criminal law i wednesdays and fridays asynmnt

8/11/2019 Criminal Law I Wednesdays and Fridays Asynmnt

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Criminal Law I Wednesdays and Fridays / 5:30-7:00 p.m. Silliman University College of Law 1st

Sem. 2014 ASSIGNMENT for June 18-20, 2014

ASSIGNED CASES

A. STATE AUTHORITY TO PUNISH CRIMES

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-11676 October 17, 1916

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,vs.

ANDRES PABLO,defendant-appellant.

Alfonso E. Mendoza for appellant.Attorney-General Avancea for appellee.

TORRES, J .:

At about noon of the 21st of October, 1915, Andres Pablo, a policeman of the municipality of

Balanga, went by order of his chief to the barrio of Tuyo to raid ajueteng game which, accordingto the information lodged, was being conducted in that place; but before the said officer arrivedthere the players, perhaps advised of his approach by a spy, left and ran away; however, on hisarrival at a vacant lot the defendant there found Francisco Dato and, at a short distance away, alow table. After a search of the premises he also found thereon a tambiolo(receptacle) and37 bolas (balls). Notwithstanding that the officer had seen the men Maximo Malicsi and AntonioRodrigo leave the said lot, yet, as at first he had seen no material proof that the game was beingplayed, he refrained from arresting them, and on leaving the place only arrested FranciscoDaro, who had remained there.

In reporting to his chief what had occurred, the policeman presented a memorandum containingthe following statement: "In the barrio of Tuyo I raided a jueteng na bilat game, seized

a tambiolo and bolas, and saw thecabecillas Maximo MAlicsi and Antonio Rodrigo and thegambler Francisco Dato. I saw the two cabecillas escape."

In consequence, chief of police Jose D. Reyes, on October 22, 1915, filed a complaint in thecourt of justice of the peace charging the said Rodrigo, Malicsi, and Dato with having gambledatjueteng, in violation of municipal ordinance No. 5. As a result of this complaint the accusedwere arrested, but were afterwards admitted to bail.


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At the hearing of the case Francisco Dato pleaded guilty. The other two accused, MaximoMalicsi and Antonio Rodrigo, pleaded not guilty; therefore, during the trial the chief of policepresented the memorandum exhibited by the policeman Andres Pablo, who testified under oaththat on the date mentioned he and Tomas de Leon went to the said barrio to raidajueteng game, but that before they arrived there they saw from afar that some persons startedto run toward the hills; that when witness and his companion arrived at a vacant lot they saw

Francisco Dato and a low table there, and the table caused them to suspect thatajueteng game was being carried on; that in fact they did find on one side of the lota tambiolo and 37 bolas, but that they did not see the accused Rodrigo and Malicsi on the saidlot, nor did they see them run; and that only afterwards did the witness learn that these latterwere the cabecillas or ringleaders in thejueteng game, from information given him by anunknown person. In view of this testimony by the police officer who made the arrest and of theother evidence adduced at the trial the court acquitted the defendants Antonio Rodrigo andMaximo Malicsi and sentenced only Francisco Dato, as a gambler.

Before the case came to trial in the justice of the peace court the policeman Andres Pablo hadan interview and conference with the accused Malicsi and ROdrigo in the house of ValentinSioson. On this occasion he was instructed not to testify against Malicsi and Rodrigo, and in fact

received through Gregorio Ganzon the sum of P5.

By reason of the foregoing and after making a preliminary investigation the provincial fiscal, onDecember 1, 1915, filed an information in the Court of First Instance of Bataan charging AndresPablo with the crime of perjury, under the provisions of section 3 of Act No. 1697. The followingis an extract from the complaint:

That on or about November 6, 1915, in the municipality of Balanga, Bataan, P.I., andwithin the jurisdiction of this court, the said accused, Andres Pablo, during the hearing inthe justice of the peace court of Balanga of the criminal cause No. 787, entitled theUnited States vs. Antonio Rodrigo and Maximo Malicsi, for violation of MunicipalOrdinance No. 5 of the municipality of Balanga, did, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously

affirm and swear in legal form before the justice of the peace court as follow: `We did notthere overtake the accused Antonio Rodrigo and Maximo Malicsi, nor did we even seethem run,' the said statement being utterly false, as the accused well knew that it was,and material to the decision of the said criminal cause No. 787, United States vs.

Antonio Rodrigo and Maximo Malicsi.An act committed with violation of law.

The case came to trial and on December 28, 1915, the court rendered judgment thereinsentencing the defendant to the penalty of two years' imprisonment, to pay a fine of P100 and,in case of insolvency, to the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment, and to pay the costs. Thedefendant was also disqualified from thereafter holding any public office and from testifying inthe courts of the Philippine Islands until the said disqualification should be removed. From this

judgment he appealed.

Francisco Dato, on testifying as a witness, said that when the policemen Andres Pablo andTomas de Leon arrived at the place where thejueteng was being played, they found thedefendant gamblers, Malicsi and Rodrigo; that, prior to the hearing of the case in the justice ofthe peace court, Malicsi and Rodrigo ordered him to call Andres Pablo, who, together withwitness, went to the house of Valentin Sioson, where they held a conference; that witnesspleaded guilty in the justice of the peace court, in fulfillment of his part of an agreement madebetween himself and his two coaccused, Malicsi and Rodrigo, who promised him that they


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would support his family during the time he might be a prisoner in jail; that Andres Pablo did notknow that they were gamblers, because he did not find them in the place where the game wasin progress, but that when witness was being taken to the municipal building by the policemenhe told them who the gamblers were who had run away and whom Andres Pablo could haveseen.

Maximo Malicsi corroborated the foregoing testimony and further stated that, on the arrival ofthe policemen who made the arrest and while they were looking for the tambiolo, he succeededin escaping; that Andres Pablo had known him for a long time and could have arrested him hadhe wished to do so; that prior to the hearing he and his codefendants, ROdrigo and Dato, did infact meet in the house of Valentin Sioson, on which occasion they agreed that they would givethe policemen Andres Pablo P20, provided witness and Rodrigo were excluded from thecharge; and that only P15 was delivered to the said Pablo, through Gregorio Ganzon. Thisstatement was corroborated by the latter, though he said nothing about what amount of moneyhe delivered to the policeman Pablo.

The defendant Andres Pablo testified under oath that, on his being asked by the justice of thepeace how he could have seen Maximo Malicsi and Antonio Rodrigo, he replied that he did not

see them at the place where the game was being conducted nor did he see them run away fromthere, for he only found the table, the tambiolo, thebolas, and Francisco Dato; that he did notsurprise the game because the players ran away before he arrived on the lot where, after fifteenminutes' search, he found only the tambiolo and the bolas; that on arriving at the place wherethe game was played, they found only Francisco Dato and some women in the Street, and asDato had already gone away, witness' companion, the policeman Tomas de Leon, got on hisbicycle and went after him; and that he found the tambiolo at a distance of about 6 meters froma low table standing on the lot.

From the facts above related, it is concluded that the defendant Andres Pablo, who pleaded notguilty, falsely testified under oath in the justice of the peace court of Balanga, Bataan, in sayinghe had not seen the alleged gamblers Maximo Malicsi and Antonio Rodrigo in the place where,

according to the complaint filed, the game of jueteng was being played and where the defendantand his companion, the policeman Tomas de Leon, had found a table, tambiolo and bolas, usedin the game ofjueteng, while it was proved at the trial that he did not them and did overtakethem while they were still in the place where the game was being played. But notwithstandinghis having seen them there, upon testifying in the cause prosecuted against these men andanother for gambling, he stated that he had not seen them there, knowing that he was not tellingthe truth and was false to the oath he had taken, and he did so willfully and deliberately onaccount of his agreement with the men, Malicsi and Rodrigo, and in consideration of a bribe ofP15 which he had received in payment for his false testimony he afterwards gave.

Francisco Dato and Gregorio Ganzon corroborated the assertion that the policeman AndresPablo undertook to exclude the gamblers, Malicsi and Rodrigo, from the charge and from histestimony in consideration for P15 which he received through Gregorio Ganzon.

Andres Pablo was charged with the crime of perjury and was afterwards convicted under ActNo. 1697, which (according to the principle laid down by this court in various decisions that arealready well-settled rules of law) repealed the provisions contained in articles 318 to 324 of thePenal Code relative to false testimony.


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By the second paragraph of the final section of the last article of the Administrative Code, or ActNo. 2657, there was repealed, among the other statutes therein mentioned, the said Act No.1697 relating to perjury, and the repealing clause of the said Administrative Code does not sayunder what other penal law in force the crime of false testimony, at least, if not that of perjury,shall be punished.

Under these circumstances, may the crime of perjury or of false testimony go unpunished, andis there no penal sanction whatever in this country for this crime? May the truth be freelyperverted in testimony given under oath and which, for the very reason that it may save a guiltyperson from punishment, may also result in the conviction and punishment of an innocentperson? If all this is not possible and is not right before the law and good morals in a society ofeven mediocre culture, it must be acknowledged that it is imperatively necessary to punish thecrime of perjury or of false testimony a crime which can produce incalculable and far-reaching harm to society and cause infinite disturbance of social order.

The right of prosecution and punishment for a crime is one of the attributes that by a natural lawbelongs to the sovereign power instinctively charged by the common will of the members ofsociety to look after, guard and defend the interests of the community, the individual and social

rights and the liberties of every citizen and the guaranty of the exercise of his rights.

The power to punish evildoers has never been attacked or challenged, as the necessity for itsexistence has been recognized even by the most backward peoples. At times the criticism hasbeen made that certain penalties are cruel, barbarous, and atrocious; at other, that they are lightand inadequate to the nature and gravity of the offense, but the imposition of punishment isadmitted to be just by the whole human race, and even barbarians and savages themselves,who are ignorant of all civilization, are no exception. lawphil.net

Notwithstanding that the said Act No. 1697 (which, as interpreted by this court in its decisions,was deemed to have repealed the aforementioned article of the Penal Code relating to falsetestimony, comprised within the term of perjury) did not expressly repeal the said articles of thePenal Code; and as the said final article of the Administrative Code, in totally repealing Act No.1697, does not explicitly provide that the mentioned articles of the Penal Code are alsorepealed, the will of the legislation not being expressly and clearly stated with respect to thecomplete or partial repeal of the said articles of the Penal Code, in the manner that it has totallyrepealed the said Act No. 1697 relating its perjury; and, furthermore, as it is imperative thatsociety punish those of its members who are guilty of perjury or false testimony, and it cannotbe conceived that these crimes should go unpunished or be freely committed withoutpunishment of any kind, it must be conceded that there must be in this country some prior,preexistent law that punishes perjury or false testimony.

There certainly are laws which deal with perjury or false testimony, like Law 7 et seq. of Title 2,third Partida.

However, since the Penal Code went into force, the crime of false testimony has been punishedunder the said articles of the said Code, which as we have already said, have not beenspecifically repealed by the said Act No. 1697, but since its enactment, have not been applied,by the mere interpretation given to them by this court in its decisions; yet, from the moment that

Act was repealed by the Administrative Code, the needs of society have made it necessary thatthe said articles 318 to 324 should be deemed to be in force, inasmuch as the Administrative


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Code, in repealing the said Act relating to perjury, has not explicitly provided that the saidarticles of the Penal Code have likewise been repealed.

This manner of understanding and construing the statutes applicable to the crime of falsetestimony or perjury is in harmony with the provision of Law 11, Title 2, Book 3, of the NovisimaRecopilacionwhich says::

All the laws of the kingdom, not expressly repealed by other subsequent laws, must beliterally obeyed and the excuse that they are not in use cannot avail; for the Catholickings and their successors so ordered in numerous laws, and so also have I ordered ondifferent occasions, and even though they were repealed, it is seen that they have beenrevived by the decree which I issued in conformity with them although they were notexpressly designated. The council will be informed thereof and will take account of theimportance of the matter.

It is, then, assumed that the said articles of the Penal Code are in force and are properlyapplicable to crimes of false testimony. Therefore, in consideration of the fact that in the case atbar the evidence shows it to have been duly proven that the defendant, Andres Pablo, intestifying in the cause prosecuted for gambling atjueteng, perverted the truth, for the purpose offavoring the alleged gamblers, Maximo Malicsi and Antonio Rodrigo, with the aggravatingcircumstance of the crime being committed through bribery, for it was also proved that thedefendant Pablo received P15 in order that he should make no mention of the said twogamblers in his sworn testimony, whereby he knowingly perverted the truth, we hold that, in thecommission of the crime of false testimony, there concurred the aggravating circumstance ofprice or reward, No. 3 of article 10 of the Code, with no mitigating circumstance to offset theeffects of the said aggravating one; wherefore the defendant has incurred the maximum periodof the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum degree toprision correccional in its mediumdegree, and a fine.

For the foregoing reasons, we hereby reverse the judgment appealed from and sentenceAndres Pablo to the penalty of two years four months and one day ofprision correccional,topay a fine of 1,000pesetas, and, in case of insolvency, to suffer the corresponding subsidiaryimprisonment, which shall not exceed one-third of the principal penalty. He shall also pay thecosts of both instances. So ordered.

Johnson, Carson, Trent and Araullo, JJ., concur. Moreland, J., concurs in the result


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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 17584 March 8, 1922

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ISLANDS,plaintiff-appellee,vs.

GREGORIO SANTIAGO,defendant-appellant.

L. Porter Hamilton for appellant.Acting Attorney-General Tuason for appellee.

ROMUALDEZ, J .:

Having caused the death of Porfirio Parondo, a boy 7 years old, by striking him with automobilethat he was driving, the herein appellant was prosecuted for the crime of homicide by recklessnegligence and was sentenced to suffer one year and one day ofprision correccional, and topay the costs of the trial.

Not agreeable with that sentence he now comes to this court alleging that the court belowcommitted four errors, to wit:

1. The trial court erred in not taking judicial notice of the fact that the appellant was beingprosecuted in conformity with Act No. 2886 of the Philippine Legislature and that the Actis unconstitutional and gave no jurisdiction in this case.

2. The lower court erred in not dismissing the complaint after the presentation of theevidence in the case, if not before, for the reason that said Act No. 2886 isunconstitutional and the proceedings had in the case under the provisions of the Actconstitute a prosecution of appellant without due process of law.

3. The court a quo erred in not finding that it lacked jurisdiction over the person of theaccused and over the subject- matter of the complaint.

4. The trial court erred in finding the appellant guilty of the crime charged and insentencing him to one year and one day ofprison correccional and to the payment ofcosts.

With regard to the questions of fact, we have to say that we have examined the record and findthat the conclusions of the trial judge, as contained in his well-written decision, are sufficientlysustained by the evidence submitted.

The accused was driving an automobile at the rate of 30 miles an hour on a highway 6 meterwide, notwithstanding the fact that he had to pass a narrow space between a wagon standingon one side of the road and a heap of stones on the other side where the were two young boys,the appellant did not take the precaution required by the circumstances by slowing his machine,


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and did not proceed with the vigilant care that under the circumstances an ordinary prudent manwould take in order to avoid possible accidents that might occur, as unfortunately did occur, ashis automobile ran over the boy Porfirio Parondo who was instantly killed as the result of theaccident.

These facts are so well established in the records that there cannot be a shade of doubt about

them.

Coming now to the other assignments of error, it will be seen that they deal with thefundamental questions as to whether or not Act No. 2886, under which the complaint in thepresent case was filed, is valid and constitutional.

This Act is attacked on account of the amendments that it introduces in General Orders No. 58,the defense arguing that the Philippine Legislature was, and is, not authorized to amendGeneral Orders No. 58, as it did by amending section 2 thereof because its provisions have thecharacter of constitutional law. Said section 2 provides as follows:

All prosecutions for public offenses shall be in the name of the United States against thepersons charged with the offenses. (G. O. No. 58, sec. 2 ).

Act No. 2886, which amends it, by virtue of which the People of the Philippine Island is madethe plaintiff in this information, contains the following provisions in section 1:

SECTION 1. Section two of General Orders, Numbered Fifty-eight, series of nineteenhundred, is hereby amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 2. All prosecutions for public offenses shall be in the name of the Peopleof the Philippine Islands against the persons charged with the offense."

Let us examine the question.

For practical reasons, the procedure in criminal matters is not incorporated in the Constitutionsof the States, but is left in the hand of the legislatures, so that it falls within the realm of publicstatutory law.

As has been said by Chief Justice Marshall:

A constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all the Subdivisions of which its greatpowers will admit, and of all the means by which they may be carried into execution,would partake of a prolixity of a legal code, and could scarcely be embraced by thehuman mind. It would probably never be understood by the public. (M'Culloch vs.

Maryland [1819], 4 Wheat., 316, 407; 4 L. ed., 579.)

That is why, in pursuance of the Constitution of the United States, each States, each State hasthe authority, under its police power, to define and punish crimes and to lay down the rules ofcriminal procedure.

The states, as a part of their police power, have a large measure of discretion in creatingand defining criminal offenses. . . .


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A Statute relating to criminal procedure is void as a denial of the equal protection of thelaws if it prescribes a different procedure in the case of persons in like situation. Subjectto this limitation, however, the legislature has large measure of discretion in prescribingthe modes of criminal procedure. . . . (12 C.J., 1185, 1186. See Collins vs. Johnston,237 U.S., 502; 35 s. Ct. Rep. 649; 59 L. ed., 1071; Shevlin-Carpenter Co. vs. Minnesota,218 U.S., 57; 30 S. Ct. Rep., 663; 54 L. ed., 930; Lynn vs. Flancders, 141 Ga., 500; 81

S.E., 205.)

This power of the States of the North American Union was also granted to its territories such asthe Philippines:

The plenary legislative power which Congress possesses over the territories andpossessions of the United States may be exercised by that body itself, or, as is muchmore often the case, it may be delegated to a local agency, such as a legislature, theorganization of which proceeds upon much the same lines as in the several States or inCongress, which is often taken as a model, and whose powers are limited by theOrganic Act; but within the scope of such act is has complete authority to legislate, . . .and in general, to legislate upon all subjects within the police power of the territory. (38

Cyc., 205-207.)

The powers of the territorial legislatures are derived from Congress. By act of Congresstheir power extends "to all rightful subjects of legislation not inconsistent with theConstitution and laws of the United States;" and this includes the power to define andpunish crimes. (16 C. J., 62.)

And in the exercise of such powers the military government of the army of occupation,functioning as a territorial legislature, thought it convenient to establish new rules of procedurein criminal matters, by the issuance of General Orders No. 58, the preamble of which reads:

In the interests of justice, and to safeguard the civil liberties of the inhabitants of theseIslands, the criminal code of procedure now in force therein is hereby amended incertain of its important provisions, as indicated in the following enumerated sections.(Emphasis ours.)

Its main purpose is, therefore, limited to criminal procedure and its intention is to give to itsprovisions the effect of law in criminal matters. For that reason it provides in section 1 that:

The following provisions shall have the force and effect of law in criminal matters in thePhilippine Islands from and after the 15th day of May, 1900, but existing laws on thesame subjects shall remain valid except in so far as hereinafter modified or repealedexpressly or by necessary implication.

From what has been said it clearly follows that the provisions of this General Order do not thenature of constitutional law either by reason of its character or by reason of the authority thatenacted it into law.

It cannot be said that it has acquired this character because this order was made its own by theCongress of the United States for, as a mater of fact, this body never adopted it as a law of itsown creation either before the promulgation of Act No. 2886, herein discussed, or, to ourknowledge, to this date.


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Since the provisions of this General Order have the character of statutory law, the power of theLegislature to amend it is self-evident, even if the question is considered only on principle. Ourpresent Legislature, which has enacted Act No. 2886, the subject of our inquiry, is the legalsuccessor to the Military Government as a legislative body.

Since the advent of the American sovereignty in the Philippines the legislative branch of our

government has undergone transformations and has developed itself until it attained its presentform. Firstly, it was the Military Government of the army of occupation which, in accordance withinternational law and practice, was vested with legislative functions and in fact did legislate;afterwards, complying with the instructions of President McKinley which later were ratified byCongress (sec. 1 of the Act of July 1, 1902) the legislative powers of the Military Governmentwere transferred to the Philippine Commission; then, under the provisions of section 7 of the Actof Congress of July 1, 1902, the Philippine Assembly was created and it functioned as acolegislative body with the Philippine Commission. Finally, by virtue of the provisions of sections12 of the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, known as the Jones Law, the PhilippineCommission gave way to the Philippine Senate, the Philippine Assembly became the House ofRepresentatives, and thus was formed the present Legislature composed of two Houses whichhas enacted the aforesaid Act No. 2886.

As a matter of fact, Act No. 2886 is not the first law that amends General Orders No. 58. ThePhilippine Commission, at various times, had amended it by the enactment of laws amongwhich we may cite Act No. 194, regarding preliminary investigation, Act No. 440 relating tocounsels de oficio and Act No. 590 about preliminary investigations by justices of the peace ofprovincial capitals. Later on, and before the enactment of Act No. 2886, herein controverted, theLegislature had also amended this General Orders No. 58 by the enactment of Act No. 2677regarding appeals to the Supreme Court of causes originating in the justice of the peace courtsand by Act No. 2709 which deals with the exclusion of accused persons from the information inorder to be utilized as state's witnesses.

These amendments repeatedly made by the Philippine Commission as well as by our present

Legislature are perfectly within the scope of the powers of the said legislative bodies as thesuccessors of the Military Government that promulgated General Orders No. 58.

No proof is required to demonstrate that the present Legislature had, and had, the power toenact and amend laws. (U.S. vs. Bull. 15 Phil., 7.) That it has the power to legislate on criminalmatters is very evident from the wording of section 7 of the Jones Law which says:

That the legislative authority herein provided shall have power, when not inconsistentwith this Act, by due enactment to amend, alter, modify, or repeal any law, civil orcriminal, continued in force by this Act as it may from time to time see fit.

It is urged the right to prosecute and punish crimes is an attributed of sovereignty. Thisassertion is right; but it is also true that by reason of the principle of territoriality as applied in thesupression, of crimes, such power is delegated to subordinate government subdivisions such asterritories. As we have seen in the beginning, the territorial legislatures have the power to defineand punish crimes, a power also possessed by the Philippine Legislature by virtue of theprovisions of sections 7, already quoted, of the Jones Law. These territorial governments arelocal agencies of the Federal Government, wherein sovereignty resides; and when the territorialgovernment of the Philippines prosecutes and punishes public crimes it does so by virtue of theauthority delegated to it by the supreme power of the Nation.


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This delegation may be made either expressly as in the case of the several States of the Unionand incorporated territories like Porto Rico and Hawaii, or tacitly as is the case with thePhilippines, which is an organized territory though not incorporated with the Union. (Malcolm,Philippine Constitutional Law, 181-205.)

This tacit delegation to our Government needs no demonstration. As a matter of fact, the crimes

committed within our territory, even before section 2 of General Orders No. 58 was amended,were prosecuted and punished in this jurisdiction as is done at present; but then as now therepression of crimes was done, and is still done, under the sovereign authority of the UnitedStates, whose name appears as the heading in all pleadings in criminal causes and in other

judicial papers and notarial acts.

The use of such a heading is prescribed for civil cases in form 1 of section 784 of the Code ofCivil Procedure; in criminal causes the constant practice followed in this jurisdiction establishedits use; and in notarial matters its use is provided by section 127 of Act No. 496. This longcontinued practice in criminal matters and the legal provision relating to civil cases and notarialacts have not been amended by any law, much less by Act No. 2886, the subject of the presentinquiry.

There is not a single constitutional provision applicable to the Philippines prescribing the nameto be used as party plaintiff in criminal cases.

The fact that the political status of this country is as yet undetermined and in a transitory stage,is, in our opinion, responsible for the fact that there is no positive provision in our constitutionallaw regarding the use of the name of the People of the Philippine Islands, as party plaintiff, incriminal prosecutions, as is otherwise the case in the respective constitutional charters of theStates of the Union and incorporated territories a situation which must not be understood asdepriving the Government of the Philippines of its power, however delegated, to prosecutepublic crimes. The fact is undeniable that the present government of the Philippines, created bythe Congress of the United States, is autonomous.

This autonomy of the Government of the Philippines reaches all judicial actions, the case at barbeing one of them; as an example of such autonomy, this Government, the same as that ofHawaii and Porto Rico (People of Porto Rico vs. Rosaly y Castillo [1913], 227 U.S., 270; 57 L.ed., 507; 33 Sup. Ct. Rep., 352) cannot be sued without its consent. (Merritt vs. Government ofthe Philippine Islands, 34 Phil., 311; L. S. Moon & Co. vs. Harrison, p. 27, ante.) The doctrine,laid down in these cases, acknowledges the prerogative of personality in the Government of thePhilippines, which, if it is sufficient to shield it from any responsibility in court in its own nameunless it consents thereto, it should be also, as sufficiently authoritative in law, to give thatgovernment the right to prosecute in court in its own name whomsoever violates within itsterritory the penal laws in force therein.

However, limiting ourselves to the question relative to the form of the complaint in criminalmatters, it is within the power of the Legislature to prescribe the form of the criminal complaintas long as the constitutional provision of the accused to be informed of the nature of theaccusation is not violated.

Under the Constitution of the United States and by like provisions in the constitutions ofthe various states, the accused is entitled to be informed of the nature and cause of theaccusation against him . . .


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It is within the power of the legislatures under such a constitutional provision to prescribethe form of the indictment or information, and such form may omit averments regardedas necessary at common law. (22 Cyc., 285.)

All these considerations apriori are strengthened a posteriori by the important reason disclosedby the following fact that the Congress has tacitly approved Act No. 2886. Both the Act of

Congress of July 1, 1902, section 86, and the Jones Law, last paragraph of section 19, providethat all the laws enacted by the Government of the Philippines or its Legislature shall beforwarded to the Congress of the United States, which body reserves the right and power toannul them. And presuming, as legally we must, that the provisions of these laws have beencomplied with, it is undisputed that the Congress of the United States did not annul any of thoseacts already adverted to Nos. 194, 440, 490 (of the Philippine Commission), and 2677, 2709and the one now in question No. 2886 (of the present Legislature) all of which wereamendatory of General Orders No. 58. The Act now under discussion (No. 2886) took effect onFebruary 24, 1920, and the criminal complaint in this case was filed on May 10, 1920. Thesilence of Congress regarding those laws amendatory of the said General Order must beconsidered as an act of approval.

If Congress fails to notice or take action on any territorial legislation the reasonableinference is that it approves such act. (26 R.C.L., 679; videClinton vs. Englebrcht, 13Wall., 434; 20 [L. ed.] 659; Tiaco vs. Forbes, 228 U.S., 549; 33 S. Ct. Rep., 585; 57 [L.ed.], 960; Nixon vs. Reid, 8 S.d., 507; 67 N.W., 57; 32 L.R.A., 315.)

Furthermore, supposing for the sake of argument, that the mention of the People of thePhilippine Islands as plaintiff in the title of the information constitutes a vice or defect, the sameis not fatal when, as in the present case, it was not objected to in the court below.

An indictment must, in many states under express statutory or constitutional provision,show by its title or by proper recitals in the caption or elsewhere that the prosecution is inthe name and by the authority of the state, the commonwealth, or the people of thestate, according to the practice in the particular jurisdictions; but omissions or defects inthis respect may be supplied or cured by other parts of the records, and the omissions ofsuch a recital or defects therein, even when required by the constitution or by statute, isa defect of form within a statute requiring exceptions for defect of form to be madebefore trial. (23 Cyc., 237, 238.)

We hold that the provisions of sections 2 of General Orders No. 58, as amended by Act No.2886, do not partake of the same character as the provisions of a constitution; that the said ActNo. 2886 is valid and is not violative of any constitutional provisions and that the court a quo didnot commit any of the errors assigned.

The sentence appealed from is hereby affirmed, the appellant being furthermore sentenced tothe accessory penalties prescribed in article 61 of the Penal Code, and to indemnify the heirs ofthe deceased in the sum of P1,000 and to the payment of the costs of both instances. Soordered.


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B. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURTManila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-5270 January 15, 1910

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,vs.

H. N. BULL,defendant-appellant.

Bruce & Lawrence, for appellant.Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey, for appellee.

ELLIOTT, J .:

The appellant was convicted in the Court of First Instance of a violation of section 1 of Act No.55, as amended by section 1 of Act No. 275, and from the judgment entered thereon appealedto this court, where under proper assignments of error he contends: (1) that the complaint doesnot state facts sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court; (2) that under the evidence the trialcourt was without jurisdiction to hear and determine the case; (3) that Act No. 55 as amended isin violation of certain provisions of the Constitution of the United States, and void as applied tothe facts of this case; and (4) that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction.

The information alleges:

That on and for many months prior to the 2d day of December, 1908, the said H. N. Bullwas then and there master of a steam sailing vessel known as the steamship Standard,which vessel was then and there engaged in carrying and transporting cattle, carabaos,and other animals from a foreign port and city of Manila, Philippine Islands; that the saidaccused H. N. Bull, while master of said vessel, as aforesaid, on or about the 2d day ofDecember, 1908, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and wrongly carry, transport,and bring into the port and city of Manila, aboard said vessel, from the port of Ampieng,Formosa, six hundred and seventy-seven (677) head of cattle and carabaos, withoutproviding suitable means for securing said animals while in transit, so as to avoid cruelty

and unnecessary suffering to the said animals, in this, to wit, that the said H. N. Bull,master, as aforesaid, did then and there fail to provide stalls for said animals so in transitand suitable means for trying and securing said animals in a proper manner, and didthen and there cause some of said animals to be tied by means of rings passed throughtheir noses, and allow and permit others to be transported loose in the hold and on thedeck of said vessel without being tied or secured in stalls, and all without bedding; thatby reason of the aforesaid neglect and failure of the accused to provide suitable meansfor securing said animals while so in transit, the noses of some of said animals were


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cruelly torn, and many of said animals were tossed about upon the decks and hold ofsaid vessel, and cruelly wounded, bruised, and killed.

All contrary to the provisions of Acts No. 55 and No. 275 of the Philippine Commission.

Section 1 of Act No. 55, which went into effect January 1, 1901, provides that

The owners or masters of steam, sailing, or other vessels, carrying or transporting cattle,sheep, swine, or other animals, from one port in the Philippine Islands to another, orfrom any foreign port to any port within the Philippine Islands, shall carry with them, uponthe vessels carrying such animals, sufficient forage and fresh water to provide for thesuitable sustenance of such animals during the ordinary period occupied by the vessel inpassage from the port of shipment to the port of debarkation, and shall cause suchanimals to be provided with adequate forage and fresh water at least once in everytwenty-four hours from the time that the animals are embarked to the time of their finaldebarkation.

By Act No. 275, enacted October 23, 1901, Act No. 55 was amended by adding to section 1thereof the following:

The owners or masters of steam, sailing, or other vessels, carrying or transporting cattle,sheep, swine, or other animals from one port in the Philippine Islands to another, or fromany foreign port to any port within the Philippine Islands, shall provide suitable means forsecuring such animals while in transit so as to avoid all cruelty and unnecessarysuffering to the animals, and suitable and proper facilities for loading and unloadingcattle or other animals upon or from vessels upon which they are transported, withoutcruelty or unnecessary suffering. It is hereby made unlawful to load or unload cattle uponor from vessels by swinging them over the side by means of ropes or chains attached tothe thorns.

Section 3 of Act No. 55 provides that

Any owner or master of a vessel, or custodian of such animals, who knowingly andwillfully fails to comply with the provisions of section one, shall, for every such failure, beliable to pay a penalty of not less that one hundred dollars nor more that five hundreddollars, United States money, for each offense. Prosecution under this Act may beinstituted in any Court of First Instance or any provost court organized in the province orport in which such animals are disembarked.

1. It is contended that the information is insufficient because it does not state that the court wassitting at a port where the cattle were disembarked, or that the offense was committed on board

a vessel registered and licensed under the laws of the Philippine Islands.

Act No. 55 confers jurisdiction over the offense created thereby on Courts of First Instance orany provost court organized in the province or port in which such animals are disembarked, andthere is nothing inconsistent therewith in Act No. 136, which provides generally for theorganization of the courts of the Philippine Islands. Act No. 400 merely extends the general

jurisdiction of the courts over certain offenses committed on the high seas, or beyond thejurisdiction of any country, or within any of the waters of the Philippine Islands on board a shipor water craft of any kind registered or licensed in the Philippine Islands, in accordance with the


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laws thereof. (U.S. vs.Fowler, 1 Phil. Rep., 614.) This jurisdiction may be exercised by the Courtof First Instance in any province into which such ship or water upon which the offense or crimewas committed shall come after the commission thereof. Had this offense been committed upona ship carrying a Philippine registry, there could have been no doubt of the Jurisdiction of thecourt, because it is expressly conferred, and the Act is in accordance with well recognized andestablished public law. But the Standard was a Norwegian vessel, and it is conceded that it was

not registered or licensed in the Philippine Islands under the laws thereof. We have then thequestion whether the court had jurisdiction over an offense of this character, committed onboard a foreign ship by the master thereof, when the neglect and omission which constitutes theoffense continued during the time the ship was within the territorial waters of the United States.No court of the Philippine Islands had jurisdiction over an offenses or crime committed on thehigh seas or within the territorial waters of any other country, but when she came within 3 milesof a line drawn from the headlines which embrace the entrance to Manila Bay, she was withinterritorial waters, and a new set of principles became applicable. (Wheaton, Int. Law (Dana ed.),p. 255, note 105; Bonfils, Le Droit Int., sec 490et seq.; Latour, La Mer Ter., ch. 1.) The ship andher crew were then subject to the jurisdiction of the territorial sovereign subject through theproper political agency. This offense was committed within territorial waters. From the line whichdetermines these waters the Standardmust have traveled at least 25 miles before she came to

anchor. During that part of her voyage the violation of the statue continued, and as far as thejurisdiction of the court is concerned, it is immaterial that the same conditions may have existedwhile the vessel was on the high seas. The offense, assuming that it originated at the port ofdeparture in Formosa, was a continuing one, and every element necessary to constitute itexisted during the voyage across the territorial waters. The completed forbidden act was donewithin American waters, and the court therefore had jurisdiction over the subject-matter of theoffense and the person of the offender.

The offense then was thus committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, but theobjection to the jurisdiction raises the further question whether that jurisdiction is restricted bythe fact of the nationality of the ship. Every. Every state has complete control and jurisdictionover its territorial waters. According to strict legal right, even public vessels may not enter the

ports of a friendly power without permission, but it is now conceded that in the absence of aprohibition such ports are considered as open to the public ship of all friendly powers. Theexemption of such vessels from local jurisdiction while within such waters was not establisheduntil within comparatively recent times. In 1794, Attorney-General Bradford, and in 1796

Attorney-General Lee, rendered opinions to the effect that "the laws of nations invest thecommander of a foreign ship of war with no exemption from the jurisdiction of the country intowhich he comes." (1, Op. U.S. Attys. Gen., 46, 87.) This theory was also supported by LordStowell in an opinion given by him to the British Government as late as 1820. In the leadingcase of the Schooner Exchange vs. McFadden (7 Cranch (U.S.), 116, 144), Chief JusticeMarshall said that the implied license under which such vessels enter a friendly port mayreasonably be construed as "containing exemption from the jurisdiction of the sovereign withinwhose territory she claims the rights of hospitality." The principle was accepted by the Geneva

Arbitration Tribunal, which announced that "the priviledge of exterritoriality accorded to vesselsof war has been admitted in the law of nations; not as an absolute right, but solely as aproceeding founded on the principle of courtesy and mutual deference between nations."(2 Moore, Int. Law Dig., secs. 252 and 254; Hall, Int. Law, sec. 55; Taylor, Int. Law, sec. 256;Ortolan, Dip de la Mer, 2. C.X.)

Such vessels are therefore permitted during times of peace to come and go freely. Local officialexercise but little control over their actions, and offenses committed by their crew are justiciableby their own officers acting under the laws to which they primarily owe allegiance. This limitation


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upon the general principle of territorial sovereignty is based entirely upon comity andconvenience, and finds its justification in the fact that experience shows that such vessels aregenerally careful to respect local laws and regulation which are essential to the health, order,and well-being of the port. But comity and convenience does not require the extension of thesame degree of exemption to merchant vessels. There are two well-defined theories as toextent of the immunities ordinarily granted to them, According to the French theory and practice,

matters happening on board a merchant ship which do not concern the tranquillity of the port orpersons foreign to the crew, are justiciable only by the court of the country to which the vesselbelongs. The French courts therefore claim exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed onboard French merchant vessels in foreign ports by one member of the crew against another.(See Bonfils, Le Droit Int. (quat. ed.), secs. 624-628; Martens, Le Droit Int., tome 2, pp. 338,339; Ortolan, Dip. de la Mer, tit. 1, p. 292; Masse, Droit Int., tome 2, p. 63.) Such jurisdiction hasnever been admitted or claim by Great Britain as a right, although she has frequently concededit by treaties. (Halleck, Int. Law (Baker's ed.), vol. 1, 231; British Territorial Waters Act, 1878.)Writers who consider exterritoriality as a fact instead of a theory have sought to restrict local

jurisdiction, but Hall, who is doubtless the leading English authority, says that

It is admitted by the most thoroughgoing asserters of the territoriality of merchant

vessels that so soon as the latter enter the ports of a foreign state they become subjectto the local jurisdiction on all points in which the interests of the country are touched.(Hall, Int. Law, p. 263.)

The United States has adhered consistently to the view that when a merchant vessel enters aforeign port it is subject to the jurisdiction of the local authorities, unless the local sovereigntyhas by act of acquiescence or through treaty arrangements consented to waive a portion ofsuch jurisdiction. (15 Op. Attys. Gen., U. S., 178; 2 Moore, Int. Law Dig., sec. 204; article byDean Gregory, Mich. Law Review, Vol. II, No. 5.) Chief Justice Marshall, in the case ofthe Exchange, said that

When merchant vessels enter for the purpose of trade, in would be obviously in

convinient and dangerous to society and would subject the laws to continual infractionand the government to degradation if such individual merchants did not owe temporaryand local allegiance, and were not amendable to the jurisdiction of the country.

The Supreme Court of the United States has recently said that the merchant vessels of onecountry visiting the ports of another for the purpose of trade, subject themselves to the lawswhich govern the ports they visit, so long as they remain; and this as well in war as in peace,unless otherwise provided by treaty. (U. S. vs. Diekelman, 92 U. S., 520-525.)

Certain limitations upon the jurisdiction of the local courts are imposed by article 13 of the treatyof commerce and navigation between Sweden and Norway and the United States, of July 4,1827, which concedes to the consul, vice-consuls, or consular agents of each country "The rightto sit as judges and arbitrators in such differences as may arise between the captains and crewsof the vessels belonging to the nation whose interests are committed to their charge, without theinterference of the local authorities, unless the conduct of the crews or of the captains shoulddisturb the order or tranquillity of the country." (Comp. of Treaties in Force, 1904, p. 754.) Thisexception applies to controversies between the members of the ship's company, and particularlyto disputes regarding wages. (2 Moore, Int. Law Dig., sec. 206, p. 318; Tellefsen vs.Fee, 168Mass., 188.) The order and tranquillity of the country are affected by many events which do notamount to a riot or general public disturbance. Thus an assault by one member of the crew


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upon another, committed upon the ship, of which the public may have no knowledge whatever,is not by this treaty withdrawn from the cognizance of the local authorities.

In 1876 the mates of the Swedish bark Frederike and Carolina engaged in a "quarrel" on boardthe vessel in the port of Galveston, Texas. They were prosecuted before a justice of the peace,but the United States district attorney was instructed by the Government to take the necessary

steps to have the proceedings dismissed, and the aid of the governor of Texas was invoked withthe view to "guard against a repetition of similar proceedings." (Mr. Fish, Secretary of State, toMr. Grip, Swedish and Norwegian charged, May 16, 1876; Moore, Int. Law Dig.) It does notappear that this "quarrel" was of such a nature as to amount to a breach of the criminal laws ofTexas, but when in 1879 the mate for the Norwegian bark Livingston was prosecuted in thecourts of Philadelphia County for an assault and battery committed on board the ship while lyingin the port of Philadelphia, it was held that there was nothing in the treaty which deprived thelocal courts of jurisdiction. (Commonwealth vs.Luckness, 14 Phila. (Pa.), 363.) Representationswere made through diplomatic channels to the State Department, and on July 30, 1880, Mr.Evarts, Secretary of State, wrote to Count Lewenhaupt, the Swedish and Norwegian minister,as follows:

I have the honor to state that I have given the matter careful consideration in connectionwith the views and suggestion of your note and the provisions of the thirteenth article ofthe treaty of 1827 between the United States and Sweden and Norway. The stipulationscontained in the last clause of that article . . . are those under which it is contended byyou that jurisdiction is conferred on the consular officers, not only in regard to suchdifferences of a civil nature growing out of the contract of engagement of the seamen,but also as to disposing of controversies resulting from personal violence involvingoffense for which the party may be held amenable under the local criminal law.

This Government does not view the article in question as susceptible of such broadinterpretation. The jurisdiction conferred upon the consuls is conceived to be limited totheir right to sit as judges or abitrators in such differences as may arise between captains

and crews of the vessels, where such differences do not involve on the part of thecaptain or crew a disturbance of the order or tranquillity of the country. When, however,a complaint is made to a local magistrate, either by the captain or one or more of thecrew of the vessel, involving the disturbance of the order or tranquillity of the country, itis competent for such magistrate to take cognizance of the matter in furtherance of thelocal laws, and under such circumstances in the United States it becomes a public dutywhich the judge or magistrate is not at liberty voluntarily to forego. In all such cases itmust necessarily be left to the local judicial authorities whether the procedure shall takeplace in the United States or in Sweden to determine if in fact there had been suchdisturbance of the local order and tranquillity, and if the complaint is supported by suchproof as results in the conviction of the party accused, to visit upon the offenders suchpunishment as may be defined against the offense by the municipal law of the place."

(Moore, Int. Law Dig., vol. 2, p. 315.)

The treaty does not therefore deprive the local courts of jurisdiction over offenses committed onboard a merchant vessel by one member of the crew against another which amount to adisturbance of the order or tranquillity of the country, and a fair and reasonable construction ofthe language requires un to hold that any violation of criminal laws disturbs the order ortraquillity of the country. The offense with which the appellant is charged had nothing to so withany difference between the captain and the crew. It was a violation by the master of the criminal


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law of the country into whose port he came. We thus find that neither by reason of thenationality of the vessel, the place of the commission of the offense, or the prohibitions of anytreaty or general principle of public law, are the court of the Philippine Islands deprived of

jurisdiction over the offense charged in the information in this case.

It is further contended that the complaint is defective because it does not allege that the animals

were disembarked at the port of Manila, an allegation which it is claimed is essential to thejurisdiction of the court sitting at that port. To hold with the appellant upon this issue would be toconstrue the language of the complaint very strictly against the Government. Thedisembarkation of the animals is not necessary in order to constitute the completed offense, anda reasonable construction of the language of the statute confers jurisdiction upon the courtsitting at the port into which the animals are bought. They are then within the territorial

jurisdiction of the court, and the mere fact of their disembarkation is immaterial so far asjurisdiction is concerned. This might be different if the disembarkation of the animals constituteda constitutional element in the offense, but it does not.

It is also contended that the information is insufficient because it fails to allege that thedefendant knowingly andwillfully failed to provide suitable means for securing said animals while

in transit, so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering. The allegation of the complaint thatthe act was committed willfully includes the allegation that it was committed knowingly. As saidin Woodhouse vs.Rio Grande R.R. Company (67 Texas, 416), "the word 'willfully' carries theidea, when used in connection with an act forbidden by law, that the act must be doneknowingly or intentionally; that, with knowledge, the will consented to, designed, and directedthe act." So in Wongvs.City of Astoria (13 Oregon, 538), it was said: "The first one is that thecomplaint did not show, in the words of the ordinance, that the appellant 'knowingly' did the actcomplained of. This point, I think, was fully answered by the respondent's counsel that thewords 'willfully' and 'knowingly' conveyed the same meaning. To 'willfully' do an act implies thatit was done by design done for a certain purpose; and I think that it would necessarily followthat it was 'knowingly' done." To the same effect is Johnson vs. The People (94 Ill., 505), whichseems to be on all fours with the present case.

The evidence shows not only that the defendant's acts were knowingly done, but his defenserests upon the assertion that "according to his experience, the system of carrying cattle looseupon the decks and in the hold is preferable and more secure to the life and comfort of theanimals." It was conclusively proven that what was done was done knowingly and intentionally.

In charging an offense under section 6 of General Orders, No. 58, paragraph 3, it is onlynecessary to state the act or omission complained of as constituting a crime or public offense inordinary and concise language, without repitition. It need not necessarily be in the words of thestatute, but it must be in such form as to enable a person of common understanding to knowwhat is intended and the court to pronounce judgment according to right. A complaint whichcomplies with this requirement is good. (U.S. vs.Sarabia, 4 Phil. Rep., 556.)

The Act, which is in the English language, impose upon the master of a vessel the duty to"provide suitable means for securing such animals while in transit, so as to avoid all cruelty andunnecessary suffering to the animals." The allegation of the complaint as it reads in English isthat the defendant willfully, unlawfully, and wrongfully carried the cattle "without providingsuitable means for securing said animals while in transit, so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessarysuffering to the said animals in this . . . that by reason of the aforesaid neglect and failure of theaccused to provide suitable means for securing said animals were cruelty torn, and many of


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said animals were tossed about upon the decks and hold of said vessels, and cruelty wounded,bruised, and killed."

The appellant contends that the language of the Spanish text of the information does not chargehim with failure to provide "sufficient" and "adequate" means. The words used are "mediossuficientes" and "medios adecuados." In view of the fact that the original complaint was

prepared in English, and that the word "suitable" is translatable by the words "adecuado,""suficiente," and "conveniente," according to the context and circumstances, we determine thispoint against the appellant, particularly in view of the fact that the objection was not made in thecourt below, and that the evidence clearly shows a failure to provide "suitable means for theprotection of the animals."

2. The appellant's arguments against the constitutionality of Act No. 55 and the amendmentthereto seems to rest upon a fundamentally erroneous conception of the constitutional law ofthese Islands. The statute penalizes acts and ommissions incidental to the transportation of livestock between foreign ports and ports of the Philippine Islands, and had a similar statuteregulating commerce with its ports been enacted by the legislature of one of the States of theUnion, it would doubtless have been in violation of Article I, section 3, of the Constitution of the

United States. (Stubbs vs.People (Colo.), 11 L. R. A., N. S., 1071.)

But the Philippine Islands is not a State, and its relation to the United States is controlled byconstitutional principles different from those which apply to States of the Union. The importanceof the question thus presented requires a statement of the principles which govern thoserelations, and consideration of the nature and extent of the legislative power of the PhilippineCommission and the Legislature of the Philippines. After much discussion and considerablediversity of opinion certain applicable constitutional doctrines are established.

The Constitution confers upon the United States the express power to make war and treaties,and it has the power possessed by all nations to acquire territory by conquest or treaty. Territorythus acquired belongs to the United States, and to guard against the possibility of the power ofCongress to provide for its government being questioned, the framers of the Constitutionprovided in express terms that Congress should have the power "to dispose of and make allneedful rules and regulations respecting territory and other property belonging to the UnitedStates." (Art. IV, sec. 3, par. 3.) Upon the acquisition of the territory by the United States, anduntil it is formally incorporated into the Union, the duty of providing a government therefordevolves upon Congress. It may govern the territory by its direct acts, or it may create a localgovernment, and delegate thereto the ordinary powers required for local government.(Binns vs.U. S., 194 U. S., 486.) This has been the usual procedure. Congress has providedsuch governments for territories which were within the Union, and for newly acquired territorynot yet incorporated therein. It has been customary to organize a government with the ordinaryseparation of powers into executive, legislative, and judicial, and to prescribe in an organic actcertain general conditions in accordance with which the local government should act. Theorganic act thus became the constitution of the government of the territory which had not beenformally incorporated into the Union, and the validity of legislation enacted by the locallegislature was determined by its conformity with the requirements of such organic act. (NationalBank vs.Yankton, 11 Otto (U. S.), 129.) To the legislative body of the local governmentCongress has delegated that portion of legislative power which in its wisdom it deemednecessary for the government of the territory, reserving, however, the right to annul the action ofthe local legislature and itself legislate directly for the territory. This power has been exercisedduring the entire period of the history of the United States. The right of Congress to delegate


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such legislative power can no longer be seriously questioned. (Dorr vs.U. S., 195 U. S., 138; U.S. vs.Heinszen, 206 U. S., 370, 385.)

The Constitution of the United States does not by its own force operate within such territory,although the liberality of Congress in legislating the Constitution into contiguous territory tendedto create an impression upon the minds of many people that it went there by its own force.

(Downes vs. Bidwell, 182 U. S., 289.) In legislating with reference to this territory, the power ofCongress is limited only by those prohibitions of the Constitution which go to the very root of itspower to act at all, irrespective of time or place. In all other respects it is plenary. (DeLimavs. Bidwell, 182 U. S., 1; Downes vs. Bidwell, 182 U. S., 244; Hawaii vs.Mankichi, 190 U.S., 197; Dorrvs.U. S., 195 U. S., 138; Rassmussen vs. U. S., 197 U. S., 516.)

This power has been exercised by Congress throughout the whole history of the United States,and legislation founded on the theory was enacted long prior to the acquisition of the presentInsular possessions. Section 1891 of the Revised Statutes of 1878 provides that "TheConstitution and all laws of the United States which are not locally inapplicable shall have thesame force and effect within all the organized territories, and in every Territory hereafterorganized, as elsewhere within the United States." When Congress organized a civil

government for the Philippines, it expressly provided that this section of the Revised Statutesshould not apply to the Philippine Islands. (Sec. 1, Act of 1902.)

In providing for the government of the territory which was acquired by the United States as aresult of the war with Spain, the executive and legislative authorities have consistentlyproceeded in conformity with the principles above state. The city of Manila was surrendered tothe United States on August 13, 1898, and the military commander was directed to hold the city,bay, and harbor, pending the conclusion of a peace which should determine the control,disposition, and government of the Islands. The duty then devolved upon the Americanauthorities to preserve peace and protect person and property within the occupied territory.Provision therefor was made by proper orders, and on August 26 General Merritt assumed theduties of military governor. The treaty of peace was signed December 10, 1898. On the 22d of

December, 1898, the President announced that the destruction of the Spanish fleet and thesurrender of the city had practically effected the conquest of the Philippine Islands and thesuspension of the Spanish sovereignty therein, and that by the treaty of peace the futurecontrol, disposition, and government of the Islands had been ceded to the United States. Duringthe periods of strict military occupation, before the treaty of peace was ratified, and the interimthereafter, until Congress acted (Santiago vs. Noueral, 214 U.S., 260), the territory wasgoverned under the military authority of the President as commander in chief. Long beforeCongress took any action, the President organized a civil government which, however, had itslegal justification, like the purely military government which it gradually superseded, in the warpower. The military power of the President embraced legislative, executive personally, orthrough such military or civil agents as he chose to select. As stated by Secretary Root in hisreport for 1901

The military power in exercise in a territory under military occupation includes executive,legislative, and judicial authority. It not infrequently happens that in a single order of amilitary commander can be found the exercise of all three of these different powers the exercise of the legislative powers by provisions prescribing a rule of action; of judicialpower by determination of right; and the executive power by the enforcement of the rulesprescribed and the rights determined.


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President McKinley desired to transform military into civil government as rapidly as conditionswould permit. After full investigation, the organization of civil government was initiated by theappointment of a commission to which civil authority was to be gradually transferred. OnSeptember 1, 1900, the authority to exercise, subject to the approval of the President. "that partof the military power of the President in the Philippine Islands which is legislative in itscharacter" was transferred from the military government to the Commission, to be exercised

under such rules and regulations as should be prescribed by the Secretary of War, until suchtime as complete civil government should be established, or congress otherwise provided. Thelegislative power thus conferred upon the Commission was declared to include "the making ofrules and orders having the effect of law for the raising of revenue by taxes, customs duties, andimposts; the appropriation and expenditure of public funds of the Islands; the establishment ofan educational system to secure an efficient civil service; the organization and establishment ofcourts; the organization and establishment of municipal and departmental government, and allother matters of a civil nature which the military governor is now competent to provide by rulesor orders of a legislative character." This grant of legislative power to the Commission was to beexercised in conformity with certain declared general principles, and subject to certain specificrestrictions for the protection of individual rights. The Commission were to bear in mind that thegovernment to be instituted was "not for our satisfaction or for the expression of our theoretical

views, but for the happiness, peace, and prosperity of the people of the Philippine Island, andthe measures adopted should be made to conforms to their customs, their habits, and even theirprejudices, to the fullest extent consistent with the accomplishment of the indispensablerequisites of just and effective government." The specific restrictions upon legislative powerwere found in the declarations that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or propertywithout due process of law; that private property shall not be taken for public use without justcompensation; that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy andpublic trial, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, to be confronted with thewitnesses against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and tohave the assistance of counsel for his defense; that excessive bail shall not be required, norexcessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted; that no person shall be puttwice in jeopardy for the same offense or be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness

against himself; that the right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures shallnot be violated; that neither slavery nor involuntary servitude shall exist except as a punishmentfor crime; that no bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed; that no law shall bepassed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press or of the rights of the people topeaceably assemble and petition the Government for a redress of grievances; that no law shallbe made respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, and thatthe free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship without discrimination orpreference shall forever be allowed."

To prevent any question as to the legality of these proceedings being raised, the Spooneramendment to the Army Appropriation Bill passed March 2, 1901, provided that "all military,civil, and judicial powers necessary to govern the Philippine Islands . . . shall until otherwise

provided by Congress be vested in such person and persons, and shall be exercised in suchmanner, as the President of the United States shall direct, for the establishment of civilgovernment, and for maintaining and protecting the inhabitants of said Islands in the freeenjoyment of their liberty, property, and religion." Thereafter, on July 4, 1901, the authority,which had been exercised previously by the military governor, was transferred to that official.The government thus created by virtue of the authority of the President as Commander in Chiefof the Army and Navy continued to administer the affairs of the Islands under the direction of thePresident until by the Act of July 1, 1902, Congress assumed control of the situation by the


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enactment of a law which, in connection with the instructions of April 7, 1900, constitutes theorganic law of the Philippine Islands.

The Act of July 1, 1902, made no substancial changes in the form of government which thePresident had erected. Congress adopted the system which was in operation, and approved theaction of the President in organizing the government. Substantially all the limitations which had

been imposed on the legislative power by the President's instructions were included in the law,Congress thus extending to the Islands by legislative act nor the Constitution, but all itsprovisions for the protection of the rights and privileges of individuals which were appropriateunder the conditions. The action of the President in creating the Commission with designatedpowers of government, in creating the office of the Governor-General and Vice-Governor-General, and through the Commission establishing certain executive departments, wasexpressly approved and ratified. Subsequently the action of the President in imposing a tariffbefore and after the ratification of the treaty of peace was also ratified and approved byCongress. (Act of March 8, 1902; Act of July 1, 1902; U.S. vs. Heinszen, 206 U.S., 370;Lincoln vs.U.S., 197 U.S., 419.) Until otherwise provided by law the Islands were to continue tobe governed "as thereby and herein provided." In the future the enacting clause of all statutesshould read "By authority of the United States" instead of "By the authority of the President." In

the course of time the legislative authority of the Commission in all parts of the Islands notinhabited by Moros or non-Christian tribes was to be transferred to a legislature consisting oftwo houses the Philippine Commission and the Philippine Assembly. The government of theIslands was thus assumed by Congress under its power to govern newly acquired territory notincorporated into the United States.

This Government of the Philippine Islands is not a State or a Territory, although its form andorganization somewhat resembles that of both. It stands outside of the constitutional relationwhich unites the States and Territories into the Union. The authority for its creation andmaintenance is derived from the Constitution of the United States, which, however, operates onthe President and Congress, and not directly on the Philippine Government. It is the creation ofthe United States, acting through the President and Congress, both deriving power from the

same source, but from different parts thereof. For its powers and the limitations thereon theGovernment of the Philippines looked to the orders of the President before Congress acted andthe Acts of Congress after it assumed control. Its organic laws are derived from the formally andlegally expressed will of the President and Congress, instead of the popular sovereignconstituency which lies upon any subject relating to the Philippines is primarily in Congress, andwhen it exercise such power its act is from the viewpoint of the Philippines the legal equivalentof an amendment of a constitution in the United States.

Within the limits of its authority the Government of the Philippines is a complete governmentalorganism with executive, legislative, and judicial departments exercising the functionscommonly assigned to such departments. The separation of powers is as complete as in mostgovernments. In neither Federal nor State governments is this separation such as is implied in

the abstract statement of the doctrine. For instance, in the Federal Government the Senateexercises executive powers, and the President to some extent controls legislation through theveto power. In a State the veto power enables him to exercise much control over legislation.The Governor-General, the head of the executive department in the Philippine Government, is amember of the Philippine Commission, but as executive he has no veto power. The Presidentand Congress framed the government on the model with which Americans are familiar, andwhich has proven best adapted for the advancement of the public interests and the protection ofindividual rights and priviliges.


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In instituting this form of government of intention must have been to adopt the generalconstitutional doctrined which are inherent in the system. Hence, under it the Legislature mustenact laws subject to the limitations of the organic laws, as Congress must act under thenational Constitution, and the States under the national and state constitutions. The executivemust execute such laws as are constitutionally enacted. The judiciary, as in all governmentsoperating under written constitutions, must determine the validity of legislative enactments, as

well as the legality of all private and official acts. In performing these functions it acts with thesame independence as the Federal and State judiciaries in the United States. Under no otherconstitutional theory could there be that government of laws and not of men which is essentialfor the protection of rights under a free and orderly government.

Such being the constitutional theory of the Government of the Philippine Islands, it is apparentthat the courts must consider the question of the validity of an act of the Philippine Commissionor the Philippine Legislature, as a State court considers an act of the State legislature. TheFederal Government exercises such powers only as are expressly or impliedly granted to it bythe Constitution of the United States, while the States exercise all powers which have not beengranted to the central government. The former operates under grants, the latter subject torestrictions. The validity of an Act of Congress depends upon whether the Constitution of the

United States contains a grant of express or implied authority to enact it. An act of a Statelegislature is valid unless the Federal or State constitution expressly or impliedly prohibits itsenaction. An Act of the legislative authority of the Philippines Government which has not beenexpressly disapproved by Congress is valid unless its subject-matter has been covered bycongressional legislation, or its enactment forbidden by some provision of the organic laws.

The legislative power of the Government of the Philippines is granted in general terms subject tospecific limitations. The general grant is not alone of power to legislate on certain subjects, butto exercise the legislative power subject to the restrictions stated. It is true that specific authorityis conferred upon the Philippine Government relative to certain subjects of legislation, and thatCongress has itself legislated upon certain other subjects. These, however, should be viewedsimply as enactments on matters wherein Congress was fully informed and ready to act, and

not as implying any restriction upon the local legislative authority in other matters. (See Opinionof Atty. Gen. of U. S., April 16, 1908.)

The fact that Congress reserved the power to annul specific acts of legislation by theGovernment of the Philippine tends strongly to confirm the view that for purposes ofconstruction the Government of the Philippines should be regarded as one of general instead ofenumerated legislative powers. The situation was unusual. The new government was to operatefar from the source of its authority. To relieve Congress from the necessity of legislating withreference to details, it was thought better to grant general legislative power to the newgovernment, subject to broad and easily understood prohibitions, and reserve to Congress thepower to annul its acts if they met with disapproval. It was therefore provided "that all lawspassed by the Government of the Philippine Islands shall be reported to Congress, which

hereby reserves the power and authority to annul the same." (Act of Congress, July 1, 1902,sec. 86.) This provision does not suspend the acts of the Legislature of the Philippines untilapproved by Congress, or when approved, expressly or by acquiescence, make them the lawsof Congress. They are valid acts of the Government of the Philippine Islands until annulled.(Miners Bank vs.Iowa, 12 How. (U. S.), 1.)

In order to determine the validity of Act No. 55 we must then ascertain whether the Legislaturehas been expressly or implication forbidden to enact it. Section 3, Article IV, of the Constitution


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of the United States operated only upon the States of the Union. It has no application to theGovernment of the Philippine Islands. The power to regulate foreign commerce is vested inCongress, and by virtue of its power to govern the territory belonging to the United States, itmay regulate foreign commerce with such territory. It may do this directly, or indirectly through alegislative body created by it, to which its power in this respect if delegate. Congress has bydirect legislation determined the duties which shall be paid upon goods imported into the

Philippines, and it has expressly authorized the Government of the Philippines to provide for theneeds of commerce by improving harbors and navigable waters. A few other specific provisionsrelating to foreign commerce may be found in the Acts of Congress, but its general regulation isleft to the Government of the Philippines, subject to the reserved power of Congress to annulsuch legislation as does not meet with its approval. The express limitations upon the power ofthe Commission and Legislature to legislate do not affect the authority with respect to theregulation of commerce with foreign countries. Act No. 55 was enacted before Congress tookover the control of the Islands, and this act was amended by Act No. 275 after the Spooneramendment of March 2, 1901, was passed. The military government, and the civil governmentinstituted by the President, had the power, whether it be called legislative or administrative, toregulate commerce between foreign nations and the ports of the territory. (Cross vs.Harrison,16 How. (U.S.), 164, 190; Hamilton vs.Dillin, 21 Wall. (U.S.), 73, 87.) This Act has remained in

force since its enactment without annulment or other action by Congress, and must bepresumed to have met with its approval. We are therefore satisfied that the Commission had,and the Legislature now has, full constitutional power to enact laws for the regulation ofcommerce between foreign countries and the ports of the Philippine Islands, and that Act No.55, as amended by Act No. 275, is valid.

3. Whether a certain method of handling cattle is suitable within the meaning of the Act can notbe left to the judgment of the master of the ship. It is a question which must be determined bythe court from the evidence. On December 2, 1908, the defendant Bull brought into anddisembarked in the port and city of Manila certain cattle, which came from the port of Ampieng,Formosa, without providing suitable means for securing said animals while in transit, so as toavoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering to said animals, contrary to the provisions of section 1

of Act No. 55, as amended by section 1 of Act No. 275. The trial court found the following facts,all of which are fully sustained by the evidence:

That the defendant, H. N. Bull, as captain and master of the Norwegian steamer knownas the Standard, for a period of six months or thereabouts prior to the 2d day ofDecember, 1908, was engaged in the transportation of cattle and carabaos from Chinesand Japanese ports to and into the city of Manila, Philippine Islands.

That on the 2d day of December, 1908, the defendant, as such master and captain asaforesaid, brought into the city of Manila, aboard said ship, a large number of cattle,which ship was anchored, under the directions of the said defendant, behind thebreakwaters in front of the city of Manila, in Manila Bay, and within the jurisdiction of this

court; and that fifteen of said cattle then and there had broken legs and three others ofsaid cattle were dead, having broken legs; and also that said cattle were transported andcarried upon said ship as aforesaid by the defendant, upon the deck and in the hold ofsaid ship, without suitable precaution and care for the transportation of said animals, andto avoid danger and risk to their lives and security; and further that said cattle were sotransported abroad said ship by the defendant and brought into the said bay, and intothe city of Manila, without any provisions being made whatever upon said decks of said


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ship and in the hold thereof to maintain said cattle in a suitable condition and position forsuch transportation.

That a suitable and practicable manner in which to transport cattle abroad steamshipcoming into Manila Bay and unloading in the city of Manila is by way of individual stallsfor such cattle, providing partitions between the cattle and supports at the front sides,

and rear thereof, and cross-cleats upon the floor on which they stand and aretransported, of that in case of storms, which are common in this community at sea, suchcattle may be able to stand without slipping and pitching and falling, individually orcollectively, and to avoid the production of panics and hazard to the animals on accountor cattle were transported in this case. Captain Summerville of the steamship Taming, avery intelligent and experienced seaman, has testified, as a witness in behalf of theGovernment, and stated positively that since the introduction in the ships with which heis acquainted of the stall system for the transportation of animals and cattle he hassuffered no loss whatever during the last year. The defendant has testified, as a witnessin his own behalf, that according to his experience the system of carrying cattle looseupon the decks and in the hold is preferable and more secure to the life and comfort ofthe animals, but this theory of the case is not maintainable, either by the proofs or

common reason. It can not be urged with logic that, for instance, three hundred cattlesupports for the feet and without stalls or any other protection for them individually cansafely and suitably carried in times of storm upon the decks and in the holds of ships;such a theory is against the law of nature. One animal falling or pitching, if he is untied orunprotected, might produce a serious panic and the wounding of half the animals uponthe ship if transported in the manner found in this case.

The defendant was found guilty, and sentenced to pay a fine of two hundred and fifty pesos,with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. The sentence and

judgment is affirmed. So ordered.

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