ens

^^

r^^ji^^^^J^

The brilliant American victory herein 1 781 over the British Legionhelped turn the tide of theRevolutionary War in the South

CowpensDownright Fighting"The Story of Cowpensby Thomas J. Fleming

A Handbook forCowpens National BattlefieldSouth Carolina

Produced by theDivision of Publications

National Park Service

U.S. Department of the Interior

Washington, D.C. 1988

About this bookThe story of Cowpens, as told in these pages, is everfresh and will live in memory as long as America'swars are studied and talked about. The author isThomas Fleming, a biographer, military historian,and novelist of distinction. His works range from anaccount of the Pilgrims' first year in America tobiographies of Jefferson and Franklin and novels ofthree American wars. Downright Fighting, TheStory of Cowpens is a gripping tale by a masterstoryteller of what has been described as thepatriot's best fought battle of the RevolutionaryWar.

The National Park System, of which CowpensNational Battlefield is a unit, consists of more than340 parks totaling 80 million acres. These parksrepresent important examples of the nation's naturaland cultural inheritance.

National Park HandbooksNational Park handbooks, compact introductions tothe natural and historical places administered by theNational Park Service, are designed to promotepublic understanding and enjoyment of the parks.Each handbook is intended to be informativereading and a useful guide to park features. Morethan 100 titles are in print. They are sold at parksand by mail from the Superintendent of Documents,U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.20402.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication DataFleming, Thomas J.Cowpens: "downright fighting."(Handbook: 133)"A HandbcH^k for Cowpens National Battlefield,South Carolina."Bibliography: p.Includes index.Supt. of Docs, no.: 129.9/5:1331. Cowpens. Battle of, 1781. I. Title. II. Series:Handbook (I'nited States. National Park Service.Division of Publications): 135.E241.C9F58 1988 973.337 87-600142ISBN 0-912(}27-33-(i tvgpo: 1988-201-939/60005

Prologue 4George F. Scheer

Part 1 "Downright Fighting" 1The Story of CowpensThomas J. Fleming

Part 2 Cowpens and the War in the South 86A Guide to the Battlefield and Related SitesCowpens Battleground 88The Road to Yorktown 91Savannah, 1778-79 91Charleston, 1780 91The Waxhaws, 1780 91Camden, 1780 92Kings Mountain, 1780 92Guilford Courthouse, 1781 92Ninety Six, 1781 93Eutaw Springs, 1781 93Yorktown, 1781 93For Further Reading 94

Index 95

:^^.I^^^jj*^)^^

::i^

Prolog

>M

Preceding pages On themorning ofJanuary 15, 1781,Morgan 's army looked downthis road at Tarleton 's legiondeploying into a line of bat-tle. Locally it was known asthe Green River Road. Fourorfive miles beyond the posi-tion held by Morgan, theroad crossed the Broad Riverat Island Ford. For oppositereasons. Morgan and Tarletoneach thought this field and itsrelationship to the BroadRiver gave him the advantage.

Splendid AntagonistsAs battlefields go, this one is fairly plain: a grassyclearing in a scrub-pine forest with no obvious mili-tary advantages. There are a thousand meadows likeit in upstate South Carolina. This one is importantbecause two centuries ago armies clashed here inone of the dramatic battles of the Revolutionary War.

In January 1781, this clearing was a frontier pas-turing ground, known locally as the Cowpens. Thename came from the custom of upcountry stockraisers wintering their cattle in the lush vales aroundThicketty Mountain. It was probably squatters'ground, though one tradition says that it belonged toa person named Hannah, while another credits it toone Hiram Saunders, a wealthy loyalist who livedclose by.The meadow was apparently well known to fron-

tiersmen. The previous October, a body of over-mountain men, pursuing Patrick Ferguson and hisloyalist corps, made camp here and, according toanother tradition, hauled the Tory Saunders out ofbed at night seeking information on Ferguson's where-abouts. Finding no sign of an army passing through,they butchered some cattle and after refreshing them-selves took up the trail again.When the troops of Continental General Daniel

Morgan filed onto this field on a dank January day in1781, they were an army on the run, fleeing animplacable and awesome enemy, the dreaded BritishLegion of Col. Banastre Tarleton. Their patrols re-ported that they were substantially outnumbered,and by any military measure of the time, they wereclearly outclassed. They were a mixed force of some830 soldiers 320 seasoned Continentals, a troop oflight dragoons, and the rest militia. Though someof the militia were former Continentals, known to bestalwarts in battle, most were short-term soldierswhose unpredictable performance might give a com-mander pause when battle lines were drawn. Theirfoe, Tarlton's Legion, was the best light corps in theBritish army in America, and it was now reinforcedby several hundred British regulars and an artillerycompany.On this afternoon of January 16, 1781, the men of

Morgan's army had run long enough. They werespoiling for a fight. They knew Tarleton as the en-emy whose troopers at the Waxhaws had sabered todeath Americans in the act of surrendering. From

him they had taken their own merciless victory cry,"Tarleton's quarter/' In the months after the infa-mous butchery, as Tarleton's green-jacketed dragoonsattacked citizens and soldiers alike and pillaged farmsand burned homes, they had come to characterizehim as "Bloody Tarleton." He was bold, fearless,often rash and always a savage enemy, and theyseethed to have a go at him.Morgan chose this ground as much for its tactical

advantages as from necessity. Most of his militialacked bayonets and could not stand up to bayonet-wielding redcoats in a line of battle. Morgan sawadvantage in this unlikely field: a river to the rear todiscourage the ranks from breaking, rising groundon which to post his regulars, a scattering of trees tohinder the enemy's cavalry, and marsh on one side tothwart flanking maneuvers. It was ground on whichhe could deploy his troops to make the most of theirabilities in the kind of fighting that he expectedTarleton to bring on.

In the narrative that follows, Thomas Reming, ahistorian with the skills of a novelist, tells the authen-tic, dramatic story that climaxed on the next morn-ing. In his fully fleshed chronicle, intimate in detailand rich in insights, he relates the complex eventsthat took shape in the Southern colonies after theWar of the Revolution stalemated in the north. Hedescribes the British strategy for conquering the re-bel Americans and the Americans' counterstrategy.An important part of this story is an account of thedaringly unorthodox campaign of commander-in-chiefGeorge Washington's trusted lieutenant NathanaelGreene, who finally ''flushed the bird" that Washing-ton caught at Yorktown. Upon reading DownrightFighting, one understands why the Homeric battlebetween two splendid antagonists on the morning ofJanuary 17, 1781, became the beginning of the end ofthe British hold on America.

George F. Scheer

Overleaf Scattered hard-woods gave Morgan 's skir-mishers protection andhelped deflect Tarleton 'shard-riding dragoons sentout to drive them in. Thebattle opened at sunrise, inlight similar to this scene.

'*lv'i^#l

-,Mi^^

,*. r >

ni%i#f^

i\f*:|ft^l|ff^^

Parti

>^ :'

"DowTheS

:^'*^

Preceding page British andContinental dragoons clashin the opening minutes ofbattle. From FrederickKimmelmeyer s painting,"The Battle of Cowpens,

"

1809.

The Anatomy of Victory1 All night the two men rode northwest along themuddy winding roads of South Carolina's back coun-try. Twice they had to endure bone-chilling swimsacross swollen creeks. Now, in the raw gray cold ofdawn, they faced a more formidable obstacle thewide, swift Pacolet River. They rode along it untilthey found the ford known as Grindal Shoals. Ordi-narily, it would have been easy to cross. But the riverwas high. The icy water lapped at their thighs as theweary horses struggled to keep their feet in therushing current. "Halt,'' snarled a voice from theriver bank. "Who goes there?"

"Friend," said the lead rider, 25-year-old JosephMcJunkin.The sentry barked the password for the night.

McJunkin and his companion, James Park, did notknow the countersign. McJunkin told the sentry hehad an important message for General Morgan. Thesentry told him not to move or he would put a holethrough his chest. He called for the captain of theguard. The two riders had to sit there in the icy riverwhile the captain made his way to the bank. Oncemore McJunkin insisted he had a message for Gen-eral Morgan. It was from Colonel Pickens. It wasvery important.The captain invited the two men onto the north

bank of the Pacolet. Above them, on a wooded hill,was the camp of Brig. Gen. Daniel Morgan of theContinental Army of the United States. AroundMorgan's tent, about 830 men were lighting fires andbeginning to cook their breakfasts, which consistedlargely of cornmeal. From a barrel in a wagon, acommissary issued a gill (four ounces) of rum. Mostadded water to it and put it in their canteens. A fewgulped the fiery liquid straight, in spite of the frownsof their officers. Some 320 of the men still worepieces of uniforms a tattered blue coat here, aragged white wool waistcoat there, patched buffbreeches. In spite of the rainy, cold January weather,few had shoes on their feet. These men were Conti-nentalsthe names by which patriot regular armysoldiers, usually enlisted for three years, were known.The rest of the army wore a varied assortment of

civilian clothing. Hunting shirts of coarse homespunmaterial known as linsey-woolsey, tightly belted, orloose wool coats, also homespun, leather leggings,wool breeches. These men were militia summoned

12

from their homes to serve as emergency soldiers forshort periods of time. Most were from westerndistricts of the CaroHnas. About 120 were riflemenfrom Virginia, committed to serving for six months.Most of these were former Continentals. They werebeing paid by other Virginians who hired them assubstitutes to avoid being drafted into the army.After five years of war, patriotism was far fromuniversal in America.

In his tent, Morgan listened to the messageMcJunkin brought from Col. Andrew Pickens: theBritish were advancing in force. Morgan whirled androused from a nearby camp cot a small groggy manwho had managed to sleep through McJunkin's badnews. His name was Baron de Glaubech. He was oneof the many French volunteers who were servingwith the Americans. ''Baron," Morgan said. "Get up.Go back and tell Billy that Benny is coming and hemust meet me tomorrow evening at GentlemanThompson's on the east side of Thicketty Creek."

Sixty-three years later, when he was 80, JosephMcJunkin remembered these words with their re-markable combination of informality and decision.It was part of the reason men like young McJunkintrusted Daniel Morgan. It was somehow reassuringto hear him call Lt. Col. William Washington, com-mander of the American cavalry and second cousinto Gen. George Washington, "Billy." It was evenmore reassuring to hear him call Lt. Col. BanastreTarleton, commander of the British army that wascoming after them, "Benny."Adding to this reassurance was 45-year-old Daniel

Morgan's appearance and reputation. He was oversix feet tall, with massive shoulders and arms, tough-ened from his youthful years as a wagonmaster inwestern Virginia. In his younger days he had beenone of the champion sluggers and wrestlers of theShenandoah Valley. His wide volatile face could stillflash from cheerfulness to pugnacity in an instant. Inthe five years of the Revolution, Morgan had be-come a living legend: the man who led a recklessassault into the very mouths of British cannon on thebarricaded streets of Quebec in 1775, whose corps ofsome 570 riflemen had been the cutting edge of theAmerican army that defeated the British at Saratogain 1777.

On this 14th of January, 1781 , a great many people

The victor at Saratoga, Gen.Horatio Gates (top) camesouth in July 1780 tocommand the Southern De-partment after the mainContinental army in theSouth was surrendered atCharleston. A month later hehimself was routed at Camdenby Cornwallis (below).

Both generals are portrayedin theirprime. CharlesWillson Peale shows Gates at49 with an open face and asteady ^aze. Cornwallis wasonly 45, two years afterYorktown, when he sat forGainsborough.

13

Daniel Morgan, Frontiersman

He was a giant of a man, 6 feet2 inches, witfi a full face, blueeyes, dark hair, and a classicnose. As a youth in westernVirginia, he had drifted intowagoneering along the roadsof the frontier. His educationwas slight. Good-natured andgregarious, he was, like hiscompanions of the road, rowdyand given to drink, gambling,and fighting. In time, he mar-ried, settled down, went intofarming, and became a man ofsubstance in his community.He was already a hero of

the Revolution when he tookcommand of Greene's lighttroops in late 1 780. His riflecorps had fought with distinc-

tion at Quebec (1 775) andSaratoga (1777). But afterbeing passed over for promo-tion, unfairly he thought, heretired to his Virginia farm.When the South fell to Britisharmies in 1 780, he put asidehis feelings and welcomed anew command.Morgan was at home in the

slashing, partisan warfare inthe South. At Cowpens themixed force of regulars andmilitia that he led so ablydestroyed Tarleton's dreadedLegion, depriving Cornwallisof a wing of swift-moving lighttroops essential to his army'soperation.

Morgan 's fine stone house(below), which he named"Saratoga, "still stands nearWinchester, Virginia.

Woodcuts of the gold medalCongress awarded Morganfor his victory at Cowpens.The original medal is lost.

15

10 Kilometers 50

10 Miles

North

G^^

^^

\^o\3

\^v>^^

h^9 hV

7-

Williamsburg^^1

tersburg ^'^^s3Yorktown Cape CharlesCornwatlis surrenders19 Oct 1781

Cape Henry

VIRGINIANORTH CAROLINA

The War in the SouthThe lower South became the decisive theatreof the Revolutionary War. After the strugglesettled into stalemate in the north, the Britishmounted their second campaign to conquerthe region. British expeditionary forces cap-tured Savannah in late 1 778 and Charleston inMay 1 780. By late in that summer, most ofSouth Carolina was pacified, and a powerfulBritish army under Cornwallis was poised tosweep across the Carolinas into Virginia.This map traces the marches of Cornwallis

(red) and his wily adversary Nathanael Greene(blue). The campaign opened at Charleston inAugust 1 780 when Cornwallis marched northto confront Gen. Horatio Gates moving southwith a Continental army. It ended at Yorktownin October 1 781 with Cornwallis's surrender ofthe main British army in America. In betweenwere 1 8 months of some of the hardest cam-paigning and most savage fighting of the war.

fallis marchesIrginia.irtay 1781

New Bern

CapeHatteras

^

CapeLookout

ATLANTIC

OCEAN

17

Gen. Nathanael Greene( 1742-86) served with distinc-tion in two roles: as quarter-master general of the armyafter others hadfailed in thepost, and as the strategistof the decisive SouthernCampaign.

in South Carolina and North CaroHna were badly inneed of the reassurance that Daniel Morgan commu-nicated. The year just completed had been a seriesof military and political disasters, with only a fewflickering glimpses of hope for the Americans whohad rebelled against George III and his Parliament in1776. In 1780 the British had adopted a new strategy.Leaving enough troops to pin down George Wash-ington's main American army near New York, theBritish had sent another army south to besiegeCharleston. On May 12, 1780, the city and itsdefending army, under the command of a Massachu-setts general named Benjamin Lincoln, surrendered.Two hundred and forty-five regular officers and2,326 enlisted men became captives along with anequal number of South Carolina militia; thousandsof muskets, dozens of cannon, and tons of irreplace-able gunpowder and other supplies were also lost.

It was the worst American defeat of the war. TheContinental Congress responded by sending southGen. Horatio Gates, commander of the army thathad beaten the British at Saratoga. Gates broughtwith him about 1,200 Maryland and Delaware Conti-nentals and called on the militia of North Carolinaand Virginia to support him. On August 16, 1780,outside the village of Camden, S.C., the Americansencountered an army commanded by Charles, EarlCornwallis, the most aggressive British general inAmerica. Cornwallis ordered a bayonet charge. Thepoorly armed, inexperienced militia panicked andfled. The Continentals fought desperately for a timebut were soon surrounded and overwhelmed.

Both North and South Carolina now seemed pros-trate. There was no patriot army in either statestrong enough to resist the thousands of British regu-lars. Georgia had been conquered by a combinedBritish naval and land force in late 1778 and early1779. There were rumors that America s allies, Franceand Spain, were tired of the war and ready to call apeace conference. Many persons thought that theCarolinas and Georgia would be abandoned at thisconference. In the Continental Congress, some al-ready considered them lost. "It is agreed on all handsthe whole state of So. Carolina hath submitted to theBritish Government as well as Georgia,'' a RhodeIsland delegate wrote. "I shall not be surprised tohear N. Carolina hath followed their example."

18

British spokesmen eagerly promoted this idea.They were more numerous in the CaroHnas thanmost 20th-century Americans reahze. The majorityof them were American born men and womenwhom the rebel Americans called tories and todayare usually known as loyalists. Part of the reason forthis defection was geographical. The people of theback country had long feuded with the wealthierlowlanders, who controlled the politics of the twoStates. The lowlanders had led the Carolinas into thewar with the mother country, and many back-countrypeople sided with the British in the hope of humblingthe haughty planters. Some of these counter-revolutionists sincerely believed their rights wouldbe better protected under the king. Another largegroup thought the British were going to win the warand sided with them in the hope of getting rich onthe rebels' confiscated estates. A third, more passivegroup simply lacked the courage to oppose theiraggressive loyalist neighbors.The British set up forts, garrisoned by regulars

and loyalists, in various districts of South Carolinaand told the people if they swore an oath of alle-giance to the king and promised to lay down theirweapons, they would be protected and forgiven forany and all previous acts of rebellion. Thousands ofmen accepted this offer and dropped out of the war.

But some South Carolinians refused to submit toroyal authority. Many of them were Presbyterians,who feared that their freedom to worship would betaken away from them or that they would be de-prived of the right to vote, as Presbyterians were inEngland. Others were animated by a fundamentalsuspicion of British intentions toward America. Theybelieved there was a British plot to force Americansto pay unjust taxes to enable England's aristocraticpoliticians and their followers to live in luxury.Joseph McJunkin was one of the men who had

refused to surrender. He had risen from private tomajor in the militia regiment from the Union districtof South Carolina. After the fall of Charleston, heand his friends hid gunpowder and ammunition inhollow logs and thickets. But in June 1780, they werebadly beaten by a battalion of loyalist neighbors andfled across the Broad River. They were joined bymen from the Spartan, Laurens, and Newberry dis-tricts. At the Presbyterian Meeting House on Bullocks

Thomas Sumter (1732-1832),a daring and energetic parti-san leader, joined the patriotside after Tarleton 's dra-goons burned his Santeehome. His militia harassedand sometimes defeated theBritish in the savage civil warthat gripped the South Caro-lina backcountrv in 1780-81.

19

Short, disciplined to the lifeof a soldier, yet plain andgentle in manner, FrancisMarion {the figure at left) wasequally brilliant as an officerof regulars and a partisanleader of militia. To the Brit-ish he was as elusive as a fox,marching his brigade at night,rarely sleeping twice in thesame camp, and vanishinginto the swamps when op-posed by a larger force.

Creek, they debated whether to accept British pro-tection. McJunkin and a few other men rose andvowed they would fight on. Finally someone askedthose who wanted to fight to throw up their hats andclap their hands. "Every hat went up and the airresounded with clapping and shouts of defiance,''McJunkin recalled.A few days later, these men met Thomas Sumter,

a former colonel in the South Carolina Continentals.He had fled to western South Carolina after theBritish burned his plantation. The holdouts askedhim his opinion of the situation. "Our interests arethe same. With me it is liberty or death," he said.They elected him their general and went to war.

Elsewhere in South Carolina, other men coalescedaround another former Continental officer, FrancisMarion. Still others followed Elijah Clarke, whooperated along the border between South Carolinaand Georgia. These partisans, seldom numberingmore than 500 men and often as few as 50 struck atBritish outposts and supply routes and attackedgroups of loyalists whom the British were armingand trying to organize into militia regiments. TheBritish and loyalists grew exasperated. After thebattle of Camden, Lord Cornwallis declared that any-one who signed a British parole and then switchedsides would be hanged without a trial if captured. Ifa man refused to serve in the loyalist militia, hewould be imprisoned and his property confiscated.At a convention of loyalist militia regiments onAugust 23, 1780, the members resolved that theseorders should be ruthlessly applied. They added oneother recommendation. Anyone who refused to servein the king's militia should be drafted into the Britishregulars, where he would be forced to fight whetherhe liked it or not.For the rest of 1780, a savage seesaw war raged

along the Carolina frontier. Between engagementsboth sides exacted retaliation on prisoners and non-combatants. Elijah Clarke besieged Augusta with amixed band of South Carolinians and Georgians.Forced to retreat by British reinforcements, he leftabout two dozen badly wounded men behind. Theloyalist commander of Augusta, Thomas Browne,wounded in the siege, hanged 13 of them in thestairwell of his house, where he could watch themdie from his bed. A rebel named Reed was visiting a

20

neighbor's house when the landlady saw two loyalistsapproaching. She advised Reed to flee. Reed repliedthat they were old friends; he had known them all hislife. He went outside to shake hands. The loyalistsshot him dead. Reed's aged mother rode to a rebelcamp in North Carolina and displayed her son'sbloody pocketbook. The commander of the campasked for volunteers. Twenty-five men mounted theirhorses, found the murderers, and executed them.

In this sanguinary warfare, the rebels knew theside roads and forest tracks. They were expert, likeMarion's men, at retreating into swamps. But theBritish also had some advantages. The rebels coulddo little to prevent retaliation against their homesand property. If a man went into hiding when theBritish or loyalists summoned him to fight in theirmilitia, all his corn and livestock were liable toseizure, and his house might even be burned, leavinghis wife and children destitute. This bitter anddiscouraging truth became more and more apparentas the year 1780 waned. Without a Continental armyto back them up, Sumter and the other partisanleaders found it difficult to persuade men to fight.

Not even the greatest militia victory of the war,the destruction of a loyalist army of over a thousandmen at Kings Mountain in October 1780, signifi-cantly altered the situation. Although loyalist sup-port declined, the British army was untouched bythis triumph. Moreover, many of the militiamen inthe rebel army had come from remote valleys deepin the Appalachians, and they went home immedi-ately, as militiamen were inclined to do. The men ofwestern South Carolina were left with the Britishregulars still dominating four-fifths of the State, stillready to exact harsh retaliation against those whopersisted in the rebellion.George Washington understood the problem. In

an earlier campaign in the north, when the NewJersey militia failed to turn out, he had said that thepeople needed '*an Army to look the Enemy in theFace." To replace the disgraced Horatio Gates, heappointed Nathanael Greene of Rhode Island as thecommander of the Southern army. A 38-year-oldQuaker who walked with a slight limp, Greene hadbecome Washington's right-hand man in five years ofwar in the north. On December 2 he arrived inCharlotte, N.C., where Horatio Gates was trying to

Elijah Clarke, a colonel ofGeorgia militia, fought at anumber of important actionsin the civil war along theSouthern frontier in 1780-81.

21

reorganize the remnants of the army shattered atCamden. Neither the numbers nor the appearance ofthe men were encouraging. There were 2,046 sol-diers present and fit for duty. Of these, only 1,173were Continentals. The rest were militia. Worse, asGreene told his friend the Marquis de Lafayette, ifhe counted as fit for duty only those soldiers whowere properly clothed and equipped, he had fewerthan 800 men and provisions for only three daysin camp. There was scarcely a horse or a wagon inthe army and not a dollar of hard money in themilitary chest.Among Greene's few encouraging discoveries in

the army's camp at Charlotte was the news thatDaniel Morgan had returned to the war and at thatvery moment was within 16 miles of the British baseat Camden with a battalion of light infantry and whatwas left of the American cavalry under Lt. Col.William Washington. Angered by Congress's failureto promote him, Morgan had resigned his colonel'scommission in 1779. The disaster at Camden and thethreat of England's new southern strategy had per-suaded him to forget his personal grievance. Congresshad responded by making him a brigadier general.

Studying his maps, and knowing Morgan's abilityto inspire militia and command light infantry,Nathanael Greene began to think the Old Wagoner,as Morgan liked to call himself, was the key tofrustrating British plans to conquer North Carolina.Lord Cornwallis and the main British army were nowat Winnsborough, S.C., about halfway between theBritish base at Camden and their vital back-countryfort at Ninety Six. The British general commanded3,324 regulars, twice the number of Greene's motleyarmy, and all presumably well trained and equipped.Spies and scouts reported the earl was preparing toinvade North Carolina for a winter campaign. NorthCarolina had, if anything, more loyalists than SouthCarolina. There was grave reason to fear that theywould turn out at the sight of a British army and takethat State out of the shaky American confederacy.To delay, if not defeat, this potential disaster,

Greene decided to divide his battered army and givemore than half of it to Daniel Morgan. The OldWagoner would march swiftly across the front ofCornwallis's army into western South Carolina andoperate on his left flank and in his rear, threatening

22

the enemy's posts at Ninety Six and Augusta, disrupt-ing British communications, and most important-encouraging the mihtia of western South CaroHna toreturn to fight. "The object of this detachment,"Greene wrote in his instructions to Morgan, "is togive protection to that part of the country and spiritup the people/'

This was the army that Joseph McJunkin hadridden all night to warn. Lord CornwaUis had nointention of letting Nathanael Greene get away withthis ingenious maneuver. CornwaUis had an answerto Morgan. His name was Banastre Tarleton.

^ Daniel Morgan might call him "Benny." MostAmericans called him "the Butcher" or "BloodyTarleton." A thick-shouldered, compact man of mid-dle height, with bright red hair and a hard mouth, hewas the most feared and hated British soldier in theSouth. In 1776 he had come to America, a 21-year-oldcornet the British equivalent of a second lieuten-ant. He was now a lieutenant colonel, a promotionso rapid for the British army of the time that it leftolder officers frigid with jealousy. Tarleton hadachieved this spectacular rise almost entirely on rawcourage and fierce energy. His father had been awealthy merchant and Lord Mayor of Liverpool. Hedied while Tarleton was at Oxford, leaving him5,000, which the young man promptly gambled anddrank away, while ostensibly studying for the law inLondon. He joined the army and discovered he was aborn soldier.

In America, he was a star performer from the start.In the fall of 1776, while still a cornet, he played akey role in capturing Maj. Gen. Charles Lee, secondin command of the American army, when he un-wisely spent the night at a tavern in New Jersey,several miles from his troops. Soon a captain, Tarle-ton performed ably for the next two years and in 1778was appointed a brigade major of the British cavalry.

Tarleton again distinguished himself when theBritish army retreated from Philadelphia to NewYork in June 1778. At Monmouth Court House hebegan the battle by charging the American advancecolumn and throwing it into confusion. In NewYork, sorting out his troops, the new British com-mander, Sir Henry Clinton, rewarded Tarleton withanother promotion. While the British were in Phila-

Charles Lee, an English gen-eral retired on half-pay at theoutbreak of the war, threw inwith Americans and receivedseveral important commandsearly in the war. His capturein late 1 776 at a New Jerseytavern by dragoons underBanastre Tarleton was acelebrated event.

23

Banastre Tarleton, Gentleman

Banastre Tarleton, only 26,was a short, thick-set, ratherhandsome redhead who wastireless and fearless in battle.Unlike Morgan, he had beenborn to privilege. Scion of awealthy Liverpool mercantilefamily, he was Oxford edu-cated and might have becomea barrister except that hepreferred the playing field tothe classroom and the de-lights of London theatres andcoffee houses to the study oflaw. After squandering a mod-est inheritance, he jumped atthe chance to buy a commis-sion in the King's Dragoonsand serve in America. Eventu-

ally he came into command ofthe British Legion, a mountedand foot unit raised amongAmerican loyalists. Marked bytheir distinctive green uni-forms, they soon becameknown as Tarleton's GreenHorse. It was their ruthlessferocity that earned Tarletonthe epithet, "Bloody Tarleton.

"

After the war, Tarleton fellin love with the beautiful MaryRobinson, a poet, playwright,and actress. Tarleton's memoir.The Campaigns of 1 780 and1 781 in the Southern Pro-vinces, owes much to hergifted pen.

Tarleton 's birthplace onWater Street in Liverpool.

25

Under Gen. Benjamin Lin-coln (top), the patriots suf-fered their worst defeat ofthe war. Bottled up by SirHenry Clinton in the penin-sula city of Charleston, hesurrendered the entire Conti-nental Army in the South-more than 5, 000 men inMay 1780. The contempo-rary map shows the patriotdefenses north of the city,the British siege lines, andwarships of the Royal Navythat controlled the harborwaters.

delphia, various loyalists had recruited three troopsof dragoons. In New York, officers some loyalist,some British recruited companies of infantry andmore troops of dragoons from different segments ofthe loyalist population. One company was Scottish,two others English, a third American-born. Clintoncombined these fragments into a 550-man unit thathe christened the British Legion. Half cavalry, halfinfantry, a legion was designed to operate on thefringe of a main army as a quick-strike force.Banastre Tarleton was given command of the BritishLegion, which was issued green coats and tanbreeches, unlike other loyalist regiments, who worered coats with green facings.

Sailing south with the royal army that besiegedand captured Charleston, Tarleton and his Legionacted as a mobile screen, protecting the British rearagainst attacks by American cavalry and militia fromthe interior of the State. The young officer soondemonstrated a terrifying ability to strike suddenlyand ferociously when the Americans least expectedhim. On May 6, 1780, at Lenuds Ferry, he surprisedand virtually destroyed the American cavalry, forc-ing William Washington and many other officers andmen to leap into the Santee River to escape him.

After Charleston surrendered, there was only oneunit of regular American troops left in South Caro-lina, the 3d Virginia Continentals commanded byCol. Abraham Buford. He was ordered to retreat toNorth Carolina. Cornwallis sent Tarleton and hisLegion in pursuit. Covering 105 miles in 54 hours,Tarleton caught up with the Americans at Waxhaws.The 380 Virginians were largely recruits, few ofwhom had seen action before. Tarleton and theLegion charged from front, flank, and rear. Bufordfoolishly ordered his men to hold their fire until thesaber-swinging dragoons were on top of them. TheAmerican line was torn to fragments. Buford wheeledhis horse and fled. Tarleton reportedly sabered anAmerican officer as he tried to raise a white flag.Other Americans screamed for quarter, but somekept firing. A bullet killed Tarleton's horse and hecrashed to the ground. This, he later claimed, arousedhis men to a "vindictive asperity.'' They thoughttheir leader had been killed. Dozens of Americanswere bayonetted or sabered after they had throwndown their guns and surrendered.

26

Tarleton 5 slaughter of Col.Abraham Buford's commandat the Waxhaws gave thepatriots a rallying cry

''Tarleton 's quarter"remembered to this day.

One hundred and thirteen Americans were killedand 203 captured at Waxhaws. Of the captured, 150were so badly wounded they were left on the battle-field. Throughout the Carolinas, the word of the mas-sacrewhich is what Americans called Waxhawspassed from settlement to settlement. It did notinspire much trust in British benevolence amongthose who were being urged to surrender.

After helping to smash the American army atCamden with another devastating cavalry charge,Tarleton was ordered to pursue Thomas Sumter andhis partisans. Pushing his men and horses at his usualpace in spite of the tropical heat of August, hecaught up with Sumter's men at Fishing Creek.Sabering a few carelessly posted sentries, the BritishLegion swept down on the Carolinians as they layabout their camp, their arms stacked, half of themsleeping or cooking. Sumter leaped on a barebackhorse and imitated Buford, fleeing for his life. Vir-tually the entire American force of more than 400men was killed or captured. When the news was pub-lished in England, Tarleton became a national hero.In his official dispatches, Cornwallis called him "oneof the most promising officers I ever knew.''

But Sumter immediately began gathering a newforce and Francis Marion and his raiders repeatedlyemerged from the lowland swamps to harass com-munications with Charleston and punish any loyalistwho declared for the king. Tarleton did not under-stand this stubborn resistance and liked it even less.A nauseating bout with yellow fever deepened hissaturnine mood. Pursuing Marion along the Santeeand Black Rivers, Tarleton ruthlessly burned thefarmhouses of "violent rebels," as he called them."The country is now convinced of the error of theinsurrection," he wrote to Cornwallis. But Tarletonfailed to catch "the damned old fox," Marion.The British Legion had scarcely returned from

this exhausting march when they were ordered outonce more in pursuit of Sumter. On November 9,1780, with a new band of partisans, Sumter foughtpart of the British 63d Regiment, backed by a troopof legion dragoons, at Fishdam Ford on the BroadRiver and mauled them badly. "I wish you would getthree Legions, and divide yourself in three parts,"Cornwallis wrote Tarleton. "We can do no goodwithout you."

28

Once more the Legion marched for the backcountry. As usual, Tarleton's pace was almost super-naturally swift. On November 20, 1780, he caughtSumter and his men as they were preparing to fordthe Tyger River. But this time Tarleton's fondnessfor headlong pursuit got him into serious trouble. Hehad left most of his infantry far behind him andpushed ahead with less than 200 cavalry and 90infantry, riding two to a horse. Sumter had close to athousand men and he attacked, backwoods style,filtering through the trees to pick off foot soldiersand horsemen. Tarleton ordered a bayonet charge.The infantry was so badly shot up, Tarleton had tocharge with the cavalry to extricate them, exposinghis dragoon to deadly rifle fire from other militiamenentrenched in a log tobacco house known as Black-stocks. The battle ended in a bloody draw. Sumterwas badly wounded and his men abandoned the fieldto the green-coated dragoons, slipping across theTyger in the darkness. Without their charismaticleader, Sumter's militia went home."Sumter is defeated,'' Tarleton reported to Corn-

wallis, "his corps dispersed. But my Lord I have lostmen 50 killed and wounded." The war was becom-ing more and more disheartening to Tarleton. Deep-ening his black mood was news from home. Hisolder brother had put him up for Parliament fromLiverpool. The voters had rejected him. They ad-mired his courage, but the American war was nolonger popular in England.While Cornwallis remained at Winnsborough,

Tarleton returned from Blackstocks and camped atvarious plantations south of the Broad River. Duringhis projected invasion of North Carolina, Cornwallisexpected Tarleton and his Legion to keep the dwin-dling rebels of South Carolina dispersed to theirhomes. Thus the British commander would have noworries about the British base at Ninety Six, the keyto the back country. The fort and surroundingsettlement had been named by an early mapmaker inthe course of measuring distances on the CherokeePath, an ancient Indian route from the mountains tothe ocean. The district around Ninety Six was thebreadbasket of South Carolina; it was also heavilyloyalist. But a year of partisan warfare had madetheir morale precarious. The American-born com-mander of the fort. Col. John Harris Cruger, had

This portrait of Tarleton andthe illustration beneath of atroop ofdragoons doingmaneuvers appeared in aflattering biography shortlyafter he returned to Englandin 1782.

29

The little village ofNinetySix was a center of loyalistsentiment in the Carolinabackcountry. Cornwallis mis-takenly thought Morgan haddesigns on it and thereforesent Tarleton in pursuit,bringing on the battle ofCowpens. This map dia-grams the siege that Gen.Nathanael Greene mountedagainst the post in May-Juneof 1781.

recently warned Cornwallis that the loyalists "werewearied by the long continuance of the campaign . .

.

and the whole district had determined to submit assoon as the rebels should enter it." The mere hint ofa threat to Ninety Six and the order it preserved in itsvicinity was enough to send flutters of alarm throughBritish headquarters.There were flutters aplenty when Cornwallis heard

from spies that Daniel Morgan had crossed theBroad River and was marching on Ninety Six. Simul-taneously came news that William Washington, thecommander of Morgan's cavalry, had routed a groupof loyalists at Hammonds Store and forced anothergroup to abandon a fort not far from Ninety Six. At5 a.m. on January 2, Lt. Henry Haldane, one of Corn-wallis's aides, rode into Tarleton's camp and told himthe news. Close behind Haldane came a messengerwith a letter from Cornwallis: 'If Morgan is . .

.

anywhere within your reach, I should wish you topush him to the utmost.'' Haldane rushed an order toMaj. Archibald McArthur, commander of the firstbattalion of the 71st Regiment, which was not faraway, guarding a ford over the Broad River thatguaranteed quick communication with Ninety Six.McArthur was to place his men under Tarleton'scommand and join him in a forced march to rescuethe crucial fort.

Tarleton obeyed with his usual speed. His dra-goons ranged far ahead of his little army, which nownumbered about 700 men. By the end of the day heconcluded that there was no cause for alarm aboutNinety Six. Morgan was nowhere near it. But hisscouts reported that Morgan was definitely south ofthe Broad River, urging militia from North andSouth Carolina to join him.

Tarleton's response to this challenge was almostinevitable. He asked Cornwallis for permission topursue Morgan and either destroy him or force himto retreat over the Broad River again. There, Corn-wallis and his army could devour him.The young cavalry commander outlined the oper-

ation in a letter to Cornwallis on January 4. Herealized that he was all but giving orders to his gen-eral, and tactfully added: "I feel myself bold in offer-ing my opinion |but| it flows from zeal for the publicservice and well grounded enquiry concerning theenemy's designs and operations." If Cornwallis ap-

30

proved the plan, Tarleton asked for reinforcements:a troop of cavalry from the 17th Light Dragoons andthe infantrymen of the 7th Regiment of Royal Fusil-iers, who were marching from Camden to reinforceNinety Six.

Cornwallis approved the plan, including the rein-forcements. As soon as they arrived, Tarleton beganhis march. January rain poured down, swelling everycreek, turning the roads into quagmires. Cornwallis,with his larger army and heavy baggage train, begana slow advance up the east bank of the Broad River.As the commander in chief, he had more to worryabout than Tarleton. Behind him was another Britishgeneral, Sir Alexander Leslie, with 1,500 reinforce-ments. Cornwallis feared that Greene or Marionmight strike a blow at them. The earl assumed thatTarleton was as mired by the rain and blocked byswollen watercourses as he was. On January 12, Corn-wallis wrote to Leslie, who was being delayed byeven worse mud in the lowlands: "I believe Tarletonis as much embarrassed with the waters as you are."The same day, Cornwallis reported to another offi-cer, the commander in occupied Charleston: "Therains have put a total stop to Tarleton and Leslie."On this assumption, Cornwallis decided to halt andwait for Leslie to reach him.

Tarleton had not allowed the August heat of SouthCarolina to slow his pace. He was equally contemp-tuous of the January rains. His scouts reported thatMorgan's army was at Grindal Shoals on the PacoletRiver. To reach the patriots he had to cross twosmaller but equally swollen streams, the Enoree andthe Tyger. Swimming his horses, floating his infantryacross on improvised rafts, he surmounted theseobstacles and headed northeast, deep into the SouthCarolina back country. He did not realize that hiscolumn, which now numbered over a thousand men,was becoming more and more isolated. He assumedthat Cornwallis was keeping pace with him on theeast side of the Broad River, cowing the rebel militiathere into staying home.

Tarleton also did not realize that this time, nomatter how swiftly he advanced, he was not going totake the patriots by surprise. He was being watchedby a man who was fighting with a hangman's noosearound his neck.

Gen. Alexander Leslie, vet-eran commander in Amer-ica. His service spannedactionsfrom Salem Bridge inFebruary 1 775 to the Britishevacuation of Charleston inDecember 1782.

31

O Skyagunsta, the Wizard Owl, was what theCherokees called 41-year-old Andrew Pickens. Theyboth feared and honored him as a battle leader whohad defeated them repeatedly on their home grounds.Born in Pennsylvania, Pickens had come to SouthCarolina as a boy. In 1765 he had married thebeautiful Rebecca Calhoun and settled on LongCanes Creek in the Ninety Six district. Pickens wasno speechmaker, but everyone recognized this slen-der man, who was just under 6 feet tall, as a leader.When he spoke, people listened. One acquaintancedeclared that he was so deliberate, he seemed attimes to take each word out of his mouth andexamine it before he said it. Pickens had been one ofthe leaders who repelled the British-inspired assaultson the back country by the Cherokee Indians in 1776and carried the war into the red men's country,forcing them to plead for peace. By 1779 he was acolonel commanding one of the most dependablemilitia regiments in the State. When the loyalists,encouraged by the British conquest of Georgia in1778-79, began to gather and plot to punish theirrebel neighbors, Pickens led 400 men to assault themat Kettle Creek on the Savannah River. In a fierce,hour-long fight, he whipped them although theyoutnumbered him almost two to one.

After Charleston surrendered, Pickens' militarysuperior in the Ninety Six district. Brig. Gen. AndrewWilliamson, was the only high-ranking official left inSouth Carolina. The governor John Rutledge had fledto North Carolina, the legislature had dispersed, thecourts had collapsed. Early in June 1780, Williamsoncalled together his officers and asked them to voteon whether they should continue to resist. Only eightofficers opposed immediate surrender. In Pickens'own regiment only two officers and four enlistedmen favored resistance. The rest saw no hope ofstopping the British regular army advancing towardthem from Charleston. Without a regular army oftheir own to match the British, they could envisiononly destruction of their homes and desolation fortheir families if they resisted.Andrew Pickens was among these realists who had

accepted the surrender terms offered by the British.At his command, his regiment of 300 men stackedtheir guns at Ninety Six and went home. As Pickensunderstood the terms, he and his men were paroled

32

on their promise not to bear arms against the king.They became neutrals. The British commander ofNinety Six, Colonel Cruger, seemed to respect thisopinion. Cruger treated Pickens with great deference.The motive for this delicate treatment became visiblein a letter Cruger sent Cornwallis on November 27.

''I think there is more than a possibility of getting acertain person in the Long Canes settlement toaccept of a command,'' Cruger wrote. "And then Ishould most humbly be of opinion that every man inthe country would declare and act for His Majesty."

It was a tribute to Pickens' influence as a leader.He was also a man of his word. Even when Sumter,Clarke, and other partisan leaders demonstratedthat there were many men in South Carolina readyto keep fighting. Pickens remained peaceably athome on his plantation at Long Canes. Tales ofTarleton's cruelty at Waxhaws, of British and loyalistvindictiveness in other districts of the State undoubt-edly reached him. But no acts of injustice had beencommitted against him or his men. The British werekeeping their part of the bargain and he would keephis part.

Then Cornwallis's aide, Haldane, appeared atNinety Six and summoned Pickens. He offered him acolonel's commission in the royal militia and apromise of protection. There were also polite hintsof the possibility of a monetary reward for switchingsides. Pickens agreed to ride down to Charleston andtalk over the whole thing with the British commanderthere. The visit was delayed by partisan warfare inthe Ninety Six district, stirred by the arrival ofNathanael Greene to take command of the remnantof the American regular army in Charlotte. Greeneurged the wounded Sumter and the Georgian Clarketo embody their men and launch a new campaign.Sumter urged Pickens to break his parole, call outhis regiment, and march with him to join Greene.Pickens refused to leave Long Canes.

In desperation, the rebels came to him. ElijahClarke led a band of Georgians and South Caro-linians to the outskirts of Long Canes, on theirmarch to join Greene. Many men from Pickens' oldregiment broke their paroles and joined them. Clarkeordered Maj^James McCall, one of Pickens' favoriteofficers and one of two who had refused to surrenderat Ninety Six, to kidnap Pickens and bring him

Andrew Pickens, a lean andausterefrontiersman ofScotch-Irish origins, rankedwith Francis Marion andThomas Sumter as majorpartisan leaders of the war.

33

before an improvised court-martial board. Accusedof preparing to join the loyalists, Pickens calmlyadmitted that the British were making him offers. Sofar he had refused them. Even if former friendsmade good on their threat to court-martial and hanghim, he could not break his pledged word of honorto remain neutral.The frustrated Georgians and South Carolinians

let Pickens go home. On December 12, Cruger sent adetachment of regulars and loyalist militia to attackthe interlopers. The royalists surprised the rebelsand routed them, wounding Clarke and McCall andscattering the survivors. Most of the Georgiansdrifted back to their home state and the Caroliniansstraggled toward Greene in North Carolina.The battle had a profound effect on Andrew

Pickens. Friends, former comrades-in-arms, had beenwounded, humiliated. He still hesitated to take thefinal step and break his parole. His strict Presbyterianconscience, his soldier's sense of honor, would notpermit it. But he went to Ninety Six and told ColonelCruger that he could not accept a commission in theroyal militia. Cruger sighed and revealed what hehad been planning to do since he started wooingPickens. In a few days, on orders from Cornwallis,the loyalist colonel was going to publish a proclama-tion which would permit no one to remain neutral. Itwould require everyone around Ninety Six to cometo the fort, swear allegiance to the king, and enlist inthe royal militia.

Pickens said his conscience would not permit himto do this. If the British threatened him with punish-ment for his refusal, it would be a violation of hisparole and he would consider himself free to join therebels. One British officer, who had become a friendand admirer of the resolute Pickens, warned him:"You will campaign with a halter around your neck.If we catch you, we will hang you."

Pickens decided to take the risk. He rode aboutLong Canes calling out his regiment. The responsewas somewhat discouraging. Only about 70 menturned out. Coordinating their movements with Colo-nel Washington's raid on the loyalists at HammondsStore, they joined the patriot cavalry and rode pastNinety Six to Morgan's camp on the Pacolet.The numbers Pickens brought with him were

disappointing. But he and his men knew the back

34

country intimately. They were the eyes and earsMorgan's Httle army desperately needed. Morganimmediately asked Pickens to advance to a positionabout midway between Fair Forest Creek and theTyger River and send his horsemen ranging out fromthat point in all directions to guard against a surpriseattack by Banastre Tarleton.The Wizard Owl and his men mounted their horses

and rode away to begin their reconnaissance. Gen-eral Morgan soon knew enough about the enemyforce coming after him to make him fear for hisarmy's survival.

4 Daniel Morgan might call Banastre Tarleton"Benny" for the entertainment of young militiamenlike Joseph McJunkin. But Morgan had been fightingthe British for five years. He was as close to being aprofessional soldier as any American of his time. Heknew Banastre Tarleton was no joke. In fact, thecasual style of his decision to reunite his cavalry andinfantry at the Thompson plantation on ThickettyCreek disguised a decision to retreat. The march toThicketty Creek put an additional 10 miles betweenhim and the aggressive British cavalryman. Behindthe mask of easy confidence Morgan wore for hismen, there was a very worried general.As soon as he crossed the Broad River and

camped at Grindal Shoals on the north bank of thePacolet on December 25, 1780, Morgan began send-ing messengers to the men of western Georgia,South Carolina, and North Carolina, urging them toturn out and support him. The response had beendisheartening. Pickens, as we have seen, was unableto muster more than a fraction of his old regiment.From Georgia came only a small detachment ofabout 100 men under the command of Lt. Col. JamesJackson and Maj. John Cunningham. Because theirleader Elijah Clarke was out of action from hiswound at Long Canes, the Georgians were inclinedto stay home. Sumter, though almost recovered fromhis wound, sulked on the east side of the Broad River.He felt Greene had sent Morgan into his sphere ofcommand without properly consulting him.Morgan's highest hopes had been focused on

North Carolina, which had thus far been relativelyuntouched by the British. The commander of themilitia in the back country was Brig. Gen. William

35

Arms and TacticsThe armies fought the waythey did on open ground inlong lines of musket-wieldinginfantry standing two and threeranks deep because that wasthe most rational way to usethe weapons they had.

The main weapon of thiscombat was the muzzle-loading, smooth-bore, flint-lockmusket, equipped with a 16-inch bayonet. It hurled aone-ounce lead ball of .70 to.80 calibre fairly accurately up

to 75 yards, but distancescarcely mattered. The objectwas to break up the enemy'sformations with volleys andthen rout them with cold steel.The British were masters ofthese linear tactics, and Wash-

Pistols Cavalrymen andmounted officers nearlyalways carried a brace ofpistols. Though wildly inac-curate, they were useful inemergencies when formalcombat broke down and afoe was only afew feet away.

American dragoon pistol

Powder horns of the typeused by rifle-carrying militiaat Cowpens: each was usuallymade bv the man who carried it.

ington and his commandersspent the war trying to instillthe same discipline in theirContinentals so that they couldstand up to redcoats on equalterms in battle.The American rifle was not

Edged Weapons came in manyvarieties. The most impor-tant for hand-to-handfight-ing were bayonets and swords.For cavalrymen, the swordwas more useful than fire-arms. It was "the most de-structive and almost the onlynecessary weapon a Dragooncarries, "said William Wash-ington. They used two types:the saber and the broad-sword. Both are shown here.

Officers, foot as well asmounted, carried swords, of-ten forfighting, sometimesonly for dress. The small-sword (shown at left below)was popular with Conti-nental officers.

the significant weapon legendlater made it out to be.Though accurate at great dis-tances, it was slow to load anduseless in open battle be-cause it was not equippedwith a bayonet. But in the

Pole Arms were in commonuse. Washington wanted hisfoot officers to direct theirmen and not be distracted bytheir own firearms. He there-fore armed them with aspear-like weapon called aspontoon. It became a badgeof rank as well as a weapon.

hands of skirmishers the riflecould do great damage, as theBritish found out at Cowpens.

Davidson, a former Continental officer whomMorgan had known at Valley Forge. An energetic,committed man, popular with the militia, Davidsonhad been expected to muster from 600 to 1,000 men.Instead, Morgan got a letter from him with thedoleful report: "I have not ninety men.'' An Indianincursion on the western frontier had drawn offmany of the militia and inclined others to stay hometo protect their families. On December 28, Davidsonrode into Morgan's camp with only 120 men. He saidthat he hoped to have another 500 mustered atSalisbury in the next week and rode off to find them,leaving Morgan muttering in dismay.Morgan had eagerly accepted this independent

command because he thought at least 2,500 militia-men would join his 500 Continentals and Virginiasix-months men. With an army that size, he couldhave besieged or even stormed the British strong-hold at Ninety Six. His present force seemed toosmall to do the enemy any damage. But it was largeenough to give its commander numerous headaches.In addition to the major worry of annihilation by theenemy, food was scarce. The country along thePacolet had been plundered and fought over for solong, there was nothing left to requisition from thefarms. On December 31, in a letter to Greene,Morgan predicted that in a few days supplies wouldbe "unattainable."What to do? The only practical move he could see

for his feeble army was a march into Georgia. TheBritish outpost at Augusta was weaker and moreisolated than Ninety Six. Even here, Morgan wascautious. "I have consulted with General Davidsonand Colonel Pickens whether we could secure a saferetreat, should we be pushed by a superior force.They tell me it can be easily effected," he wroteGreene, asking his approval of this plan.Morgan was reluctant to advance beyond the

Pacolet. The reason was rooted in his keen under-standing of the psychology of the average militia-man. He wanted to come out, fight and go home assoon as possible. He did not want to fight if theregular army that was supposed to look the enemy inthe face seemed more interested in showing theenemy their backs. "Were we to advance, and beconstrained to retreat, the consequences would bevery disagreeable," Morgan told Greene, speaking

38

as one general to another. The mihtia, he was saying,would go home.Greene was equally anxious about Morgan. Writ-

ing from Cheraw Hills on the Pee Dee River onDecember 29, the southern commander told Morganof the arrival of Gen. Alexander Leslie in Charlestonwith reinforcements. This news meant the Britishwould almost certainly advance soon. "Watch theirmotions very narrowly and take care to guard againsta surprise,'' he wrote. A week later, in another letter,he repeated the warning. 'The enemy and the Toriesboth will try to bring you into disgrace ... to preventyour influence upon the militia, especially the weakand wavering."Greene vetoed Morgan's expedition into Georgia.

He did not think Morgan was strong enough toaccomplish much. "The enemy . . . secure in theirfortifications, will take no notice of your move-ment," he predicted. Greene was persuaded thatCornwallis would strike at his half of the army intheir camp at Cheraw Hills, and he did not wantMorgan in Georgia if this threat materialized. Ignor-ing Morgan's worries about feeding his men, Greenetold him to stay where he was, on the Pacolet or "inthe neighborhood," and await an opportunity toattack the British rear when they marched intoNorth Carolina.Morgan replied with a lament. He reiterated his

warning that "forage [for the horses] and provisionsare not to be had." He insisted there was "but onealternative, either to retreat or move into Georgia."A retreat, he warned, "will be attended with themost fatal consequences. The spirit which nowbegins to pervade the people and call them into thefield, will be destroyed. The militia who have al-ready joined will desert us and it is not improbablebut that a regard for their own safety will inducethem to join the enemy."That last line is grim evidence of the power of the

British policy of forcing everyone to serve in theloyalist militia. But Nathanael Greene remainedadamant. He reported to Morgan more bad news,which made a march into Georgia even more inad-visable. Another British general, with 2,500 men, hadlanded in Virginia and was attacking that vital State,upon which the southern army depended for muchof its supplies. It made no sense to send some of the

39

army's best troops deeper into the South, when Vir-ginia might call on Greene and Morgan for aid. Al-most casually Greene added: "Col. Tarleton is said tobe on his way to pay you a visit. I doubt not but he willhave a decent reception and a proper dismission."

This was a strange remark for a worried general tomake. From other letters Greene wrote around thistime, it is evident that he had received a number ofconflicting reports about Tarleton's strength andposition. The American commander was also unsureabout British intentions. He assumed that Cornwallisand Tarleton were moving up the opposite sides ofthe Broad River in concert. Since the main Britishcolumn under Cornwallis had all but stopped ad-vancing, Greene assumed Tarleton had stopped tooand that Morgan was in no immediate danger.Around this time, a man who had known Daniel

Morgan as a boy in Virginia visited his camp.Richard Winn, after whom Winnsborough wasnamed and whose mansion Cornwallis was using ashis headquarters discussed Tarleton's tactics withhis old friend. Winn told Morgan that Tarleton'sfavorite mode of fighting was by surprise. "He neverbrings on [leads] his attacks himself," Winn said. Heprefers to send in two or three troops of horse,"whose goal is to throw the other party into confu-sion. Then Tarleton attacks with his reserve and cutsthem to pieces."Much as he dreaded the thought of a retreat,

Morgan was too experienced a soldier not to preparefor one. He sent his quartermaster across the BroadRiver with orders to set up magazines of supplies forhis army. This officer returned with dismaying news.General Sumter had refused to cooperate with thisrequest and directed his subordinates to obey noorders from Morgan.Adding to Morgan's supply woes was a Carolina

military custom. Every militiaman brought his horseto camp with him. This meant that Morgan had tofind forage for over 450 horses (counting WilliamWashington's cavalry), each of whom ate 25 to 30pounds of oats and hay a day. "Could the militia bepersuaded to change their fatal mode of going towar," Morgan groaned to Greene, "much provisionmight be saved; but the custom has taken such deeproot that it cannot be abolished."Bands of militiamen constantly left the army to

40

hunt for forage. This practice made it impossible forMorgan to know how many men he had in hiscommand. In desperation, he ordered his officers,both Continental and militia, to call the roll everytwo hours. This measure only gave him more badnews. On January 15, after retreating from thePacolet to Thicketty Creek, he reported to Greenethat he had only 340 militia with him, but did notexpect "to have more than two-thirds of these toassist me, should I be attacked, for it is impossible tokeep them collected."Making Morgan feel even more like a military Job

was a personal problem. The incessant rain and thedamp January cold had awakened an illness that hehad contracted fighting in Canada during the winterof 1775-76, a rheumatic inflammation of the sciaticnerve in his hip. It made riding a horse agony forMorgan.

In his tent on Thicketty Creek, where he hadrendezvoused with William Washington and his 80cavalrymen, who had been getting their horses shodat Wofford's iron works, Morgan all but abandonedany hope of executing the mission on which Greenehad sent him. "My force is inadequate,'' he wrote."Upon a full and mature deliberation I am con-firmed in the opinion that nothing can be effected bymy detachment in this country, which will balancethe risks I will be subjected to by remaining here.The enemy's great superiority in numbers and ourdistance from the main army, will enable LordCornwallis to detach so superior a force against me,as to render it essential to our safety to avoid comingto action."

It would be best, Morgan told Greene, if he wererecalled with his little band of Continentals andAndrew Pickens or William Davidson left to com-mand the back-country militia. Without the regularsto challenge them, the British were less likely toinvade the district and under Pickens' leadership therebels would be able to keep "a check on thedisaffected" the Tories "which," Morgan addedmournfully, "is all I can effect."When he wrote these words on January 15, Morgan

was still unaware of what was coming at him. Fromthe reports of Pickens' scouts, he had begun to worrythat Tarleton might have more than his 550-manBritish Legion with him. With the help of Washing-

41

ton's cavalry, he felt confident that he could beat offan attack by the Legion. But what if Tarleton hadadditional men? "Col. Tarleton has crossed theTyger at Musgrove's Mill," Morgan told Greene."His force we cannot learn."

Into Morgan's camp galloped more scouts fromPickens. They brought news that Morgan made thelast sentence of his letter."We have just learned that Tarleton's force is from

eleven to twelve hundred British."The last word was the significant one. British.

Twelve hundred regulars, trained troops, saber-swinging dragoons and bayonet-wielding infantrylike the men who had sent the militia running fortheir lives at Camden and then cut the Continentalsto pieces. Gen. Daniel Morgan could see only onealternative retreat.

53 Until he got this information on the numbersand composition of Tarleton's army, Morgan seemsto have toyed with the possibility of ambushing theBritish as they crossed the Pacolet. He left strongdetachments of his army at the most likely fords. Atthe very least, he may have wanted to make thecrossing a bloody business for the British, perhapskilling some of their best officers, even Tarletonhimself. If he could repulse or delay Tarleton at theriver, Morgan hoped he could gain enough time toretreat to a ford across the upper Broad, well out ofreach of Cornwallis on the other side of the river.Pickens had kept Morgan well informed of thesluggish advance of the main British army. He knewthey were far to the south, a good 30 miles behindTarleton.

North of the Broad, Morgan reasoned they couldbe easily joined by the 500 North Carolina militiaWilliam Davidson had promised him as well as SouthCarolina men from that district. If Tarleton contin-ued the pursuit, they could give battle on the ruggedslopes of Kings Mountain, where the cavalry of theBritish Legion would be useless.Morgan undoubtedly discussed this plan with the

leaders of the militiamen who were already withhim Joseph McDowell of North Carolina, whosemen had fought at Kings Mountain, James Jacksonand John Cunningham of Georgia, James McCall,Thomas Brandon, William Bratton and other South

42

Carolinians, perhaps also Andrew Pickens. They didnot have much enthusiasm for it. They warnedMorgan that at least half the militia, especially theSouth Carolinians, would be inclined to go homerather than retreat across the Broad. In the backcountry, men perceived rivers as dividing lines be-tween districts. Most of the South Carolina men incamp came from the west side of the Broad. More-over, with Sumter hostile, there was no guaranteethat they would be able to persuade many men onthe other side of the river to join them.

In this discussion, it seems likely that these militialeaders mentioned the Cowpens as a good place tofight Tarleton on the south side of the river. Thegrazing ground was a name familiar to everyone inthe back country. It was where the militia hadassembled before the battle of Kings Mountain theprevious fall. Messengers could be sent into everydistrict within a day's ride to urge laggards to jointhem there.Morgan mulled this advice while his men guarded

the fords of the Pacolet. As dusk fell on January 15,Tarleton and his army appeared on the south bank ofthe river. He saw the guards and wheeled, marchingup the stream toward a ford near Wofford's ironworks. On the opposite bank, Morgan's men keptpace with him, step for step. Then, with no warning,the British disappeared into the night. Retreating?Making camp? No one knew. It was too risky toventure across the swollen river to follow him. TheBritish Legion cavalry always guarded Tarleton'sflanks and rear.On the morning of the 16th, a militia detachment

miles down the river in the opposite direction madean alarming discovery. Tarleton was across! He haddoubled back in the dark and marched most of thenight to cross at Easterwood Shoals. He was only6 miles from Morgan's camp on Thicketty Creek.Leaping on their horses, the guards galloped toMorgan with the news.Morgan's men were cooking breakfast. Out of his

tent charged the general to roar orders at them, thewagoners, the infantry, the cavalrymen. Prepare tomarch immediately! The men grabbed their half-cooked cornmeal cakes and stuffed them into theirmouths. The militia and the cavalry ran for theirhorses, the wagoners hitched their teams, the Conti-

43

nentals formed ranks, and the column got underway.Morgan pressed forward, ignoring the pain in hiship, demanding more and more speed from his men.He headed northwest, toward Cowpens, on theGreen River Road, a route that would also take himto the Island Ford across the Broad River, about6 miles beyond Cowpens.

All day the men slogged along the slick, gooeyroads, Morgan at the head of the column setting arelentless pace. His sciatic hip tormented him. Be-hind him, the militiamen were expending ''many ahearty curse" on him, one of them later recalled. AsNathanael Greene wryly remarked, in the militiaevery man considered himself a general.

But Daniel Morgan was responsible for their livesand the lives of his Continentals, some of whom hadmarched doggedly from battlefield to battlefield forover four years. In the company of the DelawareContinentals who served beside the Marylanders inthe light infantry brigade, there was a lieutenantnamed Thomas Anderson who kept track of themiles he had marched since they headed south inMay 1780. At the end of each day he entered in hisjournal the ever-growing total. By January 16, it was1,435. No matter what the militia thought of him,Daniel Morgan was not going to throw away suchmen in a battle simply to prove his courage.Seldom has there been a better example of the

difference between the professional and the amateursoldier. In his letters urging militiamen to join him,Morgan had warned them against the futility offighting in such small detachments. He had askedthem to come into his camp and subject themselvesto "order and discipline ... so that I may be enabledto direct you ... to the advantage of the whole."

In the same letters, Morgan had made a promiseto these men. "I will ask you to encounter nodangers or difficulties, but what I shall participatein." If he retreated across the Broad, he would beexposing the men who refused to go with him toTarleton's policy of extermination by fire and sword.If they went with him, their families, their friends,their homes would be abandoned to the younglieutenant colonel's vengeance.

This conflict between prudence and his promisemust have raged in Morgan's mind as his army toiledalong the Green River Road. It was hard marching.

44

The road dipped into hollows and looped aroundsmall hills. Swollen creeks cut across it. The woodswere thick on both sides of it. At dusk, the Ameri-cans emerged from the forest onto a flat, lightlywooded tableland. At least, it looked flat at firstglance. As Morgan led his men into it, he noted thatthe ground rose gradually to a slight crest, thendipped and rose to another slightly higher crest. Oakand hickory trees were dotted throughout the moreor less rectangular area, but there was practically nounderbrush. This was the Cowpens, a place whereback-country people pastured their cattle and pre-pared them to be driven to market.

In the distance, Morgan could see the Blue RidgeMountains, which rise from the flat country beyondthe Broad like a great rampart. They were 30 milesaway. If they could reach them, the army was safe.But militia scouts brought in grim news. The riverwas rising. It would be a difficult business crossing atIsland Ford in the dark. The ford was still 6 milesaway, and the men were exhausted from their all-daymarch. If they rested at Cowpens and tried to crossthe river the next morning, Banastre Tarleton, thatsoldier who liked to march by night, would be uponthem, ready to slash them to pieces.

Perhaps it was that report which helped Morganmake his decision. One suspects he almost wel-comed the news that the army was, for all practicalpurposes, trapped and fighting was the only alterna-tive. There was enough of the citizen-soldier inMorgan to dislike retreating almost as much as theaverage militiaman.The more Morgan studied the terrain around him,

the more he liked it. The militia leaders were right.This was the best place to fight Tarleton. Sitting onhis horse, looking down the slope to the Green RiverRoad, Morgan noted the way the land fell off to theleft and right toward several creeks. The Cowpenswas bordered by marshy ground that would make itdifficult for Tarleton to execute any sweeping flankmovements with his cavalry. As his friend RichardWinn had told him, that was not Tarleton's style,anyway. He was more likely to come straight at theAmericans with his infantry and cavalry in a head-long charge. Experience told Morgan there wereways to handle such an assault tactics that 26-year-old Banastre Tarleton had probably never seen.

45

Now the important thing was to communicate thewill to fight. Turning to his officers, Morgan said,"On this ground I will beat Benny Tarleton or I willlay my bones."

D Eleven to twelve hundred British, Daniel Mor-gan had written. Ironically, as Morgan orderedanother retreat from this formidable foe, the Britishwere barricading themselves in some log houses onthe north bank of the Pacolet River, expecting animminent attack from the patriots. Their spies hadtold them that Morgan had 3,000 men, and Tarletonwas taking no chances. After seizing this strongpoint, only a few miles below Morgan's camp, hesent out a cavalry patrol. They soon reported thatthe Americans had "decamped." Tarleton immedi-ately advanced to Morgan's abandoned campsite,where his hungry soldiers were delighted to find"plenty of provisions which they had left behindthem, half cooked."

Nothing stirred Banastre Tarleton's blood morethan a retreating enemy. British soldiers, famed fortheir tenacity in war, have often been compared tothe bulldog. But Tarleton was more like the blood-hound. A fleeing foe meant the chance of an easyvictory. It was not only instinct, it was part of histraining as a cavalryman.

"Patrols and spies were immediately dispatched toobserve the Americans," Tarleton later recalled.The British Legion dragoons were ordered to followMorgan until dark. Then the job was turned over to"other emissaries" loyalists. Tarleton had about 50with him to act as scouts and spies. Early thatevening, January 16, probably around the time thatMorgan was deciding to fight at Cowpens, a party ofloyalists brought in a militia colonel who had wan-dered out of the American line of march, perhaps insearch of forage for his horse. Threatened withinstant hanging, the man talked. He told Tarletonthat Morgan hoped to stop at Cowpens and gathermore militia. But the captive said that Morgan thenintended to get across the Broad River, where hethought he would be safe.The information whetted Tarleton's appetite. It

seemed obvious to him that he should "hang uponGeneral Morgan's rear" to cut off any militia rein-forcements that might show up. If Morgan tried to

46

cross the Broad, Tarleton would be in a position to"perplex his design," as he put it a stuffy way ofsaying he could cut him to pieces. Around midnight,other loyalist scouts brought in a rumor of moreAmerican reinforcements on their way a "corps ofmountaineers." This sent a chill through the British,even through Tarleton. It sounded like the return ofthe mountain men who had helped destroy the loyal-ist army at Kings Mountain. It became more andmore obvious to Tarleton that he should attackMorgan as soon as possible.About three in the morning of the 17th of January,

Tarleton called in his sentries and ordered his drum-mers to rouse his men. Leaving 35 baggage wagonsand 70 Negro slaves with a 100-man guard com-manded by a lieutenant, he marched his sleepy mendown the rutted Green River Road, the same routeMorgan had followed the previous day. The Britishfound the marching hard in the dark. The ground,Tarleton later wrote, was "broken, and much inter-sected by creeks and ravines." Ahead of the columnand on both flanks scouts prowled the woods toprevent an ambush.

Describing the march, Tarleton also gave a precisedescription of his army. Three companies of lightinfantry, supported by the infantry of the BritishLegion, formed his vanguard. The light infantrywere all crack troops, most of whom had been fight-ing in America since the beginning of the war. Onecompany was from the 16th Regiment and had par-ticipated in some of the swift, surprise attacks forwhich light infantry was designed. They had beenpart of the British force that killed and wounded 150Americans in a night assault at Paoli, Pa., in the fallof 1777. The light company of the 71st Regiment hada similar record, having also been part of the lightinfantry brigade that the British organized early inthe war.With these regulars marched another company of

light infantry whose memories were not so grandthe green-coated men of the Prince of Wales LoyalAmerican Volunteers. Northern loyalists, they hadbeen in the war since 1777. They had seen littlefighting until they sailed south in 1780. After the fallof Charleston, Cornwallis had divided them intodetachments and used them to garrison small posts,with disastrous results. In August 1780 at Hanging

Music made the soldier's lifemore tolerable on the marchand in camp. But the mostimportant use was in battle.Both the drum and the fifeconveyed signals and ordersover the din and confusionfar better than the humanvoice. This iron fife is anoriginal 18th-century instru-ment. The drum, accordingto tradition, was carried inthe war.

47

Legion cavalry

48

fear and was ultimately self-defeating.The figures across these

pages represent the main unitsof the cooly efficient battlemachine that Tarleton led ontothe field that winter day.

Royal Artillery

Private, 71st Highlanders

Rock, Sumter had attacked one detachment, virtu-ally annihilating it. The colonel of the regiment wascashiered for cowardice. Another detachment wasmauled by Francis Marion at Great Savannah aroundthe same time. It was hardly a brilliant record. Butthis company of light infantry, supposedly the boldestand best of the regiment, might be eager to seekrevenge for their lost comrades.Behind the light infantry marched the first battal-

ion of the Royal Fusiliers of the 7th Regiment. Thiswas one of the oldest regiments in the British army,with a proud history that went back to 1685. Knownas the "City of London'' regiment, it had been inAmerica since 1773. A detachment played a vitalpart in repulsing the December 31, 1775, attack onQuebec, which wrecked American plans to makeCanada the 14th State. Among the 426 Americanscaptured was Daniel Morgan. Few if any of the menin Tarleton's ranks had been in that fight. The167-man battalion were all new recruits. When theyarrived in Charleston early in December, the Britishcommander there had described them to Cornwallisas ''so bad, not above a third can possibly move witha regiment."The British government was having problems re-

cruiting men for America. It had never been easy topersuade Englishmen to join the army and endure itsharsh discipline and low pay. Now, with the war inAmerica growing more and more unpopular, armyrecruiters were scouring the jails and city slums.Cornwallis had decided to use these new recruits asgarrison troops at Ninety Six. Tarleton, as we haveseen earlier, had borrowed them for his pursuit.Although the 7th's motto was Nee aspera terrent("hardships do not frighten us"), it must have been anunnerving experience for these men, little more thana month after a long, debilitating sea voyage, to findthemselves deep in the backwoods of South Caro-lina, marching through the cold, wet darkness totheir first batde.Undoubtedly worsening the Fusiliers' morale was

the low opinion their officers had of Banastre Tarle-ton. The commander of the regiment, Maj. TimothyNewmarsh, had stopped at a country house for thenight about a week ago, during the early stage of thepursuit, and had not been discreet in voicing hisfears for the safety of the expedition. He said he was

50

certain they would be defeated, because almostevery officer in the army detested Tarleton, who hadbeen promoted over the heads of men who had beenin the service before he was born.Behind the Royal Fusiliers trudged a 200-man

battalion of the 71st Scottish Highlanders (Fraser's),who probably did not find the night march throughthe woods as forbidding as the city men of theFusiliers. At least half were relatively new recruitswho had arrived in America litde more than a yearago. The rest were veterans who had been cam-paigning in the rebellious colonies since 1776. Theyhad sailed south to help the British capture Georgiain 1778 and had fought well in one of the mostdevastating royal victories of the southern cam-paign, the rout of the Americans at Briar Creek, Ga.,in early 1779. They were commanded by Maj. Archi-bald McArthur, a tough veteran who had served withthe Scottish Brigade in the Dutch army, consideredone of the finest groups of fighting men in Europe.Between the 71st and the 7th Regiments plodded

some 18 blue-coated royal artillerymen, leadinghorses carrying two brass cannon and 60 rounds ofround shot and case shot (also known as canisterbecause each "case'' was full of smaller bullet-sizeprojectiles that scattered in flight). These light gunswere considered an important innovation when theywere introduced into the British army in 1775.Because they could be dismantled and carried onhorses, they could be moved over rough terrainimpassable to ordinary artillery with its cumbersomeammunition wagons. The two guns Tarleton hadwith him could also be fitted with shafts that enabledfour men to carry them around a battlefield, if theground was too muddy or rough for their carriages.With the shafts, they resembled grasshoppers, andthis was what artillerymen, fond of nicknames fortheir guns, called them.The cannon added to Tarleton's confidence. They

could hurl a 3-pound round shot almost 1,000 yards.There was little likelihood that Morgan had anyartillery with him. All the southern army's artilleryhad been captured at Camden. These guns withTarleton may have been two of the captured pieces,which had originally been captured from the Britishat Saratoga in 1777.Behind the infantry and artillery rode the cavalry

51

John Eager Howard, Citizen-soldier

Few field officers served theContinental Army with greaterskill or devotion to duty thanJohn Eager Howard. Whenthe revolution broke out. hewas 23, the son of a landedMaryland family, brought upin an atmosphere of ease andcomfort. He saw his firsthostile fire as a captain ofmilitia at White Plains (1 776).The next year, as a major inthe regulars, he helped leadthe 4th Maryland at German-town. In the Southern Cam-

paign of 1 780-81 , regimentshe led fought with great cour-age at Camden, Cowpens,Guilford Courthouse, HobkirksHill, and Eutaw Springs.Nathanael Greene consideredHoward "as good an officer asthe world affords." After thewar, Light-Horse Harry' Leedescribed Howard as "alwaysto be found where the battleraged, pressing into closeaction to wrestle with fixedbayonet."

The silver medal awarded byCongress to Howardfor ser-vice at Cowpens.

Belvidere, the elegant estatethat John Eager Howardbuilt after the Revolution,stood in what is now down-town Baltimore. It was torndown a century ago and theland is now occupied by rowhouses.

53

A helmet of the 17th LightDragoons, c. 1780.

of the British Legion and a 50-man troop of the 17thLight Dragoons, giving Tarleton about 350 horse-men. In scabbards danghng from straps over theirshoulders were the fearsome sabers that could lopoff a man's arm with a single stroke. The Legioncavalry were, relatively speaking, amateurs, withonly their courage and belief in their cause toanimate them. The 17th Dragoons were regulars tothe core, intensely proud of their long tradition. Ontheir brass helmets they wore a death's head andbelow it a scroll with the words "or glory." They andtheir officers were somewhat disdainful of the Brit-ish Legion.Although their reputation among the patriots was

good, the Legion had several times exhibited cow-ardice unthinkable to a 17th dragoon. When theBritish army advanced into Charlotte in the fallof 1780, they had been opposed by 75 or 80 back-country riflemen. Tarleton was ill with yellow feverand his second in command, Maj. George Hanger,had ordered them to charge the Americans. TheLegion refused to budge. Not even the exhortationsof Cornwallis himself stirred them until infantry haddislodged the riflemen from cover. They apparentlyremembered the punishment they had taken atBlackstocks, when Tarleton's orders had exposedthem to sharpshooters.As dawn began turning the black night sky to

charcoal gray, Tarleton ordered a select group ofcavalry to the front of his infantry. They sooncollided with American scouts on horseback andcaptured two of them. These captives told them thatMorgan and his men were only a few miles away.Tarleton immediately ordered two troops of theLegion cavalry, under one of his best officers, Capt.David Ogilvie, to reinforce his vanguard. Ogilviegalloped into the murky dawn. Within a half hour,one of his troopers came racing back with unex-pected news. The patriots were not retreating! Theywere drawn up in an open wood in battle formation.

Tarleton halted his army and summoned his loyal-ist guides. They instantly recognized the place whereMorgan had chosen to fight the Cowpens. It wasfamiliar to everyone who had visited or lived in theSouth Carolina back country. They gave Tarleton adetailed description of the battleground. The woodswere open and free from swamps. The Broad River

54

was about six miles away.The ground, Tarleton decided, was made to order

for the rebels' destruction. In fact, America couldnot produce a place more suitable to his style of war.His bloodhound instinct dominant, Banastre Tar-leton assumed that Morgan, having run away fromhim for two days, was still only trying to check hisadvance and gain time to retreat over the BroadRiver. Morgan failed to stop him at the Pacolet. Hewould fail even more disastrously here. With six milesof open country in the American's rear, Tarletonlooked forward to smashing Morgan's ranks withan infantry attack and then unleashing his Legionhorsemen to hunt down the fleeing survivors. Tarletonnever dreamt that Daniel Morgan was planning tofight to the finish.

/ While Tarleton's troops spent most of the nightmarching along the twisting, dipping Green RiverRoad, Daniel Morgan's men had been resting at Cow-pens and listening to their general's battle plan. FirstMorgan outlined it for his officers, then he went fromcampfire to campfire explaining it to his men.The plan was based on the terrain at Cowpens and

on the knowledge of Tarleton's battle tactics thatMorgan had from such friends as Richard Winn.Morgan probably told his men what he repeated inlater years he expected nothing from Tarleton but"downright fighting." The young Englishman wasgoing to come straight at them in an all-out charge.To repel that charge, Morgan adopted tactics he

had himself helped design at Saratoga. There was asimilarity between the little army he commanded atCowpens and the men he led in northern New York.Like his old rifle corps, his militia were crack shots.But they could not stand up against a British bayonetcharge. It took too long to load and fire a rifle, and itwas not equipped with a bayonet.He had complete confidence in his Continentals.

No regiment in the British army had a prouder tradi-tion than these men from Maryland and Delaware.They and their comrades in arms had demonstratedtheir heroism on a dozen battlefields. Above all,Morgan trusted their commander, Lt. Col. JohnEager Howard of Maryland. At the battle of Ger-mantown in 1777, he had led his 4th Maryland Regi-ment in a headlong charge that drove the British

55

An American canteen of light infantry in panicky flight from their battle linethe type used by militia at b^^k to their tents. After the American defeat atowpens. Camden, Howard had rounded up the survivors of

his own and other regiments and led them on athr