creating a legacy of social housing - housing new zealand ... · 4 creating a legacy of social...

C R E AT I N G A L E G A C Y O F S O C I A L H O U S I N G by Vivienne Allan

Edited by Jocelyn Johnstone Design & Layout by G&A Creative Agency

First published by Housing New Zealand 2016

Copyright © 2016 Housing New Zealand

All rights reserved

This book may not be reproduced in whole or in part, stored or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise) without permission in writing from the copyright owner and the publisher of the book

ISBN 978-0-473-36192-1 (softcover)ISBN 978-0-473-36193-8 (ibook)

Image: Christchurch City from the Port Hills: Monday 30th May, 2016. Photo by Grant Nelson of G&A Creative Agency

Creating a Legacy of Social Housing

C O N T E N T SForeword...............................................................................................................4

Introduction.........................................................................................................6

PA R T O N ESaturday, 4 September 2010, 4.36am........................................26

Chapter 1: Facing The Damage...........................................................30Chapter 2: Priority: Accommodation.................................................41Chapter 3: Housing the Most Vulnerable...........................................44Chapter 4: The Long Road to Recovery..............................................49Chapter 5: ‘Expect the Unexpected’....................................................57Chapter 6: The Asset Management Strategy.......................................64

PA R T T W OTuesday, 22 February 2011, 12.51pm......................................70

Chapter 1: The Red Zones..................................................................88

Chapter 2: The CERP Office.............................................................100

Earthquake Prone Buildings......................................................109

Chapter 3: Settling the Insurance Claim..........................................111Chapter 4: Meeting the Challenge: Repair <5000............................113Chapter 5: The Close-out Reports ..................................................120

Completing the Major Repairs.................................................120Completing the Minor Repairs..................................................123

Chapter 6: Building New Homes..........................................................126

New Homes for a New Christchurch..........................................132

Urban Renewal in Aranui.......................................................138

‘The Cantabrian’.....................................................................143

Contents

C O N T E N T S

PA R T T H R E E

Chapter 1: Tenancy Liaison: Achieving Success..................................144

Tenant Surveys.........................................................................149

Creating a Community Garden................................................150

Chapter 2: The Tenant Experience........................................................152Chapter 3: Foundation Repair Trials: Cutting Edge Innovation........159

Ground Improvement Trials.....................................................164

Chapter 4: Rolleston: Breathing New Life into Damaged Houses....166

Chapter 5: Hope and Wire: A mini-series..........................................171

PA R T F O U RThe Canterbury Investment Plan

Chapter 1: Creating a Legacy................................................................175Chapter 2: ‘Here for the Long Haul’....................................................185

Author’s Notes and Acknowledgements...............................................189

Bibliography & Referenced Publications...........................................197

List of Acronyms...........................................................................................200

Appendices Part 1......................................................................................202Part 2......................................................................................208

Index.............................................................................................................216

4 Creating a Legacy of Social Housing

Foreword

Natural disasters tend to bring out the best in people; our Housing New Zealand staff were no exception when Greater Christchurch was struck with such devastating force on Saturday 4 September 2010. The team on the ground was quick to respond not only to attend to our tenants and their homes, but to contribute from the outset to the state of emergency that was declared in Christchurch, Waimakariri and Selwyn Districts. Their tenacity, strength of purpose and dedication to ensuring personal and tenant safety, to playing their part in the network of response and recovery services that were instituted, demonstrated their commitment to the job at hand.

As has been said on many occasions since then, the first earthquake wasn’t just the forerunner of worse things to come, it was in every respect, the dress rehearsal. Our organisation was in the midst of repairs and determining the insurance claim when the 22 February 2011 earthquake happened. This time there was even greater urgency for teams to fly to Christchurch, to volunteer their time and their knowledge to help our Canterbury staff with the enormous recovery effort they were facing.

Over time, memories of those immediate days and weeks may fade; the high energy, the dedication and the complete focus on the priority of safety first may also fade. However, what is evidenced by this book and by the physical presence of hundreds of new, or repaired and restored homes for our tenants, is that the legacy created by the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery team has been achieved.

I went to Christchurch on many occasions during the earthquake recovery to visit sites and discuss progress with our staff. It was important in the early days, and it was just as important during the latter part of the programme, to reassure everyone that their work was acknowledged and appreciated by the Board.

It has been a long and extremely challenging six years; much has been done with urban renewal and regeneration and with the repair and construction of our properties. Our tenants have new life as a result.

This book is a success story, and it is also a reminder to us all of what happened during the dark days and how remarkably our staff rose to the occasion. Our organisation can have universal pride in the outcome which is here for all to read and see.

Adrienne Young-CooperChair, Housing New Zealand

‘In the face of disaster, they act with discretion, at once, and together; whereby they show themselves the remnant

of a truly great people. In short, their failings such as enlightenment may remove, while their virtues another

people might long in vain to acquire.’

Walter D’Arcy Cresswell, 19281

1 Walter D’Arcy Cresswell 1896-1960, poet, born in Christchurch, New Zealand.

I N T R O D U C T I O N


Introduction

The Canterbury earthquakes that killed 185 people and injured several thousand more; that destroyed homes, streets and neighbourhoods; that damaged the inner city causing hundreds of buildings to be demolished; that were later said to be the worst event in New Zealand’s history, impacted on everyone. The earthquakes didn’t discriminate; wherever you were on 4 September 2010, on 22 February 2011, on 13 June and 23 December that same year and on many thousands of other occasions when the shockwaves shuddered across the region, you were part of a community crisis on a scale never before witnessed in New Zealand. It didn’t matter whether you were employed or unemployed, whether you owned your home or rented; whether you were a resident or a guest, the impact was profound. Psychologically, the impact would last much longer than the physical; the internal tremor when the latest aftershock suggested something fiercer and more dramatic might happen, now, in an hour, in a day.

At first glance, after 4 September 2010, it was difficult to determine the short, medium or long term consequence. After 22 February 2011, the situation became clearer. By the end of that year, it was abundantly apparent that what might have been a short-term repair and rebuild programme for the city and the region, had magnified into something that would take years, decades even.

There was never any doubt that Housing New Zealand’s comprehensive repair programme as a result of the earthquakes would be achieved. As the Government Corporation responsible for the nation’s state-owned houses, repairing 5,000 damaged properties within a three year time frame was eminently doable. There was some well-founded scepticism, however, that building 700 new homes within the same period might be more difficult to achieve.

In fairness to the staff, architects, engineers, builders, carpenters, plumbers, electricians, plasterers and painters, not to mention the suppliers, the consenting local authorities, transporters and innumerable other people involved, building more than 60 per cent of the 700 homes within the required time period was nonetheless a remarkable achievement. Completing everything by the end of June 2016 would be a significant milestone although as everyone had already recognised in February 2013, it would be a stretch. As Housing New Zealand’s earthquake recovery office prepared to close its doors for the last time, there were still a handful of houses to be finished. Even so, the design and the character of the new state homes would change the social housing landscape in Christchurch for all time.

There were some major obstacles to overcome particularly in areas where land had been reassessed and categorised according to new building guidelines.2 New ways had to be devised to deal with house foundation repairs. Underneath many houses, substantial quantities of dried mud from liquefaction had amassed that required special equipment to suck it all out. Tenants had to be moved out of their homes, sometimes homes they had lived in for decades. Not all tenants were happy to leave. Like other residents, they were familiar with their neighbourhoods. Their children were familiar with the local school. They

2 Department of Building & Housing: ‘Earthquake Repairs Guidance Document’, Appen-dix C, November 2011.

7Introduction

had friends nearby; they played sport and socialised in their local community.The whole exercise required dedication and commitment by everyone

involved. What other organisation could state with such pride that their challenge and their vision to create a legacy of sustainable social housing had been achieved?

The challenge had come from the new Housing Minister Nick Smith when he met with the recently-appointed Chief Executive of Housing New Zealand Glen Sowry, the Corporation’s General Manager responsible for Asset Development Sean Bignell and the Christchurch Manager of Housing New Zealand’s Earthquake Recovery Programme Andrew Booker, on Thursday, 31 January 2013. There had been some unfounded criticism that the organisation wasn’t making as much progress as it should; that waiting lists for state houses were growing; that the repair programme wasn’t moving quickly enough.

The Minister made it absolutely clear that he wanted to see more energy, more focus, more commitment. It was agreed then that by 31 December 2015, 5,000 properties would be repaired and tenanted. Where possible this was to be achieved without needing to move tenants. Concurrently, 700 new homes would be built and tenanted. Housing New Zealand’s housing stock in Canterbury would be returned to its pre-quake level. A letter to this effect, headed ‘Housing New Zealand’s Christchurch earthquake recovery plan update’, was sent to the Minister on Monday 4 February 2013.3 The document attached to the letter detailed the work to be achieved between April 2013 and December 2015. The condensed delivery of the full repair programme would require an additional $15 million operational cost which was to be met by Housing New Zealand.4 The programme identified each element in turn, explaining the rationale for the decisions and how the work would be operationalised.

‘The proposed repair programme will balance the advantages of taking a suburb by suburb approach with the need to have repairs complement the future use and holding period of assets. The suburb by suburb approach is to achieve a sense of completeness and to coordinate with other infrastructure works in Christchurch. The sequencing of specific properties may vary depending upon the extent of damage and their future use.’5 The documentation included a detailed chart of the cumulative repairs and their completion dates.

The new build programme was referred to as a ‘large scale investment project, that outlines how the Corporation’s housing stock in Canterbury will be reconfigured to ensure the longer term needs for social and affordable housing are met.’ The project would depend on the outcomes of the Land Use Recovery Plan (LURP), Housing New Zealand’s role in providing affordable housing, overall outcomes from the CERA/MBIE Housing Recovery Programme including housing market assessment that had yet to be progressed, and Canterbury local authorities’ future strategies for urban redevelopment.6 It was a pre-emptive set of conditions based on a suite of as yet unknown factors.

There was a separate section in the letter to the Minister dealing with the Corporation’s insurance claim, still to be settled. ‘Housing New Zealand

3 Letter from Housing New Zealand’s CEO Glen Sowry to Minister of Housing Hon Nick Smith copied to the Corporation Chair Alan Jackson, 4 February 2013.4 Canterbury Housing New Zealand Delivery Programme – Summary and Options, Febru-ary 2013. In the end the projected $15 million wasn’t used. 5 Canterbury Housing New Zealand Delivery Programme – Summary and Options, Febru-ary 2013, p36 ibid p 4


submitted its insurance claim of $430 million to Vero on 30 August 2012. As at 31 December 2012, Housing New Zealand understands there is a difference of $156 million between the insurer and the submitted claim. Critical points of difference between Housing New Zealand’s claim and the Vero offer are: assessment of repair methodologies, escalation rate for future building cost increases, internal costs to manage the repair programme, laterals associated with underground drainage damage.’ 7

There was an additional point about Housing New Zealand’s claim to the Earthquake Commission for the 23 December 2012 earthquake which had yet to be determined.

The Corporation’s Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Office was six months into its new location. It was one of the first Government Agencies to return to the central city, officially opened by the then Minister of Housing Phil Heatley, on 18 October 2012.8 The occasion had coincided with the farewell visit of the Corporation’s Chief Executive Dr Lesley McTurk, a former Chief Executive of the Christchurch City Council. Like everything else in Christchurch and Canterbury at the time, Housing New Zealand was in insurance assessment mode, at the same time trying to find additional accommodation for its tenants, while making sure its staff who had been affected by the earthquakes, were coping with their families and the inevitable distractions of their home situation. More than 27,000 emergency health and safety repairs had been effectively completed. An Accelerated Repair Programme had been initiated in May and formally started in June 2012 to repair and tenant 212 vacant houses damaged in the earthquakes. Perhaps remarkably, that task had been completed on time and on budget within a tight four month timeframe. As each property was finished, the house keys were handed over to the new tenants.

The Earthquake Recovery office was located on the first floor of an existing building on the corner of Manchester and St Asaph Streets. There were two shops on the ground floor – one that specialised in art supplies and the other providing a range of camping equipment. For whatever reason, the building had survived the earthquakes with some cosmetic damage but nothing structural. Access was from a side door on Manchester Street and there was an emergency exit to the car park on the west side. It had taken only a few weeks to completely fit out the office, to organise desks, chairs, computer wiring, to create meetings rooms, a kitchen and bathroom facilities which would accommodate 30 earthquake recovery and 10 asset development staff. The commitment at the time was to complete the first property repair programme by October 2012 and to make progress on building new homes replacing those damaged beyond repair.

All around the new Manchester Street office, commercial buildings were damaged, partially demolished or sitting like the former Odeon Theatre, in complete disrepair, the fine tracings of its blue and white mouldings open to the elements and the fast-fading red cinema seats once fitted in perfect symmetry now buckled and twisted and home to fleeing birds and other wildlife. Photographers from all over the world breeched the ubiquitous Fahey

7 Canterbury Housing New Zealand Delivery Programme - summary and options, February 2013 p 8. There was a difference of $156 million between what Housing New Zealand had claimed and what the insurers through the loss adjustors, believed should be the settlement.8 Inland Revenue and Social Development Ministry signed 9-year leases at the Airport Busi-ness Park, ACC signed a 6-year lease near Addington Raceway and Immigration New Zealand relocated to the same building.

9Introduction

security fencing to get a better perspective for posterity. It was the perfect image of a disaster; like the back-end of Liverpool after World War II.

When the winds blew, they sprayed a thick film of dust over everything and everyone. Asbestos, some said. Streets were difficult to negotiate; there was a festering epidemic of orange and white striped traffic cones; traffic management had become the fastest growing industry in town. SUVs were the best means of travel – they rode easily across the humps and slumps, the cracks in the bitumen and the fissures. Buses, mostly empty except for the driver, rode uneasily along St Asaph Street, sending a shudder throughout Housing New Zealand’s renovated offices, like a simulated aftershock. For the uninitiated, it was a frequent and unwelcome reminder.

Pre-quake, there were three Housing New Zealand offices in Christchurch servicing the tenant population in the city and its environs. One was based in Linwood; one in Aranui and the other in Papanui. There had been comparatively low level non-structural damage to the offices following the September earthquake and staff had continued to work from the three locations without difficulty. Following the 22 February and then the 13 June 2011 earthquakes, the Linwood office was declared too dangerous to be used. The Aranui office was closed indefinitely. It had been severely affected by liquefaction, like everyone and everything else in the neighbourhood. Staff were relocated into the Papanui office, a two-storeyed building tucked away on Restell Street. It was already a squashed suite of offices before the Corporation determined a special-purpose earthquake recovery office should be established and located somewhere else. Clearly with the influx of more staff, new premises would need to be found, preferably in the inner city, preferably within walking distance of the most important stakeholders – Christchurch City Council and the newly formed Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority. Hence the shift to Manchester Street and the inevitable split from the traditional way of working into something definitively different.

In her foreword to the book ‘Once in a lifetime: city-building after Disaster in Christchurch,’ Helen Clark, Administrator for the United Nations Development Programme and former Prime Minister of New Zealand, said ‘the process of recovery from this tragedy (however), presents opportunities to build back better. The road to longer-term recovery,’ she went on to say, ‘is never clear-cut and it involves far more than finding the money for reconstruction.’9

It was a truism for Housing New Zealand. It was a truism for everyone involved in first the emergency phase post 22 February 2011, and then the recovery phase. The Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management (MCDEM) is organisationally responsible for disaster response and recovery at a national level. At the same time however, there are local level planning and implementation strategies in place through Civil Defence Emergency Management groups. These are partnerships between local authorities, and emergency services – police, fire, ambulance and health – and Government agencies which have local offices in the affected area. Local authorities are legally required to prepare for, and be able to respond to disasters, hence the appropriateness of Christchurch, Selwyn and Waimakariri Mayors declaring a state of emergency immediately after the 4 September earthquake. Central Government takes control when an event is obviously exceeding the local ability

9 B Bennett; J Dann; E Johnson; R Reynolds; ‘Once in a Lifetime: City-building after Disaster in Christchurch.’ A series of 39 visual essays. Freerange Press, Christchurch New Zealand 2014.


to deal with the situation which was what happened on 22 February 2011. Housing New Zealand was to play its part in the Civil Defence emergency during the priority phases of the first and second major earthquakes as well as managing its tenants and its property portfolio.

………………………………….

From the early morning of 4 September 2010 through to the end of 2011, the people of Christchurch and Canterbury were confronted with a natural disaster on a scale that had no parallel in New Zealand. The location of New Zealand in the Pacific Ring of Fire, meant the country was prone to earthquakes and other natural disasters. However nothing could be measured against what happened on 22 February 2011. It was cited as the fifth biggest insurance event in the world since 1953 and Treasury estimates later suggested the final bill would be as high as $40 billion.10 The Murchison earthquake in 1929 and the Napier earthquake of 1931, severe and similarly unparalleled in New Zealand in their day, were of a different complexity. Now, everyone was affected in some way. It didn’t matter what status you held, what you said on the census forms – European, Maori, Pacific, Indian, Chinese, other…. it didn’t matter whether you owned your own home, rented, leased, flatted with friends or were a tenant; whether you smoked or whether you owned a washing machine; whether you were married, single, divorced, in a civil union, with children, without children, responsible for older parents, a caregiver, or any of the above. It didn’t matter if you were a tourist or a resident. When the earthquake struck, everyone was instantly equalised except for location, extent of damage, whether insured or uninsured; a victim or a survivor.

While 4 September 2010 was traumatic and the damage serious, there was no loss of life and comparatively few people were injured. As Housing New Zealand staff said later, no one had any idea that something much worse was going to happen as it did on 22 February 2011. This time, it was very different. Accident Compensation Claims totalled 7,171 of which 46 per cent were immediate and 18 per cent were related subsequent to the event.11 Thousands of homes were severely damaged. Thousands would have to be demolished. Estimates of liquefaction in the city’s eastern suburbs alone were between 350,000 and 500,000 tonnes. Estimates of the total volume of liquefied silt in Greater Christchurch exceeded 900,000 tonnes.12 Huge rocks catapulted down the Port Hills, splitting into fractions as they moved and sliced through properties on their way. No-one felt safe.

Television and social media gave New Zealanders and the rest of the world an immediate and intimate view of the impact the earthquakes had on residents, houses, streets, commercial and retail buildings in those first few hours – the flames, the smoke, the twisted metal, the distorted roofs, the shattered tiles, the caved-in walls, the smashed windows, the crushed vehicles, wet stinking mud

10 ‘Four Years On: Insurance and the Canterbury Earthquakes’ Deloitte Access Economics Report for Vero, February 2015.11 Review of the Civil Defence Emergency Management Response to the 22 February 2011 earthquake, 29 June 2012.12 International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction Vol 14 Part 1, Dec 2015, pp 6-14.

11Introduction

inside and outside people’s homes, the awfulness of waiting to learn whether a husband, a wife, a child, an aunt, an uncle, a cousin, a friend was injured, alive or dead. The search and rescue crews, the helicopters, the army, the navy, the police. On television, it was dramatic, horrific, and awful. In real time, it was much, much worse. Living the nightmare, hour on hour, the ground groaning, heaving, causing thick, grey sludge to gush from the earth, sirens wailing, dazed people, injured people, cars in gridlock, parents trying to get to nurseries, pre-school, primary school, secondary school, to find their children; teachers lining up their charges out in the playing fields, away from the buildings, checking rolls, checking numbers, and all the while, the relentless movement beneath their feet – the graunching of the tectonic plates, rock against rock, hundreds of kilometres underground, yet seemingly so close. The smell of it; the smoke; the ash.

An emergency triage centre and field hospital was created at Latimer Square where the injured were treated before being ferried to hospital. Several hundred more people turned up at the Bealey Medical Centre where lists of names were taken and people assessed for injuries. The army drove in vans converted into temporary ambulances, searching the streets for anyone needing help. Before nightfall, when drizzle had turned to rain, and the city was now closed to traffic, one of the canvas marquees already set up in Hagley Park for the planned flower festival was converted into an emergency shelter. Wooden planks were placed in front of the entrance because of the mud. Hundreds of people streamed into the tent, registered by emergency personnel with notepads and pens. Hot tea and biscuits were provided and grey woollen blankets distributed.

Fonterra tanks drove through the night laden with precious drinking water. The naval vessel HMNZS Canterbury, was a haven for the Lyttelton community, isolated and damaged, cut off from the rest of the region. In those first few hours, it was chaotic. Mobile phone companies were completely overwhelmed and often failed. Landlines worked but only if they were operating on the old system. Trying to find out what was happening to anyone was hopelessly difficult.

Later, we would learn how many people had left Christchurch by car, by plane, any way they could. Television cameras followed Prime Minister John Key, sombre in his hard hat and his high visibility jacket, together with Christchurch Mayor Bob Parker, making carefully worded statements with the silent translator alongside miming for the deaf. We were resilient, everyone said. We were stoic in the face of disaster. We would recover.

International research suggests that communities should be fully engaged and involved in recovery; that the people should decide how recovery should be implemented and what recovery should look like. While Selwyn and Waimakariri District Councils did exactly that in the aftermath of the 4 September 2010 earthquake, Christchurch City had adopted a different approach which was often viewed negatively by residents and businesses alike. The recovery process was too slow. It was being driven by politics not by the people. This time, after 22 February, it had to be better. It had to be done differently.

Helen Clark said recovery can be an opportunity for change and that opportunity should be seized. The problem was how. For the first few days it was all about rescue. Then recovery. A temporary mortuary was established at Burnham Military Camp, some 32 kilometres south from Christchurch on the main road. Teams of forensic experts flew in from across the globe to assist with the identification process. It was slow, painstaking work. In the first few


days, names of people who had died were read out by Dave Cliff, the Police Superintendent. They were printed in the press, repeated on radio and television and messaged via social media around the globe. For the people who had been killed weren’t all New Zealanders. They were South Koreans, Japanese, Israelis, Thais, people from the Philippines, China, Canada, Ireland, Malaysia, Peru, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Taiwan, Turkey and the United States of America. They were students, tourists, temporary residents, visitors who happened to be here on the day. Television crews from all over the world flooded in to Christchurch.

One week after the disaster, at 12.51pm on 29 February 2011, there was a minute’s silence across the country. It was an opportunity for everyone to pause and reflect on what had happened the week before. Not that we were yet fully acquainted with the facts. We were in a state of national civil defence emergency that wouldn’t end until 30 April 2011. John Hamilton was the National Civil Defence Controller. His first lieutenant was Steve Brazier. They were supported by a highly efficient, well organised, small team who based themselves on the first floor of the Christchurch Art Gallery which had been designated the National Civil Defence HQ. The ground floor, cleared of all its art; its paintings, glassworks, lithographs, sculptures and statues, resembled a European train station permanently operating at peak hour.

People came and went; signed in and signed out; collected their hand sanitiser and their water bottles and wrote their names on them in bold pen. There was a canvas marquee outside the main doors which was the designated media tent. On Gloucester Street, just past the Montreal Street corner there was a large cumbersome, multi-wheeled vehicle containing a suite of toilets and dubbed the Royal Flush. Up the short flight of steps – women to the right; men to the left. Otherwise, there was no running water in the building, no sanitation; generators provided much needed electricity. Every space in the building was filled with people; trestle tables had been hastily erected with folding chairs and computer terminals. Pieces of paper were taped to walls, reminders of the date and the day. It was so easy to become immune to both. When the floor shook and the lights flickered, the magnitude of the latest quake was a guessing game, bringing a touch of humour to an otherwise grim situation. Geonet became the most popular website.

Civil Defence HQ was out of bounds to everyone except those with passes – Civil Defence staff, the search and rescue teams, Christchurch City Council personnel, other local authority staff, teams from several Government Departments like housing, health, education, local authority councillors, Members of Parliament, and the kitchen crews who prepared meals to be eaten on site or to be taken away in brown paper bags by those who were working off-site. Media crews came inside for the regular updates, held in the Auditorium. HQ was like a military machine, precise in its structure, organised in its shifts. For the first few weeks it operated on a 24 hour basis. There were large maps tacked on walls; temporary signs in front of desks to indicate who was sitting there, and what organisation they represented.

The whole block was within the CBD’s red zone which stretched from Bealey Avenue to Moorhouse Avenue, from Barbadoes Street to Rolleston Avenue. The red zone included most of Christchurch’s law firms, accountants, businesses, retailers, hotels and cafes which had occupied streets that were now out of bounds. It included the Arts Centre, the Museum, Cathedral Square and Victoria Square where the red lanterns from the Chinese New Year’s festival

13Introduction

were still hanging. It was bleak, frightening and it stank of putrescible waste. There were torn verandahs, broken windows, buildings on angles, street lamps dangling precariously on the end of posts. The Hotel Grand Chancellor was the worst. Access to the red zone was controlled at various points using personnel from the New Zealand Defence Force, the Singapore Army, New Zealand and Australian Police. Business people who wanted access to their buildings to retrieve files and important documents became frustrated and angry at being locked out. Many residents quietly continued to live within the confines of the red zone, slipping unobserved in and out of the cordon.

The priorities were to make sure that people were safe, that people’s homes were secure, that there was access for health professionals, for the distribution of portable toilets in areas where sanitation was at risk; for the distribution of water, for information. Access to information was paramount. But how to achieve it? While the rest of New Zealand could watch what was happening on television in living rooms, in bars, in club-rooms, thousands of Christchurch residents were without power. They were without sanitation. Their local supermarket was closed because of quake damage. Their local petrol station was closed because of quake damage. Their street overflowed with water because the mains had ruptured somewhere in their neighbourhood. Schools were closed.

Slowly, gradually, the scale of the disaster became apparent. There were competing priorities – had everyone been accounted for; should elderly and vulnerable people be moved out of Christchurch; at what stage should children should return to school; how could businesses operate and from where? Families whose homes were red-stickered needed to find somewhere else to live. Telephones needed to be reconnected. Power needed to be restored. Insurers needed to reassure property owners that they would be covered. Staff needed to be paid wages. Everything was a priority. Who was responsible for making decisions? How were the decisions being made? Why were the decisions being made? Did anyone have the energy to question the decisions anyway?

The student army13 once again gathered its cohort of volunteers, collected wheelbarrows and shovels and started cleaning up. The farmy army14 rolled in from the country with tractors and trucks and started cleaning up. Food arrived in lorries from other parts of New Zealand. Necessities were flown in or sent by train. The central city (as was), was out of bounds for everyone except those who had a reason to be there. The streets were sealed off and patrolled by army personnel. There were military tanks on some corners.

There was an urgent need to communicate with people, to tell them what was happening and where they could go to get information. The National Controller’s public information management team (PIM) had combined forces with the Christchurch City Council’s communications team and together they covered the essentials of media liaison, organising media conferences, web and social media, community engagement, stakeholder relations, the public call centre, hosting VIPs, advertising, publications, and inter-agency communications and keeping elected representatives locally and nationally informed. There was a direct link to the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC) and to the Beehive.

13 Founded by entrepreneur Sam Johnson, the student army first formed from a Facebook invitation to students following the September earthquake; it expanded its voluntary operation after the 22 February 2011 earthquake. 14 The ‘farmy’ army was a coordinated group of farmers and other rural people set up by Federated Farmers who came to the rescue, helping with removal of mud and sludge from people’s properties particularly in the eastern suburbs.


Locally, community meetings were organised by John Hamilton’s team with Bob Parker, supported by the City Council, the Earthquake Commission, police, public health and social services. They were organised quickly, efficiently, with leaflets dropped into mailboxes, covering the east and the hills. The rivers and streams that flow through Christchurch were polluted with the breakdown of the sanitation system. There were concerns that residents might get infections or diseases. All water should be boiled. No-one should fish in the Avon or Heathcote Rivers. The estuary had risen; the Port Hills had risen; bridges had twisted and risen or collapsed; roads had collapsed; sumps had appeared. And there was liquefaction, masses of liquefaction that dried in the sun and dredged into mud heaps when it rained.

Organising portable toilets for the worst affected suburbs became an ongoing problem. Where should they be located where they would be of greatest benefit? They were positioned on street verges and were monitored and cleaned on a regular basis. They were difficult for older people, sick people; people who had mobility problems. There were still some portable toilets in the eastern suburbs left over from the September quake. Many people continued to use their house toilets even though they knew someone else further down the street would be the recipient of their raw sewage on their front lawn, through their flower beds, into their vegetable gardens. Then came the slew of chemical toilets that people could use inside. They came with instructions, distributed by the army, street by street in the worst affected suburbs. Bob Parker demonstrated how they could be used. Large round green tanks were placed where they could (in theory) be easily accessed because these camp loos needed to be emptied. This was always going to be a significant issue for people with disabilities.

The day after the earthquake, power had been restored to 50 per cent of the city but by the fourth day, 42,000 households were still without electricity. For 550 homes in the eastern suburbs there was no power for weeks. Local politicians were bombarded with frustrated residents. Every issue was huge and often insurmountable. What could politicians do that residents couldn’t do for themselves?

In the first few weeks, the Canterbury Members of Parliament met every second day with John Hamilton and a team of staff from local authorities and Government agencies who could try and answer their questions. Gradually, a structure and a process was established with MPs identifying the issues to be dealt with ahead of the meeting. They were always about toilets, sanitation, water, electricity, schooling, and access to information. Always access to information. Web-based information wasn’t necessarily a practical solution because so many people who were directly affected didn’t yet have power, or they didn’t own computers. An estimated 30 per cent of householders in Christchurch had no access to the internet at home. Distributing leaflets took time. Using community networks was one option as was inviting support from mainstream media who were always hungry for information. Social media was swift and effective but not yet structured into something that could be used and authenticated although within a comparatively short time, Facebook and Twitter became key components of communicating information. National and commercial radio remained the one constant factor together with local print media.

While the emergency phase continued through March and into April, the education system created its own change management by introducing co-location – buddying schools that had closed with those that were still functioning. It was

15Introduction

a clever, innovative system whereby students were taken by bus to an identified school and teaching hours were changed to accommodate the influx. It wasn’t easy for the newcomers or for the existing students. It wasn’t easy for the staff. After-school activities that often kept students occupied while their parents worked were either cancelled or changed. Sports grounds were damaged and unusable. Community centres were closed. Libraries were closed. It was hard for everyone, harder for families who lived in rented accommodation, who were isolated from their routines and their neighbourhoods. It was harder for people who relied on welfare, who lived on benefits, who no longer had a local bus, whose medical centre had closed, whose dentist had moved. It was hard for the frail and the elderly who usually relied on their community carers, their meals being delivered and on friendly neighbours.

On 30 April 2011, the state of emergency was lifted. But it was never going to be a return to the status quo. Earlier in the month, the Government had announced the creation of CERA – the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority - a quasi-Government Department, with a five-year shelf-life, which would be based in Christchurch and which would be responsible for coordinating the recovery, working alongside the Canterbury local authorities – Christchurch City Council, Waimakariri District Council, Selwyn District Council and the Canterbury Regional Council. The provisions of the CER Act were clearly described – ‘to provide appropriate measures to ensure that Greater Christchurch and the councils and their communities respond to, and recover from, the impacts of the Canterbury earthquakes; to enable community participation in the planning of the recovery of affected communities without impeding a focused, timely, and expedited recovery; to provide for the Minister and CERA to ensure that recovery; to enable information to be gathered about any land, structure, or infrastructure affected by the Canterbury earthquakes; to facilitate, coordinate, and direct the planning, rebuilding, and recovery of affected communities including the repair and rebuilding of land, infrastructure and other property; to restore the social, economic, culture and environmental well-being of Greater Christchurch communities; to provide adequate statutory power for the purposes stated.’15

A recovery strategy was to be developed and implemented as soon as possible.The process of earthquake recovery presented a massive opportunity for

implementing change in social, economic, culture and environmental areas. In social housing, this was soon apparent with 95 per cent of Housing New Zealand’s properties damaged, hundreds of them seriously. Social housing was the responsibility of the Government and local authorities. State housing was the invention of the Labour Government in 1930s New Zealand. It was one of the outcomes of the ‘cradle to the grave’ concept of social welfare. Generations of families lived in state houses. They regarded them as their own homes. Pre-quake, there were 6,127 such houses in Canterbury, the majority of them in scattered pockets throughout Christchurch, many in the city’s eastern suburbs, some in Kaiapoi and Rangiora and a handful further afield in Cheviot.

State housing in New Zealand although nothing like the tenement blocks in England and Scotland, nonetheless attracted its own stigma. Academic researchers and government analysts identified the reasons why and produced their own suggestions for improvements – for change. But in normal circumstances, change is slow to take effect. It needs a sharp jolt to have impact.

15 Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act, 2011.


The earthquakes created that jolt and provided Housing New Zealand with the opportunity to do it differently; to do it better.

………………………………….

To understand the complexity of the change required, it is necessary to understand the machinery of Government and bureaucracy that influence attitudes and abilities to implement change strategies. Housing New Zealand is a Statutory Corporation, not a Ministry or a Government Department or a Crown Agency.16 It has a Chief Executive who is responsible to a Board which in turn is responsible to a designated Cabinet Minister. At the time of the earthquakes, Housing New Zealand’s Chairman was Alan Jackson; its Chief Executive was Lesley McTurk. They were both experienced in the nuances of the public and the private sectors. The Board reported to the Minister of Housing, Phil Heatley. The head office was located in Wellington; there was a large secondary office in Auckland and another one of similar size in Christchurch. There were smaller offices in most other towns in New Zealand which were principally involved in maintaining contact with tenants and managing tenant issues. The Wellington and Auckland offices housed the policy makers and the strategists, the staff responsible for the organisation’s finances, budget management, housing repairs and maintenance, and replacement as required.

Social housing for workers had started in 1905 under the Liberal Prime Minister Richard John Seddon (King Dick) who, with his knowledge of municipal housing schemes in Britain, initiated the first worker dwellings in New Zealand. The purpose was to provide urban workers with low-cost housing. Although it wasn’t a major initiative, it represented an attempt to ‘raise the standard of suburban development and to provide diligent workers and their families with affordable good-quality accommodation.’17 Yet, it wasn’t until the Labour Government under Michael Joseph Savage, that state housing became part of the New Zealand psyche. It was during the Great Depression in the mid-1930s. The country’s housing problems had become acute. A national housing survey investigated 225,363 households and found that 83,000 people lived in overcrowded or substandard dwellings. There was an estimated shortage of 20,000 houses in addition to the 6,000 -7,000 needed to cater for annual population growth.18 The Under-Secretary for Housing at the time, John A. Lee, was responsible for securing several hundred acres of suburban land throughout the country and he contracted private carpenters, electricians, plumbers, plasterers and painters to build thousands of new homes. They were constructed of brick or timber, sometimes single storeyed, often double-storeyed, on large quarter-acre sections with room for a vegetable garden at the back, grassed play areas for children and flower beds at the front. They were to

16 Housing New Zealand Annual Report 2014/15: Housing New Zealand Corporation is a Statutory Corporation. The relevant legislation governing the operations of HNZC and its subsidiaries (the HNZC Group) is the Crown Entities Act (2004) and the Housing Corpora-tion Act (1974).17 Michael King , ‘The Penguin History of New Zealand’ p 270.18 Hamish Keith, ‘The state builds houses for the workers’ Readers’ Digest New Zealand Yes-terdays, David Bateman, 2001.

17Introduction

be, declared Finance Minister Walter Nash, ‘a home fit for a Cabinet Minister.’19 In his 1936 budget, Walter Nash announced that 5,000 state rental houses

would be built at a cost of £3 million. The houses would be built by private enterprise; a new Department of Housing Construction would oversee the building and the State Advances Corporation would manage them.20 Building so many houses would not only resolve what was becoming a major housing crisis, but it would provide work for the unemployed. State houses would raise the standard of New Zealand housing and give tenants security of tenure equal to home ownership. Tenants could stay in their own homes indefinitely provided they met the terms of their lease.21

One of the earliest state houses in Christchurch was built in Beanland Avenue, named after the Mayor of the city, John Beanland. The Government had acquired market gardening land in the heart of Spreydon where it developed 61 houses on Windsor Crescent and Beanland Avenue. Construction began in 1937 and the first house was completed at 16 Beanland Avenue a year later. Number 57 Windsor Crescent was completed shortly afterwards. An official opening to mark the first completed state houses was held on 24 January 1938. Mabel Howard, the local MP, the Mayor John Beanland and other dignitaries attended the event. By September the same year, all 61 houses had been completed and tenanted.

Housing construction stalled for the duration of World War II, understandably with so many men serving overseas, but from 1944 onwards, 10,000 state houses were being built throughout the country every year. Sometimes single homes, sometimes blocks of flats. In Christchurch, houses were built in Riccarton, Ilam, Bryndwr, Hoon Hay, Hornby, Mairehau, Shirley, Aranui and Avonside. Different styles of houses were built – detached family homes, single and two storeyed houses and blocks of flats.

In Riccarton for example, the Government bought a block of land for state housing which was owned by the New Zealand Metropolitan Trotting Club. A grocery store, Plunket clinic, parks and reserves were integral design features of the English Garden City planning model adopted by the Department of Housing Construction’s chief architect Gordon Wilson. ‘Visually varied and yet coherent in their design and placement within the subdivision, the buildings were clad in both historic and more modern styles.’22

In 1956, the Government announced another scheme for state housing. At least 400 houses were to be built on an area of just over 128 acres near Lake Bryndwr, south of Wairakei Road and north-west of Graham’s Road. A school site, a shopping area and a reserve were planned. Kendal School opened on 27 February 1962. Provision was made for a shopping site opposite the school gates. At this time, Bryndwr was one of the most rapidly growing areas in New Zealand.

Otara Street in Fendalton was another state housing area. Further blocks of state houses were built in the heart of Fendalton in Thornycroft Street and on the north side of Glandovey Road.

19 Michael King , ‘The Penguin History of New Zealand’ p 357. 20 Ben Schrader, ‘We Call It Home’; a history of state housing in New Zealand’ Reed Publish-ing Ltd 2005, p3521 ibid22 Amanda Ohs, Christchurch City Council February 2013.


Population shifts within New Zealand contributed to the frequent changes in state housing policies.23 In 1996, a Home Buy scheme was introduced to help state tenants buy their homes. At the same time state houses were bought and sold depending on the market, the location and the need to maintain and increase the supply of available houses. The decision to sell houses in more affluent areas at a high price in order to build more in less expensive suburbs was seen as prudent by supporters and shameful by detractors. It was always going to be part of the discourse on home owner versus home renter that existed in New Zealand and in many ways contributed to the early decisions in the wake of the Canterbury earthquakes, that a more balanced community should be developed rather than continuing to build clusters of state owned properties.

By 2010, there were 69,000 state houses throughout New Zealand owned and managed by Housing New Zealand. They were available for families and individuals in need; they housed new refugees and they also included safe havens for women and children who suffered from domestic abuse; for people who suffered psychological and physical disabilities; in other words for the community’s most vulnerable.

Over decades, while the external issues surrounding state housing continued to gain column inches, there were ongoing changes in the organisation’s management structure that received less or no publicity. The first Housing Corporation was formed in 1974 resulting from a merger between the State Advances Corporation and the Housing Division of the Ministry of Works. It remained in place until 2001 when the Housing Corporation was joined with part of the Ministry of Social Policy to combine policy and administration under one umbrella known as the Housing New Zealand Corporation. With the merger came the initiative of community renewal to build networks amongst state tenants and community groups, designed to reduce crime and improve safety and local services. The Corporation expanded its range of services to accommodate the development of its assets, improve the repair and maintenance of state owned properties, and at the same time expand and improve its tenancy services. Governments changed hands, policy makers changed over time, but there remained a strong core of Housing New Zealand staff – they provided the organisation with its history and its memory.

In 2011, Housing New Zealand was formalised as a statutory Corporation, a Crown Agency to provide housing services for New Zealanders in need. Its former role as principal advisor to the Government on housing was transferred to the Department of Building and Housing. As part of a major change in 2012, that Department merged into the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment. From July 2011, Housing New Zealand’s primary goal was redefined to provide social housing for those in greatest need. It was a radical shift away from the ‘state house for life’ approach of the 1930s towards providing housing for people in need for the duration of that need.

While change management was an inevitable consequence of contemporary housing needs throughout New Zealand, nowhere was there a more immediate need than in Canterbury.

………………………………….

23 Information provided by Natalie Cadenhead, CERA’s Heritage Researcher, February 2013.

19Introduction

The earthquakes turned everything on its head. Literally; figuratively. Finding temporary accommodation for tenants who needed to be moved was an urgent problem. There was scant available housing in the city. Waiting lists were already long, not only for state tenants but for local authority tenants as well. Communities were dislocated; tenants suffered together with everyone else. The tenants were a mix of families, individuals, single parent households, and refugees. There were language barriers; vulnerable tenants; tenants with disabilities and the elderly. It wasn’t possible to confirm the number of tenants who left Christchurch immediately following the February 2011 earthquake – in part because there was no way of tenants being able to alert their tenancy manager, and in part because for the many thousands of residents who left the city, their imperative was to get away. As a result there were broad assumptions about minimum and maximum numbers – varying from 8,500 to 10,500 and more. It would take months before Statistics New Zealand could more accurately determine the numbers by using telephone statistics and changes in postal addresses.

There were competing priorities. Housing New Zealand was well insured, however assessing damage and putting a value on damage, repair and/or replacement was going to be a long slow process. On 22 February 2011, it was still finalising the insurance claim from the 4 September 2010 quake. It was in the midst of a substantial repair programme resulting from the September quake. The Corporation put in place its own assessment team based in Christchurch and responsible for liaising with the loss adjustors engaged by the principal insurance company Vero, which acted on behalf of more than 20 other international insurers. Their task was complicated by the degree of damage, whether a house should be demolished or repaired, the age of the house and its location. The Corporation’s insurance assessment team was also liaising with the Earthquake Commission (EQC). It was becoming clear that the outcome of both independent and public insurance claims was going to take many months.

Location became an important aspect of assessment with the Government’s announcement of the residential red zones on Thursday 23 June 2011. Some areas of Christchurch and Kaiapoi would be declared unusable for houses; the land was too unstable.

John Key and the Minister for Earthquake Recovery Gerry Brownlee,24 joined the newly appointed CERA Chief Executive Roger Sutton and geotechnical experts from Tonkin & Taylor to outline and explain their decisions. The Christchurch Art Gallery was still being used by City Council staff while the civic offices in Hereford Street were being repaired. The Gallery’s auditorium which had been the main venue for media conferences in the immediate aftermath of the February earthquake, would be used again for the Prime Minister to announce the new land zones to waiting media. One of the large gallery spaces upstairs would be used to tell MPs, local authority councillors, Environment Canterbury’s commissioners, representatives of the community and interest groups about the same. It was a well-planned announcement with maps highlighting the zones, engineers on hand to respond to questions and supporting handouts.

24 Gerry Brownlee, National MP for Ilam, Christchurch.


Several thousand property owners were affected throughout Greater Christchurch with land being designated according to its level of damage. Land was colour coded according to the severity of the damage – green if it was safe, orange if a decision was yet to be made and red if it was severely damaged and therefore no longer suitable for housing. The hills around the city were zoned white because the impact of rock fall and land slips had yet to be determined.

Housing New Zealand was directly affected by the designated red zones which covered large swathes of the Christchurch eastern suburbs, isolated pockets in other parts of the city and in the town of Kaiapoi. The announcement had followed several months of land assessments by teams of geo-technical scientists and peer-reviewed by international experts. The result was that 5,000 properties were no longer deemed safe for people to live.25 At an average household of two adults and two children, it meant that potentially 20,000 people would be looking for another place to live.

The Prime Minister put the situation into financial perspective: ‘Treasury has estimated the combined cost of the first two Canterbury earthquakes to be equivalent to about 8 per cent of New Zealand’s GDP. Damage from the 1995 Kobe earthquake in Japan was just over 2 per cent of Japan’s GDP, Hurricane Katrina in 2005 cost about 1 per cent of US GDP, and the Japanese March earthquake and tsunami disaster was an estimated 3-5 per cent of Japan’s GDP.’26

Everyone wanted to know what would happen next. During the week following the announcements, public meetings were held in the most affected suburbs of Christchurch, then in Rangiora and in Kaiapoi to explain the decisions, the technical complexities of the land as a result of the earthquakes and the Government’s decision to buy the affected properties from their owners within a specified period. Government departments and agencies affected by the zoning, like Housing New Zealand, had to make their own decisions about their properties. They weren’t included in the buy-out offer. There were 211 state houses in the city’s designated red zones including 17 in Kaiapoi that urgently needed to be assessed for their insurance value and assessed as to whether they could be located elsewhere. However nothing moved swiftly. The task was too big; it was always going to take time.

Even so, there was some criticism that Housing New Zealand was moving too slowly, that it was more concerned with getting the insurance issues resolved instead of getting on with the business of repairing and rebuilding its housing stock in the region. Certainly the Government thought so. There was frequent coverage in the media about homeless families, about people living in tents, in cars and in garages, about crowded houses, about the potential for diseases. There was anxiety that with winter approaching, more needed to be done. Because so many tenants lived in the eastern suburbs, recognised as being the worst affected, there was increasing pressure to make more progress.

………………………………….

In fact, before 4 September 2010, Christchurch and Kaiapoi residents knew surprisingly little about the land on which their homes were built. Drainage

25 The final number of residential red zoned properties was 7,900. 26 Government outlines next steps for people of Canterbury, 23 June 2011.

21Introduction

was a local authority problem; if there was information available, not everyone was aware of it, or knew where to go to find out. Potential home owners made assumptions that the land available for construction was sound. Apparently there were details about the propensity for liquefaction on individual LIM reports27, but how many home owners checked or knew exactly what it was? Liquefaction, like ‘munted’ was part of the new Canterbury lexicon.

The reality was that Christchurch had been built on a swamp. From time to time there had been criticism of the first surveyor Captain Joseph Thomas who, in 1848, had determined where the town would be sited. He favoured the existing location rather than Gebbies Flat or Port Cooper as Lyttelton was known at the time, because of the gentle-flowing Avon River and the availability of large tracts of flat land for building. The Canterbury Association wanted 1,000 acres of land available for the new settlement. The plains seemed more suitable than rolling downs or hills and valleys. By all accounts, he was also influenced by the Deans brothers who were already well settled in the area and who wrote invitingly of the opportunities.

A Christchurch woman, Agnes Hercus, writing her MA thesis in 1948 was particularly aggrieved, commenting that Captain Thomas’ decision for future generations showed a ‘lamentable lack of insight into problems which he was creating by attempting to build a city upon a flat site, a large part of which was nothing but swamp.’28

Descriptions of Christchurch’s early development painted a picture of flat, low-lying, countryside with tussocks, peat swamps, marshes, sand dunes, gullies and shingle lobes, of severe drainage problems and floods. There were other descriptions of low-level housing in suburbs like Addington, Spreydon, Sydenham and Linwood where the town’s poor lived in sub-standard accommodation and where sickness and disease flourished. In the 1970s, an American engineer who was brought out to investigate odour problems at the sewerage treatment works, noted that Christchurch had been built on a marsh. ‘The original setting of Christchurch is a particularly difficult one from a sewerage and drainage point of view,’29 he commented.

If they knew little about the geotechnical facts of their properties, Christchurch residents knew even less about the potential for earthquakes. Who knew, for example, about the one in 1869 near New Brighton which had damaged the spire of St John’s Church in Hereford Street, or the one at Castle Hill in 1881 which damaged stone buildings in Christchurch including the spire of the ChristChurch Cathedral. Then there was the 7.0 quake that struck the Amuri district in 1888. This time, the top 7.8 metres of the stone spire on ChristChurch Cathedral had collapsed. The Methodist Church in Durham Street sustained damage as did the Christchurch Normal School in Cranmer Square. The Cheviot earthquake in 1901 again damaged the Cathedral’s spire. Now, the stone construction was replaced with Australian hardwood covered with copper sheeting. There were also early reports of liquefaction in some parts of Kaiapoi.

27 LIM – Land Information Memorandum; a report provided by a local authority which details relevant data held by the authority about the property.28 Agnes Isabel Hercus, ‘A city built upon a swamp: the story of the drainage of Christchurch, 1850-1903 with epilogue’ 1903-1936. MA Thesis 1942. Publisher Christchurch Drainage Board. Whitcombe & Tombs29 John Wilson, ‘Christchurch Swamp to City; A short history of the Christchurch Drainage Board 1875-1989’ Te Waihora Press. Christchurch Drainage Board p 11.


Was there a propensity for earthquakes in Canterbury? Some scientists and historians argued that there was. It just wasn’t as publicly acknowledged as Nelson, Wellington and Napier. From time to time, there were discussions about the need for greater reinforcing, particularly for public buildings to ensure public safety. Yet, everyone knew that New Zealand is an earthquake country. We weren’t called the ‘shaky isles’ without reason. The Building Act (2004) set out rules for buildings that posed a serious risk to people in the event of an earthquake. Management of these buildings was delegated to local authorities which were required to develop strategies that would also apply to heritage buildings. Unknown to most of us were the international conventions and agreements particularly the UNESCO convention of 1972 at which the protection and safeguarding of heritage buildings was prescribed.

Many scientists believed that the South Island’s fault line was on the verge of giving way. It would result in a more devastating earthquake than the earlier ones in Murchison, Napier or Inangahua. In a way, it was too complicated to comprehend.

After the 2010 and 2011 earthquakes, experts in seismic events crowded the media with their multiple versions about what happened. Writing in Scientific American, Larry Greenmeier quoted Robert Yeats, an Emeritus Professor of Geology at Oregon State University who said that the 4 September 2010 earthquake had ‘caught locals completely off-guard.’ He said the fault that had ruptured hadn’t done so in thousands of years. Professor Yeats said he had visited Canterbury, in the Darfield area. It was like ‘driving any place where it’s all flat. There are farms, but there is nothing that says here’s a fault.’ He cited the 1888 earthquake along the Hope fault. Much less was known about fault lines on the Canterbury Plains because no earthquake had happened in their historical record.30

The Royal Society of New Zealand, working with the Prime Minister’s Science Advisory Committee led by Sir Peter Gluckman, published its own account of what had happened, six months after the February quake. In response to the simple question: why didn’t scientists know about the faults that caused the two earthquakes, the Society said: ‘Prior to 4 September (2010), there were no surface signs of the Greendale Fault or the fault that generated the Lyttelton aftershock and there was no evidence for seismicity on these faults (i.e. foreshocks).’ They stated that it wasn’t unusual to have a six month gap between a magnitude 7.1 earthquake as happened on 4 September and a 6.3 aftershock as happened in February the following year. They went on to stress that the timing, location or magnitude of earthquakes couldn’t be predicted. Faults could be silent and unseen for many thousands of years before rupturing and causing damage.31

Before 4 September 2010, Christchurch was a comparatively peaceful city of approximately 400,000 people. It serviced an extensive agricultural hinterland, blessed with an abundance of clear water, green pastures, hot winds in summer and chilly nor-easterlies in winter. There were approximately 65,000 business enterprises in the Canterbury region employing approximately 335,000 people. The region contributed about $27 billion to the country’s GDP in

30 Scientific American: Interview with Professor Robert Yeats; Larry Greenmeier 22 Febru-ary 2011. The magazine was founded in 1845 and is published internationally in 18 different languages.31 Royal Society of New Zealand 2011.

23Introduction

2010. Christchurch was Canterbury’s capital city. It was an attractive city, a garden city, a university city. It was the gateway to the South Island’s many tourist destinations as well as creating its own.

There were local ructions from time to time; there were some concerns that the inner city was suffering as a consequence of the plethora of suburban malls; that there were too many empty commercial buildings in the central city; that there weren’t enough key workers living in and around the central city. There was no affordable housing in the inner city. There were several elegant apartments located around Hagley Park but they were too expensive for the average income earners. There was a major row about a proposal to build a music conservatorium in the central city. There was a pending local government election.

There were affluent people and beneficiaries and there were nearly 185,000 people employed by local businesses. There were several thousand bureaucrats working in Government offices based mainly in the central city, from ACC to Inland Revenue, from Education to Housing, Corrections to Conservation, Internal Affairs to Immigration, Customs to Culture and Heritage, Health to Social Development. In other words, most Departments and Ministries had branches in Christchurch. They were the people known in Wellington as the ‘permanent government’: they worked behind the scenes. They were often the butt of comedies and cartoons. They received more brickbats than bouquets. They were the organisers, the people who stood behind the cameras, not in front of them.

During the earthquakes of 4 September 2010 and 22 February 2011 and in their immediate aftermath, they made their own contribution to search and rescue teams, checking on the safety of families, of disabled and older people. They drove over rough roads and into damaged houses; they carried water and medical and food supplies. They had their own worries about family and accommodation; they had to find new temporary, alternative work premises. And in the months and years that followed and in the lead up to the fifth anniversary of the 22 February 2011 earthquake, they developed, continued, and completed the projects that had emanated as a result of the devastation and damage.

………………………………….

This book is about one such group - the staff at Housing New Zealand who first managed the state housing and the broader accommodation situation through the 2010 earthquake, working alongside other Government and related ad hoc departments and agencies. It is about the Canterbury staff and those who arrived to help from out of town, who lived and breathed civil defence, the response and then the recovery phases after the 2011 earthquakes. And, it is about those who were part of the Corporation’s Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Office, based in their modest offices on the corner of Manchester and St Asaph Streets, who set about repairing and rebuilding the state-owned houses located in and around Christchurch.

It is about the tenancy liaison staff who talked with tenants, explained what was happening, encouraged them, helped them when they had to move house or find alternative temporary accommodation. It is about the engineers, the


planners and project managers who liaised with other Government departments and agencies, with insurers, with Canterbury local authorities to get agreement on what needed to be done. It is about the architects and designers who organised the contracts with external suppliers to get the work done.

It is about innovation, about being tasked with making quick decisions, about being effective. It is about proving what smart thinking and imagination can achieve when freed from institutional constraints.

It is about the decision to co-locate with Arrow International Ltd and MWH Recovery, the two companies responsible for managing and repairing Housing New Zealand’s 5,000 quake-damaged properties. And, it is about the challenges of working in close proximity with private enterprise – benefitting from their expertise. It is about the team which worked alongside the Department of Corrections to set up the joint project to repair damaged homes creating new trades skills for prisoners. And it is about the staff who regularly met with community groups and organisations, often in the early morning or in the evening, who liaised with the Tenancy Protection Agency, faith-based groups, emergency services personnel, all working towards the same collective goal – to create a legacy of sustainable social housing in Canterbury – Te Manapou i te Haumanutanga o Waitaha.

It was complicated; it was difficult; it was complex; it was challenging. And it was achieved.

‘Cracks open and stuff flies up. Silt in dazzling fountains.

Grey stuff glitters in torch light. The paddock has become a garden of illuminations.’

Lines from

‘The Crack’ by Fiona Farrell32

32 Fiona Farrell, ‘The Broken Book’ Auckland University Press, 2011

PA R TO N E


Saturday, 4 September 2010, 4.36am

It was the dress rehearsal for the main event five months later, except no-one knew it at the time.

The magnitude 7.1 earthquake that rocked Canterbury at 4.36am on Saturday 4 September 2010 was a monstrous shock to everyone. Totally unexpected, it rattled sleeping households in the early hours of what would have normally been the start of a spring weekend. It lasted a ghastly, terrifying 45 seconds. It was dark. The power went off immediately which affected telephones as well as light. Mobile phone companies were quickly overloaded, preventing communication between families and friends. It was one of those earthquakes that prompted people to wonder whether it was the Alpine fault giving way, or perhaps the massive quake in Wellington that was always predicted. To discover it had actually happened in Canterbury added surprise to the earlier shock. Not that there was just one earthquake and then silence. There were waves of aftershocks that brought people tumbling into suburban streets; that frightened hotel guests; that concerned emergency services; that gave seismologists an immediate profile.

As dawn broke, it became apparent that there was substantial damage in central Christchurch, in the eastern suburbs, in rural areas and in the small town of Kaiapoi, 17 kilometres north of the city. Railway lines had buckled and twisted, rural bridges were severely damaged and extensive liquefaction had spread its ugly sludge up streets and through people’s homes.

The epicentre, Cantabrians were told later, was 37 kilometres to the west of Christchurch at Darfield. The earthquake was relatively shallow at a focal depth of only 10 kilometres, and, seismologists determined, had produced the strongest shaking ever recorded in New Zealand. Ground near the epicentre had moved up to 1.25 times the acceleration due to gravity.33 It cut a 28 kilometre east to west surface rupture through Selwyn District’s farmland. The quake, scientists explained, was the largest to affect a major urban area since the one in Napier, in 1931. It was certainly the largest experienced in Canterbury since European settlement in the 1840s. It occurred on a previously unidentified fault line and was labelled the ‘Greendale’ earthquake.

The extraordinary event made global headlines. But it had caused no deaths, and comparatively few injuries. Properties were damaged, mostly, it appeared at first glance, chimneys and concrete or brick fences. The Prime Minister told the BBC in London that the earthquake had caused damage to 100,000 of the 160,000 houses in the region. ‘I was awe-struck by the power of the earthquake and the damage it has caused in the city. It was miraculous that nobody was killed,’34 he said.

Kaiapoi, it was reported early, was badly affected. The Earthquake Commission (EQC) was quick to advise all property owners in Christchurch and Canterbury later that morning, to photograph damage, and where possible, to demolish or make safe any chimneys or fences that looked dangerous. They should make a note of what needed to be done.

It turned out to be a fine day, warm even. It was difficult to find food

33 Te Ara: The Encyclopaedia of New Zealand: Historic Earthquakes: p 12: the 2010 Canterbury (Darfield) earthquake.34 BBC News 6 September 2010.

27Part 1: Saturday, 4 September 2010, 4.36am

supplies because people rushed to stock up. Many supermarkets were closed because of spilled and broken foodstuffs besides which many were without power. Local dairies quickly sold out of essentials like torches, matches and milk. ATM machines were down. Even so, and with ongoing aftershocks, most residents, if initially scared and worried about what was happening, were relatively calm about the event. They checked on their neighbours; walked or drove to see relatives. They were, as was noted in later independent reports, calm, responsive and resilient.

At 9.50am the Mayor of Christchurch Bob Parker declared a state of emergency in the city. At 10am the Mayor of Selwyn District Kelvin Coe and the Mayor of Waimakariri District Ron Keating did the same, as was their statutory requirement. The reasons as prescribed in emergency management regulations, were to: ‘enable the closure of the Christchurch central business district, support the response, enhance public confidence, and take on evacuation powers in case of need.’35 At the same time the Kaiapoi town centre was also closed as were the Kairaki Beach and Pine Beach areas in the Waimakariri District. The formal Emergency Operations Centres were activated in Christchurch, Rangiora and Rolleston. In addition, the regional emergency centre was activated at the Canterbury Regional Council36 offices in Kilmore Street, not from necessity, because the three local authorities had separately declared a state of emergency covering their locations. There was no formal single state of emergency announced that covered the whole of Canterbury.

In Wellington, the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management (MCDEM) activated the Crisis Management Centre which is permanently located in the Beehive’s bunker. At the helm was the National Director of Civil Defence John Hamilton. John Carter was the Minister responsible for Civil Defence.

Three urban search and rescue task forces (USAR TF) were activated. A relief fund was quickly set up by the Red Cross to accept donations. A curfew was established in the Christchurch central city from 7pm to 7am. Central city buildings that were perceived to be unsafe were cordoned off.

There is an operational process for natural disasters which most members of the public know little about. It is written in manuals; step by step procedures; international standards that are applied; systems that are activated; trained personnel do what they have been trained to do. So it was for Christchurch and Canterbury in the hours and days that followed.

On Monday 6 September, Gerry Brownlee, the MP for the Ilam electorate in Christchurch, was announced as the Minister responsible for earthquake recovery. A special Cabinet Committee for the reconstruction of the region was set up on the same day. The New Zealand Defence Force was brought in to assist in the worst affected areas. On Tuesday 7 September, a wage support subsidy was announced for small businesses with fewer than 20 staff in Canterbury who couldn’t operate and were therefore unable to pay wages.

Aftershocks continued relentlessly with more than 3,000 sizeable events recorded in the following weeks including a significant magnitude 5.1 quake on Wednesday 8 September resulting in further damage to buildings, infrastructure and an increased level of public anxiety.

35 David Middleton, Richard Westlake, ‘Independent Review of the Response to the Canterbury Earthquake 4 September 2010’ May 2011. Commissioned by Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management.36 Canterbury Regional Council: Environment Canterbury or Ecan.

Image: The Christchurch Art Gallery which was the designated HQ for the duration of the Civil Defence emergency


On 11 September, the first locally organised collective group-level meeting was held. The meeting was chaired by the Chief Executive of Timaru District Council Warwick Isaacs37 and included representatives from the Ministry of Social Development (MSD), MCDEM, and the Chief Executives of Christchurch City Council, Selwyn and Waimakariri District Councils. The basis for the earthquake recovery should be the approach to disaster recovery as identified and outlined in the existing National Civil Defence Management Plan.

On Tuesday 14 September, the Canterbury Earthquake Response and Recovery Act 2010 became law. The purpose of the Bill was to ensure that the Government had adequate statutory power to assist with the response to the earthquake.38 The Act also required the establishment of a Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Commission to advise Ministers on the assignment of funding and resources allocated for recovery. The Commission, according to the Act, would be the contact point between central and local government in managing the recovery effort.39

On Wednesday 15 September, Minister Brownlee announced a programme for residents who had chimney damage as a result of the earthquake. They could make a claim and replace their fireplaces or log burners with new heaters and have the cost covered by the Earthquake Commission. (In all, some 26,000 chimneys were damaged.)

On 16 September at 12 noon, two weeks after the event, the Mayor of Christchurch Bob Parker lifted the state of emergency in Christchurch. The Mayors of Selwyn and Waimakariri Districts followed suit shortly afterwards. However, under the Canterbury Earthquake Response and Recovery Act, the state of emergency had already been extended through to the end of November by an Order in Council.

The dates of events and announcements formed the official chronology, creating a timeline that history would record later and would act as a basis for technical reports, parliamentary questions and research papers. Included in the commissioned reports after the event, were the other stories, like the formation of the Student Army which took to the affected suburbs with buckets and shovels following a Facebook request by coordinator Sam Johnson. Hundreds of university students joined forces in a concentrated effort to help shift sludge and mud.

Major emergencies have a management pattern that is laid down and prescribed. There are four generic phases used to describe natural disasters. In New Zealand the most important are reduction, readiness, response and recovery. Reduction means identifying and analysing long term risks to human life and property, taking steps to eliminate these risks if practicable and if not, reducing the magnitude of their impact and the likelihood of their occurring. Readiness is interpreted as developing operational systems and capabilities before a civil defence emergency happens, including self-help and response

37 Warwick Isaacs was later engaged by the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority and headed its Central City Development Unit (CCDU)38 NZ Parliamentary Support Research Papers: Canterbury earthquake timeline: Government’s and Parliament’s response. 9 November 2010.39 Earthquake Recovery Minister Gerry Brownlee appointed Murray Sherwin to chair the Commission. Its membership also comprised the Mayors of Christchurch, Selwyn and Waimakariri, Dame Margaret Bazley (Chair of Environment Canterbury), Arihia Bennett, and an engineer David Hopkins. In fact, as was noted in a later commissioned report of the 22 February 2011 earthquake, the Commission had little input during the recovery phase, or between the September and February events.

29Part 1: Saturday, 4 September 2010, 4.36am

programmes for the general public and specific programmes for emergency services, lifeline utilities and other agencies. Response means the actions taken immediately before, during or directly after a civil defence emergency to save lives and property, and to help communities recover. Recovery is the coordinated efforts and processes used to bring about the immediate, medium term and long term holistic regeneration of a community following a civil defence emergency.40

In the immediate aftermath of the pre-dawn earthquake there was no time to analyse the effectiveness in relation to the four specific phases. No-one questioned whether Christchurch, Canterbury or New Zealand was prepared for such an event, whether previously identified risks had been mitigated, whether in fact any risks had been previously identified. What the region and the Government did immediately and did well was the response phase and initiate the recovery phase. As analysts and researchers have identified over time, response and recovery phases tend to overlap. Recovery actually starts from the first day of the emergency.

There were several parallel strands to the recovery phase of the 4 September earthquake which covered politics (local and national), media whose purpose and role was to broadcast what was happening, emergency services including police, fire, ambulance, hospital staff and the thousands of people who worked behind the scenes including bureaucrats. Everyone who was in Canterbury on the day, had their own story to tell. It depended on where they were at the time.

Before daylight, emergency services personnel had donned boots, hard hats, high visibility jackets and started work.

40 Rachel Brookie, ‘Governing the Recovery from the Canterbury Earthquakes 2010-2011: the Debate over Institutional Design’ June 2012 Victoria University Institute for Governance & Policy Studies Working Paper, p 9.


1 Facing The Damage

Housing New Zealand was the owner of more than 6,000 properties in Christchurch and in the Waimakariri District. It was the largest landlord in Canterbury; the biggest owner of multiple individual dwellings. It looked after 18,000 tenants. It employed 50 staff across three offices in Christchurch – Papanui, Linwood and Aranui - and one in Rangiora where staff also looked after Kaiapoi. The Linwood office on Linwood Avenue, housed tenancy services and needs assessors plus case managers. They were responsible for the 3,000plus, state-owned properties in the eastern suburbs where, according to media reports, the bulk of the quake damage had occurred. Many were long term staff who knew their clients and understood their needs. They were the frontline in a national organisation whose backroom engine provided the facilities and the infrastructure. It naturally followed therefore, that in the event of a major disaster such as the September earthquake, Tenancy Services would take the lead.

Several staff operated out of the Aranui office in Marlow Road and in normal circumstances, were responsible for upgrading houses in the area working with the Aranui Community Trust (ACTIS). The central office was based in Papanui in Restell Street. It was the largest of the offices and housed the repair and maintenance teams, auditors and housing services for the areas other than the eastern suburbs as well as the regional office – the region covered Canterbury, Nelson and Marlborough. Like everyone else in the first 24 hours of the earthquake, the greatest priority was family, staff and tenants in that order. David Griffiths who was the Regional Manager (based in Christchurch) for the Corporation at the time, said it was chaotic. Organised yet chaotic. Christchurch, he said, became a tale of two cities.41 The eastern suburbs were directly affected while those in the north and north-west and in the hills appeared to be comparatively damage-free.

Mid-morning on 4 September, at the same time as the Christchurch state of emergency was announced, David Griffiths arranged to meet Bob Hardie,

41 David Griffiths, 15 January 2016

Image: The Aranui office at 34 Marlow Road

31Part 1: Chapter 1: Facing The Damage

the Housing Services Linwood Manager, at the city’s civil defence headquarters in the central city. Both had already contacted their senior staff and organised immediate checks on all other Canterbury-based staff to ensure their safety. Communication was complicated by overloaded mobile phones and an intermittent land line service, but David Griffiths was able to alert Lesley McTurk in Wellington. The Corporation had an emergency manual which outlined what to do in crisis situations, not that it was particularly useful, David Griffiths said. Priorities were always staff and tenants – therefore teams needed to be put in place to start the process. Tenants and properties – water, leaks and toilets. Even so, as Senior Design & Improvement Analyst Ian Gall said later, ‘because the earthquake was so unexpected, we were completely unprepared. Besides which, it was the weekend, and we had no idea during most of Saturday of the extent of the disaster.’42

Because of damage to the Christchurch City Council’s new civic offices in Hereford Street, and because the city’s civil defence headquarters were still located at the old (now unoccupied) Tuam Street offices,43 Mayor Parker quickly designated the new Christchurch Art Gallery as the city’s emergency response centre. Everyone who had a specific role in civil defence in Christchurch started to arrive. They assumed their roles of responsibility.

For several years, Housing New Zealand had been a partner in CSPIN – the Christchurch Social Policy Interagency Network – a group of staff from the Ministry of Social Development (MSD), Canterbury Police, the Canterbury District Health Board (CDHB) and the Corporation which met on a regular basis to discuss common issues. Housing New Zealand was also aligned with Canterbury’s Civil Defence organisation as a member of its Welfare Advisory Group with staff member Terry Wilson the Corporation’s representative. The Group’s formal role, according to the Emergency Management Plan was to ‘develop, document and implement integrated emergency welfare planning for the Canterbury area. The Group, always referred to as ‘WAG’, was responsible for identifying gaps in the coordination and delivery of welfare functions prior to and during emergencies and to address these through individual and multi-agency action.

What to do in an emergency and how WAG should function was a regular discussion point at meetings, and as a result when the earthquake happened, they had, at least in theory, an idea of what needed to be done. Emergency Welfare Centres, according to the Emergency Management Plan, are the point of contact for immediate welfare support, and provide an interface between the community and responding agencies. They are designed to provide a range of emergency welfare services such as temporary shelter, registration, finding accommodation, catering, first aid and providing information about the emergency, and response and recovery activities.44

It made sense therefore for David Griffiths and Bob Hardie to join other emergency services personnel and local authority teams in the central city. It made sense for them to organise the Corporation’s participation in the 24-hour roster at the Art Gallery and to contribute to the overall emergency response.

42 Ian Gall, 4 February 2016 43 The new civic offices had been open only one week before the 4 September 2010 earthquake hap-pened.44 David Middleton, Richard Westlake, ‘Independent Review of the Response to the Canterbury Earthquake 4 September 2010’ May 2011. Commissioned by Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management, p 36


Terry Wilson had attended meetings and courses on emergency management and was therefore the logical person to assist at the Art Gallery.

It was very frightening for everyone, he said. ‘Aftershocks continued all the time, and it was difficult to concentrate on what had to be done in the first day or so. Even though we had planned for a major event, it was very different when it actually happened.’45

Housing New Zealand’s role within the National Welfare Coordination Group (NWCG) was specifically defined - to take the lead in general housing response – not just social or state housing but across the housing spectrum. The Group’s membership knew one another and as a result, when the earthquake happened, they ‘kicked into action.’46

It was always going to be hard to know what was going on across the region without the collective knowledge that the NWCG could bring. The Christchurch Art Gallery was relatively easy to access and was designed to withstand major seismic events.47 It was a large concrete block building with a wide glass frontage spanning Montreal Street between Worcester Boulevard and Gloucester Street. It had a generous expanse of green lawn facing Montreal Street and there was a substantial storage and warehouse facility at the back. There was a large carpark beneath the building. The Gallery was located just across the Boulevard from the Christchurch City Council’s damaged civic offices and therefore comparatively easy for relocating both staff and equipment. David Griffiths and Bob Hardie were quickly joined by Michelle Mitchell Regional Commissioner for MSD and Chair of the Welfare Advisory Group. Carolyn Gallagher who was responsible for community services at the City Council arrived at the same time. Meanwhile Terry Wilson started telephoning Corporation staff in Christchurch asking for volunteers.

The Welfare Advisory Group established itself under the main stairwell to the right of the Gallery entrance. It was a dark area, not blessed with natural light and therefore quickly became known as the bunker. It wasn’t the best place to be when there was an aftershock, but, as Terry Wilson commented, everyone was in the same situation. Paintings and other artworks had to be moved and as Art Gallery staff arrived through the day, they took over the packing and storage. It was no longer the Christchurch Art Gallery. From now on it would be known as the city’s Civil Defence HQ. The first few days were confusing with some Corporation staff having identification and passes and others not; some staff had high visibility jackets and hard hats and others didn’t. The building was within the CBD’s cordoned area and therefore within the curfew zone as well.48

Reports started flowing in almost immediately about levels of damage to property, roads and bridges in the city, towns and rural areas. Liquefaction was a major problem in some areas, the impact of which in the longer term was yet to be determined. Critically, there was major damage to the city’s sewer lines. In Kaiapoi, the damage was devastating. Designated Welfare Centres were quickly set up – at the Addington Raceway, Burnside High School, Linwood College and the Kaiapoi Rugby Football clubrooms. A sector post was also established in Brooklands as an information centre. A 24-hour roster was compiled which

45 Terry Wilson, 4 February 2016.46 David Griffiths, 15 January 2016.47 Bob Parker, ‘Ripper Apart – a city in chaos’ Antares Publishing New Zealand, 2012.48 Grant Mackay: Report on the September Earthquake, February 2011.


included Housing New Zealand staff to ensure there was total day and night coverage at the Welfare Centres. Staff were equipped with food and water, with pens and paper and with maps.

Chief Executive Lesley McTurk telephoned David Griffiths from Wellington. Whatever he needed would be provided, she told him.49

………………………………….

David James was Housing New Zealand’s Contracts Manager for Maintenance for the South Island. ‘At daybreak (on the 4th) I managed to get through to SoG,50 our national repair and maintenance contractor and met them later in the morning at their Ferrymead office. We already had a crisis management plan and we agreed the safety of staff came first. I then went across town to Riccarton Road to one of our complexes which had reported a problem with water. Their water pipes had burst, and I spent most of Saturday there, trying to sort out the problem. The Corporation’s call centre in Wellington was overloaded with people ringing in, and because they knew that SoG managed our normal repairs, they referred the calls to the SoG office in Wellington which referred them back to Christchurch. It was a roundabout way of doing things, but in a crisis whatever works best is the way to go. We were reacting to the tenants’ calls.’51

Jeanette Gower, the Corporation’s Christchurch Area Manager, drove to Kaiapoi on Sunday 5 September. Together with Paul Cumming, the local manager, she trudged from door to door, checking on tenants. The town had been badly hit, she reported to David Griffiths.52 David James drove there on the same day to check on the Corporation’s properties. The problems were mainly drains and liquefaction. ‘There were springs bubbling up out of nowhere,’ he said. Sue Poasa, one of his team, had been on leave. She rang and said she was returning to work.

‘I rang the Dunedin maintenance contractors and asked them to send us a pallet of whatever they could find that would be useful – mainly plywood and tarpaulins,’ David James said. ‘They arrived over the weekend so we could start with urgent repairs on Monday. We all agreed if a tenant thought their house was unsafe and they could find alternative accommodation, they should move.’53

By the end of the weekend, Housing New Zealand staff started to arrive in Christchurch from other parts of the South Island, from Wellington and Auckland – volunteers who could assist with administration, help check on tenants, support rostered staff and start the lengthy task of identifying damage. They came from all units within the Corporation, recognising that management on the ground was the responsibility of the Tenancy Services team. Among them was Peter Wild, Housing New Zealand’s Compliance Manager who commented later that the time he spent in Christchurch was by far the hardest

49 David Griffiths, 15 January 2016.50 Switched On Group – acronym SoG51 David James, 4 May 2016.52 Jeanette Gower, 22 March 2016.53 ibid


working days he had experienced in his career.54 Insurance assessors from Vero and their appointed loss adjustors

Cunningham Lindsey swept into action. The Corporation was fortunate to have a long-established repairs and maintenance contract with Switched On Group, the owner of which was astute enough to recognise there would be a need for large amounts of plywood and he set about accessing as much as possible from throughout New Zealand.

Bob Hardie said later, his staff who covered the eastern suburbs knew and understood their community; they lived locally. The teams who arrived from out of town were able to take the load off local staff to enable them to continue the house to house visits, especially the elderly and the most vulnerable tenants.55

It was wonderful to have such support from outside Christchurch, Jeanette Gower said. ‘They were the fresh legs we needed.’56

Housing New Zealand moved swiftly to put emergency administrative arrangements in place which would cover the financial costs of the earthquake. Sarah Hill, who was Housing New Zealand’s Director of Operations for the Southern region, advised staff that systems were being put in place to monitor costs, to ensure travel and accommodation was coded correctly and that all repairs were appropriately identified in the Corporation’s IT system. It was important for insurance purposes; it was also important for the organisation to get as accurate a picture as possible about the financial cost and implications of the repair bill. Systems were also put in place to ensure tenants who left Christchurch were appropriately looked after. If they were housed by the Corporation somewhere other than Greater Christchurch, they were placed on 90 day fixed tenancies in order to give them security of tenure. Rent rebates, varying up to 50 per cent, were also put in place for a number of tenants who stayed in their homes, due to the extent of damage to infrastructure affecting water and sewerage services.57

Peter Wild took the lead for the initial property inspections. Working with the organisation’s local team, contractors and PQS58, he developed the initial scoping sheet that would satisfy insurers, identify initial health and safety work to enable tenants to stay on the property, identify where houses needed to be immediately evacuated and identify when a structural engineer’s assessment was required. It was important, he said, to link estimated costs to the items on the scoping sheets and to identify any additional support that tenants might require. ‘I had a small team working with me. A quality auditor Richard Walsh59, Phil London from PQS, Daniel Norrie the loss adjustor, the Corporation’s Health & Safety & Security Manager John Stubbe and Gavin Thwaites the Speedscan Manager.’

‘We were extremely lucky that we had only recently completed a generic scoping sheet for a property condition survey before the earthquakes happened. We had developed a process whereby we scanned the scoping sheet that turned the information into meta-data overnight. We used Speedscan, a company that had a mobile scanner which we could operate from the Papanui office. As a

54 Peter Wild, 23 March 2016.55 Bob Hardie, 20 January 2016.56 Jeanette Gower, 22 March 2016.57 Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Plan/Communications Strategy/Situation Analysis: Sarah Hill, Director of Operations, August 2011.58 PQS: Project Quality Solutions59 Richard Walsh was one of Housing New Zealand’s quality auditors. He died in 2015.

Image: Chimney damage was one of the biggest problems throughout

greater Christchurch


result, within two days of arriving in Christchurch, we could produce our first detailed report that included necessary information and progress for the local earthquake team, the insurers, our Chief Executive and her team, the Board and our Minister. The information could also be used to respond to media inquiries.’60

‘We had a team briefing in the Papanui office every morning at 8am,’ he said. At the meeting, the scoping sheets from the day before were circulated and discussed. They included as much information as could be gathered, as well as a dollar figure against every property that had been checked and assessed which helped for insurance purposes as well as for the eventual repair programme. ‘It also meant that other staff could read the sheets and comment on the information, making additions where possible. It was a total team effort.’

The data provided everyone with the list of inspections as they were completed, how many properties needed a structural engineer’s report, how many houses were condemned, levels of property damage and the estimated cost of repair, the number of health and safety jobs that had been assigned to contractors, the number of inspectors working in the field on any one day and the completed inspections in the different suburbs.

‘Part of the morning meeting included a health and safety briefing with the inspectors, which meant we could amend the scoping sheets, hear what they were experiencing, identify and clarify any potential risks, and get feedback on the welfare of our tenants, and of course, monitor our inspectors’ welfare because they were putting in long hours.’61

Within 48 hours of the earthquake, a report on Housing New Zealand’s immediate response was pulled together and sent to the Board and senior management. The organisation was under pressure to keep the Minister’s office informed. David Griffiths emailed the first of many messages out to local staff.

‘It has been a traumatic few days,’ he wrote. ‘I want to thank everyone who pulled together and worked so hard over the weekend. I am very proud of our team. We will continue feeling the impact of the earthquake for some time and I urge you all to take care and stay safe.’62 He included a reminder about not using lifts, staying away from glass partitions and windows, and when driving to be alert, to drive defensively and not to go into areas where there was a lot of damage unless there was good reason. He identified the five work streams that had been put in place to cover tenants, maintenance, assets, staff and Civil Defence. Finally, he commented on the Welfare Centres and their staffing arrangements. Civil Defence would continue to assess how long the Addington, Burnside and Linwood Centres would remain open. He asked for volunteers to help meet the Corporation’s responsibilities on the 24 hour roster from 2pm to 10pm, 10pm to 6am and 6am to 2pm. Staff who agreed to do a roster would be provided with taxi chits to ensure safe travel.

‘The earthquake has been frightening for all of us, and particularly our children. If you have any concerns please talk to your manager and you can also call the Employee Assistance Programme (EAP) at any time.’63

Housing New Zealand staff were working closely with Christchurch City Council and community organisations based at the city’s Civil Defence HQ

60 Peter Wild, 23 March 2016.61 ibid62 Email sent to Christchurch staff on 6 September 2010 by David Griffiths.63 ibid

Images: Cracks in ceilings and plasterwork were commonplace


and in the Welfare Centres. ‘So far, people who cannot occupy their homes who have sought assistance have been redirected to stay with friends and family. We have not yet had to provide accommodation directly to anyone. The condition of vacant properties is also being checked to see what may be available to be used, and what remedial work might be required.’64

In Wellington, additional staff had been brought in to help at the Corporation’s National Contact Centre which had been overwhelmed with calls from tenants affected by the earthquake. Communication was haphazard until a more defined system could be introduced. Between 8am on Saturday 4 September and 7am on Monday 6 September, 2,200 calls had been logged which was three times the normal volume. Most of the calls were about damage to chimneys. However there were also calls about structural issues such as decks falling away and roofing cavities being exposed, major cracking in walls, broken water cylinders flooding interiors and broken sewer pipes.

An immediate and cursory assessment of damage by Switched On Group reported that most of the problems were plumbing related, or damaged chimneys. The contractor’s crews were fully engaged securing chimneys and making properties safe and weather-tight. Switched On Group continued with the emergency repairs while the assessment teams progressed the bigger task of checking, completing the scoping sheets and organising structural engineers.

Housing New Zealand staff in Timaru and Ashburton had helped out with sourcing more plywood and tarpaulins. Most of the damage from initial inspections were concentrated in Avonside, Bexley, New Brighton and Kaiapoi where properties had suffered from severe liquefaction which had cracked house foundations and resulted in subsidence and broken sewers. ‘The main problems are based on where houses are located on unstable substrate. Even brand new homes have been affected in these areas. Houses on piles that were built in the 1940s to 1960s are badly affected. The liquefaction has caused upward pressure and cracked foundations, moved houses, caused houses to sink, sewer pipes to crack and water supply issues,’65 David Griffiths reported to Wellington.

On Monday 6 September, one of the Corporation’s solicitors Yazmin Juned, provided Sarah Hill and David Griffiths with legal advice about rent charges for uninhabitable properties. Following Sarah and David’s decision, rent abatements would be part of the process in the weeks and months to follow. The same day, the first of many conference calls was organised between the Christchurch and Wellington offices. Five staff were already on their way to Christchurch from Hamilton to provide backup and cover for the local teams. Even at this early stage with the severity of the earthquake not yet fully appreciated, Housing New Zealand staff reported that there would be a high demand for plumbers and builders in coming weeks and months, that pay rates would escalate as a result and that Vero and State Insurance companies were already contacting every tradesperson in Christchurch.

Three days after the earthquake, on Tuesday 7 September, a major progress report was sent to Wellington for distribution to the Housing Minister, Board and related Government departments. The focus, according to the report was on dealing with subsidence issues. A shortage of skilled tradespeople and resources was already identified and Switched On Group, as the Corporation’s maintenance contractor was looking at packaging repair work together to try

64 Situation Report, 6 September 2010.65 ibid

Image: Liquefaction was a serious problem particularly in the eastern

suburbs


and attract companies outside Canterbury. ‘We are replacing 10 hot water cylinders a day.’66

Reports aside, it was, as Ian Gall said later, very difficult to get an accurate picture of what had happened. ‘The first few days we just worked at full speed doing whatever we were asked to do.’67

It was, by all accounts, reactionary rather than working to a specific plan – in part because the earthquake had been such a tremendous shock to everyone, in part because there was no way of knowing whether another similar quake would occur, or whether the ongoing aftershocks were an expected consequence of the first one, and in part because there were no realistic expectations to be met. The Corporation hadn’t planned on such an event happening in Canterbury. Nor, to be fair, had anyone else. The normal, regular Civil Defence meetings, as was learned later, tended to be ad hoc affairs, with different people representing the various organisations turning up at successive meetings. Nevertheless, in the midst of a crisis, there was a stoic determination on the part of Housing New Zealand personnel to do whatever was required and to do it well.

‘An army marches on its stomach,’68 Jeanette Gower said. Food preparation became an essential component of the emergency. Food parcels arrived from around the country – Corporation staff doing what they could from a distance. At the same time, many local staff would work a full day then go home and prepare meals for dislocated tenants or to bring something special into the office. It wasn’t something they publicised or wanted recognition for; it was just what people did in the midst of the crisis. The Papanui office became a natural hub for meals – sometimes a gathering point for a communal breakfast before heading out in the field. ‘We would buy bread rolls and fillings, fruit and bottles of water. It was part of the morning routine,’69Julie Habberjam said.

On 8 September, Sarah Hill emailed the first formal update from Housing New Zealand to be circulated to other members of the NWCG (as required by CDEM), in which she detailed what the Corporation was doing. It had contacted or met with almost all state tenants and checked properties for damage. All urgent health and safety work was being responded to within a four hour timeframe. The 200 properties that had already been deemed to have significant damage were being prioritised. Housing New Zealand, in tandem with the Christchurch City Council had a management plan in place to move tenants to other accommodation as required. In response to the question about capability status and capacity for future staffing, she stated that current staff were fatigued and stretched. Additional staff from elsewhere in the country had been flown in to assist and would be working on a rostered basis. The Corporation was managing the Civil Defence response including 24 hour a day, seven days a week support of Welfare Centres and leading the Housing work stream, as well as attending to the needs of its tenants, checking safety and welfare needs, organising transfers and so on. It was a lengthy list and proved, although no one was doubting it, that the Corporation was taking its role very seriously and making a solid contribution to the earthquake recovery.

A week after the earthquake, the second major ‘sitrep’ was sent north. (This was in addition to the daily reports, emails and phone calls that were trafficked

66 Report signed by Greg Groufsky, Director Government Relations, 7 September 2010.67 Ian Gall, 4 February 2016.68 Jeanette Gower, 22 March 2016.69 Julie Habberjam, 23 March 2016.

Images: Walls were cracked inside and outside and chimneys were re-moved and temporary cover put in place


back and forth between Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch.) The ‘sitrep’ was one of the many formal, weekly requirements that the team put together to go to Wellington. There was some frustration locally about the time it took to write up the reports, particularly as the work load seemed to increase week on week but it gave a degree of clarity to people outside of Christchurch who needed to know what was happening. It was important for Minister Heatley to be able to give a comprehensive account to his Cabinet colleagues about what was happening with state tenants and housing in Canterbury. And it helped to have staff other than locals take responsibility for responding to media inquiries and being available for interviews.

Lesley McTurk told Radio New Zealand a week after the earthquake that early estimates suggested 100 state houses could be demolished in Canterbury. The Corporation was ‘matching people in Welfare Centres with offers of emergency accommodation from businesses and the public.’70

Indeed, offers of accommodation were starting to flow into the Papanui office. They were all acknowledged with details of location, numbers of beds, and availability.

Kaiapoi was a major focus for staff who were continuing with their checks and assessments. A total of 312 properties had been surveyed in the highest risk areas of which 3.8 per cent were found to be uninhabitable, 32 per cent required a structural survey and 64.2 per cent of properties had damage that could be included in the repair programme.71

For Housing New Zealand’s expanded team in Canterbury, there were several parts to the workload during the emergency phase – taking care of tenants, and taking stock of levels of damage to houses and property, and at the same time, contributing to Civil Defence Emergency Management in the city and in Kaiapoi, with the Welfare Advisory Group and the associated housing requirements for all Canterbury residents who needed help. There were hundreds of offers of temporary accommodation not only from throughout Canterbury but also from other towns and cities in New Zealand. The priority was to take care of the vulnerable and the elderly first.

‘We housed many refugees who didn’t speak much English if at all,’72 Terry Wilson said. They had to be a priority together with tenants who had physical and psychological disabilities.

There were multiple tasks being attended to concurrently. Accommodation was needed for out-of-town staff – not an easy job because accommodation was at a premium. These willing volunteers were rostered along with everyone else which meant they also required water and food, vehicles to get from place to place and of course fuel.

Staff who operated the Corporation’s National Contact Centre in Wellington were provided with essential messages about where tenants and residents should go for emergency assistance. The Centre was also an important conduit between the staff checking on both tenants and properties. The teams on the ground would send their property reports through to the Centre where staff would log them and immediately forward them on to the contractors.

Within a week, radio advertisements about where to go and who to contact

70 Radio New Zealand: Response from Lesley McTurk, 10 September 2010.71 Report signed by Louise Beaumont, Communications & Marketing Director, 13 Septem-ber 2010. 72 Terry Wilson, 4 February 2016.


were prepared by the Corporation’s communications team, as were flyers for distribution to the Welfare Centres. Specific forms covering details about assessments and repairs were also developed and given to assessors and tenancy managers as they checked on tenants and organised temporary accommodation. Staff arriving from other parts of New Zealand were briefed and provided with generic information to help them particularly when they were visiting tenants or working in the Welfare Centres. At first it was more rough than ready, but it gradually became a well-coordinated exercise.

On the ground, Barry Brownsea was Housing New Zealand’s lead auditor for Canterbury. He said later that to begin with, the staff who went out in pairs to check on tenants and properties had a priority list of four categories ranging from little or no damage to severe structural damage resulting in the house being demolished. It worked, he said for only two or three days. The scale of damage was such that the categories had to be extended from one to ten.73

Peter Wild mapped out the city, dividing it into manageable areas for visits and assessments. If a chimney had fallen down or was damaged, staff were to call the National Contact Centre; arrangements would immediately be made to send a crew to the property who could make temporary repairs. The chimneys were removed down to roof level, and either a new metal flue was inserted so that the wood burner could continue to be used, or, if the burner was damaged as well, it was removed and the fireplace boarded up. Heat pumps were installed instead.

‘We were loaded up with bottles of water,’ Barry Brownsea recalled. ‘Everyone needed water.’ Any damage was captured on a sheet of paper and photographed for insurance purposes. Speedscan continued to capture and maintain the data. It took several weeks for staff to cover all the properties. The workload seemed endless. Although many state houses were located in the city’s eastern suburbs and therefore more easily accessible on foot, there were thousands of others in the north, west and south-west as well as Kaiapoi that were scattered throughout suburbs, part of the original ‘pepperpotting’74 system that had existed for decades. Some of the worst were the community group homes where many of the Corporation’s most vulnerable tenants lived. While the staff were checking state properties, they were also checking neighbouring houses to make sure no chimneys or related rubble were leaning or falling in the direction of a state house. Houses were all sizes, single or multi-bedroomed homes, some were single storeyed, others were two and more and there were blocks of flats. Houses were timbered or brick. Roofs were iron or brick tiles. Some properties had garages or sheds on them.

‘At our morning meetings we were briefed on what to expect for the day, and we could report back on what had been achieved the day before. It was a very efficient process at a time when everyone was still upset and anxious at what had happened and when aftershocks were still continuing,’75 Barry Brownsea said. Temporary wire fencing became a common site around properties that were deemed to be too dangerous to enter. Traffic cones along suburban streets denoted where there were temporary closures due to water or sanitation issues. It was difficult manoeuvring vehicles, and more often than not, Housing New

73 Refer Part 1, Appendices Figure 1.74 Building state houses among private homes in the mid-20th century was known as ‘pep-perpotting’. 75 Barry Brownsea, 1 February 2016.

Images: Earthquake damage was assessed and photographed for insurance purposes.


Zealand’s staff found it easier to work the streets on foot. Up one side and down the other, knocking on doors, explaining what was happening, taking notes and taking photographs. It was exhausting work, and even though a regime had been proposed so that staff could take breaks, they were reluctant to do so. Tenants were so pleased to see someone at the door, commented Peter Wild. ‘They were very nervous and it was good to be able to reassure them when their house was safe.’76 Avonside Drive, he said, was terrible; some of the damage was simply unbelievable.

It was impossible to try and put the sights of damaged houses and streets into words. Therefore the official reports stayed with the facts – numbers of tenants checked; numbers of houses checked; extent of damage.

‘We started repairs on the Category 9 list,’ David James said. ‘SoG was responsible for getting the subbies and organising the work. But it was difficult because everyone in town wanted tradies. Plus the loss adjustors were there all the time. We had to determine what was quake-related and what might have been considered ‘normal’ maintenance work. We had several sessions with the loss adjustors going through houses to determine the basis of the scoping work required. It took many time-consuming hours.’77

76 Peter Wild, 31 March 2016.77 David James, 4 May 2016.

Image: All quake damage was noted on scoping sheets for engineers to determine the cost of repairs.

41Part 1: Chapter 2: Priority: Accommodation

2 Priority: Accommodation

By 11 September, the Welfare Advisory Group had expanded significantly. There were now representatives attending from MSD, CDEM, the Canterbury Regional Emergency Management office, Housing New Zealand, Child Youth & Family, Work & Income, Health, Education, Christchurch City Council, Selwyn and Waimakariri District Councils, Red Cross, SPCA, Salvation Army, Ministry of Agriculture & Fisheries, St John’s Ambulance Services, Victim Support, and Relationship Services. The Group’s plan covered the three key areas of housing, financial assistance and psychoanalysis support.78

Housing New Zealand was fully engaged with the city’s accommodation priority. WAG’s objective was to provide people with somewhere to live until they were able to return to their normal place of residence or alternative accommodation. The Corporation’s local teams contributed to the 24-hour roster at Burnside, Linwood and Addington, Cowles Stadium and Kaiapoi and 24-hour roster at Civil Defence HQ. They facilitated access for non-Housing New Zealand tenants to temporary accommodation while at the same time assessing untenanted properties and continuing with the assessment of all the Corporation’s properties. ‘We were everywhere,’79 Sheryl Banks commented later.

Bob Hardie noted that many of the Corporation’s tenants were surprisingly resourceful and found their own alternative and temporary accommodation; they moved in with friends or relatives. The closure of Burnside’s Welfare Centre on 6 September reduced the pressure as did the decision to move the Linwood Centre to Cowles Stadium on 12 September.

A new initiative ‘Project East’ was launched on 9 September which targeted the eastern suburbs of Bexley, Avonside, Brooklands and Dallington, a total of 3,600 households. Building inspectors worked with welfare staff going from house to house to check on residents and properties. At Cowles Stadium, a triage

78 Recovery Action Plan: 9 September 2010. 79 Sheryl Banks, 6 April 2016.


centre was established staffed from Housing New Zealand, Work & Income and Christchurch City Council. The project expanded to the Horseshoe Lake area a day later and on 11 September moved into New Brighton and Halswell.

There were problems with accommodation particularly for hard-hit families who needed a place to live on a temporary basis. As soon as the issue was publicised, Housing New Zealand was inundated with offers of help. More than 450 offers were received within a week. By 9 September, 406 people had contacted the Corporation about their accommodation needs. There was clearly an issue which needed to be resolved. As a result, the Housing Emergency Lease Programme (HELP) was formally established by the Government with the Corporation as the lead and managing agency. HELP was a temporary arrangement to address the shortage of accommodation in Canterbury. It was announced by Minister Heatley in Christchurch on 16 September. Symbolically, he selected one of the worst-affected state houses in Robson Avenue, Avonside to make his announcement. The house had been condemned as a result of the earthquake; the tenant and her five children had been successfully re-housed.

‘Many people have no experience with, have never considered, or don’t want the hassle of renting out their property but we need them to consider it now,’80 the Minister said in a media statement. ‘We are primarily appealing to people with unoccupied second properties in the Canterbury region, but houses in nearby regions could also be considered on a case by case basis.’

The Minister said a number of people couldn’t return to their homes and although many were making arrangements with insurers or friends and family, there were some who needed short or medium term accommodation while their homes were being repaired or rebuilt.

‘HNZC is going to step up and help these people find a home and I would like to see Cantabrians come forward and let us know if they have a property where these people can live,’81 he said.

Hundreds of homes and buildings had been declared unsafe by inspectors, and although many residents had found places to stay with family and friends or moved out of the region, there were many others who needed help. Private property management companies were starting to report an increase in enquiries for rental accommodation and it was anticipated the shortage would rise in the coming weeks. The Corporation was already matching people who were homeless after the earthquake with available private rental properties and temporary offers of accommodation. This new scheme was an extension to the normal programme, and would provide free, professional tenancy management for privately owned vacant houses in Canterbury.

Setting up the new programme was an addition to the Corporation’s already busy schedule. It made sense that of all the central and local government organisations involved in the recovery effort, Housing New Zealand with the most experience in dealing with accommodation issues, should take the lead. A team was created, headed by Jeanette Gower. ‘We needed to create databases and we needed more staff to help out,’82 she said. The HELP programme sought owners of vacant properties, including holiday homes in Canterbury, who were able to offer their properties for up to one year. The properties would then be offered as rentals for those in need. Tenants would be helped by having their first

80 Media release: Hon Phil Heatley, Minister of Housing, 16 September 2010.81 ibid82 Jeanette Gower, 22 March 2016.

Image: Trish Englebretsen (Tauranga) and Denise McKendry (Auckland) in the Papanui office,

working on accommodation requirements for tenants

43Part 1: Chapter 2: Priority: Accommodation

month’s rental deferred and there would be assistance with moving and storage expenses coordinated with the Ministry of Social Development (MSD). The programme would apply particularly to people whose homes had been red or yellow stickered.83 HELP was to be promoted as a temporary solution and not to be confused with Housing New Zealand’s permanent role. It was designed to add to the range of options available depending on individual circumstances.

The Government created a HELP fund of $1 million with authority for the Ministers of Finance and Housing to approve more funding up to $2 million. Initially, the project was targeted at properties that weren’t normally in the market, like holiday homes, but the Government extended the programme to all rental properties on 27 September following a review of supply and demand. Rent paid to the owner was calculated at the average market rent for the type of property in the particular area. It included properties owned by the Crown such as Defence housing but excluded the Corporation’s own tenants.

By the beginning of October, 76 people had registered for the HELP programme and 407 properties had been registered of which 133 were immediately available. They needed to be inspected by Housing New Zealand staff before they were accessible by people needing accommodation but within a short time frame 10 of the properties had been matched to families.84

Through an Options and Advice scheme also set up by the Corporation as part of its wider community role, staff continued to identify temporary and longer term accommodation for state tenants, private home owners and private renters whose homes had been deemed to be unsafe. Accommodation had been found in local hotels, motels, camping grounds and private residences. The scheme linked people to other Government agencies and departments as well as community organisations. In the event that the demand from Housing New Zealand tenants couldn’t be met using available state houses, it was agreed that privately owned homes would be leased to meet the needs of its tenants in the short term. Even then, there were some tenants who didn’t want to leave their neighbourhood and their existing state houses which, they explained to Corporation staff, were their homes. If it was safe for them to stay there, they would.

83 Properties were assessed and stickered according to the level of damage – red, yellow or green.84 Progress Report, 1 October 2010.


There is a language of acronyms peculiar to every organisation, most particularly Government agencies. It is a type of shorthand that no outsider knows, and once inside, he (or she) needs to learn as fast as possible. Housing New Zealand is no different. Community Group Housing is known in the sector as CGH. In many respects, it operates quite separately to the rest of the Corporation’s business. It has a comparatively new history, established to provide leased accommodation for non-government organisations (NGOs) that are usually social or health related, like Women’s Refuge, homes for people with intellectual and psychological disabilities, prisoner reform and so on. The organisations are responsible for their clients or patients. Housing New Zealand maintains the properties on a financial leased arrangement. The leasing organisation is the ‘tenant’. The people who live in the homes are the ‘clients’.

In the early hours of 4 September 2010, residents of the 177 community homes were thrown out of bed, disorientated, anxious and fearful like everyone else; only perhaps, or probably, more so. The leased properties were located throughout Greater Christchurch; there was no dense concentration of homes like the Corporation’s properties in Aranui or Riccarton. Their locations by necessity, were quiet, not always known as much for their residents’ safety and security as for anything else. The earthquakes shattered all sense of calm; all sense of anonymity. It was, as CGH Manager Christine McQuillan said later, deeply frightening for everyone.

There was an immediate need to assess the properties. The individual organisations were responsible for the wellbeing of their residents - to check on their safety. Housing New Zealand’s responsibility was to make sure the houses were safe. The routine that was established post-quake for all the Corporation’s properties in the region included CGH. At first glance, by Monday 6 September, there appeared to be only one house that had sustained significant damage and that was in Locksley Avenue Dallington, (later to be demolished when it was included in the 2011 residential red zone).

Karen Hocking, working for the Corporation’s Housing Partnerships and Programmes section, advised that a central coordination point would be set up for CGH homes which would relieve pressure on the already overstretched National Contact Centre whose staff were grappling with several hundred calls. What were the priorities? Karen asked. What were the messages that

3 Housing the Most Vulnerable

45Part 1: Chapter 3: Housing the Most Vulnerable

should be passed on to anyone phoning for help? Should rent be continued if a property was to be assessed as uninhabitable, or should there be rent reductions depending on what was available or not?

By noon on Monday, as everyone quickly realised, there were no vacant CGH houses to move people into. Most of the hotel and motel accommodation in the city was already overflowing. The different organisations who leased properties under the scheme, who needed urgent relocations had been moved into the individual organisation’s existing homes that were undamaged. It wasn’t the best solution but it would do as a temporary measure. It was also too early to know whether the NGOs were choosing to move their clients for physical safety reasons in terms of the property itself, or whether it was for personal, emotional safety. Two additional properties had been evacuated.

‘We need to either make a call or seek advice if we are going to take responsibility to re-house significantly affected groups,’ Christine McQuillan emailed to Wellington.

It took another 24 hours for the Corporation’s teams to be fully organised. Opus International was engaged to undertake the engineering reports on a growing list of properties known to have significant structural damage. Several of the CGH properties were included in the list. They were spread across the city.

‘My concern,’ Christine McQuillan wrote in her daily report, ‘is that following the engineers’ inspections we may have a number of properties identified for demolition or significant work. Re-housing the clients will be difficult. Groups have managed so far but their other houses are now full and many of the temporary arrangements may not be sustainable. We will need to work closely with the affected groups once we know the full picture.’

The earthquakes continued to fray nerves, not only residents and their community groups but Housing New Zealand’s staff as well. The 5.1 aftershock on Thursday 9 September resulted in more damage to properties and an influx of urgent maintenance work. The Corporation’s team reported a spike of 400 urgent jobs across state housing in Canterbury that day. Maintenance auditor Barry Brownsea inspected 14 Community Group properties. The problems seemed to be mainly minor although several would require an additional engineer’s assessment. ‘Minor’ was identified in terms of property damage and didn’t reflect the anxiety suffered by the CGH residents which was, as everyone recognised, more acute than for anyone else.

Emails flowed to and from the Christchurch office. Some contained the bare facts of the situation. Others were more explanatory, giving staff based in Wellington and Auckland a personal side to the emergency a few days after the first earthquake.

‘I want to share a story with you,’ Christine McQuillan wrote to the Wellington office. ‘I took a call on Wednesday from a private home owner who is a neighbour to four CGH units housing clients with mental health issues who live independently. The neighbour advised that one of the residents from our units had moved in with him. The CGH resident was convinced that his flat was condemned and would be pulled down. Our customer (the organisation) advised the Corporation that the units were OK. The organisation was unaware that their client had moved in with the neighbour who had been happy to accommodate the client but it was wearing a little thin especially as he talked all night. We arranged to meet


the organisation within half an hour of the phone call, together with a psychologist, the neighbour and the client together with our maintenance auditor. We felt that if someone ‘official’ inspected the flats this would allay the client’s fears. The units were fine and the client was assured that he could safely remain at home. We received thanks from the neighbour and the organisation who were thrilled with the service and the outcome.’85

Plans were put in place for a team of three inspectors to check every CGH property. ‘It should take four days to complete.’ Christine McQuillan wrote optimistically. ‘We will have a very good picture of the state of the portfolio once it is completed.’ The office was very busy, she wrote. ‘More and more people are arriving from around the country.’ Their arrivals were greeted with gratitude – an acknowledgement that even from afar, there was an appreciation of the problems being experienced in Canterbury.

Reports continued to flow from the Christchurch CGH staff. A week following the 4 September quake, the ‘sitrep’ confirmed that neither Housing New Zealand nor the Christchurch City Council would have enough housing for anyone other than their own tenants. The majority of people who were still sleeping at the Welfare Centres didn’t need to be there because their own homes were habitable, but they didn’t feel safe. Counselling was more important that housing.

Christine McQuillan cited an example of structural damage thus:

‘Last week we sent out one of our maintenance auditors who is on the inspection team to visit a Women’s Refuge (address) as they were concerned about the safety of their property. He identified a chimney with loose bricks which needed to be removed but reported that the cracking in the ceiling was of no concern. The refuge phoned the contact centre on Friday – once again very concerned about the safety of the property. Our inspector was sent back out to the property as a priority to complete the form inspection this morning. The house had moved off its foundations in one corner during the numerous aftershocks we have continued to experience. The property was rated a 2 – meaning still habitable – I asked the question of the inspector: ‘would you like to see earthquake-traumatised women and children who have been further traumatised by domestic violence stay in the house?’ The response was ‘no.’ I must say that horrible vertigo feeling returned as soon as I entered the property. I gave them the facts and advised the call to move out was theirs to make – I did say that personally I wouldn’t want to stay there. We have reports that domestic violence has increased hugely in Christchurch. The refuge has decided to close until the structural engineer’s inspection has been completed, so it is imperative that we know what the situation is as soon as possible so that planning for the future can begin.’86

Two days later, a further update was sent to Wellington. It stated the bare facts in concisely worded bullet points. If it was a repeat of information included in other reports, it didn’t matter. The more the important details were re-stated, the better people would understand the situation in Christchurch and Canterbury.

85 Christine McQuillan, 9 September 2010. 86 Situation Report, CGH Monday 13 September 2010.

Images: Damage to internal walls was a problem – sometimes

the cracking was severe; at other times less so

47Part 1: Chapter 3: Housing the Most Vulnerable

• 1219 HNZ properties inspected in the priority areas. Of these 30 are uninhabitable and 9 beyond repair. 253 require a structural engineer’s survey. 477 low-mid priority and 299 no damage

• By COB today, it is expected that the inspections in the priority areas will be completed – 2,000 properties in total

• Civil Defence State of Emergency was to be lifted today at 12pm but this has now been extended to midday Thursday

• Welfare Centres closing and Recovery Assistance Centres are opening in their place

• Kaiapoi is now a major area of focus for Civil Defence and a Welfare Centre has opened in Kaiapoi with HNZ on site

• Public meetings are to be held 5.30pm and 7.30pm this week – HNZ will be key to these

• The Minister87 will be visiting Christchurch tomorrow.

The CGH inspections continued with 95 completed by 15 September. Of the 95, 73 were medium to low priority, 18 required a structural engineer’s survey. There was no timetable for remedial work. At the same time, there were ongoing inspections of the fire protection systems that had been installed in all the CGH houses. Some were connected to the brigade and were therefore closely monitored. Others were inspected every month.

‘Until we receive the structural reports, we don’t know the extent of the damage and the number of houses that require major structural work or worse are uninhabitable. Four properties had been evacuated – so many properties were filled with sand and sludge from liquefaction…’88

Christine McQuillan wrote again to the Wellington office on 17 September: ‘Well, we have come to the end of Week 2 following the earthquake, and there are a lot of weary people who have been working long, hard hours and some who have had very little sleep with the continuing aftershocks. I am so proud of everyone who works for us and their amazing stamina and passion for what we do.’

The percentage of CGH properties requiring a structural report (12 per cent) was higher than the state housing portfolio, she wrote. One of the leasing organisations had been able to move their clients back into their home following a detailed inspection. It was ‘deemed to be habitable apart from the driveway which was a mess of mud and water from the liquefaction. Our maintenance team has been fantastic – nothing is a problem – and they arranged for metal chip to be laid on the driveway so that the residents could return home. We also had Wormalds89 inspect the fire system and discovered the alarm panel required replacement, probably spiked from the power outages. They have moved so fast and this will be replaced today or tomorrow.’

It was the dedication and support from everyone involved in the CGH properties that impressed Christine McQuillan and her small team. Regardless of their job or position, within or outside of the Corporation, everyone had endeavoured to do their best for the people who were considered the most vulnerable. Who they were, or what their personal situations were, wasn’t

87 Housing Minister Hon Phil Heatley.88 Situation Report, 15 September 2010.89 Wormalds: Fire Protection Services Company contracted to Housing New Zealand.


relevant. What mattered was ensuring properties were repaired as quickly as possible, or residents rehoused with minimal fuss. This included coming to a workable arrangement with the leasing organisations to abate rent depending on the state of the property and whether the tenancy could continue.

Keeping accurate records of costs involved in the earthquake assessments of CGH properties was essential; they would be included in the Corporation’s overall insurance assessment. This included the normal rental amount per property, the date organisations moved their clients somewhere else, costs involved in the transfer of people and their belongings, and what changes to the rent had taken place to account for services that weren’t being provided.

In the months leading up to Christmas 2010, engineering assessments continued; plans were drawn up for major repairs to CGH properties and starting dates identified. They were incorporated into the Corporation’s overall strategic plan to begin in the new year. Like everything else, there were tentative suggestions, but no formal predictions of completion dates. It was a case of wait and see.

49Part 1: Chapter 4: The Long Road to Recovery

When the immediate response phase ended on 9 September, and the recovery phase began, the Welfare Advisory Group established a housing sub-committee to manage the more medium and long-term responses. It included representatives from Housing New Zealand, MSD and the three Canterbury local authorities. Housing New Zealand was to take the lead; build a database of housing stock across the region, assess the housing needs of people in Welfare Centres and transition clients to permanent housing. It was also charged with developing an ongoing strategy to provide assistance for people with longer term housing issues – properties that had been red stickered, that were assessed as needing to be demolished and where insurance was a problem.

There was general recognition by authorities and NGOs that the emphasis needed to be on people with low incomes, refugees particularly where language might be a barrier to communication, and elderly people living on their own. There was also an appreciation that when people were under extreme stress, their comprehension of facts and figures could be impacted. Information therefore needed to be carefully worded and written in easy-to-understand language. Importantly, as Housing New Zealand’s staff were working their way around affected suburbs, they should be clear about what they were looking for when checking properties and what, if any, follow-up would be implemented. Most of the work achieved to date had been reactive, responding to issues, dealing with problems, ensuring the community knew where to go to get help, who to contact, what to say.

While liquefaction remained a major issue in Kaiapoi, and in the city’s eastern suburbs particularly Avonside and Bexley, the greater problem was sanitation and water supplies. The sewer lines in the city were badly affected by the earthquake and its ongoing aftershocks. There was an immediate need to understand how many people had been displaced and for how long.

‘We developed a displacement model with engineering expertise from the Earthquake Commission and the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC) and the University of Canterbury,’ David Griffiths said. The model used EQC data and damage categories to calculate the number of temporary houses needed over time. It could identify the total displacement of household units based solely on the household rebuild and repair requirements. It accounted for the housing demand created by contractors and their employees

4 The Long Road to Recovery


moving into Christchurch from elsewhere, demands for housing to meet infrastructure and commercial labour requirements.90

A team of engineers, under direction from Housing New Zealand’s asset team, had checked the Corporation’s Christchurch offices in Papanui, Linwood and Aranui and declared them safe for staff to return to work. There had been minor damage caused mainly by upturned furniture, but there was no structural damage. Linwood and the office in Aranui, as Bob Hardie reported, were surprisingly intact. However, as the insurance assessors, engineers and the Corporation’s quality assurance staff teamed up to start the mammoth task of formally assessing the 6,000 plus properties following the first emergency checks, the extent of the overall damage became clearer. Within a week after the earthquake, emergency repairs had been ordered to more than 1,500 properties. A total of 207 houses had been identified as requiring reports from specialised structural engineers to confirm the severity of damage. Most of the tenants who couldn’t stay in their own homes were staying with family or friends or were being re-tenanted in vacant state houses that weren’t damaged.

The daily ‘sitreps’91 highlighted what was happening and alerted Lesley McTurk and Stephen McArthur - the Corporation’s Chief Operating Officer - to issues and potential remediation requirements. They noted that while the staff on the ground were fast-tracking normal processes so that the turnaround time was reduced, they were also becoming aware that many people who had rented in the private sector before 4 September would no longer have homes and could potentially, therefore, qualify for state housing. It was inevitable that the waiting lists for social housing which included state and local authority accommodation, would rise in the immediate future.

The emergency response phase may have ended within two weeks of the earthquake, but for many Housing New Zealand staff on the ground, any real recovery phase was still months away. It had taken four solid weeks for all but a few of the Corporation’s properties in Canterbury to be inspected. On 5 October, 6,111 properties had been visited in Christchurch and the Waimakariri District (including Rangiora and Kaiapoi) and formal surveys of 5,785 had been completed. In the wider Canterbury region which included Timaru, Waimate, Ashburton and Temuka, 68 state properties out of a total 635 had been visited and 65 surveys completed. When everything was tallied up, four houses were deemed beyond repair, 369 had structural damage, 3,626 had suffered non-structural damage and the balance – 1,786 had no damage. Of the 373 houses with structural damage, including the four which were declared beyond repair and required a further engineer’s assessment, 18 were confirmed as uninhabitable. The summary statement was the important one: 29 properties were now declared to be uninhabitable – 28 in Christchurch and one in Kaiapoi.92 Of all the suburbs where state housing was located, Avonside was the most affected.

As David Griffiths had already reported to Lesley McTurk and the Board, the biggest problem remained the broken or severely damaged sewer lines. In Christchurch there were 94 state houses affected and one in Kaiapoi which had no sewerage service at all. There were a further 54 state houses in Christchurch and 26 in Kaiapoi with low flow – described as an intermittent sewerage

90 David Griffiths, 14 January 2016.91 Sitrep: Housing New Zealand’s situation report, 5 October 2010.92 Opus Engineering Report, October 2010.

Image: House boarded up following engineering assessment


service. Repairs to damaged chimneys were ongoing and weather-tightness inspections continued which included checks on header tanks, hot water restraints and heating appliances. Concurrently, tenants were either moved or temporary accommodation was being organised for families who would need to be re-tenanted elsewhere. Although it was already two weeks since the state of emergency had been lifted, the Welfare Advisory Group continued with its housing assistance programme led by Housing New Zealand. Hundreds of offers of accommodation kept coming in from hotels and motels, camp sites and caravan parks, 127 offers from out of Canterbury and several offers from private operators. They were all registered and available. Two months after the earthquake, Housing New Zealand recorded there had been 944 referrals for temporary accommodation.

In a report to the Corporation’s September Board meeting, the local team explained what had been done to date. It was a comprehensive statement of fact, noting systems and processes that had been implemented and categorising the numerous issues identified to date. If it was again repetitive in parts, it was to stress the obvious.

‘Housing New Zealand’s Canterbury portfolio comprised 6,117 properties with 18,000 tenants and a staff of 50. The emergency response began within hours of the earthquake and the local staff were called in for duty as soon as they had ensured their personal situation was secure. There were 2,200 calls to the Corporation’s national contact centre in the first 36 hours.

By 9am on the morning of the quake, the contractors Switched On Group had already started urgent health and safety work on identified properties and by noon the same day, more than 300 repair jobs had been issued. By mid-afternoon the next day (Sunday), 166 properties had been identified as requiring an engineer’s report. In the days that followed, 83 staff had come to Christchurch from around the country to help. Temporary accommodation had been sourced for them as well as food, water and vehicles.

Housing New Zealand staff were based in the Welfare Centres that had been set up in Christchurch and Kaiapoi and were working on a 24 hour roster together with other Government Departments and local NGOs93. They were responsible for matching people looking for homes to available accommodation. At the same time, 32 temporary inspectors started to formally check every state house. Twenty-two tenants were re-housed in vacant state homes and rent was reduced for 167 tenants who were still living in houses without permanent infrastructure facilities. By the time the state of emergency was lifted on 16 September, the Housing Emergency Lease Programme (HELP) was developed and launched.’

The Board report covered the health and wellbeing status of Housing New

Zealand’s Canterbury staff. The welfare of the staff working in Canterbury was important.94 Specialist counselling was available if required, two days special leave could be taken which could be extended for an additional three days.

93 NGOs: Non-Government Organisations.94 Later research suggested the biggest challenge to employers after the September earth-quake was the wellbeing of their staff.

Image: Portion of a scoping sheet used to assess all properties


There was a separate section in the report covering the insurance situation. Housing New Zealand had earthquake disaster insurance for property damage including business interruption costs. The policy limit was $250 million with an excess of $10 million. The anticipated claim was in the range of $35-52 million which comprised estimated property damage plus the increased costs of working and loss of rents, less the excess. Catherine McDonald had been engaged to oversee and manage the claim on the Corporation’s behalf.

Longer term, there were some big challenges to be faced. The scale of repair work was significant. Some properties were likely to be without permanent services for more than a year. Some houses would need to be demolished so that the land could be remediated. There was already intense competition for labour and resources, which, the Corporation predicted, would create an increase in demand and therefore costs. A recovery plan was being developed as was a process for prioritising the 300 properties that had been significantly damaged and a timeline for the repair programme.

Finally, and importantly, it was noted in the report that the Corporation’s Christchurch-based staff had both Housing New Zealand and Civil Defence responsibilities. Reports didn’t do justice to the complexities of the work on the ground however, nor did they adequately portray the extent to which local staff and the volunteers from other parts of the country were involved in everything that was going on.

‘I am extremely proud of our team in Canterbury,’ Lesley McTurk told the Board. ‘They have been working in dreadful and stressful conditions and yet they have delivered an outstanding service.’95

With the official start of the recovery phase, the Canterbury Earthquake Welfare Recovery Group96 closed the Welfare Centres in Christchurch and opened four new Recovery Assistance Centres. There was still some debate about the Welfare Centres in the Waimakariri and Selwyn Districts and the timing of similarly converting them to the new system. The Government’s 24-hour help line would continue to operate and a counselling referral line called ‘Right Place, Right Time’ was introduced. Government and local authority agencies had more work to do, however.

Housing New Zealand’s wider role continued. Keeping tenants informed with regular updates was important. In his October newsletter, David Griffiths explained progress with the repair programme. ‘Around 4,000 of our 6,000 houses in Canterbury need repairs following the earthquake,’ he wrote. ‘We are working with our insurers on a fast-track approval process so we can get the work done as quickly as possible.’97

Two weeks later, he wrote again: ‘Just as we thought things were returning to normal, a couple of large aftershocks have left many of us feeling unnerved again.’ He explained the process employed by the Earthquake Commission which had identified 1,200 properties on badly damaged land. The process of identification had been led by geotechnical engineering firm Tonkin & Taylor in consultation with local authorities, overseas experts, Government

95 Housing New Zealand report to Board, September 2010.96 The Welfare Recovery Group was led by MSD and included Housing New Zealand, Police, New Zealand Fire Service, Te Puni Kokiri, Inland Revenue, Education, Pacific Island Affairs and MCDEM. It partnered with Salvation Army, Red Cross, Victim Support and St John’s Ambulance, (later re-named St John New Zealand) and Canterbury local authorities.97 Tenant Update 1, October 2010.

Image: Trish Englebretsen from Tauranga (left) and Taina Jones from

Auckland were two of many HNZ staff who volunteered to help the

Canterbury team during the worst of times. They took on administration

tasks, enabling the local team to continue with checking tenants and

assessing properties


departments and other agencies. ‘Due to privacy issues, we have not been told where the 1,200 properties are. If you see activity happening around you and you are worried, please contact your Housing Manager.’

David Griffiths again reassured tenants that all Housing New Zealand’s repairs would be undertaken by contractors engaged by the Corporation. ‘Whatever happens,’ he wrote, ‘we are committed to keeping tenants informed throughout the recovery work, both in relation to your own situation and the wider community.’98

At the beginning of October, Canterbury staff received a note from Lesley McTurk advising them of a support package which included an offer to have their domestic properties inspected by a Corporation building inspector. Because of the number of tenancies to be checked and assessed, employees’ properties would be inspected from 4 October onwards using the same priority system as had been developed for state-owned houses. Staff would be advised if a structural engineer’s inspection would be required. The inspection wasn’t intended to replace any personal arrangement that individuals had made through their own insurance company, it was an additional offer for peace of mind, particularly for staff who had worries about their homes and their property.

David Griffiths emailed his team to advise that a $500 lump sum would be paid to them in recognition of their hard work. In addition, two days special leave was being allocated. ‘I hope you enjoy these benefits; they are well deserved. Thanks for all your great work.’99

Stephen McArthur wrote a strategic overview on 5 October which set the scene for the Board. He noted that the intended recovery plan which was already under development, was dependent on several factors including the completion and analysis of structural reports on 431 houses, the completion of insurance assessments and agreement by the Corporation’s insurers on a process for repairs, the capacity of contractors to undertake the work required and an assessment of long term staffing requirements. Stephen McArthur noted what he termed ‘the changing nature of the housing market in Christchurch and that there could be more individuals and/or families seeking state housing support as a result of loss of employment or other hardship.’100

By mid-October, Housing New Zealand’s Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Plan (2010-2012) had been developed. It was aligned to the goals in the Corporation’s broader asset management strategy and overarching strategic plan. It encompassed both state housing and civil defence responsibilities and outlined what was termed as a ‘pragmatic’ operational approach to short-term remedial work on properties and ongoing increased tenancy management. It was described as a ‘living’ document which could be updated as it was implemented and as circumstances changed or became clearer. At the time, there was ongoing discussion and speculation that a substantial aftershock was yet to be felt in Canterbury but whether it would happen again on the Greendale Fault or somewhere else was unknown as was its potential magnitude. The plan therefore had to cover contingencies as well as the essentials of customer delivery and tenancy management, asset repair and redevelopment and ongoing engagement with key stakeholders and regulatory agencies. In areas of Christchurch where

98 Tenant update 2, 26 October 2010.99 Email sent to Canterbury staff by David Griffiths, 1 October 2010.100 Strategic Overview: Situation in Christchurch, Stephen McArthur, 5 October 2010.


the impact of the earthquake would inevitably result in new development that otherwise wouldn’t have occurred, a mix of typologies would be proposed to match demand.

………………………………….

The 4 September earthquake could be interpreted as an opportunity to provide new and better housing for state tenants in areas where existing properties were old and needed refurbishment. The new plan proposed opportunities for the Corporation to partner with private developers and to target investment in the redevelopment of assets which would optimise land utilisation – in other words where there were existing ‘quarter-acre’ sections with a single dwelling, a large back yard and substantial frontage, the land would be redeveloped to provide medium density housing, provided there was agreement from the local authority. At the same time, new developments would take into consideration the number of bedrooms required by people on the waiting list. It had already been identified before the earthquake, that potential tenants required one or two bedrooms rather than three or four as in past decades. Matching supply to demand was an essential component of the new plan. To be effective, the plan needed a detailed analysis house-by-house and suburb-by-suburb of the redevelopment work to be done, timeframes and tenancy management required. In addition, specific areas of Canterbury where redevelopment would take place, needed to be identified in the short term with detailed explanation of how and when the work would be done.

The plan was welcomed by Canterbury staff. It identified roles and responsibilities. It gave them specific targets to work towards with timeframes and milestones to be achieved. Of course, it assumed that the insurance claim would compensate the Corporation for all earthquake related costs excluding the $10 million excess and land costs. It assumed the earthquake recovery and response would be fiscally neutral (with the exception of the insurance excess and land reparation costs), and it assumed there would be an agreed approach to managing cost increases associated with trades costs and work.

The plan also segmented priorities for identified tenants who were vulnerable, disabled and who suffered psychological illnesses. It covered tenancies where relocation should be avoided if possible, for example, where tenants’ children attended local schools or had nearby families who were dependent on them, or tenants who were on home detention. Segmentation also included tenancies where relocation was desirable, for example people who could sustain a private sector tenancy, thereby making space for someone on the waiting list.

Staff numbers required to achieve the recovery plan were greater than the current staffing levels. Provision needed to be made to engage more people involved in organising accommodation, setting up and managing databases, expertise in programme and project management, tenancy management (to cover increased workloads), management of maintenance and the ongoing management of the insurance claim. Then there were staff required to oversee the financial management of the plan’s implementation, and ongoing civil defence responsibilities. Although some of the work had already started, the plan would be fully staffed and ready for implementation by January 2011. A dedicated team was created to implement the plan which was staffed locally


and with assistance from the Wellington office. Julie Donovan became the programme manager to create projects based on the repair categories and to identify the people responsible for managing the workload, for procurement, contracts and oversight of the repairs being undertaken.

Operationally, work on the ground proceeded at pace. Housing New Zealand’s local teams working with engineers had identified 1,674 properties that had damage up to $1,000 in value. The repair programme was written and approved by the insurance company, and scoping had already started. Every contract specified procedures to be applied for health and safety and for work to be recorded. Every property required a digital photographic record of the damage prior to any work being started. A sketch was required of measurements relating to the affected area, for example, a window or a room. When the work was completed, another photograph was required to demonstrate the ‘before’ and ‘after’ scene and everything had to be submitted to the Corporation before payment would be made.

Importantly, the tenant had to be contacted before any work was started and advised about the time of the repairs, how many tradespeople would be involved and so on. Where a project was going to take longer than a week, regular reports were required to be submitted to Housing New Zealand detailing the previous week’s progress including any issues, trends, risks and what steps had been taken to mitigate them. Where vulnerable or elderly tenants lived on the property, the Corporation’s Tenancy Services staff would make regular visits and alert the contractors to any special care required while working in the house and around the property. It was anticipated repairs to the 1,647 properties would be completed by late February 2011. ‘This work stream can be implemented quickly, the sub-contractor is available and resourced to undertake this work, and progressing this publicly demonstrates that the Corporation is acting,’101 noted the Asset Development Programme Plan.

Another 2,005 properties were in Categories 5-8 which, according to the same programme plan were estimated to take approximately four months to complete. ‘Scopes will take approximately 30 days…there are risks associated with the volume of work in this work stream, and the availability of contractors which may extend the timeframes.’

As at 13 October, there were 402 properties that required specialist geotechnical and detailed structural design solutions. Reinstatement costs would be required to decide whether some of these properties were economic to repair. It was apparent, according to the reports, and based on specialist advice, that this programme would take considerably longer than the 12 month period allowed for the other work.

‘The most severely damaged properties are concentrated in a small number of suburbs, mainly in the northern and central parts of Christchurch. Within these suburbs, areas with large numbers of (Corporation) properties will be assessed to identify where it may be possible to undertake comprehensive redevelopment, possibly with other social housing partners. Other properties will be prioritised for remediation over these because of the potential for redevelopment.’102

The regime of inspecting properties, assessing damage, gaining approval from the insurers and scoping the work required was a lengthy process. At

101 Housing New Zealand Asset Recovery Programme Plan, p6.102 ibid


the end of October, there were still 125 properties to be inspected. Letters were written to the tenants advising them of anticipated dates when this would happen. There were 99 tenants’ homes still without connections to the city’s sewerage system. The tenants were advised that if they didn’t want to move, then their rent would be halved by way of compensation. The Christchurch City Council had advised the Corporation of interim solutions but there was some uncertainty about the timing. In addition to its long-time repair and maintenance contractor Switched On Group, Housing New Zealand had engaged engineering firm Opus New Zealand, and Sergon Building Services to assist.

Lesley McTurk updated staff across New Zealand at a series of workshops in late October, providing them with a detailed precis of what had happened and what was being done. ‘All of our people have been willing to help,’103 she said, with 83 staff being flown in to Christchurch within the first four weeks after the earthquake.

In his fortnightly update to tenants on 12 November, David Griffiths explained that permanent repairs were about to begin on more than 1,500 Corporation homes in Canterbury. ‘These homes have been chosen because they have the least damage and work can be done quickly on them. Repairs on these houses are due to be finished by March next year. At the same time, we are continuing to look at the work that is needed to make permanent repairs to the remaining 2,500 properties that have more major damage. The aim is to complete most repairs over the next year, but because there is so much to do, it could take longer.’

At the end of November, several of the Corporation’s staff, loss adjustors and the insurance assessment team met to review progress and to discuss the next steps. A plan needed to be developed to transition the organisation back to ‘business as usual’ in Christchurch, while acknowledging that for many tenants, there wouldn’t be an opportunity to return to their homes or possibly even their former neighbourhoods. While urgent health and safety work was continuing it wasn’t going to cover everyone. Christchurch, like all locations throughout New Zealand where there were state houses, had an upgrade programme to implement and other projects which had been disrupted by the earthquake like home insulation, healthy housing and external painting. These projects needed to be resumed alongside the repair programme.

A representative from the insurance assessment team, Daniel Norrie, talked about the way the Corporation’s properties were being categorised in terms of damage and proposed that a claim should be presented to the insurers and that a sample of properties be then checked to validate the claim. The claim could be made in full or in stages as more information was obtained and properties were packaged for repair. The bundles of packaged work would be peer reviewed to assess their value. There was still no clear idea of the total value of the claim. But the final tally identified 3,800 state houses in Canterbury had been damaged in the earthquake of which more than 400 had major structural damage. Twenty-four of them were uninhabitable and four were beyond repair.

103 Grant Mackay: Report of the September Earthquake, February 2011.

Image: Wearing leis to add a bright touch to the Papanui office, are from left Linda Newport, Jeanette Gower,

Denise McKendry (Auckland), Jo Rait, Trish Englebretsen

(Tauranga), Michelle Tiriana-Bishop (Rotorua) and Taina Jones (Auckland). Linda and Michelle

drove two 4WDs from Rotorua to Wellington where they and their

vehicles were ferried by HMNZS Canterbury down to Lyttelton

57Part 1: Chapter 5: ‘Expect the Unexpected’

The impact of the earthquakes was starting to be felt across the Corporation’s offices in Christchurch. Staff who had been working non-stop were tired and many were stressed not only because of what they perceived to be ongoing issues, but also because of their home situations. From the organisation’s perspective, staff needed to be physically and mentally fit to continue the massive job ahead. External counselling had been available from the outset for all staff, however some concerns were expressed that it didn’t always help. While adrenalin and the desire to participate in all aspects of the recovery had kept staff highly motivated during the first six weeks following the earthquake, now there was some cynicism that counselling didn’t provide all the answers and that clearly the repair programme was going to supersede everything else. There would be no ‘BAU’104 any time soon.

Duncan Holland was a health and safety expert, contracted by Housing New Zealand at various times – now was definitely one of those times. He had flown to Christchurch immediately following the earthquake to assess the situation and gauge staff opinions. It was the first of many visits in the coming months. Driving from the airport to the Papanui office didn’t give him any idea of the scale of damage he then saw particularly in the eastern suburbs. ‘It was just a shambles. It was a terrible shock.’105 Nothing had prepared him for what he saw. The Housing New Zealand staff were remarkable, he noted. They did their jobs and were incredibly practical.

From the start, his role was to assess health and safety risk for the staff – driving, going into buildings, the ongoing aftershocks, in fact everything that related to their personal and physical safety. ‘I was out and about very quickly,’ he said. There were some major issues to be dealt with particularly in the Welfare Centres. There had been concerns expressed about paedophiles going into the Centres. Hundreds of children were running around and the parents were very stressed about the earthquakes and families. It was an easy environment for a predator. There were also issues relating to who was offering private accommodation. A triage system needed to be put in place to make sure

104 BAU: business as usual.105 Duncan Holland, 16 May 2016.

5 ‘Expect the Unexpected’


people were safe, not only for the person being accommodated but also for the people offering their home.

Once the requisite systems and processes were in place, Duncan Holland returned to Christchurch on several occasions to monitor progress and to talk with staff. As the recovery programme continued, he talked with staff about additional support they needed. Locally, staff were increasingly weary and as a result often impatient with tenants who were themselves anxious about their living conditions. Staff were worried about not being able to achieve their ‘normal’ workload and at the same time felt the organisation wasn’t fully appreciating the time and effort that was necessary to fulfil their traditional roles. Many of their everyday routines had become irrelevant and had been replaced with tasks that were more immediate and therefore more important. What was expected of tenancy management in other parts of New Zealand couldn’t be achieved in Canterbury.

Duncan Holland led a series of de-escalation sessions which resulted in a range of issues covering everything from high workloads, to stress management. Staff were often having to deal with situations that were outside their level of expertise, particularly those relating to tenants’ personal health and wellbeing. Tenants wanted more information than staff could give them which added to the tension. While the issues were considered ‘normal’ given the environment, nevertheless further support needed to be put in place.

Ongoing aftershocks were frightening and there seemed to be no end in sight. Resources and information – always information – were critical. It wasn’t just sharing internal information; every organisation, agency and government department involved in the earthquake recovery had its own priority list. Getting access to information that would assist the Corporation with its property assessments was often difficult. EQC had sent letters to property owners who were identified by the Commission as having quake damage. But were any of the properties adjoining those of Housing New Zealand? The only way to find out was to check the coordinates on the Commission’s maps. It was time consuming work; more administration staff were required.

In November 2010, Duncan Holland wrote a staff wellbeing plan which focused on the individuals and teams working on the recovery programme. ‘To date, the focus for the provision of staff support has been on providing EAP services to teams and individuals, both proactively and in response to requests for this. In addition, management, with HR support, has been deliberate in monitoring staff wellbeing in order to act quickly when staff appear to be not coping, or when specific behaviours or performance gives cause for concern. In all cases, the management response has taken into account the impact of the earthquake, and involved talking with staff about what further support they may need.’106

What was needed was more interaction, better information sharing and opportunities for staff to get together for social occasions. The plan would be reviewed after a month to see whether there was any improvement and what other initiatives could be introduced. Even so, with aftershocks continuing on a daily basis, and more negatives than positives, it was going to be a long time before the situation improved.

Days merged into weeks and prior to Christmas, David Griffiths and his team again reviewed the situation. All the properties had been checked, assessed

106 HNZ Wellbeing Plan November 2010.


and categorised into high, medium and low levels of damage on a scale of one to ten; one being the worst and therefore written off; ten being assessed as having no damage at all.107 Opus Engineering was engaged as the Corporation’s project manager for Categories Two, Three and Four. They had the best knowledge of the sites and the dwellings following numerous visits and surveys.

At a meeting with EQC and the Corporation’s earthquake recovery team on 5 November, it was agreed that geotechnical engineering company Tonkin & Taylor would overlay the Corporation’s sites on their maps to show what houses were affected in suburbs where there was the worst level of damage. No-one yet knew what land remediation plans were being proposed until the next Tonkin & Taylor report. Kate Styles told the Corporation’s recovery team that there had been some comments from local community meetings that there would be ‘no broad brush bulldozing.’108 But it was still very unclear and the number of people affected would need temporary housing.

In his pre-Christmas update to Canterbury tenants, David Griffiths talked about the Tonkin & Taylor report. ‘The release of the Earthquake Commission’s Stage 2 geotechnical report has been the biggest news since I last wrote to you. Like other home owners, Housing New Zealand has been advised of the land recovery zones for each of its properties. In Zone A, repairs and rebuilding can start immediately as the land has not been damaged. In Zone B, the land has suffered some damage as a result of liquefaction and some geotechnical assessment may be needed. Zone C includes land which has suffered major damage or will be close to the areas of large scale land repair work. Most Housing New Zealand properties will remain the same,’ he wrote. ‘But there are some homes that have been identified in the B and C Zones that may now require more geotechnical assessment and work on the land. If you don’t hear from us, you will be in Zone A meaning that repair work will continue as planned.’109

The Tonkin & Taylor report was specific in its land assessment. Major ground deformation resulting from the Greendale earthquake had displaced land up to 4.6 metres laterally and 1.6 metres vertically. Areas most severely affected by land damage were identified as Avonside, Avondale, Burwood, Bexley, Brooklands, Kairaki, Pines Beach, Spencerville, Belfast, Casebrook, Hoon Hay, Parklands, St Albans, Dallington, Kaiapoi, parts of Fendalton, Halswell and St Martins. 110

Scoping work was continuing with engineers, Sergon and the Corporation’s staff revisiting properties to determine what level of repairs was required, how many contractors and tradespeople were needed and what type and range of materials. Scoping also included an estimate of costs which needed to be discussed with the loss adjustors. In Category Nine, more than 300 properties had now been scoped for repairs and work had begun on 200 of them; 92 had already been completed and 50 had been shifted to Category Ten. A new batch of letters had been sent to tenants alerting them to the latest work schedules.111 In Categories Five to Eight, 2,156 properties had been fully scoped with 182

107 Appendices: Part 1: Figure 1. 108 Minutes of Housing New Zealand Asset Recovery Meeting, 16 November 2010. 109 Tenant Update, 10 December 2010.110 Tonkin & Taylor Stage One Report, 18 October 2010.111 Housing New Zealand worked with NZ Post to ensure the newest possible mailing addresses for tenants were available. This was often complicated by tenants moving frequently, leaving town or not alerting the Corporation about their movements.


still to be completed. Some properties were difficult to access either because the tenants weren’t home when staff called or because the timing wasn’t convenient. In Categories Two to Four, 502 of 504 structural reports had been completed. More staff were required and roles had been advertised. With luck, interviews could be completed before Christmas and new people inducted immediately after Christmas.

Arrangements needed to be made to ensure vacant properties were checked between Christmas and New Year. A list was sent to local police units so that they could include them in their regular rounds. Hot water cylinders, heat pumps and electric ranges were removed from all vacant properties to prevent vandalism. ‘The police are using a booze bus as a hub in Avonside so they can have a noticeable presence in the community, and bogus EQC inspectors are visiting homes. The police have been alerted,’112 noted David Griffiths in the lead up to Christmas.

Tenders for repair work were sent to Switched On Group, Spotless Facility Services, City Care Ltd, and MWH/Mainzeal113, with the close-off date to be between mid to late January 2011. The Corporation hired SUB 5 Private Security to look after its vacant properties in Mairehau, St Albans, Bryndwr, Redwood, Bishopdale, Bexley, Avondale, Aranui, Papanui, Linwood, Avonside, Phillipstown, Richmond, Southshore and Dallington in Christchurch plus several properties in Kaiapoi for a six week period. In addition, the security firm would make random checks at specified locations.

A full risk register was developed by the Christchurch team which included everything from the availability of tradespeople, to funding, potential delays in getting local authority consents, implications of the Corporation’s ability to source and develop its housing stock, inability to source appropriate staff and inability to meet housing demands for new tenants. Every risk was assessed and updated on a fortnightly basis. Everything, as Julie Habberjam noted later, changed almost on a daily basis.114

Detailed monthly reports were presented to the Corporation’s Board. The December report clarified the situation at the end of 2010. The Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC) had established the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Senior Officials Group (CERSOG). Sarah Hill was delegated to attend on behalf of Housing New Zealand. The Corporation’s staff in Christchurch and Wellington continued to work closely with the Department of Building & Housing, DPMC and the Earthquake Commission to share information and report on progress. A weekly meeting with EQC gave Housing New Zealand immediate access to critical information about land damage and planned remediation work which would impact on the Corporation’s recovery plans and any rebuilding work.

By 4 December 2010, the Earthquake Commission had received more than 150,000 claims from across the region. It was estimated the total land and property claims in Canterbury would exceed $2 billion. Christchurch claims were in excess of 124,000. There were more than 11,000 in both Selwyn and Waimakariri districts, over 4,000 claims in Timaru and 3,500 claims in Ashburton. EQC estimated there would be between 2-3,000 uninhabitable

112 Minutes of Video Conference Meeting, 15 December 2010.113 In 2010, Vero (Housing New Zealand’s leading insurer) appointed MWH/Mainzeal joint venture as their preferred partner in the Christchurch rebuild.114 Julie Habberjam, 22 January 2016.


houses and up to 15,000 more that would need to be vacated while repairs were done. Damage to infrastructure was estimated to run into the billions with local authorities, Lyttelton Port Company, the Canterbury District Health Board, New Zealand Transport Agency and private businesses producing their individual estimated costs.

The Welfare Advisory Group of which Housing New Zealand was a pivotal member, had met every day during the response phase and frequently during the recovery phase. As additional welfare issues were identified, the appropriate agency to deal with that particular situation was invited to join the group. Providing much needed sustenance to residents regardless of their status was essential.

Yet, Housing New Zealand’s ongoing involvement in the Group was becoming a point of debate with the organisation’s senior management in Wellington. Should it not be better engaged in ensuring the Corporation’s insurance claim was finalised; its repair programme completed and tenants re-housed as quickly as possible? After all, as the region’s largest landlord, it had the largest number of repairs. It was a testing time for the local staff who had a substantial job to do. Kaiapoi had been badly affected by the ongoing earthquakes and the Corporation’s properties in the town needed immediate attention.

Kaiapoi would never be the same again, Waimakariri District Mayor Ron Keating had told the New Zealand Herald four days after the September quake. It was a small town with a population of approximately 10,100. First estimates suggested 200 of its homes had been damaged, 50 of which had already been deemed unsafe. In the commercial part of the town, 22 buildings had been declared unsafe and red stickered. More damage would be discovered in the weeks and months ahead as engineers completed assessments. The town had suffered major water problems.

Was it a good time for Housing New Zealand to withdraw from its wider community role and focus more specifically on its own problems? David Griffiths thought not. The Canterbury staff knew their clients and understood the business. They were well supported by teams from Wellington and Auckland and because their offices were surprisingly undamaged, they were able to continue to operate without difficulty. They believed implicitly that by having the lead role for housing and not just for state tenants, they were not only contributing to the community’s earthquake recovery, they were the ‘go-to’ organisation for housing in general.

At a practical level, the local staff had an important job to do particularly in the worst affected suburbs and in Kaiapoi. PQS was the Corporation’s appointed external assessors for all state properties throughout New Zealand. The company’s team was actively engaged in assessing all the Canterbury properties, working with local tenancy managers, contributing to the information required for the eventual insurance claim. It was a job, noted both David Griffiths and Bob Hardie, that was going to take several months.

At the December 2010 meeting of the Canterbury CDEM Joint Committee, a detailed report on the earthquake and its recovery in the preceding three months written by the local Civil Defence Controller Robert Upton and endorsed by Jon Mitchell the Manager of the Regional Emergency Management Office, was presented and discussed at length. Although the report was positive in the main, it highlighted some of the inhibiting factors that existed in the first 48-72 hours immediately after the earthquake.


Foremost was a reluctance within some of the authorities and partner agencies to acknowledge the overarching direction and coordination role of Group Controllers in a large scale emergency (as defined by the Act 2002). It was clearly a conundrum at the time, although debating who was in charge was irrelevant to the people on the ground. Bob Parker wrote later that although the earthquake had ‘regional elements to it, it was not a regional event. Each of the councils within the area were in the best position to know the facilities, the welfare centres, the roads, the water supply and the waste water systems within their areas.’115

The assumption in national plans and guidance that Welfare Advisory Groups could readily transform from planning and relationship-building bodies to response-coordination entities proved to be (at least) questionable during the emergency, despite the high degree of competence and commitment of the various partner agency personnel involved. There was inconsistent understanding of the requirement for ‘across-local authority’ direction and coordination when a state of emergency is declared.116 In other words, what worked on paper didn’t always work in practice. If there was another major civil defence emergency, some things would need to be done better, in particular what was noted as ‘the occasional disconnect between national direction and local agency operational coordination.’

There was some criticism of local body politicians - giving them too much airtime didn’t always work well because it ‘tended to distort the true picture of the extent of the emergency, external perceptions of needs, and initial decisions as to appropriate resources.’117 At the same time, there was general agreement that politicians were the ‘face’ of local and central Government and that as a result they carried a degree of mana that wasn’t always apparent with civil servants. Efforts to create a joint information committee during the response and initial recovery phases were ‘rebuffed’ by some local and national partners which had resulted, as the report stated, in media relations and communication to the public being more difficult to coordinate than would have been ideal and contributing to the crisis image being projected to and by the media.

Prophetically, the report concluded: ‘Expect the unexpected. Earthquake risk and resilience need to be taken more seriously.’118

An independent review of the 4 September 2010 earthquake, noted that there could have been greater utilisation of elected representatives. The resources that they had in the community would have improved intelligence gathering and two-way communication with disaster-affected communities. This resource could have been extended to include local constituency or list MPs as well as mayors and councillors.119

In spite of any behind-the-scenes criticism and any ongoing issues that may have existed within and between local authorities and various agencies, there was no doubt that the front-line people continued their tasks and, according to Bob Hardie, his staff at the very least, deserved a medal for their work.

Was it ever again going to be business as usual in Christchurch? Importantly

115 Bob Parker, ‘Ripped Apart – a city in chaos’. Antares Publishing 2012, p 38.116 Canterbury Civil Defence Emergency Management Meeting, 13 December 2010.117 ibid118 Canterbury Civil Defence Emergency Management Meeting, 13 December 2010.119 David Middleton, Richard Westlake, ‘Independent Review of the Response to the Canter-bury Earthquake, 4 September 2010: technical report commissioned by MCDEM May 2011’ NB: a full review wasn’t completed because the process was overtaken by the 22 February 2011 earthquake.


for Housing New Zealand’s staff locally, the Corporation while acknowledging the ongoing work, was keen for the basic necessities of creating a safe home for its tenants to continue almost unabated. The insurance assessors now suggested estimates of damage up to $97 million.

In Canterbury, as elsewhere in the country, the old-fashioned state housing model was no longer appropriate for modern needs. It wasn’t a new situation; it was simply exacerbated by the earthquakes. A high percentage of stock was old and tired, more so in Canterbury than in other parts of the country. Three bed-roomed houses sitting on large sections no longer met required needs. Tenants weren’t interested in maintaining vegetable gardens in the back yard and flower beds in the front. Did the September earthquake present an opportunity for change?

The year 2010 had been targeted as a major upgrade for more than 600 state houses in Canterbury, Nelson and Marlborough. That plan had been replaced by a repair programme for 3,779 quake-damaged properties. It was, according to the Corporation’s asset team, about six year’s ‘normal’ work programme condensed into 12 months.


In mid-2010, Housing New Zealand’s Board adopted a new national Asset Management Strategy which set out how the Corporation would optimise the value of its property portfolio through better utilising land, divesting assets that were under-performing or surplus to demand, and investing in the right standard of assets in the right places. In other words, assessing location, demand for housing, and what type of properties would provide the best return. The strategy would result in an increase in the number of houses in high-demand areas and develop and reconfigure existing properties to meet current and anticipated future demand. The strategy came on the back of a Government review of New Zealand’s social housing sector which resulted in the Corporation having a significantly tighter role. The emphasis would be two-fold. Firstly, on state house asset management – the provision of a state house portfolio that would be fit for purpose and would deliver to as many high-need tenants as possible, giving maximum return on the Crown’s investment in social housing. Secondly, on state house tenancy services – the management of state house tenancies for those most in need for the duration of their need.120

Various initiatives had been introduced throughout the year including the Healthy Housing Programme which was a joint initiative between the Corporation and District Health Boards. Fortunately for Canterbury, it was agreed the programme would be delayed until the situation with housing in general was better understood.

Translating the requirements as defined by the Government and approved by Housing New Zealand’s Board, although a priority for the organisation, was less important for the regional office and Canterbury-based staff who were heavily involved in looking after anxious tenants and the repair programme for the remainder of 2010 and into the first month of 2011. Anyone who had come to Christchurch in the first six weeks (post 4 September) and had experienced the ongoing aftershocks could more readily understand how the local staff were feeling. Key performance indicators, producing reports, balancing budgets and the usual minutiae of normal business were not highest on everyone’s agenda.

The ongoing torrent of aftershocks continued to worry staff and tenants.

120 Housing New Zealand Annual Report, 2010/2011.

6 The Asset Management Strategy

65Part 1: Chapter 6: The Asset Management Strategy

More than 1,400 aftershocks had been recorded after just one month. Scientists predicted there was a high probability of a substantial quake still to come.

There was a magnitude 5.0 aftershock on 19 October which was just 9 kilometres deep. It was frightening and it exacerbated anxiety in the community. Was that the one?

But on Boxing Day when the sales were in full swing, a swarm of 32 shallow quakes startled Christchurch residents. The largest, which occurred at 10.34 am was centred 12 kilometres below the suburb of Opawa. It registered 4.9 (magnitude) and caused more damage to commercial buildings, closed the central city again and cut power to more than 40,000 homes. GNS scientist Kelvin Berryman told media that clusters of aftershocks often followed a major earthquake and could have a life of their own. Technically however, they were all aftershocks from the 4 September event. Although the frequency and size of the quakes had declined, seismic activity was still higher than would be expected compared with long-term earthquake averages for Canterbury.121

The Telegraph in Britain gave a graphic report of the 26 December aftershock to its readers. ‘Masonry and glass rained down on Boxing Day shoppers,’ it reported. The article’s concluding paragraph was pure science. ‘New Zealand sits above an area where two tectonic plates collide. The country records more than 14,000 earthquakes a year – but only about 150 are felt by residents, and fewer than 10 a year do any damage.’122

In Christchurch and Canterbury there had already been several thousand aftershocks recorded since 4 September. Was the one on 26 December 2010 the predicted large aftershock? It was still too soon to tell.

The new year started as the last one had finished – scoping work ongoing; repair work ongoing; tenant contact ongoing. Tonkin & Taylor had completed its Stage 2 report for the Earthquake Commission in November 2010 which had been made available to Housing New Zealand. It included more detailed analysis about the land remediation options as related to specific suburbs. The impact for the Corporation would be on its properties identified in Zone C where, the report noted, staging the work would allow rebuilding to begin as soon as one portion of land remediation work was completed.123

The insurers advised Housing New Zealand that they had approved the demolition of Category One properties in Zone C. The decision didn’t automatically mean immediate demolition. Tenders had to be called and demolition costs provided to the insurers. The Corporation needed to know the claim settlement for the identified properties before they were demolished. The normal process for tenders, contractors, crews and clean-up had to be applied and like so much else, it was time-consuming. The Boxing Day earthquake had resulted in more damage and the Corporation’s staff needed to advise the insurers about the process in place to review and reassess any damage and how this was going to be managed. New damage, the local team was advised, would mean additional costs.

A weekly meeting had been established with EQC enabling access to essential information about land damage and planned remediation work. The Commission, according to the regular reports provided to Housing New Zealand’s Chief Executive and Board, wanted to coordinate land and house

121 Paul Gorman and Giles Brown, The Press, 27 December 2010.122 The Telegraph, London, 26 December 2010.123 Tonkin & Taylor Report Stage 2, November 2010.


remediation and infrastructure work in the most damaged parts of the city and environs and was working with local Corporation staff as well as Canterbury local authorities and insurers to do so. The key focus for the foreseeable future was to repair damaged properties, maintain tenant safety and demolish houses too badly damaged to survive. But, the insurance claim remained a specific priority to ensure the Corporation received its maximum entitlement.

Writing to tenants on 26 January 2011, David Griffiths explained why so many home visits were necessary in order to undertake the requisite repairs. ‘In a perfect world, if your home had earthquake damage, one person would come just once to assess it, fix it and be on their way. Unfortunately, the level of damage done by the 4 September earthquake and its aftershocks means we can’t work like this. Many Housing New Zealand homes have had so much damage that several visits are required just to sort out what work is needed. For a home with minor damage, the process is generally that someone comes to assess the level of damage, a contractor comes to see how they will do the work, they return to do the work and then someone from Housing New Zealand comes to check the work has been done to a high standard. In some cases, the home will also need to be visited by another agency such as the Earthquake Commission. We apologise for the number of times people may have to visit your home but it is essential in getting repair work approved and done to a high standard.’124

Sarah Hill wrote a comprehensive status report also on 26 January 2011 outlining progress against the Earthquake Recovery Plan. Several roles identified in the plan had been filled which had reduced the degree of assistance required from other Housing New Zealand staff outside Canterbury. Laptops had been provided for local staff to enable staff to work more efficiently out in the field. ‘Asset repair and redevelopment for most work streams are on track although work on Category 9 repairs is currently behind schedule,’ she wrote. Meetings with the contractors were taking place to get assurances that they would be able to meet the end of February deadline.

The Boxing Day earthquake was being treated as a separate event by the Corporation’s insurers, but, said Sarah Hill, it had resulted in little additional damage to state-owned properties. ‘We have, in conjunction with the loss adjustors, reviewed our processes for the coding and management of repair work associated with this aftershock to ensure that this is managed appropriately.’ It was yet another indication of the complexity involved, always discussing the process of assessing and scoping repairs with the loss adjustors rather than being able to just get on with the job.

The report explained that work on the properties in Zone C of Tonkin & Taylor’s Stage 2 Report was expected to begin in August 2011. ‘As stated previously, (HNZC) are in close contact with EQC who are developing a coordinated repair programme encompassing land and house remediation and infrastructure work in Zone C. HNZC are commissioning their own geotechnical reports in order to make informed decisions about EQC’s proposal.’

Sarah Hill noted that the local team would continue to work closely with other Government agencies and would maintain its representation on the Christchurch Social Environmental Task Group (SETG) and chair its Housing Sub-Group. ‘This is an opportunity to get clarity around the future role of HNZC on the Housing Sub-Group and the fit of this with our mandate.’ She

124 Tenant update, 26 January 2011.

67Part 1: Chapter 6: The Asset Management Strategy

said that a Corporation representative would be attending the first meeting of the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Senior Officials’ Group on 3 February 2011. No meeting had yet been set for the Officials’ Group for the Adhoc Cabinet Committee on Canterbury Earthquake Recovery (OACE).

There was also a detailed paragraph in the report which went some way to explain the challenges everyone and every organisation was faced with at the time.

‘Late on 18 January we received a Cabinet Paper regarding the

management of temporary accommodation (displaced households and temporary workers). The paper recommended that HNZC lead this work through the establishment of a Canterbury Earthquake Temporary Accommodation Management Office (CETAMO). HNZC was not involved in or consulted on the development of the paper which sought feedback by midday 19 January and was intended to go to Cabinet on 25 January. HNZC has since met with officials from the Department of Building & Housing and Department of Prime Minister & Cabinet to discuss the proposal. We have informed the acting Chief Executive who has discussed this with the Chair of HNZC Board and the office of the Minister of Housing who was also unaware of the paper. There are significant implications for the Corporation being tasked with all or some of the work outlined in the paper, and we have concerns about the robustness of thinking relating to the options. We are waiting to hear whether it is still intended to submit a paper to Cabinet on 25 January.’125

Clearly there were some anxieties that the organisation was already committed to resolving earthquake-related issues, to confirming the repair programme and getting settlement on its potential insurance claim without taking on the leadership of a bigger initiative. It was a short-term operational decision rather than a long-term strategic decision. Of course, there was no knowledge that only one month later there would be a much more severe and damaging earthquake, that would put greater pressure on accommodation across Christchurch and would hasten the establishment of what would become the Canterbury Earthquake Temporary Accommodation Service (CETAS) with David Griffiths as its lead.

At the beginning of February 2011, five months after the 4 September earthquake, another comprehensive report was written and distributed to the Board and senior staff in the Wellington office. The Tonkin & Taylor report detailed the number of Corporation properties that were identified as having redevelopment potential – they included 10 in Bexley, 67 in Avonside, three on Avondale Road, 24 in Richmond, 14 in Kaiapoi and 10 in Aranui. Zone C, the report qualified, was land which required a wide-scale coordinated repair strategy. There were 149 Housing New Zealand properties in this zone, much of which was in the structural damage category.

‘The Earthquake Commission is developing a coordinated repair programme encompassing land and house remediation and infrastructure work in Zone C. This is likely to have an impact on the Corporation’s repair and redevelopment timeframes for its properties in this zone.’126 Zone C work was expected to begin

125 Internal Housing New Zealand Update Report, 26 January 2010.126 Progress Report, 1 February 2011, signed by Joy Gribben, Acting Director, GRU.


in April 2011. The report explained that because Zone C land was severely damaged, even if houses needed only minor to moderate repairs, fixing the land might require tenants to shift temporarily. ‘It will take many months before all Zone C land has been remediated.’127

The report was a clear reminder to everyone not working in Christchurch that the September earthquake and its ongoing aftershocks would have a much greater impact on the repair and reconstruction strategy than had initially been forecast. The insurance estimate was changed and updated on a regular basis. By February 2011, the loss adjustors had estimated damage to Corporation buildings at $75.3 million with business interruption insurance of $8.4 million. Treasury officials had estimated the total cost of the September earthquake was in the region of $5 billion.

Tonkin & Taylor, in their Stage 2 report had noted: ‘the probability of another equal or greater earthquake event means that the risk of similar damage in the future is about the same as other natural hazard risks for communities elsewhere in New Zealand. While the Darfield Earthquake sequence is currently assessed approximately as a one in 500 year event, the Government believes it is best to take the opportunities land remediation offers to improve the level of resilience for the communities most severely affected by this event.’128

Early in February 2011, John Tubberty arrived in Christchurch from Auckland. He had been asked by Asset General Manager Kevina Mara to drive the Corporation’s asset management response. ‘There was a lot going on. Catherine McDonald was leading on the insurance claim and Switched On Group was actively engaged with repairs.’129

On 16 February, the accommodation team based at the Aranui office, reported on their progress and outlined their daily activities. Their key purpose was to provide a ‘timely and consistent approach to matching applicants to the Corporation’s houses. They were responsible (still) for relocating earthquake affected tenants. Every tenant who was relocated had to sign an agreement as much to protect themselves as to keep Housing New Zealand’s Tenancy Services alerted to where they were staying. Tenants could be relocated back to their former homes if they wished; there were six month tenancies and periodic tenancies. The world, according to Christchurch and Canterbury, was very different to the Corporation’s business elsewhere in the country.

In fact, noted former Housing New Zealand staff person Nicole Randall, who had been seconded to the Minister’s office at the time of the September earthquake, ‘before the earthquake, Canterbury didn’t really feature on anyone’s radar in the organisation. It was doing well; there weren’t the housing issues that existed in Auckland or Wellington for that matter. The earthquake turned all that on its head.’

‘We had a sense of relief (in the Minister’s office), because no one was reported killed or seriously injured. That had been our main concern.’130

Unbeknown to anyone, the worst was yet to come.

127 Progress Report, 1 February 2011, signed by Joy Gribben, Acting Director, GRU128 Tonkin & Taylor Stage 2 Report, November 2010, p 8.129 John Tubberty, 4 May 2016.130 Nicole Randall, 2 February 2016.

‘Resilience is accepting your new reality, even if it’s less good than the one you had before.

You can fight it, you can do nothing but scream about what you’ve lost, or you can accept that and try

to put together something that’s good.’

Elizabeth Edwards131

131 Elizabeth Edwards 1949-2010, author of ‘Resilience: Reflections on the Burdens

and Gifts of Facing Life’s Adversities’ 2009

PA R TT W O


Tuesday, 22 February 2011, 12.51pm

It was just another working day in Christchurch; not quite the norm that existed before 4 September 2010, but normal enough. Schools had been back for three weeks after the summer holidays. February is traditionally the hottest month in the Canterbury calendar. It is when the harvests are beginning; when the nor-westers blow heat across the plains. It is one of the busiest tourist months; when the hospitality industry is at its summer peak. The Ellerslie Flower Festival was due to open. There were workers at Hagley Park setting up marquees and marking out spaces for stalls and vehicles. Banners promoting the city fluttered on lamp posts. The traditional Summer Times events were in full swing. There were visitors in the ChristChurch Cathedral – tourists from across the globe; people shopping at Ballantynes and wandering in and out of the many boutiques and cafes along Cashel Mall and Oxford Terrace. City workers were finishing their lunch, reading on the banks of the Avon close to the Band Rotunda or walking back to the office. They were in the gym or going for a run. They were in the city’s library on Gloucester Street, or rehearsing for the latest play at the Court Theatre. They were in the hospitals - patients, nurses, doctors, porters, clerks. They were in office blocks, bent over their computers, keying in data. In the suburbs, people were similarly engaged; community workers were on their rounds, driving from home to home, checking on clients. There were delivery vans moving between shops. People were on the phone, doing housework, playing golf – doing what they usually did. Children were at school. It was a typical day.

Suddenly, inexplicably, completely without warning, the earthquake struck. It was vicious, a magnitude 6.3 quake which although smaller in size than the September event, was much worse. It was centred two kilometres west of Lyttelton, ten kilometres to the south-east of central Christchurch. It was a shallow quake, only five kilometres below the earth’s surface. It was intense. Recordings showed the movement of the fault and structure of the bedrock produced exceptionally strong ground motion – up to 1.8 times the acceleration due to gravity in the eastern suburbs. In the hills between Christchurch and Lyttelton, from Westmorland around to Sumner, and in the Heathcote Valley, the noise and the violence was horrific. In the city centre, ground accelerations were three to four times greater than the ground motion produced by the 4 September 2010 earthquake.132 It was horrendous. There was no other word for it. Fissures appeared in the ground, wet mud slithered its way through grass, through bitumen, through concrete. Street lighting swung dangerously from their poles. Verandahs crashed; concrete smashed; vehicles were crushed; buildings crumbled.

Like everyone else, Housing New Zealand staff ran for cover wherever they were; ducked under tables, stood in doorways; grabbed hold of something, anything deemed to be solid that might save them from injury or death. This was worse than anything experienced during and since September. It didn’t last as long but the impact was frighteningly terrible. Office furniture was turned upside down, chairs on castors slid across the floors, filing cabinets were upended and their contents strewn about. There was paper everywhere.

132 Eileen McSaveney. ‘Historic earthquakes - The 2011 Christchurch earthquake and other recent earthquakes’, Te Ara - the Encyclopedia of New Zealand, updated 14 October 2014. URL: http://www.TeAra.govt.nz/en/historic-earthquakes/page-13

71Part 2: Tuesday, 22 February 2011, 12.51pm

Pictures fell from walls. Phones didn’t work. Doors jammed or were blocked by furniture. Getting out was a priority. At the Elms Hotel on Papanui Road, there was a senior staff meeting in progress – Sarah Hill was down from Wellington to chair the meeting. This time, as David Griffiths explained, everyone was tossed to the ground.

Malcolm Jones recalled it vividly. He was in his car poised to enter the roundabout at QE11 Drive and Innes Road. It was absolute mayhem, he said. ‘I almost lost control of the car.’133 He managed to get back to the Papanui office which was empty by then, save for the mess. Everyone had disappeared. While aftershocks continued to shake the building, his mobile phone was still working and he contacted BECA Engineering to come and do a quick safety inspection as soon as possible at the Papanui office and then the Linwood office. ‘We needed to be able to have both offices open if possible.’

David James was working in the Papanui office. ‘There was a managers’ meeting going on down the road at the Elms (Hotel) so not everyone was in our office. Suddenly everything was swirling around me, including filing cabinets. I could hear screaming in another room. We all managed to get outside – there were a couple of loss adjustors there as well. It was terrible. The phones weren’t working so I couldn’t get hold of SoG. They were based out at Shirley and so I thought I should drive over there. I couldn’t get much further than Hills Road, so decided to take off my shoes and socks and roll up my trousers and walk. In hindsight it was a stupid thing to do because I realised I could’ve disappeared down a sump hole and no-one would have found me. There was mud and liquefaction and water everywhere. I waded through muck up to my knees and arrived at the SoG office. Everyone was outside. They had been trying to ring around to find out how their families and staff were. We could text but it took ages for replies to come through.’

‘We had a discussion about checking whether there would be any subbies who wanted to work and then I left them to it and waded back to my car. There were cars sticking out of the mud, sunk into deep holes and there were people walking away from town. It took me several hours to get home. On the way I went past Cashmere Primary School to see whether my grand-daughter was still there. Because of the delays in text messages getting through I thought she might be. It was impressive to see how well the school teachers had organised the children with games while they waited for their parents to arrive.’134

Sheryl Banks was the only person working in the Aranui office. Now it was surrounded by a rising tide of liquefaction. The landline didn’t work. She was able to ring her mother and let her know she was safe before her mobile phone died. Her car was in the driveway but she knew even if she got to it, she couldn’t get inside, let alone move it without help. She cleaned up the broken glass and put shelves and cabinets to rights, and then sat on the doorstep and watched as people waded along the street thigh high in watery mud, and waited for someone to come and find her. Darryl Freeman appeared, jumping across neighbouring fences; he was her rescuer. No-one could have been more welcome. He lived in the area and was anxious to find his family, but first, he said, they must try and start her car and get it out onto the street. It wasn’t easy and it took time, but they did it, she said. Darryl disappeared as he had arrived, jumping over fences and she inched her way forward eventually onto

133 Malcolm Jones, 11 April 2016.134 David James 4 May 2016.


Pages Road. It was an extraordinary sight. People had left their cars anywhere and were walking; lines of people walking on the road, sidestepping pools of mud. It took her five hours of slow driving to eventually arrive home. When she thought about it later, she said she was helped by a stranger who had stopped alongside her on the Waltham Bridge. Aftershocks were continuous and they had each wound down their car windows and started a conversation. ‘I never asked his name and he didn’t ask mine. But we kept each other company as we crawled along the roads. It was something I will never forget.’135

There was an immediate realisation that if Housing New Zealand thought the earlier quake had been the big one, this one was it. If the offices were wrecked, what about the tenants, those with disabilities, those with children, older tenants, vulnerable tenants; tenants who were refugees who didn’t speak much English. Were any of them injured? Were they safe? Telephones weren’t working; staff needed to check on their families first, then get out and check on tenants. How could the staff alert Wellington to what had happened? Who was going to take control?

It didn’t take long for everyone to know what had happened in Christchurch. John Tubberty was at a meeting in Wellington with a group of other senior Asset staff. There was an immediate rush to get to the airport and try to get on a plane. ‘Some of us were lucky to get a flight; other people took the ferry.’

‘Just fix it,’ Kevin Mara136 told him as he was leaving.

EmailFrom: Stephen McArthur Sent: Tuesday, 22 February 2011 4:16 p.m.To: Lesley McTurkSubject: Christchurch earthquake - status report

Hi everyone, Our CE, Lesley McTurk has asked me to provide a further update on the

situation in Christchurch. Following this afternoon’s quake and aftershocks, Christchurch is under a

state of emergency. Internally, the Corporation has set up a group to coordinate support and relief for staff and tenants for the foreseeable future. This group is being led by me at the national level, and Director Operations Southern, Sarah Hill and Regional Manager, David Griffiths in Christchurch. We have people representing us at the national and local levels of the Civil Defence effort.

Christchurch staff All our Christchurch staff are accounted for but many are unsure about

family and friends. Most staff have been sent home to see to their own affairs as a first priority. Our local services are expected to be limited tomorrow.

We know some Christchurch staff are out of town right now. If you need

help getting home please contact Manager of CDBI Kevin Black (in the first

135 Sheryl Banks, 6 April 2016. 136 Kevin Mara was Housing New Zealand’s General Manager Asset Development at the time.


instance email [email protected] otherwise phone 04 439 3411 or 027 549 5147) . There are transport issues in and out of the city and travel needs to be co-coordinated.

Southern and Central CD Director Sarah Hill, and Christchurch regional

manager David Griffiths are in Christchurch and are working with other agencies to provide whatever support is necessary.

Family membersThose of us outside Christchurch with family or friends there - this will be a

very anxious time for you as you try to contact close ones, to ensure their safety and whereabouts. That is your first priority at this time. If you need to go home to better coordinate your efforts, please work with your manager to organise this.

Volunteering helpIf you wish to volunteer help, please email Kevin Black as above.

While some staff provided direct help after the September quake, this time we need to prioritise the kind of help and people we send. The sorts of skills we will need shortly include civil defence, tenancy management and property damage inspection.

TenantsWe have diverted all Christchurch landline calls to our National Call

Centre and are increasing resources there. Cellphone reception in Christchurch is patchy. We are advertising the NCC’s 0800 801 601 number on Christchurch radio. The HELP website is also still active at: http://www.housinghelp.govt.nz/>. Early reports of damage are focused on the central city, rather than where our houses are located - but we are unable to check on our houses right now.

News mediaPlease direct any media enquiries to Amanda Binns, 09-261 5107 or 021

487 197. Situation in ChristchurchThe situation as reported to us is:

• Magnitude 6.3 quake centred 5km under Lyttelton • Buildings have fallen in the central city • There is expected loss of life among the public • Christchurch Hospital has been evacuated • There are gas pipeline ruptures • Roads are blocked to traffic • The airport is closed until at least 7pm • Firefighters are putting out fires in the central city • Some cellphone towers are down • Accommodation is a priority

We will continue to keep you updated on the situation and what we can do to help.

Regards Stephen

………………………………….


The media update issued by Housing New Zealand’s media team the following day at 5pm outlined the current situation to the rest of the Corporation’s staff throughout the country. It was factual. It made grim reading. By implication, it encouraged staff to offer help in any way they could.

MEDIA UPDATE 23 FEBRUARY 2011, 5 pmTVNZ is running all-day coverage, and Radio NZ is also continuing its intensive coverage.

For anyone with online access, www.stuff.co.nz and http://www.google.com/crisisresponse/christchurch_earthquake.html have excellent information and links to resources.

UPDATE AND GENERAL INFOThe PM has declared a national state of emergency. Two extra welfare centres have opened at COWLES STADIUM, 170 Pages Road, Aranui and BURNSIDE HIGH SCHOOL, 151 Greers Road and by 6pm tonight PIONEER STADIUM, 75 Lyttleton Rd, Spreydon will open as well. HAGLEY PARK welfare centre is now full.

Mayor Bob Parker is continuing to urge people to stay at home, saying the city is effectively “closed” for at least the next three days.

Reports have the death toll now at 75. A woman was recently rescued alive from the PGG building.

Police have set up a family liaison service at the Papanui station. People wanting information about missing relatives are urged to go to the station.People wishing to report missing persons should ring 0800 RED CROSS (0800 733 276)

A 24-hour Government helpline has also been set up on 0800 779 997. It will provide information, advice and transfer calls through to other appropriate agencies.

Lyttelton, Redcliffs, South New Brighton, Shirley, Wainoni and Phillipstown schools are all distributing drinking water. Steps are also under way to get food supplies in.

MSD says that financial assistance will also be made available to those who need it, with the ability to provide Civil Defence emergency payments and other assistance.

RESCUE EFFORTSPolice have put in place a curfew across the city. From 6.30pm a restricted access zone will be in force and anyone, including media, found in the central city after that time will be arrested. The restrictions are being put in place partly for safety reasons, but also to keep criminal elements out of the city. Media reports are saying there are still survivors at 7 sites across the city but


Police have recently confirmed the CTV building is not survivable. Earlier media reports that 15 people had been found alive in an air pocket in the building were incorrect.

At 2.24 pm today an area around the Hotel Grand Chancellor - Christchurch’s tallest building was cleared as engineers advised that the building was on the verge of collapse. This situation is being closely monitored.

Search and rescue staff are expected to continue looking for survivors overnight.

INFRASTRUCTURENZ Post has suspended all mail deliveries and postal services until 28 February.Christchurch City Council has advised that supplies of clean water are likely to run out in the next few days. (Fonterra delivered 200,000 litres of fresh water to the city this afternoon).

Telecommunications are patchy and many residents do not have drinking water.Telecom made payphones FREE from 3 am this am.

Half the city is still without power but it is estimated that by the end of today 70-80 percent of the city will be back online.

Civil Defence is asking for the public to keep cellphone use to a minimum, especially voice and data. If you must use your cellphone, text. Christchurch’s 111 service has been diverted to Wellington, but network damage, overloading and power blackouts could affect connections. Telecom says payphones in the Christchurch area will be free to use.

Lyttelton Tunnel is closed, as are many roads in the city. NZTA asks motorists to make essential trips only. State highways are open but the Chaneys on-ramp to State Highway 1 north of Christchurch is closed.

FLIGHTSAirlines have added extra domestic flights to Christchurch today. The airport is now open, but there are long queues.

Air New Zealand says an additional 313 seat Boeing 777-200 flight will operate from Christchurch to Auckland this afternoon, as well as a 133 seat Boeing 737 flying between Wellington and Christchurch. The airline will also operate a special Airbus A320 service this afternoon from Wellington to Christchurch.

All of its domestic fares to and from Christchurch continue to be available at $50, and the airline is also offering discounted international fares for immediate family wishing to travel to or from Christchurch.

Jetstar is sending four aircraft to Christchurch to resume its domestic service at midday and help move a backlog of stranded passengers. Four extra flights in addition to scheduled services will also be operated to and from Christchurch today.


Air NZ: 0800 737 000 or www.airnewzealand.co.nzJetstar: 0800 800 995 or http://www.jetstar.com/nz/en/jetstar-information.aspx Jenny AlexanderSenior Communications Advisor Central and SouthernHousing New Zealand Corporation

………………………………….

There is a certain inevitability about major disasters. Individuals gain an internal strength they didn’t know they had. It is that definition of ‘resilience’ in its purest form - the ability to recover quickly from difficulties.137 Perhaps it is adrenalin or perhaps pure instinct to do something. Work manuals and standard operating procedures are good on paper, but how often are they practised and what happens when the real emergency occurs?

By some peculiar twist of fate, all New Zealand’s civil defence controllers were in Wellington attending a debriefing from the September earthquake. In Christchurch, Bob Parker declared a state of local emergency at 2.45pm. A day later, on 23 February 2011 at 10.30am, the Minister of Civil Defence John Carter declared a state of National Emergency. Explaining his decision to Parliament, the Minister said that the required civil defence emergency management would be ‘beyond the capacity of local civil defence emergency people to respond on their own.’ The declaration would ensure the ‘maximum possible coordination and cooperation between central and local resources and international assistance.’138

The earthquake response would be led by the Director of Civil Defence Emergency Management John Hamilton, and he would be based in Christchurch. It was a departure from normal procedure, but this was an abnormal event. The Government realised that the framework developed for the September earthquake recovery wasn’t sufficient for long term recovery.139 Critically, there were still unresolved issues between the governing bodies resulting from the 4 September earthquake particularly in Christchurch. In all respects, bringing the National Controller to the city was the best solution. As was noted in the later independent report of the response and recovery earthquake phases, the lives, health and wellbeing of the people of Christchurch were severely at risk. The national resources required to deal with the emergency would clearly be very substantial, more than was available within the Christchurch City Council.140

While the political machinery busied itself with the wider macro issues – who was to lead what, how, when and why - the people on the ground, in the frontline, emergency services, Government agencies and departments based

137 Oxford Dictionary definition.138 Ian McLean, David Oughton, Stuart Ellis, Basil Wakelin, Claire B Rubin, ‘Review of the Civil Defence Emergency Management Response to the 22 February Christchurch Earthquake’, 29 June 2012.139 Rachael Brookie, University of Victoria paper ‘Governing the Recovery from the Canter-bury Earthquakes 2010-2011: the Debate over Institutional Design.’ June 2012, Victoria Univer-sity Institute for Governance & policy Studies Working Paper.140 Review of the Civil Defence Emergency Management Response to the 22 February Christchurch Earthquake.


in Christchurch swung into action yet again. The Christchurch Art Gallery was convened as the natural emergency centre. The civic offices were again damaged, this time more seriously than in September. The Art Gallery became the congregation house; the venue for local and central Government staff to set up temporary offices. As the numbers increased, all the art works were moved out, more desks and computer monitors were moved in. Security was quickly put in place. People signed in when they arrived and signed out every time they left the building. Water bottles and hand-sanitisers were stacked on what was previously the reception counter. Spaces were allocated; where there wasn’t an allocation, someone took the initiative. Maps of the city and the greater region were enlarged and pasted on walls. The pace was frenetic, yet calm. The army arrived. More than 1,400 military personnel were later identified as being involved in the response and recovery phases. They provided logistics support, equipment, transport, airbridges, helped with the desalination plants in the eastern suburbs, assisted the police with security and managed the cordons immediately in place surrounding the city centre. They provided the ‘command and control’ mechanisms needed in a time of a major disaster.141 The USAR teams were once again deployed to check suburban houses and properties.

Assessing the havoc wreaked on the city was an immediate and a longer term task, involving geotechnical and structural engineers, experts in roads and bridges, in what had happened beneath the ground as well as on top of it. Infrastructure damage was immense, later assessed at more than $2 billion – affecting roads, underground water and waste pipes. Over half the city’s roads were damaged; there were more than 50,000 potholes to fix of varying dimensions and depths; there were 30 broken bridges and 600 cracked or fractured retaining walls. More than 424 kilometres of water and sewer pipes needed to be repaired or replaced.142 It was no wonder then, that access was a major problem from Day One. Even though, as had been said in the weeks that followed the September quake, Christchurch was a city of two halves; even though there was less obvious damage in the north and to the west of the city, it became apparent, as assessments continued, that damage particularly to infrastructure was wide-spread. This time, homes and properties across the city were badly damaged.

For Housing New Zealand’s Christchurch staff, disaster recovery was part of the work plan, if not before 4 September, definitely after. There had been thousands of earthquakes in the intervening five months, some bigger than others, and all enough to give practical consideration to what needed to be done in an emergency situation. There was barely time to have any defined learnings from the September quake, even so, there was an immediate realisation that two teams would once again be required – one to contribute to the national disaster recovery based at the Art Gallery, and the other to visit every tenant in every house and check on their welfare. The twin roles could be juggled according to a hastily established roster with staff from other centres flying in to assist.

David Griffiths said his teams were once again at the forefront; they were practised in knowing what to do by now. ‘The job had just got bigger, although

141 Jane Parfitt , General Manager City Environment Christchurch City Council, ‘Disaster Response: Lessons learned from Christchurch’ Paper presented to Australian Civil Military Centre, January 2012.142 ibid


it was very different.’143 Little wonder staff said the September quake had been the dress rehearsal.

………………………………….

Andrew Booker flew down from Auckland on 23 February, taking one of the $50 flights that Air New Zealand was offering to people who wanted to help. He had family in the city, so finding accommodation wasn’t an issue, although petrol was, and he found an old bicycle that he said later was a very good means of transport from one side of the city to the other. ‘It was much easier to swerve around sumps, patches of liquefied mud, cracks and fissures in the streets than it was to drive.’144 Not always an easy means of transport when carrying water bottles, he soon realised. ‘I could fit four 1-litre bottles into my back pack and four more in each of two separate bags which I tried to balance on the handlebars – one bag on each side.’145

He walked into Housing New Zealand’s Papanui office and said: ‘I’m here to help.’146

At the Art Gallery, Housing New Zealand’s team was once again based with the Welfare Advisory Group on the ground floor, to the right of the entrance and the stairway and beyond the area designated for the public information centre.147 It was a repeat of the September emergency: they were in the bunker. Trestle tables and chairs were available as were computer terminals. There were no allocated seats – no priority placings – people sat where there was a space, found a chair if there wasn’t one immediately available, logged on and got going. Rosters were created and circulated; there was a 24 hour meal service available from the former Alchemy restaurant in the building, plus meals prepared and packaged for the search and rescue teams who were constantly on the move. There was a perpetual supply of tea, coffee and biscuits. It was another of the many essential jobs done behind the scenes. Housing New Zealand staff who weren’t at the Art Gallery or checking on tenants were also rostered to the Welfare Centres which had been set up almost immediately at Burnside High School, Cowles Stadium and Pioneer Stadium.148 It was a repeat performance except everyone was better prepared. And it was crowded. Now there were many more volunteers, stepping into new roles, taking over to allow tired staff to take a break, learning as they were going along.

Everyone who wasn’t in Christchurch wanted to know what was happening. Scores of media personnel from overseas as well as New Zealand were camped outside the Art Gallery, cameras at the ready, waiting for news. On 24 February, Housing Minister Phil Heatley emerged from the Cabinet meeting in Wellington and was immediately interviewed by National Radio’s Kathryn Ryan.

143 David Griffiths, 28 April 2016.144 Andrew Booker, 22 January 2016.145 ibid146 ibid147 PIM is an integral part of emergency management and has its own structure and requirements.148 Rebecca Dell, Daniel Williams, ‘Public Health Response to 22 February 2011 Christchurch Earthquake’ Progress Report 30 March 2011.


The Corporation’s national call centre was being inundated with calls, he said. Up to 3,900 calls per day. Mostly chimneys again falling through roofs, hot water cylinders, burst pipes, windows shattering… ‘In terms of the general housing population, teams will be assessing the state of Christchurch houses in the suburbs this morning. We are sending out 40 teams of four, consisting of building officials, engineers and welfare officers in Brighton, Dallington, Avonside, Wainoni, Avondale, Parklands, Queenspark, St Martins, Opawa and Lyttelton.’ The teams were assessing not just the properties, but the welfare needs of the people, he explained. ‘What we do know, is that this time around, there are a large number of residents who have actually decided to leave Christchurch, and we know that eventually, through experience, they will be away for three days, or a week, maybe two weeks, and then we’ll need quite a significant accommodation supply in Christchurch and we’re working on that at the moment.’

The Minister signalled that prefabricated modular housing would be required in Christchurch. ‘The Department of Building and Housing are in direct discussions with housing providers, and those who actually provide such accommodation…we’ve previously contacted them, of course because of the September earthquake, now we’re bringing all that work forward…In the next 48 hours, we’ll have a good feel for sites, what temporary accommodation can be erected and how long that will take.’149

Later the same day, the Minister issued a general media statement. Housing New Zealand would provide a temporary accommodation service to people displaced by the earthquake. ‘Housing New Zealand will collate and coordinate offers of accommodation from around the country on behalf of the civil defence effort, and work directly with the people of Canterbury to match them to the most appropriate accommodation available for them,’ he said. In order to do this quickly the HELP line and website had been reinstated to provide a matching service. ‘As of this morning, 1,184 calls have been made to the 0800 HELP line since the earthquake, most of them with accommodation offers. Housing New Zealand staff have also been putting people up in their own homes.’ The Corporation would be working with other agencies and private businesses to coordinate the offers received on behalf of the civil defence effort.150

In Auckland, there was a concentrated effort to help Cantabrians who had fled the region. Civil Defence had established a reception centre at Lambie Drive in Papatoetoe where staff from Housing New Zealand, WINZ, CYFs, Victim Support, Red Cross and other agencies were available to help. Already the centre had dealt with more than 400 families needing assistance. Staff were diverted to help displaced current tenants and people who weren’t existing state tenants turning up at the neighbourhood units in Auckland and to direct them to Lambie Drive.

Tania Eden, the Regional Manager for the Corporation’s Auckland East, emailed: ‘We have alerted the Airport Welfare team to advise all evacuees to go to the Reception Centre at Lambie Drive and fact sheets are being distributed as we speak regarding available services and processes for support.’151

Less than a week later, Minister Heatley announced there would be rent

149 Interview between Hon Phil Heatley, Minister of Housing and Kathryn Ryan, Radio New Zealand, 24 February 2011.150 Media release: Hon Phil Heatley, Minister of Housing, 24 February 2011.151 Email sent to Housing New Zealand internal earthquake teams, Monday 28 February 2011.

Image: Extreme damage to an HNZ property on Bridle Path Road following the 22 February earthquake

Images: Demolition was the only answer for many Corporation houses that were too badly damaged to be repaired


relief for state tenants affected and displaced by the earthquakes. There would be immediate rent reductions including zero rent for 2,500 tenants in 32 Christchurch suburbs that had been very badly affected by the earthquakes. As a result, there was an immediate media buzz of interest with queries from other regions wanting to know about local impact if any.

By the beginning of March more than 2,000 people from Canterbury had registered at Auckland’s reception centres. They had been accommodated either through community organisations, billets or motels. Auckland’s City Council had sent 144 staff to Wellington and Christchurch, including civil defence personnel, 60 building inspectors, three engineers and 40 contractors. The Auckland Fire Service had sent 69 officers to Canterbury and District Health Boards from the Auckland region had sent 15 doctors south and 19 nurses.

………………………………….

In Christchurch, the priorities were staff and tenants. ‘Our immediate need was to inspect what had happened,’ John Tubberty said. ‘We had to get out to see the tenants and very quickly get an idea of what had happened to our properties. We made many return visits. Our first scan was to check on tenants. Our second scan was on the house. We had multiple surveys and multiple survey reports. All of them were important for the insurance claim. We needed to understand what damage related to which earthquake and calibrate what could be claimed and what couldn’t.’152

Duncan Holland arrived back in Christchurch once again to assess the situation from a health and safety perspective. ‘This time everyone was much more organised. It wasn’t about ‘inventing’ it was about ‘activating’, about dealing with the response,’153 he said. But the damage was much worse. ‘The trauma was much worse. So many people were emotionally exhausted. And the damage. Driving around the eastern suburbs was like driving on a river bed.’154

The systems that he had introduced after the September quake were reviewed and reintroduced. Emphasis was on staff and tenants. In many ways, he said later, what was put in place for Canterbury changed the organisation’s whole attitude to health and safety.

Everyone, whether staff or volunteers, engineers or contractors checked in at the Papanui office on a daily basis. Once again, it was the best and the safest place for teams to meet and work. There were meetings to discuss the day’s activities, rosters were confirmed, staff who were delegated to visit tenants were provided with a vehicle, water, and if they weren’t local, with a map of the city. The small administration team was fully occupied organising pick-ups from the airport, arranging transport and finding accommodation – one of the biggest challenges in the first few difficult days.

‘We would find accommodation then find a supermarket that was functioning, stock up on essential food supplies, collect people from the airport, get them settled and then provide them with their roster,’155 Julie Habberjam

152 John Tubberty, 4 May 2016.153 Duncan Holland, 16 May, 2016.154 ibid155 Julie Habberjam, 22 January 2016.

Image: Assessing the level of damage was a challenging and

time -consuming task, important for the insurance claim as much

as for HNZ’s decision about demolition or repair


said. Out-of-towners were buddied with local staff and, armed with their maps, walked from street to street, knocking on tenants’ doors.

Looking after the volunteers who had flown in to help was a full time job. They were given a day’s training, provided with a mobile phone and a laptop and Housing New Zealand’s 0800 number. ‘We also had more than 20 people through temp agencies – they were hairdressers and out-of-work real estate agents – of course, there weren’t any houses to sell at the time. They helped staff the Emergency Centres and the MSD vans. At one stage we had a king tide which lapped the doorway to the Mt Pleasant Yacht Club where one of the Emergency Centres was set up. Our volunteers stayed on the job until we turned up and told them to go home. There wasn’t anything they could do. They did a great job for us and allowed our local and permanent staff to get on with checking on tenants.’156

‘It was extraordinary,’ Andrew Booker said. ‘Our teams would be working one side of the street and various welfare agencies were working the other. Then we would swap sides and start again.’157 Not one property was missed out.

‘We found many tenants had already gone – we didn’t know where. Other tenants rang the (national) call centre and said they were leaving. Tenants, especially families, whose homes were too damaged to be safe, often found friends or relations to stay with on a temporary basis. Our tenants, like everyone else, were extremely resourceful in the face of such a crisis.’158

There were times when rules and regulations were over complicated and unnecessary. The Corporation’s assessment teams needed to get Council-issued permits to enter tenants’ houses that had been vacated. That meant getting into the cordoned central city red zone and into the Art Gallery to find where the Council staff were located, to get the requisite papers.

The system employed immediately after the September quake was once again put into practice; some people joked that they hadn’t had time to stop from one quake to another. The same generic scoping sheets were reprinted and photocopied; the same checks required; the same 1-10 damage scale repeated, except this time it was tripled, quadrupled in time and activity. Once again, Peter Wild had flown down from Wellington. ‘We would give the same scoping sheet to everyone going out into the field – sometimes to more than 50 people. They would fill them in as they moved from house to house, and we would then modify the sheet to make sure we had covered everything that needed to be identified. It was great for us, and great for the insurance assessors. If we worked hard in September, we worked harder this time. Everything became more difficult and more complicated. It was impossible to explain to anyone who wasn’t here, experiencing it for themselves.’159

‘This time, there was a huge amount of pressure from Wellington. Everyone wanted to know what was happening. Reports were required for the Minister as well as our Chief Executive. Everything had to be as accurate as possible, but it was very complicated. If we had thought September was bad, February was much, much worse. I was provided with a four-wheel drive vehicle so that I could get around the city. But it took me five whole hours to find a petrol station to fill up.’160

156 Andrew Booker, 13 April 2016.157 Andrew Booker, 22 January 2016.158 ibid159 Peter Wild, 31 March 2016.160 Peter Wild, 31 March 2016.


The teams worked in pairs, as much for safety as for anything else. ‘The work itself didn’t faze me,’ Malcolm Jones said afterwards. ‘We had to look at all our properties from a technical and practical perspective. We could see how the direction of the quake had impacted on our houses. What did faze me, though, was the level of destruction. It was terrible. We were asked to identify damage according to the 1-10 categories developed by Peter Wild. The city was divided into areas so we could move around more easily. Sometimes houses were on an angle, at other times they had just sunk gracefully into the ground.’161 The teams looked at the services and functionality of every property to decide whether tenants should be moved or whether they could stay.

‘We had urgent repairs to be done. It was all about safety for our tenants and the houses they were living in.’162

While the teams were checking on tenants, the loss adjustors were busy assessing damage, reading the survey reports and determining what additional information they required. Vero had remained Housing New Zealand’s principal insurer. The company had retained Cunningham Lindsey to assess the level of damage after the September earthquake. Now they had to begin all over again. Housing New Zealand’s quality assessment team was assigned to work with them, going from property to property, doing what they had done in the months immediately after the September earthquake, and re-evaluating everything.

Sergon, managed by the Corporation’s Dunedin-based Asset Manager Bill Sharp, and Opus Engineering worked with the Corporation’s teams doing the engineering assessments. But they too were stretched. ‘We needed arms and legs on the ground. Often the engineers provided us with architectural students to help out. It was a good thing we had so many of our own staff with a trades’ background in the quality and audit teams. The staff worked like machines.’163

It was a complicated, challenging task. And it was exhausting. It was as if all the work that had been done since 4 September had been in vain. Every property had to be visited and rechecked. Every house and every room. With 6,127 properties to be looked at, it was obviously going to take months. The loss adjustors by necessity, were working for the insurers, therefore anything that was potentially unrelated to the earthquakes could be discounted for the eventual claim. At the same time, the Corporation’s staff had a much better idea of what damage related to what event, whether damage was age related, tenant related or quake related and could therefore more easily define the cause. This time, it was an exercise that was going to be protracted and complex. Even so, it became apparent relatively quickly, that almost all of the state-owned properties were damaged, some irreparably, particularly those in the city’s eastern suburbs.

Housing New Zealand staff and their many temporary workers maintained their daily schedule of a briefing at the Papanui office every morning and a more concentrated session every evening. It was, according to Andrew Booker, an essential component of the roster system and helped the teams to feel motivated, and importantly, to know they were helping in the crisis. The Corporation attempted to put a limit of working for seven days and then taking a break. But, as Peter Wild said later, it didn’t work. Everyone was completely dedicated to the task at hand. It meant stress levels remained high. ‘Going out

161 Malcolm Jones, 11 April 2016.162 David James 4 May 2016.163 Peter Wild, 31 March 2016.


for a walk at night could be tricky especially going round a corner and finding an army tank coming silently towards you.’164 Trying to tell anyone what was happening who wasn’t involved, was impossible.

The damage was clearly worse in the eastern suburbs than anywhere else. There was no water, power or sewerage systems operating. Staff saw raw sewage floating on front lawns and through vegetable and flower beds. Some of it had found its way from household toilets in Belfast, Malcolm Jones said. Windows had been blown out, roofs buckled, tiles broken and lying in grass in front and behind the houses. Inside, sludge and mud had flowed through rooms, the force of the liquefaction165 lifting carpet and other forms of flooring. Walls were torn and twisted; inter-tenancy walls which separated one tenant’s flat from another in duplex buildings were often similarly damaged. Furniture was ruined, upended, tenants’ belongings were scattered from room to room. It was a complete disaster and it was dangerous work. Accessing properties was complicated by the state of roads, bridges and footpaths. Yet, as doors were opened and tenants not yet moved, staff were met with a grin and an invitation to come in and see what had happened. Not everyone was ready to move and in some instances, in spite of having no power for a refrigerator or cooking facilities, no clean water, no working toilet, no local supermarket operating and no petrol station, some tenants were reluctant to be moved.

The first priority was to find accommodation for tenants who definitely had to move. ‘It was surprising how readily our tenants found their own temporary accommodation’, Sheryl Banks said later. ‘The situation was so bad for everyone that friends and family helped out. It was an extraordinary time.’

The displacement model that had been developed after the September earthquake was reviewed and extended to take into account the potential numbers of people who would be without accommodation. David Griffiths said it was definitely the best tool.

‘We could add in the time factor and work out what was going to be needed.’166

Where houses and properties could have some immediate ‘make safe’ repairs, they were identified and the repair teams sent out to start work. Switched On Group was again engaged to do the immediate essential work. Like Corporation staff, however, they too had their own personal situations to grapple with. Juggling home and work was a challenge. ‘I remember having to go to Lyttelton where we had some properties. Driving through the tunnel was frightening. I couldn’t help thinking ‘what if…’167 Andrew Booker said.

Some properties were quickly identified as unsalvageable – demolition was the only option. Tenants’ belongings were removed and the houses were boarded up. Even so, leaving them for foragers and thieves to break in wasn’t an option. And, because there were still people living in the neighbourhood, it was important to at least maintain the frontage. A mowing contract was organised

164 Peter Wild, 31 March 2016.165 Definition of liquefaction according to the Royal Society: is the term used to describe when some soils behave more like liquid than a solid during the shaking from an earthquake. During an earthquake, the particles are rearranged and compacted, forcing out water onto the surface, creating sand volcanoes, water fountains and surface cracking. Lateral spread can also occur which is when the liquefied soil flows into lower areas such as river channels under the force of gravity.166 David Griffiths, 28 April 2016.167 Andrew Booker, 13 April 2016.

Images: The strength and velocity of the earthquake was such that bricks and roofing tiles often crashed through ceilings


as well as a security company. Arsons had been reported, and the Corporation didn’t want their properties to be damaged any more than had already occurred.

Malcolm Jones and Roger Hopkins (who flew down from Wellington) were asked to write new codes in preparation of the huge repair programme. ‘We were responsible for writing the repair methodology for lathe and plaster walls and ceilings.’ Like many Christchurch homes, the internal walls and ceilings of state houses were originally built using lathe and plaster. ‘There was no accepted industry standard for this work. Fletchers had started overlaying them, but we didn’t believe it would be a long-term solution for us, besides our engineers said lathe and plaster ceilings were too heavy and should be removed.’168

‘Our quality assessors were amazing,’ John Tubberty said. ‘They would crawl into ceiling spaces that the engineers didn’t want to go to. They often highlighted risks that other people had missed.’169

On 8 March, Minister Heatley released another media statement. This time, it concentrated on the house inspections. There were now 50 Corporation staff from other parts of the country working in Christchurch. Checks had been completed on more than 4,500 homes including 2,600 in the eastern suburbs and in other areas badly affected by the earthquake.

‘During the course of these inspections, it became clear to Housing New Zealand that damage in the suburb of Shirley warranted an extension of the rent relief scheme. Consequently all HNZ tenants in Shirley will pay no rent between 22 February and 15 March,’ he said. HNZ will continue to check on the remainder of its more than 6,000 homes in Christchurch over the coming week. More minor repair work is already well under way with more than 2,600 jobs let out to contractors.’170

By itself, the statement couldn’t hope to explain the detailed, comprehensive, time consuming and exhausting work being achieved day after day, in dusty, dirty and often smelly conditions.

On 9 March, the Minister again made headlines when he said thousands of Christchurch residents with quake damaged homes would be required to pay rent when they moved into temporary Government accommodation. Interviewed by Radio New Zealand, he said many residents’ insurance would be able to pay, otherwise there were assistance packages available. Offers of accommodation for people who didn’t want to live in temporary facilities had continued to flow into Housing New Zealand. He wasn’t sure how many people would require accommodation, and this would be monitored week by week. People might be living ‘in this type of accommodation for six months to several years, and he didn’t think ‘it’ would turn into a ghetto.’171

………………………………….

Two weeks after the earthquake, the emergency Welfare Accommodation Centres were closed and replaced with ten Recovery Assistance Centres (RACs). Housing New Zealand staff worked alongside people from WINZ, Red Cross,

168 Malcolm Jones, 11 April 2016.169 John Tubberty, 4 May 2016.170 Media Release: Hon Phil Heatley, 8 March 2011.171 Radio New Zealand, Morning Report, 9 March 2011.

Image: When tenants were moved and houses were deemed

unsalvageable, they were boarded up quickly to prevent thieves breaking in


Christchurch City Council, Quake Support & Counselling Services and Inland Revenue. Mobile vans were also used, equipped with laptops, generators and aerials to access the more isolated areas. As in the weeks following the September quake, Corporation staff were rostered into the Centres and the vans to play their part.

Once again, as teams of staff continued to work their way from house to house, checking on tenants, checking on properties, a plan was taking shape to manage the Asset Group’s requirements. This time, unlike September, the property damage was so great that a dedicated team would be required to manage the recovery not only for February but also for the related post-September repair programme that had to be restarted. Even when the staffing requirements were being discussed, the loss adjustors had to be involved to check on the rationale for any costs relating to recruitment and procurement. Everything hinged on the insurance claim settlement. Nothing could be left unaccounted.

In a newsletter to tenants on 22 March 2011, Regional Manager Kevin Third, who had taken over from David Griffiths when the latter resigned to take on the job of establishing temporary housing in Greater Christchurch, commented: ‘no one thought we would have another earthquake so soon, especially one that would cause as much destruction to our community as that of 22 February. My sincere sympathies to those of you who have lost loved ones or friends in this tragedy. More than 100 Housing New Zealand staff from throughout the country have been in Christchurch assisting us to contact you and inspect your home for damage. Working seven days a week, and very long hours, these teams inspected all but a handful of our more than 6,000 properties within 14 days. With these initial property inspections finished, staff are returning with engineers to assess homes where structural damage has been found…sadly all the damage is going to take a long time to fix.’

Kevin Third reminded tenants to continue to boil water from taps and tankers before drinking, to avoid waterways because they were contaminated with untreated sewage and to be careful because of silt contamination. ‘If you have to work with silt, wear waterproof gloves, gumboots and a dust mask; shower or wash immediately afterwards and wash clothes separately. If you are using a timber-framed toilet with a bucket, it is important you add absorbent material such as kitty litter, sawdust or similar material to the bucket before unwrapping and disposing the material in your red wheelie bin.’ He reminded tenants where they could go for additional information, using any of the Recovery Assistance Centres or the nine Recovery Information Kiosks that had been opened in various suburbs as well as Little River and Akaroa.

In his April update, Kevin Third again reminded all tenants to conserve water and to flush toilets sparingly. If tenants had a chemical toilet or portaloo, they were to use them in preference to house toilets because the sewerage and waste-water system was so fragile. The situation was little changed by June 2011, with the next update explaining the nuances of how to empty chemical toilets and where to get additional chemicals. ‘The City Council is gradually making its way around all the suburbs clearing silt and sand from the city’s wastewater pipes. However, this is slow going, and not all areas have been cleared. If you haven’t had a letter from the Council saying you can once again use your toilet, you must use your chemical toilet.’

………………………………….

Image: Portaloos line a street in Avonside. Photo from Kete Christchurch


In April 2011, John Tubberty set out the case for implementing the Major Recovery Plan, and described the scale and complexity of work required based on assessments to the end of March, not knowing of course, that there were yet more severe earthquakes to come that would influence any earlier decisions. The strategy, he explained later, had been partially determined following the 4 September earthquake. Now it had been refined and signed off by the Board.

‘At the time of writing’, he said, ‘we know that in excess of 4,000 of our houses are damaged to some degree by the Canterbury earthquakes in September 2010 and February 2011. Scoping work for non-structural repairs started on Monday 14 March and is scheduled to be completed in 5 to 6 weeks (end of April). Scoping for structural work is scheduled to start in the week beginning 28 March 2011 with an estimated completion date yet to be determined.’

Now, the scoping work would be done by BECA and Sergon. Preliminary estimates had suggested that there were 3,341 homes that required non-structural repairs and over 700 homes with structural damage. There were still 175 homes to be assessed. Large volumes of the Corporation’s properties across all damage categories were in locations where the future use of the land was still unclear. Decisions about the land and their properties were still some time away and the decision making process would involve central Government-led strategic planning activities with multiple stakeholders.

The Corporation had 353 Home Lease Programme (HLP)172 properties in Christchurch which needed to be inspected by the Earthquake Commission to determine what remedial or reinstatement work was required. Community Group Houses as in September, were included in the overarching assessment and inspection programme although implemented independently to take into account vulnerable tenants. It was, in all respects, a mammoth undertaking. Existing staff and resources wouldn’t be sufficient.

Five work streams would be created to cover the proposed repair and rebuild programme over a five year period from 2011 to 2016. They included strategic land and asset planning, emergency heating and roof repairs, minor repairs and non-structural reinstatement, structural reinstatement and new builds. Each work stream would contain its own projects.

The strategic land and asset planning group would need to integrate the key decisions relating to earthquake damage by the Government and others including land use, infrastructure investment and community development with the Corporation’s asset management strategy and long term capital and tactical plans. It would need to take into account changes in demand and supply, need and typology demand, concentration and density requirements, land remediation costs and asset lifecycle planning.

The second work stream was specifically designed to manage emergency heating and roof repairs both of which needed to be completed before winter 2011. The response, John Tubberty signalled, might be temporary emergency heating while longer term solutions were being developed.

The third work stream would concentrate on minor repairs and non-structural reinstatement. It would be at least a two year programme working on houses where the future use of the land wasn’t in any doubt. The initial work would include scoping, the procurement process for engaging contractors and the management of the contracts once agreed. Work stream four was

172 Housing New Zealand leased privately owned properties to help boost the amount of affordable housing available in areas of high demand. Ref: HNZ Website.


concentrated on structural reinstatement. Similar to the non-structural reinstatement, it would focus on properties where the future use of the land wasn’t in any doubt.

The fifth work stream concentrated on new construction and redevelopments. It covered the implementation of approved new building and redevelopment programmes arising from key decisions made about land and houses that had been significantly impacted by earthquake damage. It included the procurement process and programme management of delivery contracts. John Tubberty anticipated this work stream would take up to five years to complete.

Then there were the leased properties to be considered. A work stream to manage this programme was to be established by the Corporation’s Lease Services Unit. Activities would include accompanying EQC inspectors, following up with owners about any remedial work required, liaising with owners to understand when work would take place and liaising with Tenant Services staff if any tenants had to be relocated.

For the dedicated recovery team, to be based in Christchurch, a mix of 12 to 24 month contracts for all positions was proposed. John Tubberty estimated that within the first 12 to 18 months a more extensive detailed strategy and implementation plan would be developed and the resource requirements would need to be reviewed once the strategy was approved.

Even as plans were being drawn up and approved by the Board, Mother Nature once again delivered a resounding blow.


Aftershocks continued at an accelerated rate after the February earthquake. It was as if the tectonic plates couldn’t decide where to settle. But the work must go on. At the end of April 2011, the Civil Defence National Emergency Phase officially ended. At the same time, the Government’s newly created organisation to oversee the Recovery Phase officially started work. The Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority CERA leased two floors of a Government building in Winstone Avenue, Papanui. Structural engineers had assessed the building prior to the small band of CERA staff moving in. Even so, it was regarded by its occupants as not being the most stable edifice in the city. Some of the CERA staff, like Warwick Isaacs and Baden Ewart, remained in the Art Gallery bunker, close to the demolition action taking place in the cordoned off inner city red zone.

The twin earthquakes that struck Christchurch on Monday 13 June 2011 were an unexpected disaster – a double shock for everyone in the city. The first one, a magnitude 5.6 happened at 1pm. It was 8.9 kilometres deep. An hour and 20 minutes later an even bigger quake registering 6.3 at a depth of only 6 kilometres hit the city yet again. Similar to the February quake in size yet without the violent shaking. But it was bad enough. Could things get much worse? As one wit reported later: ‘the whole fault system seems to be progressively unzipping from west to east, and the locus of seismic activity has now moved past Christchurch and is heading out to sea.’173

This time several buildings particularly in the inner city which were already deemed unsafe, were now declared unsalvageable. The quakes were an immediate justification for keeping the area within the four avenues closed to the public. Although Earthquake Minister Brownlee flew to Christchurch and was available for the first media conference in the early evening, there was no decision to declare another state of emergency, either local or national.

This time the Art Gallery was temporarily vacated and Bob Parker found suitable premises in Simpson Grierson’s legal offices on Hereford Street opposite the fenced off Arts Centre, where the Council’s Emergency Operations Centre could be activated. The building was wooden, two-storeyed and usually

173 Chris Rowan, ‘Highly Allochthonous’, 13 June 2011.

1 The Red Zones

Images: Many red-zoned houses were already badly damaged from the

earlier earthquakes

89Part 2: Chapter 1: The Red Zones

occupied by office workers. There was a portable toilet outside, and there was enough space for portable computers to be set up and a ‘war-room’ created in what was usually the Company’s board room. A 24 hour roster was established for the first 72 hours with reports flowing in about the extent of additional damage. It was yet another heartache for a city already severely ravaged. GNS lead scientist Kelvin Berryman arrived to front a media conference.

This time the quakes were on a fault to the south-east of the city. Once again phones were overloaded. There were public requests for people to text rather than ring.

Reports flowed in of one person killed, scores of injuries and many parts of the city again without power. There were more rock slides, more liquefaction, burst water pipes, more dust, more traffic jams. More damage to the ChristChurch Anglican Cathedral, more damage to the historic Godley House at Diamond Harbour. Flights in and out of the city were temporarily halted. The tunnel between Lyttelton and Christchurch was once again closed while engineers assessed it for any damage.

Housing New Zealand was barely through the first round of its property assessments. Andrew Booker who had returned to Wellington in March, flew back to Christchurch to help and worked in the Aranui office alongside Bob Hardie. A team from PQS arrived back in the city. They were all accommodated at Speights Ale House on Bealey Avenue, which Julie Habberjam said, was an excellent venue for early morning meetings. The team could have a briefing immediately after breakfast, before they headed out. ‘One of the bedrooms was set up as an ops room and we gave them their scoping sheets and discussed what they needed to do for the day.’174

This time in addition to more general damage, the inspections showed major problems with inter-tenancy walls. ‘The teams would go up into the manhole and they could see the walls were compromised.’175 Some of the walls had been temporarily repaired after the September earthquake. Now the damage was much more severe. The walls appeared to be safe from floor to ceiling, but the damage from the ceiling to the roof line was too bad for tenants to remain in the units. The most affected properties, according to Malcolm Jones were twin units that were double-storeyed and twin units that were single storeyed.176

‘No-one was specifically targeting inter-tenancy walls so Roger (Hopkins) and I wrote the methodology to be applied. Scaffolding was needed and as a result we needed building inspectors to check the work. Fortunately we had a very good working relationship with the Council and we were able to start the inter-tenancy wall repair programme quite quickly.’177

Nationally, Housing New Zealand had started a major transformation programme in 2009 and now, although the Canterbury staff had plenty on their plate, they weren’t immune from the challenges proposed by the new programme. It involved replacing all core systems, redesigning the Corporation’s service delivery model and making changes to the main business processes and organisational culture. It incorporated an enterprise transformation initiative to update out-moded technology, aspects of which were more than 20 years old. It was a complicated time. Yet the emphasis in Canterbury had to remain on the

174 Julie Habberjam, 15 April 2016.175 ibid176 Double storeyed twin units aka Tuds. Two units that were single storeyed were known as Tus’s.177 Malcolm Jones, 11 April 2016.


issues at hand – the impact of the earthquakes. There were inevitable frustrations for the staff who were completely focused on dealing with worried and stressed tenants, accommodation issues and property assessments. Absorbing anything new was another hurdle to be overcome.

The earthquake recovery programme had moved of necessity from Tenancy Services to Asset Development in line with the changes within the Corporation. The recruitment plan initiated by John Tubberty was starting to take shape. With the organisation involved in its comprehensive restructure, it meant the usual HR team was otherwise fully engaged. ‘So, I brought in an external consultant, Miriam Williams, to help me find the right people,’178 he said.

Andrew Booker was appointed as the Quality Assurance and Reporting Manager. ‘Our immediate focus, in addition to the ongoing assessments, checks and reviews of our properties, was the insurance claim,’179 he said. It was a huge undertaking, something that could only be fully appreciated by the people on the ground.

‘The quality of photographs from the September quake weren’t good enough. This time around we had to do better. Our survey forms had to be completed more fully in order to better justify our statements on our insurance claim. At the same time, we had to continue on with the emergency repair programme.’180

From its exhaustive checks and rechecks, supported by engineers’ reports, Housing New Zealand was now confident that the majority of its properties had been damaged through a combination of the September and February quakes, enhanced in some areas by the ongoing aftershocks in between. June wasn’t going to make life any easier and winter was already beginning.

It was difficult to tell how many tenants had left the city and the region. Early estimates of total numbers of residents who had left suggested more than 10,000 people had gone.181 How many of those were tenants was anyone’s guess. The vacated state houses couldn’t be re-tenanted without essential checks taking place – on the property, inside and outside the house, whether former tenants’ belongings were still there and if so what should be done with them. In many cases, the properties were deemed too damaged to be re-tenanted without repair work being done. They were boarded up and added to the list.

Because many of the properties had to be revisited after the June 2011 earthquakes, Housing New Zealand agreed with the loss adjustors that the best approach to finalise the insurance claim was to try and match levels of damage against the three major events – September, February and now June. The claim was further complicated by different international insurers being involved in different claims. ‘We locked everything into Speedscan under the dates in the three defined time periods,’182 Malcolm Jones said.

‘In many ways, we were in a similar situation to private home owners with three major events, each being individually assessed for quake damage. It was the only way we could arrive at some resolution with ongoing differences of opinion between the loss adjustors and ourselves,’ Andrew Booker said. ‘We

178 John Tubberty, 4 May 2016.179 Andrew Booker, 13 April 2016.180 John Tubberty, 4 May 2016.181 Newell J, Beaven S, D.M. Johnston: GNS Science Miscellaneous Series 44 April 2012. ‘Population movements following the 2010 and 2011 earthquakes: summary of research workshops’ November 2011; current evidence.182 Malcolm Jones, 11 April 2016.


were a small team to begin with. Barry Brownsea, Malcolm Jones and myself working with our contractor Catherine McDonald. We had significant support from our Wellington office, particularly from our Chief Financial Officer, Scott Scoullar.’183

The team grappled with challenges almost on a daily basis with everything being challenged and discussed. It took many months for some of the more complex assessments to be negotiated and agreed on. A case in point, according to Andrew Booker, was enamel paint. ‘Who could imagine such a small thing could turn into such a major problem?’ But it did. ‘We had to show we had evidence-based arguments for our case. On this occasion, we wrote a paper on the cost comparison of preparation for painting over enamel paint. We had been asked by the loss adjustors to explain our reasoning for requiring acrylic paint rather than enamel and the cost differential of applying either type of coating. We had a number of properties where the bathroom surfaces were painted in high gloss enamel. Our maintenance standards required that enamel paint when below its acceptable standard should be replaced with acrylic. Our paint supplier was Dulux and we required our contractors to comply with their application guidelines.’

The discussion between the loss adjustors and the Corporation’s negotiators was about the cost difference in acrylic paint compared with enamel paint. Housing New Zealand’s experience backed up by its supplier, was that if enamel was the current surface then it would require extra preparation no matter what paint system was going to be applied. Cunningham Lindsey said that they believed enamel over enamel was a like to like insurance requirement and that it could be cheaper than the Corporation’s current methodology.

The Corporation’s negotiators were able to prove conclusively that replacing enamel paint with acrylic was significantly cheaper than replacing ‘like to like’ – enamel with enamel.

‘We often sought advice and costings from three different organisations, engineers and quantity surveyors to justify our position. It was critical that we demonstrated the cost of everything that would relate to repairs and reconstruction, the methodology we would be applying for repairs and the rates. We always used facts. For example, we surveyed 100 houses for drainage damage to prove our costings were correct. We asked BECA Engineering to explain the methodology for lifting houses. And we used BECA to document safety. It was an enormous challenge but in the end we believed we argued our case very professionally.’184

………………………………….

On 23 June, ten days after the twin earthquakes, the Prime Minister John Key and Earthquake Recovery Minister Gerry Brownlee led the announcements of the new land zones. For Housing New Zealand’s staff on the ground - continuing their assessments, engineers’ checks, determining what was salvageable and what wasn’t; continuing liaison with their insurers - the proposed residential red zones were almost inevitable. Jeanette Gower

183 Andrew Booker, 13 April 2016.184 ibid


commented later that they weren’t unexpected. ‘We could see that there were parts of Christchurch and Kaiapoi that were uninhabitable. We were working there every day. Our engineers and maintenance people knew that many of our houses were in suburbs that were too badly damaged.’185

The new red zones were in Dallington, Richmond, Avondale and a large portion of Bexley as well as substantial parts of Avonside, some areas in Burwood and Brooklands and included an estimated 5,000 properties. Areas of Kaiapoi were also red-zoned. The announced orange zones were the ‘hold’ zones so designated because they were areas which had suffered further damage in recent aftershocks and would require more extensive geotechnical investigation before a final decision could be made. There were 100,000 green properties where, technical experts had determined there was no significant land issue. Finally, there was the white zone which covered the inner city and the Port Hills.

Housing New Zealand sent letters to every tenant living in the identified residential red zones. Signed by Kevin Third, they explained the situation clearly and precisely. ‘…Your home is in the Red Zone. Properties in the Red Zone are where the Government has said it is not sensible to rebuild on the land at the moment, and nor is it sensible to repair damaged homes in the Red Zone. The Government has made these decisions based on advice from experts. We know this may be alarming to you on top of everything else. But this news doesn’t mean your house is unsafe unless we tell you that it is. Inspections are currently being undertaken. The Government is going to come back to private homeowners in your area in about eight weeks’ time and Housing New Zealand will do the same for you…’

In a general newsletter to Canterbury tenants, Kevin Third explained the implications of the new zones. The Corporation was visiting all tenants in the Christchurch and Kaiapoi residential red zones to explain what the announcements would mean and what would be done. ‘For tenants living in the orange zone, we have written to let them know we are waiting to get more information from the Government about the state of the land, and we will be back in touch with them as soon as we have it. If you haven’t received a letter from us, it is because your home is either in the green or white zones.’ The state of the land was important, he wrote, because it affected the Corporation’s ability to repair properties that had been damaged.

The land zones were to be enforced within a specified period. Property owners could challenge the decisions, but in all but a few cases, the zones stood. The Government would buy red zoned properties from their owners at a pre-determined price; there was a specific time period to decide whether to challenge the price during which the owners could also negotiate with their insurance company to see whether they could get a better price. It was a fair offer, but it was complicated as was everything at the time. People who were stressed and anxious with the ongoing aftershocks didn’t always have the ‘good’ sense they would normally have when deciding to sell their homes and move. Elderly people who had lived in their neighbourhoods for decades and who didn’t have any experience in negotiating sales often struggled to make decisions. Families who had already been dislocated by the chain of events often decided to take the Government offer and move – but where to go? Options were, as one saddened resident said, limited by location and price. They were also limited by age, disability and emotional anxiety. The enforced relocation of several thousand

185 Jeanette Gower, 22 March 2016.

Images: Kevin Third, a highly regarded and popular regional

manager who spent several months in Christchurch during the worst of the post-quake period. Kevin passed

away in December 2015


home owners, renters, tenants and businesses was the equivalent of a new town, except there was no new town to move to. Vacant properties within the city limits which were green rather than red zoned were expensive and, depending on the land category186, required costly foundations. Treasury estimated the cost to the Government to buy the 5,000 red zoned properties would be between $485 million and $635 million.

Unlike private property owners, Housing New Zealand didn’t qualify for the Government’s buyout. At final count, 215 state houses were red zoned, 27 of which were in Kaiapoi. It was dispiriting news to everyone. Some tenants wanted to move out straight away and the Corporation made the necessary arrangements to find alternative accommodation. Others preferred to stay longer, with the knowledge and understanding that eventually they would need to go elsewhere.

In many respects, the red zones gave some definition to what was happening. It was easier to see by the maps that were made available, where the biggest hits from the earthquakes had occurred; the impact on waterways; the significance of land that was originally swamp. Green zones were good; orange zones were still to be determined – would they be red or green? There was anxiety and outrage; some people who were zoned red believed they should be green. Others who were zoned green thought it was a mistake and they should be red. Sometimes the red zones drove a line straight through an individual property. There was concern that some home owners would be left in a street that would be isolated when their neighbours moved. There was distress that long-term neighbourhoods would be demolished; families who had grown up together would be dislocated. It was symptomatic of the after-effects of a major disaster, and particularly problematic for people at the lower end of the economic scale.

In a lengthy report commissioned by MBIE, which assessed Greater Christchurch’s housing market, related issues covering the red zone, its families, demographics, income size and relocation were discussed in detail. The report confirmed what most people already knew that families living in the red zones (typically) had slightly lower incomes than other Christchurch families and that they (typically) were likely to ‘struggle to find suitable accommodation at market rents without significant assistance or alternatively clustering in a dwelling with other families to make the rent more affordable.’187

‘Lower income people tend to be the most affected by disasters and take longer to transition through the stages of housing, sometimes remaining for long periods of time in severely damaged homes.’188 It was certainly the case for state tenants, as Housing New Zealand’s longitudinal study later identified.189

On 24 June, Kevin Third sent another update to Housing New Zealand’s staff involved in the earthquake recovery in the Christchurch office and elsewhere. ‘It’s been another challenging week to everyone with a large aftershock of 5.4 at 10.30pm on Tuesday night. This follows on from the aftershocks on 13 June and those that took place in the following days. I realise how difficult this must be for everyone. Continue to keep an eye on your colleagues and if there is

186 TC1, TC2, TC3.187 Livingston & Associates Ltd, Research Report, Greater Christchurch Housing Market Assessment for MBIE, April 2013.188 Statistics NZ: ‘Housing in Greater Christchurch after the earthquakes.Trends in housing from the Census of population and dwellings 1991-2013. Author: Rosemary Goodyear. Published June 2014.189 Refer Part 3: Chapter 2.

Images: Additional damage caused by the twin earthquakes on 13 June, 2011 compounded existing structural damage


anything we can do to help, please let us know…What we are dealing with here is the largest natural disaster we have ever faced in New Zealand…As expected, the big news this week was the Government announcement of a package for homeowners (with insurance) in some of the worst affected areas…I also realise the announcement yesterday would have impacted on some of you personally, on close family members and on friends. We will continue to support you through this as much as we can…’

Kevin Third talked about the additional inspections that had been done since the 13 June aftershocks. ‘We have inspected around 500 properties. These inspections are being done by teams from PQS, BECA, Sergon and our own quality auditors. We are also checking firewalls and if any houses are found to be unsafe, we are moving these tenants straight away as well. We’ve also had out of town support here in Christchurch to help us this week and we’ll have some again next week. Work is being done by CDBI190 to speed up the vacation process and on how we will manage market rent tenants living in homes in the red zone…’

In his weekly email to staff on 1 July, Kevin Third again thanked the many staff who continued to fly in and out of Christchurch helping through the week in the Linwood and Papanui offices. The Minister had been in town talking with the Christchurch Housing Forum191 about progress and meeting with tenants in the residential red zone. Inter-tenancy wall inspections were ongoing and likely to continue for another two weeks. In addition to everything else the Corporation’s national introduction of tenancy reviews had started as had changes to the social allocation system (SAS).

‘From 1 July,’ he wrote, ‘the circumstances of all our new tenants will be reviewed at least every three years to determine the ongoing suitability of their state home and whether other options are available to them…’ It seemed an anomalous situation for Canterbury tenants given the tenuous state of accommodation, but the change was nationwide. ‘From 1 July, we will be using revised SAS criteria to assess housing need and prioritise applicants according to their level of need, and, allocate state houses. Only those in greatest need will get a state house…’192

………………………………….

After the 22 February earthquake and through the following months, many Housing New Zealand tenants had simply walked out. In some cases, they didn’t even take their personal belongings. They left town; they moved in with other family or with friends. Like several thousand other Christchurch residents, they didn’t want to stay. The year drifted to a close with reams of paper documenting damage. The final tally was depressing news. It confirmed what had already been tentatively suggested, that most of Housing New Zealand’s properties had sustained damage to a greater or lesser degree. The Recovery Plan announced by John Tubberty earlier in the year needed to be reviewed. It might have worked before; it definitely didn’t now.

190 CDBI: Customer Delivery Business Improvement 191 The Christchurch Housing Forum was formed in November 1999; it meets every six weeks to discuss housing issues. The lead organisation is Tenants Protection Agency (TPA).192 The Canterbury region was exempted from the new regime until 2017.


The Corporation needed to reassess its asset portfolio, but with the insurance claim still to be settled, it wasn’t going to be easy. At the same time, urgent health and safety repairs were an equal if not a greater priority at least to the frontline staff. The normal procedures and rules that applied to moving tenants were no longer applicable. There had to be a better way.

Global experts in disaster recovery flew into Christchurch. They all had their experiences to offer central and local authorities. They stated that recovery should be driven by the community not by officials; that it would take at least five years, probably ten, before the community would recover. There was also recognition at least by frontline staff across the region that although the formal recovery phase had started with the advent of CERA, thousands of people were still living in a crisis and for them the emergency phase had not ended. There were so many priorities it was difficult to know what, if anything, took precedence.

Insurance was everyone’s worry. In the pre-quake world, property owners – private and commercial – paid insurance which, they believed, was designed to cover specified loss. In addition, New Zealand was fortunate to have the Earthquake Commission, levies of which were part of the annual property insurance cover. It was a commonly held assumption that in the event of a crisis or a disaster, the home owner’s insurance would naturally cover repairs or a rebuild depending on what was required. The infamous ‘small print’ leapt into focus from 4 September 2010 onwards.

Over-cap or under-cap became new words associated with quake repairs. Anything assessed as being under $100,000 was covered by the Earthquake Commission. Over $100,000, the programme was the responsibility of the property owner’s insurance company. There were exceptions. Retaining walls remained the Commission’s responsibility; lateral spread remained the Commission’s responsibility. Red zoned home owners who negotiated with their own insurance company rather than accepting the Government’s offer were suddenly confronted with the Commission which was responsible for the land. It was terribly complicated and for people who had little or no understanding of the legalese involved, it was another burden to bear.193

In August 2011, a communications strategy for Housing New Zealand in Canterbury was approved by the Operations Director Sarah Hill which detailed the specifics of recovery work to date and what communiques were required to ensure major stakeholders including tenants were kept informed.

‘Asset Portfolio has advised, as at late July, that around 2,150 full inspections have been undertaken so far with the remainder to be completed as soon as possible. At this stage, around 165 tenants are in the process of, or will need to be relocated to other Corporation homes.’194

The strategy set out the numbers of Housing New Zealand properties that were in each of the identified zones; 182 were in the red zone of which 77

193 EQC scorecard at Christmas 2015: of 167,357 properties with a building claim, 42% were resolved and paid out (undercap); 40% were resolved and repaired. 16% were resolved and paid out (overcap). 2% were yet to be resolved. Of 187,188 contents claims, 99.9% were settled. 80,166 properties were still to be assessed for land damage of which 75% were resolved and 25% remained work in progress. 7,722 properties in the Port Hills had a land claim; 98% resolved. 9,526 properties currently being assessed for increase flooding vulnerability, 34% resolved, 68% work in progress. 8,753 properties being assessed for increased liquefaction vulnerability; 19% resolved, 81 % work in progress.194 Housing New Zealand Communications Strategy, August 2011.


were currently tenanted, 283 in the orange zone of which 233 were currently tenanted, 5,516 in green zone of which 5,110 were currently tenanted and 136 properties in the white zone of which 131 were still tenanted.

The strategy explained that home owners could expect decisions about movement between zones, for example, from orange to red, or green to orange and so on, would take months. Therefore Housing New Zealand and its tenants could expect it would take some time for final decisions to be made. The Corporation’s approach would be to continue with its own earthquake recovery planning and work collaboratively with the newly formed CERA which would be responsible for decisions about land remediation.

The Corporation’s portfolio of red zoned houses was an added factor to be considered when attempting to redefine its plan for the future. For the Corporation’s tenants, there was nothing to do except wait. But there was more to come.

Over the ensuing months, as the zones were amended and changed, Housing New Zealand tenants living in the orange zones were informed whether they would go green or red. A further 23 tenants living in Kaiapoi were zoned red following a general announcement by Gerry Brownlee on 18 August 2011. Amanda Binns, managing communications for the Corporation, emailed advice to internal staff. She would be working with Kevin Third to find a suitable meeting place for affected tenants so that they could be told in person. ‘As with other Corporation tenants in the Red Zone, HNZC is committed to rehousing them in other state homes. They won’t need to move immediately but we will assist them when the time comes…’195

In his August staff update, Kevin Third talked about additions to the recovery team – Andrew Booker as Project Manager, Assurance and Reporting, Steve Wiffen Quality Auditor, Malcolm Jones as Project Manager Structural work stream, and Steve Worsley in the role of Asset Manager.

‘The Programme Team continues to work alongside Cunningham Lindsey our loss adjustors on the scoping parameters for our claims for the three earthquakes. Running alongside this, work is continuing on developing different work streams to support the programme and on refining the definitions of scope of work. A Registration of Interest will shortly go to market to source various contractors for the repair programme once this has been finalised.’

The Corporation’s Board had been due to visit Christchurch on 26 July but the visit had been postponed due to snow and was now scheduled for 23 August. The itinerary would be the same as before with a visit to the residential red zone in Christchurch, the new (CETAS) temporary accommodation village in Kaiapoi and they would drive through some of the accessible parts of the former Central Business District. They would be accompanied by Bob Hardie, Sarah Hill and John Tubberty. The Board members would lunch with the team in the Papanui office and in the afternoon would go to the Linwood Neighbourhood office.

Kevin Third sent out a fresh update to Canterbury tenants in September. ‘The region has marked a year since the Canterbury earthquake on 4 September. The past year has presented challenges for many of us, which we can expect to continue as the region moves forward with planning for the rebuilding of our city.’ Kevin Third wrote about the snows in Canterbury through the winter months which had closed many roads, schools and businesses, and sometimes

195 Internal email from Amanda Binns, 19 August 2011.

Image: The heavy snowfall in July 2011 added to existing problems for

tenants and HNZ staff


Corporation offices. He commented on the August announcements for Kaiapoi and that around 1,000 properties in Kaiapoi and Pines Beach had been rezoned from orange to red. He explained that in addition to Canterbury’s earthquake recovery, the Corporation had initiated a programme to modernise its frontline services…

‘The proposal looks to de-clutter the roles of housing managers so they can be out in the community working with tenants. To enable this, we will be introducing new technology to reduce paperwork and allow us to deliver services more efficiently. It is also proposed to strengthen our phone-based Customer Services Centre so you can have more routine enquiries looked after quickly over the phone.’ Due to the Linwood Neighbourhood Unit being closed because of the earthquakes, Christchurch had already had the opportunity to be working in a similar way to what was being proposed nationally.

‘We have equipped a group of housing managers with laptops, phones, cameras and the support necessary to do their work out in the community, in tenants’ homes and community facilities. Additionally, the Accommodation Team working out of the Linwood office has five needs assessors who have also been equipped to go mobile. The Christchurch approach is a good example of how we would like more of our staff to be able to work around the country over time.’196

By the beginning of November 2011, most of Housing New Zealand’s tenants remaining in the residential red zones (Kaiapoi and Christchurch), had been moved out.197 Switched On Group was contracted to undertake a six week work programme covering 400 now vacant and/or structurally damaged state-owned properties including those that had been red zoned. They were to board up every house – doors and windows. Garages were to be similarly boarded up and two metre high temporary fencing put up. All letter boxes, furniture and rubbish remaining from tenants was to be removed and a grass cutting regime put in place. A sample audit would be undertaken by Housing New Zealand’s quality auditors and the insurance loss adjustors to assess the timeliness, quality and cost of the work.198

The city’s Christmas gift was a nasty aftershock on Friday 23 December. It measured 5.8 and created more liquefaction in the eastern suburbs. It was followed by an even stronger magnitude 6 quake less than two hours later. Another swarm of aftershocks came in waves. Because they were further towards the east than the previous quakes, there were initial fears of a potential tsunami.

‘Everyone had gone on leave,’ Malcolm Jones said. ‘It was early afternoon. Sheryl Banks and I were looking after the Christchurch office. We were obviously not going to get any time off. Andrew Booker was in Christchurch. We talked to him; he rang Sean Bignell199 in Auckland who agreed we should ring PQS and request a large team to come to Christchurch as soon as possible. They arrived on Boxing Day. We set about revisiting 500 properties just on the coast of the eastern suburbs, in Parklands, New Brighton and South New Brighton. They reported more damage to inter-tenancy walls and to external brickwork. We decided to move further inland checking houses until we reached the point

196 Tenant newsletter, 12 September 2011.197 All red zoned tenants from Christchurch and Kaiapoi were moved to alternative accom-modation by mid-2012.198 HNZ: Programme of Special Work, letter and terms of contractual arrangement. 4 November 2011.199 Sean Bignell, General Manager Asset Development.


where there was little or no apparent further damage. We stopped checking properties when we got to Linwood. It was the right decision.’200

‘Be aware of further aftershocks. Drop cover and hold. Look after each other, look after the neighbours, stay safe…’ The same suite of messages came from local Civil Defence staff who were also immediately out on the job. CERA produced its own update reporting that the quakes had resulted in rock fall behind the containers at Scarborough and more liquefaction at Parklands. Police started aerial reconnaissance to check for damage across the city…201

………………………………….

Towards the end of June 2011, Civil Defence National Controller John Hamilton commissioned a second independent earthquake review.202 He wanted to get a clear picture of what had happened with lessons learned which could be used to formulate plans for managing disasters in the future.

‘The success of the emergency response was (also) due to the resilience of the Christchurch community and work by community organisations. Most of the rescues were by people close by and help for those in need was mostly provided by neighbours, community organisations including marae and churches or by the recently emergent voluntary organisations like the Student Army and the farmy army.’

The report went on to conclude that ‘at the time of the earthquake, the local civil defence emergency management structures were dysfunctionally divided and recovery from the 4 September 2010 earthquake had stalled. The scale of the disaster and the need for national resources required a declaration of national emergency. The scale, together with the weakness of the CDEM co-operation between Christchurch City Council and the CDEM Group required a nationally recognised figure with high mana to be in charge in Christchurch…’

‘The event in its magnitude and complexity was in many ways overwhelming. For emergency services in the first 24 hours, far more demands were received than these services had resources to respond. Their overall efforts were commendable and on many occasions courageous. The scale of the event and volume of calls seeking assistance from a traumatised population placed great strain on emergency service operations. In this demanding and difficult operational environment, Police, Fire Service and St John Ambulances responded well. The NZDF contribution to the response was overwhelmingly positive and facilitated by the fortuitous presence of troops for an NZDF exercise and the HMNZS Canterbury being in Lyttelton.’

‘The City Council faced an immense job in restoring its water and waste water services and its roads, but managed the task competently and effectively. The cellphone service proved remarkably resilient and provided the core of communications, without which the response would have been severely hampered. The success of the lifelines sector was due to a high level of preparedness, including an understanding of the vulnerability of lifelines’ assets.’203

200 Malcolm Jones, 11 April 2016.201 Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority: 23 December 2011.202 The first independent earthquake review was commissioned following the 4 September 2010 earthquake.203 Report on the 22 February Earthquake by Ian McLean Consultancy Services, 28 June


In January 2012, Christchurch City Council’s Director of Operations Jane Parfitt presented a paper to the Australian Civil-Military Centre. ‘A disaster of the scale that befell Christchurch in February 2011, brings with it challenges that can never be predicted. Organisations with different operating styles, mandates and cultures are thrown together to work for a common purpose.’

Her comments were the clearest affirmation to date of what was happening in Christchurch in the wake of the disaster. Every local and central agency was engaged in the recovery in some way or another. Drawing their activities together into a cohesive strategic plan fell to CERA which had announced its intentions in a substantial document in 2011 and which then added to its responsibilities in April 2012 by creating the Central City Development Unit, a separate body within CERA with its first task being to finalise a recovery plan for central Christchurch due for completion at the end of July.

The April paper presented to Cabinet by Gerry Brownlee commented on the programme of work for residential development in the central city. There would be social and community housing in the central city; the ‘combined CCC-MBIE Housing Showcase and the HNZ Housing Showcase.’ The combined CCC-MBIE project was the widely promoted ‘Breathe Project’ – a new urban village design competition with an international panel of experts including UK presenter Kevin McLoud.204 Housing New Zealand’s project was its proposed mixed tenure development at 399 Manchester Street.

2012.204 After lengthy delays, the Breathe project was still trying to secure funding in November 2015.


Sean Bignell took up his position as the General Manager of Asset Development, based in Auckland in August 2011. Earthquake recovery was already in full swing. The earthquakes presented a huge challenge to change the way social housing was modelled in New Zealand. The key to success was regeneration, he believed. Bold thinking was required. A change from the way things had been done in the past. The Corporation’s Asset Management Strategy needed to be revised and updated and a separate plan developed for Canterbury. A fresh approach was required where there could be innovation and a team culture of success.

On 15 September 2011, he emailed staff in Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch involved in the earthquake recovery effort. Matthew Johnson had been appointed the Programme Manager for the Earthquake Recovery which would enable John Tubberty to return to his role of Facilities Manager Houses, in the Product Management team. ‘I would like to take this opportunity to thank John for the leadership he has provided to the asset programme over the past seven months. John has built a strong foundation enabling a smoother transition from crisis response to our asset recovery and redevelopment programme,’ Sean Bignell wrote. A new Steering Group had been formed which included Callum Logan (Asset Planning), Kevin Third (Tenancy Services) and Matthew Johnson.

The staff changes, as noted by Sean Bignell marked a new beginning for the team to be based in the former training room in the Papanui offices. Matt Johnson set up a formal weekly meeting for every Monday morning. Attendees included Amanda Binns, Andrew Booker, Ian Gall, Julie Habberjam, Bob Hardie, Matt Johnson, Malcolm Jones, Callum Logan, Catherine McDonald, John Pointon, Kirsty Rose, Kevin Third and John Tubberty. Reports would be given by different staff depending on the most pressing issues.

A report covering key actions, status of milestones and a summary of key statistics would be developed and delivered each Monday. An interim report could be required for the insurance meetings held on Wednesdays if a milestone had been met. Reports were required for Speedscan, insurance, asset planning, BECA scoping, CGH, procurement, communications, assurance and reporting, tenancy services and anything else that was considered important on the day.

It was almost impossible to get through such a detailed agenda, Andrew

2 The CERP Office

101Part 2: Chapter 2: The CERP Office

Booker commented later. ‘Everyone needed the information, but we all had work to do on the ground as well.’205

Meetings were held with local authorities to explain what was happening with state properties. In mid-December 2011, Matt Johnson together with Catherine McDonald and Callum Logan met with the Shirley Papanui Community Board to update them on the condition of state houses in the Shirley neighbourhood. The Board was keen to know whether Housing New Zealand would be prepared to gift four of its Skipton Street properties to help MacFarlane Park with more street frontage. It was not a request the Corporation was yet prepared to consider however, with the insurance claim not settled and the extent of damage still not fully calculated.

The events that followed the 23 December 2011 earthquakes meant further changes were in the offing. The imperative of the insurance claim was absorbing staff time to the apparent detriment of resolving some of the more pressing issues and every week the overall accommodation situation in Christchurch worsened. Waiting lists climbed by the day; Housing New Zealand worked closely with the City Council and private housing providers, but even so, there were few dents in the lists at the end of every week.

In January 2012, there were more staff changes in the Papanui office that signalled increased urgency to finalise a new repair and reconstruction plan and to strengthen the team responsible for the immediate non-structural repairs. Sean Bignell appointed Andrew Booker into the role of Earthquake Recovery Manager for Housing New Zealand. He had been living in Christchurch for nearly a year, worked in the Art Gallery during the emergency phase, walked the streets with assessors and inspectors, regularly met with agencies and authorities involved in the immediate post-quake period, and blessed with a long-time understanding of the Corporation. He was seen to be the best fit for the job.

An auditor by background, he agreed with the need to complete the insurance claim, however, he could also see the greater issues at hand. In Canterbury, the emphasis had to be on Housing New Zealand’s property portfolio, which, unless it was repaired and rebuilt within a reasonable timeframe, would become problematic at all levels and would be a major stumbling block to relocating existing tenants and reducing the already burgeoning waiting list. The recovery programme would come under the aegis of the Corporation’s Asset Development Group – a major shift from its earlier direct alignment with Tenancy Services. The change gave added impetus for making the decision to create a separate office in Christchurch, if not physically, at least in staffing terms.

A formalised programme management system needed to be developed which would document what needed to be done, how it was going to be done, who would do the work and the risks involved. The team needed to include people with the skills to achieve the work plan, which meant canvassing the organisation to find the best, and those who would be prepared to relocate south.

Importantly, Andrew Booker realised that in order to create an office that covered all the bases, there needed to be a separate Tenancy Liaison team comprising staff who understood not only the needs of tenants, but also had the ability to contribute to driving the programme forward. He needed project managers, finance and procurement specialists, legal, communications, health

205 Andrew Booker, 28 April 2016.


and safety, and human resources staff, maintenance and asset managers. In short, it was to be a complete operational structure within Housing New Zealand, using Wellington and Auckland based staff where necessary, but essentially, everyone should be in Christchurch.

It was the only way, he said, that the new group would have the authority to achieve what was required. ‘We needed to be single-minded without outside influences that might colour our thinking. We needed to be an entity with one focus, to repair and rebuild state properties in Christchurch and Kaiapoi.’206

In fact, as Sean Bignell commented later, the first proposal was for the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Programme to be established as a completely separate entity within Housing New Zealand, perhaps akin to the Hobsonville Land Company in Auckland but for a specified time period.207 That way it would have the autonomy needed to achieve the repair and rebuild programme and to also achieve medium density housing options and to introduce the concept of mixed community development. The idea although thoroughly discussed, didn’t eventually find favour with either the executive or the Board.

The new programme developed more organically than formally. What amounted to a split within Tenancy Services as people were siphoned into the new team, wasn’t always greeted with enthusiasm by the staff who remained with their ‘business as usual’ portfolios. At the same time, not everyone wanted to move to a new group. Finding the project managers and associated staff proved easier to resolve with agreement that some staff would operate from their home bases in Auckland and Wellington, commuting to Christchurch as required. Julie Habberjam who had been working on contract with the Corporation since the September event, had been recruited by John Tubberty as the Recovery Programme Office Manager. It was a big job involving the development of a formalised risk register, developing templates for reports, and establishing the systems and processes required for a multi-million dollar programme of work.

Sheryl Banks was recruited from Tenancy Services to lead the new Tenancy Liaison team. She engaged two more coordinators – Alana Smart and Chris Coey to help her get started. (Margaret Dickinson had been recruited earlier on.) Their role was to manage the coordination of tenant relocations out of the residential red zones in Christchurch and Kaiapoi, working with the tenants, dealing with concerns, complaints and resolving issues as quickly as possible.

Barry Brownsea headed the Quality Assurance Team with first Steve Wiffen from Napier, Alf Tope and Gary Roachford working alongside him.208 They needed to have all the technical skills and ‘know-how’ to do the job and to maintain ongoing communication with the Tenancy Liaison staff and the Project Managers. The team was responsible for checking on the quality of properties as the repair programme ramped up, working alongside contractors.

‘By mid-March (2012), we had team workshops every fortnight to plan our work. We were concerned at the number of houses we might have at any one time. A lot of our properties had already been assessed as being too risky for tenants and there was always the risk of another earthquake happening. By necessity, we were always reactive to the reports that were coming in.’

206 Andrew Booker, 23 March 2016.207 Sean Bignell, 12 May 2016.208 The QA team expanded later to include Ron Laing, Sue Poasa, Hayden Stockdale and Richard Walsh.


The Asset Development Group initiated a functional chain of command. It was a structure that Andrew Booker supported and his team readily formed what became known as the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Programme, with its acronym CERP. Still based at Papanui, the new team took over the former training room and squeezed in as many desks and computers as they could. The first major task was to develop the next step in the repair programme following the 27,000 urgent health and safety repairs that had been achieved to date.

‘One of the good things (surprisingly) was working in such a crammed space,’ Andrew Booker said. ‘We were all within speaking distance of one another. We had no need to email – everyone was right there. If I wanted to find out something, the team was physically all around me. We were very focused on dealing with the organisation’s earthquake-related problems. We had many discussions about what we should do in-house and what should be contracted, the procurement plans and looking for people who had common sense and drive.’209

On 12 April 2012, an extensive briefing paper was prepared for the Minister Heatley with three recommendations:

a. Note the range of initiatives Housing New Zealand Corporation has delivered and has planned for; the recovery of the Canterbury assets portfolio

b. Note that decisions about the recovery and renewal of the assets portfolio are focused on prudent property management and delivering on Housing New Zealand Corporation’s core business

c. Note that there are overarching decisions about the future of Canterbury which are still to be made and that these decisions will have implications on the implementation of Housing New Zealand Corporation’s recovery and rebuild plans for the region.

The paper provided a comprehensive summary of the initiatives that had already been delivered and were planned for in terms of the asset portfolio recovery. ‘The Corporation has regularly updated you on its Canterbury earthquake response and recovery activities,’ the briefing paper noted. ‘In September 2010 and again in February 2011, the Corporation was required by statute to assist Civil Defence by coordinating the provision of temporary housing and housing advice for displaced residents for the duration of the declared state(s) of emergency. After each earthquake (except for the less damaging December 2011 earthquake) and following immediate response inspections, every Corporation property in Canterbury has been assessed for damage and categorised accordingly, for example, ‘structural’ or ‘non-structural’ damage. Plans for repair, reinstatement and future development were disrupted, re-scoped and resumed after each major earthquake.’210

The briefing paper noted that ‘demand for state housing did not spike immediately after the earthquakes, and had only risen moderately in the 11 months following the September 2010 earthquake. During this period, tenants who moved were predominantly those under 50 years of age with children; applications from the over 49 year old group increased as a proportion of total applications (there has been an associated rise in demand for 1-2

209 Andrew Booker, 28 April 2016.210 Ministerial briefing paper, 12 April 2012.


bedroom dwellings); and demand was highest for homes in areas to the west of Christchurch city. Demand rose in November and December 2011 which was largely attributable to demand from red zone residents who had recently relocated and been unable to sustain a private rental tenancy in another part of Christchurch, and families and individuals who had ‘outstayed their welcome’ after lodging with family and friends for extended period. All earthquake related applicants were placed on the A waiting list and were an automatic priority, the briefing noted.

There was a section covering the post-quake environment which was ‘complex and remains in flux.’ The overarching recovery strategy being developed by CERA was still to be finalised and considered by Cabinet. Housing New Zealand intended to align recovery and renewal priorities with that strategy and it had a specific interest in land and infrastructure plans. The City Council’s central city plan was still to be endorsed by the Minister Gerry Brownlee. Aftershocks, the briefing indicated, continued to hamper the repair of key infrastructure networks and recurring aftershocks had required many of the Corporation’s properties to be re-inspected and reassessed with ongoing cost implications.

The section covering pre-earthquake assets portfolio plans for Canterbury spelt out its original intentions which were to reduce net stock levels in Canterbury, to reposition the portfolio to better match stock to demand including fewer three bedroom and more one and two bedroom homes which would be consistent with the same challenge around the country, and to invest in the west of Christchurch and divest in the east. ‘The earthquakes have negatively impacted the condition of, and effectively aged, the portfolio. This has accelerated the Corporation’s plans for Canterbury.’

Plans for the future were focused on prudent property management and delivering on the Corporation’s core business. It had to consider the ‘timing of inter-dependent and complementary works including infrastructure repair and replacement, the potential constraints on delivery such as the availability of materials, labour and land zoning and minimising the impact of recovery and rebuild activities on tenants.’

The briefing identified five priorities for Canterbury:

• An affordable and efficient portfolio to build, own and operate into the future

• A portfolio of ‘safe’ and ‘sound’ properties based on the best available technical advice and information at the time of rebuild and repair

• A portfolio focused on the region’s development areas, activity centres and growth nodes to provide:

Well-serviced, safe living environments for tenants A future proofed investment for the Crown as the

Corporation’s shareholder • Partnerships and business opportunities to reduce the overall impact of

the earthquakes and to ensure the consistent delivery of recovery activities

• Utilise the need for accelerated reconfiguration as a positive opportunity to lift the scale and rate of churn and change.

In its concluding paragraph, the briefing stated: ‘The Corporation has made, and intends to continue to make, a considerable contribution to the recovery


and rebuild of Canterbury within the funding envelope and resource capacity currently in place. Informed, core business focused decisions are being made about the future delivery for the Corporation’s Canterbury assets portfolio which are balanced by the future risk profile and complexity of the scale and nature of the rebuild programme.’211

In all respects, the briefing covered the Corporation’s intentions and the potential inhibitors which would prevent or reduce the ability to make progress with any degree of speed. In going to the Minister, the briefing passed through the hands of the executive team and the Board. There was no doubt in anyone’s mind that the recovery and rebuild programme would be complex and there would be many challenges ahead.

Early in May 2012, Sean Bignell presented a plan to the Housing New Zealand Board that not only met with immediate approval, but which was sharpened in its timetable. The plan proposed repairing 212 vacant quake-damaged homes by 31 December. The idea behind the plan, he explained later, was to be able to ‘unravel some of the cost mysteries for the insurance claim’ and would be a good example of ‘just getting on and doing the job.’212 While the Board fully endorsed the plan, it shortened the timeframe from six months to four. The Accelerated Repair Programme would be completed by 31 October. With the first month taken up recruiting staff and engaging contractors in an already over-committed environment, there was concern that the time-frame wouldn’t be met. But the challenge had been issued, agreed to and the deadline set.

‘We sent out RFIs and from there selected the businesses who could meet the deadline,’213 Malcolm Jones said. The Corporation’s long-time repair and maintenance contractor Switched On Group was one of four firms to start work. Spotless Facilities (NZ) Ltd, Arrow International and Murray Charles Ltd completed the quartet. The priorities were the structural integrity of the houses, drainage problems and liquefaction. ‘We selected houses where there were no historical add-ons (house additions) and looked for properties that weren’t just in one suburb.’214

The project began in June 2012. Just four months to complete the repair programme with media and political eyes fixed firmly on progress and the end result. The budget was set at $19.1 million. The 212 identified properties were spread across Christchurch from Bexley to Hornby and there was one in Kaiapoi. Because the insurance claim was still in progress, there were ongoing pressures to make sure everything was well documented by contractors and by the programme manager. Structural engineers assessed every property before contractors could start. Loss adjustors make regular site visits. It was a comprehensive programme of work. On some properties new walls were required; on others existing walls could be repaired. On some houses new roofs were required; on others existing roofs could be repaired. Chimneys were removed and new heating installed. New flooring was laid, new plumbing installed and new electrical wiring. Then the houses needed to be plastered and painted inside and out, lawns sown, trees planted, paths laid, new perimeter fencing erected if the old fences were damaged beyond repair. There were

211 Housing New Zealand briefing paper to the Minister, 12 April 2012.212 Sean Bignell, 12 May 2016.213 Malcolm Jones, 11 April 2016.214 ibid


constant reviews and checks; sometimes large piles of sludge from initial liquefaction had settled beneath the house and needed to be suctioned out. Specialised equipment was needed.

In his tenant newsletter, Symon Leggett, the Manager of Tenancy Services for the Southern Region said the Accelerated Repair Programme was ‘major news’. ‘While we don’t yet have the money from our three insurance claims, Housing New Zealand has prioritised some money to allow this first stage of the repair programme to start early. This has been in response to the increasing housing shortage in Canterbury as people leave the red zones and have to leave houses that need to be rebuilt or repaired.’

The tenants, as predicted, were delighted to move into renovated homes and, reducing the waiting list by 212 was, as Andrew Booker said, immensely satisfying. The Accelerated Repair Programme was achieved on time and on budget, demonstrating to the Board and senior management at Housing New Zealand, that the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Programme could make its mark on the local landscape.

The official opening of the new office on the corner of Manchester and St Asaph Streets took place on 18 October 2012 and was attended by Minister Heatley and Lesley McTurk. ‘This is quite a milestone in the rebuild of Christchurch,’ the Minister said. ‘It’s important the Corporation’s earthquake recovery team is located in the central city. It’s actually 12 years since the Corporation had a presence in the central city and its return is a key part of the city’s revitalisation.’215 The Minister used the event to announce that some elements of the Social Allocation System would be deferred for Canterbury state tenants. ‘This means that individuals or families who meet all other eligibility criteria won’t have to provide evidence that they can’t access alternative housing. Having to provide this has placed additional stress on families already in difficult circumstances. When the housing market down here is clearly so unique and challenging, these requirements are not as applicable.’216

The day before the official opening, Minister Heatley had attended a Housing Forum organised by the Tenants Protection Agency, with Jeanette Gower and Sheryl Banks. A set of questions had been sent to the Minister’s office ahead of the meeting which he dealt with in turn. They included questions about Aranui, the City Council’s consenting issues, housing for the elderly, short term solutions for housing in the city and the rising prices of properties. Everyone wanted to know what was happening with social and affordable housing and most people held a view.

………………………………….

The new CERP offices were located in an almost abandoned part of the city, the former Civic Offices on Tuam Street empty and damaged; the former McKenzie & Willis Department Store on the corner of High and Tuam Streets, similarly abandoned and damaged. The only bright spot was the Stray Dog Kitchen & Bar newly opened by James Jamieson, the former owner of Le Cafe at the now cordoned off Arts Centre. The Stray Dog became the coffee house

215 Media announcement by Phil Heatley, Thursday 18 October 2012.216 ibid

Image: Some of the CERP team working in their new offices in

Manchester Street


of choice not only for the CERP team but for Housing New Zealand staff from out of town, politicians and the very occasional tourist. Within a few months, a new Information Technology Hub was opened across the road, but to begin with, there was just the Corporation.

The move from the Papanui office was the start of major change within the Corporation not just for Christchurch and Canterbury. There was an urgency to make progress, to get things done. Everyone involved was committed to the programme. If they were unhappy, there was nothing to keep them. Andrew Booker wanted a totally motivated team with a vision and a target.

By now, recruitment for the CERP team was almost completed. David James had put his hand up and was engaged as one of the project managers. ‘I wanted to be involved with earthquake recovery. Christchurch is my town and I wanted to be able to contribute to the work the Corporation was doing.’217 He wasn’t alone. Several permanent Housing New Zealand staff were keen to contribute to what was going to be the biggest project ever undertaken. Shane Austin was recruited from the Hawkes Bay together with Darren Buckland. Sheryl Banks had engaged three more staff – Trish McDowell, Mike Kerrigan and Jason Hickey.

To help seal both the commitment and the vision, a new brand was created for Housing New Zealand’s Earthquake Recovery Programme, aligned to CERA and in accordance with the overarching government’s recovery strategy. Housing New Zealand’s repair and rebuild programme would contribute in the specific areas of social, economic, build and environmental recovery. The CERP team consulted with Te Runanga o Ngai Tahu on a Maori phrase that would be appropriate and suitable for the work to be done.

Te Manapou i te Haumanutanga o Waitaha – contributing to the Earthquake Recovery of Canterbury was signwritten in bold, sweeping letters on vehicles, on billboards and on all publications produced to explain Housing New Zealand’s initiatives in Canterbury. The initial design was considered too modest and too conservative by both Glen Sowry and Sean Bignell. Signwriting especially on vehicles should be bigger and bolder. They should make a statement.

There was some initial concern that being so obvious could result in a negative reaction from tenants. Historically, the relationship between the Corporation and tenants wasn’t always cordial, however the post-quake situation was very different. There were new priorities; staff and tenants were suffering the same problems. To a greater or lesser extent, everyone was in the same situation.

At the end of November 2012, an update on progress was circulated within Housing New Zealand. It followed the completion of the 212 vacant earthquake damaged properties by 31 October. ‘As at 19 November 2012, there are 543 vacant earthquake damaged state houses in Canterbury. This comprises 211 houses and three sections in the residential red zones (Christchurch and Kaiapoi). This leaves 332 houses on land that is zoned TC3 (241) TC2 (85). There are four urban non-residential and two Port Hills and Banks Peninsula properties that currently have no TC rating. There are a total of 215 residential red-zone properties – 1 CGH property is tenanted with a plan in place for their move. Vacant house numbers will change dramatically over the next 6 months as houses are either demolished or moved out of the red zone.’ (The properties were identified as 5,622 state owned houses and 330 state houses leased. CGH owned 159 and leased a further 16.)

217 David James, 4 May 2016.

Image: The CERP team’s vehicles were signwritten in Maori and English. They contributed to the increased visibility of HNZ’s repair and rebuild programme in Greater Christchurch


While the on-the-ground work continued in Christchurch, Sean Bignell and the Asset Development Group in Auckland progressed a four-stage $1.2 billion investment proposal for Canterbury, projected over a ten-year period, starting with the repair and rebuild programme and including a substantial reconfiguration of the Corporation’s asset portfolio to better meet the needs of contemporary and future tenants. It was an ambitious plan and was welcomed by Lesley McTurk and the Board. Reconciling what had happened in Christchurch with what needed to be done was always going to be a major undertaking, but the extent of damage even 18 months after the main event was not yet fully recognised.

Commenting on the plan in the Corporation’s 2011/2012 Annual Report, Chair Alan Jackson said: ‘Like many other Government agencies, the Corporation has continued to play a major role in the Canterbury earthquake recovery work. The Board approved the first two stages of a four-stage Canterbury Investment Plan during the year. The plan demonstrates a commitment to early and visible action in Canterbury and will see the fast-tracked repair of more than 200 damaged properties, followed by an 18-month redevelopment programme that will involve the Corporation working in partnership with the private sector.’

The second stage was framed according to the damage estimates and based on the number of houses that needed to be demolished and built. Up to 350 new homes would be built in Christchurch and Kaiapoi within the next two years. The project, according to the plan, would incorporate new initiatives on five identified sites where a mix of apartments would be developed for state tenants, first home owners and people who wanted to rent or lease. The mixed tenure model was being widely touted in Europe, the US and Australia as the preferred option to clusters of government-owned housing. It encouraged greater diversity within communities and for Christchurch particularly, given the extent of residential property damage, taking the initiative and developing something enterprising that could be modelled in other cities in New Zealand was given widespread approval.

The third stage was a five-year repair programme for the vast majority of the state houses that had been quake damaged. With an estimated budget of $203.6 million, it would be a significant undertaking in an environment where skilled labour was becoming increasingly scarce. There was no suggestion at this time, that the repairs and the new homes would be undertaken concurrently, however the underlying assumption was that it couldn’t be done any other way. The empty quake-damaged state houses had already been repaired; the next tranche would include existing tenants. Managing and organising their temporary shifts or putting in place options whereby contractors could work around them if they remained in situ was something Sheryl Banks Tenancy Liaison team would be responsible for.

The fourth stage with a proposed $.5 billion budget was the reconfiguration of Housing New Zealand’s Canterbury assets. It was a necessity, yet viewed as highly ambitious by its detractors. It would deliver multiple housing options with a future-proofed ‘fit for purpose’ portfolio, well located, structurally and technically sound, of higher value, and matched to the predicted social housing demand.

The Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Programme would implement the plan’s second and third stages; the fourth would be the Asset Development Group’s project. There was perfect alignment with the local team responsible to the Asset Development. Making it happen would be the biggest challenge.

Image: The Canterbury Investment Plan - January 2013


It was about innovation and mixed tenure, Sean Bignell said later. ‘We were breaking new ground. The CIP would be the benchmark for other social housing developments in New Zealand.’218

The project began in October 2012 immediately following the completion of the Accelerated Repair Programme. It was formally launched by the Corporation’s Chair Alan Jackson and Deputy Chair Adrienne Young-Cooper in January 2013. ‘This investment plan will help the Canterbury rebuild not only in terms of housing, but as an integral component of the economic, social and cultural recovery so critical to the community’s wellbeing.’

The plan gave credence to the Government’s already announced vision that Canterbury ‘recovers and progresses as a place to be proud of – an attractive and vibrant place, to live, work, visit and invest.’219

Included in the Corporation’s publicity material were three major initiatives; the development of the first mixed tenure apartments, a new collaborative project with the Department of Corrections to train offenders in the repair and refurbishment of quake-damaged houses, and a partnership with Southern Response and Arrow International to undertake house foundation repair trials.

………………………………….

Earthquake Prone Buildings

The proposed rebuild and repair programme to be implemented by the

Corporation’s Earthquake Recovery team was extensive. The announcement towards the end of 2012 that there were earthquake-prone buildings in Christchurch was greeted with dismay. What was an earthquake-prone building and how could it differ from what had already been identified, assessed, checked and rechecked? It seemed anathema to everyone.

All buildings were classified according to a New Build Standard (NBS) of the 2004 Building Act. A building was considered to be earthquake prone when it was less than 34 per cent of the NBS. Housing New Zealand grouped buildings that were earthquake prone into four groups. Group 1: the building was assessed as below 20 per cent. Group 2: the building was assessed as between 20 and 33 per cent. Group 3: the building was assessed as between 34 and 66 per cent. Group 4: the building was assessed as being over 67 per cent.

All buildings that were built before 1976, that were more than two storeys and where there were more than three households living, had to be checked by a qualified, registered structural engineer to see whether they were earthquake prone. In Canterbury, CERA stated that the checks had to be completed no matter how old the building. On top of everything else that was going on, it was a problem for the Corporation’s Canterbury team.

Since the beginning of 2012, specialist engineers from Sinclair Knight Merz (SKM) had been engaged by Housing New Zealand to inspect several hundred buildings around the country that the Corporation had deemed to be

218 Sean Bignell, 12 May 2016.219 The Government’s announced Recovery Strategy for Greater Christchurch, 2012.

Image: The CERP team at the end of 2012. The background is the badly damaged former Odeon Theatre


potentially earthquake prone. The purpose was to determine what needed to happen next with each building. Some would require a more detailed seismic assessment where access to individual units within the building would be required. If this was the case, tenants would be informed and given 48 hours’ notice of the pending inspection. Following the assessments, a decision would be made about the future of the building with options including strengthening work within 12 months or five years, redevelopment or divestment of the property. In other cases, earthquake strengthening work wouldn’t be required as the building would be at 67 per cent or more of the NBS.

In Christchurch and Canterbury, noted an internal information paper, ‘EPB is complicated because of the sequence of earthquakes and the earthquake damage assessments that have been completed on all properties on several occasions. As a result, tenants and the public in general don’t fully understand the implication of an earthquake prone building…The greatest risk in Canterbury is another significant earthquake that could result in a building collapsing with resultant injuries or death. CERP has managed each situation on a case by case basis.’220

Because the situation in Christchurch was deemed to be more complex than in the rest of the country, communication and tenant liaison would be managed by the CERP office. A fact sheet was prepared for tenants whose homes were assessed as being below 20 per cent and the Tenancy Liaison team worked with local Tenancy Services managers to try and find alternative accommodation. They were reluctant to use the traditional 90 day notices, because of the ongoing aftershocks.

‘Sometimes the earthquake prone building may be repaired quite easily. In this case, you may only have to move temporarily. Sometimes the building will take longer to be repaired in which case it may be better to move permanently. And, sometimes the building will be too costly to repair. If that happens, Housing New Zealand has to decide whether to demolish the building and build something new.’221

Nationally, SKM found the Corporation owned 837 earthquake prone buildings affecting about 5,000 tenants. In Christchurch there were 35 EPBs. Immediate visits were arranged to the affected tenants with a hand-delivered letter. Depending on their situation and the status of the building, tenants could be moved immediately. ‘We will endeavour to minimise any disruption to tenants’ families including community and schooling needs,’ wrote Andrew Booker in the tenant letter. Tenant information in person and in print explained that all the Corporation’s Canterbury properties had been assessed by structural engineers on several occasions since the first earthquakes, however since then the organisation’s safety criteria had been raised from the Government’s standard of one third of NBS standard (Building Act 2004) to 67 per cent of the same standard.

Every tenant who was living in a building that was earthquake prone, was moved to alternative accommodation. Where possible, this was achieved without needing to shift families out of the suburb to avoid any further disruption to schooling or local activities.

220 Internal report on Earthquake Prone Buildings (undated).221 Fact sheet on Earthquake Prone Buildings prepared for Canterbury tenants.

111Part 2: Chapter 3: Settling the Insurance Claim

While the repair programme progressed and designs for the first of the new homes were completed and sent to the Christchurch City Council for resource and building consents, negotiations with Vero as the lead insurer came to an eventual conclusion and on 12 April 2013, Nick Smith announced a settlement of $320 million. It was a ‘significant and welcome step in Canterbury’s recovery,’ he said in a press release. The settlement was the largest single insurance payout in New Zealand’s history (to date) and would be, according to Dr Smith, great news for New Zealand’s tenants, for Canterbury’s economy and New Zealand taxpayers.

The negotiations had taken months to complete and had involved two years of concentrated assessments, surveys, photographs, checks and rechecks by Housing New Zealand staff and the insurance company’s loss adjustors. It had been a concentrated and at times gruelling exercise and had often included lengthy debates about the repair and rebuild programme, what foundation repairs might be necessary, whether damage had been caused by land movement or not; the immediate costs involved and the potential costs in terms of staffing requirements.

Sean Bignell and Rowan Southee had flown to London in 2012 to meet with claim representatives of the London insurers to update them on the claim progress. It was part of Housing New Zealand’s annual insurance renewal visit.

Sean Bignell said later it was a positive meeting with concentrated presentations. ‘It was a way of giving them confidence so being there was very beneficial for the claim settlement outcome.’222

‘The greatest benefit from this settlement,’ Dr Smith said when the claim was finalised, ‘is that it enables Housing New Zealand to proceed with its repairs and redevelopment at pace. It can now get on and demolish, repair or redevelop its housing without the slow and bureaucratic process of having to individually check off each property with the insurer.’223

Behind the scenes, there was muted jubilation at the settlement. The original claim of $430 million was based on what the Corporation could claim under its insurance policies. It had included costs across all the technical land categories and the number of properties in each; 17 per cent in the residential red zones,

222 Sean Bignell, 12 May 2016.223 Ministerial announcement about HNZ’s insurance settlement, 12 April 2013.

3 Settling the Insurance Claim


3 per cent TC1, 36 per cent TC2 and 43 per cent TC3. The Corporation’s insurance policy covered ‘material damage and business interruption insurance, primarily for houses, blocks of flats and office contents.’ It was ‘capped at $250 million plus GST for any one loss. In respect of loss or damage to rental properties with a re-instatement value of under $1 million there is an excess of $10 million on each claim.’ The financial impact of the 4 September 2010, the 22 February and 13 June 2011 earthquakes was calculated by Housing New Zealand as $464 million less the $10 million excess per event ($30 million).224

As explained by Dr Smith, the reason the final settlement was less than the original claim was because the claim had been based on a five year repair timeframe whereas it was now closer to three years. This had reduced the escalation component of the claim and due to early settlement, Housing New Zealand would also earn interest on settlement monies prior to paying for the repairs.

The insurance settlement was ceremoniously signed on the bonnet of one of the Corporation’s sign-written silver vehicles parked in the driveway of a damaged house in the suburb of Shirley by Dr Smith and Vero representative Adrian Tulloch in front of a large media crowd. Vero represented four New Zealand insurance companies and there were 23 other insurance companies based in London and Europe.

In its own media release, Vero said the settlement was a ‘landmark for New Zealand and especially for many Christchurch residents…We believe the key to the successful and timely resolution of the Housing New Zealand claim has been the high level of open and transparent communication between the teams involved in the negotiation. It was clear from the outset, that we were all committed to reaching a settlement figure that was in accordance with the policy.’225

There was still the claim to the Earthquake Commission to be settled which covered Housing New Zealand’s Canterbury properties from 31 October 2011 to 31 October to 2012. The policy limit was $100,000 plus GST per property.

On 12 July 2013, EQC’s Chief Executive Ian Simpson wrote to Glen Sowry. ‘…I would (also) like to acknowledge the pragmatic and constructive approach taken by both organisations in reaching this settlement. Taking a portfolio approach has reduced the inspection, assessment and handling of costs that would have otherwise be incurred by both parties through a claim-by-claim approach. The result is an expedited settlement position that minimises the disruption to tenants and allows repairs to be started sooner…’226

The settled claim was $4,062,747.56 to be paid within 10 working days from the agreement being signed.227

224 Housing New Zealand Annual Report 2011-2012, p 79.225 Media release from Vero. Spokesperson Adrian Tulloch, Vero EGM Corporate and Specialty Lines.226 Letter from Chief Executive of EQC Ian Simpson to Housing New Zealand’s Chief Executive Glen Sowry, 12 July 2013.227 Notes to this effect included in the 2012-2013 and 2013-2014 HNZ Annual Reports. ‘The revenue was recognised in the 2012-2013 financial year, however the cash was received in this financial year.’ (2013-2014 Annual Report, p 56.)

Image: Housing Minister Nick Smith and Glen Sowry show house

foundation damage to a photographer ahead of the insurance claim

settlement being signed.

Image: Signing the claim: Glen Sowry, watched by Vero representative Adrian Tulloch

(left) and Dr Nick Smith.

113Part 2: Chapter 4: Meeting the Challenge: Repair <5000

The projected timetable for the Canterbury Investment Plan and its anticipated achievements were discussed in detail when the new Minister of Housing Dr Nick Smith made his first visit to Housing New Zealand’s Earthquake Recovery Office on 31 January, 2013. It was a lengthy meeting attended by local National MP Nicky Wagner, Roger Sutton CERA’s Chief Executive, Paul Honeybone from MBIE,228 the Corporation’s Chief Executive Glen Sowry and several other staff. The Minister was unequivocal in his belief that the Corporation’s progress was too slow. Repairing 5,000 quake damaged properties in five years wasn’t acceptable. And the plan, as outlined in the Canterbury Investment Plan to build up to 350 new homes in two years wasn’t good enough. The number was too low and they needed to be built as quickly as possible.

The Canterbury team decided to create a timetable that would be both politically acceptable and achievable. It would double the number of new homes and at the same time, it would repair the 5,000 damaged properties. The work would be done concurrently using external project management companies and contractors. Both programmes would be achieved within a timeframe from February 2013 to 31 December 2015. The team worked non-stop over the weekend supported by Auckland and Wellington colleagues. The letter of confirmation was signed by Glen Sowry and sent to the Minister’s office on Monday 4 February 2013.

The completion of the insurance claim was ongoing. Settlement was still several months away. Even so, as Sean Bignell noted later, ‘the scale of the work was enormous and it needed to be started as soon as possible.’229 It wasn’t just the targets that had been set, it was the confirmation that everything else as outlined in the Corporation’s Canterbury Investment Plan would also be achieved. It included the joint venture with the Department of Corrections and

228 MBIE: Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, established on 1 July 2012 merging the Department of Building & Housing (DBH), Department of Labour, Ministry of Economic Development and Ministry of Science & Innovation. Until then, HNZ had worked closely with DBH. Now there was a composite Ministry within which several new staff were engaged, requiring new stakeholder engagement.)229 Sean Bignell, 12 May 2016.

4 Meeting the Challenge: Repair <5000

Image: Minister of Housing Hon. Dr Nick Smith discusses the complexities of sucking liquefaction from beneath house foundations with Glen Sowry (left) and the contractor during his first visit to Christchurch following his appointment


the house foundation repair trials. Internal discussions focused on how the repair programme could be achieved

and whether it was possible for Housing New Zealand’s Christchurch team, competent as it was, to undertake everything without external assistance. The eventual decision was made to go to tender using the traditional government process, to invite expressions of interest with the expectation that such a multi-million dollar project lasting three years would attract the best in the business. The original intention was for one tender to cover everything. But, as Andrew Booker said, separating the minor repairs from the major repairs and engaging two different project management companies to undertake the work made more sense. It seemed an innocuous title for work, which regardless of being termed ‘minor’ or ‘major’, was large scale and priced at several million dollars; which would involve three years continuous work and would engage several hundred independent contractors and trades personnel.

Even developing the tender documents was time consuming and complex involving Housing New Zealand’s legal and procurement teams, and dedicated communication plans to cover the inevitable media and industry interest. Site safety was becoming a big concern in Canterbury with overseas trades personnel and contractors coming to work in the city who were used to operating under very different circumstances. With another winter approaching, there were concerns that many tenants would be still living in homes that although safe, weren’t necessarily warm. Not that it particularly troubled them. As the later survey demonstrated, Housing New Zealand’s tenants, like most people living in Christchurch at the time, were stoic and ‘resilient’ in the face of ongoing after-shocks and the difficulties associated with living in a city that was severely damaged.

………………………………….

Repairs remained the biggest priority and in December 2012, following the earlier success of the Accelerated Repair Programme, Housing New Zealand started a three month repair pilot to see whether it was feasible to achieve most of the repairs without needing to shift tenants to another location. It was important for school aged children to have stability, and it was important for long-term tenants and particularly for people with disabilities, to be able to remain in their local neighbourhood if possible. The project known as ‘Rapid Start’ was the beginning of the co-located MWH Project Management team’s work and was implemented on a suburb by suburb basis making it easier to visit tenants in advance and alert them to what was being planned. (Ref Part 3: Chapter 1, Tenancy Liaison)

‘We had already completed the 212’s in October and finished another 40 repairs when we started this new initiative which involved 200 houses,’ 230 Andrew Booker said.

Two companies were selected for the repair programme. MWH Recovery, an offshoot of international company MWH Global was identified as the successful tenderer for the minor repair programme. It involved 3,600 quake damaged properties requiring repairs up to and between $40,000 and $50,000.

230 Andrew Booker, 13 April 2016

Images: The Accelerated Repair Programme completed October 2012


Announcing the winning tender, Nick Smith said the contract was ‘an important step towards the goal of having all 5,000 earthquake damaged Housing New Zealand homes fixed and another 700 built by the end of 2015.’

At a total cost of $100 million, the programme, according to MWH, was challenging in terms of management, logistics and reporting requirements. With a background in technical services and technical engineering, development and infrastructure, MWH Recovery had formed a joint venture with Mainzeal, partnering with Vero Insurers in the wake of the September 2010 earthquake. Following Mainzeal’s collapse two years later, MWH had recruited 86 of Mainzeal’s former staff to assist with its projects.231 It had a well-established programme management office and it was familiar with the energy required for disaster recovery having worked in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina.

The challenge for MWH Recovery and its team of project managers was to complete over 240 property repairs per month to meet the declared timetable. It meant engaging more than 800 tradespeople, working alongside Housing New Zealand’s Tenancy Liaison Team, auditors and assessors and adhering to the strict health and safety regime that most businesses had now signed up to in Canterbury. Minimising risk was an essential element of the repair programme as was keeping the tenants informed and maintaining a steady stream of reports to Wellington. The best and most advantageous way of achieving the pre-determined targets, was, according to Andrew Booker, to move the MHW project management team into the Corporation’s Earthquake Recovery offices. It would mean taking more space in the building. Even more critical, it would mean co-locating two individual offices, two separate businesses, private enterprise and a Government Agency, two very different cultures. It was to be a win/win for both organisations.

The MWH team, led by Peter George, understood the requirements of the contract which included a hearty list of planning and reporting, health and safety, risk identification and management, procurement and management of sub-contractors, developing and embedding a formal delivery process and the associated monitoring required. As the General Manager of Canterbury’s Recovery and Redevelopment, Paul Commons said that it didn’t matter how many tradespeople and contractors were working on Housing New Zealand sites, or what businesses employed them, in the end they were known as working for the Corporation and therefore how they performed and how they behaved was critical. It was Housing New Zealand’s billboards on the work-sites; its site safety statements attached to fences and gates. Health and safety were the top priority. Visible signs of the Corporation’s intentions featured on every site.

While MWH Recovery was the Project Management Office (PMO) for the minor repair programme, Housing New Zealand took full contractual responsibility for the programme. ‘It was important for us and for the contractors that we did this,’ Andrew Booker explained.

‘We had no doubts at all about MWH’s ability to do this as well as managing the repairs, but essentially this was a Housing New Zealand project and we took full responsibility for direct contracting and the payment of all contractors.’232

Once MWH was involved, Andrew Booker said, the repair programme

231 Mainzeal Property & Construction Ltd was placed in receivership on 6 February 2013 and went into liquidation on 28 February 2013. It reformed and renamed MWH Recovery, to fulfil Vero’s insurance claim requirements. Press Release MWH, 19 February 2013.232 Andrew Booker, 13 April 2016.

Image: The CERP quality assurance team circa 2013 from left: Brendan Ross, Sue Poasa, Barry Brownsea, Hayden Stockdale, Alf Tope

Image: Signage promoting Housing New Zealand’s repair and rebuild programme went up on all sites


moved very swiftly. ‘They had the expertise and were able to help procure the contractors, establish their office within Housing New Zealand’s Manchester Street’s premises and they introduced us to their systems and processes – they brought their expertise to the job. They were highly professional and applied the project management disciplines that were needed.’233

Shane Austin had been recruited to the CERP team in May 2012. He was responsible for the minor repair programme. The efficiency and speed with which MWH put their plan into action was remarkable, he commented later. ‘They knew absolutely what they were doing. There were carpenters, painters, electricians, plumbers, cleaners, floor layers all working on sites. We had our CERP signage and every tradie had an HNZ ID tag. We had Barry, Sue and Hayden working on site as the quality assurance. It was a very good system.234

‘We had developed comprehensive new scoping sheets with more details than earlier and they formed the practical nature of the repairs. They were linked to the costs and could only have happened once the PMO was in place. MWH wanted some ‘quick wins’ to check that their processes were accurate and that the larger minor repair programme would be achieved in time.’235

The Rapid Repair programme started in Bishopdale and Casebrook on Wednesday 17 April 2013. In advance of contractors moving in, leaflets were distributed to tenants alerting them to the start date, supported with follow-up visits by the now expanded Tenancy Liaison team. Local media were keen to observe and to talk with tenants about the work that was being done. The first rubbish amnesty was organised for tenants – getting rid of unwanted or damaged household goods and appliances was part of the project and Earthquake Recovery staff were willing volunteers to help out. It was part of the team’s mantra, espoused by Andrew Booker, that everyone in the Earthquake Recovery office was working towards the same end goal.

‘It wasn’t just about achieving the targets we had set ourselves, it was about creating a legacy,’ he said. ‘We had our own strategy and work plan and we also had developed our vision: to create a legacy of sustainable social housing for the people of Canterbury. We were an incredibly strong team and very determined to succeed.’236

Work began in earnest in, following the success of the Rapid Repair programme. Tenants were alerted ahead of time to prepare for the rubbish amnesty that would be part of the work. There were instructions about the number of rubbish skips and their locations and what could be dumped in them and the times during the day when the skips would be on site. The amnesty was for old TV sets, furniture, mattresses, washing machines and so on. If a tenant was disabled, the Tenancy Liaison team would come and assist.

In his May update to tenants, Andrew Booker talked about the repair programme and what was involved. ‘Teams of contractors working on repairing houses are a regular sight now in Canterbury and will continue to be for a few years to come.’ He explained the complications that had arisen with the newly announced earthquake-prone buildings. It was anathema to Cantabrians when there was so much damage from the earthquakes that now tenants needed to be moved from their homes because their building had an engineering assessment

233 Andrew Booker, 13 April 2016.234 Shane Austin, 18 April 2016.235 ibid236 Andrew Booker, 23 March 2016.

Image: The CERP team helped tenants to sort out unwanted

household goods as part of the rubbish amnesty

Images: Contractors working on internal house repairs


that said it was earthquake prone. ‘We have issued 90 day notices to 70 tenants affected by these assessments and are working with them to find alternative accommodation,’ he wrote.

But finding alternative accommodation in an already choked environment was difficult. Tenancy Liaison staff led by Sheryl Banks contacted moteliers and private accommodation rentals to compile a list that would cover the bare essentials. On 20 December 2013, the CERP team was able to report they had met and exceeded the first target of repairing 550 houses by the end of the year.

In October 2014, the tender for the major repair programme was awarded to Arrow International. It was more complex because of the difficulties of the work to be done, although involving a lesser number of properties than the minor programme. The requirements were the same however; Housing New Zealand would take responsibility for the contractors brought in by Arrow to do the physical work; engagement with tenants would be the Housing New Zealand’s Earthquake Recovery office’ responsibility, managed by the Tenancy Liaison team led by Sheryl Banks. Where tenants had to move to enable repairs to be done, they would need advance notice and guidance about what could be stored in containers on site, and what could be left in the house.

The major repairs began with a pool of 500 structurally damaged houses but the final tally was 329 (repaired). This was because, as Malcolm Jones explained later, many of the properties that had suffered major structural damage needed to be reviewed by the Asset Development teams to see whether they were worthwhile repairing depending on location as much as on damage. Everything needed to be re-scoped to then be quantified and then agreement reached as to the final repair methodology. The contracted tradespeople to undertake the major repairs were Maiden Construction Ltd and Constructa Ltd.

Repairing 5,000 properties on time and within the allowed budget owed much to the skills of the project management companies engaged to do the job. At the same time, credit was due to the Corporation’s Earthquake Recovery team for taking the initiative and doing things differently. This wasn’t about BAU, said Paul Commons. ‘What worked for Housing New Zealand elsewhere in the country, wasn’t necessarily going to work for us in Christchurch where everything was totally different. The usual processes and systems in place for repairs and maintenance were never going to work here. We had to adapt to the situation and we had to be innovative. Talking with the industry and getting their views on what had to be done, helped us gain a better appreciation of the environment, where the labour pool was coming from, what were the cultural differences we had to be aware of.’237

Contractors worked at their own pace, some were able to do more than others. ‘We worked from one suburb to another, from one street to the next. It meant we could demonstrate progress more quickly and it was good for the tenants and other people living on the street and in the area, to see what was being done.’238

The 2,500th house to be repaired was considered a ‘terrific achievement’ by Associate Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Minister Nicky Wagner. The house had required substantial repairs including a full redecoration with new carpets, vinyl, curtains, new heat pump and range hood and a fresh coat of paint throughout. The tenant, Manu Harris, was reportedly ‘stoked’ with the result

237 Paul Commons, 21 April 2016.238 ibid


and the quality of the work. Reaching the repair programme’s halfway mark (2014) was an incredible effort, according to Nicky Wagner. ‘The earthquakes have caused great hardship for many people and state housing tenants are not immune to that.’239

………………………………….

Community Group Housing properties that were assessed as repairable were bundled into either the minor or major works programme depending on the scoped and costed value of the repairs. In the wake of the 2011 earthquakes, as with the 4 September 2010 quake, the organisations responsible for their clients had found alternative accommodation. The post-February assessment regime had been included in the Corporation’s large-scale programme of works. Project Manager Karen Williams said thirteen homes had been identified for demolition, ten had been badly damaged and the remaining properties were classified in the ‘minor’ repairs category. Six properties had been red zoned and consequently had been sold to the Earthquake Recovery Authority.

‘It was a major exercise deciding what to do with the properties and more importantly, how to relocate the residents as easily as possible.’240 It was never going to be a simple task, mainly because accommodation was at a premium in the city and finding something that suited the residents’ different and often complex needs was a challenge. Like everyone else in the region, the residents had suffered during the worst of the quakes. It wasn’t only their home and their location, but their extended families, relatives and carers who were similarly affected and yet needed to be available to provide reassurance and support.

Moving the residents to a different place, even for a short time, required time and patience – reassuring them that they could take their belongings with them, explaining where they were going and for how long, and organising transport. It was another of the many unsung tasks that took place in the months and years following the earthquakes. Known by only the few who were involved.

Moteliers, Karen Williams said, were incredibly helpful as were private real estate agents. Where the properties had sustained minor damage, containers were moved onto the site and residents’ belongings carefully stored there for the duration. ‘We were the resource centre,’ she said. ‘We were the organisation that the NGOs and others came to for advice and support.’241

The minor repairs took anything from between four to six weeks to complete and regularly included plastering and painting, sometimes replacing existing drapes and putting down new carpets. They were completed by Switched On Group as the Corporation’s long-time maintenance crew, and who had the best appreciation of the clients’ special needs. The more structural repairs could take up to four months and included double glazing windows, re-flooring some rooms, completely redecorating and re-carpeting every room. While the repairs took place, the community groups continued their care programme at the temporary accommodation homes and Housing New Zealand monitored

239 Canterbury tenant update, November/December 2014.240 Karen Williams, 15 March 2016.241 ibid

Image: Minor repairs took anywhere between four to six weeks

to complete


the site-work. It was an equitable arrangement where everyone fitted in and ‘just got on with the job.’ Malcolm Jones commented later that every effort was made to maintain complete discretion to ensure the safety of clients and the organisations responsible for their care.

One of the last of the major repairs to be completed was a CGH home. It was described by major repair company Constructa Ltd in the close-out report thus: ‘Asbestos has been found in the lounge ceiling only. There is a separation issue between the old part of the house and the new rear extension; this will need to be re-inspected after the people living there have left. Three bedrooms at the front have ornate fire places. The client would prefer it if these fireplaces were retained. However HNZ policy needs to be considered. A new kitchen is planned. We are removing and making safe the LPG gas heating system. The client has asked for this and is willing to pay towards the installation of new heat pumps. Four heat pumps have been scoped for the hallways and communal areas with an eco-panel heater in each of the ten bedrooms. The concrete driveway is very broken up and it has been allowed to be replaced; a drainage survey to confirm the state of the drains needs to be completed. The gardens are very well kept and some care will be needed around any digging up of the drains if required. The complications mean the property won’t be finished until April 2016.’

And it was, as Malcolm Jones noted later. It was an ‘excellent repair job’,242 he observed. The house was originally an old homestead that had two extensions – the floor had been ripped open by the force of the earthquakes and there was significant other structural damage.

‘Managing people’s expectations was the biggest part of the job,’ Karen Williams said. ‘Keeping interest groups and those immediately involved well informed about progress and what was being planned, was central to the project’s success.’243

………………………………….

By June 2015, the CERP team together with MWH and Arrow, had completed 4,000 of the 5,000 house repairs. By September they had finished 4,377 repairs and were heading towards the completion date. ‘Behind these figures,’ Andrew Booker wrote in the tenant update, ‘are thousands of tenants and their families who are now living in warmer, drier and healthier homes…All of this is genuinely a team effort with many partners involved in making these numbers a reality.’244

The agreed tally of 5,000 repairs was achieved on time. The close-out reports were written and delivered to the Corporation to be included in the final documentation for the Earthquake Recovery Programme. There was a quiet celebration, a recap of events over the two and a half years. The two PMOs packed up, signed out and left the Manchester Street offices.245

242 Malcolm Jones 25 May 2016.243 Karen Williams, 15 March 2016.244 Canterbury tenant update, September 2015.245 MWH finished in October, and Arrow in November 2015.

Image: Hon. Paula Bennett visited some of the damaged community group homes in 2013, accompanied by (from left) Andrew Booker, Daran Buckland and Symon Leggett


What were the learnings from the two repair programmes? What were the successes, the benefits, the level of understanding that could be translated across Housing New Zealand and become the model for the national ongoing repair and maintenance programme? Close-out reports were prepared for the major and minor repair programmes. They were detailed sketches – pen and ink analyses of one of the most significant chapters in the Corporation’s history. The reports concentrated on the detail, the correct documentation and the health and safety standards applied. They were focused on achievement. As with almost everything relating to the earthquake recovery programme, whether Housing New Zealand or any other organisation, the stalwart nature of the people involved in doing the physical work was a given rather than a statement. Quantifying what was done was relatively uncomplicated. Qualifying the work and the outcomes would always be more subjective, relying as it did, on the interpretation of the observer. Engaging close on 1,000 tradespeople from Christchurch, from around New Zealand and from overseas, was a challenge by itself because of different cultures, different work practices and varying degrees of experience and expertise. Channelling the work programmes, organising the methodologies, and particularly working around existing tenants contributed to the pressures of the job. It was by far the largest single work programme achieved in Greater Christchurch.

Completing the Major Repairs

On 11 January 2016, the final report on the major repair programme was fully documented and completed. It made compelling reading in part because it clarified the roles and responsibilities of each contributing party and in part because it included specifics about the challenges of working in an extremely complex environment. Nothing was ever going to be easy repairing houses that had significant structural damage and that were often borderline between repair and demolition. Sometimes demolition won, but most times it was large-scale repair. Tenants moved out. Contractors moved in.

Arrow International Ltd was the successful Project Management Office

5 The Close-out Reports

121Part 2: Chapter 5: The Close-out Reports

(PMO) for the major repair programme, tasked with repairing houses that required foundation and structural repairs. It joined the Corporation’s Earthquake Recovery Team in its Manchester Street offices. Like everyone else, co-location was something new. It required a measure of diplomacy and tact, learning to work with other people in a busy, active office with people coming and going. This wasn’t an environment where all was quiet save the occasional rustle of paper and the tapping of keys.

The work started in February 2014. Arrow began the ‘Parklands 28’ property repairs. These were major repairs to be completed under an existing agreement with Housing New Zealand. The Corporation also engaged two main contractors – Constructa Ltd and Maiden Construction Ltd - to deliver the on-site property repairs and upgrades. Constructa was expected to repair 200 properties and Maiden to repair 100. Both companies undertook the ‘Parklands 28’ properties as sub-contractors to Arrow.

Arrow’s programme manager Walter Savage and the CERP team, led by Andrew Booker, Malcolm Jones and later David Kolien worked closely together on scoping the identified properties to gain a good understanding of the extent and final cost of the repairs. The CERP team made the property repair decisions based on the estimated repair costs, residual life of the property and risk of costs increasing due to the potential presence of asbestos and drainage damage.

By November 2014, the first 100 major repairs had been completed. With a concentrated effort on the part of the PMO and contractors, the 200th repair was completed in March 2015. It was a sterling achievement. The second 100 repairs had been completed within half the time of the first. It was an intense period of work, which, the close out report noted ‘forged relationships and instilled a sense of confidence that the 31 December 2015 deadline would be achieved.’

Health and safety had been a key part of the repair programme, with what was described as a ‘genuine focus on raising health and safety awareness and to grow a strong safety culture. The aim was to put the responsibility of health and safety onto everyone involved in the programme regardless of their role.’

The 300th repair was completed on 18 September 2015 and the programme was 20 repair completions ahead of schedule and on track to achieve completion ahead of time.

As quoted in the R5000 RFP Document: ‘at the end of 2015, we want to say we have met our targets, repaired our properties and most importantly, enabled our tenants to have warm, dry and well restored houses in which to live.’

What were the successes that enabled the Major Repair Programme to be achieved on time and within budget?

It is clear from the close-out report, that a culture of achievement, health and safety had been instilled into everyone involved in the programme. Andrew McKenzie, Arrow’s Christchurch Director noted: ‘…The one-team approach has been at the forefront and is a cornerstone to the success of this programme…I know that the Arrow team has relished the opportunity to be part of the programme and we are proud of what has been delivered for Housing New Zealand.’

Dene Dickson, the health and safety consultant engaged by Housing New Zealand was complimentary about the programme. ‘I have appreciated working with such a receptive and professional group of people and organisations,’ he wrote. From January to October 2015, he had carried out close on 200 health


and safety observations and 31 follow up site visits. During the period the levels of compliance with legal and industry standards had improved significantly, particularly in the areas of task analysis implementation, electrical equipment and working at heights issues. Site conditions such as housekeeping, materials storage, and safe access/egress had also improved.

‘These improvements were in line with a gradual change in attitude and behaviour at all levels of all organisations involved in the programme…it indicated that all parties are taking more ownership of health and safety issues, and this needs to be recognised and encouraged to ensure a continuous improvement.’

Workmanship and quality was rated highly. Both Constructa and Maiden were praised in the close-out report for the way they delivered their work. Random audits had been conducted throughout the repairs on an average of four to six completed properties every month. During the course of the programme, the PMO developed additional checklists to assist with the delivery of quality and performance.

In March 2015, MBIE undertook a survey of 105 houses that had been repaired by the various PMOs who had completed non-consented structural repairs to damaged homes. Five of the Corporation’s houses in the major repair programme were included in the survey. One property was deemed to be non-compliant. The completed MBIE surveys triggered an industry-wide response to further review repaired properties.

Housing New Zealand took the MBIE surveys and their results extremely seriously. It reviewed its repair programme in addition to its existing work between August and October 2015. The results were re-assuring as they confirmed the majority of repairs had been completed to the required standard. Only four of the repaired properties were then identified as being non-compliant and they were rectified as part of the programme.

Some of the reasons for MBIE’s findings could be attributed to industry knowledge or the lack thereof. It was the first time this type of large-scale residential repairs had been undertaken in the country. Many of the applied techniques weren’t covered in standard industry training and in some cases ‘best endeavours’ were adopted. MBIE’s requirements hadn’t been clarified until May 2015, and then only in supplementary notes. Up to this point, MBIE’s documentation had been open to interpretation. Housing New Zealand issued specific design details to clarify MBIE’s expectations on 2 June 2015 after MBIE had issued a ‘clarifications and update to the Guidance (Issue 9, May 2015).

Arrow’s close-out report detailed the programme’s finances. Initially, the average repair cost per damaged home in the major repair programme was approximately $60,000. There was a degree of uncertainty at the start regarding the repairs and methodologies to be used which brought a level of cautiousness to approving what was considered to be a high repair cost. However, as the repair programme developed, methodologies and repair numbers became clearer, scopes and costs were better understood and a consistent delivery was achieved.

The relationship between the contractors and the PMO staff was a key ingredient to making the programme a success. Continual and open communication was essential. The decision to utilise two main contractors was also key in delivering the programme. The contractors appreciated and responded to the commitment and loyalty that was shown to them. The delivery team held weekly sessions with both contracting companies. These


sessions alternated weekly with a general coordination meeting held once a fortnight that covered health and safety, programme, quality audit, design and consents and general site activities. The alternate week included tenancy and decant meetings at which the team discussed the planning and reviewing of tenant decanting schedules.

The PMO demobilised on 27 November 2015. A dedicated plan was put in place to ensure the correct processes and procedures for the delivery and transfer to take place. There were a handful properties still to be repaired and a detailed schedule was written to ensure they could be completed in time.

………………………………….

Completing the Minor Repairs

On 11 November 2015, the report documenting the Repair <5000 Minor Works Programme was completed by MWH and handed over to Housing New Zealand. Like the Major Repairs report, it was detailed and thorough, again making compelling reading. It clarified, once again, the complexities of working to a very tight schedule and of being tasked with a programme that involved sometimes delicate negotiations to ensure tenants were comfortable with what was being repaired.

The report prepared by MWH - Peter George as the Project Manager, Shane Bishop and Bruce Hewitt - detailed the successful completion of 3,581 properties as at 31 October 2015 with 100 repairs yet to be completed within the deadline of 31 December 2015. It was a mammoth task, finished on time and within budget.

‘Given the challenging 31 December 2015 completing target, MWH implemented a two-stage delivery strategy, involving an initial ‘Rapid Start’ delivery phase running concurrently with the establishment period, leading into the delivery phase for the main programme. Because of its success rate, the MWH PMO was demobilised on 30 October, two months earlier than the 31 December target. From its start date in mid-September 2013, 850,000 construction ‘man’ hours were achieved with zero serious harm injuries. Importantly, there had been no negative media. It was a win/win for the Corporation, MWH and the contractors engaged to do the physical work.

The report summarised what the four key aspects were that had contributed to the programme’s success. The decision to co-locate with the CERP team in its Manchester Street offices resulted in a ‘one-team integration’ outcome. In a similar theme, the PMO concentrated on ensuring effective relationships with contractors through a regime of focused disciplined meetings, forums, newsletters and regular catchups, combined with an environment that concentrated on influencing and supporting the contractors to be successful. Procurement of a successful job management system and reporting capability was another critical success factor. The adoption of a specific system, combined with a comprehensive suite of automated operating reports designed across all levels of stakeholders, provided the PMO with flexibility, accuracy, efficiency and full transparency. MWH had the background of experience and successful delivery of PMO projects to help drive the processes, systems, roles and


responsibilities. And, it had the benefit of experience when it came to ensuring it had an over-supply of contractors to get the work done.

Ahead of the Repair <5000 going to tender, Housing New Zealand had decided to separate the work into two distinct areas. Minor repairs were classified as ones where individual property repairs were at $40,000 or below, were not involved with potential demolition or needed significant structural or reconstructive work. The objective was to complete the work safely, as quickly as was practicable, to work to quality standards as specified by Housing New Zealand and in a manner that would demonstrate value for money.

As far as possible, repairs were to be carried out with minimal disruption to tenants, so that they could remain in their homes while repairs were done. Upgrades to properties should be achieved so that they would be tenant-worthy and the level of investment (by carrying out the repairs) would support the future useful life of the property. MWH was required to meet all of the Corporation’s standards and compliance, and all legislative requirements. It went without saying, that the work had to be done before the end of 2015.

MWH was tasked with managing the governance, strategic planning and reporting of the Programme, its health and safety performance, risk identification and management, the procurement and management of the main contractors, financial management, the selection and implementation of the management system and reporting capability development, the development and embedding of delivery processes and the monitoring of the construction performance. It was a huge learning curve for Housing New Zealand, Shane Austin said later. ‘We learned a lot from MWH. They brought expertise and professionalism to the Programme.’246

One of the Programme’s successes was planning and implementing the repairs on a suburb by suburb basis – geographic bundling. Thirteen contractors were selected based on their perceived capabilities to deliver. (Refer Part 2, Appendix 3) They were put through a training schedule that included a series of induction workshops run jointly by the CERP team and MWH, and covering health and safety, codes of conduct, quality standards, communications and delivery. The city’s suburbs were divided into three zones to enable efficient project management; each with its own team comprising a project manager, project administrator, and several contractor managers. Each contractor was assigned to work primarily within one of the three identified zones.

A high degree of emphasis was placed on developing a positive collaborative relationship to attract and retain contractors and thereby achieve the goals that had been set. Monthly forums were organised for all contractors, relevant CERP and MWH staff who were working within each of the three identified zones, to discuss performance, updates, issues and other matters of interest. Regular meetings were held between MWH and the contractors which were formalised with an agenda, working to specific delivery milestones and ensuring a high degree of contractor accountability. The meetings enabled issues to be discussed that inhibited work throughput, like for example, health and safety issues relating to testing and removal of asbestos, tenant-related access issues, and shortages of some specialist tradesmen particularly vinyl and carpet layers.

Health and safety were particularly important. The work sites were usually properties where tenants were living. This meant that the planning, documentation and implementation of health and safety procedures needed

246 Shane Austin, 18 April 2016.


to be accurate and strictly adhered to. Each site had a Site Specific Safety Plan, defining the hazards, risks and associated mitigation measures. For the contractors, this meant ensuring visibility of whether the property was tenanted with an ‘at risk’ tenant prior to the planning phase so that appropriate allowances could be made. For the tenant, it meant declarations from the contract teams about prior convictions, each with acknowledgment reviewed prior to any approval for the individual work on site. All site staff were issued with Housing New Zealand identity tags.

At a workshop on 24 August 2015, a representative team from MWH and CERP sat down to review the programme and discuss lessons learned; what had been done well and what could have been done better. Much of the credit went to the health and safety regime introduced from the outset with the focus on training, a health and safety forum, clearly defined standards and expectations and quick alerts. What could have been done better included better defined roles in terms of nominated suppliers (MWH was required to use existing, established Housing New Zealand suppliers of products and services in particular curtains, ventilation systems and carpet), more pictorial documentation for non-English speaking trades people on site, and more defined requirements specific to the contract and RFP.

The Rapid Start programme had proved invaluable ahead of the start of the main work as was the allocation of contractors to specific geographical areas and having containers on site. On the other hand, the report noted that it was important not to underestimate the time it took to decant tenants and the length of time before they could move back in again. Equally important was the need for accurate asset information, for example in Aranui. The report was complimentary about the benefits of co-location, the partnering workshop that had been initiated early on in the planning phase, and the industry briefings.

A second workshop on 9 September, reviewed and confirmed the lessons learned.

‘Overall, the success of this programme is considered to have provided a positive legacy and established a new delivery benchmark for future HNZ activities of a similar nature.’

It was a comment that was fully endorsed by both Andrew Booker and Paul Commons who were impressed with the professionalism MWH brought to its role, its efficiency in developing appropriate systems for the work and its high level of success.

Image: Celebrating 5000 repairs completed. From left: Shane Austin, Paul Commons, David Kolien


In an editorial perspective for the Press in 2013, Glen Sowry wrote about the issues facing Housing New Zealand with its recovery programme.

‘State Housing in New Zealand has a proud heritage dating back to the 1930s, even earlier if we include housing for low income workers which began in 1905. Today’s view of social housing is vastly different to that of a century ago however. Housing New Zealand’s purpose is to provide housing for people in need – in the right house, in the right place and at the right time for as long as that need exists. In Canterbury, in 2013, this poses a challenge for the future…pre-quake we had a plan to reshape our property portfolio, to improve insulation, to demolish older houses and to explore new medium density options.’

‘Like everyone else’, he wrote, ‘our priorities changed depending on the situation. While we were helping move tenants, assessing properties, and contributing through the difficult months of the immediate civil defence phase, our staff who lived here were also dealing with their own personal circumstances. Help came from all quarters, and nationally, Housing New Zealand staff put up their hands to come to Canterbury, to roll up their sleeves and pitch in.’

‘Looking ahead, our immediate priority is to repair the properties that were damaged and to rebuild what we have lost. Out of adversity comes opportunity and Housing New Zealand is focussed on reshaping and rebuilding its social housing capacity to best meet the needs of Cantabrians in the decades ahead.’

‘In the early years, a state house was generally two or three bedrooms, built with a timber frame, clad in brick with a tiled roof, and centred on a quarter acre section. This historic one-size-fits-all approach no longer meets the needs of our customers’ diverse range of needs and we must work on reconfiguring our assets to reflect the changes in society that have occurred with a sharp eye to the future.’

‘Modern cities look at residential housing as a priority. Intensified clusters of social housing are a thing of the past. Diverse and integrated communities are the future…Housing New Zealand has a proud history in Canterbury and I am determined that we will play a key role in the

6 Building New Homes

Image: Preparing the section for a new home

127Part 2: Chapter 6: Building New Homes

regeneration and development of modern and sustainable housing in the region in the years ahead. We are taking this responsibility seriously and are excited about what is possible.’

Even though state houses were no longer regarded as a home for life, nevertheless once tenanted they were the homes of the people who paid the rent. There were restrictions certainly, especially relating to dogs, noise, and the usual requirements of respect for someone else’s property, even if it was the state rather than a private owner. Many Housing New Zealand’s properties were in the eastern suburbs of Christchurch, an area not only recognised as socio-economically deprived247 but also the largest residential red zone in the city. There were several thousand other state houses scattered throughout the city. Many were in areas like Fendalton in the north-west, dating back 100 years or so, to times when philanthropic developers bought land and set aside areas for housing labourers. It wasn’t common practice however, and for many different reasons, suburbs like Aranui and Bexley had a substantial proportion of state owned compared with privately owned properties. There were also clusters of social housing in Waimakariri District, mostly in Kaiapoi, and a small number in Cheviot.

The earthquakes presented an opportunity with so many new houses to be built, to introduce different types of designs and developments and on a different scale. International research had demonstrated that in communities where renters, private ownership and leasing arrangements lived alongside one another, the environment was better, there was less crime and there was better access to services. Mixed tenure in its broadest sense, worked for families, for older people and for people with disabilities.

In Christchurch where there was a noticeable residential dislocation in many suburbs and the process of regeneration was clearly going to take decades, making the decision to invest in mixed tenure developments was an attractive proposition. It was particularly so when consideration was given to land use and the potential to build terraced housing or apartments on large sections where only one single house had stood previously.

In Housing New Zealand’s 10-year Canterbury Investment Plan, the case for mixed tenure developments was outlined and explained. ‘Housing New Zealand’s properties need to meet the social and financial metrics of right type and right place. Achieving this in Canterbury where earthquake damage is high and the age of state houses is generally older than the national average, means taking a proactive approach to improvement.’

‘Improving the housing stock must be matched to the changing market where family sizes have decreased in some areas and increased in others. Put alongside the global trend for mixed tenure properties, where people lease, rent or own their homes, there is a demonstrable opportunity in Canterbury to set the future trend for New Zealand in the way that state housing is structured.’248

In the decade before the earthquakes, global decisions about affordable and social housing had changed rapidly. Urban renewal was resulting in a departure from the tenements and apartment buildings of the 19th and early

247 Philippa Howden Chapman et al, ‘The Inverse Care Law’ Once in a Life time City Build-ing after Disaster in Christchurch, Freerange Press 2014 p 191. 248 Meeting the housing need in Canterbury: Housing New Zealand Canterbury Invest-ment Plan, January 2013.


20th century to broader-based communities where a greater balance could be achieved with the way properties were developed and how the people living there could engage in local decision making. There were plenty of examples in Britain, in Europe, in North America and in Australia. Taking the lead in New Zealand and creating mixed tenure living in Christchurch was going to be a step ahead for the Corporation, paving the way for its properties in the rest of the country.

Various international studies defined the social mix and the social balance required for success. They included age, tenure, income, and ethnicity. Mixed tenure wasn’t about retirement villages where age similarity was the dominant factor, or student flats where youth and life-style were the main component. Mixed tenure was about creating a balanced community where age, tenure, income and ethnicity weren’t considered in isolation. They were harmonious.

Urban development in Christchurch was going to be very different from the pre-quake era. The population creep towards the north-west away from the eastern suburbs was already in evidence in 2011. New and revised building guidelines were going to have a major impact on building costs in suburbs where land was rezoned according to new technical criteria. The announcement of a proposed new Land Use Recovery Plan to be led by Environment Canterbury was greeted with cautious enthusiasm by Housing New Zealand.

In a letter to Sean Bignell on 20 December 2012, CERA’s Chief Executive Roger Sutton wrote: ‘We acknowledge the hugely important role that HNZC has in the redevelopment of the social and affordable housing sectors and are keen to work collaboratively on matters relating to recovery. You will make a significant difference to the redevelopment of these housing sectors and the future of Greater Christchurch.’ Mr Sutton went on to say that CERA was very keen to see Housing New Zealand involved in the preparation of the LURP and welcomed its offer of assistance. ‘The LURP scope includes providing for a diverse range of housing types including social and affordable housing. I understand you have representation on this group, providing a fantastic opportunity to get your input and develop your ideas, not surprisingly; your best people will be needed for this role.’

Referring to the Corporation’s intensification proposal, Roger Sutton said: ‘CERA would like to see more evidence and information to support the case for affordable housing recovery in Greater Christchurch within HNZC’s remit. In particular, the specific case for Canterbury and the price point…You are now in contact with the Project Team working on the LURP and I understand that you have had similar discussions with the Christchurch City Council. It is important that these relationships are maintained and your involvement with the LURP continues so that options for the recovery and availability of affordable housing are explored. CERA looks forward to working with you on these matters.’249

On 13 March 2013, in an internal briefing paper about up-zoning in Greater Christchurch, Sean Bignell put the Corporation’s reconfiguration plans into context. Up-zoning for intensified development would enable the release of properties for affordable and social housing. Stage 4 of the CIP involved rebuilding between 1,300-1,400 properties (infill and reconfigured sites) and the release of 1,350-2,700 sites for the market to increase the supply of social

249 Letter from Chief Executive of CERA Roger Sutton to Sean Bignell Housing New Zealand GM Asset Development, 20 December 2012.

Image: Pouring foundations for a new home


and affordable housing. Housing New Zealand had been working to advance up-zoning opportunities since early 2012, he wrote, but it had been constrained by a lack of clarity about the most suitable regulatory vehicle for achieving up-zoning. Two efforts to work through CERA hadn’t been successful. Instead the Earthquake Recovery Authority had suggested Housing New Zealand should pursue up-zoning through the development of the LURP.

Housing New Zealand had contributed to the plan particularly with reference to brown-field250 sites where it wanted to be able to demolish existing houses and build new ones. Led by Patrick Dougherty from the Auckland office, it had been involved in the planning process specifically relating to up-zoning and medium density housing and had been part of the early consultation through a Developers Workshop, Urban Oversight Group workshops and direct feedback to the LURP team. In addition, it had contributed to a paper presented by BECA Engineering which identified suitable locations throughout the existing suburban framework for medium density housing. ‘Housing New Zealand is suitably located within identified sites.’251

Housing New Zealand needed the LURP to provide directions to the Christchurch City Council’s District Plan for zoning changes to support intensification which would enable Stage 4 of the Corporation’s Canterbury Investment Plan. However, as Sean Bignell pointed out, the LURP team had indicated that the City Council was ‘highly resistant’ to District Plan changes being directed through the LURP. The Council’s view was that zoning changes to the District Plan should be achieved through the normal District Plan Review process which wasn’t due to begin until 2014.

The Corporation prepared a detailed submission to qualify its intentions. It supported the priorities identified for land use recovery and in particular those that related to the provision of housing and the manner in which that housing was to be provided. It agreed that there needed to be positive and realistic recognition of medium density housing as an efficient economic form of urban development in post-earthquake Greater Christchurch. It supported opportunities that would provide incentives and mechanisms that allowed a wider range of housing types. However, it believed the LURP could go further and be more specific in its criteria. It should define what was meant when talking about medium density development and the improvement of housing choice.

‘High profile promotion of projects for redevelopment is essential and we welcome the opportunity to work with Christchurch City Council (and others) on initiating exemplar projects for medium density development to accommodation opportunities for quality social and affordable housing.’252

The Corporation was enthusiastic about the ‘floating zone’ concept as outlined in the LURP which described anticipated use and the development controls for such use while retaining geographic flexibility of that use of activity. ‘To assist the development of the LURP, we have proposed a potential Floating Comprehensive Development Zone…we consider this an essential response for built environment recovery.’253

Housing New Zealand would develop ‘exemplar sites’ which would

250 Definition of brown field sites.251 Internal Briefing Paper by Sean Bignell General Manager Housing New Zealand Asset Development, 13 March 2013.252 Housing New Zealand submission on LURP, March 2013.253 ibid


demonstrate the benefits of medium density and affordable housing.254 The LURP was finally announced by Minister Brownlee on 6 December

2013.255

What did the terms ‘medium density’ and ‘affordable’ housing mean in a region where safe properties were at a premium, section prices were rising at a remarkable rate, rental properties were almost unavailable and the cost of building materials increasing to an unreasonable degree? Medium density housing already existed in some areas of Christchurch although it was more prevalent in Auckland and Wellington. It was defined by the Ministry for the Environment as ‘comprehensive developments including four or more dwellings with an average density of less than 350m2 per unit. It could include stand-alone dwellings, semi-detached (or duplex) dwellings, terraced housing or apartments within a building of four storeys or less. These could be located on either single or aggregated sites, or as part of larger master-planned developments.’256

The definition of affordable housing (by comparison), varied depending on where people lived, however the Economic Times explained it as ‘housing units that are affordable by that section of society whose income is below the median household income.’ It stated that ‘though different countries have different definitions for affordable housing, it is largely the same – i.e. affordable housing should address the housing needs of the lower or middle income households. Disposable income of the people remains the primary factor in determining affordability.’

While Housing New Zealand was not in the business of affordable housing, it could encourage mixed tenure developments whereby affordable housing could be included in the range of options available.

………………………………….

The decision to build new mixed tenure apartments, although not overtly controversial, nonetheless attracted both positive publicity and some criticism about the proposed location.

For several years, Housing New Zealand had owned a 2000 msq property on the fringe of the central city, adjacent to ‘Holly Lea’ one of Christchurch’s heritage buildings. Holly Lea had been built by an early pioneering philanthropist Allan McLean. Completed in 1890, and bordering Manchester and Colombo Streets, the large kauri homestead had numerous owners and tenants in its life-time, however it retained its Category One rating from the New Zealand Historic Places Trust and it was a sizeable landmark in the city. In the early 20th century, the Government had bought several acres of the property facing Manchester Street which was in turn used as a dental nurses’ hostel before being converted into state-owned houses. The existing timbered flats were old and most of the tenants had gone after the earthquakes. The high red brick heritage

254 Land Use Recovery Plan, p 5.255 Land Use Recovery Plan, Compiled by Environment Canterbury with the Christchurch City Council, Waimakariri and Selwyn District Councils, New Zealand Transport Agency and the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority, it covered the area of Greater Christchurch including Metropolitan Christchurch, Lincoln, Prebbleton, Rolleston, Kaiapoi, Rangiora and Woodend/Pegasus. 256 Ministry for the Environment, 2012.

Image: The quake damaged Manchester Street flats being demolished – Holly Lea, aka

McLean’s Mansion, in the background.


wall that separated the flats from the street had been damaged in the February earthquake. The land was ripe for redevelopment.

In October 2012, the Corporation unveiled its plan. It would demolish the flats and develop a public private partnership to build 20 to 30 one and two-bedroomed apartments, a third of which would be owned or leased by Housing New Zealand. It was an ambitious plan for Christchurch and it would set a benchmark for future mixed tenure housing in New Zealand. It took another four months for details to be finalised and for Auckland-based Legacy Corporation to be announced as the venture partner. In the interim, the last remaining tenants were shifted to alternative accommodation and the demolition work started for what would be an extensive construction site. There was no simple solution to progressing the project however and it wasn’t until 21 November 2013 that Housing Minister Nick Smith turned the first sod on the site preceded by a blessing from Erurera Tarena on behalf of Ngai Tahu. By then, the ground had been cleared and a long-standing pin oak which had been included in the City Council’s list of heritage trees and had survived the earthquakes, had been savaged by high winds the previous summer.

There was scepticism from some quarters that the project wouldn’t be successful, that Christchurch was too conservative for mixed tenure apartments. A local research company worked with Legacy Corporation to survey prospective owner-occupiers and confirm whether they would be happy to live in such an environment. The response was both positive and enthusiastic. Even better, the project received endorsement from CERA’s Christchurch Central Development Unit when it included 399 Manchester Street in the new residential chapter of its Recovery Plan entitled ‘A Liveable City’. The Housing New Zealand initiative was cited alongside the Margaret Mahy playground, and the ‘Breathe’ project as contributing to the ‘East Frame Residential Neighbourhood.’

In a later article, journalist Matt Philp wrote: ‘The recently completed ‘Stalla’ apartment complex is the face of Housing New Zealand’s new mixed tenure policy in which state tenants will live alongside private owners in ‘tenure blind’ medium-density housing developments. The building, developed by Legacy Property and designed by award-winning architect Andre Hodgskin, is also pioneering in sustainability terms.’257

The journalist quoted Mitchell Jefferson, Development Manager for Legacy, as saying the project had been three years in the making, and that he had ‘chased a Homestar rating’ after a study tour of medium density residential developments in the US. Legacy had incorporated Level 6 Homestar rating into the building consent drawings…’258 The new apartments boasted roof solar panels to power the common area, rainwater tanks for garden irrigation, LED lighting, extensive landscaping, communal vegetable gardens, parks for cycles and parking for a single car per unit. It was a ‘fine plan’ noted Matt Philip, and an ‘optimistic note to strike at the heart of quake-struck Christchurch. Housing New Zealand has described the Manchester Street development as the start of a building programme that will change the face of social housing.’259

The big yet-to-be-answered question was whether the units allocated for state tenants would be as Walter Nash had pronounced back in the 1930s: ‘fit for a Cabinet Minister.’

257 Matt Philip: Article about 399 Manchester Street, 2015.258 ibid259 ibid

Image: The new mixed tenure apartments on the same site.


More mixed tenure developments were earmarked for Phillipstown and then Riccarton - a suburb that already housed state tenants and which was home to many student flats and private renters.260

New Homes for a New Christchurch

The plan to build 700 new homes by the end of 2015 attracted considerable publicity when it was announced by the Minister in February 2013. Local media were particularly keen to know where the houses would be built. Equally, the Christchurch City Council’s Community Boards wanted to know what was happening in their area. Talking with tenants and communities was an essential part of the plan. Leaflets were written and distributed explaining the process, the locations as far as they had been determined, and potential timeframes. ‘Housing New Zealand is embarking on an ambitious rebuilding programme in Canterbury over the next ten years. This $1.2 billion contribution to the earthquake recovery will revitalise communities in existing suburbs and provide quality, well designed houses that meet the national building code and standards. Houses will be built according to need and will include a mix of social and affordable housing options…’261

Key messages were developed for the Tenancy Liaison team visiting tenants to explain what would be happening. As the new construction sites were announced, tenants would be alerted well in advance. If their home was going to be demolished and rebuilt, the tenants would need to be relocated in which case early discussions would take place including finding the best location.

Newsletters were also sent to tenants when there was something specific happening in their suburb even if it didn’t particularly involve Housing New Zealand. The new pressure waste-water system to be introduced in some Christchurch suburbs impacted on Corporation properties. Tenants needed to know when contractors would be working in their areas and whether they would be on individual properties. In Woolston, the new system was installed during July and August 2013. The tenant newsletter explained the system with images, and the associated cost. Not every tenant was happy with the news and there were several meetings including one involving the local MP’s office.

The agreed target of 700 new homes was regarded as particularly challenging in the Christchurch construction environment. There was pressure on the availability of materials, trades people, access, and transport. The consents process for resource and building was becoming a problem. Corporation houses to be built on TC2 and TC3 land were inevitably going to cost more than those on TC1 land. Foundations would need to be ‘spec’d’ differently with more engineering expertise required. Housing New Zealand had never been confronted with an issue so complex and as a result even though there was a specific office in place staffed with people involved only in earthquake recovery, the Corporation’s processes and systems were slow and cumbersome.

In spite of this, Sean Bignell was clear that the CIP was a really good plan. ‘We had maps of the city. We had tried to get some of the cleared school

260 Although more mixed tenure apartments were built on Rex and Elizabeth Streets in Riccarton, the need for social housing in the city was too great and all new homes built by Housing New Zealand in Phillipstown were occupied by state tenants.261 CERP New Housing leaflet, 2013.

Image: Tree planting at the first new house to be built – David James

looks on as Glen Sowry prepares the ground.

Image: The first of the new builds.


sites which would have worked well for us for medium density housing but that didn’t happen. We had already talked with the development sector to understand their practice. We wanted to be able to build new homes that were in line with the Corporation’s future housing projections for Canterbury and that could optimise regeneration on brown field sites.’262

The first new home to be completed and tenanted, like every other ‘first’ for the earthquake recovery programme was greeted with publicity and fanfare. It was one of several new dwellings to be built in identified suburbs of Addington, Aranui, Avondale, Avonside, Linwood, Richmond, Riccarton, Shirley and Somerfield amongst others. Building contractors for the first tranche were Miles Construction, Consortium Construction, Falcon Construction and Legacy Property. The new homes were designed to blend into their surroundings – ‘blind tenure’ was the quotable terminology, to the extent that it would be difficult to know whether the house belonged to Housing New Zealand or a private home owner.

The new build programme had its own brand: ‘New Homes for a new Christchurch’ which was used on all cleared and new sites, with space for a design sketch and details of the builder and associated contractors if required.

Number 18 Wilding Street was located close to the Heathcote River in leafy St Martins, a well-established neighbourhood which had survived the quakes with comparatively little damage, probably more as a result of the September event than the February one. Housing New Zealand owned several properties in the suburb and it was able to achieve consent to build three two-bedroomed units on a large section where only one house had stood previously. The site was cleared in April 2013 and Gerry Brownlee was an early visitor together with Nick Smith, to observe the first concrete foundation slabs being poured and to admire the layout and design of each unit. The houses were completed, landscaped and furnished inside before the first tenants moved in. It was a televised event on 19 September 2013, with Glen Sowry and one of the tenants planting an evergreen magnolia tree, a plaque unveiled on site and media given a tour of each unit.

‘They have been built in record time taking only 12 weeks from the time the foundations went down to our tenants being able to move in,’ Glen Sowry said at the official opening. ‘It is proof positive that we will meet our commitment to the earthquake recovery to build 700 quality new homes by the end of 2015.’263

There were other homes under construction at the same time, in the suburbs of Barrington, Somerfield, Shirley and Linwood. Construction plans for a further five sites in Shirley, Avondale, Riccarton and Aranui had been sent for building consent. But there were problems with the Christchurch City Council which was experiencing ongoing issues within its consents department. It wasn’t only Housing New Zealand which was becoming frustrated with the delays; architects, builders, and other agencies were similarly affected. In July 2013, the Council lost its accreditation to issue building consents. It was a major blow to the Council and it was a severe problem for the city’s construction sector. The Council had been overwhelmed with a burgeoning number of consents and delays had happened as a consequence. There were arguments and counter arguments, debates in public about what was going on and as many, if not more debates behind closed doors.

262 Sean Bignell, 12 May 2016.263 Housing New Zealand Chief Executive Glen Sowry, official opening of 18 Wilding Street, 19 September 2013.

Image: Demolition was the first step, then preparing the ground for a new home depending on whether the land was zoned TC1 TC2 or TC3

Image: Earthquake Recovery Minister Hon. Gerry Brownlee interviewed on site with Nicky Wagner MP and Hon. Dr. Nick Smith - Housing Minister.

Image: New foundations for a new home


It took a year for the accreditation to be regained during which time the Council overhauled its consents systems, while other local authorities helped out by taking on some of the backlog. The Council’s problems however, contributed to delays in enabling Housing New Zealand’s building programme to continue at the pace it wanted. As Andrew Booker commented at the end of 2015 when the anticipated 700 new homes weren’t finished, the complex challenges within the Council relating to building consents, was a major stumbling block. It wasn’t helped by some developers regularly attempting to bypass the specified local authority requirements.

‘It was as much game playing as anything else,’264 Paul Commons said. Issues relating to meeting new construction guidelines on land zoned TC2 and TC3 didn’t help either, and there were ongoing issues relating to procurement, internal signoff procedures that had to be met and the constant search for innovation.

It was always going to be the new houses that would help alleviate the accommodation crisis in Christchurch particularly for rental accommodation. Waiting lists continued to rise and although the repair programme was making huge strides, it wasn’t part of the problem or the solution to reducing the list and finding accommodation in the city. As a result, the huge repair programme didn’t always get the accolades it deserved for completing milestones and achieving targets. If it wasn’t reducing waiting lists, and therefore building new houses, it wasn’t newsworthy.

‘Our progress was slow and it didn’t help to have public comparisons with our rate of speed measured against the kilometres of underground pipe that SCIRT265 was installing or the number of homes EQR was repairing for EQC,’266 Paul Commons said. The work was completely different.

‘We adopted an approach that differed from the Housing New Zealand norm,’ he said. ‘We met with the Master Builders Federation and with insurance companies who had already started their rebuilding programmes and we discussed what approaches they had taken in order to ensure we could get specialists, builders, contractors and the like who would be able to build what we required. We wanted to make sure that we weren’t simply replacing like with like. Balanced communities are about making sure state houses aren’t obvious. So we wanted design innovation as well as practicability.’

Taking the time to meet people already involved in the construction sector proved valuable particularly when establishing the approval panel.

‘We developed a core stable of 17 building firms who had the knowledge of the industry and the supply channels to meet our needs. It wasn’t so much individual units, it was our interest in building new apartments that were a good fit for the community,’ Andrew Booker said. ‘We put a lot of time and energy into meeting with Community Boards and local groups and organisations to test their views and to make sure what we proposed doing would fit with their aspirations. This was particularly important in areas like Aranui and Riccarton where we planned substantial new developments.’267

264 Paul Commons, 21 April 2016.265 SCIRT: Stronger Christchurch Infrastructure Rebuild Team, established in 2011, and responsible for rebuilding horizontal infrastructure in Christchurch following the earthquakes. Included City Care, Downer, Fletchers, Fulton Hogan and McConnell Dowell; CERA, Christ-church City Council and New Zealand Transport Authority (NZTA).266 Paul Commons, 21 April 2016267 Andrew Booker, 28 April 2016.

Image: Construction under way

Image: Concreting walkways between new units


Images: New, warm, safe homes replacing quake-damaged properties

The City Council required signed consent from neighbours in some suburbs and in others like Phillipstown, Aranui and Addington, Housing New Zealand arranged to meet the local community to discuss designs and what the eventual buildings would look like. Not everyone was always happy with what was being proposed and not everyone wanted social housing in their neighbourhood, but in the main, designs were greeted with enthusiasm for being different and definitely better than what had been there before the earthquakes.

In Riccarton where several buildings had been demolished, Sheryl Banks and the Tenancy Liaison team worked with local police to create a community garden on Housing New Zealand property that would have a two year wait before housing construction could begin. ‘It all helped create a feeling of support for what we were doing,’268 Sheryl Banks said. Another leaflet was written and published specifically for the redevelopment in Riccarton with a map identifying existing state homes and their land designation.

‘Riccarton is a well-established Christchurch suburb with a long history of social housing. In 2014 and 2015, Housing New Zealand will be repairing all of its earthquake damaged properties in the area and building up to 150 new houses. They will be predominantly one and two bedroomed units and every building will be architecturally designed and well landscaped.’ 269

The leaflet explained that six new two-storey units would be built on a section bordering Blenheim Road, Wainui and Rex Streets. Between Rex and Elizabeth Streets, 42 units would be built – these units would also be offered for private purchase. On Rex Street, a further seven two-bedroom units would be built and on Blenheim Road between Wainui and Matipo Streets, two separate sites would house a total of 16 two-bedroom units. Also on Blenheim Road between Matipo and Division Streets, another twelve two-bedroom units would be built. Two separate developments would be built on Broadbent Street, and on the corner of Tika and Peverel Streets, another two separate developments would be built.

Most of the Corporation’s properties in Riccarton were zoned either TC1 or TC2 which made it easier to plan the repair and rebuild programme. The leaflet explained that all its properties in Riccarton were being assessed taking into consideration their age, current status and whether they were earthquake prone. Some houses would be demolished to make way for new homes. It was a positive statement and was warmly received by the Riccarton/Wigram Community Board when Andrew Booker went to explain what was being proposed, armed with detailed maps, design sketches of the new buildings and information sheets.

While work on the ground proceeded at pace, a new report needed to be developed and sent to the Minister outlining progress one year after the agreement to repair 5,000 houses and build up to 700 new ones.

On 24 February 2014, close on a year since the first letter of intent had been sent to the Minister, the Corporation’s new Board Chair Dr Allan Freeth wrote to Nick Smith: ‘We are on target for repairing all damaged houses in Christchurch by Christmas 2015, which acknowledging the pace of repairs is now accelerating so as to achieve our target. The programme for minor repairs is proceeding at a contracted repair rate of 180 houses per month and major

268 Sheryl Banks, 1 February 2016.269 ‘Social Housing Redevelopment in Riccarton’, Leaflet produced by Housing New Zealand, January 2014.


repairs at 25 per month. The Foundation Repair Trials, as reported at the seminar on 4 February, form part of the technical base for structural house repairs. These repair rates and contractor capacity are sufficient to meet our targets while maintaining sufficient high standards of tenant satisfaction, safety, quality and value for money…The (repair) contractors are proven, capable and reputable companies who understand the importance and urgency of our work.’

Dr Freeth discussed the new build programme. He outlined the target and the complications in achieving the original 700. ‘Our expected outcome, without further mitigation management, is 640 and this is due, partly to delays around consenting and the late release of the LURP.’270 He said the Corporation would continue to report monthly on a run-rate basis and update the Minister on the 60 house ‘gap’ that would need to be closed. The homes, he said, would be a mix of buying off plans and building on cleared sites.

‘We have signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Christchurch City Council to work closely together on the redevelopment of social housing in the city where appropriate. I am confident that a positive working relationship is established between Housing New Zealand and other key players in the recovery programme – CERA, Ngai Tahu, MBIE, Department of Corrections, Ministry of Education, Environment Canterbury, Waimakariri and Selwyn District Councils, Southern Response and others…Finally, I would like to reiterate our assurance in last year’s letter that we are committed to maintaining strong leadership in Canterbury and that we are working with a high level of urgency to repair and reconfigure Housing New Zealand’s property portfolio in the region.’271

Back in Christchurch, the February 2014 update to tenants also explained progress on the construction of new homes. In Addington, new units were being built in Church Square which were designed to blend with the community’s design requirements. In Phillipstown work had started on new units in Ollivers Road. In Riccarton 150 new homes were going to be built on several different sites. In a further update in September the same year, tenants were told of 12 two-bedroomed units in Worcester Street – close to the inner city - which had been opened by the Housing Minister, and 10 new two-bedroomed homes were close to being finished in Poulson Street. More homes were under construction in Papanui.

Shirley however remained a suburb yet to be redeveloped. There were many reasons for the ongoing indecision. In spite of having been named as an ‘exemplar’ site in the LURP, the land was mostly TC3 therefore expensive to repair and then rebuild. There were ongoing discussions with the City Council and local organisations to explore the feasibility of a new community centre being developed in central Shirley. There were issues with water reticulation and waste water that weren’t the domain of the Corporation’s to resolve. There were issues relating to the potential for new roading and for the way in which it was proposed to redefine MacFarlane Park.

Redevelopment in Shirley would still happen, Paul Commons said, but it would be part of the future programme rather than the 700 new builds.

A comprehensive update was emailed to the CERP team in February 2014

270 Letter from Dr Allan Freeth, Chair of Housing New Zealand Board to Minister of Housing Hon Nick Smith, 20 February 2014. p 2.271 Letter to Minister of Housing Hon Nick Smith from Dr Allan Freeth, Chair Housing New Zealand, 14 February 2014.

Images: New social housing for Christchurch


at the start of a change in the team’s staffing. Stakeholder engagement would be an essential component of the work programme in the coming year. In election year, the Corporation’s Wellington-based Government Relations Unit (GRU) would be formally managing relations with government officials. ‘If there is a direct query from an MP’s office relating to a tenancy or repair/build issue, it can be responded to locally with the query and response cc’d to GRU…’ Although GRU had an acknowledged role to play in keeping the flow of communications between the repair and rebuild programme and Ministerial offices, much of the other work particularly liaison with local MPs had been the preserve of the CERP team for the previous two years.

Keeping tenants informed remained a high priority. The tenants’ newsletter would continue every two months throughout the year and Tenancy Liaison would continue to update tenants on the repair and rebuild programme.’272

In fact, posting the bi-monthly newsletters to tenants was a major task by itself in part because of the tenants’ frequent moves and relocations in and out of Canterbury. Making sure the mail reached its intended recipient took time and commitment not only by the CERP team, but by Housing New Zealand’s contracted service and New Zealand Post. The old adage of ‘the mail must go through’ resonated throughout Canterbury from 4 September 2010 onwards.

Towards the end of 2014, Christchurch tenant Paul Meek gave the Prime Minister a guided tour of his newly built home in Church Square Addington. Until recently, Mr Meek had been living in a state house in Ashburton because of the accommodation pressures in Christchurch. Relocated back to Christchurch was the perfect Christmas present, he told John Key.273

272 Communications & Stakeholder engagement internal memo. HNZ February 2014.273 Canterbury tenant update, April 2015.


Urban Renewal in Aranui

By far the biggest new housing development project was to take place in Aranui. A large social housing area before the earthquakes, it had suffered major damage and needed to be re-planned and re-designed ahead of any new construction taking place. Discussions with ACTIS, the local Aranui community group provided Housing New Zealand with background information about what local people needed and wanted. In a series of information sheets and updates, the Earthquake Recovery team explained what was being proposed. One hundred new homes would be built in addition to repairing 460 quake damaged properties. Some homes would come from Rolleston Prison following their complete repair and refurbishment. All the new homes would be built on existing Housing New Zealand land in Guernsey, Hampshire, Aldershot and Corhampton Streets and on Breezes Road.

It wasn’t the easiest project. There were several discussions within Housing New Zealand about the imperatives of re-starting social housing in Aranui. The suburb had a complex history. As Lincoln University post-graduate student Felicity Boyd noted in a case study of Aranui and Wainoni, ‘It is no secret that there is a problem with the suburb of Aranui. Developed in the 1950s, Aranui and neighbouring Wainoni are an example of the large-scale, state-funded subdivisions of the time, yet, unlike similar developments in the North Island, they have received little to no attention from researchers…what went so wrong?’274 she asked.

Felicity Boyd went on to note that since the two social housing suburbs had been developed, they had become increasingly deprived, ‘materially, socially, culturally and spiritually,’ and in 2000, a new scheme had been developed known as the Community Renewal Project.275 The project was jointly sponsored by Housing New Zealand and the Christchurch City Council. Making the announcement at the time, Housing Minister Mark Gosche and local MP Lianne Dalziel were enthusiastic about the project’s potential.

‘Community renewal is about empowering communities,’ the Minister had said. ‘Housing New Zealand wants to build meaningful partnerships with local communities, to make them more vibrant, vigorous and viable.’ Lianne Dalziel was reported to have said she was ‘thrilled with the opportunity the approach had to offer Aranui. My electorate office is in Aranui, and I feel very connected to the project and I support it 100 per cent.’276

A year later, the Minister of Social Services & Employment Steve Maharey announced a total of $426,000 over each of the following four years as part of the expansion of the national Stronger Communities Action Fund (SCAF). The community renewal programme had been expanded into other parts of the country where such initiatives had been identified as having the potential to make a difference.

‘The Aranui community through the Aranui Community Trust has already made significant progress in identifying a vision for their community and work on the Aranui Renewal Project is underway.’277 Aranui’s priorities for future

274 Felicity Boyd, ‘The evolution of a state-funded subdivision. A case study: Aranui and Wainoni’. Lincoln University 2011.275 ibid276 Media release by Lianne Dalziel MP for Christchurch East, 13 June 2001.277 Media announcement by Steve Maharey, 3 December 2002.

Image: The CERP team consulted with the Aranui community

particularly ACTIS to make sure new houses would meet their needs


developments had been identified through community consultation, the Minister said. Design workshops had been organised with the community to determine what new housing should be built following demolition of some older houses in the area. Aranui High School had been the first secondary school in Christchurch to set up the academy system enabling students to specialise in sports like rugby, netball and water sports while maintaining their academic studies. A local health directory had been developed. There was an annual Aranui Affirm festival as well as a budget advisory service and a youth initiative.

It all augured well for a community which had considered itself ‘neglected’ by local and central authorities over several decades. The earthquakes didn’t help. In a comprehensive Press article in November 2012, Phillip Matthews recounted some of the worst episodes in the suburb’s life before going on to praise the work achieved through ACTIS. Crime dropped, he wrote, local pride and social cohesion increased. It was ‘text book’ urban renewal. Even so, he wrote, ‘Housing New Zealand used to top local surveys as the most reviled organisation.’ But its status improved after derelict state houses were replaced by new townhouses. Problems re-emerged after the earthquakes. Aranui was badly hit. ACTIS under the intuitive management of Rachael Fonotia, organised the distribution of fruit and vegetables, nappies, pet food and canned food. According to local City Councillor Glenn Livingstone, the success of the Aranui response was due to the structures established by ACTIS and its profile as a community hub.278

For Housing New Zealand’s Earthquake Recovery team, Aranui was a suburb that required discussion with ACTIS and the City Council’s Burwood Pegasus Community Board before it could start either its repairs or the rebuild programme. It was the first suburb for large-scale repairs. As Sheryl Banks said later, all the contractors went there as the first suburb for the repair programme. ‘We sent everyone a letter, even the neighbours of our properties in Aranui, explaining what we were doing and letting them know that they would experience noise and dust. “Unfortunately this is unavoidable when repairs are being done. We hope you will bear with us while this work is carried out.”279

In October 2013, Paul Commons explained the Corporation’s ‘progressive approach’ to rebuilding its quake-damaged properties in Aranui. ‘For families, an important consideration will be having secure outdoor play areas that are separate from the driveways. Like all new buildings in Christchurch, our houses will be designed to suit the ground conditions. A lot of Aranui land is zoned TC3 which means we will most likely concentrate on timber-frame construction and light-weight roofs.’280

Commenting in a tenant update in September 2014, Paul Commons said the repairs were a team effort. ‘A great example of how this team approach is working really well for tenants happened recently in Hampshire Street in Aranui. Tenants in 14 of our properties agreed to move out of their homes for a week while contractors, including painters, vinyl and carpet layers, worked day and night to carry out repairs to those homes. We provided containers and helped tenants move their possessions out of their homes. Most tenants chose

278 Phillip Matthews, ‘Setback slow Aranui’s Road to Recovery’, The Press, 24 November 2012.279 Letter to Housing New Zealand neighbours in Aranui, February 2014.280 Media statement Paul Commons, Redevelopment Manager, Housing New Zealand, 22 October 2013.

Image: Preparing the ground for new homes in Aranui


to stay with family and friends while the repairs were done…In just a week they had their homes repaired.’281

Designing the new houses and agreeing on where they should be located proved to be more of a challenge. Paul Commons said there were differences of opinion about what should be built, but even before then, there were discussions about the rationale for Housing New Zealand building any of the agreed 700 new homes there. ‘But, we had history in Aranui. We owned the land, and it made sense to stay there. We talked with the Ministry of Education and the City Council and we could see the commitment and the genuine will to rebuild Aranui.’282

It took more time than expected. Even though the land wasn’t as badly damaged as other suburbs in the east, there were issues to be resolved like water reticulation and power that were the responsibility of other organisations involved in the rebuild. And there were ongoing negotiations with ACTIS about what new homes should look like.

David Killick writing in the Press in December 2014 commented favourably on the proposals for Aranui. In his article entitled ‘Thinking outside the box on social housing,’ he defended Housing New Zealand’s plan against local critics who had slammed it as a ‘breeding ground for crime.’ Not so, David Killick wrote. ‘If I were designing a new housing development, I would go further (than HNZ’s plan) and get rid of high fences and long driveways altogether. I would add a shared meeting area, a pocket park and garden areas that everyone could enjoy. If you know your neighbours and can see who is around, you feel safer. Intelligent design cuts crime.’283

The Earthquake Recovery team had consulted ‘Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design’ principles before confirming the proposed designs, because, as Stakeholder Engagement Manager Ray Tye said at the time, it wasn’t in Housing New Zealand’s interests to create problems. But, such a comprehensive explanation of what was being proposed and how the new building project would take shape, didn’t always gain community support. There was criticism that Housing New Zealand had come to the community with a plan already resolved. There was criticism that the new houses would be the same as before ‘only prettier.’284 There were concerns expressed that the same cluster housing as had existed before would become the norm of the future.

A dedicated plan was needed to explain to the Aranui community and its interested stakeholders precisely what was being proposed. Ray Tye explained the rationale for doing this in Aranui over any other suburb where social housing was being planned. ‘We invited them to participate in refining plans, ensure their feedback was considered and reflected in the final plans, and to work in an inclusive way to deliver new homes that suited the community and the environment,’285 she said. There were discussions with the local police, schools, churches, the Aranui Renewal Group, the electorate MP, Burwood-Pegasus Community Board, Christchurch City Council, MSD, Maori interests, tenants, neighbours, business interests and of course the Aranui Community Trust.

281 Housing New Zealand Tenant update: Canterbury Catch-up, September 2014.282 Paul Commons, 21 April 2016.283 David Killick is a freelance journalist and photographer who specialises in articles about houses, design and lifestyle. 284 The Press, 22 November 2014.285 Ray Tye, June 2015.

Image: Before and after: new homes for Aranui


There were meetings, workshops, public meetings and report back sessions. Information was posted on relevant websites, there were pamphlets, media releases and articles, presentations, advertising and newsletters. There was also a scaled 3D model available for people to pore over and discuss.

Newsletters were sent to local organisations explaining what was happening. ‘Liquefaction and structural damage contributed to many of the houses being vacated as we moved families to safer accommodation…we have several properties in Hampshire and Aldershot Streets and Rowses Road that have been vacated due to structural damage. They will be the first to be demolished and new houses will be built on the properties.’286

‘The new homes will be an improvement on existing Housing New Zealand houses. They will be better designed, and more comfortable with better use of land sites. They will be a mix of house types and styles, with varying number of bedrooms.’287 Exactly what would be built on a specific site would depend on land availability and conditions, access to amenities such as schools and parks, street access, estimated costs and section layout. There would be single storeyed and two storeyed buildings but nothing greater than two. The houses would be timber-framed with light weight roofs, and would be raised for earthquake resilience and to meet current flood plain requirements. Houses would have from between two and five bedrooms which would reflect MSD’s waiting list demand for social housing. The number of bathrooms, location of laundries, methods of heating, insulation, storage and outside areas were all discussed at length.

From initial suspicion, mistrust and criticism, came a gradual acceptance that what the Corporation was attempting to do was to engage, listen and implement some of the changes the community wanted for the new houses. Such a comprehensive engagement had its downside including time delays and additional financial costs. However, they resulted in five fewer houses than originally planned, nine fewer two-storeyed houses, more standalone homes, garages for 25 three and four-bedroomed houses, no laundries upstairs, use of pool fencing to provide for permeable street frontages, and 1.8 metre fences to create private backyards, the removal of through-roads and internal walkways, more own-driveways and use of rumble strips and variation in house cladding for visual relief across the five sites.

The discussions, meetings, information sharing and proactive communiques disproved the generally held belief that the Corporation had already made up its mind on redeveloping Aranui and that any consultation would just be a token gesture. Although Housing New Zealand couldn’t accommodate everyone’s wishes, it made several significant changes and improvements to the final designs, landscaping and eventual construction.

It was a travesty, therefore, that three of the newly built homes in Aranui were destroyed by a suspicious fire in December 2015.

Progress was essential however, and on Friday 8 April 2016, the first of six major new developments in Aranui was formally opened in Aldershot Street by ACTIS Chair Rob Davidson and Andrew Booker. It included 15 two-storeyed units, ten of which were two-bedroomed homes, three three-bedroomed homes and two four-bedroomed homes. A total of 108 new homes was planned for Aranui to replace what had been demolished after the earthquakes.

286 Housing New Zealand Information sheet to Aranui residents, November 2013.287 Housing New Zealand Information sheet to Aranui/Bexley residents, October 2014.


‘Housing New Zealand worked closely with the community around the design and configuration of these new homes, and engagement and feedback was key to getting a positive outcome,’288 Andrew Booker said. Two open days were planned for the Aldershot Street development to enable residents and interested people to look through the new buildings.

In all respects, noted Paul Commons, Aranui would become a real example of urban regeneration. The unanswered question was whether additional urban renewal could come from private developers – whether they could see the potential in revitalising a community which had suffered so badly. It would mean significant commercial and retail development together with private housing options.

In a 2015 review of the Neighbourhood Social Mix and Outcomes for Social Housing Tenants, the Centre for Research, Evaluation and Social Assessment (CRESA) commented that ‘some of the negative effects associated with social housing concentrations (and indeed low income communities), are not caused by the concentration but relate to poorly designed and maintained built environments, a lack of control of derelict properties, inaccessible or poor service provision, poor allocation practices and tenant management, and under- or over-policing. These problematic issues can be addressed without social mix directed initiatives.’289

Paul Commons would argue persuasively, that the new housing initiatives in Aranui, catering for state tenants, were several steps up from the past, and by themselves showed a willingness on the part of Housing New Zealand to contribute to the ‘new’ community. He said the community’s invitation to a supermarket company to build and open a new business in the area was a sign of initiative and progress. Equally progressive, although yet to be proven, was the super-school – Aranui Community Campus - combining the former Aranui High School, Avondale, Aranui and Wainoni primary schools and due to open in 2017.

The impetus to create a balanced community was demonstrated in Guernsey Street where, for example, nine new houses were contracted to Mike Greer Homes of which Housing New Zealand would take five and the balance would be sold by the builder on the open market. Residents in the Corporation’s new homes across Aranui would be a mix of existing and new tenants. ‘The long-term upkeep of our new houses and the areas around them will be important for tenants and neighbours, as well as the wider community and Housing New Zealand.’290

288 Media Release: official opening of first new homes in Aranui, 8 April 2016.289 Kay Saville-Smith, Nina Saville-Smith, Bev James: Neighbourhood Social Mix and Outcomes for Social Housing Tenants: Rapid Review. November 2015: commissioned by the NZ Ministerial Social Sector Research Fund. 290 Canterbury Redevelopment Information Sheet: Housing New Zealand October 2014.


‘The Cantabrian’

It was a competition for architects to design a house that would reflect the next generation of housing in Canterbury, more particularly for homes to be built on TC3 land. The competition brief was based on MBIE’s guidelines for TC3 land, taking into consideration shape, construction materials and sustainability.

The competition was organised by Southern Response in conjunction with the New Zealand Institute of Architects and it attracted wide publicity and 47 entries from throughout the country. The inspiration for the concept was the well-known ‘Queenslander’, according to Chief Executive of Southern Response Peter Rose, which was built for the Queensland conditions. ‘We wanted to develop something that was appropriate for the prevailing conditions in Canterbury,’ he said.

‘We were approached by Southern Response to see whether we had a suitable property,’ Andrew Booker said. ‘They looked at a number of sites and eventually decided on Cranford Street.’291 The site was large, on TC3 land, and the existing Corporation house had been damaged in the earthquake. The house was transported to Rolleston Prison to be included in its refurbishment programme, and the site was cleared and leased to Southern Response for the duration of the competition, the construction phase and then for several months as a show home.

The competition winner, announced by Prime Minister John Key, was Nelson architect Richard Sellars who said he was inspired to enter the competition because he believed that every house, no matter how small a budget or footprint, should be well designed and placed ‘carefully’ on the land.

Construction began towards the end of 2013. It took six months to complete the house including interior decoration and furnishings. From the first open day in June 2014, the house attracted several thousand visitors. It was described as a ‘modern take on the quintessential New Zealand bungalow.’ It was a two-bedroomed house with panel walls that could enable a third bedroom to be created if required. Southern Response landscaped the property including fencing and parking as required and handed it back to Housing New Zealand late in 2015. The new state tenants had moved in by Christmas the same year.


Image: The ‘Cantabrian’ completed and ready for tenants.

‘There is no doubt that creativity is the most important human resource of all. Without

creativity, there would be no progress, and we would be forever repeating the same patterns.’

Edward de Bono

PA R TT H R E E

145Part 3: Chapter 1: Tenancy Liaison: Achieving Success

The goal for the Earthquake Recovery Tenancy Liaison team was straightforward. ‘We will relocate, coordinate and facilitate temporary or permanent accommodation for tenants with earthquake damage where required, providing a seamless transition with a high quality customer service by positively managing relationships and prioritising demands.’292

The challenge was enormous, starting when Andrew Booker appointed Sheryl Banks into her role. She understood Housing New Zealand’s tenancy requirements, having worked in Tenancy Services and having known the trauma tenants experienced during the earthquakes and their aftermath. Now the task was much bigger, the programme more detailed, the staffing levels higher. ‘I had appointed Margaret Dickinson first,’ she said, ‘then two more people – Alana Smart and Chris Coey - to go with our maintenance teams when houses needed to be boarded up in the residential red zones. Staff came in to achieve a specific piece of work. But it wasn’t until the repair programme started that we needed to increase our numbers.’ Trish McDowell was appointed in early 2012 followed by Mike Kerrigan and Jason Hickey a few months later.

The process was straightforward. The list of affected tenanted properties generated by CERP’s Programme Manager would be sent to the Tenancy Liaison team who would check the list to make sure that anyone on the Corporation’s Tenant Risk register was identified to the contractor who would be working on the property. A member of the Tenancy Liaison team would contact the tenant whose home required earthquake repairs and meet with them in person, explain the process for repairs, the name of the contractor, when the repairs would start and any impact on the tenancy. A letter to this effect would be left with the tenant.

Housing New Zealand’s policy for renting its properties specified there had to be a ‘main’ or ‘head’ tenant who was responsible for keeping the property to a required standard. The number of bedrooms in the house depended on the number of people in the tenant’s family, how many children, their ages and whether there were older family members living there as well. There were often

292 Sheryl Banks, ‘Processing for Access and Tenancy Relocations for EQ Damage.’ November 2012.

1 Tenancy Liaison: Achieving Success

Image: Some of the tenancy liaison team members circa 2013 – from left Jason Hickey, Sheryl Banks, Mike Kerrigan and Trish McDowell


additional people living in the house who weren’t part of the head tenant’s family and overcrowding was a particular concern after the earthquakes. Housing New Zealand also had a strict policy relating to pets, particularly dogs, which was often ignored by the tenants. Working through these issues was part of the Tenancy Liaison team’s brief.

The original intent of the Repair <5000 programme was to try and keep tenants in their homes while the repairs were taking place. ‘We had planned on decanting 20 per cent,’ Sheryl Banks said. In the event, at its peak, 35 to 40 per cent of tenants were moved. It was one of the biggest challenges faced by the Tenancy Liaison team, yet it was effected remarkably smoothly.

The process for moving tenants out of their homes included discussions with the contractor after the property had been fully scoped for repairs. A member of the Tenancy Liaison team visited the family and explained what was going to be done and the potential impact on the tenant.

‘We talked with the tenants and realised that most of them didn’t want to be in the house while the repairs were being done,’ Sheryl said. It had been relatively uncomplicated in the first tranche in Bishopdale and Casebrook because the repairs weren’t too difficult to achieve and contractors could work around people in the house. But once the main repair programme started, it became more complex.

‘We realised there was a risk to both tenants and contractors. A lot of the workmen were used to repairing empty houses, and we had a lot of vulnerable tenants. And there were house-pets to consider. We developed a criteria. We went out and talked to everyone we could think of who owned properties or who would be prepared to rent. We talked to people who ran bed and breakfast places, motels, private rental places and we looked at the suitability of the location and how they would be paid.’

Most of the accommodation owners were happy to rent to Housing New Zealand mainly because they knew they would be paid on time, and because the Tenancy Liaison teams were immediately contactable if there were any problems. ‘We kept them very well informed about progress and they knew the amount of time that our tenants would be living there.’

Housing New Zealand had a pool of 65 properties in addition to external short and long term private rentals which they could utilise short term while repairs were being done. ‘It worked extremely well,’ Sheryl Banks said. ‘They were one, two and three bedroomed houses and we were able to turn them around very quickly after one family moved out and another moved in. We also had portacoms that we used. The amazing thing was that we didn’t have one delay throughout the entire process and we shifted 350 families.’

The shortest stay in one of the Corporation’s houses was 4 days; the longest stay was 199 days. The average stay was 44 nights. At the final tally, the total number of nights spent by tenants in relocation properties was 16,210. ‘One of our houses in Emmett Street in Shirley was the most popular choice,’ she noted.

There were times when permanent rather than temporary relocations were a better decision. If the tenant family had to relocate for repairs and the makeup of the household had changed, the Tenancy Liaison team discussed options with the tenant that would better meet their needs. This could include a permanent relocation out of Christchurch – often seen as a better solution for some tenants who didn’t want to remain in the city – or a permanent move within their area or a different side of town if available.


The team arranged containers for tenants’ belongings and organised rubbish amnesties to coincide with the repair programme - the first of which was in Bishopdale. They were an immediate success. The team organised skips for general rubbish, special containers for metals, and high wire trailers for furniture. Volunteers from the Earthquake Recovery office turned up to assist every time and occasionally other staff from Wellington and Auckland flew down to help out. ‘It was one of the activities that everyone got in behind regardless of the weather and the state of the properties.’

The amnesties also highlighted what Sheryl Banks later explained, was a major problem with tenant hoarding. ‘We often organised mini-amnesties outside of the main ones in conjunction with the tenant and we would fill a skip with unwanted items to help with de-cluttering.’

The properties needed to be cleared so that the contractors could move in and undertake the repairs without interruptions, and besides, the Corporation wanted the houses to be repaired and refurbished to a state that would give them greater longevity. It was better for the tenants to move back into a clean and refreshed house as well as one that had been repaired plus the tenants felt they had a fresh start to keep their house in a good state.

‘At our peak, we moved between 60 and 70 families per month. We had a hands-on approach to everything. We would visit the tenants first, sit down with them and explain what was happening. We would explain what would happen with their belongings, what they could take with them, and what could be packed up. What we found was that people just wanted to move out. As long as they could be close to their children’s schools, they were happy.’

The team also created its own temporary village. ‘We bought four relocatable, transportable units from MBIE and put them on a Corporation site. They were used on many occasions for tenants while their properties were being repaired.’

The Tenancy Liaison team stopped using the formal 90 day notices almost immediately once the repair programme started. ‘They didn’t work for us, and although the Corporation didn’t like us stopping, we were adamant. We found it was best to arrange a meeting with the tenants, talk to them about what was happening, and agree on the next steps.’

It was a process that worked very well. Many tenants were more than happy that they had a personal visit rather than being issued with a sterile notice.

The main repair programme began in earnest in Aranui in September 2013. ‘We put every contractor in there to start with. The former office in Marlow Road was reopened to serve as a hub for staff and tradespeople. ‘We liaised with the local group ACTIS and asked for their feedback.’

It was a huge operation and understandably not everything flowed smoothly. The Tenancy Liaison team was actively engaged talking with tenants when they remained at home while repairs were being carried out. Sometimes contractors explained what was going to be done which didn’t then eventuate; on other occasions tenants had expectations that weren’t realised. Contractors didn’t always let tenants know when they were coming which caused tension.

Housing New Zealand had created a detailed agreement between the tenant and the maintenance contractor which was discussed at length and which was to be agreed to before any repair work was undertaken. This included timeframes, hours of work, paint and decoration colours, sequence of work, hazards, use of utilities and amenities and so on. The agreement was designed to minimise issues and to ensure work was completed according to the schedule.


In general, everything worked satisfactorily, given the enormity of the workload, the several hundred tradespeople involved and the varying situations of the tenants. However there were the inevitable issues relating to damage when household goods were shifted, when appliances were turned off, and there were always issues with dust. Dust, as everyone knew, was a perennial problem throughout Christchurch particularly during the summer months and periods when the nor-wester or the easterly was particularly strong.

‘There had to be a balance between inevitable discomfort with ongoing work and providing a suitable living space for rent-paying tenants.’

Because the Project Management Company MWH Recovery was working out of the Corporation’s Manchester Street offices, communication between the contract managers and the Tenancy Liaison team was relatively simple. It enabled immediate action to be taken if there were negative reports coming through from either tenants or contractors. Even so, there were some occasions when problems weren’t always easily resolved. Overcrowding was an issue when extended family was living on a property and wasn’t already identified as being part of the tenancy. Sometimes tenants or their relations became aggressive towards contractors and there were frequent issues with pets, particularly dogs and cats.

‘There was a huge positive for the Tenancy Liaison team in that there were no fixed parameters to provide solutions. The team could look outside the box for ideas and were given flexibility to achieve the goals by different means. They could purchase travel tickets or petrol vouchers for tenants instead of paying accommodation and they could organise taxis to get children to school if tenants were temporarily relocated outside of the area. Having different options of temporary accommodation types was of huge benefit because different tenants suited different living situations.’

Not every tenant qualified for temporary accommodation however. It depended on the scale of the repairs and the extent to which the family would be affected either physically or psychologically. When tenants opted to remain at home there was no compensation other than for dust or paint fumes. But, as was acknowledged later, these were rare events.

In October and November 2015, as the repair programme moved towards its end-of-year completion date, Sheryl Banks noted in the Tenancy Liaison updates that the main priority was to make sure people who had been moved into temporary accommodation while minor repairs were being carried out, could be shifted back into their homes in time. ‘We currently have 47 temporary relocation properties for the repair programmes all of which are fully booked with tight turnaround times through to November,’ she wrote. The pressure was on to achieve the final deadline.

Referencing the major repair programme, she wrote: ‘we are continuing to manage the return of decants back into their repaired properties. To date, Maiden Construction has decanted 87 properties and Constructa has decanted 219. Overall, once the major repair programme is completed, there should be a combined total of 331 decanted tenants. Next month (November), our focus is on returning decants and carrying out work-in-progress visits with tenants in situ. Closing out any tenant issues is also our priority, for example damage, reworks and access.’

At year’s end with the completion of Repair <5000, the Tenancy Liaison team was praised for its contribution and its success. It was recognised for its notable achievement in both the Major and Minor Programme’s close out

Image: The expanded Tenancy Liaison team from left:

Claire Moran, Vicki Tucker, Chloe Andersen, Sheryl Banks, Terry Wilson, Darryl Freeman, Alison Rance, Trish McDowell,

Lauren Goodman


reports. ‘This team knew how to manage its issues because of the number of complaints that I didn’t receive,’ Andrew Booker said. ‘Everything was dealt with efficiently and correctly.’293

The team hadn’t just stuck to its primary goal, it had regularly met with organisations and interest groups, with neighbours and with social services to gain a greater understanding of the wider community within which state tenants lived. Most importantly, the team had always been available. Its success story had the potential to pave the way for a cultural change in the way the organisation liaised and managed its tenants throughout the country.

………………………………….

Tenant Surveys

Surveying tenants was part of the Tenancy Liaison team’s brief. ‘We wanted to find out how they coped during the repair programme,’ Sheryl Banks said. ‘We asked them about the attitudes of the trades people, whether they were treated with courtesy and respect, whether there were any problems, whether the work areas were left clean, and the quality of work.’

The results were an independent affirmation of the PMO’s close-out reports. Overall, tenants were satisfied with their home repairs. Carpets and curtains featured highly on their thank-you list as well as the installation of heat pumps.

‘Outstanding, thank you very much Housing New Zealand’

‘Excellent job. I thought I was in a new house.’

‘We really highly recommended the painters – they were very thoughtful’

‘Very impressed with every member of the crew especially the project manager and HNZ liaison. Nothing could have made the process easier. A pleasure, thank you.’

Not everything was perfect however. There were complaints about the length of time tenants had to wait for some additional repairs to be completed.

‘Concrete left on the lawn, still a bag of cement to be removed.’

‘We had to clean everything after they left.’

‘Paint, plaster left on benches, in baths and floors, lots of dust.’

‘Some work not that flash.’

Even so, when the comments about the quality of work were analysed, 70 per cent of tenants were satisfied and the attitude of the people doing the work exceeded 85 per cent and 94 per cent of tenants expressed satisfaction at the way they were treated.

293 Andrew Booker, 11 May 2016.


Creating a Community Garden

Demolishing badly damaged houses was a major part of Housing New Zealand’s recovery strategy, although not all of the cleared properties would be built on in the immediate future. Rather than having cleared land left vacant, the Tenancy Liaison team, working with the Riccarton West Neighbourhood Policing Team came up with a plan in 2013. They would create a community garden on a piece of land at 151-153 Peverel Street. To be successful, they would talk with the local community and invite them to participate. First the Corporation’s property would be loaned to the community on a year-to-year basis. Workshops and community consultation would follow to establish initiatives that would help mitigate crime and safety concerns.

The garden’s purpose was to be a place of meeting and connection in the community. The garden would operate and function through the dedication and work of volunteers. It would provide a place to grow fruit and vegetables for the collective benefit of the Riccarton community, and it would offer its produce free to local residents. Everyone except the frail elderly would be expected to contribute in some way with weeding, planting, watering, donations of seeds, plants or fertilisers.

On 6 October 2013, a group of students from Sam Johnson’s Student Volunteer Army joined with the Tenancy Liaison team, members of the local community and the Riccarton West Policing Unit to dig the cleared land and prepare the site for planting. Sponsorship was approved from local businesses and the Need Now Fund (Rata Foundation) as well as the City Council’s Wigram Riccarton Community Board. Vegetables, flowers and fruit were planted; a produce swap was introduced and the garden’s success was assured.

The Oak Development Trust, based in Riccarton, became the overseeing, governing body of the garden in May 2014. The Trust developed the garden’s purpose, operational and best practice guidelines to ensure a productive garden. In 2016, the community garden was extended for another three years to 2019 – a validation of the commitment and support by the Riccarton residents.

From the outset, the impact of the garden was significant with many comments flowing in.

An elderly man who lives in a Housing New Zealand flat was the recipient

of some fresh vegetables from the garden. He said it made him feel ‘part of the community even though he wasn’t involved in the garden.’

A member of the management group appreciated being able to feed many families at Christmas.

At an Older Person’s Gathering, fresh broad beans were delivered from the garden. One of the attendees commented that when driving along Peverel Street, she finds her eyes always drawn towards the garden – ‘it is so neat and colourful.’

A young man who helps at the garden five days a week reflected that the garden had been ‘fantastic’ for him. He was unemployed and the garden had given a lot of motivation.

The community garden flourished from its establishment with one area divided into allotments and made available to community groups and

Images: The community garden is one of Tenancy Liaison’s

many success stories


individuals. ABC Riccarton took up one of the plots.

‘Our children really value going to the community garden. We go there almost every day in summer. The pre-school doesn’t have room for its own garden so the ability to grow our own produce is such a great learning experience for our children.’

The Step Ahead Trust developed an allotment. It gave their clients:

‘a place to go and meet and interact with other people as they tend the garden. Chinese, Nepalese, Koreans and Indian people from the community have a plot where they can grow vegetables.’

In 2016, the garden had been transformed into an area of great community pride. The produce grown there had been widely distributed in the surrounding area – adhering to the original principle of growing produce for local people by local people. Fruit and vegetables had been used to create ‘Welcome Packs’ for newly arriving Housing New Zealand tenants in the area. In many ways, it had increased people’s sense of safety, and importantly, it had served as a means of reaching out to vulnerable and isolated members of the community.

Local police said the garden has been a significant factor in reducing crime and increasing community wellbeing in the area. ‘With the increasing density of housing in Riccarton, the social investment return that comes from this community garden is invaluable,’ Constable Brad Hagerty said.294

‘When we started the project, we had no idea whether it would be successful,’ Sheryl Banks said. ‘It was such an amazing team effort. Everyone was incredibly enthusiastic. We are tremendously proud of what has been achieved.’

294 Information provided courtesy of Ray Tye, Housing New Zealand.

Images: A perfect vegetable garden, ripe for the picking


In 2008, Housing New Zealand embarked on a longitudinal study of its tenants throughout New Zealand that aimed to identify typical housing pathways for tenants and applicants. It was led by social anthropologist Patricia Laing who headed the Corporation’s Customer Intelligence Research & Forecasting Unit. The initial pilot study resulted in a three-way study beginning in 2009 to explore the housing pathways of applicants and tenants over a six-year period. The research objectives were to identify and analyse the relationships between housing tenure and life circumstances of the Corporation’s tenants and applicants that lead to both positive and negative outcomes. The study would also look at the resources and interventions that help or prevent Housing New Zealand’s tenants and applications achieving their housing aspirations. The study would examine the typical housing pathways for tenants – either through what was known as ‘housing churn’, state house for life and state housing as a stepping stone.

As a result of the Canterbury earthquakes, the team departed from the route adopted for the study and devoted a specific amount of time interviewing tenants in Canterbury to get a more defined suite of opinions about the September, February and June earthquakes and their aftermath.

The research team, led by Luke Smith, senior analyst in the Customer Intelligence Research & Forecasting Unit, interviewed 80 people including 40 who were tenants and 12 who were applicants in 2009. The remaining 28 were tenants who had all started their tenancies after July 2011. They were therefore not involved in the earlier study and not living in a state-owned house during or immediately following either the 4 September 2010 or 22 February 2011 earthquakes. The interviews took place during November 2012 and therefore gave tenants the opportunity to reflect on what had happened, how they experienced the earthquakes, the impact on their lives and those of their families, and how they felt about the repair programme. The final report was completed in May 2013.

There were some key findings which demonstrated what the Corporation’s Canterbury staff had already recognised – that tenants, like everyone else had suffered through the worst of the quakes, and that, again like everyone else, they understood that although there had been immediate emergency help, the actual recovery was going to take a long time. General comments from interviewees included:

2 The Tenant Experience

153Part 3: Chapter 2: The Tenant Experience

• Damage to buildings was so widespread that some level of damage was

considered to be ‘normal’; tenants and applicants were used to dealing with damage to their homes and their communities.

• Tenants and applicants frequently dismissed the damage to their own home as minor relative to what ‘others’ were living with, often citing this as a reason for not complaining about the lack of repairs to their property.

• The immediate response from Housing New Zealand following the major earthquakes was praised by many tenants.

• Tenants noted that Housing New Zealand staff were dealing with the same housing, family, and community related issues that they were, noting that given these pressures, Corporation staff had gone above and beyond what could reasonably be expected of them.

The preliminary analysis of the interviews identified three high level categories of themes:

• Context: wider contextual factors that appeared to influence tenants’ and applicants’ attitudes to both impacts and mitigations, for example, comparing their situation with others worse off, acclimatisation to the ongoing impacts of the Canterbury earthquakes.

• Impact: an ongoing, earthquake-related effect on how tenants and applicants experienced living in their homes, and/or their housing expectations and aspirations – for example damage to property, health and changes in community composition.

• Mitigation: factors which did, or could, mitigate an ongoing earthquake-related impact, services or interventions that had the potential to affect the way in which tenants and applicants experienced the ongoing impacts of the earthquakes – for example, maintenance, communication and community-initiated support.

When exploring these themes in greater detail, the researchers found that many tenants and applicants believed that their home was damaged, but that compared with many other properties in their street, they were relatively okay. Tenants often said everyone ‘was in the same boat.’ It normalised the situation for them. As one 75 year old tenant noted:

‘When you’re walking on the footpath, especially you’ve got to watch where you tread, there’s little potholes and things and cracks and whatever …we all know about it now. We just take it for granted; it’s an everyday thing.’

Many tenants and applicants not only noted that damage was largely universal, but cited examples of people in far worse situations whose problems deserved to be addressed as a priority. In some cases they described fairly significant damage to their own home before dismissing it as minor relative to what other people were experiencing, as described by a single parent with a young child.

‘O, there’s block work there. There’s the kitchen, there’s big cracks all through

the kitchen. My bedroom, you can see the big crack up there. That sort of


thing. Yeah, there’s gaps in the block work just that sort of stuff…We had water coming out that electrical socket, things like that. In my son’s room we had water coming through the floor, ‘cause the silt, where the floor is, the silt’s like here. Just little, lots of little things like that…No we consider ourselves very, very fortunate…and avoided a lot of things a lot of other people have had to endure.’

Many tenants said they were lucky to have a roof to sleep under compared with people who were homeless or staying in temporary accommodation. One tenant living in a house partially off its piles with significant issues relating to water tightness reflected:

‘The best thing, we have a house to stay in. So, it doesn’t matter how many cracks around the house, about the windows, about the…but if I saw some other people, they, what we call, have no houses. So to me, it’s better than nothing.’

Another existing tenant described how their family was provided with another Corporation house immediately after one of the earthquakes as their previous house was declared unsafe to live in. The house they moved into was in poor condition but given the context of the earthquakes, they were just happy to have a house.

‘When we moved in here, obviously the house was, it had been empty for a

good 18 months, so it was filthy, very overgrown, and so we cleaned all that up ourselves. We did all the painting, we did all of the section clearing, just to, you know, just happy to have a house…so the tenancy manager who gave us this property was a temporary manager. When the manager of the actual property came back, she said she never would have rented the property in the state it was in, but I didn’t care. I just wanted to flush a toilet and be able to do the washing and things like that, it was just a clean up thing. We were quite happy to come in here and do what needed to be done.’

It was obvious from the interviews, that many tenants had sympathy for the Corporation’s Canterbury staff and were positive about the immediate and ongoing response from them. They stressed that the staff were facing the same or similar problems with their own homes, suffering the same anxiety and worry and had the same pressures from family, friends and communities. One interviewee noted:

‘I thank our tenancy managers, I take my hat off to them, I really do, because they have families of their own and it was horrific, absolutely horrific. And the hours and the work they put in, I don’t think I could have done it, I really don’t.’

The sense of ‘normalisation’ was a recurring theme throughout the interviews. Publicly, people referred to Christchurch as living in a ‘new normal’ which almost gave the whole situation a sense of reality rather than the precarious state that thousands of people found themselves in. It was a coping mechanism more than anything else, which was reflected in the second part of the study related to the impact of the earthquakes.

One third of tenants and applicants had to move from their homes temporarily or permanently as a result of the earthquakes. Many more hosted


family and friends who were forced to move. This movement in and out of communities impacted on some of the tenants’ networks, particularly older people. All tenants noted unaddressed earthquake damage to their houses. The most common of these were cracks in walls and ceilings and gaps around doors and windows. There was a strong link between unaddressed quake damage and increased risk of negative health outcomes. Obvious damage made some tenants feel anxious and unsafe in their homes, despite reassurances that they were safe. Many tenants reported that their homes were significantly colder, and more difficult to heat as a result of unaddressed quake damage. They reported high levels of ongoing anxiety and fear related to the earthquakes. In particular, many people reported high levels of stress and tension among their children.

In a small number of households, everyone was still sleeping in the living areas of the house because they wanted their children near them in the event of another large earthquake. Many tenants and applicants described how the private rental market was not a realistic option due to sharp increases in rent and increased competition for the lowest priced house. The study found that the earthquakes had had an impact on housing aspirations, preferences and expectations of some tenants and applicants. For example, some tenants noted that their children were no longer comfortable living in buildings with more than one storey, while other households no longer aspired to home ownership.

Their descriptions mirrored that of other households who were home owners or private renters. In the aftermath of the earthquakes there were similar veins of feelings and opinions running throughout the community and not restricted to one particular group of people. Many Housing New Zealand tenants were positive about the need to move either to another part of Christchurch or to another part of the country; others didn’t like it and resented the change even though they appreciated their options were limited. As one tenant said:

‘It’s like working through a bereavement and I still sometimes cry. I want to go home. I still have that feeling of “when is this going to be over.” But I can’t. No home. But that’s going because I’m becoming more established here.’

One older tenant said:

‘I’m pretty isolated because all of my friends in my district were distributed north, south, east and west, and we’ve had to keep in touch sometimes it’s more difficult, that’s okay.’

The researchers asked tenants and applicants to rate how they felt about their houses and neighbourhoods, and their feelings of safety in their neighbourhoods. Those who were forced to move as a result of the earthquakes appeared to be no less satisfied with their new house and neighbourhood than those who remained in their existing houses. The most obvious impact, discussed by almost everyone was unaddressed damage to their houses. Almost all tenants said their properties were promptly assessed following the earthquakes, but that progress on addressing the damage was slow. They commented that maintenance was focused on fixing what they termed big issues and leaving less urgent jobs unaddressed.

Damage most frequently mentioned were superficial cracks to ceilings and walls, and gaps around doors and windows affecting the weather tightness of the house. A small number of tenants also talked about all or part of the house


being off its piles; a conservatory having separated from the house leaving large gaps around where it had been joined; a large temporary patch in the roof where the chimney had collapsed into the house and structural damage to a firewall. Tenants worried about the health of their families and were anxious about the house being unable to withstand another major earthquake. This was in spite of assurances from the engineering teams whom Housing New Zealand had instructed to check all its properties.

The interviewees discussed their health concerns – the most common was anxiety, fear and stress rather than concerns about potential respiratory issues resulting from living in homes that weren’t weathertight.

‘It’s more when there’s earthquakes, you don’t know how big they are going to be. And you always worry about, are your children okay, especially when they aren’t with you.’

Some tenants described how their children’s fears of further earthquakes had influenced their choice of houses, where the bedrooms were situated in relation to each other, distances from front or back doors and so on. One applicant described how they managed with everyone sleeping in the living room. Another described how the garage on the property was red stickered but the house wasn’t. However most of the family’s belongings were stored in the garage which they couldn’t access, and the parents were afraid to let their children play outside in case they inadvertently accessed the garage.

One of the biggest concerns was the housing situation in Christchurch which appeared to be getting worse. Most tenants said the private rental market was now unaffordable. Rents had increased significantly since the earthquakes. Applicants and tenants often said they had been trying to find an affordable private rental property for many months without success. They noted that competition was fierce for the few affordable rental properties that appeared on the market. A small number of applicants living in private rentals said that their landlord could be getting a lot more for their house but because they were long-term tenants, the landlord had kept their rentals manageable.

The researchers did an analysis of lower quartile rent data from March 2009 to December 2012 and confirmed that for private rental accommodation with two or more bedrooms, rent in Christchurch had become more expensive since the earthquakes. The rate at which the lower quartile rent had increased was greater than the national trend except for single bedroom properties.

Some tenants said that after seeing the impact of the earthquakes on home owners, they no longer aspired to own their home. The perceived risks associated with home ownership were deemed too great, and these tenants noted they would be ‘renters for life’.

‘Buying our own home was originally where we wanted to be, but after these earthquakes, and seeing what other people have been through in regards to having owned their own home and lots of those people that weren’t able to leave, their homes were damaged and they still had to go and look for somewhere else and pay their mortgage and the rent of the other property. It would put you in a messy situation. No, I don’t think after these earthquakes, we will ever buy a house. I think we will rent till we die.’


Other tenants said they wanted to buy their current house because they either withstood the earthquakes without damage or were located in an area that wasn’t badly affected.

‘I like this house because it’s still standing, it’s solid, solid as…I think because of the earthquake, if I won Lotto tomorrow, I’d buy it because it’s so solid. It’s done really well as far as I’m concerned.’

The composition and behaviour of many communities changed considerably following the earthquakes. The increased churn in many communities as households moved in and out of the areas, was described by some as contributing to a decreased sense of community. Tenants and applicants who were living in the most damaged areas of the city commented on the large number of empty red-stickered houses in their community.

Opinion was mixed as to whether the changes in the composition of local communities was positive or negative. One tenant said the ‘gangs and hooligans’ had left the area and viewed this as a positive change. Another tenant was concerned that several people with significant mental health issues had been moved into their neighbourhood after their Council-provided houses were destroyed in the earthquakes. Others described how their friends and family had left the area, resulting in feelings of isolation, particularly for older people.

Both tenants and applicants commented on changes in amenities available in neighbourhoods as businesses closed down or moved. Tenants said they had to travel further to access services they were used to having in their local community. At the same time, other tenants said their local area was being revitalised as the closure of the CBD had pushed businesses out into other parts of the city.

The final theme of the research focused on mitigation of impacts. The majority of Housing New Zealand’s tenants were very positive about the Corporation’s immediate response to the earthquakes. However, most were growing increasingly dissatisfied with the lack of visible progress since. The way in which emergency and urgent maintenance issues were dealt with also came in for direct praise, although there was concern that non-urgent maintenance wasn’t being done. Many tenants said the newsletters and updates they received didn’t always tell them what they wanted to know, for example, information about their specific street or neighbourhood rather than the wider region, specific information about when things were going to be done and forward-looking timeframes rather than a summary of what had been done.

Some tenants had received mixed messages from the insurance assessors or didn’t trust the engineer’s assessment of the safety of their property. They all commented that community support was essential to help mitigate the ongoing impacts of the earthquakes. The disaster appeared to have brought neighbourhoods and communities together, many of whom had never talked in the past. Support included checking on each other following an aftershock, providing food or other household goods and simply ‘being there’ to provide emotional support.

In spite of some negativity, tenants generally praised the local Housing New Zealand staff and their tenant managers for their help and support, for checking on their welfare in the immediate aftermath of each of the major earthquakes. They appreciated the reduced rent option allowing them to cover additional


and unexpected costs like increased travel, having to use laundromats because their own washing machine couldn’t be used.

‘We were on a 50 per cent rent, so we basically had $100 a week to get to the

Laundromat and do other basic things. Without it (the rent relief ) we would have been shot.’

Some tenants had to be moved immediately from their house to another one that was safer. Not everyone was happy even if they appreciated the urgency of the situation.

‘Well they gave me 24 hours to move out of here after the earthquake. They told me I had to move because of the firewall and I turned around and said: ‘well I’ve never missed a week’s rent or anything. I think it’s a pretty horrible way to treat a tenant.’

Other tenants described the difference between a private landlord and the Corporation.

‘If something’s wrong you can ring the 0800 number 24/7 and they’re out soon as, and that’s what I really like. And even when there was an earthquake that happened, I know other tenancies that have private (rental)homes, and yet, most people that own those homes don’t have to look after that many people and it took them longer to get hold of them than what it did with the Housing New Zealand tenant. I was rung straight away to see if I needed anything for me and my kids and stuff, and I just thought that was really amazing. Like all my family complained, ‘cause they all live in private (rental accommodation)...’

When Patricia Laing and Luke Smith came to Christchurch in 2013 to present their preliminary findings to the Corporation’s Canterbury Earthquake Recovery team, they both expressed their own concern at the perceived ‘normalisation’ that had taken place, that tenants and applicants viewed their situation and their environment as the way things were now, and that there was little they could do about it.

Their findings were endorsed by the Canterbury team and by the Tenancy Services personnel who also attended the presentation. The research would make a significant contribution to the body of information being gathered and collated as part of Canterbury’s response to the earthquakes.

159Part 3: Chapter 3: Foundation Repair Trials: Cutting Edge Innovation

In February 2014, Housing New Zealand published the results of house foundation repair trials that had an immediate impact on not only its own post-quake repair programme but they provided vital analysis and detailed information for engineers, builders, surveyors and home owners throughout Canterbury. It was cutting edge innovation at a critical period in the region’s rebuild and recovery. The impetus for the trials was the release of MBIE’s first guidelines on foundation repairs. The trials were designed to test the feasibility of repairing damaged houses on land that had been assessed as having significant damage.

Housing New Zealand established a team of experts, external geotechnical and structural engineers, its own engineers, and partnered with Southern Response Earthquake Services Ltd and Arrow International Ltd. The aim was to find repair solutions that were not only economic, but were financially feasible. The aim also was to provide answers in clear, simple English that could be interpreted and understood by home owners who were struggling to comprehend what was required to either repair or rebuild their homes. The trial results therefore, wouldn’t be restricted to professional organisations, Government departments and Housing New Zealand, but would be widely available to the Canterbury people.

The project had been initiated in late 2012 as a collaboration between the three organisations who were dealing with similar issues and who believed that by combining their skills and resources, they could explore and trial different solutions. At the time MBIE had issued the first set of guidelines on how to repair and level houses. Matt Tipa from Arrow International had studied the guidelines and presented his findings to an internal team, inviting Malcolm Jones to attend. The outcome was a proposal from Housing New Zealand and Arrow to MBIE suggesting that they organise some trials to see whether the guidelines would be effective. Everyone agreed the idea had merit and a trial would be a good solution.

‘We wrote the proposal in September 2012 while the 212 repair programme was still in progress. It was an incredibly busy time,’295 Malcolm Jones said.

295 Malcolm Jones, 11 April 2016.

3 Foundation Repair Trials: Cutting Edge Innovation

Image: HNZ, Arrow staff and the team of geotechnical and structural engineers gather for their first on site discussion

Image: Ground testing machinery used as part of preliminary assessments


Southern Response was a Government-owned company that had been established in April 2012 to resolve outstanding earthquake claims from residents who had been insured with AMI. Before the earthquakes, AMI had been the biggest home insurance company in Christchurch. It had enjoyed a stellar existence since 1926 when it began operating as the South Island Motor Union (SIMU). By 4 September 2010, it had more than 85,000 policyholders in Christchurch with 225,000 policies. It was estimated AMI had successfully gained about 35 per cent of the residential insurance market in the city.296 In the months following the February 2011 quake, there was public concern that the company mightn’t have sufficient funds to cover all claims. The Government discussed the possibility of bailing out the company up to $1 billion. However, as the losses grew larger and larger, and the claims mounted, it became apparent that more drastic measures would be required to ensure quake affected property owners were taken care of. The Government agreed to separate AMI’s quake claims from its other business. The company was sold to IAG Insurance Company on 5 April 2012. At the same time, the Government created Southern Response to manage AMI’s earthquake claims. It was based in Christchurch with a Governance Board chaired by Ross Butler. Its Chief Executive Peter Rose was familiar with the insurance environment having come to Christchurch in May 2011 as AMI’s Executive Manager for Earthquake Recovery.

Like all the insurance companies involved in assessing and resolving earthquake claims, Southern Response couldn’t hope to manage everything relating to individual claims on its own. The post-quake environment saw the emergence of project management companies which could work alongside engineers and scientists, loss adjustors, the Earthquake Commission and more particularly the clients, to assess levels of damage and determine whether a house should be demolished or repaired. At least, that was the theory. Arrow International was contracted as Southern Response’ project management company responsible for assessment, scoping and cost estimating identified repair or rebuild work. It had started its business in a small way in Dunedin in 1984 and by the time it partnered with Southern Response it was well-established in New Zealand and Australia. It was familiar with supply chain networks and it was well connected when it came to negotiating contracts for repairs and construction. Its budget for completing the required work for Southern Response was $3 billion.

There was no single off-the-shelf manual available to demonstrate how any of the technical and building challenges resulting from the earthquakes could be tackled. The Department of Building and Housing published the first version of the Earthquake Repairs Guidance Document in December 2010. While it was recognised as an excellent engineering reference, it didn’t cover the difficult land zones known later as Technical Category 3 until the publication of Appendix C in November 2011. This new combined manual became the engineering guidance document to assist engineers, home owners and contractors to determine the methods that would work best for individual properties. The biggest challenge however, was the lack of practical knowledge to apply to the theoretical engineering principles as described in the revised manual.

The partnership between Housing New Zealand, Southern Response and

296 Marta Steeman stuff.co.nz/businessday 7 April, 2011.

Image: Teams of contractors were involved in the trials


Arrow International became a major collaboration with MBIE’s297 Engineering Advisory Group. They worked alongside four major engineering companies in Christchurch – Lewis Bradford & Associates Ltd and Powell Fenwick Consultants Ltd as the structural engineers, and Golder Associates and Geoscience Consulting NZ Ltd as the geotechnical engineers - to develop a plan to identify properties on which foundation repair trials could be undertaken. The basis of the plan was to determine the best options for damaged homes on land that had been designated TC2 and TC3 with an emphasis on finding economic and viable solutions for houses that had concrete perimeter foundations with timber floor and concrete floor slab foundations. Different house types needed to be identified as well as the different land categories and as much as possible, the houses needed to be in different suburbs. Tonkin & Taylor was engaged to review all the geotechnical data which was gathered at each of the identified properties.

Understanding the new land categories was difficult for many home owners who were already burdened with their insurance claims; whether to repair or rebuild, whether to stay in Christchurch or move away. These were problems they had never faced before. If the land had been assessed as Technical Category 1 (TC1), it was deemed to be safe and repairs or a new house could be built without specifically identified requirements. Future land damage from liquefaction was unlikely. If the land had been assessed as Technical Category 2 (TC2), it was possible there would be minor to moderate land damage from liquefaction if there were significant earthquakes in the future. Construction could still take place however there were specific engineering requirements for foundations, external cladding and roofing materials. If the land was assessed as Technical Category 3 (TC3), there were multiple complications. Moderate to significant land damage due to liquefaction was possible in future large earthquakes. Site-specific geotechnical investigation and specific engineering foundation design would be required.298

To have an organisation identifying properties on the most difficult land and finding appropriate solutions for foundation repairs was going to be a relief. Communicating the plan was essential. A leaflet explaining the proposed programme was sent to all tenants and to major stakeholders. In addition, a partner newsletter was produced for everyone involved in the project.

‘The TC2/TC3 foundation repair trials are a very important component of the earthquake recovery programme for Canterbury’s home and property owners. They are something that we must get right first time and have available to the construction sector as well as the general public,’ Andrew Booker said in the introduction. ‘Work will begin in earnest early in the New Year, and it is important that we develop a photo archive of progress as milestones are achieved, and that we invite industry people to visit sites and have our resident experts available to explain what is happening and why…thanks to everyone for your commitment to this project. Its success will depend on us all.’299

To make it easier to access information and find out more, the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery team decided to produce a series of videos which would be

297 MBIE was established in July 2012 and included the former Department of Building & Housing in its portfolio.298 Ministry for Business, Innovation and Employment’s Department of Building & Hous-ing.299 Housing New Zealand/Southern Response/Arrow International: Newsletter to Project partners. December 2012/January 2013.

Image: Bringing technology on site complemented the ground work that contractors did as part of the Foundation Repair Trials


available to the public via its website. They would include commentaries from the advising geotechnical and structural engineers who could explain what and how the problems had eventuated and what was the potential solution. The website would be linked to the Southern Response, Arrow International and CERA websites to widen public access including tenants who were alerted to the project through their regular newsletters.

By November 2012, 32 properties had been identified for the first selection. Criteria for assessment was based on geographical location, liquefaction on the site, varying floor and foundation levels, the slope of the floor and the amount of damage to the house foundation as well as its exterior cladding. From the initial selection, 20 sites were eventually chosen for further analysis of which five dwellings were on four TC2 sites and 15 dwellings were on eleven TC3 sites. The properties belonged to Housing New Zealand and were located in Burwood, Avondale, Aranui, New Brighton, Parklands, Bishopdale, Mairehau, and Bryndwr. All were vacant due to earthquake damage. Some of them were comparatively new, others were older; they covered the required criteria of design, size and foundation type. The emphasis was on finding solutions for houses that had concrete perimeter foundations with a timber floor (Type B) and concrete floor slab foundations (Type C).

It was the first time a team of geotechnical and structural engineers had worked together on such a project and while they were completing their assessments, Housing New Zealand and Arrow International’s teams determined the details of the next stage. The trials needed to include contractors who were skilled in the different methods of foundation repairs that were appropriate for the properties. They needed to be committed to the trials providing an open book policy on their costs and individual intellectual property.300 Everything needed to be documented down to the last detail. A comprehensive task list was prepared covering the time allocated for property selection, geotechnical investigations and documentations, superstructure assessments, engineering recommendations, cost analysis, foundation repair contractors, building consent applications and approvals, site handover and preparation, and the completion of all reports.

Each of the identified sites posed different challenges dealing with such issues as varying ground conditions, different construction methods, and collateral challenges as a result of the applied methodology used. The houses also varied in type and size, weatherboard or brick on the outside; whether there were two or three bedrooms. And, because re-tenanting the properties was also a priority, the Corporation needed to have its team of contractors available immediately the trials were finished to renovate, repair, plaster, paint and furnish the houses. It was a multi-faceted initiative led by project manager Malcolm Jones. Skilled in design and construction, he understood not only Housing New Zealand’s political imperatives but also the management and operational requirements that were critical to success.

What everyone soon realised was the innovative steps the selected companies were prepared to take to achieve the best results. The traditional jack and pack method – jacking up the superstructure and packing using plastic shims or solid treated timber onto existing piles to support the subfloor’s structure

300 Contractors involved in the programme included: A.J. Scott Construction Ltd, Global Construction Solutions, Maiden Group, Martin Civil Construction, Slab Jacking NZ Ltd, Smartlift Systems, Stake Consulting Ltd, Uretek Ground Engineering NZ Ltd.

Images: Different methodologies were tested as part of the trial programme


was the most common. The screw pile method involved installing screw piles around the perimeter foundation beam at spacings and depths determined by an engineer. The screw piles acted as the solid bearing point for the jacks lifting the foundation. Brackets were then bolted to the foundation above each screw pile to provide a jacking point. The foundation was then lifted and the exposed gap filled with a high flowing grout. The third system was mechanical jacking of the perimeter ring foundation by pouring a series of concrete jacking pads at spaced locations beneath the existing foundation and using jacks under or beside the footing to lift the foundation back to level, filling the space beneath the lifted foundation with concrete void-fill and packing the existing piles to support the floor framing.

The fourth method was an engineered resin lift which consisted of a solid polymer network formed by the reaction between two components – a proprietary engineered resin and a hardener. Lifting was achieved through expansion of the resin, allowing control of localised areas and levels could be achieved with no excavations and minimal intrusion. The spacing and number of injection locations, resin mix specifications, resin propagation radius and resin injection pressures were determined by the weight, strength and area of the structure to be corrected and the amount of lift required.

The fifth method was slab stitching to repair foundation cracks in concrete floor slabs. The stitching was used once concrete slabs had been relevelled. It involved cutting chases at right angles to the crack and installing reinforcing bar staples set in an epoxy resin to prevent further spreading.

The trials took seven months to complete, finishing in November 2013, during which there were Ministerial visits, television crews keen to see what was happening and a regular flow of locals observing progress from the street. Like everything else, access to the identified properties was tight; there were health and safety checks for everyone coming on site, hard hats and high visibility jackets issued and firm footwear always a priority.

The methods being applied were too technically complex for most home owners to fully understand. As a result, the videos that were produced to explain and demonstrate all of the five procedures were immediately popular. Talks by the consulting engineers explaining the trials and what they had achieved were given to the construction sector and the public. A CERA-organised weekend at which seminars and displays were available to the public enabled Housing New Zealand to talk to packed houses about the foundation repair trials and the methods that had been tested and applied. The trials and their results pushed the engineering fraternity to the forefront. They had to demonstrate professionalism and expertise in a way that was easily understandable by lay people. They became the ‘in-demand’ group.

The final report was published and officially launched by the Housing Minister Nick Smith to an audience of specialists in the engineering and construction sectors on 24 February 2014.301 It was the culmination of an innovative project, undertaken in a challenging environment where weather conditions were critical and there was always the pressure to get a house finished so that it could be added to the completed properties available for tenants.

301 A revised edition was produced in April 2015.

Images: More methodologies tested as part of the repair trials


Ground Improvement Trials

In 2012, the Earthquake Commission approached Housing New Zealand’s Earthquake Recovery Manager Andrew Booker with a proposal to be involved in an exercise to ‘investigate several unconventional ground remediation techniques in an effort to find practical, cost effective and consentable methods to strengthen residential land that is prone to liquefaction.’302 It would include a comprehensive set of testing trials and a pilot project applying ground improvements on 31 existing residential properties. Housing New Zealand joined a lengthy list of contributors to the project including the USA National Science Foundation, the US Network for Earthquake Engineering Simulation, several American Universities, University of Canterbury, several insurance companies, MBIE and engineering company Tonkin & Taylor. Housing New Zealand and MBIE would contribute financially to the project and the Corporation would provide three properties in the eastern suburbs that had been red-zoned, that had experienced severe liquefaction and that would therefore be suitable for the trials.

Writing to Housing New Zealand, Peter Fraser from EQC explained the main rationale for the trials. ‘There are currently few locally proven and cost effective repair solutions (for residential application) for land which has become more vulnerable due to liquefaction…the issues with the two existing ground improvement techniques (excavate and replace, or mechanical in situ mixing) are that both are impractical in situations where there is a house in situ (as the house either needs to be shifted or demolished in order to obtain access to the land underneath) and neither technique has yet been shown to be cost-effective for a residential application.’303

Test sites, in Wainoni, Avondale and Bexley, were selected from a ‘careful analysis of geotechnical information to ensure that the engineering properties of the soil layers closely matched the majority of soil conditions that would be encountered in the rebuild where ground improvements would be most relevant.’304

The aim of the project was to find affordable ways to create building platforms that would be less vulnerable to liquefaction damage in future earthquakes. It was divided into two main work streams – the ground improvement trials (the Science Trials) and the ground improvement pilot project (The Pilot). The Science Trials, which took place in three phases between April and December 2013, tested how well ground improvement methods performed when the underlying soil layers were liquefied. Specialised equipment was brought over from the United States including an outsized T-Rex truck on loan from the University of Texas. The truck used a large metal plate to create intense, but highly localised shaking that diminished rapidly with increasing distance from the truck and which triggered localised liquefaction to particular areas of land.305

Everyone was enthusiastic about the initiative and there were several visitors on site including interested Cabinet Ministers. Information was sent to residents still living near Avonside Drive and Breezes Road explaining about the trials and what residents could expect.

302 Dr Hugh Cowan, interviewed by Nick Helm for BRANZ publication, 1 August 2014.303 Letter from Peter Fraser to Housing New Zealand, 21 May 2012.304 Dr Hugh Cowan, interviewed by Nick Helm for BRANZ publication, 1 August 2014.305 Ground Improvement Trials Brochure, Earthquake Commission, August 2013.

Image: HNZ worked with EQC, Tonkin & Taylor and US-based

organisations to trial different options for ground improvement


Various technical methods were applied and tested. Rapid Impact Compaction which was already widely used in New Zealand and around the world. Low Mobility Grout which involved injecting low mobility grout to form a column of concrete bulbs within the soils. Rammed Aggregate Piers which used gravel instead of concrete to create columns that help stiffen the soil. Horizontal Soil Mixing which worked by drilling horizontally under an existing property and using a horizontal axis rotary mixing tool to create a hole which was then filled with cement.

The first phase of the ground improvement trials was completed in mid-July 2013. The data from the trials was analysed, assessed and internationally peer-reviewed over the following two years. It showed that ‘differential ground surface settlement which causes damaged to houses when the underlying soil liquefies during earthquakes, can be satisfactorily controlled with the construction of shallow, ground improvement works in conjunction with a TC2 surface structure foundation system.’306 Further, the trials successfully tested and piloted ground improvement methods that were consentable and could be practically constructed for an appropriate level of protection for houses on land vulnerable to liquefaction-induced damage.’307

The Pilot had a three-fold design plan; firstly to determine the costs, practicalities and risks associated with constructing the best-performing ground improvement options identified in the Science Trials constructed in an actual residential setting; secondly to assess Canterbury contractor capability to implement ground improvement solutions and stimulate the market, and thirdly to enhance understanding and acceptance by other key stakeholders.308

The success of the project was highlighted in the documented report which discussed the various methods included in the trials. ‘It has facilitated a significant step forward in the research of methods to affordably mitigate liquefaction vulnerability of residential houses,’309 the report noted. While the initiative had come from the sequence of earthquakes in 2010 and 2011, the results could be applied not only throughout New Zealand but internationally.

It was classed as ‘world leading research that has advanced global knowledge and understanding of appropriate ways to improve land vulnerable to liquefaction damage.’310

306 Report on the Residential Ground Improvement Trials; Tonkin & Taylor, Earthquake Commission (undated) p 30307 ibid308 Report on the Residential Ground Improvement Trials; Tonkin & Taylor, Earthquake Commission (undated) p 38.309 ibid p 36.310 Report on the Residential Ground Improvement Trials; Tonkin & Taylor, Earthquake Commission (undated) p 38.


On 17 December 2012, Housing New Zealand and the Department of Corrections signed a memorandum of understanding to work together to develop a rehabilitation initiative that would contribute to the Canterbury earthquake recovery programme. Corrections’ signatory to the agreement was Ray Smith; Philippa Jones signed on behalf of Housing New Zealand.311

The agreement was modelled on an existing arrangement between the two organisations at Spring Hill prison (near Meremere in the Waikato), whereby Corporation houses that needed to be repaired were transported to the prison yards and refurbished to an exacting standard before being relocated onto new sites. It wasn’t a new initiative for either organisation, even so the Christchurch announcement was greeted with surprising political and media enthusiasm; perhaps because there was some anxiety at the time that red zoned houses might be demolished without being assessed for their reusability. Several independent operators had sussed out empty houses that could be relocated to other towns in the South Island rather than sink into total disrepair resulting only in demolition. It was an unpalatable concept for many people given the acute accommodation situation that had existed since the February 2011 earthquake. Many of the houses that were red zoned were in a reasonable condition, some were new, some were weathered but in good repair. It was considered a travesty that demolition might be the only solution.

As a result, the prison project became newsworthy; there were ongoing requests for information about start dates, timetables, what houses were going to be selected, what was the selection criteria, who was making the decisions, what was Rolleston Prison going to do and how was it going to create construction areas, holding yards, select prisoners and so on. The details in the agreement between Housing New Zealand and Corrections covered positives and negatives, outlined individual responsibilities, security, advice, materials and compliance. The Spring Hill project was the basis of the local agreement which although creating a viable and workable arrangement for the Auckland region, didn’t always cover the variances and difficulties to be faced in Canterbury.

311 Philippa Jones was Housing New Zealand’s Deputy Chief Executive.

4 Rolleston: Breathing new Life into Damaged Houses

Image: Ground breaking ceremony at Rolleston. From left: Southern

Regional Commissioner for Corrections Ian Bourke, Minister of

Corrections Hon. Anne Tolley and CERP Manager Andrew Booker

167Part 3: Chapter 4: Rolleston: Breathing new Life into Damaged Houses

There were two specific goals to the Rolleston project – to breathe new life into damaged houses and to provide prisoners with the chance to create a new future for themselves by learning the skills associated with the repair programme and thereby the potential for employment in the construction sector upon release.

With the deed signed, the next step was to formulate the plan that would see 30 houses moved to the prison, repaired and relocated onto Corporation sites every year over a five year period (until June 2018). Housing New Zealand would select the houses, organise their transport to the prison and provide all the materials required to refurbish each house. The Department would provide the site and undertake the house repairs using supervised prison labour.

A visit to Rolleston prison identified the area that could be converted into suitable yards. With its existing experience at Spring Hill, the Corporation knew what it wanted in terms of appropriate houses. What it didn’t realise was the complexity of accessing suitable buildings that could be removed from the red zone. Clearly if there weren’t enough state houses, it would have to source others. Southern Response was the Government-owned agency set up to clear the earthquake insured properties from the failed AMI company. It also had red zoned properties. Together with the Christchurch City Council, Southern Response was the logical choice to make up the numbers.

Peter Thurston and Andrew Rose - Housing New Zealand’s staff responsible for the Spring Hill programme - flew to Christchurch to talk with Andrew Booker and make the initial assessment of potential houses. Their first visit to the red zone was a shock. Their familiarity and experience of state houses in the North Island which were part of the normal repair and refurbishment programme, didn’t prepare them for the scale of the damage they saw in the eastern suburbs. Corporation houses that had been vacated were now boarded up, numbered and external appliances removed to act as a deterrent to vandals. All around them private houses were empty, their gardens were overgrown; the occasional property owner still living in increased isolation.

The Auckland staff were particular about what they wanted. The Corporation’s Asset Development Group recommended houses that were in reasonable condition, preferably one, two, or four-bedroomed. They should be timber framed, and could be weather-board or have a brick façade which could be stripped away for easier transport. The Canterbury Earthquake Recovery team assessed the red zoned houses and identified those which could be moved immediately onto cleared and prepared Housing New Zealand sites and re-tenanted with minimal repairs required, and those which required repair and refurbishment. The latter were the houses to be transported to Rolleston.

A report to Housing New Zealand’s Board in March 2013, explained what was being proposed and some of the likely challenges. In addition to red zoned state houses, Housing New Zealand was working closely with the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority, Southern Response and Arrow International to identify houses that were suitable. The Corporation would take responsibility for clearing the red zoned site once the houses had been removed.

CERA had developed a suite of operating procedures for clearing properties in the Christchurch and Kaiapoi residential red zones. The work programme was separated into four phases – acquisition of properties involved, the disconnection of all utilities (power and water) and the removal of all structures and their foundations, land clearance including the removal of gardens, shared driveways, any residual fences and the removal of any redundant public


infrastructure including roads, pedestrian paths and so on. Significant trees (unspecified) could be left. As a party to the agreement, Housing New Zealand would comply with the procedures insofar as it affected their properties. The agreement came with additional clauses that included minimising disruption to residents still living in the street, prompt clearance and compliance with the numerous Acts of Parliament that might apply.

Once agreed, the next step was to create a category or categories from which a ‘tick’ list could be used when determining what house would be selected for the prison project. Estimating the amount of time it would take to completely refurbish a house depended on the extent of its damage.

The earlier proposed timetables were never going to be realised however, because unlike Spring Hill which had been operating since 2008, the Rolleston prison site had to start from scratch. The prison was located on several hectares of flat, grassed land off a side road on State Highway 1 south of the Rolleston Township. The new construction yards were yet to be built, a new secure entrance needed to be developed, and new huts were required for staff and storage. The huts, Housing New Zealand could supply and did reasonably quickly, selecting several garages from its red zoned properties that could be easily converted and trucked to the prison site.

Negotiations between Housing New Zealand and Corrections took place over several months covering the selection and training of offenders, methods to be applied for the repair programme, the selection of qualified personnel as tutors, contracts for transporting the houses from the red zones in Christchurch and Kaiapoi to the prison site and contracts for relocating the completed houses onto their new sites. Housing New Zealand engaged a project coordinator as liaison between Corrections and the Corporation who was qualified in project management, understood the need for sound budgeting, was an experienced communicator and who had significant experience in managing teams. Time wasn’t considered the most essential factor. It was more about enabling skills to be taught in a positive environment, well supervised with professional tutors.

The Corporation’s procurement team became involved with the selection of the New Zealand companies who specialised in house removals.

The ground breaking ceremony took place at Rolleston prison on Thursday 13 June 2013 attended by the Minister of Corrections Anne Tolley and Andrew Booker on behalf of Housing New Zealand.

It took 10 months for the two construction yards to be built and completed and for the first houses to be moved to the prison, tutors selected and offenders to be schooled in the training regime that would be implemented. The Prime Minister John Key, Ministers Nick Smith and Anne Tolley plus innumerable interested parties attended the afternoon ribbon-cutting ceremony on 10 September 2013. A walkabout to explain what would be done, afternoon tea in a marquee and several media interviews set the scene for the project’s formal beginning. Even so, there was little real appreciation of the differences between the two prison sites. Spring Hill was well established; Rolleston was new. Auckland housing sites didn’t have the complex technical land issues that Canterbury was now confronting. Depending on where the refurbished house was going to be relocated, the site might require expensive and time consuming preparation especially if it was zoned TC3. Then there was landscaping, paths and driveways to be completed before a house could be approved for tenanting.

In addition, there were different local authorities involved with the Canterbury project depending on where the house was going to be relocated

Image: House loaded on to transporter ready to leave the red

zone en route to Rolleston

Image: Houses were often moved at night to reduce congestion on SH1

between Christchurch and Rolleston

Image: Attending the official opening of the prison yards at Rolleston on

10 September, 2013, from left: Hon. Nick Smith, Hon. Anne Tolley,

Rt. Hon. John Key and Corrections Chief Executive Ray Smith

169Part 3: Chapter 4: Rolleston: Breathing new Life into Damaged Houses

once completed. Moving the houses to Rolleston was comparatively easy so long as it was completed between midnight and 2am when there was less traffic on the roads. Once on site, Corrections’ officers inspected every house before any prisoners were allowed to begin work, checking for anything that could be perceived to be dangerous.

Costs associated with the project were separated into distinct areas – those related to the disconnection of existing services, testing and, if found, removing asbestos, preparing the house for transport, the removal from the original site and relocation to the prison yards. Then there were the costs of materials and those of sub-contractors. The third cost covered the relocation of the completed house to its new site, new foundations, local authority consent charges, connection of all infrastructure services like electricity and water, and finally landscaping. It was never going to be the cheapest of the ‘new’ builds, but it was definitely one of the most rewarding.

Problems aside, it was an exciting project for everyone involved. The houses were completely refurbished from inside out. Where possible, a modern internal configuration of open plan living and dining was achieved; new kitchen and bathroom installed, new double glazed windows, renewed electrical and plumbing requirements and everything finished to a professional standard. Every room was plastered and painted with new LED lights, new carpets and thermal drapes. Rolleston developed a partnership with the Building & Construction Industry Training Organisation to give added gravitas to the project and its trainees.

By March 2014, 72 houses had been selected of which seven were earmarked for offices, storage and training; 30 were on site at the prison of which 12 were already under repair and 42 were identified for transport. A year later 22 more houses were either identified, ready for transport or being repaired. By March 2016, 25 houses had been completely refurbished and moved to their new locations. Eighteen houses were completed and ready for their new tenants and a further seven were in their new surroundings waiting for landscaping and fencing before being tenanted.

Housing New Zealand’s project manager for Rolleston, Mark Harrison, was, and remains, an enthusiast of the project and its potential. Its emphasis is on giving prisoners a chance; reducing recidivism and increasing employment opportunities when prisoners are released. It enables the prisoners involved in the project to work towards qualifications including a National Certificate in Building Construction, Certificates in Plumbing, Painting and Gas-fitting and entry to a range of electrical apprenticeships. They have the opportunity to gain a skill they didn’t have before. Importantly for both organisations, media interest remains positive.

Awards and public recognition flowed for the project. It was a finalist in the 2014 IPANZ Excellence in the Public Sector Awards. 312 In the same year, it won the Department of Corrections Partner of the Year Award. The partnership between Housing New Zealand and the Corrections Department won the New Zealand AHI Leading Asset Management Award and the Australasian AHI Highly Commended Award in the same category in October 2015. The awards were greeted with acclamation on both sides of the Tasman. It was an affirmation of the project’s success and, as Andrew Booker said at the time, it was the ‘icing on the cake’ for everyone involved. The project ‘ticked all

312 IPANZ – Institute of Public Administration New Zealand.

Image: House with temporary cover to enable external repairs to be carried out

Image: On site and getting prepared for restoration


the boxes, supporting effective reuse of public resources, helping those in the community who are in need, and helping offenders gain skills which can lead to employment and therefore help sustain positive change in their lives. Hearing about a person trained in the (Rolleston) yard now with a new job, supporting his family and maintaining a crime-free life proves the value of the project. Making a difference for these people is our biggest reward.’313

313 Housing New Zealand/Department of Corrections joint media announcement, October 2015.

Images: Newly refurbished homes for new tenants

171Part 3: Chapter 5: Hope and Wire: A mini-series

Was it ever considered, that in the midst of the earthquake recovery, there should be a request from one of New Zealand’s best known film-makers, to utilise one of Housing New Zealand’s damaged houses as part of a television mini-series? It wasn’t in the CIP; it wasn’t part of the recovery strategy. It was definitely out of scope. It was a request, like so many at the time, that came literally out of the blue. But the idea was a good one.

Housing New Zealand owned several properties in the suburb of Richmond some of which were already boarded up in preparation for demolition because they had been red zoned. There were burst water mains, no sewerage systems operating, and impassable roads. In 2012, they were now in an isolated part of the city which was, at least in the eyes of producer Chris Hampson, ideal for a new production to be called Hope and Wire. It was going to be a televised three-part mini-series, directed by award-winning New Zealand film maker Gaylene Preston and co-written with Dave Armstrong.

The title Hope and Wire came from the song written by Adam McGrath of the Lyttelton based band The Eastern. The story would centre on the sequence of earthquakes and the way in which they impacted on the lives of several different people who lived in different parts of Christchurch and who came from different backgrounds. It was, as Gaylene Preston said ‘a postcard to Auckland.’

The initial approach to Housing New Zealand came via one of the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority’s advisors Linda Paterson who had been contacted by Gaylene Preston in July 2012 to ask about the process for gaining access into the central city’s red zone and the residential red zone. Linda Paterson liaised with the Christchurch City Council and with Canterbury University’s CEISMIC314 project.

Anyone working in the world of film and television drama, knows the amount of time it takes once a script is written, to find the most suitable

314 CEISMIC: An archive developed in 2011 by the University of Canterbury to preserve the knowledge, memories and experiences of the 2010 and 2011 earthquakes. A consortium including the University of Canterbury, National Library of NZ, Ministry for Culture & Heri-tage, NZ On Screen, Christchurch City Libraries, CERA, Canterbury Museum, Archives NZ, Te Papa, Ngai Tahu Research Centre.

5 Hope and Wire: A mini-series


location, to source the cast, to access all the props, to build the sets, to shoot, edit, direct, produce and eventually to promote the finished product.

The film’s production team knew it would take time to get the necessary permissions particularly in areas that were still off limits to the public. They weren’t the first however. Controlled access had already been given to bereaved families, tenants and property owners, as well as media and foreign diplomats, contractors and documentary makers.

The cast and crew of Hope and Wire were required to sign an access application form and provide relevant personal identification. They contacted the owners of commercial buildings themselves when they wanted to use their properties and they had to agree that they wouldn’t interrupt any of the demolition work that was going on in the central city’s red zone at the time. As a result, the crews worked around contractors, timing their filming for evenings and weekends.

One of the potential sets was 4B Evelyn Couzins Drive. The production team had found the boarded up house while driving around the city searching for suitable suburban properties for their cast. The house was one of six timbered one-bedroom units down a driveway close to Avebury House, a Victorian heritage home which like most of the properties in the Richmond area had been badly affected by the earthquakes. The houses had all been tenanted by elderly people some of whom had lived there for many years; four men and two women, all of whom maintained immaculate gardens, all of whom had their own personal stories to tell.

Andrew Booker and Sheryl Banks together with a contractor from PQS, had been to check on the houses the Saturday following the 22 February 2011 earthquake. They realised immediately that the inter-tenancy walls were severely compromised in all the buildings and that the tenants needed to leave straight away.

‘They were vulnerable yet very remarkable people,’ Sheryl Banks said. ‘We talked with them individually and explained the situation. They were stoic and all they wanted to know was whether they could return later to take some of their plants and shrubs. Of course we agreed.’

‘It was a very sad time for them. One of the women who was in her 70s told me that her unit had been her refuge for 20 years following a very abusive relationship,’ Andrew Booker said. ‘It has stayed in my mind.’ The tenants were all able to find their own alternative accommodation with family.

In many ways, without knowing the history, Chris Hampson had selected the perfect home for the mini-series because it resonated so well with the former tenant and its neighbours. It was a leafy suburb which, he said, would be perfect for filming. Would Housing New Zealand be interested in letting one of its houses be used for the film? It would.

‘4B’ would be fitted out for the character of ‘Dorothy’ to be played by Dame Kate Harcourt. The production team would take care of everything. The Corporation just needed to remove the exterior boards. Two of the Corporation’s Earthquake Recovery staff, Sue Poasa and Hayden Stockdale, were dispatched to open up the house and check it for any further damage. They were watched by members of the production crew. It was perfect, they declared. There were the usual legal niceties to be taken care of including permission granted from the Wellington office. The communications team in the capital were fascinated by the proposal and encouraging in their enthusiasm. Nothing like this had ever happened before.

Images: Hayden Stockdale and Sue Poasa opened up 4A and 4B Evelyn Couzins Drive to check which of the two units would be most suitable for

Hope and Wire.

173Part 3: Chapter 5: Hope and Wire: A mini-series

Housing New Zealand’s health and safety team would liaise with the production team; the production team would provide onsite security. Housing New Zealand would organise an information leaflet to be sent to people still living in the immediate vicinity advising them of the preparations and filming to take place.

The production team moved into gear, trucking several loads of mud onto the property which later on screen lent total authenticity to the scenes. Inside, they refurbished the house as a suitable home for ‘Dotty’ in preparation for the indoors filming.

Filming for Hope and Wire began on 25 February 2013 and it took ten weeks to complete. The crew filmed inside the central city cordon for five days, although as Linda Paterson noted later, much of the filming supposedly in the red zone was actually on sets in Templeton, Riccarton and Fendalton. They provided their own independent engineer’s reports, took care of sewage disposal and provided 24 hour security for their sets as well as keeping a safety team on site during filming.

The shoot at ‘4B’ was completed by mid-March. The production crew returned Housing New Zealand’s property back to its existing damaged condition, thanked everyone for their help and made sure the Corporation was credited with its support.

‘Everything went well at the Evelyn Couzins location and filming there is now complete,’ wrote the production coordinator Jacqui Wood when she returned the house keys.

It took many more months for the production to be ready for screening in 2014. Audiences who watched the series screened on TV3 were mixed in their response depending on where they lived in New Zealand. The reviews however were warm and reflective with their opinions. It was ‘one of the most important TV dramas to be made in New Zealand for years,’ National Radio’s Lara Strongman wrote.

The Listener’s reviewer Rebecca Macfie said ‘Hope and Wire is really good – it captures the loneliness and the dislocation, the loyalty and the grime, the greed and generosity.’

‘Earthquakes move mountains. But so do imagination and ingenuity – when matched with implementation.’

FEMA315

315 Federal Emergency Management Agency USA: Mitigation Works. Testimony and answers before the House Committee on Science, Subcommittee on Basic Research, Hearing on

Turkey, Taiwan and Mexico Earthquakes: Lessons Learned. (undated).

The Canterbury Investment Plan

PA R TF O U R

175Part 4: Chapter 1: Creating a Legacy

‘Our aim was always to create a legacy. How we were going to achieve it and whether we could do it within the specified time was critical. More important to us, was whether the legacy would be sustainable and whether what we had repaired and rebuilt would stand the test of time. Would the community in which our tenants live, understand what we had done and why?’316

For Andrew Booker and his team, finishing the programme at the end of June 2016 was the target. After that, the remainder of Housing New Zealand’s ten year investment plan for Canterbury, originally propounded by Alan Jackson in January 2013, would take over. The Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Programme would sign off. There would be no return to ‘business as usual’ because, as everyone who worked in Christchurch knew, that concept had flown the coop on 4 September 2010.

The office mantra, espoused by Sheryl Banks had always been ‘there are no locks on the doors, and no bars on the windows.’ In other words, anyone who didn’t want to participate in the programme, or who thought the targets were too tough was free to leave. Not that it happened. With the exception of personal life changes, transfers, shifts and the other ‘normal’ patterns of office personnel, the team stayed the distance. In many ways, it was a validation of the original challenge, coupled with a genuine desire to see social housing in Canterbury adopt a different, better face. Some said it was ‘blind’ housing where it was impossible to tell whether a dwelling was state or privately owned. The preferred terminology became ‘balanced communities’ in line with international housing trends.

The original intent to create mixed tenure housing as part of the new building programme didn’t fully eventuate as the Corporation had planned, principally because there was such a critical shortage of social housing in Canterbury. Even so, the first apartments in Manchester Street were hailed as a success.

At its peak, the Earthquake Recovery team comprised 40 staff in the Christchurch office, supported by staff from assets, procurement and finance in Auckland and Wellington. The decision to bring into the office the two project management companies, Arrow International and MWH Recovery, selected


1 Creating a Legacy


to manage the major and minor repair programmes, meant more space was required to fit 70 people in total working out of the Manchester Street offices. Co-location was unknown territory for Housing New Zealand but it proved to be a successful combination of know-how and the joint wish to succeed.

Meetings were held with local authorities to explain what was happening with state properties. In mid-December 2011, Matt Johnson together with Catherine McDonald and Callum Logan met with the Shirley Papanui Community Board to update them on the condition of state houses in the Shirley neighbourhood. The Board was keen to know whether Housing New Zealand would be prepared to gift four of its Skipton Street properties to help MacFarlane Park with more street frontage. It was not a request the Corporation was yet prepared to consider however, with the insurance claim not settled and the extent of damage still not fully calculated.

In June 2013, Paul Commons was appointed as the Recovery Programme General Manager, reporting directly to Glen Sowry. Andrew Booker took on the role of Operations Manager to strengthen the management of the repair and rebuild programme. There were always structural changes going on within Housing New Zealand. Sometimes they impacted on earthquake recovery, but the team had learned to ride with the changes and focus on the job at hand.

‘Communication was critical,’ he said. The entire team gathered in the CERP office every Tuesday morning for an update and a briefing. ‘We asked all team leaders to explain what they were doing and the progress that was being made. We sent out weekly internal updates to our staff which we often copied to Wellington so that they knew what we were doing too. It was important when something out of the ordinary was happening like the winter snow storms, and the earthquakes in Marlborough when members of our Tenancy Liaison team went up there to help out.’317

CERP’s health and safety programme paved the way for the rest of the country. Shane Austin commented that before the earthquakes, health and safety was always about tenants and not about staff. ‘Experts came to Christchurch from all around the world telling us about the imperatives of having very strong health and safety rules and regulations in place. We took note and applied their learnings.’318

Paul Commons was equally intent on making sure all staff wore the proper gear and carried correct equipment. It wasn’t just about high visibility jackets, hard hats and boots, it was about wearing masks when dealing with potential asbestos, making sure all site visitors were well equipped and were given a briefing before they entered the premises. It was about being sensible.

Duncan Holland went further than sensibility. ‘In many ways, CERP was the catalyst for change within Housing New Zealand’, he said. ‘It arranged for what were known as ‘body duress alarms’ onto the Tenancy Liaison team’s smart phones. Now every Tenancy Manager has the system on their phones throughout the Corporation.’319

Sheryl Banks said it was such a good system. ‘Previously, when we were entering unsafe houses that needed boarding up, Tenancy Liaison Coordinators had to ring me when they were going in and ring again when they were leaving, and they had to go in pairs. With the body duress alarms, they could be set for

317 Andrew Booker, 19 April 2016.318 Shane Austin, 18 April 2016.319 Duncan Holland, 16 May 2016.


up to one hour and all the person had to do was shake them and they would go off and an alert would go to the manager to phone them immediately.’320

Early on in CERP’s development, Chief Executive Glen Sowry had set up a Governance Board to oversee the implementation of the repair and rebuild programme. The first meeting was held on 21 March 2013. Glen Sowry and Sean Bignell flew down from Auckland, Scott Scoullar, Philippa Jones and Andrea Morton321 came from Wellington. Andrew Booker and Julie Habberjam were present from the CERP office and Symon Leggett from Tenancy Services. The terms of reference for the Governance Group were agreed, progress reports on procurement, repairs, reconstruction, tenancy management, resourcing and business support, risks and issues were presented and discussed. Future meetings would be held every month. Adrienne Young-Cooper was a regular attendee, representing the Board and taking a lively and professional interest in progress. Roger Sutton, CERA’s Chief Executive attended the first meeting and he later delegated David Griffiths, the former Regional Manager for the Corporation’s Southern area, now working for the Canterbury Earthquake Temporary Accommodation Service (CETAS), to attend in his place.

While its membership changed over its duration, the Governance Group served a useful purpose to challenge systems and processes and to remind everyone of the overall objective. Earthquake recovery was one of the Corporation’s biggest priorities. Even so, it wasn’t always at the top of the Corporation’s operations agenda. In the briefing for the incoming Minister (October 2014), the focus was more on its developed strategy of being ‘the social housing provider of choice.’ It talked about the organisation’s transformation programme, investment in new systems, its role within the Social Housing Reform Programme and where the Corporation fitted into the social housing sector.

The organisation’s original 2012 Asset Management Strategy was still active although being ‘refreshed’ to take into account MSD’s role as the purchaser of Housing New Zealand’s services. Referring to the repair and rebuild programme in Canterbury, the briefing papers advised the Minister that the programme was ‘on track’ to meet the 5,000 repair and 700 new build target. It talked about the demolitions, the buildings that were deemed to be earthquake prone and discussed the prison project at Rolleston at some length.

The Canterbury Investment Plan was a ‘significant and important priority for Housing New Zealand,’ and major reconfiguration of its assets in Canterbury would take place over the next 10 years with a budget of approximately $1.2 billion. The briefing papers commented that local body planning rules had been resolved and foundation solutions had been defined; however there was still uncertainty around long-term future demand which was compounded by the current high level of demand in the wider market, the introduction of a contestable market with the not-for-profit sector and the ability of Christchurch City Council to sustain its social housing portfolio.’322

As the Earthquake Recovery team took stock in May 2016, ahead of the office’s closure and the completion of the repair and the rebuild programme confirmed for 30 June, how did they believe the next stage of the Canterbury Investment Plan (CIP) would unfold? What of the future?

320 Sheryl Banks, 16 May 2016.321 Andrea Morton was the newly appointed procurement manager for the Corporation.322 Briefing Papers for the Incoming Minister, October 2014.


The 2011 CIP contained a suite of six delivery principles which formed the basis of the Corporation’s earthquake recovery effort.

1. Develop an affordable, safe, efficient and fit-for-purpose portfolio to build, own and operate, that is matched to forecast state housing demand in Canterbury.

2. Create a range of housing opportunities and choices through portfolio reconfiguration initiatives including support for the wider Canterbury recovery by freeing up land in Christchurch’s middle suburbs for residential development.

3. Focus investment around Christchurch’s key activity centres, growth nodes and new development areas to sustain and reinforce wider investment in essential services and community infrastructure; provide well-serviced living environments for state tenants and create a future- proofed investment for the Crown.

4. Foster strong and constructive relationships with central and local Government agencies, the private sector, the not-for-profit housing sector and the wider Canterbury community for greatest benefit and delivery of efficiencies.

5. Innovate in design, construction and delivery for seismic resilience (future earthquakes); the management of life-cycle (maintenance and operational costs); and support for the commercial opportunities arising from new building methodologies and products.

6. Optimise commercial and partnering opportunities to support Canterbury’s economic recovery and reduce the overall cost impact of the earthquake.

The overall intention, as spelt out in the investment plan was to develop a comprehensive, quality housing stock that would be ‘robust in construction and longevity.’ At the time, of course, it hadn’t factored in the multiplicity of changes that had taken place in the intervening five years as a result of new Government initiatives and within the organisation itself.

Paul Commons was succinct in his view that Auckland had much greater problems than Christchurch. Regionally, Canterbury had successfully reconfigured a large part of its social housing portfolio through its repair and rebuild programme and had equally successfully developed a model of liaison with tenants that hadn’t worked in the past. Whether the local success could be replicated elsewhere was up for debate. It wasn’t so much a level of disinterest as the fact that nowhere else in the country was there a major disaster that warranted such a response. Even so, Paul Commons said, there were major learnings from the Canterbury experience that would stand the organisation in good stead.

Having local responsibility was key; not having everything driven from a central point. Common sense and a balanced approach was a major factor and having a culture of achievement. ‘The Christchurch team was empowered in the main, to do its job. There was strong local autonomy, sometimes it went against the Wellington way, but the focus was always on getting the job done – 5,000 and 700. There was a common purpose coupled with a very strong sense of ownership. There were no silos.’323

323 Paul Commons, 5 May 2016.


There was no doubt that innovation had played a large part in the repair and rebuild programme. Of necessity, innovation was critical to its success. Not only the various methodologies developed for house foundation repairs, but the very different housing designs for new homes. The old state homes were definitely in the past and had been replaced with contemporary designs that met structural and seismic guidelines. They were attractive, warm, well fitted out, and many would meet the Walter Nash criteria of being fit for a Cabinet Minister in terms of location, size, durability and comfort.

Creating a range of housing opportunities was another achievement, helped to some extent by the implementation of the LURP and its attendant criteria and principles. Where formerly one house had been built in the centre of a large section, there were now two smaller homes or a two-storeyed dwelling. In keeping with local authority guidelines and building consents, new houses were constructed to a scale relative to the size of the section, enabling pathways, plantings and vehicle parks to be included. The question now posed by Paul Commons, was whether intensification would gain ground?

Maintaining strong relationships with the major players in the earthquake recovery was an essential part of communication as was regular liaison and contact with the Tenants Protection Agency, regular attendance at the Housing Forums and the many local community groups and neighbourhood organisations who were keenly interested in the recovery programme. Attending local authority meetings to explain what was happening and providing progress updates was the best way to keep people informed. Local communities wanted to know what was being done in their suburbs; they wanted to know the shape of social housing in the future. They wanted to be consulted; to be involved. Developing a specific brand for the earthquake repair and rebuild programme was a great success because it gave direct visibility to the work being done in the community. There was a genuine thirst for information, for knowledge about what was happening.

In July 2011, CERA had initiated a highly successful ‘My Housing Options’ Forum, held at the Addington Raceway. In April 2013, it organised an Expo designed to give people more information on progress. This time, the CERP team partnered with CERA and MBIE and agreed to lead two seminars on the Foundation Repair Trials at which Andrew Booker, Malcolm Jones and Gordon Ashby, an expert engineer from Tonkin & Taylor who had been part of the team involved in the trials, would explain about the project and its results. Both seminars were an outstanding success, attracting a capacity audience, television coverage and enthusiasm from the community to learn more.

………………………………….

In 2014, an Australasian Housing Institute’s Seminar was held in Christchurch. Andrew Booker gave a detailed presentation on the Corporation’s role in Canterbury’s recovery programme. He said he had chosen to focus on the aftermath of the 22 February 2011 earthquake because of the role played by Housing New Zealand. ‘More than three years later, we have to ask ourselves if another 6.3 magnitude earthquake hit us with the same strength and velocity would we be better prepared? Would we have our contingency plans in place? Would they be accessible? It’s a hard question to ask and a hard question to answer.’


‘It’s one thing to set up an office with desks and chairs and computer screens and all the back office paraphernalia and to have a plan and a budget and recruit the people you need. It’s something else to motivate and encourage people to work towards achieving something that in the environment we were all working in, was incredibly complex. We developed a vision which has given us motivation and something concrete to work towards. We have targets and milestones that we must achieve – but we needed to have something that at the end of the job we could say ‘we have contributed to Canterbury’s recovery.’

‘Modern tenants don’t want big gardens’, Andrew Booker said. ‘Generally speaking they don’t grow vegetable gardens. The houses that were built in the 40s, 50s and 60s don’t have modern heating and insulation. Their brick chimneys fell down in the earthquakes. In the eastern suburbs, the gaps between the ground and the house foundations filled up with liquefaction. We had the opportunity with the earthquakes to do something better. At the same time, we needed to mesh with the Government’s recovery strategy – with three of them – leadership, social recovery and the built environment.’

Managing relationships was a critical component of the recovery plan. In his presentation, Andrew Booker talked about the tenants and their priorities, also about staff and their home situations. ‘We recognised that many of our staff based in Christchurch had problems with their own land, their own houses and their families. So we needed to support them and to make sure they had time. The staff who came from other parts of the country had a different view of the quakes. They were more dispassionate about it. The combination of both sets of staff worked to our advantage.’

‘Our priority is always our tenants, and we needed to be able to keep them well informed. We did this with our Tenancy Liaison team who were always out in the field. And we did it by introducing a tenant earthquake recovery update that was delivered directly to their mail boxes. We developed a stakeholder engagement plan which included face to face meetings, discussions about our plans and an invitation to participate.’

‘Our priority is local, but our end goal is national. We are part of a national organisation and what we learn here we need to be able to disseminate to the rest of Housing.’

While Housing New Zealand’s emphasis would always be on housing vulnerable people and those in need, it had to be certain that what was being built would be a good ‘fit’ for the community.

Aranui was a case in point. It was always going to be a social housing area with so many state-owned properties before the earthquakes. The critical agenda was how to build new homes that would accommodate tenants and be appropriate for the neighbourhood. The LURP was an important mechanism to be able to build medium density housing, however the design was equally important to demonstrate to local critics that this wasn’t going to be a return to the houses of the 1950s. Locally, there was a strong preference for single-storeyed homes, although as Andrew Booker pointed out, meeting the needs of tenants who didn’t want big gardens was a more important consideration.

The Repair <5000 programme exceeded expectations completing 5,126 at the end of December 2015. There would always be ongoing repairs to Housing New Zealand’s properties; the key would be to continue the impetus that had been started by the Earthquake Recovery Programme. It had been a phenomenal effort on the part of over 1,000 contractors and trades people working alongside Housing New Zealand’s staff.


‘We will be passing on massive institutional learnings,’ Andrew Booker said in April 2016. ‘All our records will be kept, and if something like this happens anywhere else in New Zealand, the Corporation will be more prepared than it was in 2010 because of it.’

The reconfiguration of social housing in the suburbs of Shirley and Bryndwr would continue and in addition, new apartments were in the pipeline for developments within the four Avenues as part of the Central City strategy. Shirley and Bryndwr had been identified as exemplar social housing sites in the LURP, but the Corporation realised it could achieve medium density housing in other suburbs without them.

‘We will build new apartments in Worcester and Barbadoes Street which will contribute to more people living close to the inner city,’324 Andrew Booker said. It would be in keeping with the Government’s stated preference to have more housing for key workers closer to their place of employment and for residents who need easier access to services.

………………………………….

In March 2015, Paul Commons appeared before an Independent Hearings Panel convened to deal with the proposed Christchurch Replacement District Plan. He said that in repairing its quake damaged properties and building new ones, Housing New Zealand had benefitted from a number of development mechanisms introduced in the post-quake environment including the LURP and the Community Housing Redevelopment Mechanism (CHRM) to redevelop areas of existing social housing in Aranui, Broomfield, Bexley and Shirley.

‘The effectiveness of the District Plan is heavily reliant on supporting physical Council infrastructure and planning procedures and processes. Collectively, the Council has a very significant influence on the speed of the Corporation’s redevelopment projects in Christchurch and their cost economies. The goal of the Corporation is to provide purpose-built, sustainable homes for residents with high housing needs. Simply put, more effective plans and efficient planning processes result in better and more homes for more residents at a time of great need and urgency.’

‘When undertaking development projects, the Corporation aims to build and manage positive ‘blind tenure’ integrated communities. That is, when viewed externally, the social housing dwellings developed will be constructed and managed to have the same or similar external appearance to other community housing and private housing that may form part of the redevelopment…’

The Corporation was ‘committed to providing leadership in developing new and innovative solutions to the Christchurch rebuild following the 2010 and 2011 earthquakes,’ Paul Commons said. Housing New Zealand maintained a large presence in the original state housing suburbs of Aranui, Avonside, Bishopdale/Casebrook, Burnside, Burwood, Hornby, Islington, Linwood, Riccarton, Shirley and Woolston. In the submission, he expressed concern at the Council’s urban design assessments; that they were in conflict with other equally important considerations such as Crime Prevention through



Environmental Design (CPED) which was viewed by Housing New Zealand as a critical aspect of new buildings given the vulnerability of many state tenants.325

………………………………….

There were concerns at the outset, about the organisation’s ability to build 700 new state homes within the specified three-year period. They were concerns, as Andrew Booker noted later, that the commitment had been made without knowing the full extent of the conditions everyone was dealing with at the time. ‘Who knew that the Christchurch City Council would have such internal problems with its consents? Not that it was surprising because the people in the industry always knew there would be a bottle neck situation at some stage. The building that was going on was huge, and not everyone was fully geared up to handle it.’326 He acknowledged that although the Corporation believed it had good internal systems and processes in place, particularly since its major transformation programme had been completed, the organisation could be unwieldy, clunky even, and not everyone in Wellington and Auckland really understood the total urgency the Christchurch team was dealing with. ‘You had to be here to fully understand it.’327

Politically, too, there were constraints and pressures. Reporting mechanisms were dramatically increased after the first earthquake on 4 September and didn’t let up. The Chief Executive needed to know what was happening in order to report to the Board. The Board needed to know what was happening in order to report to the Minister. The Minister needed to know what was going on in order to tell Cabinet. It was a chain of command that was steeped in tradition and not even the severity of the earthquakes was going to change it. Sometimes meeting reporting deadlines was a stifling duty preventing what the local teams considered was more important work on the ground.

There was frequent frustration at the flood of requests emanating from Wellington, often up to three within a 24 hour period. When interested organisations asked questions of their local MP, there was a regulated response mechanism that involved the Wellington office’s Government Relations Office. There were numerous official information requests, always with a deadline for response. There were Ministerial questions to be responded to in Parliament. The bureaucratic system remained steadfastly in place. However complex the question, the Christchurch staff did their best to provide a response, however they also noted that unless people were here in person, they couldn’t hope to understand the scale of the issues or the depth of the problems. It was often that lack of understanding from people outside the region that caused the most irritation.

Ministers paid regular visits to Christchurch to see the recovery in person. Dr Smith had a good knowledge of the construction industry and was able to understand the nuances of sucking tonnes of dried liquefaction from beneath state houses. He could discuss the complex techniques of house foundation trials

325 Submission on the proposed Christchurch Replacement District Plan, 20 March 2015.326 Andrew Booker, 28 April 2016.327 ibid


with the expert contractors on the job site. He thought nothing of donning a hard hat, high viz jacket and a pair of gumboots to see for himself what was going on. His many visits focused on meeting tenants when repairs had been completed and site visits for new builds. Paula Bennett was keenly interested in the state of the Community Group Housing and what was happening to some of the most vulnerable tenants. Gerry Brownlee discussed the house design plans with Miles Construction staff when the concrete foundations were poured at Wilding Street. Bill English came to the Manchester Street office to talk to staff to find out for himself what were the critical issues particularly relating to costs. There were also local body politicians who wanted to see the reaction of tenants when they moved back into a repaired house or were shifted into a new home.

And there were local meetings organised by CERA, Christchurch City Council, Waimakariri District Council, Environment Canterbury, and other ad hoc organisations, all of which were regularly attended by members of Housing New Zealand’s Earthquake Recovery team.

In addition to the awards recognising the Rolleston project, the Corporation’s Earthquake Recovery team was also recognised with awards for its excellence in site safety and in October 2015, it won the New Zealand (AHI) Excellence in Social Housing award followed by the prestigious Australasian (AHI) award for Excellence in Social Housing. To a large extent, CERP’s achievements culminated in the completion of Repair <5000 by 31 December 2015 and the building of hundreds of new homes at the same time.

The sheer scale of the work achieved was ‘fantastic’, Andrew Booker said at the end. ‘Our best month was December 2015 when we completed 105 new homes in Christchurch. In many respects it was a timing thing – plan the work; work the plan. The plan took time to be developed; contracting took time, but once on site, the builders and the trades’ people just worked. We had first class quality controls in place through the efforts of Chris Clayton who led the Quality Assurance team for us from 2014. The relationship we developed with the (City) Council helped enormously, and credit goes to Lito Magadia and Tim Allan for this. They did a great job enabling us to ensure that inspections and documents were in order. The quickest time we achieved from the Council’s final inspection to them issuing the Code of Compliance was half a day. The Council deserves a lot of credit for their efforts as well.’328

………………………………….

On Monday 18 April 2016, CERA closed its doors; five years - give or take a day or two - since the Authority had been established. It was replaced by Regenerate Christchurch, Otakaro Ltd and a new structure within the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC). LINZ, MBIE, the Ministry of Health and the Canterbury District Health Board were taking over some of CERA’s functions as well. CERA’s website was archived for future reference.

‘It is time for central government to start stepping down so the local institutions and authorities can take the lead,’ Acting Chief Executive John

328 Andrew Booker, 26 May 2016.

Image: Site safety was a critical aspect of the recovery programme. Receiving their award are from left: Sue Poasa (CERT), Janice Tucker HNZ Operational Safety Advisor, Andrew Booker (CERT), Keith Permain (CERT) and David Kolien (CERT)


Ombler stated in a large advertisement in The Press on Saturday 16 April. The Press editorialised CERA’s completion date. ‘Few will mourn the loss of Cera. It has attracted well deserved flak about the sluggardly speed of the recovery in some areas…The job is massive, admittedly, and when it began, the central city was wrecked, a complete and utter mess.’

In a more wide-ranging article the same day, journalist Michael Wright questioned what legacy the Authority had left Greater Christchurch. ‘Cera’s first job was disaster recovery. It took charge as emergency powers in Christchurch expired, when the city was still broken. Much of the rubble still had to be cleared. Damaged buildings had to be assessed and many of them were demolished. This included thousands of homes in the city’s eastern suburbs…Of the new recovery organisations, only Regenerate Christchurch is a major shift from the old order. Local authorities have been granted more power, but even as the changes draw praise, their success will hinge on how that power is used.’

It was an obituary for an organisation which had been so influential in Canterbury from its first days in Winstone Avenue in Papanui and then in the HSBC building on Worcester Boulevard.

Like many other Government agencies, Housing New Zealand had developed its recovery plans in line with CERA’s broader recovery strategy. It wasn’t done with fanfare however, or with a desire for headlines; it was done for achievement.

185Part 4: Chapter 2: ‘Here for the Long Haul’

In one of his early meetings with Christchurch City Council’s Community Boards, Andrew Booker said Housing New Zealand was ‘here for the long haul.’ It had a major task ahead to repair damaged houses and to build new ones. It was also going to further its long-term vision of an ongoing building programme that would ensure the longevity of social housing in the region.

Te Manapou i te Haumanutanga o Waitaha – contributing to the earthquake recovery of Canterbury – would be completed and a new structure would take over. In many ways, it would mirror the concept of regeneration propounded by the Christchurch City Council and the Government. Regeneration, after all, was not new in the world of social housing and in Christchurch particularly, regeneration would include the development of more balanced communities. Tenure mix, as planned for new housing within the city’s four Avenues would include social housing alongside affordable housing and owner occupiers.

‘We achieved this in Manchester Street and in Riccarton and we proved it is successful.’329

Housing New Zealand’s future development programme as originally outlined in its Canterbury Investment Plan would include construction of 135 new homes every year for the foreseeable future.

Commenting on the CERP’s programme in the Corporation’s 2014/15 Annual Report, Chair Adrienne Young-Cooper said: ‘Our success in Christchurch over the past two years demonstrates what can be achieved when focus and capability are brought to bear. We intend to apply the lessons learned from our building and earthquake repair programmes across the wider business. Housing New Zealand is a major driver of economic activity in New Zealand, with thousands of suppliers, contractors and builders involved in our activities.’330

The annual report provided information on progress. ‘This massive level of activity will be completed in the coming financial year and will restore Christchurch’s state housing numbers back to pre-quake levels. It will also result in some of the most modern and restored social housing in the country.

329 Andrew Booker, 28 April 2016.330 Housing New Zealand Annual Report, 2014/15.

2 ‘Here for the Long Haul’


Despite working in an environment where there is strong demand for builders and tradespeople, Housing New Zealand attracted about 1,000 (tradespeople) who focussed on delivering the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Programme. Strong ongoing relationships with key stakeholders including consenting authorities, build partners, tenants and the wider community, have also ensured the programme continues to meet its targets.’331

The report also commented on the future requirements of social housing stock in Canterbury. As the CIP had noted in 2013, ‘improving the housing stock must be matched to the changing market where family sizes have decreased in some areas and increased in others. Put alongside the global trend for mixed tenure properties where people lease, rent or own their homes, there is a demonstrable opportunity in Canterbury to set the future trend for New Zealand in the way that state housing is structured. Housing New Zealand’s demand forecast model reflects a reducing demand for state housing in Canterbury which is similar to the slow growth population projections for the region overall. There is a natural tendency for the existing and new populations to move more towards the north and north-west of Christchurch and into the Waimakariri and Selwyn Districts.’332

The Greater Christchurch Urban Development Strategy (UDS) had been framed and developed in 2007. A key issue at the time had been deciding where development should occur in the city and surrounding districts. Threats posed by natural hazards such as earthquakes, floods and rock falls were taken into consideration to ensure the most appropriate land was identified for development. The areas earmarked for growth were Belfast, Wigram, Halswell, Lincoln, Rolleston, Rangiora, Woodend and Pegasus.333 It was natural therefore that Housing New Zealand’s CIP would acknowledge this growth pattern and give emphasis to it when considering its property portfolio. Tenant demand for housing location would be similar to private home owners. It was also natural, based on the UDS strategy and the severity of the earthquakes, that the Corporation would ponder the wisdom of rebuilding in the Christchurch eastern suburbs, particularly given the land, the tendency to liquefaction and the implementation of the residential red zones. Even so, as Paul Commons commented, Housing New Zealand owned a lot of property in the east, and the City Council had shown enthusiasm and a willingness to rebuild infrastructure in the area.

Together with the Ministry of Education’s proposal for the new, composite school in Aranui, and the proposed single site for Shirley Boys and Avonside Girls secondary schools, there was clearly a willingness to maintain a strong presence in the east. The Corporation could have rebuilt elsewhere but it had seen the importance of continuing what was tantamount to urban renewal with commercial interests as well as Government and local authorities having a new role to play.

Elsewhere in the city, the Corporation’s national policy of renewing old houses would continue for the foreseeable future. Housing New Zealand wanted to be the ‘social housing provider of choice’ and it had projected that vision with the innovative designs of its new houses in Christchurch.

Christchurch had a proud history of social housing, with the first state

331 Housing New Zealand Annual Report, 2014/15.332 Canterbury Investment Plan, January 2013.333 Greater Christchurch Urban Development Strategy and Action Plan, 2007.

187Part 4: Chapter 2: ‘Here for the Long Haul’

houses interwoven with private owners’ homes across the city and in its wider environs. It had proven to be a success. The later decisions to create larger clusters of state houses hadn’t been as successful for a variety of reasons. A review undertaken by the Families Commission in November 2015 commented: ‘The merits or otherwise of social mix within neighbourhoods has been debated for decades. Some urbanists have argued that mixed neighbourhoods had a sense of community across income, ethnic and class differences. Others have argued that settlements are better seen as mosaics in which people with similar experiences and in similar circumstances can live in communities in which they feel comfortable with shared identity.’334

The new team to replace CERP, according to Paul Commons, would remain part of the Corporation’s Asset Development portfolio with its emphasis on renewal. It would understandably be smaller, focused on achieving the organisation’s wider goals. It would, in all respects, be returned to the mother ship. But, as he also noted, the new team would retain the strength of purpose initiated in the post-quake environment.

‘We started something different here. We accepted the Minister’s challenge. Peter Drucker said “culture eats strategy for breakfast.” In our case, we developed a culture of doing it once and doing it right. It wasn’t just about the strategy of repairing 5,000 houses and building 700 new ones. It was about having a culture of achievement. We intended it to be our legacy for Canterbury and it is.’335

334 Kay Saville Smith, Nina Saville Smith, Bev James, ‘Neighbourhood Social Mix and Out-comes for Social Housing Tenants: Rapid Review.’ Superu, November 2015. NB: Supervu – Social policy evaluation and research unit. Established from 1 December 2014.335 Paul Commons, 21 April 2016

Image: The CERP team October 2015. In the background is Environment Canterbury’s new offices still under construction

A U T H O R ’ S N O T E S

A N D A C K N O W L E D G E M E N T S

189Author’s Notes and Acknowledgements

Author’s Notes and Acknowledgements

In 2016, six years after the 4 September earthquake that started such a terrible chain of events, people talk less about recovery and more about regeneration and about the new future for Christchurch and Canterbury. For many organisations like the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority, the first few months were phase-down time. For others, like Otakaro Ltd, April 2016 was the start of the next decade which, perhaps, will be more positively received than the dark period many of us have lived through. And it has been dark. There have been so many thousands of aftershocks that we have lost count. If 4 September 2010, or 22 February 2011, 13 June 2011 or 23 December 2011 were the penultimate straws, Valentines Day 2016 was surely the last, we thought. But it wasn’t.

Insurance worries have plagued people; deciding where to live when already past retirement age has been agonising for so many; living through the trauma of a family member being killed in the February earthquake has been devastating, and the perpetual anxiety of what is going to happen next – that level of uncertainty - has been inexplicable to anyone who didn’t live through it all.

In the course of researching about Housing New Zealand and the earthquakes, I have read in addition to documents, reports, papers and media releases, some beautiful poems and essays that describe in intuitive details the events and their impact on us all. Fiona Farrell’s poems in ‘The Broken Book’ and Philip Armstrong’s essay in ‘Landfall 2011’ had particular meaning. His description of ‘the phenomenon of liquefaction’ is picture perfect.

‘During each major earthquake huge volumes of liquefied silt, neither fluid nor solid but an unworkable hybrid of the two, erupts through roads, pavements, lawns, floors and walls, building up into weeping boils a mere metre tall.’336

His words reminded me of driving on Humphreys Drive, around the estuary after the twin earthquakes on 13 June 2011, and looking at huge mud plops that had lurched upwards, turning the water’s edge into something more reminiscent of Rotorua than Christchurch.

Writing about Housing New Zealand’s contribution to the Canterbury earthquake recovery has presented an opportunity to explore the Corporation’s past, its varied history, its successes and its progress; its many issues, its sometimes positive and its often negative public persona. In a reputation audit conducted in June 2013 by Rob Fenwick and Ross Vintner, which included testing the opinions of New Zealand media, the Corporation was variously described by journalists and commentators alike as ‘slow’, ‘patchy’, ‘difficult’ and even ‘grey’. Nothing could be further from reality when referring to the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Programme’s Team which was to my mind a lively, energetic, and at all times totally focused group of people. Like Sir Peter Blake when he led Team New Zealand to America’s Cup victory in 1995, CERP was only interested in ‘winning the cup’.

It was a definite sea-change for Housing New Zealand, reflected in CERP’s

336 Philip Armstrong, ‘On Tenuous Grounds’ Landfall 222, Christchurch and Beyond, Otago University Press, 2011 p16.


unique branding, its emphasis on liaison, communication and engagement. The initiatives that emanated from the team proved the old adage that when the going gets tough, the tough get going. As Ralph Emerson famously said: ‘What lies behind us and what lies ahead of us are tiny matters to what lies within us.’

When the team was still working from Housing New Zealand’s Restell Street offices in Papanui, it was already actively engaged in recruiting staff, cramming itself into a comparatively small space, yet coping without complaint; everyone focused and intent on the new mission. Its move to the central city was organised to coincide with the completion of the Accelerated Repair Programme, enabling the Minister of Housing at the time Phil Heatley, to make the announcement and to explain that we were among the first of existing Government departments and agencies in Christchurch to move back into what was essentially a wind-swept and badly damaged area.

Walking to and from the CERA and Christchurch City Council offices was an endurance test particularly when it was windy. Dust blew from all directions. Tourists often wore masks as they photographed ruined and partially demolished buildings. CERP just put up with it. The Tenants Protection Agency, led by Helen Gatyoni, was reasonably close by and could be more easily accessed by walking than by car. CERP representatives were regular attendees at TPA’s meetings along with other social housing agencies and interest groups. Everyone wanted to know what was happening, and more to the point, when. Helen Gatyoni remained a staunch advocate of social housing renewal after the earthquakes, together with her pragmatic approach to issues especially when they came into the public arena courtesy of media.

There were the inevitable challenges when displaced or homeless people gained media attention by deciding to set up house in a park, or live in a car in the sand dunes. There were the unhappy cases of families and especially children who were living in unheated garages or crammed into damp and unheated rooms. It was heartening to talk with Patricia Lang and Luke Smith who were in the throes of the Corporation’s longitudinal study of tenants and who came to discuss their findings with the CERP team and Tenancy Services. Heartening, because the tenants expressed their appreciation and understanding that life was difficult and challenging for everyone, and that repairing their damaged homes and building new houses was going to take time.

Deciding on a new brand for Housing New Zealand in Canterbury was a relatively easy exercise. CERP needed to be visible in a way that wasn’t ‘business as usual’ for the Corporation. But then, nothing was BAU nor was it likely to be again. What might have worked in the past, wouldn’t work in Canterbury. Creating a new website for the Corporation’s earthquake recovery programme was greeted with caution and scepticism. Would tenants be interested? But the website wasn’t only for tenants – it was for everyone, so that people could see what was being done; they could see progress as it happened. Besides which, it was a misnomer to suggest that tenants didn’t have access to computers. Tenant newsletters were not unusual, in fact they were a traditional means of information sharing and had been used to good effect from the first earthquake in September 2010 to explain what was being done. However, now the team needed to be more specific; to use photography to demonstrate the repairs and the rebuilding programme and to show tenants the ‘face’ of recovery. That way, when one of Sheryl Bank’s Tenancy Liaison team knocked on the door, they were immediately recognised. At a time when tenants were distressed and


anxious about what was going on, knowing the person at the front door was important.

Both Glen Sowry and Sean Bignell were enthusiastic advocates for a new brand. It was important for the programme’s implementation and they were more than happy for a local design company to be engaged to come up with suitable graphics. It was another departure from the Housing New Zealand ‘norm.’ They also readily agreed to the team working with a local company specialising in video production. By producing a suite of videos that could be used to highlight the Foundation Repair Trials, CERP could explain what was being done and the benefits of the trials not only for Housing New Zealand but for every property owner who was struggling to understand the new land designations TC1 TC2 and TC3. Writing the scripts, recording them on site, inviting different people engaged in the trials to explain what was being done was a very worthwhile and rewarding exercise.

The team wanted people to see and experience what initiatives Housing New Zealand was engaged in. The priority was to talk with stakeholders, the people who were immediately involved and interested in what was being done. Everything was both challenging and enterprising; nothing was mundane. Various staff who came from Wellington and Auckland saw the Earthquake Recovery team as something different; something special. It had a mission and it had a vision which it aimed to achieve.

On one of his southern visits, Glen Sowry suggested the CERP office could have electronic progress reports on the office walls which would generate enthusiasm. He recommended going to see what Air New Zealand did, and the team willingly agreed. The outcome was to put up two large screens which could not only document progress, but highlight staff, achievements, what was being achieved on a regular basis, and be linked to national television channels to get immediate news. This was definitely a step up for the Corporation and as in so many ways, CERP was showing what the organisation was capable of doing given the impetus and the permission.

Clarity of purpose definitely helped. Having a generous ‘sponsor’ in Sean Bignell was another welcome advantage because he encouraged innovative ideas to be implemented without having to go through the usual bureaucratic channels. Nothing was ever discounted when it came to promotion, public relations and stakeholder engagement. The website flourished and the number of ‘hits’ grew on a weekly basis.

I asked Paul Commons, at the end of April 2016, now the organisation’s Chief Operating Officer, what he considered was the legacy the earthquake recovery programme would leave behind on its finish date of 30 June 2016. Not the legacy it was leaving Greater Christchurch, but the legacy for Housing New Zealand. He replied, it would be in the towns where old houses needed to be demolished. It would be in Auckland where more progress needed to be made more quickly. It would be in the focus, the drive, the dedication of the team – concentrating on things that mattered. I asked him whether CERP was a model for the organisation. Could it be replicated elsewhere in the country? He said CERP’s success was due to many things – to the culture of ‘doing’, forming strong relationships, celebrating milestones, and having a strong sense of affirmation, of growth, of team work and camaraderie. It was about progress combined with speed and efficiency. ‘As CERP draws to a close, we are still building more houses in Christchurch than we are in Auckland,’ he said.

On his appointment to his national position, he sent an email to his team


commenting on yet another week of the media referring to ‘horror stories’ around state houses. He wrote that he found the reports ‘highly confronting and embarrassing.’ He said: ‘they don’t reflect the organisation and the hard working people…but they do reflect outcomes when we haven’t got things right.’

It was that ‘getting things right’ that made the CERP team a standout part of Housing New Zealand. From the early morning call that David Griffiths made to Bob Hardie on Saturday 4 September 2010, the organisation focused its attentions on doing what it did best. In many ways, given its knowledge and understanding of housing vulnerable people, and given it was a well-established Government agency, it was an error of judgement on the Corporation’s part, not to accept the role offered in January 2011 to create temporary accommodation for misplaced people affected by the earthquakes. However, as Lance B. Kurke wrote: ‘Hindsight is a double-edged sword.’337 It didn’t happen and the Canterbury Earthquake Temporary Accommodation Service was created under the umbrella of MBIE, building temporary villages in Kaiapoi and Christchurch for families who needed to vacate their homes while repairs were being done. The eligibility criteria didn’t include state tenants. As a result, the CERP team found alternative and innovative ways of resolving its acute accommodation crisis during the worst of times.

First impressions are often the most long-lasting. John Tubberty said that when he first arrived at the Papanui office barely two weeks before the 22 February earthquake, he was impressed with the people and their resolve. ‘They had been through September’s shocking experience and yet they remained committed to solving their own problems. Post February, it was very different. They welcomed the input from the rest of us. When we were sitting around the table and there was yet another aftershock, you could see the colour drain out of their faces. Yet they carried on. It was that steely resolve. I was hugely impressed.’338

………………………………….

This book is written to acknowledge the work of the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Programme’s team and everyone who was involved while based in other Housing New Zealand offices. It acknowledges the people who agreed to be interviewed and the people who hunted out papers and documents. Andrew Booker was always going to be a firm advocate of documenting CERP’s achievements, and he was available by phone and email when not in Christchurch. To me, he was always ‘the boss’ even when he wasn’t sitting in the boss’s chair, and he is acknowledged and thanked most warmly for his insistence that this book be written and published.

Sean Bignell provided me with valuable insights into the development of the Asset Management Strategy and its sub-set the Canterbury Investment Plan, that I wouldn’t have otherwise known about, as well as explaining the complexities of establishing a team in Christchurch and empowering the staff to

337 Lance B. Kurke, ‘The Wisdom of Alexander the Great: Enduring Leadership Lessons from the Man who created an Empire’.338 John Tubberty, 4 May 2016.


do what was required in a difficult and challenging time. Like Paul Commons, he said the Board was always supportive of CERP’s work, in particular the commitment from Adrienne Young-Cooper.

Julia Habberjam, the CERP programme office manager with whom I shared many coffees at the Stray Dog Bar was another former staff person, generous with her time and blessed with an excellent memory; she was extremely helpful with suggesting people to be interviewed and was knowledgeable about the generic differences in ‘management-speak’ of programmes versus projects. Sheryl Banks, the innovative Tenancy Liaison manager, found papers and was always ready to respond to questions, to explain some of the original decisions made back in 2010 and to clarify several of the organisation’s papers and reports. Similarly Malcolm Jones was a wonderful help, explaining the Foundation Repair Trials and the many projects he worked on. He and Barry Brownsea made a great duo comparing notes and sharing memories of the 4 September earthquake and its aftermath.

Amanda Binns, based in Auckland, has an amazing depth of knowledge about the Corporation and she was a regular visitor to Christchurch after the September and February earthquakes, providing communications assistance. She was able to hunt out reports that were critical to documenting the work undertaken by Housing New Zealand after the main events and was always available even when off-duty, to confirm facts.

Peter Wild gave me some valuable insights to the work he did when he flew to Christchurch in the immediate aftermath of the September and February quakes, setting up the systems to be used for scoping and checking properties. Mark Harrison explained the complexities of the Rolleston prison project with the ease of his thorough knowledge about what has been involved. David James provided me with some more insights into the post 4 September earthquake and the immediacy of the urgent health and safety repairs. As project manager for 100 of the 700 new builds, and having seen so much of the Corporation’s construction programme, he said the completion of the first houses at Wilding Street remained his most successful moment.

My grateful thanks also go to Ian Gall, Terry Wilson and Joanna Rait who took time to reflect on what had happened and were happy to be interviewed. They also helped enormously finding information particularly relating to the September earthquake and its aftermath. Similarly David Griffiths had an excellent memory for detail about the September earthquake, the decisions that were made and the input the Canterbury team and others made to the general recovery in the following months. Bob Hardie and Jeanette Gower filled in many gaps relating to the organisation’s structure that existed at the time and their thoughts and comments made writing what happened in the first 18 months comparatively straight forward.

Christine McQuillan and Karen Williams provided me with some very personal and important insights into the issues that Community Group Housing experienced during the earthquakes and in the long road to recovery. They were highly complimentary about Barry Brownsea who had been involved in the assessment processes for the CGH properties and who had always showed consideration for the people who lived there. Barry himself was self-effacing during his interview, insisting that what was done was always a team effort.

Shane Austin, the Manager for the Minor Works Programme, talked about the value of having MWH Recovery and Arrow International working alongside the team in the office. Co-location, he said, was the best thing because it gave


staff a first-hand view of a professional Project Management Office (PMO) in operation. He made some interesting comments at his farewell on 29 April 2016, particularly his admiration for the way in which the team had focused on its work and what it had achieved. John Tubberty, whom I interviewed relatively late in the piece, provided me with the background detail that I needed to complete the picture. He too had a first class memory for facts and figures and for the little details that added gravitas to the story. Like everyone immediately involved in the earthquake repair and rebuild programme, he was succinct in his gratitude to the Housing New Zealand staff who came to Christchurch to help out and to the local staff who were there, day and night, hour upon hour, reluctant to take a break while there was still urgent work to be done. Unless you were here, you couldn’t possibly know or understand, he said.

Duncan Holland, a health and safety consultant to Housing New Zealand praised what he considered to be Housing New Zealand’s respectful, practical and positive approach to dealing with the earthquakes, playing its part in the community response at the Welfare Centres and managing its own tenants. On his many visits to Christchurch, he observed the calm manner in which staff including those who had volunteered from other regions, took on their roles. They accepted his advice and acted upon it.

I am indebted to Maggie McKenzie who spent hours finding photographs in a gallery of several thousand images starting with the first pictures of property damage taken on 4 September 2010 through to those taken by professional photographers of activities, events and newly completed homes. Similarly Sheryl Banks who searched through additional files to find as many representative reflections of CERP’s work as possible. Carrianne Brown clarified the total numbers of CGH properties damaged in both the 4 September 2010 and 22 February 2011 earthquakes.

Paul Commons was an eloquent adjunct to the middle and penultimate completion of the CERP team’s work, handing back to Andrew Booker to oversee its final days and the eventual closure of the office. He paid tribute to the CERP team and its ability to make progress against some difficult odds. The phase-down of the programme was always going to be a sad time for everyone.

I am most grateful to Jocelyn Johnstone who read through the completed chapters, offered editorial advice and corrected my sometimes wayward use of apostrophes.

When I joined the CERP team in September 2012, I knew very little about Housing New Zealand’s mandate or its operation, locally or nationally. I was aware that it housed New Zealand’s quota of refugees, although Christchurch hadn’t taken any more since the earthquakes. I was aware of the clusters of state houses in and around some parts of the city and like most other people with an existing or former involvement in media, I was aware of the apparent stigma that often prevailed in some parts of the community when state housing was discussed. My job was to be responsible for the CERP team’s communications, its stakeholder engagement, public relations, branding, website, media and anything else that related to the team being able to succeed in its mission.

It was an enlightening two years. Writing about the work the CERP team did, the long hours, the tiredness, the roadblocks and the achievements, was hugely important because otherwise, with the exception of archiving documents, reports and the myriad of papers produced over the period, there would be no public record. In many respects, this book is a social history, documenting what happened not only in terms of Housing New Zealand’s commitment


to the earthquake recovery, but also how the Corporation’s involvement was interlinked with other agencies, organisations, local and national authorities. Making that connection was important because it demonstrated that at that most critical time, no one organisation worked in isolation. There were the inevitable frustrations, and sometimes the long-term goal seemed clouded by differing agendas, hence the importance of including background material in this book which could give context to otherwise potentially oblique references in some of the chapters.

The book has been written to acknowledge the people behind the scenes.

Vivienne Allan,31 May 2016

B I B L I O G R A P H Y A N D

R E F E R E N C E D P U B L I C AT I O N S

197Bibliography and Referenced Publications

Bibliography & Referenced Publications

Part 14 September 2010

Grant Mackay, Report of the September Earthquake February 2011

International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction Vol 14 Part 1, Dec 2015 Isabel Agnes Hercus, ‘A city built upon a swamp: the story of the drainage

of Christchurch 1950-1903 with epilogue 1903-1936’ MA Thesis 1942 Christchurch Drainage Board, Whitcombe & Tombs

Independent Review of the Response to the Canterbury Earthquake 4 September 2010.

David Middleton (Kestral Group) and Richard Westlake (Westlake Consulting). May 2011, Commissioned by Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management.

John Wilson, ‘Christchurch Swamp to City; A short history of the Christchurch

Drainage Board 1875-1989’ Christchurch Drainage Board. Te Waihora Press

Michael King, ‘The Penguin History of New Zealand’

NZ Parliamentary Support Research Papers: Canterbury earthquake timeline: Government’s and Parliament’s response. 9 November 2010.

Rachel Brookie, ‘Governing the Recovery from the Canterbury Earthquakes 2010-2011: the Debate over Institutional Design.’ June 2012, Victoria University Institute for Governance & policy Studies Working Paper

Scientific American: Interview with Professor Robert Yeats; Larry Greenmeier, 22 February 2011

Tonkin & Taylor, Stage 1 Report, 18 October 2010

Tonkin & Taylor, State 2 Report, November 2010

Part 222 February 2011

Barnaby Bennett, James Dann, Emma Johnson, Ryan Reynolds ‘Once in a Lifetime: City-building after Disaster in Christchurch’ Freerange Press 2014

Ben Schrader ‘We Call It Home: A History of State Housing in New Zealand’ Reed Publishing NZ Ltd 2005


Bob Parker ‘Ripped Apart: A city in Chaos’ Antares Publishing 2012Deloitte Access Economics Report for Vero Insurance Company, ‘Four Years

On: Insurance and the Canterbury Earthquakes’ February 2015

Eileen McSaveney, ‘Historic earthquakes - The 2011 Christchurch earthquake and other recent earthquakes’, Te Ara - the Encyclopedia of New Zealand, updated 14-Oct-14

Ian McLean, David Oughton, Stuart Ellis, Basil Wakelin, Claire Rubin, ‘Review of the Civil Defence Emergency Management Response to the 22 February Christchurch Earthquake’ 29 June 2012

Hamish Keith, ‘The state builds houses for the workers,’ Reader’s Digest: New Zealand Yesterdays, Bateman 2001

Housing New Zealand Annual Reports 2010/2011, 2012/2013, 2014/2015 and Situation Reports during the earthquakes of September 2010, February, June and December 2011

Jane Parfitt, ‘Disaster Response: Lessons learned from Christchurch’, Paper presented to Australian Civil Military Centre January 2012

J. Newell, S. Beaven, D.M. Johnston ‘Population movements following the 2010 and 2011 earthquakes: summary of research workshops November 2011; current evidence.’ GNS Science Miscellaneous Series 44 April 2012

J.P. Morrison ‘The Evolution of a City’ Christchurch City Council 1948

Rachel Brookie, ‘Governing the Recovery from the Canterbury Earthquakes 2010-2011: the Debate over Institutional Design.’ June 2012, Victoria University Institute for Governance & policy Studies Working Paper

Report on the Residential Ground Improvement Trials; Tonkin & Taylor, Earthquake Commission (undated)

Review of the Civil Defence Emergency Management Response to the 22 February 2011 earthquake, 29 June 2012

Rob Fenwick, Ross Vintner, ‘Reputation Audit: Media Section Findings’ June 2013

Rosemary Goodyear, ‘Housing in Greater Christchurch after the earthquakes. Trends in housing from the Census of population and dwellings 1991-2013’ Author: Rosemary Goodyear. Statistics NZ June 2014

Kay Saville-Smith, Nina Saville-Smith, Bev James: ‘Neighbourhood Social Mix and Outcomes for Social Housing Tenants: Rapid Review.’ November 2015: commissioned by the NZ Ministerial Social Sector Research Fund.

Interviews conducted with current and former Housing New Zealand staff, and with Corporation consultants: Shane Austin, Sheryl Banks, Sean Bignell, Amanda Binns, Andrew Booker, Barry Brownsea, Paul Commons, Ian Gall,

199Bibliography and Referenced Publications

Jeanette Gower, David Griffiths, Julie Habberjam, Bob Hardie, Mark Harrison, Duncan Holland, David James, Malcolm Jones, Christine McQuillan, Nicole Randall, Joanna Rait, John Tubberty, Peter Wild, Karen Williams, Terry Wilson.

Extensive material including files, reports, documents and other relevant

papers sourced and provided by Sheryl Banks, Amanda Binns, Carrianne Brown, Ian Gall, Julie Habberjam, Maggie McKenzie, Ray Tye.


List of Acronyms

ACC: Accident Compensation Corporation

BAU: Business as Usual

CBD: Central Business District

CDHB: Canterbury District Health Board

CERA: Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority

CERP: Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Programme

CERSOG: Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Senior Officials Group

CHRM: Community Housing Redevelopment Mechanism

CPED: Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CSPIN: Christchurch Social Policy Integrated Network

Ecan: Environment Canterbury

EMP: Emergency Management Plan

EQC: Earthquake Commission

EQR: Earthquake Repairs

HNZC: Housing New Zealand Corporation

MCDEM: Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management

MSD: Ministry of Social Development

NGO: Non-Government Organisation

NWCG: National Welfare Coordinating Group

OACE: Adhoc Canterbury Committee on Canterbury Earthquake Recovery

PIM: Public Information Management

SETG: Social Environmental Task Group

SITREP: Situation Report

USAR TF: Urban Search & Rescue Task Force

WAG: Welfare Advisory Groups

A P P E N D I C E S


Part 1

Appendix 1

Earthquake Civil Defence and Asset Project Team – Internal Stakeholders

• Louise Beaumont, Communications & Marketing Director

• Kevin Black, Manager Customer Delivery Business Improvement

• Graeme Broderick, Acting Director of Services, Southern

• Janine Conradie, Finance Senior Advisor

• Richard Cook, Senior Advisor Customer Delivery Business Improvement

• Ann Croft, Maintenance Manager, Southern

• Julie Donovan, Programme Manager Asset Earthquake Response

• David Griffiths, Regional Manager – Christchurch, Nelson, Marlborough

• Greg Groufsky, Director Government Relations Unit

• Sarah Hill, Director of Operations, Southern. Project lead for Earthquake Recovery Project, Civil Defence and Assets

• Kate Styles, Asset Planning & Programme Manager, Project leader for Earthquake Asset Recovery

• Kate Tibbitts, Manager People Capability

• Daniel Vena, Team leader Customer Delivery Business Improvement

203Appendices

Appendix 2

Earthquake Asset Recovery Programme Team

• Graeme Broderick, Acting Director of Asset Services, Southern

• Gail Clark, Speedscan Representative

• Ann Croft, Maintenance Response Manager Southern

• Julie Donovan, Programme Manager Earthquake Asset Recovery Programme

• David Griffiths, Regional Manager, Christchurch, Nelson, Marlborough

• Michele Hider, Communications Advisor

• David James, Maintenance Response Manager, Canterbury

• Catherine McDonald, HNZ Insurance Claim Representative

• Sharon Matson, Regional Manager, Southern

• Daniel Norrie, Cunningham Lindsey Insurance Assessor and Claim Representative

• Dallas Paotonu, Procurement Advisor

• David Reilly, Maintenance Response Manager, Canterbury

• Jaco Schneltler, Project Manager – Categories 5-8 and 2-4

• Kate Styles, Asset Planning & Programme Manager, Project Leader for Earthquake Asset Recovery

• Peter Wild, Compliance Manager


Appendix 3

National Welfare Coordination Group (NWCG)

Led by the Ministry of Social Development (MSD) to:

• Provide a national-led welfare response for individuals and communities affected by an emergency (that is, coordinating the response of all welfare agencies at a national level); and

• Coordinate recovery centres for national welfare and related agencies in affected areas; and

• Provide staffing at, and the lead agency role in, recovery centres where required; and

• Coordinate government information help lines for those affected by an emergency; and

• Provide social policy advice to the Government as requested.

NWCG: Membership

• Accident Compensation Corporation

• Child Youth & Family

• CDEM Groups

• Department of Internal Affairs

• Housing New Zealand

• Inland Revenue Department

• Ministry of Agriculture & Forestry

• Ministry of Civil Defence Emergency Management (MCDEM)

• Ministry of Education

• Ministry of Health

• Ministry of Social Development

• Red Cross

• St John

• Salvation Army

• SPCA

• Te Puni Kokiri

• Victim Support

205Appendices

Appendix 4

Accommodation (Housing New Zealand)

As lead agency for accommodation, HNZ maintains plans for the national coordination of accommodation. Support agencies for this function include:

• Child Youth & Family

• Ministry of Social Development

• Ministry of Education

• Department of Building & Housing

• Insurance Council of New Zealand

• Te Puni Kokiri

In a civil defence emergency, immediate emergency accommodation is the prime responsibility of CDEM Groups with Housing New Zealand support. Subsequent temporary accommodation is the prime responsibility of Housing New Zealand with CDEM support. The aim is to identify and provide temporary and longer-term accommodation for people who have been displaced from their normal dwellings. Liaison between Housing New Zealand, other welfare providers, and health services, to ensure the health of those in temporary accommodation, is part of normal arrangements.


Figure 1: Definition of Categories for Damaged Properties

Property DefinitionEngineer’s Report Required

1 (Properties that are deemed to be uninhabitable and are therefore written-off )

Write off, uninhabitable Yes

2 (Properties with damage sustained that require a specialised engineered solution to rectify)

Foundations cracked in several places but house stable. May be written off following structural report.

Yes

3 “ Foundations cracked in a few places but house stable. Yes

4 “ Chimney crashed through roof and damaged roof structure Yes

5 (Properties with damage that can be rectified to the Building Code and NZS3604)

Significant damage to internal & external walls No

6 “ Chimney cracked or fallen, no roof damage No

7 “ Internal cracks to linings throughout the house No

8 “ Multiple cracks to external brick/cladding No

9 (properties with minor damage up to $1,000

Hairline cracks to interior linings of a minor nature No

10 No damage No

Figure 2: Categories of building damage339

Severity Repair Cost (Exc GST) Description

Minor <$10,000 Cracks in interior linings, non-structural cracks in the exterior

Moderate $10,000 - $100,000Chimney damage, roof damage, minor structural damage, cracks in exterior linings which affect weather tightness

Severe >$100,000Buildings out of level, twisted, broken through hogging or dishing, differential settlement generally more than 50mm, stretched more than 20mm.

339 Tonkin & Taylor Stage 1 Report October 2010

207Appendices

Figure 3: The five work streams set up post 4 September 2010

Tenants David Griffiths & Sarah Hall

Maintenance Anne Croft & David James

Assets Callum Logan & Daphne Velji

Staff Connie Nicholson-Port

Civil Defence David Griffiths

Figure 1: Definition of Categories for Damaged Properties

Property DefinitionEngineer’s Report Required

1 (Properties that are deemed to be uninhabitable and are therefore written-off )

Write off, uninhabitable Yes

2 (Properties with damage sustained that require a specialised engineered solution to rectify)

Foundations cracked in several places but house stable. May be written off following structural report.

Yes

3 “ Foundations cracked in a few places but house stable. Yes

4 “ Chimney crashed through roof and damaged roof structure Yes

5 (Properties with damage that can be rectified to the Building Code and NZS3604)

Significant damage to internal & external walls No

6 “ Chimney cracked or fallen, no roof damage No

7 “ Internal cracks to linings throughout the house No

8 “ Multiple cracks to external brick/cladding No

9 (properties with minor damage up to $1,000

Hairline cracks to interior linings of a minor nature No

10 No damage No

Figure 2: Categories of building damage339

Severity Repair Cost (Exc GST) Description

Minor <$10,000 Cracks in interior linings, non-structural cracks in the exterior

Moderate $10,000 - $100,000Chimney damage, roof damage, minor structural damage, cracks in exterior linings which affect weather tightness

Severe >$100,000Buildings out of level, twisted, broken through hogging or dishing, differential settlement generally more than 50mm, stretched more than 20mm.

339 Tonkin & Taylor Stage 1 Report October 2010


Part 2

Appendix 1

The CERP Team

• Tim Allan, Manager CIP Strategic Planning & Implementation • Vivienne Allan, Communications Manager • Doug Allen, Project Manager • Chloe Anderson, Tenancy Liaison Coordinator • Lito Andrada, Quality Assurance • Jacquie Annand, Administration Assistant • Cara Ang, Maintenance Administrator • Kimra Argus, Administrator • Shane Austin, Programme Manager, Repair <5000, Minor Repairs • Sheryl Banks, Tenancy Liaison Manager340 * • Andrew Booker, Manager, Earthquake Recovery & Operations* • Carrianne Brown, Manager, Programme Reporting & Governance • Jason Browne, Project Manager • Barry Brownsea, Quality Assurance Manager* • Daran Buckland, Project Manager • Warren Cameron, Health and Safety Advisor • Chris Clayton, Quality Assurance Manager • Chris Coey, Tenancy Liaison Coordinator • Paul Commons, General Manager Earthquake Recovery • Lesley Corbett, Project Manager • Adele de la Paz, Administrator • Margaret Dickinson, Tenancy Liaison Coordinator • Cathy Farrell, Programme Coordinator • Amandah Fernando, Commercial Manager, Procurement • Darryl Freeman, Tenancy Liaison Coordinator • Natasha Freeman, Project Administrator • Lauren Goodman, Tenancy Liaison Administrator • Julie Habberjam, Programme Office Manager • Ken Hardman, Project Manager • Mark Harrison, Project Manager, Rolleston • Dave Henshaw, Quality Assurance, Health & Safety • Jason Hickey, Tenancy Liaison Coordinator • Jane Hossack, Programme Administrator • Hannah Howarth, Project Administrator, Procurement • David James, Project Manager • Judith Jehru, Project Manager • Harriet Jenkins, Project Coordinator • Matthew Johnson, Programme Lead • Malcolm Jones, Project Manager* • Suriya Kanta, Project Administrator • Mike Kerrigan, Tenancy Liaison Coordinator

340 This is the complete CERP staff list for the duration. Staff with an asterix beside their name were part of the CERP team from the beginning. Some staff were engaged for a specific period. Some staff resigned for personal reasons. At its peak, there were 49 CERP staff.

209Appendices

• David Kolien, Programme Manager Repair <5000, Major Repairs • Ron Laing, Quality Assurance • Andrew Lusty, Project Manager • Lito Magadia, Programme Manager, New Builds • Steve May, Quality Assurance Assessor • Claire Moran, Tenancy Liaison Coordinator • Catherine Morris, Maintenance Administrator • Michelle Morrow, Office Administrator • Trish McDowell, Tenancy Liaison Coordinator • Deborah McGarr, Project Administrator • Aaron McGuinness, Data Analyst • Maggie McKenzie, Office Manager • Steve Newman, Fraud Specialist • Nick O’Malley, Project Manager • Anne Patel, Project Administrator • Sue Poasa, Quality Assurance Assessor • Deana Pochin, Project Manager • Rutwik Raj, Asset Administrator • Alison Rance, Tenancy Liaison Coordinator • Claire Reburn, Project Administrator • Rona Reid, Contracts Manager • Alan Rennie, Quality Assurance Assessor • Melissa Riach, Project Administrator • Gary Roachford, Quality Assurance Assessor • Kirsty Rose, Maintenance Account Manager* • Brendan Ross, Project Manager • Alana Smart, Tenancy Liaison Coordinator • Josh Stevenson, Senior Development Manager • Hayden Stockdale, Quality Assurance Assessor • Richard Toomey, Commercial Manager, Procurement • Alf Tope, Quality Assurance Assessor* • Vicki Tucker, Tenancy Liaison Coordinator • Isaac Walker, Senior Development Manager • Richard Walsh, Quality Assurance Assessor • Angela Ward, Maintenance Administrator • Rachel Weston-Hood, Project Coordinator • Steve Wiffin, Quality Assurance Assessor • Terry Wilson, Tenancy Liaison Coordinator • Steve Worsely, Asset Manager* • Sarah Zhu, Maintenance Administrator

Temp staff: Administration

• Ella Farrell • Claire Fodie • Leanne Grimes • Emma Healey • Lynsey Maguire • Rebecca Patterson • Harriet Jenkins


Auckland Staff

• Sean Bignell, General Manager Asset Development • Amanda Binns, Senior Communications Advisor • Caroline Butterworth, Principal Governance Advisor • Mike Butler, Senior Development Manager • Andrew Crosby, Manager Property Development • Patrick Dougherty, Manager Development Strategy • Fiona Docherty-Wright, Manager Commercial Partnering • Marie Winfield, Senior Communications Advisor

Wellington Staff

• Andrea Morton, Manager Procurement • Dallas Paotonu, Procurement Portfolio Manager • Dean Bryant, Procurement • Roger Hopkins, Technical Advisor

National Staff (based in the CERP Office)

• Alex Dieudonne, Management Accountant • Andrew Conlon, Finance Manager • Jonathan Gardiner, Finance Manager • Nathan Kraft, Portfolio Analyst • Shane Matthews, Portfolio Planning Manager • Keith Permain, Health & Safety Manager • Richard Toomey, Commercial Manager

Regional Staff

• Glenn Conway, Communications Manager • Ray Tye, Stakeholder Engagement Manager

Contractors

• Catherine McDonald, Earthquake Claims Consultant • Cameron Preston, Accountant • Bryan Schriiffer, Senior Procurement Specialist

211Appendices

Appendix 2

CERP Governance Group

• Glen Sowry, CEO Housing New Zealand (Auckland) Chair

• Philip Bailey, Chief Financial Officer (Wellington) until (May 2014 – March 2015)

• Sean Bignell, General Manager Asset Development (Auckland) until February 2013

• Andrew Booker, Manager Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Programme (Christchurch)

• Paul Commons, General Manager Earthquake Programme Recovery (Christchurch) from August 2013

• Leonie Freeman, General Manager Asset Development (Auckland) from February 2013

• Bryony Hilless, General Manager Communications (Auckland) from February 2013

• Philippa Jones, General Manager Organisational Development & Planning (Wellington) until (June 2013)

• Rose-Anne MacLeod, Chief Financial Officer (Wellington) from (March 2015)

• Andrea Morton, Manager Procurement (Wellington)

• Scott Scoullar, Chief Financial Officer (Wellington) until (March 2014)

• Adrienne Young-Cooper, Board representative & programme Champion

• Julie Habberjam, Administration (Christchurch) until March 2014

• Carrianne Brown, Administration (Christchurch) from March 2014


Appendix 3

Repair Programme

Accelerated Repair Programme: June – October 2012

Contractors: • Arrow International Ltd • Murray Charles Ltd • Spotless Facility Services NZ Ltd • Switched On Group

Repair <5000

Major Works Programme

PMO: Arrow International Ltd • Constructa Ltd • Maiden Construction Ltd

Minor Works Programme

PMO: MWH Ltd • A. Sefton and Company Ltd • Buildtech Restorations Ltd • Canterbury Trade Management Ltd • City Care Ltd • Cornerstone Building • Downer Ltd • Edifice Ltd • Global Developments NZ Ltd • NorthStar Group • Space Reinstatements Ltd • Spotless Facilities (NZ) Ltd • Switched On Group • Watts & Hughes Construction

213Appendices

Appendix 4

Building Companies involved in the 700 new builds

• Buildtech Restorations Ltd • Consortium • Constructa • Cornerstone • David Reid Homes • Dax Group • Enterprise Homes • Fab Consortium • Fusion Homes • G.J. Gardiner • Horncastle Homes • Legacy Corporation • Maxim Homes • Mike Greer Homes • Miles Construction Ltd • Modus Group • Signature Homes

Appendix 5

Foundation Repair Trials

Contractors & Consultants

• A J Scott Construction Ltd • A P Design Architecture • Geoscience Consulting (NZ) Ltd • Global Construction Solutions • Golder Associates • Harrison Grierson Consultants • Lewis Bradford & Associates • Maiden Group • Powell Fenwick Consultants Ltd • Slab Jacking NZ Ltd • Smartlift Systems • Stake Consulting Ltd • Uretek Ground Engineering (NZ) Ltd


Appendix 6

Locations for New Homes in Greater Christchurch

• Addington • Aranui • Avondale • Avonside • Bexley • Bishopdale • Bromley • Broomfield • Bryndwr • Central Christchurch (Manchester Street & Bealey Ave) • Dallington • Halswell • Heathcote Valley • Hei Hei • Ilam • Linwood • Mairehau • Northcote • North New Brighton • Parklands • Phillipstown • Riccarton • Richmond • St Albans • St Martins • Shirley • Somerfield • Spreydon • Upper Riccarton • Waltham • Wigram • Woolston • Kaiapoi • Rangiora (new homes still to be completed)

215Appendices

Figure 1: Costs of moving a tenant family from a 3-bedroomed house

To hire removal company for 3 hours Approx $95.00 exl GST

Boxes Approx $2 per box

Phone Approx $50

Sky Approx $40-$50

Sundry e.g. St Johns Medic Alert To be negotiated

A temporary relocation was weighed up carefully due to additional financial cost relating to time delays when the contractor was working around the tenant.

Budget was based on 20% of temp/perm moves, taking into account cost of motels, moving costs, container hire, storage, skips and incidentals.


Index

Shane Austin 107, 116, 124, 125, 176, 193

Sheryl Banks 41, 71, 72, 83, 97, 102, 106, 107, 117, 135, 139, 145-149, 151, 172, 175-177, 193, 194

Sean Bignell 7, 97, 100-102, 105, 107-109, 111, 113, 128, 129, 132, 133, 178, 191, 192

Andrew Booker 7, 78, 81-83, 89-91, 96, 97, 100-103, 106-108, 110, 114-116, 119, 121, 125, 134, 135, 141-143, 145, 149, 161, 164, 167-169, 172, 175-177, 179-183, 185, 192, 194

Barry Brownsea 39, 45, 91, 102, 115, 193

Paul Commons 115, 117, 125, 134, 136, 139, 140, 142, 176, 178, 179, 181, 186, 187,

191, 193, 194

Allan Freeth 135, 136

Ian Gall 31, 37, 100, 193 Peter George 115, 123

Jeanette Gower 33, 34, 37, 42, 91, 92, 106, 193

David Griffiths 30-33, 35, 36, 49, 50, 52, 53, 56, 58-61, 66, 67, 71-73,

78, 83, 85, 177, 192, 193

Julie Habberjam 37, 60, 81, 89, 100, 102, 177

Duncan Holland 57, 58, 80, 176, 194

Alan Jackson 7, 16, 108, 109, 175 David James 33, 40, 71, 82, 107, 132, 193

Malcolm Jones 71, 82-84, 89-91, 96-98, 100, 105, 117, 119, 121, 159, 162, 179, 193

John Hamilton 12, 14, 27, 76, 98 Bob Hardie 30-32, 34, 41, 50, 61, 62, 89, 96, 100, 192, 193 Mark Harrison 169, 193 Sarah Hill 34, 36, 37, 60, 66, 71-73, 95, 96 Catherine McDonald 52, 68, 91, 100, 101, 176

Christine McQuillan 44-47, 193

Lesley McTurk 8, 16, 31, 33, 38, 50, 52, 53, 56, 72, 106, 108

Glen Sowry 7, 107, 112, 113, 126, 132, 133, 176, 177, 191

Roger Sutton 19, 113, 128, 177

Kevin Third 85, 92, 93, 94, 96, 100 John Tubberty 68, 72, 80, 84, 86, 87, 90, 94, 96, 100, 102, 192, 194 Ray Tye 140, 151 Peter Wild 33-35, 39, 40, 81-83, 193 Karen Williams 118. 119, 193 Adrienne Young-Cooper 109, 177, 185, 193

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