche,andJamesaswellproceedtoadescriptivemethod.Instead

ofabidingbyprinciples,theyobserveexperienceableprocesses.Inthedescriptionof

theconditionsandstructuresofhumanorientationthatprecedescientificandmeta-

physical thinking, Dilthey, Nietzsche, and James largely agree. Nietzsche describes

theminthemoststimulatingway,Diltheyinthemostdifferentiatedway,andJames

most concisely. Dilthey experiments with the notion of “being-oriented” (Orien-

tiertsein), Nietzsche with the notions of “perspective” and “interpretation”; and

Jamescallspragmatismon thewhole “anattitudeoforientation.”Their respective

descriptionsextend to the fieldsof (1)culture, (2)history, (3) life,and(4)experi-

ence.Forthispurpose,theydevelopnewandspecificmodesofdistinction.

(1)Culture: InNietzsche’s eyes, an “eraof comparison”hasbegun: “all steps

andkindsofmoralityandcustomsofcultures”areaccessiblethroughtraveling,the

mixtureofdifferentpeoples,themediaandthesciences;theyarecomparedtoeach

other in its valueand canbe “experienced sideby side.”Thus, theyareobligatory

onlytoalimitedextent.Today,thisphenomenonisdescribedaspostmodernglobal-

ization.Thecomparativemethodorientsitselfbydescribingculturaldifferences,yet

without assuming that different cultures have something in common. The differ-

encesareregisteredwiththehelpof footholdsthatare, fortheirpart,notbinding.

Theyconstitutenoessentialattributes.Onearticulatescontrastsinordertogainan

overview.Comparisonscanpossiblybedrawninalldirections.

(2)History:Undertheprogrammatictitle“critiqueofhistoricalreason”(Kritik

der historischen Vernunft), Dilthey conducts extensive historiography, focusing on

thehistoryof ideasthatcomparesandcontrastsdifferentepochs.Nietzschewants

tobeginaneweraof“historicalphilosophizing”andaimsfora“formationhistoryof

thinking”(EntstehungsgeschichtedesDenkens).Thishistoryshallbekindofanatu-

ralistic “chemistry of concepts and sentiments” (Chemie der Begriffe und Emp-

findungen).Butitcanalsoproceedalternatively,namely“antiquarian”incompiling

sources and facts; “monumentalizing” in giving prominence to great examples; or,

whatmatters toNietzsche, “critical” in comparing itsown timewithearlier times,

which enablesus todecideonourown standards. In any case, history shall serve

life.

(3)Life: James concentrates on accounting for all intellectual and spiritual

lifeasaprocessofnaturallife.Hisbroadconceptoflife,whichemphasizesdiversity

and transformation, includes culture and history as well. For James just as for

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DiltheyandNietzsche,theconceptoflifehasthefunctionofreplacingapriorijudg-

ments: life does not require any transcendent or transcendental justification. Life

regulates itself,butcanalsobeshaped; it isalways tobepresupposedasawhole,

but it can never be grasped as a whole – like Spinoza’s deus sive natura (sec. 9).

Dilthey understands life as mere interrelation and interdependency (Zusammen-

hang).Inthe“interrelationoflife”(Lebenszusammenhang),thereconstantlyemerge

connections of structures (Strukturzusammenhänge) or, in brief, structures

(Strukturen)thatdissociatethemselvesfromtheirenvironment,sustainthemselves

within it, and can react upon it. This happens fortuitously, under favorable condi-

tions.Therespectivestructurescanincorporateelementsandotherconnectionsof

structures that are in their environment, but they can also divide themselves and

dissolveagain.Thecrucialnewthoughtis:thesestructurespreservethemselvesasa

netofmereconnectionsandnotbecauseofisolatedrelationsofcausality;theyare

individuallikeeverylivingcreature.Diltheyspeaksofan“acquiredstructuralinter-

relation” (erworbener Strukturzusammenhang), while Nietzsche aggressively uses

thekeywordofthewilltopower;for“initsbasicfunctions,”lifeis“violating,raping,

exploiting,devastating,” too. InNietzsche,uncountablewills topowerengagewith

other wills to power without any pregiven laws; this is, Nietzsche supposes, the

mosteconomicalhypothesishelpingustounderstandlifeassuch.

Sinceonecannotstepoutoflifewithoutlosingone’slife,onecanonlydojus-

ticetoitbyunderstandingitonitsownterms,notbyexplainingitwithreferenceto

somethingelse.Ourunderstandingis,inturn,boundtocontextsoflife.Forthisrea-

son,understandingisalwaysindividual,ontheonehand,andcomprehensiveonthe

other:inunderstanding,objectsarenotfirstisolatedandthenconnectedaccording

toone-dimensionalrelationssuchascausality;rather, theyare fromtheverystart

contextualized,apprehendedintheirrespectiverelations,whichcanbedifferentiat-

ed or abbreviated dependent on the requirements of the situation.Understanding

thereby proceeds in an oscillatingmanner and in a hermeneutic circle: individual

thingscanbeunderstoodintheirrelationstoawhole,andthewholecanbeunder-

stoodinrelationtoitsindividualparts.Thisisthebasicmodeloforientationinasit-

uation.

Nietzscheconsidersunderstanding, too,asawill topower,namelyasanap-

propriationofothernessonone’sown terms. Inprinciple, the latter is thereforea

misunderstanding,sincethere isnosuperordinatecriterionforclearlydistinguish-

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ingatruefromafalseunderstanding.Itis,asweallknow,difficulttobeunderstood.

Hence, Nietzsche’s point of departure is not being-understood, but rather being-

misunderstood. Among human beings, understanding is, for him, a “leeway and

playgroundofmisunderstanding (SpielraumundTummelplatz desMissverständnis-

ses).”Hegoesevenfurther:thewilltotruthandthevalueoftruthitselfcouldbea

metaphysical prejudice, for human life is also in need of deception and self-

deception.Onemust “admituntruthasa condition in life,” and logic,metaphysics,

andmoralitycould, inNietzsche’sview,belongtountruthsthatarevital for life.In

philosophy,alltruthsincludingthewilltotruthappeartobeconditionedbylifeand

thus not equally true for everyone: “all the basic instincts of humanbeings” have,

accordingtoNietzsche,“alreadyphilosophized.”Thismeansthatphilosophyis“the

most intellectualwill topower,”andphysics, too, is “nothingbutan interpretation

and design of the world (Auslegung und Zurechtlegung),” a kind of “world-

interpretation (Welt-Interpretation) that wants to divest existence of its naturally

“equivocalcharacter.”

ForJames,theorientationbylifecontextsinsteadofisolatedobjectsrequires

thepragmatistic self-restraintofphilosophy.Heconceptualizesakindofcritiqueof

active,livingreason,whichimpliesthatlifecannotbehaltedforthesakeofenabling

objective insights. For this reason, truths must be parts of life contexts. Truths

emerge from experiences; in their light, new experiences are gained in a self-

referentialprocess,andfromthesenewexperiences,newtruthsoriginate,etc.James

describesanongoingprocessoforientation:incontextualization,“linesofinfluence”

takeshapeandarelinkedby“conductors”thatofferthemselvesatsomeplacesand

can fail to appear at other places. James uses already themetaphor of fibers in a

thread,whichbecamefamousthroughWittgenstein.Ifunderstandingistheintegra-

tionintocontexts,themereintegrationofobservations,objects,andsentences,etc.,

makes them already true. Theremay bemanifold systems of integration, but one

cannot escape from integration in some form. Nonetheless, “the ‘absolutely’ true,

meaningwhat no farther experiencewill ever alter,” is still thinkable, but only as

“thatidealvanishing-pointtowardswhichweimaginethatallourtemporarytruths

willsomedayconverge.”Suchvanishing-pointsarealsopartsoftheveryprocessof

orientation.InJames’eyes,allexperiences“leanoneachother,”butthewholeofex-

periencesleansonnothing.Whatremainsisa“stateofrelativeinsecurity.”

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James,justlikeDiltheyandNietzsche,doesnotfindanybadrelativisminthis

current stateof insecurity,but ratherarealism towhichphilosophymust faceup.

Onenotonly(followingHobbes,sec.8)regardssomethingasgoodbecauseonede-

siresit,butcanalsoregardsomethingastruebecauseoneisokaywithittotheex-

tentthatitfitswelltotheroutinesofone’sownlife.Truthsonlycatchattentionas

suchwhentheymakeadifference,i.e.whentheyrenderactionmoreorlesssuccess-

ful–whereby thesuccess isassessedby theagents themselves in their respective

situations.Asregardsabstractthinking,NietzscheandJamesclarifythatitssuccess

liesinitsorientingsteeringfunction.Nietzschedesignateslanguageasawholeasa

“processofabbreviation(Abkürzungs-Prozess).”Seen fromahistoricalperspective,

languagedevelopsviaevernewusagesinevernewsituations.However,atalltimes,

languageandtheconceptsitoffersgiveapre-orientation,andallthinkingandacting

isunderthe“spell”ofthispre-orientation:“thespellofcertaingrammaticfunctions

isultimatelythespellofphysiologicalvaluejudgmentsandracialconditions.”

AccordingtoJames,thesingleconceptsinparticularare“onlyartificialshort-

cuts”:“Theirgreatuseistosummarizeoldfactsandtoleadtonewones.”Allcomes

downtothis“beingguided”byaconcept,andeveryagreementissaidtobe“anaf-

fairof leading.”Logical linksworkwithabstracted features; yet, theway inwhich

oneabstractssomefeaturesfromsomeentities,andthequestionofwhichfeatureis

regardedascrucial(for instancethemortalityofSocrates inthe logicalparadeex-

ample‘Socratesismortal’),allthisdependsontherespectivepurposesandinterests

thatareimpliedinanargumentation.Thetrulyinterestingaspectofsyllogismisthe

decisionforcertainfeaturesandcertaindirectionsofabstraction.Therearevarious

kindsofunionandseparation;yet,Jamesarguesthatundertherespectivetermsof

“greatsystemsof logicalandmathematical truths,” thesensible factsofexperience

“eventuallyarrangethemselves,sothatoureternaltruthsholdgoodofrealitiesalso.

Thismarriageoffactandtheoryisendlesslyfertile.”

Theprocessoforientation,aswecallit,sediments,forJames,inthe‘common

sense’oftheEnglishtradition.Thecommonsensecollectsplausibilitiesthatcanand

neednottobejustifiedanymore.Atthispoint,theprocessoforientationcomesto

rest.AsJamesputsitin“TheMeaningofTruth”(1909),“thecommon-sensestageis

aperfectlydefinitehaltingplaceof thought,primarily forpurposesofaction.”Seen

from rationalistic points of view, this stage is “vague, confused andmixed,” but in

concretesituations,itis“auseusuallysuggestedsufficientlybythecircumstancesof

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thespecialcase.”Itorientsus“inanextraordinarilysuccessfulway”:Jamesbelieves

thatit“sufficesforallthenecessaryendsoflife.”Afterall,the“economyinthought”is

crucialinallsituationsoforientation.

(4)Experience:However,understandingpresupposesadistancetotheobjects

andcontextstobeunderstood.Withhisnotionofexperience(Erleben),Diltheyeven

goesback ‘behind’understanding.Life is experienced immediately in life contexts,

anditisexperiencedbyindividualconsciousness.Thewaysinwhichweexperience

life individually, the ‘how’ of experience, is investigated in psychology. Especially

throughWILHELMWUNDT(1832-1920AD),psychologywasinGermanydevelopedas

anempiricalsciencethatrestsonaphysiologicalfundament,anditwasconducted

as individual and folk psychology.Dilthey and Jamespresuppose this kind of psy-

chologyandadvanceit.JamesdoessowithhisvoluminousPrinciplesofPsychology

of1890,whichturnedhimintothefoundingfatherofpsychologyintheUSA;Dilthey

doessowithintheframeworkofhisfoundationofthehumanitiesinhisIdeasfora

DescriptiveandAnalyticPsychology(Ideenübereinebeschreibendeundzergliedernde

Psychologie,1894).Bothofthemgobeyondthescientificexplanatoryexperimental

psychology in order to describe coherencies that, asDilthey formulates it, are not

just“thoughtoutordeduced,butexperienced.”Thereby, the footholdsare“typical

humanbeings.”

Inthisnewpsychology,everythingthathithertohasbeendiscussedunderthe

title ‘epistemology’ shall be suspended:psychologynowno longer assumesa sub-

ject-object- or body-soul-dichotomy, but rather proceeds from functional life con-

texts. James,who often combines his descriptionswith pedagogical recommenda-

tions, focuses on the “stream of consciousness,” in which different states of con-

sciousnessalternatecontinuously,anddiscussesstepbystep theroleofattention,

conception,discriminationandassociation,ofthesenseoftime,ofmemoryandim-

agination,ofperception, reasoning, emotion, and instinct, and finallyof thewill in

thisstreamofconsciousness.Nietzschedispenseswithsystematicdeliberations.He

aggressivelytakespsychologytobecriticalanddebunking,andheusesitinorderto

disclose hidden personalmotives behind all claims for absolute certainty that are

particularlyprominent inmoralphilosophy. Inhispsychology,heseesanew“way

tothebasicproblems”ofphilosophy.Hisgenealogyofmoralscanbeunderstoodas

thefoundationofacriticalmoralpsychology.

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Inregardtothetechniqueofdistinction,theproductiveliberationfrommeta-

physicswithitsunconditionalcertaintiesthatarebuiltonabstractconceptsleadsto

anewtypeofgeneralization,namely typing (Typisierung).Dilthey typesorcatego-

rizesworldviewsthatdevelopincertaincircumstancesoflife(forinstancenatural-

ism,idealismoffreedom,objectiveidealism);Nietzschetypecastssocialfiguresthat

becomerelevantinthelifeofsociety(namelytheeducatedphilistine(Bildungsphil-

ister), themanand thewoman, the strongand theweak, the sovereign individual,

thecriminal)aswellasindividualstowhomheascribesaspecialweightinhistory,

society, and literature (for instance the types of Socrates, Jesus, and Zarathustra);

Jamescategorizeswaysofactingthatcanmakeadifference(ordonot).Allthreeof

themcompareandcontrastthesetypeswithothers,interpretthempsychologically

andcharacterizethemasmodels–notinordertofindfixedgeneraltermsforacer-

taincaseorasharplycircumscribedassemblageofcases,butratherinordertogive

somepreliminaryfootholdsofhowtheycouldbecaptured.

Typingservesorientation,both theorientationof thosewho typecastandof

others.ParticularlyinNietzsche’scase,typingresultsobviouslyinindividualcharac-

terizationsandinterpretationsthatrevealhisownwilltopowerandtherebycom-

promise him. One can always counter the preliminary footholds, which appear

throughtyping,withotherfootholds;typingleavesaleewayforotherformsoftyp-

ing.Hence,generalizationsremainflexible;theyalwaysremaingeneralizationswith

reservations. Everyone can decide on his or her ownwhether he or shewants to

adoptgeneralizationsortypesforhisorherownorientation.Intheend,everysin-

gle individual is responsible for the general. Dilthey,Nietzsche, and James discuss

thisproblem,andNietzschealsodemonstratesitineverymomentwiththehelpof

hispointedandfasttypinginhismanifoldformsofphilosophicalauthorship.

The philosophy of orientation is still dealingwith the paradoxes thatWilliam

Jamesplacesatthebeginningandtheendofhisoverviewofpragmatism:“Phi-

losophy isatonce themost sublimeand themost trivialofhumanpursuits.”–

“Ontheonesidetheuniverseisabsolutelysecure,ontheotheritisstillpursuing

itsadventures.”Bothparadoxesarise throughtheendofmetaphysicsorof the

beliefintruthsofunconditionalcertainty.Dilthey,Nietzsche,andJamesliberate

themselves productively frommetaphysics in investigating the conditions and

structuresofhumanorientationthatmetaphysicshasconcealed;formetaphys-

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icsemergesexactlyifoneignorestheconditionsandstructuresofhumanorien-

tation.

Whenthelattercomeintoview,James’paradoxesdissolve.Humanorien-

tation, which seems to be trivial, proves to be highly sublime. According to

Dilthey,Nietzsche,and James,orientationworkswithdescriptive, comparative,

and hermeneutic procedures that clarify structural contexts or connections of

structures, Strukturzusammenhänge, as Dilthey calls them: they can crop up

spontaneously,isolatethemselvesfromtheirenvironment,sustainthemselvesin

it or react upon it; they can change under shifting conditions and dissipate

again.Thesestructureshavetheirfootholdsinthemereinterrelationandinter-

dependency (Zusammenhang) of their parts,which is the reasonwhy they do

notneedanymetaphysicalfoundation.Nietzschecoinedtheformulaofthe“mu-

sicoflife”thatmustbere-learnedbyidealisticphilosophers.

The“truths”atwhichhumanorientationarrivesbelongtosuchlivingin-

terrelationsandcontexts.Humanorientationcontrolsthem,accordingtoJames,

inregardtowhatdifferencetheymakeforaction.Thisimpliesthathumanori-

entation can generalize its footholds only for a time and with reservation, or

that it can only preliminarily typecast that which it observes, as Nietzsche

demonstrates effectively with his entire work. Thereby, human orientation

workswithconceptualshort-cutstotheobservablefootholdsinchangingsitua-

tions,anditalwaysleavesleewayfornewfootholdsandthesemanticdeferralof

itsconcepts.Inthisway,humanorientation–aswellasthephilosophyoforien-

tation–cankeepupwiththetimes.

***Tobecontinued***

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SectionstofollowinaSecondEdition:

19.AlternativesinDesigningPhilosophyinViewofTime:

Nietzsche,Bergson,andWhitehead

20.AlternativesinDesigningPhilosophyinViewofLanguage:

Frege,Wittgenstein,andAnalyticPhilosophy–PeirceandPhilosophiesofSign

21.AlternativesinScrutizingthe‘Given‘:PhenomenologyandHermeneutics

22.AlternativesinConceptualizingHumanBeing:Anthropology,ExistentialPhilosophy,andStructuralism

23.AlternativesinConceptualizingSociety:SociologicalSystemsTheoryandCriticalTheory,

CommunitarianismandLiberalism

24.AlternativesinConceptualizingEthics:TheoryofJustice(Rawls),DiscourseEthics(Habermas),Metaethics,

andEthicsStartingfromtheOther(LevinasandDerrida)

25.AlternativesinCourageouslyReversingOne’sOwnOrientation:WittgensteinandHeidegger

TranslatedwiththegreathelpofClaudiaWelz,

towhomIowemysincerethanks.