Kant: Epistemology and Metaphysic Lecture 7 The Categories of Understanding and the Self.

I. Kant and HumeHume: a) Items of experience are subjective (impressions, private mental states)b) Items of experience are unconnectedKant:a) Kant agrees with Hume: there is nothing in representations themselves which links them together. Every impression is completely foreign to every other, standing apart in isolation (A97)

b) Disagrees with Hume: the linkage cannot be based on mere association but representations must be related to each other in a non-arbitrary way. This is possible only if the categories have objective validity. The concept of substance applies to experience (eg. Salt tastes saline; to talk about properties it must be a property of something (concept) When we compare different representations (impressions) they must be combined under a concept (i.e. they are not connected arbitrarily). What unifies these representations is the concept by which the manifold of intuition is united (B137)

The concept at the same time excludes other representations eg salt is: white, salty, grainy but not sweet wooden or green [We shall pursue this claim further when we discuss the Analogies of Experience]

II. Kants initial claim A. Just as nothing can appear to us which I not subject to the conditions of space to time (1) so nothing can be an object of experience for us which is not subject to the categories (2)

B. Yet in 1775 he realised that while (1) is true (2) is not: It is conceivable (1) is true: i.e. things necessarily appear to us in space and time but (2) is false there could be things which we are unable to bring under the categories they could thus not become an object of experience. Note: Object for Kant is that in the concept of which the manifold of a given intuition is united (B137)

A is only valid if we have objective experience but is this necessarily so? Let us take, for instance, the concept of cause, which signifies a special kind of synthesis, whereby upon something , A, there is posited something quite different, B, according to a rule. It is not manifest a priori why appearances should contain anything of that kind Appearances might very well be so constituted that the understanding should not find them to be in accordance with the conditions of this unity. Everything might be in such confusion that, for instance, in the series of appearances nothing presented itself which might yield a rule of synthesis and so answer the concept of cause and effect (A90)

To avoid this Kant needs to show that nothing can appear to us in sensibility which is not already subject to the categories. This is the task Kant sets himself in the B version of the Deduction.

III. The Transcendental Unity of ApperceptionHe realises thus what needs to be first accounted for is what it means for an object to appear to us or indeed what it means to have experience of something that is distinct from us; i.e. objective.

The claim will be: the subject can only become aware of itself as a distinct subject by distinguishing its purely subjective states from objective ones. I couldn't even have the thought "all these are my states" unless I could distinguish myself from something distinct from myself. And the way in which objectivity is conferred on judgments of external existence is precisely by the application of the categories. *So the categories, as necessary conditions of objectivity, but are equally a necessary condition of subjective self-awareness.The clam is:1) The unity of consciousness would be impossible (a priori) if our experience was Humean in nature.

2) Representations refer to an object only by being related to each other in a non-arbitrary, rule governed way. This is only the case if the categories have objective validity.

3) They must be experienced by one and the same self-consciousness. Kant calls this the transcendental unity of apperception or synthetic unity of consciousness.

III. Why do we need to appeal to a unitary permanent vantage point?

William James:Take a sentence of a dozen words, and take twelve men and tell to each one word. Then stand the men n a row or jam them in a bunch, and let each man think of his word as intently as he will: nowhere will there be a consciousness of the whole sentence. (Principles of Psychology cited by Forster, Dicker and Kemp Smith)

In order for a series of words to come to form a sentence, or a series of representations to come to form a thought, they have to occur in one and the same consciousness. If the manifold of representations were not refer back to one and the same enduring consciousness: I would have as many coloured and diverse a self as I have representations (AB134)

Eg. When I look at a table I can see the front, side, top or bottom of the table. In each case however I am aware that I am seeing one and the same table. The properties all fall under the concept table.

** That I am able to see them all as being part of one object means that I am able to relate them to another in one consciousness.

If each representation belonged to different consciousnesses, there would be no representation whatsoever equally if they did not fall under a concept there would be no consciousness of an object.

IV. B DEDUCTION: Temporality thesis (Strawson)The B version of the Deduction Kant emphasises the temporal dimension of consciousness ie. he recognises that representations are apprehended in a temporal succession (there is the synthesis of apprehension, reproduction and recognition):

Take temporal succession as an example. I can hear a succession of notes, I am only aware of this succession because I can relate each tone back to one and the same consciousness. Namely I recognise that the next note is related to the previous one which I experienced just before since I can run through and hold together the chain of events (i.e. notes) (synthetis of apprehension) Moreover, I can reproduce the previous members of succession (i.e. the previous notes) (Synthesis of reproduction) and I can recognise that the notes that I am reproducing relate to the previous ones that were played (synthesis of recognition).

Hence, we only experience an objective unity if there is a is a unitary consciousness. Moreover, we have no self-consciousness without consciousness of objects, and we are not conscious of objects if there is no consciousness of an I.

IMPORTANT:Subjective conditions of thought can have objective validity!i..e It is not that there is no alternative for us to think otherwise (Hume) but the objective validity of our way of thinking is not only a condition of our being able to have the thought of an object, but moreover the condition of possibility for there to be an object!