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2

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INTRODUCITON Malakand Region was once an attraction for the tourists but the rise of

militancy challenged the writ of the state as a result Malakand remained a primary focus of

electronic media. The news regarding suicide attacks, kidnappings of government officials

and slaughtering of law enforcement personnel were flashed in the media as breaking news.

In order to establish the writ of the state a successful military operation was

carried out during this phase more than two million people were displaced. In fact, durable

and lasting peace can only be achieved with the presence of an efficient, capable and

transparent criminal justice system.

Creation of secure environment cannot be achieved in isolation therefore

cooperation of the community and their confidence in law enforcement agencies is of vital

importance. In post-operation phase the recruitment of Special Police Force (SPF), former

Army personnel, increase in the number of Sub-Division from 13 to 21 and Police Stations

from 45 to 61 were immediately planned and executed. Improvements in the capabilities of

police and its ability to protect the community shall be a continuous and long term agenda

to be pursued.

Soon after the operation, I twice visited all districts of the region and met the

DIG Region, all DPOs, Judges, Community elders and Jail Superintendents and tried to learn

the strengths and weaknesses of the criminal justice system. The completion of this

endeavour was not possible without the support and patronage of Malik Naveed Khan,

Provincial Police Officer, Khyber Pakhtoonkhwa, DIG Idrees Khan, Mr. Asim Iman, District

Session Judge, Swat, SP Qazi Farooq, SP Mumtaz Zareen Khan, SP Abdul Rauf, SP Ejaz Khan

and SP Israr Bacha.

SSP Muhammad Ali Khan Babakhel SSP M-2, National Highways & Motorway Police e-mail; alibabakhel@hotmail.com pisces.mohammad@gmail.com

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ANOTHER TURBULANT TRANSITION IN MALAKAND

MALAKAND The Malakand Agency was one of the tribal areas of Pakistan until 1970s. It included the

princely states of Chitral, Dir, Swat and an area around the Malakand fort known as the Malakand Protected Area. In 1970, following the abolition of the princely states, the agency became the Malakand Division which was divided into districts one of which was the Malakand Protected Area, known as Malakand District. In 2000 the Malakand Division was abolished. On 28th July, 1969 princely states of Swat, Dir and Chitral were dissolved and were incorporated in Pakistan. In 1996 Dir was divided into two administrative districts i.e. Lower Dir and Upper Dir. Today Malakand Region consist of Dir Lower, Dir Upper, Swat, Chitral, Buner and Shangla districts.

Dir is considered one of the most sensitive areas in Pakistan in term of religious extremism. Religio-political parties have taken root in Dir, e.g. JUI, JI and TNSM. The development indicators in Dir have always been discouraging. Dir was ruled by a princely dynasty till 1969. There were limited facilities for education, health, road, transportation and communication for the inhabitants of the Dir State. DIFFERENT PHASES OF TRANSITION: LAWS

i. SHARIAH LAW (1895 TO 1925) ii. Shariah Laws / Dasturul Amal (1925 to 1967)

DASTRUL AMAL There were Jamadars and Subidars, who used to be enlisted on political basis for deciding cases of petty nature both criminal and civil. They had lesser power than the Tehsildars. Tehsildars were deciding all type of cases on the basis of Dastrul Amal. The Jamdars, Subidars and Tehsildars were given full fledged authority. FRONTIER CRIMES REGULATION (FCR) (1967 TO 1971) A set of laws first enforced by the British Raj in the Pakhtoons inhabited tribal areas in 1848 to counter the fierce opposition of the Pakhtoons to British rule. The main objective of this regulation was to protect the interest of British Empire in the area. The regulation was re-enacted in 1873 and again in 1876 with minor modifications. With the passage of time, the regulation was found to be inadequate and new acts and offences were added to it to extend its scope. This was done through promulgation of the Frontier Crimes Regulation 1901. The FCR advocates collective punishments and many human rights activists argue it is against the fundamental human rights. REGULAR LAW Regular law was functional in this area upto 1976 but was repelled by “PATA” on the announcement of the then Prime Minister of Pakistan Mr. Z.A Bhutto (late).

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PATA (PROVINCIALLY ADMINISTERED TRIBAL AREA) FROM 1976 TO 1989 Regular law was implemented in this area since the merger upto 1976 on the pattern of the rest of the country. In 1976 the government without considering the genuine feelings of people of Malakand replaced the main parts of prevalent procedural law and promulgated the Jirga Laws commonly known as “PATA” regulation. It was a combination of authoritarianism, ignorance of the changing social structure of the Swat Valley and conventions framed to appease the local elite. Judicial authority in PATA was transferred from the regular courts to the Deputy Commissioners of the districts in Malakand division. A Jirga, consisting of local notables, would decide cases of conflict among the people of the area under the supervision of a Tehsildar (the revenue officer). The Jirga members were to be selected from the existing landed gentry. Any appeal against the jirga’s decision was to be made to the deputy commissioner and the NWFP home secretary. The Jirga was given exclusive jurisdiction in respect of all offences under the PPC except offences against the state or those relating to armed forces, elections etc. The Jirga could adjudicate on all disputes of civil nature. A Niab Tehsildar could preside over the Jirga hearing a criminal case. The promulgation of PATA regulation was widely resented, criticized and condemned by the intelligentsia in Malakand Division on the basis of following arguments:-

i. PATA regulations I & II 1975 (amended later) lacked legislative sanctions, these laws were not enacted by legislatures but laws made by Home Department. These laws were not made in the interest of public, but made to facilitate the administrators.

ii. These regulations lacked judicial sanctity. Even the High Court and Supreme Court of

Pakistan have declared them to be derogatory to the fundamental rights.

iii. The regulations were discriminatory and retrogressive. The people governed by these regulations had been deprived of judicial protection and were pushed to the mercy of Executive Officer.

iv. The PATA regulations were promulgated in presence of highly qualified and trained judicial

officers. v. Bureaucrats used to rule the public of this area during the old days of FCR and so many

others, having vested interest, could not tolerate the “RULE OF LAW”. They were not happy with just decisions of the judges hence they manipulated to usurp the powers of court of law.

Lawyers in the late 1980s submitted a petition in the Peshawar High Court pleading for the abolition of the PATA Regulation. The Peshawar High Court gave its verdict in Feb. 1990 in favour of the petition. The learned court held these regulations to be volatile to article 25 of the constriction (Constitutional Guarantee of Equity of Citizens). The federal government then appealed in the Supreme Court which ruled four years later that the PATA regulation was unconstitutional.

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By the time the Supreme Court declared the PATA regulation to be ultra vires, the TNSM had become so powerful that it brought the entire Malakand administration to a standstill in 1994, demanding the imposition of Sharia in the Swat valley and other districts in the division.

Maulana Fazalullah of Mam Dheri, Swat accompanied by his followers (approx. 3/4 thousands) initiated their terrorist activities in 2007 by challenging the writ of the government. They started with targeting the government’s installations, specially belonging to LEAs, and damaged public and private property. The situation reached to its boiling point after government’s operation at Jamia Hafsa and Lal Masjid.

Maulana Fazalullah was a staunch supporter of Maulana Abdul Aziz. While agitating the operation against Jamia Hafsa and Lal Masjid, Maulana Fazalullah addressed public meetings on 3rd and 4th July 2007 wherein he urged the people to get ready for Jihad. Declared not to spare any government employee and urged the suicide bombers to perform the task they have been assigned. This was followed by some gory incidents including slaughtering of personnel of LEAs and display of their beheaded bodies in the bazaars. During 2009, DPO Khurshid Khan was killed in an encounter. DCO Upper Dir, Sub. Maj Rahim Khan, Engineer PWD and Steno DOR Muzaffar were kidnapped.

Consequently, the government had to deploy Pak Army and the security forces launched an

operation against Maulana Fazalullah and his followers on 26-10-2007. The move was widely welcomed by the general public as they were fed up with the atrocities of the Maulana and it was a ray of hope for them regarding restoration of peace at Swat. NIZAM-I-ADL REGULATION 2009 The regulation-2009 replaced the Shahria Nizam-i-Adl regulation 1999. According to new law, the conduct and character of a judicial officer and executive magistrate should conform to Islamic principles and he should decide all cases in accordance with Sharia. The regulation envisages two appellate forums Darul-Darul Qaza and Darul Qaza, which would operate in Malakand Region. Darul-Darul Qaza would be equivalent to the Supreme Court and Darul Qaza would have appellate jurisdiction similar to that of a High Court. The Sharia Niazam-i-Adl Regulation also repeals the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Ordinance of 2001 and revives the executive magistracy, including the district magistrate, additional district magistrate, sub-divisional magistrate and other executive magistrates. The system was abolished on Aug 14, 2001. Qazis would now be bound to decide a civil case within six months and a criminal case within four months. Any Qazi who fails to comply with the schedule would be censured and adverse remarks will be entered in his service record if he receives three letters in a year. According to the new law, the number of pending cases before Zila Qazi, Izafi Zilla Qazi and district magistrate should not exceed 150. The maximum number of cases pending before Aala Ilaqa Qazis (Senior Civil Judge), Ilaqa Qazis and executive magistrates should be 200. If pending cases exceed the court’s capacity, the provincial government will be required to set up new courts. Apart from the appellate courts, there will be five categories of courts: the court of Zila Qazi (district and sessions judge); Izafi Zila Qazi (additional district and session judge); Aala Ilaqa Qazi (senior civil judge); Ilaqa Qazi (civil judge) and executive magistrate.

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POLICE ESTABLISHMENT MALAKAND REGION Malakand Region consists of six districts headed by a Deputy Inspector General. Each district is headed by a District Police Officer. The total area of region is 28919 sq.kms having 43,69,082 population. After the creation of Pakistan, the region underwent certain legal and administrative transitions. Having analysis of the statistics regarding available manpower it was learnt that the average ratio in the region between police constable and population is 01:610 (one constable for 610 citizens). According to Police Rules 2.2(2) the ratio of police strength compared to its demographic strength in towns shall be 01:450 (one constable for 450 inhabitants). In the light of this provision, the required strength for the region is 9709 constables. MANPOWER

OPERATIONS

OPERATIONAL CHAIN OF COMMAND

SWAT

SHANGLA

District SP/SSP DSP DSP/L IP SI ASI HC C DVR Total Population Area (sq.

Kms)

Constables. &

Population ratio

Swat 1+1 7 1 24 67 132 361 2376 31 3001 16,74,613 5337 705

Shangla 1 3 0 5 20 37 108 592 12 778 4, 34, 563 1,586 734

Buner 1 3 0 5 23 43 131 713 18 937 5,06,048 1, 865 710

Dir Lower 1 4 0 8 52 79 263 1624 7 2038 8,00,000 1, 582 493

Upper Dir 1 3 0 5 34 50 120 943 12 1168 5,75,858 3,699 611

Chitral 1 1 0 5 22 22 165 916 27 1159 3,78,000 14,850 413

G. Total 7 21 1 52 218 363 1148 7164 107 9081 43,69,082 28919 610

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BUNER

DIR LOWER

UPPER DIR

CHITRAL

SSP

(1)

DSP

(1)

IP

(05)

SI

(22)

ASI

(22)

HC

(165)

Const.

(916)

(Driver)

(27)

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RECRUITEMENT In 2009, recruitment campaign was launched to enroll 2654 constables in six districts. The candidates expressed keen interest to get themselves enrolled in Malakand Police. 7811 applicants’ submitted applications, finally 2654( 2634 Male+ 20 Female) constables were recruited. Its strongly recommended that recruitment and promotion in other ranks also be carried out in proportion to the available strength of constabulary.

RECRUITMENT YEAR 2009

District Cadre No. of vacancy Applications Received Selected Total

selected Male Female Male Female Male Female

Swat Const 1058 9 1324 7 1058 7 1065

Dir Lower Const 581 20 2553 0 581 0 581

Upper Dir Const 286 17 830 4 286 3 289

Bunir Const 280 0 800 2 280 0 280

Shangla Const 217 5 1188 4 217 4 221

Chitral Const. 212 6 1116 (both

Male+Female) 212 6 218

G. Total 2634 57 7811 2634 20 2654

MORALE During the wave of militancy, 149 officers and Jawans of Malakand Police embraced martyrdom and 220 officers and Jawans were injured. A large number of police men also deserted. Almost 75% desertion was reported in Buner District alone. During that period, even the senior police officers also avoided posting in these areas. Twelve officers have been posted as DPO Swat in 21 months, out of which three officers even refused to assume the charge. The rest served for some weeks before getting a better posting in other parts of the province. Those days the morale was at lowest ebb as even the Elite Police Force (EPF) refused to be deployed in these areas. However, during my visit of these areas, the morale of the constabulary was observed high. It’s worth appreciation that National Flag was found hoisted on all police establishments. The public developed faith and confidence in Police, they admire the scarifies rendered by the Malakand Police. One can observe the painted flags on the shutters of shops and wall-chalking having patriotic slogans on the walls of Swat. A number of Police establishments and roads have been named after with the names of the police martyred e.g Irshad Ali Khan Shaheed Chowk Swat, Farooq Shaheed Chowk, Swat, Javed Iqbal Shaheed Police Lines, Swat , Taj Malook Shaheed Chowk, Swat, PS Khursheed Khan (old PS Khawzekhela), Swat, Khursheed Shaheed Police Lines, Dir Lower, PS Said Muhammad Shaheed Daggar (old PS Daggar), Buner. This opportunity shall not be wasted but rather a lasting relationship between public and police shall be developed. For this partnership it is essential to devise a long term strategy.

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POLICE SHUHADA

District 2006 TO 2009

SSP DSP IP SI ASI HC FC CLASS-IV TOTAL

Swat 1 3 7 4 16 56 1 88

Buner - 1 - - 2 3 11 - 17

Dir Lower 1 - 1 1 2 7 7 - 19

Upper Dir - - - 1 1 1 7 - 10

Shangla - - - 1 1 1 9 - 12

Chitral - - - 1 1 1 - - 3

G.Total 1 2 4 11 11 29 90 1 149

POLICE OFFICERS INJURED

District SSP/SP DSP IP SI ASI HC FC CLASS-IV TOTAL

Swat 2 2 5 9 9 27 103 1 158

Buner - - - - - 2 6 - 8

Dir Lower - 2 1 3 4 5 9 - 24

Upper Dir - - - - 1 1 12 - 14

Shangla - - - - 1 1 14 - 16

Chitral - - - - - - - - 0

G.Total 2 4 6 12 15 36 144 1 220

CRIME (2008-2009) Having analysis of crime statistics of five affected districts of Malakand Region, following are the findings:-

i. In year 2009 the crime against person (Murder, attempt to Murder, Hurt, Zina/Sodomy) witnessed downward trend. During 2008, 1603 cases and in 2009, 1137 cases were registered (showing a decline of 447). It indicates that the period was of extreme fear and depression consequently, people even forgot their enmities.

ii. The incidents of kidnappings for ransom show an increase of 16%. It was learnt that the terrorists and criminals were earning huge revenue from kidnapping for ransom.

iii. In year 2009, the crime against property shows upward trend. During 2008, 146

cases while in 2009, 170 cases were registered. Sharp increase in the incidents of Dacoity and Burglary has been recorded.

iv. Eighteen percent (18%) reduction in the recovery of illegal arms reflects the poor

performance of police as police was reluctant to recover such weapons.

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CRIME AGAINST PERSON

District Murder A.Murder Hurt Zina/Sodemy Kidnapping

/Ransom Child Lifting /Abduction

Total

Year 2008 2009 2008 2009 2008 2009 2008 2009 2008 2009 2008 2009 2008 2009

Swat 260 123 197 50 134 36 13 3 24 37 28 21 656 270

Shangla 34 48 28 32 38 32 7 1 0 1 3 8 110 122

Bunir 52 59 37 39 94 69 3 1 1 4 6 12 193 184

Dir Lower 94 72 67 58 133 118 3 2 8 16 5 6 310 272

Dir Upper 83 99 99 95 225 200 0 0 24 21 10 16 441 431

TOTAL 523 401 428 274 624 455 26 7 57 79 52 63 1710 1279

-122 -154 -169 -19 +22 +11 -431

57%

43%

Cases of Murder

2008

2009

61%

39%

Cases of attempt to Murder

2008

2009

58%

42%

Cases of Hurt

2008

2009

79%

21%

Cases of Zina/Sodemy

2008

2009

42%58%

Cases of Kidnapping/Ransom

2008

2009

45%

55%

Cases of Child Lifting / Abducitiion

2008

2009

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CRIME AGAINST PROPERTY

District Dacoity Robbery Burglary Vehicle

Theft/snatching M.cycle

theft/snatching Total

Year 2008 2009 2008 2009 2008 2009 2008 2009 2008 2009 2008 2009

Swat 12 17 1 4 50 61 19 14 2 3 84 99

Shangla 1 0 2 0 9 11 0 0 0 0 12 11

Bunir 0 11 0 1 9 14 4 7 0 0 13 33

Dir Lower 0 2 4 2 0 0 15 15 3 1 22 20

Dir Upper 2 1 2 0 0 0 11 6 0 0 15 7

TOTAL 15 31 9 7 68 86 49 42 5 4 146 170

+16 -2 +18 -7 +1 +24

33%

67%

Cases of Dacoity (Highway, Bank & others

2008

2009

56%

44%

Cases of Robbery (Highway, Bank & others)

2008

2009

44%

56%

Cases of Burglary

2008

2009

54%

46%

Cases of Vehicles Theft/Snatching

2008

2009

56%44%

Cases of M. Cycle Theft/Snatching

2008

2009

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ARMS RECOVERY

TERRORISM During the phase of Militancy (2006 to 2009) 581 civilians and 146 Policemen lost their lives. The innocent civil population was badly affected as 82% loss incurred by public and 18% by the Policemen. Regarding intensity years 2008 & 2009 can be termed worst in the history of Malakand Region.

HUMAN LOSSES IN TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

District 2006 2007 2008 2009

Police Killed

Civilian Killed

Police Killed

Civilian Killed

Police Killed

Civilian Killed

Police Killed

Civilian Killed

Swat 0 0 18 81 43 194 27 128

Shangla 0 0 4 0 0 1 8 46

Buner 0 0 0 0 11 33 6 6

Dir Upper 0 0 0 0 2 10 8 35

Dir Lower 6 0 0 0 4 9 9 38

Total 6 0 22 81 60 247 58 253

HUMAN LOSSES

59%

41%

Arms Recoverd

2008

2009

District Arms recovered Difference

Year 2008 2009

Swat 278 70 -208

Shangla 93 110 17

Bunir 275 144 -131

Dir Lower 667 532 -135

Dir Upper 46 87 41

TOTAL 1359 943 -416

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INVESTIGATION Apart from improvement in visibility of police the prime task of Malakand police is to complete the investigation of 1128 pending cases especially of the cases of terrorism. All six districts have sanctioned posts of SP Investigations but on ground situation is that only district Swat has SP Investigation. District Buner is being looked after by an Acting SP. Dir Lower and Dir Upper are being supervised by Acting DSsP and Chitral & Shangla are without SP investigation. Surprisingly no DSP Investigation is posted in the whole region which reflects either the lack of interest in investigation or the acute shortage of officers in the rank of DSP. In Article 110 of PO 2002 the head of investigation has been assigned the responsibility of Secretary of CJCC. The absence of Superintendents of Police as incharge of investigation not only affects the quality and disposal but also hampers the coordination within Criminal Justice System. STRENGTH OF INVESTIGATION WING

INVESTIGATION WING

CHAIN OF COMMAND

SWAT

18%

82%

Police Killed

Civilian Killed

District SP/SSP DSP IP SI ASI HC FC Total

Swat 1 0 7 22 40 59 164 293

Shangla 0 0 2 5 8 16 33 4

Buner 1 0 3 11 20 36 78 149

Dir Lower 1 0 5 10 34 33 83 166

Upper Dir 1 0 3 8 19 24 64 119

Chitral 0 0 2 7 6 15 46 76

G. Total 4 0 22 63 127 183 468 807

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SHANGLA

BUNER

DIR LOWER

DIR UPPER

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CASES IN 2009 Having an overview of the cases registered in the year-2009, total 15906 cases were registered (in 05 affected districts). Whereas the strength of upper subordinates (ASI, SI & IP) is 197. In the light of these figures, an IO has to investigate 80.74 cases per annum. According to the essence of CrPc a case has to be challaned within 14 days. Keeping in view the present strength and number of cases to be investigated an IO has to complete the investigation of one case in 2.25 days which seems not realistic. INVESTIGATION PROGRESS -2009

DISTRICT

TRACED UNTRACED CHALLANED PENDING TOTAL

ATA Other PPC

ATA Other PPC

ATA ATA Other PPC

Other PPC

ATA ATA Other PPC

Other PPC ATA

Other PPC

Traced Untraced Traced untraced Traced Untraced Traced Untraced

Swat 468 787 327 299 82 145 549 131 386 182 238 168 795 1086

Buner 39 293 5 14 14 1 281 12 25 4 12 2 44 307

Shangla 10 139 4 17 10 3 135 17 - 1 4 - 14 156

Dir Lower 51 415 7 61 11 4 390 38 40 3 25 23 58 476

Upper Dir 9 591 2 51 4 2 586 46 5 - 5 5 11 642

G.Total 577 2225 345 442 121 155 1941 244 456 190 284 198 922 2667

AFGHAN REFUGEES

The presence of Afghan Refugees in these districts badly affected the situation. The camps and their colonies are regarded safe heavens for criminals and terrorists. The law enforcement officers strongly recommended deportation of refugees.

S# District Camp Population

1 Buner Koga 10722

2 Malakand Zangal Patai` 7247

3 Dir/Chitral Barawal 1904

4 Chakdar 29, 326

5 Toor 11,410

6 Kalkatak (Chitral) 3925

G. Total 15,335

(Office of the Commissioner Afghan Refugees)

District No.of cases

registered in 2009 Upper Sub-Ordinates

Cases per officer (Avg.)

Swat 3195 69 46.30

Shangla 1092 15 72.8

Buner 1647 34 48.44

Dir Lower 7850 49 160.20

Upper Dir 2122 30 70.73

Total 15906 197 80.74

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Following is the involvement of Afghan Refugees in different crime in District Dir Lower since 1978 to 30-06-2007:-

S.No. Name of Police Station Number of cases

1 PS Ouch 1094

2 PS Timergara 934

3 PS Balambat 325

4 PS Lalqilla 30

5 PS Khall 27

6 PS Munda 1180

7 PS Samarbagh 358

Total 3948

(Record SP Office Dir Lower) NON-CUSTOM PAID (NCP) VEHICLES According to an estimate more than 50, 000 NCP vehicles are plying in Malakand Region. The presence of such vehicles is a source of stress for police. In case of any involvement in a criminal or terrorist activity, it’s almost impossible for the investigators to trace the owner of the car. In a recent suicide attack registered vide FIR # 478 dated 18-12-2009, PS Balambut District Dir Lower, a double cabin pickup driven by a suicide bomber hit the Police Lines consequently 15 persons were killed and 45 were injured. While having discussion with the investigators of the case, i learnt that Forensic experts determined the engine and chassis numbers but so far they failed to trace the registration number and owner of the vehicle. Probability regarding use of NCP vehicle in this incident seems high. 2. Earlier these vehicles were temporarily registered in union councils but during post-operations phase in Swat it’s being registered in police stations.

ARRESTED ACCUSED MILITANTS (2007-09)

HARD MILITANTS WANTED IN TERRORISM CASES

NAME OF MILITANT NO. OF CASES

Mulana Fazal Hayat alias Fazlullah 90

Anwar Ullah 48

Muslim Khan 45

Bakht Farzand 41

Haroon Rashid alias Romai 29

Iqbal Hussain 28

DISTRICT NO. OF ACCUSED ARRESTED

SWAT 354

BUNER 102

DIR LOWER 35

UPPER DIR 26

SHANGLA 3

G. TOTAL 520

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Mehboob ur Rehman 24

Shah Dawrab 23

Qari Mushtaq 23

Seraj-ud-din 22

Ahmed Jan 20

Abdur Rehman 20

Naeem 16

Fazal Rehman 15

Amir Sahib 14

Yousaf alias Babo 14

Qari Suhail 13

Ikram-ud-Din 12

Saif-ul-Malook 11

Ibni Amin 11

Ibni Aqil 11

Sher Muhammad Qasab 11

Sofi Muhammad Amir TNSM 11

Sadiq Ahmed 10

Ahmad Ali 10

(Investigation Wing Swat) INVESTIGATION PROGRESS OF SELECTED CASES OF TERRORISM DISTRICT SWAT

i. FIR # 34 PS Rahimabad, dated 03-05-2009 unknown militants attacked the Police Station with Rocket Launchers. Police retaliated but keeping in view the increased threats and low morale of Police the high-ups ordered to vacate the premises. The PS staff was shifted to the Grid Station where FC was already stationed. Later on, a case was registered against unknown militants. Case is still under investigation.

ii. FIR # 36 PS Rahimabad, dated 04-05-2009 (the registration of case was made on 27th of June, 2009) the Police Station was destroyed; the militants kidnapped two Frontier Reserve Police Constables namely Shah Pasand and Pervaiz and looted the Government property. The whereabouts of kidnapped officials is not yet known. In the same FIR another incident was also incorporated. According to brief details, the militants killed FC Subidar Awal Khan and Sephy Shafiq. The ineffectiveness of police and chaos in the area can be estimated by the fact that FIR # 36 was registered after a delay of 52 days. Apart from destruction of PS, they killed FC officials and also kidnapped FRP personnel.

iii. FIR# 162 PS Mingora City, dated 30-08-2009 U/S 302/324/353/120B/121/124A/109

PPC, 3/4 Explosive Act, 7 ATA. This police station was attacked thrice, two were car bomb explosions and one was suicide attack. It was learnt that its mastermind namely Anwar Khaliq managed to enroll himself in Special Police Force (SPF). However, on next day (31-08-2009) he was killed in an encounter with Law Enforcement Agencies. As a result of this attack 16 under training SPF officials and one instructor lost their lives. In this case proceedings U/S 87 CrPc has been completed. So far no arrest has been made. Case is still under investigation.

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DIR LOWER

i. FIR# 393 PS Ouch, dated 08-05-2009 U/S 3/4 Explosive Act, 7 ATA, 148/149/427 PPC. According to the brief facts of the case, the building of PS Ouch was completely destroyed by the militants. The building was already abandoned by police in April, 2009. A case against 72 accused was registered, 20 were arrested and 8 released by court on bail. In this case, police is the complainant and the witness. The record & case properties were completely destroyed. Case is still under investigation as according to the procedure laid down for the investigation of the terrorism cases (Section 19(10) ATA 1997), it is mandatory to publish the names of wanted accused in three National Dailies. Owing to the limited budget, the information department so far failed to advertise these advertisements which is a major obstacle in further progress of the investigation.

ii. Attack on Malakand University. FIR # 339 dated 18-03-2009 U/S 17(iv) Haraba, 324/353/436/427/148/149/109 PPC, 3/4 Explosive Act, 7 ATA. During midnight militants armed with heavy weaponry attacked the University. A contingent of PS Ouch reached the spot. Police Mobile was hit with a rocket launcher, consequently, 01 ASI, 01 HC, 02 Constables, 01 Driver and 01 Security Guard of University were killed. All 12 accused are absconders. Case is still under investigation.

FLAWS & PROBLEMS IN INVESTIGATION

i. NON-COOPERATIVE PUBLIC In cases where the suspects or accused are militants the public has been found very reluctant to be witness. With such attitude police cannot make these cases success against the terrorists in courts.

ii. RECOVERY MEMOS ARE NOT SIGNED BY THE PUBLIC WITNESSES According to section 103 CrPc the Police officer/IO are required to get signatures of two witnesses on recovery memo. But either police do not follow or the public do not cooperate. Consequently Police is doing it in isolation.

iii. FIRs AGAINST UNKNOWN SUSPECTS Public seems afraid to name terrorists in FIRs. Therefore, it’s a challenge for the police to trace a case registered against unknown criminals.

iv. SHORTAGE OF MANPOWER Due to the shortage of manpower in investigation wing, the pace of the disposal is very slow. For example Adenzai circle (Dir Lower) having 03 Police Stations staffed with 01 IP, 03 SIs, 02 ASIs, 04 HCs and 06 Constables.

v. RELUCTANCE OF INVESTIGATORS It was learnt that IOs avoid to investigate high profile cases as they were threatened by certain militant groups. SHO Habib Zaman was killed in a funeral prayer of DSP Javed Iqbal for investigating certain high profile cases. Furthermore, the

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investigation staff was not found enthusiastic regarding the disposal of pending cases of terrorism.

vi. INVESTIGATION KITS Majority of the police stations have the Investigation kits but the staff was found reluctant to use these kits.

vii. LACK OF KNOWLEDGE REGARDING EXPLOSIVES The majority of investigators and Moharrar staff are not trained regarding the storage of explosive and IEDs as case properties.

viii. DATA OF STOLEN/SNATCHED VEHICLES Non-availability of data regarding stolen and snatched vehicles hampers the pace of investigation.

ix. SHANAKHT PARADE (IDENTITIFICATION PARADE) While going through the files of investigation, it was observed that initially the cases of terrorism were registered against unknown accused but later in certain cases the IOs traced the names of accused. According to article 22 of Qanoon-e-Shahadat, 1984 and 26-32 of Police Rules, 1934 identification is an important procedure which is not being carried out by the IOs.

x. COLLECTION & PRESERVATION OF EVIDENCE Its observed that majority of investigation officers had the experience of investigation of cases like murder, theft, robbery and hurt etc. therefore majority of them do not realize: a) The importance of evidence in cases of terrorism b) Timely collection, preservation & dispatch of evidence

xi. COST OF DNA TEST The investigators revealed that they are confronting shortage of money. As the Lab management demands advance payment of Rs 12000/- for each test.

xii. NON AVAILABILITY OF FORENSIC LABORTARY AT DIVISIONAL LEVEL The non-availability of forensic lab at divisional level hampers the pace and disposal of the cases.

xiii. LESS NUMBER OF ANTI TERRORIST COURTS

In January-2010, the Provincial Government increased the number of Anti-Terrorism Courts from one to three. It’s worth mentioning that one ATC had been functional since July-2002 in Swat. One ATC for District Swat and another for District Malakand

21

have been notified but not yet functional. Recently, advertisement has been published in the dailies to recruit staff for the remaining Anti Terrorism Courts.

xiv. PROSECUTION

At provincial level, prosecution service is being headed by a Director General. Earlier prosecution service was working under the Law Department but now functioning under the Home Department. The shortage of prosecution staff can be estimated with the fact that in District Swat alone total 28 courts are functional but only 08 Public Prosecutors are posted. Presently only one Public Prosecutor is posted at ATC, Swat.

xv. SECURITY OF ACCUSED /TERRORISTS As the anti-terrorist courts are located in Swat and Malakand Districts. Therefore, the accused in these cases have to be transported from Dir Upper, Dir Lower, Chitral, Shangla & Buner to Malakand and Swat. Such exercise is not only costly but also a risky affair.

xvi. INSUFFICIENT FUND FOR ADVERTIZEMENTS WITH INFORMATION DEPARTMENT

The majority of Investigation Officers (of terrorism cases) expressed that they have completed their process but that is subject to the publication of advertisements in the Newspapers known as “ISHTIHAR ROPOSHI”. The IOs stated that the administration of information department justifies non-publication due to the non-availability of funds. Therefore, the cases cannot be challaned without publication.

xvii. FREQUENT TRANSFER OF INVESTIGATORS In majority of criminal cases police officers are summoned by the courts to appear as witness but frequent transfers and postings have profound impact on the delay of the judicial process. In case of retirement of police officer they are also summoned and they face problem regarding payment of TA/DA. It’s suggested that funds for such purpose be made available at the disposal of court who will disburse the amount.

xviii. TENURE OF NAIB COURTS In newly introduced Judicial Policy the tenure of Naib courts has been reduced up to 3 months. Naib Court is actually a facilitator and coordinator. Reduced tenure also affected the working of the courts. Minimum suggested tenure may be one year.

xix. SHORTAGE OF TRANSPORT

The investigation wing is facing acute shortage of vehicles at their disposal. For example, the investigation wing of District Buner has only four mobiles for 09 Police Stations.

xx. NON-AVAILABILITY OF LOCKUPS The investigation staff suggested the provision of lockups at the disposal of

Investigation staff.

22

SPECIAL BRANCH The prime job of the special branch is to collect, communicate and share information with concerned quarters but according to the impression derived from conversation with senior officers, special branch was found reluctant to share information during militancy .Theoretically, it shall play an effective proactive role but it failed to fetch authentic information to the district police. Even after the operations there is lack of coordination between these two units which can be understood from the fact that during employment drive of Special Police Force there was some communication gap needs to be plugged immediately. It was learnt that the master mind of attack on the under training officials at Mingora police station namely Anwer Khaliq got himself enrolled as member of Special Police Force. This speaks about the flaws in the system as the need for security clearance was compromised. The special branch in Malakand Region is understaffed. Presently in different ranks sanctioned posts are 61 while posted personnel are 70. Furthermore, in Special Branch Malakand Region there is no sanctioned post of Inspector.

MANPOWR OF SPECIAL BRANCH

District DSP IP SI ASI HC FC TOTAL

S P S P S P S P S P S P S P D/E

Swat - 1 - 1 1 5 1 - 11 5 - 4 13 16 +3

Dir Lower - - - 1 1 2 - - 8 5 - 1 9 9 0

Dir Upper 1 1 - 1 2 3 - - 6 8 2 1 11 14 +3

Buner - - - 1 2 3 1 - 6 5 1 2 10 11 +1

Shangla - - - - 1 1 - - 3 3 3 3 7 7 0

Chitral - - - 1 1 1 - 2 10 9 - - 11 13 +2

Total 1 2 0 5 8 15 2 2 44 35 6 11 61 70 +9

D Deficiency (-)

E Excess (+) BOMB DISPOSAL SQUAD It’s surprising that the BDS unit of entire region is having only 14 personnel. District Shangla even does not have BDS unit. Upper Dir, Buner and Shangla are without Walk-Through gates. On the other hand Buner, Dir Lower and Shangla are also functioning without explosive detectors.

District Staff Walk-Through gate

Explosive detector + Exploner GT 200

Metal detector

Bomb Suit

Mine detector

Water canon gun

x-ray machine

Swat 3 4 2 + 1 50 1 4 1 (cartridge

not available) 1

Buner 4 - - 3 - - - -

Dir Lower 3 1 - 38 - - - -

Upper Dir 4 - 1 7 - - - -

Shangla - - - - - - - -

G. Total 14 14 4 32 1 4 1 1

23

WOMEN POLICE

Capacity building of women police is need of the hour as their presence during Nakabandi, search and interrogation is mandatory. During recent recruitment, 57 vacancies were advertised. In response, only 27 applicants expressed their interest. Finally only 20 were selected.

District DSP IP SI ASI HC Const Total

S P D S P D S P D S P D S P D S P D S P D

Swat - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 30 21 9 30 21 9

Dir Lower

- - - - - - - - - - - - 1 1 - 21 1 20 22 2 20

Upper Dir

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - 20 3 17 20 3 17

Bunir - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 0 6 6 0 6 +6

Shangla - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 9 4 5 9 4 5

Chitral - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 - 1 22 22 0 22 22 0

G.Total (Present) 2 1 1 103 58

* S – sanctioned * P- Present * D- Deficiency In Malakand Region there are 103 sanctioned posts for female police officers while on ground only 58 are available. Regarding senior ranks there is no sanctioned post in the ranks of DSP, IP, SI and ASI. Having comparison of gender representation (in rank of constable) in Malakand Region, male represents 99.24% and female presence is merely 0.76 %. CAPACITY BUILDING & PROVISION OF MODERN GEDGETS Presently Malakand Region has no training institution/school. Recently 2436 police constables and 5215 SPF have been enlisted in different districts of Malakand Region. Merely recruitment or increase in the manpower may enhance the visibility on the road but it will not serve the real purpose of prevention and detection of crime and terrorism. The on ground situation is very challenging as militants have dedicated, highly trained people having access to modern means of communication and transportation. Until & unless we build the capacity and equip the available strength, it will be difficult to curb the menace of terrorism for good.

24

BUILDINGS Malakand Region consists of 61 police stations and 73 police posts. Before operations there were 45 police stations but in the post-operations phase 16 new police stations have been added. 51 police stations are functioning in official buildings while 10 are operational in rented facilities. During militancy 06 police stations were totally destroyed. Twenty-three (23) police stations are in poor condition which need expansion or reconstruction. Surprisingly, 10 police stations are without Lockups. Out of 51 police stations the lockups of 09 police stations were found in poor conditions. Police Lines is regarded the nucleus of police establishment in a district. Police Lines Swat and Dir Lower are old establishments need expansion specially the construction of new barracks. Police Lines in Upper Dir is functional in old building of the hostels of Govt. Degree College and in Shangla it’s functional in an old building of a factory. The Police Lines Buner is temporarily working in two rooms while Police Lines Chitral also needs reconstruction and expansion.

POLICE STATIONS & POLICE POSTS

S# DISTRICT NAME OF

POLICE STATION BUILDING

TELEPHONIC FACILITY

LOCKUP POLICE POST

1

UPPER DIR

Wari

Functional in old building of sub-jail New building is under construction

Yes Yes Akhgram

2 Jagam Rented building. Established as PS in Nov. 2009

Yes Yes -

3 Gandigar

Rented building (insecure). During militancy the militants attacked the PS.The construction of new building was included in ADP of 2007 but later it was dropped from the plan.

Yes Yes -

4 Dir Functional in C & W building. Yes Yes Chukian / Miana

5 Barawal

Functional in a fort of Former Nawab of Dir. The accommodation is not enough for constabulary; however two new rooms have been constructed recently.

Yes Yes (Poor condition)

Shahikot

6 Sheringal Newly constructed but not based on the approved map provided by the Central Police Office.

Yes Yes -

7 Kalkot

Functional in the part of the fort of former Nawab of Dir. Recently two rooms & accommodation for the SHO has been constructed.

Yes No Thall/Patrak

8 Police Lines

Housed in an old building of college hostels. The construction of boundary wall is in progress.

No -

25

1

BUNER

Said Muhammad Shaheed Daggar

Govt. Building Yes Yes

PP Bagra PP Budial PP Torwarsak PP Gokand PP Daggar Kali

2 PIr Baba Govt. Building (partially destroyed)

Yes Yes -

3 Totalai Old state building (Govt.) Yes Yes -

4 Nawagai Old state building (Govt.) Yes Yes -

5 Gagra

It was newly constructed building not yet occupied by the police. Completely destroyed by the militants. Presently functioning in two quarters of BHU Gagra

No No PP Sawrai

6 Jowar

It was functional in an old Govt. Building, also destroyed during the wave of militancy. Presently functional in a rented building

No No PP Leganai PP Nansair PP Katkala

7 Batara (Non-Functional)

Rented No No PP Shahidasar

8 Chinglai (Non-functional)

Demolished during insurgency. Now it has been planned to be made operational in the building of education department.

No No -

9 Nagral (Non-functional)

Ex-State Tehsil Building No No PP Charorai

10 Police Lines Functional in two rooms temporarily

Yes - -

1

SHANGLA

Alpuri

Housed in an old building of Ex-state (Wali-i-Swat) 02 rooms have been recently constructed.

Yes Yes PP Karora PP Olandar

2 Bisham Constructed by Kohistan Development Board (KDB) in 1974

Yes Yes -

3 Chakisar Govt. Building without boundary wall (insecure)

Yes Yes -

4 Aloch Newly constructed Govt. Building Yes Yes -

5 Martung

Presently functional in old two rooms of Ex-state. Its without boundary wall (highly insecure)

NO (Wireless Comm. Is

weak)

NO (accused

are kept in the Lockup of PS Aloch)

-

6 Karora (not functional yet)

Old Govt. Building of Police Post NO No -

26

7 Police Lines Functional in an old building of a factory. Construction of new barracks is need of the hour.

Yes -

1

DIR LOWER

PS Ouch

Building was destroyed during the wave of militancy. Presently functional in the building of PP Kharkani

Yes Yes -

2 PS Chakdara Newly constructed. Govt. Building Yes Yes PP Khadagzai PP Batwan

3 PS Asbanr Functional in the building of a Police Post.

Yes Yes PP Sarbala

4 PS Talash Newly constructed Govt. Building Yes Yes -

5 PS Timargara Govt. Building Yes Yes -

6 PS Balambut Govt. Building Yes Yes PP Hayasari PP Lajbuk (Not functional yet)

7 PS Lal Qila Govt. Building Yes Yes -

8 PS Zaimdara Functional in a BHU Building NO

NO (accused

are kept in Lockup of

PS Lal Qila)

PP Gal

9 PS Khal Govt. Building Yes Yes PP Rabat

10 PS Munda Govt. Building Yes Yes PP Munda Bazar

11 PS Mayar Newly constructed Govt. Building Yes Yes PP Sangi Para

12 PS Samar bagh Newly constructed Govt. Building Yes Yes PP Shahi (Not functional)

Police Lines Construction of new barracks is recommended

Yes -

1

SWAT

PS Ghaligay Govt. Building Yes Yes

PP Landakay PP Gammon Bridge PP Karakar

2 PS Shamozo Rented building NO Yes

Temporary -

3 PS Kabal Govt. Building Yes Yes PP Dewli

4 PS Kanju Rented building NO Yes

Temporary PP Mamdhari

5 PS Kalam Govt. Building NO Yes -

6 PS Khursheed Khan Shaheed

Govt. Building Yes Yes PP Miandam PP Upper Topsin PP Chamtali

7 PS Madyan Govt. Building Yes Yes -

8 PS Bahrain Govt. Building. Needs expansion NO Yes PP Kolalai

9 PS Matta Govt. Building Yes Yes PP Shakar Darra PP Shawar

10 PS Chuprial Rented NO Yes

Temporary -

27

11 PS Mingora

As a result of two car bomb blasts and one suicide attack the building was completely demolished. Presently functional in a primary school.

Yes Yes

(Temporary)

PP Malookabad PP Sangota PP Shingrai PP Yakh Tangi PP Shah Darra PP Banr PP Labour Colony PP Panr PP Kokari

12 PS Rahimabad Demolished by the militants. Temporarily housed in a Grid Station.

Yes Yes

Temporary PP Balogram PP Ingaro Dherai

13 PS Saidu Sharif Govt. Building Yes Yes PP Kokrai PP Afsarabad

14 PS Charbagh Rented NO Yes

Temporary PP Golibagh

15 PS Malamjabba Rented NO Yes

Temporary -

16 PS Kalakot Rented NO Yes

Temporary -

17 Police Lines

It has the capacity to accommodate approx. 200 people. Presently, these barracks are occupied by the officers and Jawans of FRP and FC. The recently, recruited recruits (approx. 700) are housed in 85 tents. There are 24 bath rooms, which reflects that at the avg. 38 officials have access to 01 bath room.

1

CHITRAL

PS Chitral Official (old building) Accommodation is not enough

Yes Yes -

2 PS Ayun Official (old building) Accommodation is not enough

Yes Yes PP Bamburate PP Gahirate

3 PS Drosh Official (old building) Yes Yes

PP Asharait PP Ursoon PP Jinjratekoh PP Kalash PP Lawari Tunnel

4 PS Arandu Newly constructed. Yes Yes PP Arandu Gool

5 PS Lotkoh Newly constructed Yes Yes PP Begusht PP Parabag

6 PS Koghozi Functional in the building of PP. Needs expansion.

NO

NO (accused

are kept in PS Chitral)

PP Barnais

7 PS Shahgoor Functional in the building of PP. Needs expansion.

NO

NO (accused

are kept in PS Lotkoh)

PP Sufait Arkari

8 PS Boni Newly constructed Yes Yes PP Sonoghor PP Reshum

28

VEHICLES

During militancy 19 vehicles were damaged and 16 snatched. After the operations, 117 new vehicles have been provided to the region. Presently, 262 vehicles and 93 Motor Cycles are available. There is an acute shortage of drivers as presently only 107 drivers are serving in the region. The rest of shortage has been managed but such stop gap arrangements will deteriorate the newly purchased fleet of vehicles.

Description Car Jeep Van Pick-

up Bus/ Truck

P/ Van

Amb: APC Water Tanker

Fire Tender

Total M/

Cycle

Grand Total

Before Military operation

3 16 1 124 14 5 8 0 0 0 171 82 253

Vehicles issued after military operation

0 2 0 78 16 0 3 15 1 2 117 20 137

Total 3 18 1 202 30 5 11 15 1 2 288 102 390

Snatched - 1 - 9 - - 1 - - - 11 5 16

Damaged - - - 15 - - - - - - 15 4 19

Present Total 3 17 1 178 30 5 10 15 1 2 262 93 355

(Telecommunication wing Frontier Police)

9 PS Mastuj

The building of PS Mastuj was cracked in earth quack of Oct. 2008 which was declared dangerous therefore, demolished. Housed in a portion of another Govt. Building.

Yes Yes

PP Herchine PP Mera Garam No.2 PP Yarkhoon Lasht

10 PS Mulkoh Newly constructed Yes Yes PP Oveer PP Terich

11 PS Torkoh Newly constructed Yes Yes PP Khot PP Rech

12

Police Lines

Constructed Kacha on self help basis. It developed cracks in Oct. 2008 earthquake. Strength stationed in tents & rented quarters.

Yes

29

FLEET OF VEHICLES

District Car Jeep Van Pick-

up Bus/ Truck

P/Van Amb: APC Water Tanker

Fire Tender

Total M/Cycle Grand Total

Swat Before operation 3 5 1 36 2 2 3 0 0 0 52 24 76

After operation 0 2 0 32 4 0 1 8 1 1 49 18 67

Dir Lower

Before operation 0 3 0 19 2 1 2 0 0 0 27 17 44

After operation 0 0 0 9 3 0 0 1 1 0 14 0 14

Upper Dir

Before operation 0 2 0 19 2 1 1 0 0 0 25 11 36

After operation 0 0 0 4 2 0 0 1 0 0 7 0 7

Chitral Before operation 0 5 0 19 5 0 1 0 0 0 30 13 43

After operation 0 0 0 10 2 0 0 0 0 0 12 0 12

Buner Before operation 0 1 0 17 2 1 2 0 0 0 23 12 35

After operation 0 0 0 16 2 0 0 5 0 0 23 1 24

Shangla Before operation 0 0 0 16 1 0 0 0 0 0 17 6 23

After operation 0 0 0 7 3 0 0 0 0 0 11 0 11

(Telecommunication wing Frontier Police) ARMS After having a look on the quantity of available pistols, it was learnt that 505 pistols of different bore are available for 584 posted Upper Subordinates in the five affected districts. The militants are armed with sophisticated weapons but Malakand police still possesses 2953 rifles 303 Bore. The weapons of obsolete bore shall be replaced with latest weapons.

Type of Arms Swat L/Dir U/Dir Buner Shangla Total

Pistol 30 Bore 36 23 7 3 4 73

Pistol 9 MM 75 70 47 37 28 257

Pistol 9MM Glock 17 80 30 20 15 10 155

Pistol P7 0 8 7 5 0 20

Rifle 303 Bore All Marks 1546 1374 0 0 0 2920

303 B Bren Gun 13 13 7 0 0 33

Bullet proof jackets 1650 429 381 362 205 3027

Ballistic helmet 1450 850 750 700 470 4220

Rifle 7.62 B China 3076 781 558 760 743 5918

Rifle G3 A3 143 93 87 87 50 460

SMG 7.62 Bore 2250 1322 857 871 649 5949

SMG 7.62 Confisc ated 160 581 124 138 33 1036

MP 5 A2.9 MM 111 115 105 90 28 449

MP 5 A3 9 MM 5 0 0 0 5 10

9 MM Sten Gun 40 18 6 4 6 74

LMG 7.62 China 50 20 16 11 9 106

(Logistics wing Frontier Police)

COMMUNICATION During the wave of militancy 93 base sets, 69 Mobile sets, 149 Pocket Phone, 04 HF sets, 66 Batteries (12 volt) , 29 Generators and 05 Repeaters were destroyed or looted by the terrorists

30

and criminals. Such incidents badly affected the communication network. 42 police stations have telephonic connection while 19 police stations are functional without telephonic facility. During my visit the following were observed:-

i. The mobile of PS Ouch District Dir Lower was found without wireless set.

ii. The wireless communication is not secure as the frequency had been intercepted by the terrorists.

iii. The connectivity of wireless communication was found weak particularly in

the areas of Gokand, Gulbandai, Kingargali, Nagrai & Chinglai of District Buner. It was also observed that 16 vehicles were without mobile wireless sets.

Description District

Base Set

Mobile Set

Pocket Phone

(PP) HF Set

Battery 12 Volt

Generator Repeater

Communication Equipments held before militancy

Swat 45 76 168 2 43 14 1

Buner 30 21 75 1 18 8 1

Dir Lower 20 37 73 1 27 7 1

Dir Upper 17 40 54 1 11 6 1

Shangla 21 27 50 1 22 6 1

Communication Equipments destroyed/ Misplaced during militancy

Swat 27 32 82 1 23 10 1

Buner 29 10 38 1 12 2 1

Dir Lower 6 12 15 0 15 5 1

Dir Upper 13 8 2 1 0 6 1

Shangla 18 7 12 1 16 6 1

Communication Equipments provided after the operation

Swat 13 40 110 1 13 5 0

Buner 4 2 28 0 29 0 0

Dir Lower 0 5 8 0 8 0 0

Dir Upper 0 4 5 0 3 0 0

Shangla 0 3 16 0 3 0 0

G. Total 243 324 736 11 243 75 10

(Telecommunication department Frontier Police)

31

COMMUNITY POLICING JIRGA The local people have emotional attachment with the institution of Jirga. They have little faith in procedural formalities of the prevailing criminal justice system. They regard police station as a place where a Jirga can effectively decide certain disputes. They believe in quick disposal of their problems and issues and do not have the capacity to pay the fee of advocates. 2. Jirga is a judicial institution in Pakhtoons based on customs & traditions which has far reaching effects on Pakhtoons community. It’s an assembly of elders likely Khans, Malaks and Tribal Chiefs. In other words it’s an essence of real democracy in Pakhtoons where every individual has the authority of self expression. Sitting in a circle, the Jirga has no chairman, convener, speaker & secretary. All are equal and have equal right of saying. Generally, Jirga is not convened but rather is called for when issue or dispute arises. 3. All types of cases, criminal, civil disputes, conflict between groups, tribes and individuals are being decided in Jirga. At the start “Waak” (authority) is entrusted by both the parties to decide the case according to its best judgement. While passing the judgement of a case, the Jirga also keeping in view the Narkh (precedence). The aggrieved party has the right of “Maraka” (appeal) For ceasefire between the worried parties “Tiga” literally a stone, is being placed, on which both the parties are forced to abide by the decision. In case of violation by any party, punishments likely confiscation, burning of house and imposing of heavy fines etc. are being awarded in accordance with the nature, significance and sensitivity of the case. There is a saying that “what is not resolved in Jirga will be decided in carnage”. 4. The people believe in speedy justice which they considered is to be possible only through Jirga. The essence of the concept of conciliatory committees is based upon the practice and institution of Jirga. i. CONCILIATORY (MUSALIHATEE) COMMITTEES IN DIR LOWER It’s worth appreciation that such committees are effectively contributing for quick disposal of petty disputes between two parties. This act improves the image of police. While constituting these committees, following criteria has been adopted:-

a. Minimum age 35 years b. Member shall not be a convict from any court. c. Member shall be literate/educated. d. Enjoys good repute. e. No political affiliation.

2. The head of the committee is coordinator assisted by Deputy Coordinator. No member can present his name for the head of the committee. The Coordinators are elected by secret vote. His election is for three months. 3. During the visits of different police stations the police officials and the public appreciated the formation of these committees. In all police stations a separate room has been designated as office of these committees. 4. Its worth appreciation that retired officers from different departments like SP (Rtd.) Haq Nawaz Khan, DSP (Rtd.) Raheem Khan, Mr. Qadir Khan, former Principal, SP (Rtd.) Alamzeb Khan,

32

DSP (Rtd.) Muhammad Rafiq, Mr. Hanif Ullah, Press reporter, Mr. Anwar-ud-Din, Press reporter and Mr. Abdul Rehman, retired Director Education are playing very effective role to bridge the gap between public and police. 5. However, Its matter of grave concern that female folk is totally found absent in its composition.

SPECIAL POLICE FORCE (SPF)

In 2008, IGP NWFP introduced the concept of Community Police named as Special Police Force. This is the first ever experience after the promulgation of Police Order 2002. In fact its essence has been derived from PO 2002.The talent has been hired from the same community. Hiring of local talent to provide security to neighbourhoods, towns, and villages sends a positive signal to the local population. Article 29 of PO 2002 highlighted the importance and need of the appointment of Special Police. Article 133 of PO 2002 empowered DPOs to have control over village watchmen and special police officers. 2. The recruitment of SPF is for 2 years contract, each constable receives fixed salary of Rs. 10,000/- per month. RECRUITMENT CRITERIA:-

a. Age 22- 44 years b. Education : Not essential, may be literate c. Physical standard: Medically fit d. Domicile Local District

UNIFORM Black Shilwar Qameez. MANDATE To assist the police in operations (watch & ward duties), they cannot function independently. SECRUITY VETTING & TRAINING OF SPF The enlistment of SPF was made in limited time. Therefore, the probability of the enlistment of bad characters or criminals was also there. However, after the death of the mastermind of Mingora Police Station suicide case in an encounter with law enforcement agency the police administration is paying serious attention towards security vetting. It was learnt that the criteria of local domicile was not followed religiously while enlisting the SPF constables (in one of the districts of Malakand Region). 2. The enlistment of SPF tremendously improved the visibility of police in these affected areas consequently enhanced the public trust and confidence in police. The management of Malakand police tried its level best to build the capacity of SPF but more attention is needed in this regard.

33

STRENGTH OF SPF

District Sanctioned Present Deficiency

Swat 3225 2604 -621

Buner 800 597 -203

Shangla 800 664 -136

Dir Lower 1050 750 -300

Upper Dir 650 600 -50

Total 6525 5215 -1310

DISTRICT PUBLIC SAFETY COMMISSIONS In 2003, the Provincial Government constituted DPCs in Dir Lower , Dir Upper, Buner, Swat and Shangla. After the completion of the tenure of District Governments, these bodies are no more functional. PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OR DE-WEAPONIZATION During the visit of village Bandai, Maidan, Dir Lower, it was observed that community was apprehensive as they had the impression that probably the government wants to collect weapons from the common people. On the other hand, community suggested that government shall encourage the common people to devise self defence mechanism for this goal they need more weapons. Such move will enhance proliferation of weapons in the society. The positive aspect of the visit of the area was that people were found very enthusiastic regarding self defence of their areas.

34

PRISONS DISTRICT PRISON DIR LOWER This prison was established on 1st of November, 1990. Prisoners from Upper Dir, Shangla, Bunir and Malakand Districts are also kept here. During the visit it was observed that 63 militants are being confined in this jail. During the insurgency Maulana Khalid and his followers established their own administration within the jail. They did not allow the prison staff to move inside the barracks. After the posting of new jail Superintendent, a search operation was carried out during the search two pistols, 13 grenades and 13 mobile telephones were recovered. Before this operation, a Public Call Office (PCO) was functional with prime objective to provide facility to the inmates. This facility was misused by the confined terrorists therefore, it was also closed down. The juvenile section of the jail was found well disciplined, having the facilities of a small TV set and indoor games.

Capacity Present Over crowded

Male Female Juvenile Male Female Juvenile Male Female Juvenile

240 10 20 382 12 16 +142 +2 -4

PRISON STAFF DIR LOWER OBSERVATOINS

a. The district jail Dir Lower is located on the main road. Therefore, there are certain security threats. Furthermore, from another side the hill tops are nearby that exposes the inmates to the external threats. During the visit, I learnt that in year 1996 a rival of an inmate targeted him from the hill top consequently, the inmate was seriously injured.

b. Surprisingly, the prison security staff was still found equipped with 303 bore (Mark4) rifle on the other hand the terrorists/criminals are equipped with sophisticated weapons.

c. District jail Dir Lower having deficiency of 22 security guards.

d. For district jail Dir Lower only Rs. 67000/- has been allocated under the head of Medical. If we assume the average number of inmates as 410, the per head allocation is approximately Rs. 163/- per annum. Therefore, it is recommended that realistic allocation be made.

TITLE STRENGTH

Superintendent Jail 1

Deputy Superintendent Jail 1

Assistant Superintendent Jail 2

Senior Clerk 1

Junior Clerk 2

Dispenser 1

35

SUB JAIL DAGAR BUNER This jail was established on 01-07-1992. Like district jail Dir Lower, it was also found over crowded. Security of this facility is also a major concern.

Capacity 145

Present 284

Over crowded +139

DISTRICT JAIL SAIDU SHARIF (SWAT) The building was erected during the era of Wali-i-Swat. The building has been declared as condemned. After the earthquake of October-2005 C & W declared it dangerous consequently, the prisoners were shifted to jails of Dir Lower and Buner. In order to create convenience for the appearance in the courts, three barracks were repaired. Again in 2007, C & W declared it dangerous. In 2008, its building material was auctioned for Rs. 35, 00000/-. Presently, prisoners from Swat are being kept in other districts. AVERAGE DAILY PRODUCTION & NEW ADMISSION

Detail Daily Average

Production of inmates in courts 35

New Admission 15 ( Dir Lower & Buner)

OBSERVATIONS

i. According to the plan it will be reconstruction. It means it will be constructed on the same old pattern and design. It is recommended that a Juvenile section and enhanced security features be incorporated in the reconstruction plan.

ii. The non-availability of a functional jail is a source of greater inconvenience for the relatives

of inmates as they have to travel from Swat to Dir Lower or Buner.

iii. To transport inmates from other districts to the courts of Swat is a costly affair, it increases the POL cost of district police.

iv. Such frequent transportation is very risky.

v. Sometimes the courts order immediate production of prisoners on ZAMEMA-B but owing to the physical distances the production on the same day is not possible that is another source of delay in the hearings of the cases.

vi. The release orders of the courts also reach with delay. Consequently, the release of

prisoners is also delayed.

36

DISTRICT JAIL UPPER DIR District Jail Upper Dir is a small jail. It’s not over crowded but is insecure as :-

a. Its without boundary wall b. from hill tops everything is visible within the jail

Following is the detail regarding capacity and presence of inmates:-

Capacity Present

Male Female Juvenile Male Female Juvenile

60 Nil 6 9 - -

PRISON STAFF UPPER DIR

TITLE STRENGTH

Superintendent Jail 1

Assistant Superintendent Jail 1

Head Warden 2

Female Warden 2

Clerk 1

Teacher 1

Dispenser 1

Sweeper 2

37

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. A police training school be established in Malakand Region. 2. A forensic facility be planned and established at divisional level. However, a mobile

forensic lab be immediately provided. 3. Organizational revamping of special branch is strongly recommended. At divisional level

it shall be headed by Superintendent of Police or its operational control be given to the DIG Region. A software be designed and updated information data bank to be maintained.

4. BDS Swat was found well equipped but expansion in this unit is strongly suggested. Establishment of BDS at Shangla and capacity building of BDS staff is recommended on war footings.

5. Protective kits to be provided to all officials working in BDS. 6. Capacity building of Investigation and Moharrar staff regarding storage and handling of

explosives and IEDs is essential. 7. Capacity building regarding the use of gadgets like Walk-through gates, explosive

detectors, metal detectors, Investigation kits, gas guns, use of digital and video cameras, use of grenades and preventive techniques to avoid damages in suicide attacks are suggested to be planned and imparted.

8. Annual Practice Fire to be carried out religiously. 9. More dedicated talent be posted in investigation.

10. Tenure for the posting in investigation wing be fixed and respected. 11. In Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs) their performance regarding quality, disposal and

progress of the investigation be made the assessment criteria. 12. The induction of specialized talent in the field of investigation be encouraged. For this

purpose, the services of the lawyers, Doctors, Computer & Forensic experts be hired. 13. It is suggested that section 19(10) of ATA, 1997 relating to publication of proclamation

of offenders in national dallies for absconding accused in terrorism cases may be relaxed ; or more funds may be allocated under this head.

14. Updated data of stolen/snatched vehicles may be made available at sub-divisional level. 15. In order to register the NCP vehicles, the government may announce the amnesty

scheme. It will not only provide convenience to the law enforcement agencies but also be a source of huge revenue for the government. Temporarily NCP vehicles be registered in all Police Stations of Malakand Region and a complete data bank be maintained.

16. Monthly coordination meeting of Criminal Justice Coordination Committee (CJCC) shall be carried out regularly.

17. Owing to present security threats, it is need of the hour to mount CCTV Cameras at the main entrance, boundary wall and barracks of the prisons.

18. The provision of metal detectors and walk-through gates will ensure the safety and security of inmates.

19. The possession of arms and mobile telephones speaks either of inefficiency or the involvement of jail staff in corrupt practices. Therefore, it is strongly recommended that an inquiry is to be carried out to dig out the actual facts regarding any involvement. Phase wise transfer of staff and inmates to other jails is strongly recommended.

20. Keeping in view the presence of the dozens of militants in this jail, it is strongly recommended that they shall be transferred to different jails in the province.

21. In order to improve the living of juvenile and to enhance their educational and technical capacity, a plan be worked out with reputed NGOs and Government Departments.

22. As per essence of Pakistan Prison Rules (PPR), a central jail shall be established at Divisional level. Therefore, establishment of a central jail is strongly recommended.

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23. The procurement and installation of CCTV Cameras, metal detectors, walk-through gates for all prisons is strongly recommended.

24. The installation of search lights on the boundary walls will enhance the security level. 25. Often due to load-shedding electricity is off even for days, darkness in the barracks can

be a source of embarrassment for the administration of jail. Therefore, facility of generators in prisons is strongly recommended.

26. Only one Dispenser and a weekly visit of Doctor is not enough. Therefore, creation of a post of a Medical Officer and a functional dispensary at all prisons is strongly recommended.

27. The establishment of separate Juvenile section is recommended for sub jail Buner. 28. Two more prisoners vans be provided to district Swat for the transportation of accused

arrested in the cases of terrorism. 29. Establishment of Public Call Office (PCO) in Jails shall not be permitted. 30. In order to improve the gender balance in Malakand, it is imperative that the Police

administration shall create conducive working environment for the female. Fresh female recruitment campaign in different ranks may be launched. In this regard support of the community particularly of elected representatives, NGOs and educational institutions be attained. Posts of female police officers in the ranks of DSP, IP, SI & ASI be sanctioned.

31. Representation of female in conciliatory committees be considered. 32. Capacity building of drivers is strongly recommended for this purpose the frontier police

shall arrange drivers training courses at PTC Hangu and also seek the cooperation of NH & MP.

33. For the enrolment of SPF the minimum education standard shall be middle pass. 34. The recruitment on 1310 vacant posts of SPF be completed at earliest. 35. Security clearance /vetting of newly recruited police officials and SPF be immediately

referred to special branch, IB and other intelligence agencies. 36. Disciplinary Rules for SPF be drafted. 37. Police Stations defence mechanism is to be designed keeping in view the geographical

situation and the security threats. 38. Standardization of Police Lines buildings is also recommended. 39. The law enforcement agencies shall adopt zero tolerance policy towards petty crime and

traffic violations. 40. In the light of recent losses incurred by Malakand Police, the NWFP police welfare rules

be revised as the DPOs do not have amount at their disposal to look after the injured officials. Therefore, it is suggested that at least Rs. 50,000 be made available at the disposal of each DPO.

41. After the operation Malakand police received 117 vehicles therefore, enhancement of fuel ceiling is strongly recommended.

42. Standardization and quality of Uniform articles is strongly suggested. The model of National Highways & Motorway Police may be followed.

43. Capacity building of the Levis Force in Malakand District is also suggested.

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LEGAL REFERENCES CONSULTED i. Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 ii. Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 iii. Police Rules, 1934 iv. Qanoon-e-Shahadat, 1984 iv. Anti Terrorist Act, 1997 vi. Pakistan Prison Rules vii. Standing Order No. 16/2009, Issued by PPO, NWFP.

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ABBREVATIONS NWFP North West Frontier Province IGP Inspector General of Police PPO Provincial Police Officer DIG Deputy Inspector General AIG Assistant Inspector General DPO District Police Officer SSP Senior Superintendent of Police SP Superintendent of Police DSP Deputy Superintendent of Police DSP/L Deputy Superintendent of Police Legal IP Inspector Police SI Sub-Inspector ASI Assistant Sub-Inspector HC Head Constable DVR Driver C Constable NH & MP National Highways & Motorway Police SPF Special Police Force FC Frontier Constabulary FRP Frontier Reserve Police IB Intelligence Bureau EPF Elite Police Force PS Police Station PP Police Post PTC Police Training Centre IO Investigation Officer SHO Station House Officer LEA Law Enforcement Agency ATA Anti Terrorist Act, 1997 ATC Anti Terrorist Court PO-2002 Police Order-2002 DPCs District Public Safety Commissions Cr.Pc Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 PPC Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 PPR Pakistan Prison Rules FIR First Information Report U/S Under Section DG Director General DCO District Coordination Officer Eng. Engineer Sub.Maj Subidar Major NGOs Non-Governmental Organizations JUI Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam JI Jamait-i-Islami TNSM Tahreek Nifaz-i-Shariat-i-Muhammadi Avg. Average Sq.Km2 Square Kilometre TA Travelling Allowance DA Daily Allowance

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ACR Annual Confidential Report NCP Non-Custom Paid Amb. Ambulance POL Petrol Oil Liquid HF High Frequency BDS Bomb Disposal Squad PATA Provincially Administered Tribal Areas FCR Frontier Crime Regulation PWD Public Works Department C & W Communications & Works DNA Deoxeribo Nucleic Acid PCO Public Calls Office CJCC Criminal Justice Coordination Committee BHU Basic Health Unit ADP Annual Development Programme KDB Kohistan Development Board DOR District Officer Revenue IED Improvised Explosive Device CCTV Close Circuit Television

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Meetings Mr. Ibrahim Khan, Session Judge, Buner Mr. Idrees Khan, DIG Malakand Region Mr. Waqar Maroof, Additional Commissioner (Hqrs) Afghan Refugees Commissionerate, NWFP Mr.Mumtaz Zareen, DPO Dir Lower Mr. Ijaz Khan, SP Investigation, Swat Qazi Ghulam Farooq, DPO, Swat Mr. Falak Naz, DPO Buner Mr. Israr Bacha, SP Investigation Buner Mr Altaf Khan, Senior Civil Judge, Dir Lower Mr. Manzoor Qadir, Senior Civil judge, Buner Mr. Sahibzada Shah Jehan, Jail Superintendent, Dir Lower Mr. Saud Khan, Jail Superintendent, Buner Mr.Habib-ur-Rehman, DSP/HQ, Swat Mr.Mohammad Nawaz , DSP Shangla DSP Chakdara, Dir Lower Mr. Bakhat Raj (IP) Circle officer Investigation, Dir lower Mr. Wakeel Khan SHO PS Chakdara, Dir Lower Mr. Badshah, SHO PS Ouch, Dir Lower Mr. Taza Gul, Office Superintendent, DIG Malakand Region Telephonic Interviews Mr. Asim Imam, District & Session Judge, Anti Terrorist Court, Swat Mr. Akbar Khan, DG, Prosecution Service, NWFP Mr. Rauf Khan, DPO Dir Upper Mr. Qasim, SP/MT, Frontier Police Mr. Sakhi Khan, SP/Telecommunication, Frontier Police Mr. Jamsheed Khan, Public Prosecutor, ATC Court Swat. Mr. Bakht Akbar, Reader Judge, ATC, Swat.