WMSU LLB 2A 2015 CrimProc Atty. F. Sales 1 MAS CRI MI NALPROCEDURE: PRELI MI NARY I NVESTI GATI ONCASES TABLEOFCONTENTS G.R. No. 168811 Marilyn Co vs Republic .................................................................................................................... 2 G.R. No. 158236 Ligaya Santos vs Domingo Orda Jr. ........................................................................................... 10 G.R. No. 149148 Mendoza-Arce vs Office of Ombudsman ................................................................................. 22 G.R. No. 131144 Advincula vs CA................................................................................................................................. 31 G.R. No. 127107 Dimatulac vs Villon .......................................................................................................................... 37 G.R. No. 72301 Ponsica vs Ignalaga ............................................................................................................................ 63 G.R. No. 164268 Torres Jr. vs Aguinaldo .................................................................................................................. 77 G.R. No. 106087 Go vs CA ................................................................................................................................................ 87 WMSU LLB 2A 2015 CrimProc Atty. F. Sales 2 MAS G. R. NO. 168811MARILYNCOVSREPUBLIC Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 168811 November 28, 2007 MARILYN H. CO and WILSON C. CO, Petitioners,vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON. EUFRONIO K. MARISTELA, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, San Jose, Camarines Sur, Branch 30, and JOCELYN FRANCIA, Respondents. D E C I S I O N CARPIO, J.: The Case Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 3 January 2005 Decision2 and 30 June 2005 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 82155. The Antecedent Facts On 15 May 2001, at around 5:00 p.m., Miguel Antonio Francia (Miguel) was shot dead in front of his house in Caramoan, Camarines Sur by Sgt. Roberto Reyes4 (Sgt. Reyes), a member of the Philippine Army. Jocelyn Francia (Jocelyn), Miguels widow, filed a complaint for Murder against Sgt. Reyes and John Does. Mayor Marilyn H. Co (Mayor Co) and Wilson C. Co (petitioners)5 were included as principals by induction. The motive for the killing was allegedly Miguels shift of loyalty to Mayor Cos political opponent. Sgt. Reyes and the John Does in the complaint were allegedly Mayor Cos bodyguards. While Miguel was at the Caramoan Municipal Hospital, Sgt. Reyes, SPO2 Ramil Araas (SPO2 Araas), and a John Doe allegedly entered the Francias house against Jocelyns will. They searched for papers and other effects, and caused chaos and disarray in the house. Accordingly, Jocelyn also filed a complaint for Violation of Domicile against Sgt. Reyes, SPO2 Araas, and John Doe. The accused alleged that Miguel was drunk and unruly, and indiscriminately fired his 9 mm pistol. Sgt. Reyes, who was at the vicinity, accosted Miguel and fired a warning shot. However, Miguel pointed his pistol at Sgt. Reyes. Sgt. Reyes was forced to shoot Miguel who was hit at his right thigh. Sgt. Reyes and his companions brought Miguel to the Caramoan Municipal Hospital where he died due to loss of blood. WMSU LLB 2A 2015 CrimProc Atty. F. Sales 3 MAS After the preliminary investigation, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of San Jose, Camarines Sur issued a Joint Resolution6 dated 30 August 2001, as follows: WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing consideration, let the case against SPO2 Ramil Araas, Roberto Reyes, Mayor Marilyn Co, Wilson Co and other John Does for Murder be dismissed for lack of probable cause and an information for Homicide be filed against Sgt. Gilbert Reyes, P.A.[,] with the proper court[,] his allegations of self-defense being evidentiary in nature and another information for Violation of Domicile against Sgt. Gilbert Reyes and another John Doe be filed with the proper court, as the case against SPO2 Ramil Araas, for lack of probable cause[,] is hereby dismissed. SO RESOLVED.7 Jocelyn filed a petition for review before the Department of Justice (DOJ). In a Resolution8 promulgated on 25 June 2002, the DOJ resolved: WHEREFORE, the assailed resolution is hereby MODIFIED. The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Camarines Sur is hereby directed to file the Information for murder against respondents SPO2 Ramil Araas, Sgt. Gilbert Reyes, Mayor Marilyn Co, Wilson Co and John Does, and another information for violation of domicile against respondents SPO2 Ramil Araas, Sgt. Gilbert Reyes and a certain John Doe. The Provincial Prosecutor is further directed to report to this Office the action taken within ten (10) days from receipt thereof. SO ORDERED.9 On 2 July 2002,10 Provincial Prosecutor Agapito Rosales filed a new Information for Murder against the accused. The accused filed a motion to suspend proceedings pending the motion for reconsideration of the DOJs 25 June 2002 Resolution. Jocelyn, through a private prosecutor, filed a motion for issuance of warrants of arrest against the accused. Jocelyn thereafter filed a motion for inhibition of Judge Alfredo Cabral (Judge Cabral) for loss of trust and confidence due to the delay in the issuance of the warrants of arrest. Judge Cabral granted Jocelyns motion and the cases were transferred to the sala of Judge Eufronio K. Maristela of the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Camarines Sur, Branch 30 (trial court). In an Order11 dated 13 September 2002, the trial court denied the motion to suspend proceedings as well as the motion for the issuance of warrants of arrest. Instead, the trial court set the cases for preliminary investigation of Jocelyn and her witnesses to determine probable cause. During the scheduled preliminary investigation on 23 September 2002, only Dr. Minerva Balmacea-Aguirre of Caramoan Municipal Hospital appeared. Jocelyn and her witnesses did not appear for fear for their lives. The private prosecutor moved for the suspension of the judicial determination of probable cause as he was filing a petition for change of venue. In an Order dated 14 October 2002, the trial court held in abeyance the presentation of additional evidence for judicial determination of probable cause. However, this Court subsequently denied the private prosecutors motion for change of venue. WMSU LLB 2A 2015 CrimProc Atty. F. Sales 4 MAS In an Order dated 19 May 2003,12 the trial court held that no probable cause exists against the accused for the crime of Murder. The trial court dismissed the Information for Murder but upheld the Information for Homicide against Sgt. Reyes. The trial court issued another warrant of arrest against Sgt. Reyes. The private prosecutor moved for reconsideration of the 19 May 2003 Order. On 13 August 2003,13 the trial court granted the motion and set the presentation of additional evidence for judicial determination of probable cause on 29 August 2003. Meanwhile, on 12 August 2003, Jocelyn executed an Affidavit of Retraction/Desistance absolving the accused, particularly petitioners, from liability for Miguels death. On 28 August 2003, the private prosecutor filed an Omnibus Motion to Admit Affidavit of Desistance of Private Complainant Jocelyn Francia and to Dismiss the Case. On 29 August 2003, neither the government nor the private prosecutor appeared at the scheduled hearing. None of the witnesses stated in the subpoena appeared. In an Order dated 21 October 2003,14 the trial court dismissed the Information for Murder against SPO2 Araas, Sgt. Reyes, John Does, and petitioners for lack of probable cause. The trial court again sustained the Information for Homicide against Sgt. Reyes. The private prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration. In its Order dated 17 December 2003,15 the trial court denied the motion. Jocelyn, joined by Miguels sons Antonio Francia II and Mark Anthony Francia (collectively, the heirs of Miguel), filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals assailing the 21 October 2003 Order of the trial court. The heirs of Miguel alleged that the 21 October 2003 Order was issued despite Jocelyns submission of an Affidavit withdrawing her Affidavit of Desistance and despite her lack of affirmation in open court of the Affidavit of Desistance. The heirs of Miguel further alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the Information for Murder for lack of probable cause to sustain the charges against the accused. The Ruling of the Court of Appeals In its 3 January 2005 Decision, the Court of Appeals set aside the trial courts 21 October 2003 and 17 December 2003 Orders. The dispositive portion of the 3 January 2005 Decision reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is impressed with merit. Perforce, the questioned Orders dated October 21, 2003 and December 17, 2003 are hereby reversed and set aside for being issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack and/or in excess of jurisdiction. The respondent court, therefore, is hereby ordered to enforce the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice promulgated on 25 June 2002 (Annex I, pp. 153 to 161, Rollo) and in pursuance thereto, to re-admit the information filed by Provincial Prosecutor Agapito B. Rosales dated July 4, 2002 (Annex "J", p. 162, Rollo). SO ORDERED.16 The Court of Appeals distinguished between a preliminary investigation for the determination of sufficient ground for the filing of information on one hand, and preliminary examination for the determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest on the other. The Court of Appeals ruled that in this case, the incident before the trial court was the determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest against the accused. The trial court was not tasked to WMSU LLB 2A 2015 CrimProc Atty. F. Sales 5 MAS determine whether there was a probable cause to prosecute the accused for the crime of Murder. The determination of probable cause to prosecute the accused for Murder falls within the jurisdiction of the prosecutor. This was already settled with the issuance of the 25 June 2002 Resolution by the Secretary of Justice and with the filing of an Information for Murder before the trial court. The Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court went beyond its jurisdiction when it assumed the duty and function of the prosecutor. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 30 June 2005 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the motion. Hence, petitioners came to this Court, raising the following arguments:17 1. The Court of Appeals erred when it reversed the order of the trial court considering that there was clearly no probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners. 2. The Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it found that the trial court arrogated unto itself the functions of the public prosecutor. The Issue The sole issue in this case is: Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in reversing the trial courts 21 October 2003 Order which dismissed the Information for Murder against petitioners, SPO2 Araas, Sgt. Reyes, and John Does for lack of probable cause. The Ruling of this Court The petition has no merit. Preliminary Investigation Should be Distinguished from Preliminary Examination In this case, what was brought before the trial court was the preliminary examination. The trial courts jurisdiction is limited to the determination of whether there is probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest against the accused. Instead, the trial court assumed the function of the prosecutor by determining whether there was probable cause for the filing of the information for Murder. In Salta v. Court of Appeals,18 the Court already ruled that Section 2 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure no longer authorizes Regional Trial Court Judges to conduct preliminary investigations. In Castillo v. Villaluz,19 the Court reiterated: Judges of Regional Trial Courts (formerly Court of First Instance) no longer have authority to conduct preliminary investigations. That authority, at one time reposed in them under Sections 13, 14 and 16, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court of 1964, was removed from them by the 1985 Rules on WMSU LLB 2A 2015 CrimProc Atty. F. Sales 6 MAS Criminal Procedure, effective on January 1, 1985, which deleted all provisions granting that power to said Judges. x x x The 1988 Amendments to the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, declared effective on October 1, 1988, did not restore that authority to Judges of Regional Trial Courts; said amendments did not in fact deal at all with the officers or courts having authority to conduct preliminary investigations. This is not to say, however, that somewhere along the line RTC Judges also lost the power to make a preliminary examination for the purpose of determining whether probable cause exists to justify the issuance of a warrant of arrest (or search warrant). Such a power indeed, it is as much a duty as it is a power has been and remains vested in every judge by the provision in the Bill of Rights in the 1935, the 1973 and the present (1987) Constitutions securing the people against unreasonable searches and seizures, thereby placing it beyond the competence of mere Court rule or statute to revoke. The distinction must, therefore, be made clear while an RTC Judge may no longer conduct preliminary investigations to ascertain whether there is sufficient ground for the filing of a criminal complaint or information, he retains the authority, when such a pleading is filed with his court, to determine whether there is probable cause justifying the issuance of a warrant of arrest. x x x.20 The Court again reiterated this rule in People v. Inting21 where we further explained: Judges and Prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry which determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or released. Even if the two inquiries are conducted in the course of one and the same proceeding, there should be no confusion about the objectives. The determination of probable cause for the warrant of arrest is made by the Judge. The preliminary investigation proper whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and, therefore, whether or not he should be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial is the function of the Prosecutor. x x x We reiterate that preliminary investigation should be distinguished as to whether it is an investigation for the determination of a sufficient ground for the filing of the information or it is an investigation for the determination of a probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The first kind of preliminary investigation is executive in nature. It is part of the prosecutions job. The second kind of preliminary investigation which is more properly called preliminary examination is judicial in nature and is lodged with the judge. x x x22 Clearly, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in assuming the function of the prosecutor.1wphi1 It should have limited itself to the determination of the existence of probable cause for the purpose of issuing warrants of arrest against the accused. The Court of Appeals did not err in reversing the trial courts Order which dismissed the information for Murder filed against the accused. Petitioners Arguments are Evidentiary in Nature Petitioners further allege that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the order of the trial court because there is clearly no probable cause for the issuance of the warrants of arrest against them. Petitioners allege that the admitted facts show that their co-accused who are law enforcers were WMSU LLB 2A 2015 CrimProc Atty. F. Sales 7 MAS performing their functions to maintain order and enforce the law. Petitioners further allege that the physical evidence, consisting of the injuries suffered by Miguel, eliminates the element of treachery. Petitioners allege that the location of the wound totally negates intent to kill. Petitioners also allege that there is no evidence of abuse of superior strength. The fact that Miguel was taken to the hospital only 15 minutes after he was shot was nobodys fault and should not be taken as an attempt to hide intent to kill. Finally, petitioners allege that the only evidence linking them to the crime is hearsay in character. Again, the trial court went beyond the determination for the issuance of warrants of arrest. The trial court made a judicial determination of probable cause for the filing of an information against the accused. Petitioners arguments are matters of defense and are evidentiary in nature. They are best left for the trial court to resolve after a full-blown trial on the merits.23 WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 3 January 2005 Decision and 30 June 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 82155. SO ORDERED. ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice WE CONCUR: ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ* Associate Justice CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice A T T E S T A T I O N I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. ANTONIO T. CARPIO** Associate Justice Acting Chairperson C E R T I F I C A T I O N Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. WMSU LLB 2A 2015 CrimProc Atty. F. Sales 8 MAS CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Acting Chief Justice Footnotes * As replacement of Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing who is on official leave per Administrative Circular No. 84-2007. ** Acting Chairperson. 1 Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. 2 Rollo, pp. 65-83. Penned by Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes with Associate Justices Eugenio S. Labitoria and Rosalinda Asuncion-Vicente, concurring. 3 Id. at 84-85. 4 Also referred to as Sgt. Gilbert Reyes. 5 Sgt. Reyes, SPO2 Araas, John Does, and petitioners are collectively referred to as the accused in this Decision. 6 Rollo, pp. 111-130. Signed by 3rd Asst. Provincial Prosecutor and OIC Esperidion R. Solano, with 2nd Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Eulogio I. Prima recommending approval. Provincial Prosecutor Agapito B. Rosales approved and signed the Joint Resolution. 7 Id. at 130. 8 Id. at 180-187. 9 Id. at 187. 10 Id. at 189. 5 July 2002 in the RTC Order of 13 September 2002. 11 Id. at 189-193. 12 Id. at 200-202. 13 12 August 2003 in the CA Decision. 14 Rollo, pp. 194-198. 15 CA rollo, p. 36. 16 Rollo, pp. 82-83. Emphasis in the original. WMSU LLB 2A 2015 CrimProc Atty. F. Sales 9 MAS 17 Id. at 28. 18 227 Phil. 213 (1986). 19 G.R. No. 34285, 8 March 1989, 171 SCRA 39. 20 Id. at 42-43. Emphasis in the original. 21 G.R. No. 88919, 25 July 1990, 187 SCRA 788. 22 Id. at 792-794. See also AAA v. Carbonell, G.R. No. 171465, 8 June 2007. 23 See Redulla v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 167973, 28 February 2007, 517 SCRA 110. WMSU LLB 2A 2015 CrimProc Atty. F. Sales 10 MAS G. R. NO. 158236LIGAYASANTOSVSDOMINGOORDAJR.Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 158236 September 1, 2004 LIGAYA V. SANTOS, petitioner,vs. DOMINGO I. ORDA, JR., respondent. D E C I S I O N CALLEJO, SR., J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 72962 granting the petition for certiorari filed by Domingo I. Orda, Jr. and nullifying the Orders2 of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City, Branch 258 dated July 5, 2002 and July 23, 2002 in People v. Ligaya V. Santos, et al., for murder, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 01-0921 and 01-0425. The Antecedents On January 17, 2001, Dale B. Orda, a college student and son of respondent, Assistant City Prosecutor of Manila Domingo Orda, Jr., was shot by a male person on a motorcycle at the corner of Ayala Boulevard and San Marcelino Street, Manila. Dale was then seated at the passengers seat at the back of their car, while his father was at the wheel. Fortunately, Dale survived the shooting.3 At about 6:20 p.m. on April 2, 2001, another son of the respondent, Francis Orda, a twenty-year-old senior engineering student of the Mapua Institute of Technology, was shot to death at Saudi Arabia Street corner Sierra Leone Street, Better Living Subdivision, Barangay Don Bosco, Paraaque City. Gina Azarcon, a helper at the Bakers Brew Coffee Shop at the corner of Saudi Arabia and Somalia Streets, Barangay Don Bosco, gave a sworn statement to the police investigators on April 1, 2001, declaring that three male persons perpetrated the crime, two of whom shot the victim inside his car.4 On April 7, 2001, Azarcon gave a supplemental affidavit pointing to and identifying Rolly Tonion and Jhunrey Soriano as two of the assailants.5 An Information was filed in the RTC of Paraaque City, docketed as Criminal Case No. 01-0425 on April 18, 2001, charging Rolly Tonion alias "Komang" and Jhunrey Soriano with murder for the killing of Francis Orda.6 The accused filed a petition for bail. The prosecution presented Gina Azarcon as its witness in opposition to the petition. WMSU LLB 2A 2015 CrimProc Atty. F. Sales 11 MAS On June 7, 2001, Ernesto M. Regala and his son, Dennis C. Regala, a barangay tanod of Barangay 659, Arroceros, Ermita, Manila, executed separate affidavits before the Assistant City Prosecutor of Paraaque City. Ernesto narrated that at about 10:00 p.m. on April 1, 2001, he sent his son, Dennis, to deliver collections from the public toilet at Arroceros to Barangay Chairman Ligaya Santos. When Dennis had not yet arrived by 11:00 p.m., he decided to fetch his son. While they were in Santos office, Dennis and Ernesto heard Santos saying, "Gusto ko malinis na trabaho at walang bulilyaso, baka makaligtas na naman si Orda." They saw Santos give a gun to Rolly Tonion, who was then with Edna Cortez, a certain Nognog, Ronnie Ybaez, and another male companion. Dennis then gave Ernestos collection amounting to P400 to Santos. At 11:00 p.m. on April 2, 2001, Cortez told Ernesto that the son of the assistant city prosecutor was ambushed at the Better Living Subdivision, and that the latter was fortunate because the bullet intended for him hit his son instead.7 For his part, Dennis alleged that at 9:00 a.m. on April 3, 2001, Tonion asked him to return the gun to Santos for him, but that he refused to do so. On April 15, 2001, Santos asked him to monitor the activities of the respondent and his son at the store owned by the latter, located at the LRT Station at Arroceros. The respondent executed an affidavit-complaint dated June 7, 2001 and filed the same in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Paraaque City, charging Santos, Cortez and Ybaez with murder for the death of his son Francis.8The case was docketed as I.S. No. 01-F-2052. In her counter-affidavit, Santos denied the charge and claimed that the affidavits executed by Ernesto and Dennis were all lies. She averred that she was in their house in Cavite City on April 1, 2001 and returned to Manila only in the early morning of April 2, 2001. Her alibi was corroborated by the affidavits of Anthony Alejado, Marianito Fuentes, Normita Samonte, and Lilian Lemery. She also denied Dennis claims that she asked him to monitor the activities of the respondent and his son on April 15, 2001. She alleged that the respondent filed the charge and other baseless charges against her to enable him to gain control over Plaza Lawton where his store was located. Cortez also denied the charge. She claimed in her affidavit that Santos was not in her office on April 1, 2001, it being a Sunday. She alleged that the affidavits of Dennis and Ernesto were lies. On July 31, 2001, the investigating prosecutor issued a Resolution finding probable cause against Santos and Cortez for murder.9 An Information for murder was, thereafter, filed on August 29, 2001 against Santos and Cortez, docketed as Criminal Case No. 01-0921.10 On August 30, 2001, Azarcon executed an affidavit implicating Barangay Kagawad Christopher Castillo, his brother Girlie Castillo, and Robert Bunda for the killing of Francis. On the same day, the respondent executed an affidavit-complaint charging them for the same crime.11 On September 7, 2001, the trial court issued an Order requiring the prosecutor to submit additional evidence against Cortez.12 Sabino M. Frias, thereafter, executed an affidavit on September 18, 2001, implicating Santos, Cortez, the Castillo brothers, Bunda, and Pedro Jimenez, the driver of Santos, in the killing of Francis.13 Meanwhile, Santos, Cortez, and Ybaez filed a petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor in I.S. No. 01-F-2052 in the Department of Justice (DOJ).14 On their motion, the trial court suspended the proceedings against Santos and Cortez and the issuance of warrants for their arrest. However, on September 12, 2001, Azarcon executed an affidavit recanting her statement against the Castillo brothers and Bunda.15 WMSU LLB 2A 2015 CrimProc Atty. F. Sales 12 MAS In the meantime, during the hearing on October 23, 2001, the prosecution terminated the presentation of its testimonial evidence in Criminal Case No. 01-0425 on the accused Tonion and Sorianos petition for bail and offered its documentary evidence. The accused presented Azarcon as their first witness to prove their innocence of the crime charged. On November 12, 2001, the public prosecutor issued a Resolution in I.S. No. 01-H-3410 finding probable cause for murder against the Castillo brothers and Bunda. On November 28, 2001, the public prosecutor filed a motion to amend information and to admit amended information against them as additional accused.16 The accused, thereafter, filed a petition for review of the resolution of the public prosecutor before the DOJ on January 7, 2002.17 They also filed a motion to suspend proceedings and the issuance of warrants of arrest in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-0425 and 01-0921 and a motion to admit newly discovered evidence, namely, Azarcons affidavit of recantation.18 The public prosecutor opposed the motion and filed a motion to admit second amended information with Pedro Jimenez as additional accused.19 On February 5, 2002, the trial court issued an Order denying the motion of the accused Castillo brothers and Bunda and ordering the issuance of warrants for the arrest of Santos and Cortez.20 The court then issued the said warrants based on its finding of probable cause against them21 for lack of probable cause to recall the warrants of arrest, and to examine the witnesses. The court, however, denied the motion on the ground that it had not yet acquired jurisdiction over their persons and it had not yet received any resolution from the Secretary of Justice on their petition for review. On February 20, 2002, the trial court issued an Order denying the petition for bail by Tonion and Soriano,22 ruling that the evidence of guilt was strong. In the meantime, Ernesto and Dennis recanted their affidavits.23 During the trial on April 23, 2002 in Criminal Case No. 01-0425, accused Tonion and Soriano presented Dennis as their witness.24 On April 26, 2002, the trial court issued an Order admitting the second amended Information against the Castillo brothers, Bunda, and Jimenez and ordering the issuance of warrants for their arrest.25 On April 29, 2002, the said warrants were issued by the court. On June 11, 2002, Secretary of Justice Hernando B. Perez issued a Joint Resolution reversing the assailed resolution of the public prosecutor and directing the latter to withdraw the Informations against Santos, Cortez, Bunda, the Castillo brothers, and Jimenez. The Secretary of Justice found Azarcon, Frias, Dennis, and Ernesto incredible witnesses because of their recantations, to wit: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed resolutions are hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The City Prosecutor of Paraaque City is hereby directed to cause the withdrawal of the criminal Informations for murder filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 258, Paraaque City, against respondents LIGAYA SANTOS, EDNA CORTEZ and RONNIE YBAEZ (I.S. No. 01-F-2052) and against respondents CHRISTOPHER and GIRLIE CASTILLO and ROBERT BUNDA (I.S. No. 01-H-3410) and to report to this Department the action taken within ten (10) days from receipt hereof. SO ORDERED.26 On June 27, 2002, the respondent filed a motion for reconsideration thereof. However, the public prosecutor filed a motion to withdraw the Informations in the two cases on June 20, 2002 in compliance WMSU LLB 2A 2015 CrimProc Atty. F. Sales 13 MAS with the joint resolution of the Secretary of Justice. On July 2, 2002, the respondent filed a comment/opposition to the motion to withdraw the Informations filed by the public prosecutor, contending: I- THAT COMPLAINANT HEREBY ADOPTS ITS POSITION RAISED IN ITS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION FILED WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (COPY ATTACHED AS ANNEX "A"). HENCE, THE DETERMINATION OF THE INSTANT MOTION IS STILL PREMATURE ESPECIALLY SO THAT ALL THE ACCUSED-MOVANTS ARE STILL AT LARGE, EVADING SERVICE OF ARREST WARRANT, IN WHICH CASE THEY ARE NOT ENTITLED TO ANY RELIEF; II- THAT THE LATE (SIC) FINDINGS OF NO PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE ACCUSED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE IS NOT BINDING; III- THAT THE HONORABLE COURT HAS JUDICIOUSLY AND SOUNDLY ADJUDGED THE EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE; and, IV- THAT TO GIVE DUE COURSE TO THE INSTANT MOTION WOULD ONLY CREATE CHAOS AND INJUSTICE.27 Pending resolution of the motion for reconsideration, the trial court issued an Order on July 5, 2002 granting the motion of the public prosecutor to withdraw the Informations in the interest of justice and equity.28 The trial court ruled that such withdrawal would not prevent the refiling of the Informations against the accused who would not be able to invoke double jeopardy, considering that the court had not yet acquired jurisdiction over their persons. The private complainant filed a motion for reconsideration of the order which was not opposed by the public prosecutor. Nonetheless, on July 23, 2002, the trial court issued an Order denying the motion on the ground that it could not order the refiling of the Informations if the DOJ and the public prosecutor refused to do so.29 The respondent forthwith filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA) assailing the orders of the trial court. On March 19, 2003, the CA rendered a Decision granting the petition. The appellate court ruled that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the withdrawal of the Informations without making an independent evaluation on the merits of the case. Santos filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision and a supplement to the said motion, which was opposed by the respondent. On May 6, 2003, Santos and Cortez were arrested based on the warrants issued by the trial court. On May 22, 2003, the CA issued a resolution denying the said motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. Santos filed a petition for review on certiorari with this Court contending as follows: A.) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED GRAVELY AND ACTED ARBITRARILY IN NULLIFYING THE ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT GRANTING THE PROSECUTIONS MOTION TO WITHDRAW THE INFORMATIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES NOS. 01-0921 AND 01-0425 PURSUANT TO DOJ JOINT RESOLUTION DATED 11 JUNE 2002. B.) THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN DIRECTLY REINSTATING THE CRIMINAL COMPLAINTS, INCLUDING THE WARRANTS OF ARREST, WITHOUT AFFORDING THE WMSU LLB 2A 2015 CrimProc Atty. F. Sales 14 MAS TRIAL COURT THE OPPORTUNITY TO EXERCISE ITS JUDICIAL PREROGATIVE OF DETERMINING WHETHER TO PURSUE OR DISMISS THE COMPLAINTS PURSUANT TO ITS OWN EVALUATION OF THE CASE AND EVIDENCE IN LIGHT OF THE DOJ JOINT RESOLUTION FINDING LACK OF PROBABLE CAUSE.30 The threshold issue is whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in granting the public prosecutors motion to withdraw the Informations and in lifting the warrant of arrest against the petitioner on the Secretary of Justices finding that there was no probable cause for the filing of the said Informations. The petitioner avers that the trial court did not abuse its judicial discretion when it granted the motion of the public prosecutor to withdraw the two Informations as ordered by the Secretary of Justice in his Joint Resolution on the finding that there was no probable cause against the accused therein to be charged with murder. The petitioner asserts that, by allowing the withdrawal of the Informations without an independent assessment of the merit of the evidence and without prejudice to the refiling thereof, the court did not thereby order the dismissal of the cases for insufficiency of evidence. The petitioner posits that, after all, the trial court had not yet acquired complete criminal jurisdiction to resolve the cases because it had not yet acquired jurisdiction over the persons of all the accused. The petitioner argues that the CA erred in relying on the rulings of this Court in Crespo v. Mogul31 and Perez v. Hagonoy Rural Bank, Inc.32 because the said cases involve the withdrawal of the Informations and the dismissal of the cases for insufficiency of evidence. In contrast, the public prosecutor filed a motion merely to withdraw the Informations and not to dismiss the cases due to insufficiency of evidence. In its comment on the petition, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) avers that the decision of the CA is in conformity with the rulings of this Court in Balgos, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan,33 Dee v. Court of Appeals,34 Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,35 Ledesma v. Court of Appeals,36 Jalandoni v. Drilon37 and Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. How.38 The OSG asserts that the rulings of this Court apply whether the motion filed by the public prosecutor was for the withdrawal of the Informations due to lack of probable cause or insufficiency of evidence. The OSG avers that the trial court had acquired jurisdiction over the persons of all the accused, either by their respective arrests or by the filing of pleadings before the court praying for affirmative reliefs. In her reply to the comment of the OSG, the petitioner insisted that she did not submit herself to the jurisdiction of the trial court by filing her motion to quash the Informations for lack of probable cause and to examine the witnesses before the issuance of the warrant of arrest against her. As the trial court itself held, it had not yet acquired jurisdiction over her person. In nullifying the assailed orders of the trial court, the appellate court ratiocinated as follows: To support these assigned errors, petitioner contends that the respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion when he granted the Motion to Withdraw Informations filed by his trial prosecutor based on the Joint Resolution of the Department of Justice and in denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. We resolve to grant this petition considering that this contention is impressed with merit. WMSU LLB 2A 2015 CrimProc Atty. F. Sales 15 MAS The rule, therefore, in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court, any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court, he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court which has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation (Crespo v. Mogul, 151 SCRA 462). However, if the trial court has failed to make an independent finding of the merits of the case or make an independent evaluation or assessment of the merits of the case, but merely anchored the dismissal of the case on the revised position of the prosecution, the trial court has relinquished the discretion he was duty-bound to exercise because, in effect, it is the prosecution through the Department of Justice which decides what to do and that the trial court was reduced into a mere rubber stamp, in violation of the ruling in Crespo vs. Mogul (Martinez vs. Court of Appeals, 237 SCRA 576, 577), which is the situation obtaining in this case considering that the dismissal of the criminal cases against private respondents was based solely on [the] recommendation of the Secretary of Justice because the reliance of public respondent Judge was based solely on the prosecutors averment that the Secretary of Justice had recommended the dismissal of the case against private respondent which is an abdication of the trial courts duty and jurisdiction to determine a prima facie case, in blatant violation of the courts pronouncement in Crespo vs. Mogul (Perez vs. Hagonoy Rural Bank, 327 SCRA 588). Moreover, public respondent having already issued the warrants of arrest on private respondents which, in effect, means that a probable cause exists in those criminal cases, it was an error to dismiss those cases without making an independent evaluation especially that the bases of the probable cause are the same evidence which mere made the bases of the Joint Resolution dated June 11, 2002 of the Secretary of Justice. Consequently, the dismissal order dated July 5, 2002 having been issued upon an erroneous exercise of judicial discretion, the same must have to be set aside.39 We agree with the appellate court. In Crespo v. Mogul,40 the Court held that once a criminal complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case or dismissal or acquittal or conviction of the accused rests within the exclusive jurisdiction, competence, and discretion of the trial court. The trial court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the public prosecutor should be addressed to the court who has the option to grant or deny the same. Contrary to the contention of the petitioner, the rule applies to a motion to withdraw the Information or to dismiss the case even before or after arraignment of the accused.41 The only qualification is that the action of the court must not impair the substantial rights of the accused or the right of the People or the private complainant to due process of law.42 When the trial court grants a motion of the public prosecutor to dismiss the case, or to quash the Information, or to withdraw the Information in compliance with the directive of the Secretary WMSU LLB 2A 2015 CrimProc Atty. F. Sales 16 MAS of Justice, or to deny the said motion, it does so not out of subservience to or defiance of the directive of the Secretary of Justice but in sound exercise of its judicial prerogative.43 In resolving a motion to dismiss the case or to withdraw the Information filed by the public prosecutor on his own initiative or pursuant to the directive of the Secretary of Justice, either for insufficiency of evidence in the possession of the prosecutor or for lack of probable cause, the trial court should not rely solely and merely on the findings of the public prosecutor or the Secretary of Justice that no crime was committed or that the evidence in the possession of the public prosecutor is insufficient to support a judgment of conviction of the accused. As the Court emphasized in Martinez v. Court of Appeals,44 the trial court must make an independent evaluation or assessment of the merits of the case and the evidence on record of the prosecution: Secondly, the dismissal was based merely on the findings of the Acting Secretary of Justice that no libel was committed. The trial judge did not make an independent evaluation or assessment of the merits of the case. Reliance was placed solely on the conclusion of the prosecution that "there is no sufficient evidence against the said accused to ascertain the allegation in the information" and on the supposed lack of objection to the motion to dismiss, this last premise being, however, questionable, the prosecution having failed, as observed, to give private complainant a copy of the motion to dismiss. In other words, the grant of the motion to dismiss was based upon considerations other than the judges own personal individual conviction that there was no case against the accused. Whether to approve or disapprove the stand taken by the prosecution is not the exercise of discretion required in cases like this. The trial judge must himself be convinced that there was, indeed, no sufficient evidence against the accused, and this conclusion can be arrived at only after an assessment of the evidence in the possession of the prosecution. What was imperatively required was the trial judges own assessment of such evidence, it not being sufficient for the valid and proper exercise of judicial discretion merely to accept the prosecutions word for its supposed insufficiency. As aptly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General, in failing to make an independent finding of the merits of the case and merely anchoring the dismissal on the revised position of the prosecution, the trial judge relinquished the discretion he was duty bound to exercise. In effect, it was the prosecution, through the Department of Justice which decided what to do and not the court which was reduced to a mere rubber stamp in violation of the ruling in Crespo v. Mogul. The dismissal order having been issued in violation of private complainants right to due process as well as upon an erroneous exercise of judicial discretion, the Court of Appeals did not err in setting aside said dismissal order and remanding the case to the trial court for arraignment of petitioner as accused therein and for further proceedings. Indeed, it bears stressing that the trial court is not bound to adopt the resolution of the Secretary of Justice since it is mandated to independently evaluate or assess the merits of the case and it may either agree or disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice. Reliance alone on the resolution of the Secretary of Justice would be an abdication of the trial courts duty and jurisdiction to determine a prima facie case.45 WMSU LLB 2A 2015 CrimProc Atty. F. Sales 17 MAS The trial court may make an independent assessment of the merits of the case based on the affidavits and counter-affidavits, documents, or evidence appended to the Information; the records of the public prosecutor which the court may order the latter to produce before the court;46 or any evidence already adduced before the court by the accused at the time the motion is filed by the public prosecutor. In this case, the trial court failed to make an independent assessment of the merits of the cases and the evidence on record or in the possession of the public prosecutor. In granting the motion of the public prosecutor to withdraw the Informations, the trial court relied solely on the joint resolution of the Secretary of Justice, as gleaned from its assailed order: For resolution is the Motion to Withdraw Criminal Informations filed on June 21, 2002 by the Office of the City Prosecutor, this jurisdiction, to which a Comment/Opposition thereto was filed by private complainant Domingo I. Orda, Jr. on July 2, 2002. It appears that the motion is in compliance with the Joint Resolution of the Department of Justice (DOJ) promulgated on June 11, 2002 directing said Office to cause the withdrawal of the criminal informations for murder against the accused, Ligaya V. Santos, Edna Cortez, and Ronnie Ybaez, in Crim. Case No. 01-0921 (I.S. No. 01-F-2052) and against Christopher Castillo, Girlie Castillo, and Robert Bunda in Crim. Case No. 01-0425 (I.S. No. 01-H-3410), copy of which was received by this Court on June 19, 2002. The Court, after going over the Comment/Opposition filed by the private complainant, vis--vis the Joint Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of the DOJ, is of the firm belief and honest opinion and so holds that meanwhile that the Motion for Reconsideration of the private complainant is pending before the DOJ, justice and equity dictates that this Court has to give due course to the Motion to Withdraw the Criminal Informations, specially so that warrants for the arrest of all the accused have been issued. No injustice, prejudice, or damage will be suffered by the private complainant considering that if ever his Motion for Reconsideration will be granted by the DOJ, said criminal informations may be refiled and the principle of double jeopardy cannot be invoked by all the accused as the Court has not yet acquired jurisdiction over the persons. Upon the other hand, the warrants of arrest will serve as swords of damocles hanging over the heads of the accused if the Court will rule otherwise.47 In granting the public prosecutors motion, the trial court abdicated its judicial power and acted as a mere surrogate of the Secretary of Justice. Worse, as gleaned from the above order, the trial court knew that the Joint Resolution of the Secretary of Justice had not yet become final and executory because the respondent, the private complainant, had filed a timely motion for the reconsideration thereof which had not yet been resolved by the Secretary of Justice. It behooved the trial court to wait for the resolution of the Secretary of Justice on the motion for reconsideration of the respondent before resolving the motion of the public prosecutor to withdraw the Informations. In fine, the trial court acted with inordinate haste. Had the trial court bothered to review its records before issuing its assailed order, it would have recalled that aside from the affidavits of Azarcon, Ernesto and Dennis, there was also the affidavit of Frias implicating the petitioner and the other accused to the killing of Francis and that it even gave credence to the testimony and affidavit of Azarcon when it denied Tonion and Sorianos petition for bail. Moreover, the trial court found probable cause against the petitioner and issued a warrant for her arrest WMSU LLB 2A 2015 CrimProc Atty. F. Sales 18 MAS despite the pendency of her petition for review in the Department of Justice, only to make a complete volte face because of the Joint Resolution of the Secretary of Justice. The bare fact that the trial court had issued warrants of arrest against Santos, Cortez, the Castillo brothers, and Bunda, who were the petitioners in the Department of Justice, did not warrant an outright grant of the public prosecutors motion to withdraw the Informations. The court had already acquired jurisdiction over the cases when the Informations were filed; hence, it had jurisdiction to resolve the motion of the public prosecutor, one way or the other, on its merits. While it may be true that the accused could be incarcerated, as warrants of arrest had already been issued against them pending the resolution of the respondents motion for reconsideration, the same does not justify ignoring the rules and running roughshod over the rights of the respondent. Justice and equity is not for the accused alone; the State and the private complainant are entitled thereto, as well. Moreover, the petitioner had submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the court when she filed her motion to examine the witnesses, and suspend the proceedings and the issuance of a warrant for her arrest. The trial court committed another travesty when it denied the motion for reconsideration of its July 5, 2002 Order, on its ratiocination that In todays hearing on the Motion for Reconsideration, considering that the Public Prosecutor informed the Court that their office will no longer file any opposition thereto, the said Motion for Reconsideration is denied considering that the filing and the withdrawal of an Information is purely an executive function and the Court cannot order the refiling if the Department of Justice or the Public Prosecutors Office refuses to do so. 48 This is so because the July 5, 2002 Order of the court had not yet become final and executory when the private complainant filed her motion for reconsideration of the said order.49 Until and unless the July 5, 2002 Order shall have become final and executory, the Informations filed with the court were not yet considered withdrawn. On the other hand, if the trial court had granted the motion for reconsideration of the respondent and set aside its July 5, 2002 Order, there would no longer be a need to refile the Informations. IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED DUE COURSE. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. Puno*, Austria-Martinez**, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur. Footnotes * On official leave. ** Acting Chairman. 1 Penned by Associate Justice Mercedes Gozo-Dadole, with Associate Justices Bennie A. Adefuin-Dela Cruz and Mariano C. Del Castillo, concurring. WMSU LLB 2A 2015 CrimProc Atty. F. Sales 19 MAS 2 Penned by Judge Raul E. De Leon. 3 Rollo, p. 263. 4 Id. at 11. 5 Id. at 134. 6 Id. at 136. 7 Id. at 140-142. 8 Id. at 139. 9 Id. at 174-176. 10 Id. at 177. 11 Id. at 179. 12 Id. at 502. 13 Id. at 195-197. 14 Id. at 182-190. 15 Id. at 193-194. 16 Id. at 229. 17 Id. at 233-245. 18 Id. at 246-248. 19 Id. at 249. 20 Id. at 251-252. 21 Id. at 253. 22 Id. at 254-262. 23 Id. at 267-270. 24 Id. at 271-306. 25 Id. at 307. WMSU LLB 2A 2015 CrimProc Atty. F. Sales 20 MAS 26 Id. at 321. 27 Id. at 340-341. 28 Id. at 68-69. 29 Id. at 70. 30 Id. at 26. 31 151 SCRA 462 (1987). 32 327 SCRA 588 (2000). 33 176 SCRA 287 (1989). 34 238 SCRA 254 (1994). 35 254 SCRA 307 (1996). 36 278 SCRA 656 (1997). 37 327 SCRA 107 (2000). 38 338 SCRA 511 (2000). 39 Rollo, pp. 62-63. 40 Supra, note 31. 41 Odin Security Agency, Inc. v. Sandiganbayan, 365 SCRA 351 (2001). 42 Martinez v. Court of Appeals, 237 SCRA 575 (1994). 43 Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, supra. 44 Supra, note 42. 45 Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. How, supra. 46 Section 8, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. 47 Rollo, pp. 68-69. 48 Id. at 70. 49 Section 13 of DOJ Circular No. 70 provides: WMSU LLB 2A 2015 CrimProc Atty. F. Sales 21 MAS SECTION 13. Motion for reconsideration. The aggrieved party may file a motion for reconsideration within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from receipt of the resolution on appeal, furnishing the adverse party and the Prosecution Office concerned with copies thereof and submitting proof of such service. No second or further motion for reconsideration shall be entertained. WMSU LLB 2A 2015 CrimProc Atty. F. Sales 22 MAS G. R. NO. 149148MENDOZA-ARCEVSOFFICEOFOMBUDSMAN SECOND DIVISION [G.R. No. 149148. April 5, 2002] SUSAN MENDOZA-ARCE, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN (VISAYAS), PRIMOC.MIRO,DEPUTYOMBUDSMAN,REGIONALTRIALCOURTROXASCITY, EXECUTIVEJUDGE,HONORABLESALVADORGUBATON,OFFICEOFTHECITYFISCAL, HONORABLE JULIUS ABELA, SANTIAGO B. VILLARUZ, respondents. D E C I S I O N MENDOZA, J.: This is a petition for certiorari to annul the resolution, dated April 20, 2001, of the Office of the Ombudsman(Visayas),findinga prima facie caseforviolationof3(e)ofR.A.No.3019(Anti-Graft andCorruptPracticesAct)andArt.171oftheRevisedPenalCodeagainstpetitionerSusan Mendoza-Arce, and the order, dated June 29, 2001, denying her motion for reconsideration. The facts are as follows: Respondent Santiago B. Villaruz is one of the oppositors in Special Proceeding Case No. V-6433, entitledIntheMatterofthePetitiontoApprovetheWillofRemediosBermejo-Villaruz, deceased, v.NicolasP.Villaruz.[1] Thecase,originallyassignedtotheRegionalTrialCourt(RTC), Branch 15, Roxas City, of which Judge Roger B. Patricio was presiding judge, was later re-assigned to Branch 19 of the same court, presided over by Judge (now Justice of the Court of Appeals) Sergio Pestao.[2] RespondentSantiagoB.Villaruzwasoriginallytheadministratoroftheestateofhismother Remedios Bermejo Villaruz. However, in an order issued by the trial court on June 10, 1998, he was removed as such for patent neglect of his legal duties and failure to comply with the court orders. In hisplace,respondentseldestbrother,NicolasB.Villaruz,Jr.,wasappointed regularadministrator, uponfilingandapprovalbythisCourtofanAdministratorsBondintheamountoffiftythousand pesos (P50,000.00).[3] In a motion, dated July 1, 1998, Nicolas filed a motion for the approval of his bond, furnished by the Philippine Surety & Insurance, Inc., in the amount of P50,000.00. Santiago and his brother Jose Ma.VillaruzopposedNicolasmotionandprayedthatJoseMariabeinsteadappointedregular administrator.[4] Attachedtotheiroppositionwasacertification,datedAugust31,1988,executed bytheirmotherRemediosbeforeshepassedaway,authorizingSantiagototakepossessionof and/or to manage her nipa lands, which were then in his care, for a period of 20 years or during her lifetime, whichever was longer. Remedios Bermejo-Villaruz also gave Santiago the option of leasing thepropertiesfor P120,000.00ayearpluslandtaxes.[5] Theoppositorslikewisesubmittedan agreement,datedFebruary6,1993,executedbythethreechildrenofRemediosBermejo-Villaruz, in which they agreed to honor the lease until August 23, 2008.[6] WMSU LLB 2A 2015 CrimProc Atty. F. Sales 23 MAS In an order, dated September 22, 1998, Judge Patricio denied the oppositors opposition, while recognizingthevalidityofthecertificationexecutedbyRemediosBermejo-Villaruzandthe agreement of the heirs, and stated that the administration of the new administrator was subject to them.No mentionoftheagreementwas,however,madeinthedispositiveportionoftheorder, which simply read: WHEREFORE, premises considered, for lack of merit, oppositors Opposition and Motion dated July 15, 1998 is denied, while action on petitioners Motion to Approve Administrators Bond dated July 1, 1998 is held in abeyance until after petitioner submits to this Court, within ten (10) days from receipt of this order, an updated certification from the Supreme Court to the effect that the Philippine Phoenix Surety & Insurance, Inc. has no pending obligation and/ or liability to the government insofar as confiscated bonds in civil and criminal cases are concerned.[7] On October 12, 1998, Judge Sergio Pestao, to whom the case was in the meantime reassigned, approved the administrators bond of respondent Nicolas B. Villaruz, Jr. in an order which stated: It appearing from the Certification issued by the Supreme Court that Philippine Phoenix Surety and Insurance, Inc. has no pending obligation and/ or liabilities to the government insofar as confiscated bonds in civil and criminal cases are concerned, the Administrators bond filed by petitioner Nicolas B. Villaruz, is approved. Send copy of this Order to petitioner through his counsel, to the Clerk of Court of this court, and to the oppositors through their counsel.[8] After receiving a copy of Judge Pestaos order, respondent Susan Mendoza-Arce, Clerk of Court VI of the Regional Trial Court of Roxas City, prepared a Letter of Administration (LOA) which read: KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: That by order of this Court dated October 12, 1998, issued by Honorable Sergio Pestao, Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Roxas City, Nicolas B. Villaruz, Jr. has been appointed Administrator of the estate of Remedios Bermejo-Villaruz, deceased, with full authority to take possession of all property/ies of said deceased in any province or provinces in which it may be situated and to perform all other acts necessary for the preservation of said property, he having filed a bond satisfactory to the Court. Said Administrator shall within three months from the date of this appointment return to the Court a true inventory and appraisal of the real and personal estate of the deceased which have come into his possession or knowledge and shall render a true and just account of his administration to the Court within one year and at any other time when required by the Court. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I sign and seal these presents in Roxas City, Philippines, this 16th day of October 1998. (sgd.) Susan Mendoza-Arce (t)SUSAN MENDOZA-ARCE The LOA was based on the form prescribed in the Manual for Clerks of Court.[9] Accordingly, on December7,1998,administratorNicolasB.Villaruz,Jr.,accompaniedbythreearmedsecurity WMSU LLB 2A 2015 CrimProc Atty. F. Sales 24 MAS guards and respondents Deputy Sheriff Charles Aguiling, took possession of the entire estate of the decedent, including the nipa lands which had been leased to respondent Santiago B. Villaruz.[10] This gave rise to the present action. In a letter-complaint to the Ombudsman, dated March 25, 1999,respondentSantiagoB.Villaruzallegedthatpetitionercommittedtwocrimesinissuingthe LOA, to wit: 1. FalsificationbyapublicofficerunderArticle171,par.3oftheRevisedPenalCode,by attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding statements other than those in fact made by them. 2. Corruptpracticeinviolationof3(e)oftheAnti-GraftandCorruptPracticesAct(R.A.No. 3019)bycausinganyundueinjurytoanyparty,includingtheGovernment,orgivinganyprivate partyanyunwarrantedbenefit,advantageorpreferenceinthedischargeofhisofficial administrativeorjudicialfunctionsthroughmanifestpartiality,evidentbadfaithorgross inexcusable negligence.[11] Attachedtohisletter-complainttotheOmbudsmanwere affidavitsexecutedbyrespondent SantiagoB.Villaruzandhisemployees,namely,TeresitaB.Bechayda,RamonBenliro,Jr.,GarryB. Bonales, Romeo S. Bolante, and Sulpico B. Blanco.[12] In his affidavit, respondent accused petitioner ofactingwithmanifestpartiality,evidentbadfaithandgrossinexcusablenegligencebyfalsely attributingtoJudgePestaotheappointmentofNicolasB.Villaruzasnewadministratorand investing him with full authority to take possession of all property/ies of the decedent, because the fact was that it was Judge Patricio who had appointed Nicolas administrator of the estate subject to thetermsandconditionsoftheleaseagreementinfavorofrespondentSantiagoB.Villaruz. Respondent claimed that he had been deprived of income in the amount of P33,000.00 every week, aswellasofthebancasandboatsusedinhisbusiness,asaresultoftheissuanceoftheorderin question.[13] In her report, dated May 13, 1999, Graft Investigation Officer Estrela Alma A. Singco stated that the allegations in the complaint warrant further investigation and recommended that petitioner be ordered to file her counter-affidavit.[14] Inhercounter-affidavit,datedJune23,1999,petitioneradmittedissuingtheLOAinfavorof NicolasB.Villaruz,Jr.Sheclaimed,however,thatsheactedincompliancewiththeorderof PresidingJudgeSergioPestaoandthat,inpreparingtheLOA,shemerelyadoptedthelegalform prescribed in the Manual for Clerks of Court, whichhad been approved by this Court. She said she issuedtheLOAinline[with]myofficialfunctionswhich[are]ministerialinnatureanddevoidof any bad faith and with manifest partiality.[15] Inareply-affidavit,datedJune29,1999,respondentSantiagoB.Villaruzreiteratedthe argumentsraisedinhisletter-complaintandassertedthatlegalformsaremereguidelinesinthe preparationoflegaldocumentsandthatrespondentusurpedthefunctionsofthebranchclerkof court when she issued the LOA.[16] In a resolution, dated April 20, 2001, Ricardo A. Rebollido, Graft Investigation Officer II, found probablecauseagainstpetitioner.Basedontheaffidavitsandcounter-affidavitssubmittedbythe parties,hefoundpetitionerguiltyofthechargebymakingitappearthatitwasJudgePestao, instead of Judge Patricio, who had appointed Nicolas B. Villaruz as administrator, without regard to theleaseagreementinfavorofrespondentSantiagoB.Villaruz. TheGraftInvestigationOfficer found that although petitioners duties were ministerial, she should have read the order recognizing the lease. The resolution concluded, WMSU LLB 2A 2015 CrimProc Atty. F. Sales 25 MAS All things considered, respondent [now petitioner Susan Mendoza-Arce] in the discharge of her official administrative or judicial functions, through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence caused undue injury to complainant and gave unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference to Administrator Nicolas B. Villaruz, Jr. who has been the one reaping the fruits and products of the said 120 hectares of nipa lands the fruits and products of which lawfully and rightfully belong to complainant as lessee. WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Office finds a prima facie case against respondent ATTY. SUSAN MENDOZA-ARCE for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act 3019 otherwise known as the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices Act, and for the crime of Falsification of Official Document under paragraph 3, Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. Let the corresponding Informations be filed before the proper court.[17] Petitionermovedforareconsideration,maintainingthatherofficialduties asaclerkofcourt wereministerialinnatureandthatshemerelytriedtocomplywiththedispositiveportionof orders and decisions of the trial court. She pointed out that neither the order, dated June 10, 1998, nor the order, dated September 22, 1998, issued by Judge Patricio mentioned the lease of nipa lands and that it was only in the text of the order, dated September 22, 1998, that said lease was referred to.Indischargingherofficialduties,sheargued,shecouldnotbeguiltyof manifestpartiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence, as asserted by complainant.[18] In an order, dated June 29, 2001, the Graft Investigation Officer found no new matters or issues raised therein which would justify the reversal or modification of our earlier findings, and held that inanyeventthegroundsreliedbyrespondentareevidentiarymatterswhichcouldwellbe ventilated before the court of justice. Hence, this petition. WefirstdisposeofaproceduralissueraisedbyrespondentSantiagoB.Villaruz.Inhis Comment,datedOctober12,2001,respondentinvokesRule65,4ofthe1997RulesofCivil Procedureandcontendsthatthepetitionforcertiorariinthiscaseshouldhavebeenfiledinthe Court of Appeals. This provision states in pertinent parts: SEC. 4. When and where petition filed.- The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion. The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals. No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for compelling reason and in no case exceeding fifteen (15) days. Thecontentionhasnomerit. In Tirol,Jr.v.delRosario,[19] weheldthatalthoughasa consequence of the decision in Fabian v. Desierto[20] appeals from the orders, directives, or decisions oftheOmbudsmaninadministrativecasesarenowcognizablebytheCourtofAppeals, neverthelessincasesinwhichitisallegedthattheOmbudsmanhasactedwithgraveabuseof WMSU LLB 2A 2015 CrimProc Atty. F. Sales 26 MAS discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, a special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65maybefiledinthisCourttosetasidetheOmbudsmans orderorresolution. In Kuizonv. Desierto,[21] weagainheldthatthisCourthasjurisdictionoverpetitionsforcertiorariquestioning resolutions or orders of the Office of the Ombudsman in criminal cases. Coming now to the merits, we find the petition meritorious. Tobeginwith,in Posadasv.Ombudsman,[22] weheld:Therule,ofcourse,isthatacriminal prosecution cannot be enjoined. But as has been held, infinitely more important than conventional adherence to general rules of criminal procedure is respect for the citizens right to be free not only fromarbitraryarrestandpunishmentbutalsofromunwarrantedandvexatiousprosecution.In thatcase,theOmbudsmanorderedtheprosecutionofcertainofficialsoftheUniversityofthe Philippinesin Diliman,QuezonCityforpreventingtheNationalBureauofInvestigationfrom arresting without warrants student-suspects in the killing of a fraternity member. The question was whethertherewasprobablecauseforviolationofP.D.No.1829,whichmakesitunlawfulfor anyone to obstruct the apprehension and prosecution of criminal offenders. The Court found none andenjoinedtheOmbudsmanandhisagentsfromprosecutingtheU.P.officials.Theattempted arrest was declared illegal and petitioners to be simply protecting the rights of the students. Indeed,whilethisCourtspolicyisoneofnon-interferenceintheconductofpreliminary investigations, leaving the investigating officers with a latitude of discretion in the determination of probable cause,[23] nonetheless exceptions to the general rule have been recognized, to wit: 1.Whennecessarytoaffordadequateprotectiontotheconstitutionalrightsofthe accused; 2. Whennecessaryfortheorderlyadministrationofjusticeortoavoidoppressionor multiplicity of actions; 3. When there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice; 4. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority; 5. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation; 6. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent; 7. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense; 8. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution; 9. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance; 10. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been denied.[24] In this case, we hold that the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) acted without or in excess of itsauthoritywhenitorderedthefilingofinformationsagainstpetitionerforviolationofR.A.No. 3019,3(e)andtheRevisedPenalCode,Art.171,par.3,despitetheabsenceofprobablecause, defined as such ground as engenders a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, warranting the filing of the case in court.[25] First. Petitioner Arce allegedly violated 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 by including the phrase withfullauthoritytotakepossessionofallproperty/iesofsaiddeceasedinanyprovinceor provinces in which it may be situated . . . in the LOA she prepared in Special Proceeding Case No. V-6433. This provision states: WMSU LLB 2A 2015 CrimProc Atty. F. Sales 27 MAS SEC. 3. Corrupt Practices of Public Officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: .... (e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions. The elements of the offense are: 1. That the accused are public officers or private persons charged in conspiracy with them; 2. Thatsaidpublicofficerscommittedtheprohibitedactsduringtheperformanceoftheir official duties or in relation to their public positions; 3. That they caused undue injury to any party, whether the Government or a private party; 4. That such injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to such parties; and 5. Thatthepublicofficershaveactedwithmanifestpartiality,evidentbadfaithorgross inexcusable negligence.[26] Theseelementsmustallbeproven.[27] Inthiscase,thereisnobasisforthefindingthatin issuingtheLOAinquestionpetitioneractedwith partiality,orbiaswhichexcitesadispositionto seeandreportmattersastheyarewishedforratherthanastheyare,withbadfaith,which connotesnotonlybadjudgmentornegligencebutalsoadishonestpurposeorconscious wrongdoing,abreachofdutyamountingtofraud,norwithgrossnegligence,whichisnegligence characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a dutytoact,notinadvertentlybutwillfullyandintentionally,withaconsciousindifferenceto consequences as far as other persons are concerned.[28] TheManualforClerksof Courtdescribestheclerk ofcourtasanofficeroftheCourt,apublic officer,andanofficerofthelaw,[although]thepositionisnotthatofajudicialofficer,norisit synonymous with the Court. . . . The office is essentially a ministerial one.[29] Petitioner performed a ministerialdutyinpreparingtheletterofadministrationbasedonthedispositiveportionsofthe orders dated September 22, 1998 and October 12, 1998. She merely copied substantially the form forlettersofadministrationprescribedintheManualforClerksofCourts. TheLOAmaynotbe accurate for lack of reference to the lease agreement in favor of respondent Santiago B. Villaruz, but itcannotbesaidwithcertaintythatsheactedeitherwithgrossnegligenceorfromsomecorrupt motive.Thefactisthat,insteadofemployingherownwords,sheusedphrasesintheManual prescribed by this Court. Second. The Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) found a prima facie case for falsification under Article171,par.3oftheRevisedPenalCodeagainstpetitionerbecauseshestatedintheletterof administration that Nicolas B. Villaruz, Jr. had been appointed administrator by Judge Sergio Pestao when what the latter did was to approve the administrators bond. WedisagreewiththeOmbudsmansfindings. Art.171,par.3oftheRevisedPenalCode provides: WMSU LLB 2A 2015 CrimProc Atty. F. Sales 28 MAS Falsification by public officer, employee, or notary or ecclesiastical minister. The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts: . . . . 3. Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding statements other than those in fact made by them. Criminalintentmustbeshowninfeloniescommittedbymeansof dolo,suchas falsification.[30] Inthiscase,thereisnoreasonablegroundtobelievethattherequisitecriminal intent or mens rea was present. Petitioner prepared the letter of administration on the basis of the order of Judge Pestao, dated October 12, 1998, approving the administrators bond filed by Nicolas B. Villaruz, Jr. By the approval of hisbond, Nicolas B. Villaruz, Jr. qualified as administrator so that in a sense, therefore, the statement in the letter of administration [t]hat by order of this Court dated October 12, 1998, issued by Honorable Sergio Pestao, Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, RoxasCity,NicolasB.Villaruz,Jr.hasbeenappointedAdministratoroftheestateofRemedios Bermejo-Villaruz,deceasediscorrect. Therewasnothingwillfulorfeloniousinpetitionersact warranting her prosecution for falsification. WHEREFORE,thepetitionisGRANTEDandtheresolutiondatedApril20,2001,oftheGraft InvestigationOfficer,asapprovedbytheOfficeoftheOmbudsman,andhisorder,datedJune29, 2001, are hereby SET ASIDE and the complaint of respondent Santiago B. Villaruz against petitioner Susan Mendoza-Arce for violation of R.A. No. 3019, 3(e) and for falsification committed by a public officer under Art. 171 of the Revised Penal Code is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED. Bellosillo, (Chairman), and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur. Quisumbing, J., no part. Close relations to counsel of a party. [1] Order dated September 22, 2002; Rollo, pp. 38-40. [2] Orders dated June 10, 1998, September 22, 1998, and October 12, 1998; id., pp. 35-41. [3] Order dated June 10, 1998; id., pp. 35-37. [4] Order dated September 22, 1998; id., pp. 38-40. [5] Certification of Remedios B. Villaruz dated August 23, 1988; Records, p. 17. [6] Agreement of Nicolas B. Villaruz, Jr., Jose Ma. B. Villaruz, and Santiago B. Villaruz dated February 6, 1993; Records, p. 18. [7] Rollo, pp. 38-40. [8] Id., p. 41. [9] Rollo,p.42;TheManualforClerksofCourt,p.612 (1991)prescribedtheformforLettersof Administration as follows: WMSU LLB 2A 2015 CrimProc Atty. F. Sales 29 MAS Know All Men By These Presents: ThatbyorderofthisCourtdated_______,19__,issuedbyHon.__________,Judgeofthe_____Court, Branch__________hasbeenappointedAdministratoroftheestateof_____,deceased,withfull authority to take possession of all property of said deceased in any province or provinces in which it may be situated and to perform all other acts necessary for the preservation of said property, he/ she having filed a bond satisfactory to the Court. Said Administrator shall within three months from thedateofthisappointmentreturntotheCourtatrueinventoryandappraisaloftherealand personalestateofthedeceasedwhichhavecomeintohispossessionorknowledge,andshall render a true and just account of his administration to the Court within one year and at any other time when required by the Court. INWITNESSWHEREOF,Isignandsealthesepresentsin_____,Philippines,this_____dayof_____, 19__. [10] Affidavit of Santiago B. Villaruz dated March 25, 1999; Records, pp. 3-8. [11] Letter-complaint dated March 25, 1999; Rollo, pp. 16-17. [12] Records, pp. 23-27. [13] Affidavit of Santiago B. Villaruz dated March 25, 1999; Records, pp. 3-8. [14] Records, pp. 46-47. [15] Id., pp. 50-51. [16] Id., pp. 59-66. [17] Rollo, pp. 21-28 (emphasis in the original). [18] Id., pp. 29-33. [19] 317 SCRA 779 (1999). [20] 295 SCRA 470 (1998). [21] G.R. Nos. 140619-24, March 9, 2001. [22] 341 SCRA 388 (2000). [23] Sebastian,Sr. v. Garchitorena,343SCRA463(2000);Camanag v. Guerrero,268SCRA473 (1997); Fernando v. Sandiganbayan, 212 SCRA 680 (1992). [24] Posadas v. Ombudsman,341SCRA388(2000);Venus v. Desierto,298SCRA196(1998); Brocka v. Enrile, 192 SCRA 183 (1990). [25] Rules of Court, Rule 112, 1. [26] Bunye v. Sandiganbayan,306SCRA663(1999);Ingco v. Sandiganbayan,272SCRA563(1997); Ponce de Leon v. Sandiganbayan, 186 SCRA 745 (1990). [27] Avila,Sr. v. Sandiganbayan,307SCRA236(1999);Fernando v. Sandiganbayan,212SCRA680 (1992). [28] Fonacier v. Sandiganbayan 238 SCRA 656 (1994); Alejandro v. People, 170 SCRA 400 (1992). [29] Manual for Clerks of Court (1991), p. 2. [30] See Revised Penal Code, Art. 3. WMSU LLB 2A 2015 CrimProc Atty. F. Sales 30 MAS WMSU LLB 2A 2015 CrimProc Atty. F. Sales 31 MAS G. R. NO. 131144ADVINCULAVSCA Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 131144 October 18, 2000 NOEL ADVINCULA, petitioner,vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SOLICITOR GENERAL, HON. EDELWINA PASTORAL, Presiding Judge, RTC-Br. 91, Bacoor, Cavite, HON. HERMINIO P. GERVACIO, Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite, AMANDO OCAMPO and ISAGANI OCAMPO, respondents. BELLOSILLO, J.: NOEL ADVINCULA, in this petition for review, assails the Decision of the Court of Appeals which set aside the resolution of the Secretary of Justice ordering the Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite to file an Information for Illegal Possession of Firearms against private respondents Amando Ocampo and Isagani Ocampo. As found by the Court of Appeals, on 1 October 1993 at around three o'clock in the afternoon, private respondent Isagani Ocampo was on his way home when petitioner Noel Advincula and two (2) of his drinking companions started shouting invectives at him and challenging him to a fight. Petitioner, armed with a bolo, ran after Isagani who was able to reach home and elude his attackers. Petitioner kept cursing Isagani who eventually left. A certain Enrique Rosas told private respondent Amando Ocampo, father of Isagani, that petitioner had chased his son with a bolo. Amando then got his .22 caliber gun, which he claimed was licensed, and confronted petitioner who continued drinking with his friends. But petitioner threatened to attack Amando with his bolo, thus prompting the latter to aim his gun upwards and fire a warning shot. Cooler heads intervened and Amando was pacified. He left to check on his son. Later, however, he saw petitioner's drinking companions firing at petitioner's house.1 Petitioner however has a different version. According to him, on 1 October 1993 he and his friends were having a conversation outside his house when Isagani passed by and shouted at them. This led to a heated argument between him and Isagani Then Isagani left but returned with his father Amando and brother Jerry. Isagani and Amando were each armed with a gun and started petitioner who ran home to avoid harm but private firing at respondents Isagani and Amando continued shooting, hitting petitioner's residence in the process.2 A series of criminal complaints were filed by petitioner on one hand and private respondents on the other. But the controversy in this petition arose from the complaint filed by petitioner on 5 April 1994 for Illegal Possession of Firearms against private respondents before the Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite. Petitioner's complaint was supported by his complaint-affidavit, the affidavit of one Federico San Miguel, photocopies of photographs showing bullet holes on petitioner's residence, and certification of the Firearms and Explosives Unit of the Philippine National Police that private respondents had no records in that office. WMSU LLB 2A 2015 CrimProc Atty. F. Sales 32 MAS After private respondents submitted their counter-affidavits, the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, with the approval of the Provincial Prosecutor, dismissed on 26 May 1994 petitioner's complaint against private respondents for Illegal Possession of Firearms for lack of evidence. According to the Provincial Prosecutor After a close and careful study of the records of the instant case, undersigned finds and so holds that the evidence presented by the complainant is not sufficient to engender a well founded belief that the crime for Illegal Possession of Firearms has been committed and the respondents are probably guilty thereof. While it is true that respondent Amando Ocampo was possessing a gun on the date of the incident per the allegations in his counter-affidavit that he fired a gun upwards to prevent complainant from further assaulting him yet the possession of said firearm cannot be considered illegal or unlawful as the same is covered by a firearm license duly issued by the chief of the Firearm and Explosives Office. With respect to respondent Isagani Ocampo, no convincing evidence has been presented by the complainant except the allegations appearing in his affidavit and that of his witness which is not sufficient to establish a prima facie case for charging the former with Illegal Possession of Firearms. Even the slug depicted in the xeroxed photo copies marked as Annex "E" of the complaint do not show that said slugs were fired from different firearms hence it can be presumed that the same were fired from the gun of respondent Amando Ocampo an indication that during the incident, only the latter was in possession of a firearm.3 On 21 October 1994 petitioner filed a petition for review with the Secretary of Justice insisting that the pieces of evidence he presented before the Provincial Prosecutor were sufficient to make a prima facie case against private respondents and prayed that the dismissal of his complaint be set aside. Private respondents filed their opposition thereto stating in essence that Amando's gun was licensed and that there was no proof other than petitioner's self-serving statement that Isagani had carried a firearm. In his Resolution of 6 June 1996 the Secretary of Justice granted petitioner's appeal and ordered the Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite to file the corresponding charges of Illegal Possession of Firearms against private respondents. As the Secretary of Justice held There is no dispute as to the fact that respondent Amando Ocampo, by his own admission, was in possession of a firearm. His defense that it was duly licensed, however, by the records of the Firearms and Explosives Office (FEO). Granting, however, that said firearm was duly licensed by the Philippine National Police, no evidence was submitted to prove that he is possessed of the necessary permit to carry the firearm outside of his residence. In other words, his possession of the firearm, while valid at first, became illegal the moment he carried it out of his place of abode. With regard to respondent Isagani Ocampo, his bare denial cannot overcome his positive identification by complainant and his witnesses. Physical evidence, such as the bullet marks on the walls of complainant's residence, indeed strengthen the latter's allegation that respondents actually fired at him. The case was nevertheless dismissed on the ground of lack of evidence. This is erroneous. In cases falling under violations of PD 1866, it is not indispensable that the firearm used be presented in evidence as long as the possession and WMSU LLB 2A 2015 CrimProc Atty. F. Sales 33 MAS use thereof have been duly established by the testimony of several witnesses. (People v. Jumanoy, 221 SCRA 333).4 On 25 June 1996, pursuant to the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice, the Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite filed two (2) separate Informations against Amando and Isagani Ocampo for Illegal Possession of Firearms before the Regional Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite, docketed as Crim. Case No. B-96-141 and B-96-142, respectively. On 17 December 1996, private respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with a prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order with the Court of Appeals questioning the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice. In giving due course to private respondents' petition, the Court of Appeals agreed with the position of the Solicitor General A judicious examination of the records will show that there is no probable cause to hail petitioners for trial for illegal possession of firearms. The weakness of the case against petitioners is highlighted by the failure of the Information to allege the identity of the firearms allegedly possessed by petitioners at the time of the incident. No guns were seized or recovered from them. There is no corpus delicti. It could not therefore be ascertained with verisimilitude that petitioners did not have the license to possess or carry guns. Given the mutual recriminations which were generated by the incident, it would have been facile for any of the protagonists to concoct a charge of illegal possession of firearms against their adversary . . . In crimes involving illegal possession of firearms, the prosecution has the burden of proving the elements thereof, viz.: The existence of the subject firearm and the fact that the accused who owned or possessed the firearm does not have the corresponding license or permit to possess the same. Negative allegation of the lack of a license is an essential ingredient of the offense which the prosecution must prove. How could the people prove beyond reasonable doubt that petitioners committed the offense of illegal possession of firearms when the firearms are not even identified with certainty . . .5 On the basis of the evidence on record, the Court of Appeals granted private respondents' petition and set aside the disputed Resolution of the Secretary of Justice. Hence, this petition. The main issue to be resolved is whether the Court of Appeals erred in granting private respondents' petition and in setting aside the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice. In determining this question, we need to address these questions: (a) Was there sufficient evidence to warrant the filing of charges for Illegal Possession of Firearms against private respondents; and (b) May the Court of Appeals set aside the Decision of the Secretary of Justice when the corresponding Information has already been filed with the trial court? The Court of Appeals found that no charges for Illegal Possession of Firearms could be filed against private respondents for two (2) reasons: First, as to private respondent Amando Ocampo, he had the requisite license to possess the firearm, which was established by sufficient evidence on record. Second, as to private respondent Isagani Ocampo, there was no convincing evidence that he was in possession of a gun during the incident involving him, his father and petitioner, except for the eyewitness account of petitioner and one Federico San Miguel. WMSU LLB 2A 2015 CrimProc Atty. F. Sales 34 MAS Indeed, the rule is well settled that in cases of Illegal Possession of Firearms, two (2) things must be shown to exist: (a) the existence of the firearm, and (b) the fact that it is not licensed.6 However, it should be noted that inPeople v. Ramos,7 citing People v. Gy Gesiong,8 this Court ruled: " . . . Even if he has the license, he cannot carry the firearm outside his residence without legal authority therefor." This ruling is obviously a reiteration of the last paragraph of Sec. 1 of PD 1866 SECTION 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition . . . The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall carry any licensed firearm outside his residence without legal authority therefor. The Secretary of Justice, in his contested Resolution, thus made the following findings: Even if Amando had the requisite license, there was no proof that he had the necessary permit to carry it outside his residence; and Isagani's plain denial could not overcome his positive identification by petitioner that he carried a firearm in assaulting him. These are findings of fact supported by evidence which cannot be disturbed by this Court. Besides, the rulings relied upon by the Court of Appeals and private respondents deal with the quantum of evidence needed to convict persons for Illegal Possession of Firearms. This petition arose from a case which was still in its preliminary stages, the issue being whether there was probable cause to hold private respondents for trial. And probable cause, for purposes of filing criminal information, has been defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that respondent is probably guilty thereof. The determination of its existence lies within the discretion of the prosecuting officers after conducting a preliminary investigation upon complaint of an offended party.9 Their decisions are reviewable by the Secretary of Justice who may direct the filing of the corresponding information or to move for the dismissal of the case.10 The procedure is in no wise in the nature of a trial that will finally adjudicate the guilt or innocence of private respondents. The requisite evidence for convicting a person of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearms is not needed at this point. It is enough that the Secretary of Justice found that the facts, as presented by both petitioner and private respondents, would constitute a violation of PD 1866. Hence, the Secretary of Justice did not commit grave abuse of discretion in directing the filing of criminal Informations against private respondents, and clearly, it was error for the Court of Appeals to grant private respondents' petition for certiorari. The Court of Appeals also took note of the fact that petitioner's appeal to the Secretary of Justice was filed out of time. Per DOJ Circular No. 7 dated 25 January 1990, the aggrieved party has fifteen (15) days to appeal resolutions of, among others, the Provincial Prosecutor dismissing a criminal complaint. Petitioner filed his appeal four (4) months after receiving the Provincial Prosecutor's decision dismissing his complaint. This notwithstanding, the Secretary of Justice gave due course to the appeal. It can be surmised then that DOJ Circular No. 7, while aimed at facilitating the expeditious resolution of preliminary investigations, does not tie the hands of the Secretary of Justice if he thinks that injustice will result from the dismissal of the criminal complaint when there is a good ground to file it. Assuming arguendo that the Secretary of Justice was not able to establish probable cause to direct the Provincial Prosecutor to file the charges of Illegal Possession of Firearms against private respondents, the filing of the Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals was not the proper remedy for private respondents. It should be noted that when the Petition was filed, the WMSU LLB 2A 2015 CrimProc Atty. F. Sales 35 MAS Information was already filed by the Provincial Prosecutor with the Regional Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite. The criminal case commenced from that time at its course would now be under the direction of the tr