crises of identity

Al-Baqir al-Afif Mukhtar

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The Crisis of Identity in Northern Sudan:1

A Dilemma of a Black people with a White Culture

A paper presented at the CODSRIA African Humanities Institute

Tenured by the Program of African Studies at the Northwestern University,

Evanston

I ask to be no other man than that who I am.

And will know who I am.2

Background of the Study

In Sudan, Africa’s largest land, there is a civil war, the longest in

Africa, and probably in the whole world. It has continued for thirty-six

years, claimed 1.9 million lives, and displaced five million people. Since

1989, when the current government came to power, more people have been

killed, by war and war related famine, than in the Bosnian, Rwandan and

Somalia wars combined.3 Attempting to understand the roots of the war,

Sudanese historians and political analysts generally adopted two main

approaches. The first generation of these focused mainly on the colonial

powers, and their “calculated measures to separate the South from the

North”, by sowing the seeds of hatred in the South. However, after more

than four decades of national rule, the problem is not only there, but has

aggravated, and its latent religious tone has now taken a full-fledged form.

This matter has motivated new generations of Sudanese to do some

rethinking. Thus the second approach came into being and shifted the focus

from the enemy “without” to the enemy “within”; it identifies the roots of


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the war as a conflict between the two main identities in the country,

Northern and Southern. Now there is a wide consensus among Sudanese,

Northern and Southern alike, that the country is in a state of a crisis of

national identity. The war is basically viewed as a war of vision, and a

conflict of identities, as Francis Deng, the prominent Southern Sudanese

intellectual, eloquently puts it.4 The North, feeling that it is Arab and

Muslim, has always sought to define the whole country in these terms. It did

not only resist any attempts by the non-Arab segment of the country to

identify Sudan with black Africa,5 but also tried relentlessly to assimilate the

South through Arabization and Islamization policies, and to turn the

Southern identity into a distorted image of the Northern self. The South, on

the other hand, perceiving this scheme as a kind of cultural cloning, has

always resisted it.

However, this study goes a step further and investigates a deeper level

of the roots of the war. It focuses on the conflict “within” the Northern

identity, which underlies the conflict “between” Southern and Northern

identities. It tries to reveal the connection between the cleavage caused by

the ruling Northern elite in the country and the fissures of the Northern self,

and whether the former is both manifestation and sign of the latter. Thus this

study makes another shift of focus from the external duality characterizing

the North/South divide to the internal duality characterizing the Northern

self-divide.

A Definition of Identity

Identity is defined by The Webster’s Third New Dictionary of the

English Language as “the sameness of essential genetic character in different

examples or instances. Or Sameness of all that constitutes the objective

reality of a thing: self-sameness, oneness; sameness of that which is


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distinguishable only in some accidental fashion. The sense arising in shared

experience, an instance of such sameness. Or unity and persistence of

personality: unity or individual comprehensiveness of a life or character. Or

the condition of being the same with something described, claimed or

asserted, or of possessing a character claimed”.6

If we want to establish a person’s identity, we may need to know his

or her name, color, ethnic and cultural background and the position one

occupies in the community. Thus there are two faces to identity, one

primordial and given, and the other constructed and chosen. Identity is both

subjective and objective, personal and social, and hence its illusive nature.

Individuals have a wide range of possible identities. They can have racial or

ethnic identities, national or religious identities, or even hometown

identities.7 The talk about personal identities is firmly connected to the realm

of genetic discourse. Although biological characteristics are objective,

personal identities mean much more than these; they also include “a

subjective sense of a continuous existence and a coherent memory”.8

The subjective sense of identity is the sense of sameness and

continuity as an individual,9 a sense of belonging to a deep-rooted set of

values which forms one’s mental and moral attitude, and gives individuals

their unique characters. It enables the individual to live life more fully and

intensely. At such moments, it can be said that an individual has become

himself or herself, and is “at home with his or her body”, and in harmony

with his or her environment and symbolic order. However, what underlie

such a subjective sense are objective attributes, which can be recognized by

others.

Identity is also dynamic and responsive to changing conditions. It is

bound to shift with changing technologies, cultures and political systems.10


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It is also strategic. People claim certain identity for strategic reasons, such as

empowerment. Above and underlying these factors are the historical legacies

of our ancestors which “weigh heavily on who we are and who we can

become”.11 Identity is therefore a claim for membership based on all sorts of

typologies such as race, ethnicity, gender, class, caste, religion, culture, etc.12

It is the way by which people define themselves and are defined by others on

the basis of the above typologies.13

A Definition of Identification

Identification is defined by the Dictionary of Social Sciences as a

“tendency to imitate and or the process of imitating the behavior of an

object. It may also denotes the process of merging emotionally, or the state

of having so merged, with the same object”.14 S. Freud introduced the term

into psychology in 1899. He stated that identification is “the earliest

expression of an emotional tie with another person". An individual identifies

with another person as an ‘ego ideal’ someone he or she would like to be,

rather than someone he or she would like to have. This is why it is relevant

to group behavior. He explained the need and capacity of the individual to

affiliate, and the strength of the emotional ties involved, as essential

attributes of human beings. He also mentions the ‘infantile origin’ of the

process of identification, and postulates that this particular infantile origin

accounts for its operation at the subconscious level, for its strength as a

motivational factor, and for its irrational and, sometimes, regressive

manifestation. To him identification is not simple imitation, but rather

assimilation on the basis of similar aetological pretension.15

N. Sanford takes issues with Freud and states that, on the contrary,

identification is a conscious process, while imitation is unconscious. J.P.

Seward defines identification as “a general disposition to imitate the


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behavior of a model.”16 Freud speaks of three levels of identification. His

thesis is that, first it takes the form of emotional tie with an object. Then it

becomes a substitute for a libidinal tie, as if it takes the form of introjection

of the object into the ego. Finally it gives rise to new perception of a

common quality shared with some other person,17 or group. Scheler

differentiates between two types of identification, idiopathic and

heteropathic. In the first type, identification comes about “through the total

eclipse and absorption of another self by one’s own”, whereas in the second

type, “the identified is overwhelmed and hypnotically bound by the

model”.18

Identity Formation

The classical idea was that social identities are primordially given and

inherited like the biological traits. This view started to give way to the idea

that identities are constructed by choice,19 and are always subject to

reconstruction.20 However, people’s choices of identities are limited or

constrained by the given and primordial factors such as their features,

families, communities, histories, cultures, etc. Identity formation, according

to Erikson, is a process by which

[T]he individual judges himself in the light of what he perceives to be the way in which others judge him in comparison to themselves and to a typology significant to them; while he judges their way of judging him in the light of how he perceives himself in comparison to them and to types that become relevant to him.21

Social Psychologists hold that an individual’s identification with a

group, for example, a social class, or a racial or ethnic group, is probably the

most pervasive of all the psychological processes that are directly relevant to

social behavior. Identification with a dominant group, for instance, takes


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place when one “internalizes the role system of the group and considers

oneself a member of it”.22 This happens through the process of cultural

assimilation. As David Laitin puts it:

[C]ultural assimilation is like religious conversion, and as the literature of religion conversion makes clear, what one generation considers simple pragmatism the next considers natural. Thus the children who are brought up in a religious community will, egged up by religious authorities castigates their parents for what they see as their hypocrisy.23

This view corresponds to De Vos’ perception of constructed identities as

“deviant”. To him, they demonstrate “excessive instrumental expediency”

and a sign of “inner maladjustment”,24 which occurs in certain social

conditions that have a huge impact on self-perception of own identity.25

Despite their constructed nature, “identity categories have the power to

subsume and even to colonize individuals”.26

In the formation of social identities, there is always an in-group,

which represents the desired social identity, and a peripheral group, which

have to adjust in order to identify with the model. In such cases the former

represents the core, and occupies the center stage of that social identity

whereas the latter represents the outer circle and occupies the margin. The

former is privileged, and the latter seeks to be so. The former has the power

to legitimize or de-legitimize the latter. To describe a similar concept,

Chalres Taylor uses the term "recognition / misrecognition". He postulates

that people’s identity is: "partly shaped by the recognition or its absence,

often by misrecognition of others".27

For instance, whereas the white middle to upper class represents the

center of the American identity, the blacks, Japanese, etc., Americans

represent the peripheries of that identity. The center monopolizes the power


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to recognize or misrecognize these groups. The tension between the center

and the peripheries may lay dormant or works at a low key in normal and

peaceful times. At such times the umbrella of identity seems to embrace all

the social groups that share the nation. But in times of severe conflicts the

center uses and often abuses the power of recognition. It can withdraw the

umbrella from any of the peripheral social groups whenever it sees it

necessary to do so. This actually had happened during World War 11, when

the Japanese Americans were detained in concentration camps, for their

loyalty to America was questioned by the center of the American identity.

The selectivity of the center in using the power of recognition and

misrecognition can be demonstrated by the fact that German Americans

were not detained in the same scale, despite the fact that Germany was the

major force of the European Axis. Thus the center decided to misrecognize

the Japanese Americans during the war, and to restore recognition to them

after the war. The same thing can be said about Britain, where the English

identity represents the center of the British identity. It is noticed that the

term English is frequently used by the media community in Britain when it

means British, the matter which irritates nationalists in Scotland and Wales.

It is also observed by the black British community that the mainstream

British media some times refer to Afro-Caribbean athletes as "British" when

they won medals for Britain, and as "Caribbean" when they lost. These

examples illustrate the tensions between the center and the peripheries in

each identity as well as the dynamics and processes of recognition and

misrecognition that operate between the center and the peripheries.

Change of Identity

Relying on a model developed by Thomas Schelling, Laitin interprets

identity shifts in terms of “cascades” and “tips”. Cascades occur when


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people’s behavior and actions are motivated by or based on their anticipation

of what other people will do. When so many people in the community think

that others will think on the same lines and behave accordingly, suddenly the

community “tips” from its stable order before the cascade to a new stable

order. To demonstrate how communities tip and cascade, Laitin gives the

following example: “Consider the case of one or two African Americans

who buy homes in a stable “white” neighborhood. Suddenly the white

families, fearing that they will be the last whites in the neighborhood, all

seek to sell out at the same time. But only African Americans who are

willing to buy. Very quickly the neighborhood “tips” from a stable white to

a stable African American”.28

Identity shifts in the same manner, i.e. it can also cascade.29 In his

empirical study of the Russian community in Astonia, after the collapse of

the USSR, and the shrinkage of its borders, David Laitin gives us a clear

example of how identity shifts. He described the efforts Russian individuals,

who found themselves foreigners in the communities they once dominated,

were exerting in order to accommodate to the new realities. Russians in

Astonia struggled to obtain the Astonian nationality. They started to learn

the Estonian language, which they did not feel the need to learn before the

collapse of the union, as the Estonian were compelled to speak Russian.

Laitin concludes that the quest of these people to keep their families intact,

and to avoid deportation, gave then an incentive for an identity shift. This in

turn lays the foundation for the construction of an Estonian identity for their

grandchildren, and that, as a community, they are moving towards an

identity tip.30

Communities normally live in equilibrium. In such situations

communities feel that the world is completely stable. Identities do not come


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under question, and there will be no incentive for change. All people share a

tacit understanding of who they are. Cultural and political elite of such a

group step in to give meaning to this equilibrium by providing it with

beliefs, constraints, principles,31 myth, and a symbolic order. At this stage

the community can be described as being itself, i.e. it lives in harmony with

its environment, and sees the world through their own eyes. However,

turbulent events can shake the equilibrium, bring instability to the

community, result in an identity crisis, and motivate some people to explore

new identities. At this stage cultural and political elite normally split

between those who try to defend the status quo, and those who will seek to

induce a cascade towards a new equilibrium.32

Three Dimensions of Identity

None of the identity theories summarized above can alone explain the

complexities of the Northern Sudanese identity, and a synthesis of them is

therefore essential for that purpose. Thus on the basis of the foregoing one

can identify three elements that interact to define any social identity. The

first element is a group’s perception of itself. The second is the others’

perception of the group. The third is recognition or lack of recognition of the

group by the center of identity. If these three elements interact in a

harmonious way, i.e. if people’s definition of themselves matches with other

people’s definition of them, and that the center of that identity grants them

recognition, then this particular community is said to be living in

equilibrium. Here is where the cultural and political elite steps in to give

meaning to this equilibrium by providing it with a set of beliefs, constraints,

principle,33 myth, and symbolic order. The symbolic order seeks to

harmonize the whole universe around the community’s identity, or in other

words, to make the universe looks as though emanating from the


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community’s collective self, or as if it is an extension of their identity. At

this stage the community can be described as being itself, and as seeing the

world through their own eyes. An example of how the symbolic order works

is the way by which western cultures have reconstructed the image of Jesus

Christ to make him look like an Anglo Saxonian. This happened regardless

of the fact that he was a Jew, and by no means that he had blonde hair and

green eyes. But nevertheless, this reconstruction is essential for harmonizing

the white people's identity, for people make better sense of the universe

when they worship a God that looks like them, not one that is alien to them.

On the other hand, if the three elements interact contradictorily, i.e. if

people’s perception of themselves does not match with the way other people

define them, or, more seriously, if the legitimizing powers did not recognize

the community’s definition of itself, then this particular community is said to

live in disharmony. In such a case, the symbolic order does not emanate

from the community's collective self, but is usually borrowed from the

center of the identity that the community is aspiring for, and wants to "be".

These conditions set the scene for the paradoxes of identity to become

visible, for instability to creep into the community, and for the crisis of

identity to loom in the horizon.

Crisis of Identity

A crisis of identity can occur at both the personal and the social levels.

At the personal level, a crisis ensues when infantile identifications are

brought to conform to urgent new self-definition and irreversible role

choices.34 Also, personal identity is a lifetime quest, as Erikson postulates,

and failure to attain it represents a crisis, which can have a damaging effect

on individuals.35 At the social level, a crisis may ensue when people, while


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constructing their identities, fail to find a label that adequately fits them, or

“when they do not like the identity they have chosen or were compelled to

go by”. And because social identities are usually “constructed from the

available repertoire of social categories, misfits are inevitable”.36 Also a

crisis may occur when people are ambiguous about their identity, or lack a

clear identity.37 A crisis may also ensue when there is a disparity between

self-perception of one’s identity and others’ perception of the same identity.

Finally a crisis may exist if the center of identity, i.e. the legitimizing power,

does not recognize the peripheral's claims.

Elements of the Crisis in Northern Sudan

Among the elements that constitute a crisis of identity in any

community, one can identify three that are applicable to the Northern

Sudanese. First, there is a disparity between Northerners’ self-perception of

their identity and others’ perception of them. Northerners think of

themselves as Arabs, whereas the Arabs think otherwise. Northerners’

experience in the Arab world, and especially in the Gulf, proved to them

beyond any doubt that the Arabs do not really consider them as Arabs, but

rather as abid, (sing. abd), slaves. Almost every Northerner in the Gulf has

had the unpleasant experience of being called abd. The Arabs of the Middle

East, and especially those of the Arab Peninsula, and the Fertile Crescent,

represent the in-group of the Arab identity that Northerners aspire to. These

“real Arabs” occupy the center stage of this identity, and enjoy the power of

legitimizing or de-legitimizing the peripheries’ claims. The Northerners, on

the other hand, represent the outer circle of the Arab identity, occupy the

periphery and wait to be drawn closer to the center, as a sign of recognition.

Mis-recognition of any group by others, especially if these others represent

the center of identity, can inflict serious damage in that group.38 In Charles


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Taylor's own words, "a person or a group of people can suffer real damage,

real distortion, if the people or society around them mirrors back to them a

confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves".39 Far from

recognizing Northerners as Arabs, the center dubbed them ‘abid, and thus

kept them, to use Taylor’s term, in a “reduced mode of being”. 40

The second element of the crisis of identity in Northern Sudan is

concerning “ambiguity” about identity. Northerners came face to face with

this symptom especially in Europe and America where people are classified

into ethnic and social categories. In 1990, a group of Northern Sudanese in

Birmingham in Britain convened a meeting to discuss how to fill in the

Local Council’s Form, and especially the question about the social category.

They felt that they did not fit in any of the categories that include, among

others, “White, Afro-Caribbean, Asian, Black African, and Others”. It was

clear to them to tick on “Others”, but what was not clear was whether to

specify as “Sudanese, Sudanese Arab, or just Arab”. There was a heated

discussion before they finally settled on “Sudanese Arab”. When the

question why not to tick on the category of Black African was raised, the

immediate response was that, “but we are not blacks”. When another

question raised the point why not just say Sudanese, the answer was that:

“Sudanese include Northerners and Southerners, and, therefore, does not

give an accurate description of us”.41 Ambiguity about identity was also

observed in the feeling of dismay Northerners usually experience when they

discover, for the first time, that they are considered blacks in Europe and

America. It is also observed in their attitude towards the black communities

there. To be called black was a shocking experience to the average Northern

individual. Southerners usually joke by saying to their Northern friends

“thank God here we are all blacks” and its variant “here we are all abid”.


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Northerners attitude towards the black population in these countries is

similar to their attitude towards the Southerners. They usually refer to them

by the word “abid”, and one of my interviewees, once, referred to the Afro

Caribbeans as Southerners “janubiyyin”.42

The third element of the crisis is concerning “misfits” of identity.

Northerners live in a split world. While they believe that they are the

descendants of an “Arab father” and an “African mother”, they seem to

identify with the father, albeit invisible, and despise the mother who is so

visible in their features. There is an internal fissure in the Northern self

between the looks and the outlook, the body and the mind, the skin color and

the culture, and, in one word, between the “mother” and the “father”. Arabic

culture standardizes the white color, and despises the black color.

Northerners, in using the signification system of the Arabic language, and

the value system and symbolic order of the Arabic culture, do not find

themselves, but they find the embodiment of the center. The Northern self is

absent as a subject in this order. It is only seen, as an object, through the

eyes of the center, and hence the “misfits”.

The Impact of Marginal Identity on the Northern Psyche

This inferior position has undoubtedly had its impact on the

psychology of the Northern individual. Recognizing that the standard

features of the in-group as white or light complexion, soft straight hair, and

non-flat nose, the average Northern individual has a sense of lacking in some

of these traits and attributes, and a desire to complement or compensate for

them. The understanding was that the lighter the color of the skin, the closer

the person is to the center, and the more authentic his or her claim to Arab

ancestry. Failing to comply with the standard color, as is the case with most

of the Northerners, the individual seeks a second resort in the hair, in order


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to prove his or her Arab descent; the softer the hair the closer the individual

to the center.43 Failing to meet the hair criteria, the individual takes the last

resort in the shape of the nose, the closer to the standard the better, for, at

least, it can stand as a prove of non-Negroid origin.

Colour Consciousness

An individual lacking in the standard features normally seeks to

compensate or complement them. And because marriage offers these

individuals an opportunity to compensate and complement, the average

Northerner aspires and seeks, as far as possible, to marry a partner who is

closer to the standard features and color.44 Such a union gives the individual

an immediate compensation for his or her darkness and offers an opportunity

of recovery from it in his or her offspring. In her remarkable study of a

Northern Sudanese village that she gave the pseudo name Hofriyat, Janice

Boddy found out how the villagers are color conscious. She learned from

them that the ranking of skin color according to desirability "ranges from

'yellow' or light through increasingly darker shades called 'red', 'green', and

'blue'". She then continues to say that the term aswad (black) is usually

reserved for Southern Sudanese or Africans".45

Whereas Boddy's quotation proves the point of desirability of the

lighter color among Northerners, her literal translation of the terms of the

Northern color codes asfar, asmar, akhdar, and azrag, may cause some

confusion, if not explained. And in order to explain it, one would rephrase

Boddy's quotation as follows. The first color in ranking is asfar. This

literally means "yellow", but used interchangeably with ahmar to denote

"whiteness". The second in ranking is asmar. This literally means reddish,

but it is used to describe a range of color shades from light to dark brown.

This range usually includes subdivisions such as dahabi (golden), gamhi (the


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color of ripe wheat), and khamri (the color of red wine). The third in ranking

is akhdar. This literally means green, but it is used as a polite alternative of

the word "black" in describing the color of a dark Northerner.46 Last and

least is azrag. This literally means "blue", but it is used interchangeably with

aswad to mean "black", which is the color of the 'abid.

The average Northerner views dark color as a problem that should be

dealt with. Whereas females deal with it directly through local or imported

color lighteners, males usually resort to indirect methods, i.e. a conjugal

union with a light-colored partner.47 But whatever satisfaction this latter

complementary and compensatory measure may offer the individual, still

there remains a great deal of anxiety generated by the consciousness that one

is moving around with the wrong color. In order to counter such an anxiety,

defense mechanisms must be put to work; thus the color brown becomes the

standard, and the color black takes a different name. In order to avoid

describing the self as aswad (black), the collective Northern consciousness

renamed the word as akhdar, which originally used to describe the dark

color of the soil. Thus, accordingly, whereas a very dark Northerner is only

akhdar, an equally dark Southerner is bluntly aswad.

In discussing the Northerners’ color concept, Deng writes the

following:

Northern racial pride focuses on the right brown color of the skin, considered the standard for the North and therefore for the Sudan. To be too light for a Sudanese is to risk being considered a foreigner, a khawaja (European), a Middle Eastern Arab, or worse, a Halabi, a term used for the Gypsy-type racial group, considered among the lowest of the light-skinned races. The other side of the coin is of course, looking down on the black race as inferior, a condition from which one has mercifully been redeemed. Northern Sudanese racism and


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cultural chauvinism, therefore, condemns both the very dark and the very light.48 While Deng’s observation is generally true, his conclusion needs

many qualifications. It is my contention that ahmar (white) is the ultimate

standard color for the average Northerner. It is considered the standard color

of the in-group, i.e. the center of the Arab identity. Whereas the brown color

is standard only at a lower level, and as a way of defense mechanism that

had to accommodate it as an inescapable reality. Unlike the white color,

brown is good not on its own right, but only as a second best alternative.

Although popular music frequently flatters the magical looks of the brown

sweet heart asmar ya sahir al-manzar, the overriding signification system of

the Arabic Islamic culture standardizes the white color, as we will

demonstrate later. Had Northerners developed a comprehensive and

consistent signification system that standardizes the brown color, they could

have solved a great deal of their identity crisis.

Although it is true that Northerners stigmatize the very light ahmar

and the very dark, aswad or azrag, this stigma is not at the same level. The

social stigma attached to the color aswad is because it is associated with the

color of the ‘abid (slaves). Whereas the social stigma attached to the color

ahmar (white) is because it is associated with color of the halab (Gypsies).

The halab, who are looked upon as people with lax morality and demeaning

behavior, are considered as “social outcasts”.49 The cultural formulations

that prejudice the color aswad are overwhelmingly abundant and deeply

rooted in the Arabic culture and literature, unlike those that prejudice the

color ahmar which are scant and only developed later on, during the Turkish

occupation of the Sudan. These latter cultural formulations came about as a

result of the atrocities inflicted by the Turks upon the population, for


17

Northerners came to view the Turks as the embodiment of corruption, greed,

and cowardice. The Mahdist revolution against the Turks and his decisive

victory over them intensified and augmented their contemptible image in the

eyes of Northerners. This was when the popular catch phrase “al-humra al-

abaha al-Mahdi”, came into usage. The phrase can be translated as “the

redness, (meaning whiteness) that the Mahdi had detested”. Ahmar is

therefore condemned, with these limitations and connotations in mind, not in

absolute terms. Indeed ahmar is essentially viewed, by both the Arabic

culture and by the Sudanese local culture, as the embodiment of beauty. In

his Qamus al-Lahja al-'Amiyyah fil-Sudan, A Dictionary of Colloquial

Arabic in Sudan, 'Awn ash-Sharif Qasim has this to say about the white

color.

They [the Arabs] call an individual with a white complexion ahmar. 'Aisha, wife of the Prophet, was called al-humaira, (a diminutive form of the word ahmar) because her skin was white. The Arabs also used to call the Persians and the Romans humr (plural of ahmar) because the color of their skins is white. And they mean the white color when they say al-husnu ahmar (beauty is white).50

Janice Boddy shows how the women of Hofriyat village are conscious

of skin color. To them, "white skin is clean, beautiful, and a mark of

potential holiness". They repeatedly told her that, as a white woman, she had

far greater chances to get into heaven, if she converted to Islam, than them

or any other Sudanese. Their reasoning was that "this is because the Prophet

Mohammad was white, and all white-skinned peoples are in the favored

position of belonging to his tribal group".51

Also, condemnation of ahmar (white) remains only at the level of

discourse and is not reflected in the social behavior of the Northern


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Sudanese. For instance, Northerners showed readiness to intermarry with

white people, be they Europeans or Arabs, but they demonstrated reluctance

to intermarry with black people, be they Southerners or Africans in

general.52 More precisely, whereas Northerners do not have problems in

marrying off their daughters to the first category, they do not even

contemplate marrying them off to second category.53

Marginality Consciousness

Another sign of the impact of the marginal identity on the Northern

psyche might be observed in the political behavior of Northern ruling class.

One of the first decisions to be taken by the Northern ruling class after

independence was to join the Arab League. Mohamed Ahmed Mahgoub tells

us that "we had hasten to join the Arab League immediately on the

declaration of our independence".54 Recognizing its place in the margin of

the Arab world, this government kept a low profile within the Arab world,

and did not take sides in the Arab internal disputes, neither with the radicals

nor with the conservatives.55 Like any other marginalized categories, Sudan

was almost forgotten by the Arab world in normal and stable times. History

teaches us that only during turbulent times of wars and upheavals that

severely shook or torn the social fabric of societies, that women and slaves,

as marginalized categories, got recognized by the center. Equally, only when

the Arabs were demoralized and humiliated by the stunning defeat that they

suffered at the hands of Israel in 1967, that Sudan was remembered, drawn

close to the center, and allowed to play a significant role within the Arab

League. It's neutrality, or rather its bystander role, qualified it to host the

1967 Arab Summit. Mahgoub tells us that "Khartoum was the only

politically acceptable conference site for both conservative and extremist

Arab leaders".56 What he does not tell us, though, is that the margin had


19

become a convenient place for the center to withdraw to, in order to lick the

wounds.

Carrying the Luggage

Another sign of the impact of the marginal identity is what may be

called “carrying-the-luggage” attitude. The marginal identity always looks

forward to the center for cultural, religious, and political inspirations and

intellectual pursuits. It has an inclination to borrow cultural products from

the center, and is not expected to produce or lend. Sean O’Fahey tells us that

“the northern riverain Sudan always interacted with Egypt or looked across

the Red Sea to Arabia”.57 The cultural relationship between Northerners and

the Arab world is more or less a one way road, in which cultural materials

flow from beyond the northern borders, against the tide of the Nile, and from

the east, across the Red See. It is remarkable that almost every political party

in the Arab world has a branch in Northern Sudan. The Ba’th Arab

Nationalist Party, in its both factions, the Syrian and the Iraqi, the Nasirite

Party, Qaddafi’s Peoples’ Conferences, Saudi’s Wahabbi movement and

Egyptian’s Muslim Brothers movement all have offshoots in the North. The

1924 political movement, and later the Unionist movements in the 1940s

worked under the patronage of the Egyptians, and both aimed at the political

unity with Egypt.58 To the center, the margin is a cultural and political

vacuum, if not a dust bin, which is there to be filled. This is why the

different entities within the center compete to fill it up.

Conformity with the Center

Another sign of the impact of the marginal identity on the psychology

of the Northern individual is what I may call the “conformist attitude”. It is

observed that the majority of Northerners that work in the different countries

of the Arab world adopt the accent spoken in the country they find


20

themselves in. Even when they return to Sudan, there is a high possibility

that these accents, or at least, certain words and expressions may become

part of the individual’s language repertoire. It is also observed that the few

Arabs who come to Sudan do not change their accents even if they lived

among the Sudanese for years. Moreover, Northerners that mix with these

Arabs in Sudan are more likely to amend their language and accent in order

to conform to that of the Arabs who live among them.59

Agency to the Center One of the most prevailing statements among Northern cultural

enterpreneaurs is that Sudan is a bridge between the Arab world and Africa,

usually referring to it as “the dark continent”, emparting to it Arabic culture

and Islamic religion. Consequently, Sudan became the home of many

organisations and institutions that propogate Arabic Islamic culture, such as

Khartoum International Institution for Arabic language, The Institute for

Teaching Arabic to non-Arabic Speakers, the African Islamic Institute, the

Organisation for the Propogation of Islam, and its specialised offshoot, the

African Islamic Agency for Relief, Dan Fodio Humanitarian Corporation for

Trade, The African Council for Private Education, and the African

Humanitarian Association for Childhood and Motherhood. The ultimate

objective of these institutions is “to work towards the spread of Islam and

the Deepening of Islamic Culture in Africa”. Sudan, the margin, is the agent

through which the center, the Arab World, is to carry this objective out.60

Describing the role of an agent that Northerners play for the center, Ibrahim

has said the following:

This role which had been designed for us by the Arabic Islamic

Propagation Appoach has caused us great hardship. As a result


21

of our readiness to undertake this task, we looked down upon

our fellow citizens as worthless and primitive people who have

no culture or religion. We have accused their language of

intelligibility (‘ujma), and their religion of paganism, and we

set out, aided with the state machinery, to destroy their

languages and cultures, and to substitute them with the correct

language (Arabic) and the right religion (Islam). The

consequent was a fundamental misunderstanding or clash

between the Arabic Islamic group and the African group, a

clash which has resulted in the civil war.61

The designated role of the agent for the Arabic Islamic culture has led

Northerners to two main distortions with regard to the nation building in

Sudan, according to Ibrahim. The first distortion is with regard to the drive

to build an Islamic state in Sudan, for this call has never emanated from an

internal need that yearns for social justice and an ethical state. Propagation

of Islam through jihad and missionary methods has always been the main

factor behind this call. The second distortion is with regard to the ruling

class. The majority of this class has confused their official role as state men

who are supposed to serve all citizens, and their role as agents of the Arabic

Islamic culture. Their second role has mostly prevailed. In their pursuance to

get military help to fight the rebel movement in the South, the ruling class

has always relied on the Arab countries. Their main argument was that

Arabisim and Islam in Sudan, and not Sudan itself, are threatened by the

rebel movement. As Ibrahim has rightly observed, “that who set out to

mopolise people and obtain help was not the statesman but rather the agent”.

He continued to say:


22

What we fear is that the future ruling class will come out of

those who have been fed and brought up in the Institutions of

the propagation of Arabic Islamic culture (with its lucrative

work conditions - for they pay in dollars, and are exempt from

taxes, and have regional and international connections), who

deeply believe that the Arabic Islamic group in Sudan is there

on behalf of the Arabs and the Muslims, and not on behalf of

themselves. If this happens, we fear that the role of agency will

completely take over the role of statesmanship.62

Invisibility Consciousness

Because the margin is conscious of its invisibility to the center, there

is a need to advertise itself. Thus another sign of the Northerners' marginal

identity is their overemphasis on Arab descent. Northerners, and especially

the elite, usually state and reiterate that they are Arabs. Statements such as "I

am an Arab. I have a genealogy"63, or "I am an Arab, whether you like it or

not"64, or "we are the Arabs of the Arabs",65 or "I am an Arab, nationally and

culturally"66, are repeatedly issued by the political and cultural

entrepreneurs. Unlike the elite of the Arab world, who do not need to state

the obvious, Northerners feel the need to complement their lack in features

by words. One sees this phenomenon as a continuation of the old

Northerners’ quest to create family genealogies, for both phenomena reflect

the disputable nature of Northerners claim to be Arabs.

All these signs provide evidence that Northerners have all the

symptoms of “misrecognition” that Charles Taylor discusses in his Politics

of Recognition; namely internalization of inferiority, “self-depreciation”,

and “a crippling self-hatred”.


23

The Construction of Arabic Islamic Identity in the North

The present Northern Sudan was the home of the Nubian civilization

that flourished several thousand years before Christ, as well as the home of

the great Nubian kingdoms. The pyramids in Nubia stand to this day, living

monuments of the greatness of the Nubian race. In the 8th century, Nubia

conquered the whole of Egypt and dominated the Nile Valley.67 Nubia was

an active player in the international stage of the ancient world and came in

contact with many civilizations. As Lloyds Binagi has explained, “The

Northern Sudan has a long and rich civilization that pre-dates Pharaonic

Egypt and the rise of Islam…. Nubia… has had contact with every

civilization that has appeared in Egypt: the Greeks… the Romans, Arabs,

Turks and British”.68

Christianity found its way to Nubia in the sixth century, transforming

it into a Christian kingdom that lasted for a thousand years. Soon after the

rise of Islam in the seventh century, the Muslims conquered Egypt and

knocked on the doors of Dongola the capital of Nubia. The Nubians

resistance, although stopped the Islamic march, could not drive the Arabs

out of the Nubian land.69 A stalemate between the two parties furnished the

ground for a political settlement. A treaty between the Nubians and the

Arabs was reached in 651-52 A.D. The terms of the treaty are interpreted

differently by different contemporary writers. Whereas some of these writers

consider it to be in the advantage of the Arabs,70 others see it as a victory for

the Nubians.71 However, the undisputed fact is that the Nubian kingdom

achieved what no other kingdom had achieved in the ancient world, i.e. to

stop the hitherto unstoppable Muslims' march. Muslims divide world into

dar al-Islam and dar al-Harb (territory of Islam and territory of war). With

Nubia maintaining its territorial integrity, Muslims had to create a third


24

category, which is neither dar al-harb nor dar al-Islam came into being.

This is called dar al-'Ahd (territory of pact). Although the treaty secured the

sovereignty of the Nubian kingdom for almost a thousand years, it opened

the land for the Arabs to trade freely, and therefore set the process of

Arabization and Islamzation in motion, the matter that ultimately led to the

kingdom’s demise.

Although its roots can be traced in the coming of the Arabs to the

Sudan, the Arabic Islamic identity in the North is a relatively recent creation.

The 14th and the 15th centuries were considered as a period of change in the

riverain Sudan. Social movements, especially of the Arabs and the Funj,

along with economic and cultural developments coming from the

surrounding countries,72 set the scene for more favorable conditions for the

processes of Islamization, and identification with the Arabs.

Travelers into the Funj kingdom in the first quarter of the 16th century

described an ethnic composition of the country very similar to that of present

day Sudan. References to tribes such as Shaiqiyya, Ja'aliyyin, and Rubatab

as "Berabra", meaning Northern Nubians, were made by Gailliaud who

visited the Funj kingdom in 1523.73 Gailliaud found that the population of

the kingdom was classified ethnically into six categories, which are "so

distinct that there is no one individual who does not know to which he

belongs".74 Five of these classes were classified mainly by the color of their

skins. The color of the Funj is azraq (blue=black). "Their color", he

maintained, "is that of copper". The 'Abdallab are close in complexion and

features to the Funj, apart from their curly hair, and their color is akhdar

(green, meaning dark brown to black). The Barabra, i.e. the Ja'liyyin, the

Rubatab, the Shayqiyya, and the Danagla, are described as Khatif lunayn (of

two colors mixed). "The individuals of this class", said Gailliaud,"are half


25

yellow [asfar] and half green [akhdar]. .. the blood strain which

predominates in them is that of the Ethiopians".75 The Arabs' color was

described as asfar (yellow meaning white). He said of them the following:

These are the least colored, and belong to the tribes of nomadic Arabs. They have straight hair. This race crosses only rarely with the others… It is easy to recognize, not only from the traits of their visage, but from the purity with which they still speak the Arabic language.

Strikingly enough, he also spoke of the abid who had been brought into

Sinnar from the South and the west (the Nuba mountains).76 This is more

or less the same ethnic and color classification at present. Probably, the

only difference is that in the 16th century the Ja'aliyyin, the Rubatab and

the shaygiyya still spoke their Nubian languages. They continued to speak

it until the early 19th century.77

These conditions sowed the ingredients of the Northern identity in the

soil of the North. These ingredients are Arabic language, claims of Arab

ancestry, Islam, and the legacy of slavery. The inhabitants of this part of

Sudan exhibited a special liking for the Arabs. It looks that they took every

opportunity, whether a remote link, imaginative, or even fabricated, to

identify with the Arabs, and to adopt their language. The Funj give us a clear

example of identity shift that may shed light on the phenomenon of

identification with the Arabs. At the beginning of their Kingdom, the Funj

were pagans in religion and spoke their own language, which was the

kingdom's official language until the 18th century. They also administered

justice in their courts according to their own tradition.78 Their first king,

'Amara Dungas converted to nominal Islam in the early years of his rule for

political expedience.79 Three centuries later, i.e. during the 18th century the

administration of justice was founded on Islamic law, and official documents


26

were written in Arabic language, which also became the lingua franca of the

kingdom.80 Not only that, the Funj king, Badi III, announced officially in a

circular to his subjects that he and his folk "descended from Arab, and

indeed from Ummayads". He made that announcement in response to a

whisper campaign, which accompanied a revolt in the northern provinces,

and which branded them "pagans from the White Nile". The circular, which

was sent to Dongola, concluded that "and so you have seen the facts the

tongues are silent, and the slave 'Aziz may see the virtue of the use of

discretion in regard to injurious speech".81 And part of this injurious speech

is obviously that he was "accused" of not having Arab ancestry. As the class

of Muslim merchants strengthened, and the religious sufi communities

spread, and the power of the ulama, individuals learned in Islamic law,

increased, the kings sought to retain their eroding judicial power by studying

Islamic law and become ulama on their own right. Therefore, the Funj ruling

class, according to Spaulding "joined the Orthodox merchant families in

promulgating claims to Arab origin" and they "discovered a fact hitherto

unknown- they were Ummayyads".82 Thus the identity shift, which started in

the 16th century for political convenience, was completed in the 18th century.

And as David Laitin says, "what one generation considers simple

pragmatism the next considers natural".83

If the Funj kings were able to become Arabs by a royal decree, the

tribes of the riverain North secured the desired ancestry for themselves by

other means. They were able to write their own genealogies which "have

been known to be traced with many jumps or lacunae back to Arabia, and in

cases where the Sudanese lineage is politically or religiously prominent,

back to the Prophet Mohammed, his tribe, the Quraysh, his relatives, or his

close associates”.84


27

It was clear that for the Nubians as well as for the Funj, the world was

no longer stable. Old identities came under questions, and people could no

longer be themselves. The incentives for an identity shift we1re abundant,

and the conditions for a “tip” and “cascade” were complete. The result was

that Scheler’s two types of identification seem to have taken place,

idiopathic and heteropathic. Idiopathic identification can be observed in the

areas where the indigenous languages were lost, and Arabic was adopted

instead. Heteropathic identification, on the other hand, can be observed in

the areas where indigenous languages survived.

Three Salient Features of Arabic Islamic Culture

In the pervious section I tried to answer the "why" part of the

question, i.e. why Northerners identified with the Arabs, or, in other words

what motivated the shift of identity they experienced. In this section I try to

look into the "how" part of the question, i.e. what made it possible for the

Northerners, and indeed for a whole lot of people across the Islamic world,

to bid for Arab descent. To my mind there are three salient features of

Arabic Islamic culture that made it fairly easy for individuals and groups to

lay claims to Arab ancestry without being seriously and vocally challenged

by the center of the Arab identity.

The first feature is the patriarchal order of the Arab tribes. In this

order children are linked to their father, while the mother count little in the

lineage, for she is the field (harth) or the bowl (ma'un) of the husband. The

concept of the wife as the field of her husband, entails that whereas she bears

his seeds, the harvest is his, and not hers.85 This is how any intervention of

Arabic blood, in the Nubian family line, whether real, imagined, or

contrived, immediately put an end to all the lineage before the moment of


28

intervention. Thus, according to the popular belief in the North, the Arab

personality from whom the three main Ja'aliyyin groups in the North, i.e. the

Shaigiyya, Rubatab, and the Ja'aliyyin proper, have descended is Ibahim

Ja'al. Through this eponymous ancestor, the lineage of these three Nubian

groups have been diverted to Arabia (Qurraish) and linked to al-Abbas uncle

of the Prophet Muhammad. However, this claim, according to a prominent

historian who belongs to the same group, is "difficult to substantiate".86

Another feature of the Arabian patriarchal society is that strong tribes

have a set of satellite groups, such as clients, slaves and other forms of

affiliation, revolving around it. The hierarchical system of the tribe

accommodates all these groups in well-stratified social categories, and

enables them to claim affiliation to the tribe, although they know their place.

An individual belonging to these lower strata can be elevated to a higher

position on merit, or/and recognition of parentage, as the case of 'Antra

shows. This characteristic made it easier for the Arabs to accommodate the

Northerns' affiliation, and to place them in a lower stratum of their

hierarchical system.

The second feature is the concept of purity in Islam. Purity is central

to the Islamic faith, and although it can be acquired by all Muslims through a

definite purification process,87 it is also God given to the Prophet and his

family. The Qur'an says: "God has willed to remove all abomination from

you, ye ahl al-Bayt, (house of the Prophet) and to purify you through and

through".88 Thus accordingly, the closer the person to the Prophet's clan the

better, and the best of all is to descend directly from the Prophet's daughter

Fatima. But nonetheless a drop of Arab blood is enough to purify you and

your descendants. One observes that western white culture has exactly the


29

opposite concept, where one drop of black blood contaminates you and

makes you black even if your skin color is predominantly white.

The third feature is the relationship between Islam and Arabic

language. The fact that Islam was revealed to an Arab Prophet, and that it

was spread by the Arabs, and that Arabic is the language of the Qur'an, all

these factors have made the Arab race, the most prestigious race in the eyes

of Northerners and Arabic not only a prestigious language, but also divine.

Although absence of Arabic did not prevent non-Arabic speakers in the

Muslim world, such as in Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and even in Sudan, from

laying claims of Arab descent, speaking Arabic as the mother tongue has

sealed the myth of Arab descent among certain Northerners with a proof of

lisanun Arabiyyun Mubin, a clear and pure Arab tongue.89

A Continuous process

Nevertheless, the construction of an Arabic Islamic identity in the

North is a continuous process. The Turks augmented the process of

Arabization and introduced Orthodox scholarly Islam, and a long with the

Arabs, Europeans and Northerners, they led slave hunt expeditions into the

land of non-Arabised group, namely in the South and the Nuba Mountains.

The Mahdist State that replaced the defunct Turkish in 1885 further

augmented the process of Arabization and Islamization. The Mahdist State

was not different from the Turks with regard to slave raids. When the British

colonized the Sudan in 1898, they ranked the Arabized groups over the black

African groups. Anthropologist C. G. Seligman, who was sponsored by the

colonial government in Khartoum to study the groups inhabiting Sudan, for

the purpose of helping the administration to rule effectively, described the

Southern tribes as “savages”.90 The British showed a great deference to the

Arabized groups of the North, and maintained, respected and enhanced their


30

Arabic-Islamic identity.91 Education policies focused mainly on the Arabic-

speaking, Muslim communities of the central riverain North.92 Within these

communities the beneficiaries of this education were sons of prominent

families; the Mahdi and Khalifa families, the Madhist amirs (commanders),

and "fine Arab" notable families.93 In the early twentieth century,

nationalism started to nurture among the young-modern-educated-

generations of these families.94 "They explored "Sudanese"-ness in Arabic

poems, essays, and other literary forms, and glorified the Arabic language,

an Arab ethnic heritage, and Islam as the core values of this nationalism".95

However, been conscious of the long history of the term Sudani and

the negative connotations attached to it, they assigned to it a double

meaning. At one level Sudani remained as it had always been, i.e.

synonymous to 'abd. At another level the term was seized upon "as a field

for nationalist definition".96 They treated it as an evacuated frame, and tried

to fill it with their own image. Thus the term Sudani, at this level, became a

"label of national identity that placed great value on Islamic and Arabic

culture".97 Thus from the viewpoint of other ethnicities, becoming a Sudani

at this level is synonymous to becoming a Northerner. It means an

"imitation of a more 'Arab' way of life", and a conversion to a "lifestyle

which has historically emerged along the Nile".98 This definition has later

proved to be so narrow, shortsighted as well as highly problematic. It is

exclusionist, at one end, and assimilationist at the other end. Those who

misfit the new definition of Sudani, are either to be cut off from the body

politics, physically (cessation) or politically (marginalization), or to be

changed in order to fit (i.e. to be turned Northerners). As Heather Sharkey

has rightly observed "by failing to recognize cultural contributions the

territory's non-Muslim and non-Arabic-speaking populations, their


31

nationalist pogrom alienated, rather than attracted, many groups, specially in

the South. The civil war, ranging intermittently since 1955, is the bitter fruit

of this nationalism".99 An even more bitter fruit of this narrow definition of

identity is the National Islamic Front (NIF) which usurped power in 1989,

and set out to remove the misfits by the use of brute force.

Arabic Culture & the Black Color

In his al-shu'ara' al-sud wa khsa'isuhum fi 'lshi'r al-'arabi (the Black Poets

and their Distinctive Characteristics in 'Arabic Poetry), 'Abduh Badawi tells

us the following:

The Arabs hate the black color, and like the white color. They describe anything pleasant (whether material or psychological) as white. Having a white skin is a matter of pride for a man, and a trait of beauty to the woman. Whiteness to them is a sign of honor. A man is praised by being described as the son of a white woman. Indeed they pride themselves of having white women as concubines. … They call the black poets aghribat al-Arab, the ravens of the Arabs, in simile to that detested black bird whose blackness is traditionally considered bad omen".100

Detestation of the black color stems from the historical experience of the

Arabs with African people. The stereotypical image of the black African in

the Arabic culture is that he is malodorous, deficient in body and mind, and

depraved of passions. The Arabic proverb "the Negro, if he is hungry, steals,

and if his stomach is full he commits adultery",101 sums it all up. The name

'son of a black woman' was the ultimate insult that black people were

assaulted with.

Before Islam

Before Islam, the children of an Arab father and an African mother

were not accepted as full members of the tribe even when the tribe depended

on them in its wars, as the story of 'Antra reveals. Badawi shows how the


32

black color represented a great barrier in front of these poets. Calling

somebody ghurab (a raven) was an insult. Badawi says:

[T]here was a sharp sensitivity over color among the black poets before Islam. This was because they were a depressed and downtrodden group and because they were excluded, sometimes roughly, sometimes gently, from entering the social fabric of the tribe. Thus they lived on the edge of society as a poor and depressed group. They were only acknowledged under conditions of extreme pressure, as we know from the life of 'Antra. Although this poet was the defender of his tribe, and its supreme poetical voice, his own tribe's attitude towards him continued to pain him and to weigh on his mind. The name 'son of a black woman' stuck to him even when returning from victory in battle.102

During the Prophet's life

Although Islam preached the unity and equality of human kind despite

differences in tongues and colors and that "the most noble of you in the eyes

of God is the most pious", the Arabs' attitude towards the blacks never

changed. The Prophet has taught that: "no Arab shall enjoy superiority over

the non-Arab, nor shall the white ever excel the black, nor the red the

yellow, except in piety". Yet this did not prevent Abu Dhar al-Ghiffari, one

of the prominent Companions of the Prophet to call his black brother Bilal

ibn Rabah, another prominent Companion and mu'ezzin, caller for prayer, of

the Prophet, "son of a black woman". The Prophet, when heard about this,

reprimanded Abu Dhar so severely that the latter felt that a mere apology to

Bilal would not do. So Abu Dhar lied on the ground, put his cheek on dust

and asked Bilal to step on it, as a sign of humiliation, and humbleness.103

The Middle Ages

If this was the situation during the life of the Prophet, who preached

the equality of the believers, it is all natural that the Arabs' attitude towards


33

the blacks would worsen after his death. Bernard Lewis mentions this in the

following passage:

While the exponents of religion preached a doctrine of equality, albeit in somewhat ambiguous terms, the facts of life determined otherwise. Prevailing attitudes were shaped not by preachers and relaters of tradition but by the conquerors and slave owners who formed the ruling group in Islamic society. The resulting contempt- towards non-Arabs in general and the dark skinned in particular- is expressed in a thousand ways in the documents, literature and art that have come down to us from the Islamic Middle Ages… This literature, and especially popular literature, depicts [the black man] in the form of hostile stereotypes- as a demon in fairy tales, as a savage in the stories of travel and adventure, or commonly as a lazy stupid, evil-smelling and lecherous slave. The evidence of literature was confirmed by art. In Arab, Persian and Turkish paintings, blacks frequently appear, sometimes as mythological figures of evil, sometimes as primitive or performing some menial tasks, or as eunuchs in the palace or in the household.104

Ibn Khaldun sees the blacks as "characterized by levity and excitability

and great emotionalism" and that "they are everywhere described as stupid".

He offers an explanation for this stupidity and love of joy by attributing it to

the "expansion and diffusion of the animal spirit".105 The Old Testament

myth that the black people are the descendants of Ham, and that blackness of

skin came about as a result of Noah's curse on his son Ham, was adopted and

propounded by some Arab writers such as Ibn Jarir.106 However, Ibn

Khaldun did not accept this prevailing wisdom of his time, and tried to

provide an alternative "scientific" explanation for the blackness of the

Africans based on the heat.107

In his description of the inhabitants of the Equator, al-Dimashqi had to

say the following:

The Equator is inhabited by communities of blacks who may be numbered among the savage beasts. Their complexion and hair


34

are burnt and they are physically and morally abnormal. Their brains almost boil from the sun's heat.108

Ibn al-Faqih al-Hamadhani follows the same line of reasoning. He founded

his opinion on an ancient Greek geographical theory that divides the earth

into seven latitudinal zones where zone 1 and zone 7 represent extreme heat

and extreme cold respectively. He postulates that these two extremes

produce savages whereas the middle zone, where the climate is moderate,

people are well civilized. To him, the people of Iraq have "sound minds,

commendable passions, balanced nature, and high proficiency in very art,

together with well proportioned limbs, and a pale brown color, which the

most apt and proper color". But the zanj who inhabitant zone 1 are

"overdone until they are burned so that the child comes out between black,

murky, malodorous, stinking, and crinkly-haired, with uneven limbs,

deficient minds, and depraved passions".109 John Hunwick observes that

while al-Hamadani's prejudice against the Slavs is only limited to their

"leprous" color, his prejudices regarding the zanj go beyond color to depict

their "deformed bodies", "feeble minds", and "stinking smell". Ibn Khaldun

believed that the Africans are closer to animals than to humans, and that they

are cannibals as well. "Their qualities of character", says Ibn Khaldun, "are

close to those of dump animals. .. they dwell in caves, eat herbs, live in

savage isolation, and do not congregate and eat each other".110

Response of the Blacks With such manifest prejudices, two kinds of reactions are predictable,

resistance and internalizing contempt. While some blacks rose up to counter

these prejudices, others accepted their ill fate, and saw themselves mirrored

through the Arabs' eyes. However, resistance itself took two approaches; one

challenged the stereotypical image and declared that black is beautiful, and


35

the other accepted the prevailing prejudice that it is ugly, apologized for it,

and celebrated the human moral qualities. 'Abduh Badawi tells us that:

The poets saw themselves and their people as downtrodden, and although this sense of being downtrodden varies from century to century, and from poet to poet, yet the black man could not refrain from being a voice of protest against the life around him and the tragedy of his own situation. Later we see [black poets] exploding in the face of those who allude to their color as may be seen in the poetry of the 'three angry poets' al-Hayqutan, Sunayh, & 'Akim [of the early 8th century]. For them it was not enough just to defend themselves. We see them taking pride in their blackness and in the history of black people and the lands they came from and attacking the Arabs on points in which they prided themselves.111

Internalizing Contempt

An example of internalizing contempt is Nasib al-Akbar, another poet

of Nubian origins. His attitude was similar to that of Uncle Tom in western

culture. He chose not to confront the society and to conform to its

prejudices. When his own son proposed to a lady from the family of his

former owners, who were willing to accept him, Nasib came and ordered

some of his black slaves to drag his son from his legs and to beat him hard.

The slaves beat up his son. Then Nasib saw a young man of nobility and said

to the lady's uncle "marry your brother's daughter to this man, and I will pay

the dowry".112 Thus he did not find his own son fit to marry a woman of

nobility, and beat him in order to know his place. Another story reported that

the Ummayyads Caliph, 'Abdel Malik ibn Murwan asked Nasib to join his

drinking group, but the poet apologized that he was too low to deserve such

an honor. He said to the caliph:

Oh Amir al-Mu'minin (commander of the faithful) my skin is black, my frame is deformed, and my face is ugly and I am not fit to be in this position (of being the Caliph's drinking partner).113


36

Another story reported that he resorted to invisibility. He wanted to

conceal his blackness from his audience, when he was asked to read his

poetry to some women, in order not to injure their feelings. He said: "Let me

perform behind a veil. Why should they see me? My skin is black and my

hair is white. Let them listen to me behind a veil".114

'Antra, the heroic poet, gives us another example of internalizing

contempt. He seemed to resent his Ethiopian mother, Zabiba, as the one who

was responsible for his blackness. He viewed her as ugliness in incarnation.

He called her to a she hyena, and he resembles her legs to those of an

ostrich, and her hair to black pepper.115

Resistance (1)

An example of resistance based on the first approach is the work of

the great classical writer al-Jahiz who lived in Bagdad in the 3rd century of

Islam (9th century A.D.), and who was black himself. He tried to remind the

'Arabs that the black people are the creation of God, and that it cannot be

true that God intended to distort His own creation, as the Arabs might have

believed. He said:

God did not deform us by creating us black. Our black color came as a result of the country (environment). The evidence is that even among the Arab tribes there are blacks, such as Bani Salim Ibn Mansour who live in al-Harrah. All the inhabitance of al-Harrah are black, even its bears, ostriches, foxes, wolves, donkeys horses, goats, and birds are black, and even its air is black.116 Al-Jahiz also wrote Fakhr al-Sudan ala al-Bidan, (the boast of the

superiority of the black people over the white people). Al-Jahiz exalts the

black complexion comparing it to the sacred black stone of the Ka’ba, as

well as to elements of the natural world that are dark-hued, beautiful and

strong, dates, ebony, lions, female camels, musk, night and shade”.117 Three


37

centuries later al-Jawzi, another Bagdadian writer who lived in the end of the

6th century of Islam (13th century A.D.) would rise to defend the blacks. Al-

Jawzi wrote “Tanwir al-Ghabash fi fadl al-Sudan wa al-Habash, The

Illumination of the darkness on the Merits of the Blacks and Ethiopians). In

this works he also exalts the black color, praised the nobility and morality of

the kings and queens of Sudan and Ethiopia, as well as the black

Companions of the Prophet.118

Resistance (2)

The resistance based on the second approach usually accepted the

negativity of blackness but asserted moral and intellectual qualities. The line

of argument this approach preferred is "yes black but virtuous". The poet

Sahim 'Abd Bani al-Hassas, who was a Nubian, says: " if I have been a slave

my soul is free, and if my skin is black my virtues are white". He also says,

"had I been rosy white, they (women) would have adored me, but my God

has cursed me with a black skin".119 Khifaf Ibn Nadba, another black poet,

followed the same pattern. He accepted that his blackness is a negative

mark, but he prided himself as a great warrior who settled his account with

his detractors in the battlefield: "I said to him while my spear dripping his

blood, this is me right here over your body". And "I marred his body with

his blood until he turned real black".120 'Antra followed the approach as well.

He said; "during peacetime they call me son of Zabiba, and when it is war,

they say to me 'come on attack them son of nobility". And, "I am the black

slave who throws himself in the battle field when its dust rises high in the

sky. My sword and spear are my noble origin, and they are my best friends

when fear strikes people".121

However, the few works of resistance had no effect more than making

a point. Prejudicing the black color intensified in Arabic Islamic culture as


38

the empire grew and the Arabs set out to hunt slaves. Eventually an

association between slavery and al-Sudan, i.e. the blacks, became instilled.

As Akbar Muhammad writes, with the expansion of the empire: “almost the

egalitarianism of the Prophet‘s age crumbled under the heavy weight of

urbanism, acculturation, internal ethnic factionalism, and Arab

ethnocentrism”.122 Such ethnocentrism and racism is abundantly reflected in

the classical Arabic literature.

The Arabs usually did not address black people by their names, but by

the word al-Aswad (the black) or al-'abd al-Aswad (the black slave). When a

black poet read his poetry in front of an Amir or a Caliph, the usual response

was "ahsant ya aswad", (hey black man you have excelled).123 The Arab

poets usually felt bitter whenever a black poet produced excellent poetry.

Their usual reaction when they heard an excellent poetry was "I wished I

had said that before the black slave". Their favorite way to taunt their black

colleagues was to say to them "qul ghagh", i.e. "make the sound of the

raven".124

Al-Mutanabbi’s satirical poems on Kafur al-Ikhshidi, the black ruler

of Egypt during the Middle Ages, are another proof of this point. Al-

Mutanabbi is widely recognized as the most talented Arab poet of all times.

He approached Kafur, a freed Nubian slave, who ascended to power through

his superior military and administrational skills, hoping for an amara, i.e. to

be appointed ruler of one of the regions. He composed poems that hail praise

on Kafur. He even praised his black color and considered it the embodiment

of beauty. Failing to get the job he was aspiring to, he fell out with his

benefactor, sneaked out of Egypt, and started a campaign of defamation

against Kafur. He composed a number of satirical poems, considered the

best in artistic terms, against Kafur, calling him eunuch slave, ugly Nubian,


39

and stinking pig. In all these poems, al-Mutanabbi mocks Kafur's black

color. He says in one of them, "a black slave whose lower lip is half his size,

yet people say to him 'you are the full moon in the midnight'". He also

mocks the Egyptians, and calls them the world's laughing stock, because

they had Kafur as their ruler. In one of his poems he says, "many things in

Egypt are funny, but they are the kind of funny things that make you cry".125

It is remarkable that when Northerners read these poems, they identify

themselves with al-Mutanabbi and not with Kafur, despite the fact that Kafur

was actually a Nubian, i.e. in modern terms, he was a Northern Sudanese.

The Sources of Islam & Color Symbolism

It has been mentioned that in its symbolic order, Arabic Islamic

culture standardizes the white color and prejudices the black color. In pre-

Islamic poetry, in the Qur’an, in classical Islamic jurisprudence, fiqh, and in

classical as well as modern literature, the white color symbolizes beauty,

innocence, purity, hope, etc, whereas the black color symbolizes the

opposite of these concepts.

The Qur’an contains two types of discourse; one is color conscious

and the other is color blind; one standardizes “white” and prejudices

“black”, and the other is totally neutral. Examples of the first type of

discourse are the following verses: “On the Day when some faces will turn

white and some faces will turn black, to those whose faces have blackened

(we will say) 'Did you reject the Faith after Accepting it? Do taste then the

Penalty of rejecting Faith'. But those whose faces have become white, they

are (enjoying) God’s Mercy; therein to dwell for ever” (S. 111, Ay. 106 &

107).126 “On the Day of Judgement wilt thou see those who have told lies

against God; Their faces will be turned Black, Is there not in Hell an abode

for the Arrogant”, (S. xxxix, Ay. 60). “When news is brought to one of them


40

of a birth of a female, his face turned black, and he is filled with inward

grief” (S.XLIII, 17).127

Examples of the second type of discourse are the following verses:

“Among God’s signs are the creation of heavens and of the earth and the

diversity of your languages and of your colors”. (S. XXX, Ay. 22).128 “O

people! We have created you from male and female and we have made you

into nations and tribes so that you may come to know one another. The

noblest among you in the eyes of God is the most pious” (S.XLIX: Ay.

13)”.129 The Prophetic hadiths also have the same characteristic of the

parallel levels of discourses. Example of the lower level of discourse is

"Listen to and obey your ruler even if he an Ethiopian slave with crincky

hair". The higher level of the prophetic hadiths preaches the unity and

equality of the human race despite differences in color, tongues, and

customs. Example of this is "all humans are as equal as a teeth of a comb",

and "all of you have descended from Adam, and Adam has descended (or

created) from the mud”.

In dealing with these two types of discourse I adopt Mahmoud

Muhammed Taha’s idea of the duality of the Qur’anic discourse. Taha

perceived the Qur’an as having two levels of discourse: lower and higher,

particular and universal, temporal and eternal. The lower level reflects, to

some degree, the seventh century Arabs’ particular values, ideology and

culture. It is historically bound, and, therefore, it accommodates some of the

Arabs shortcomings and prejudices. The higher level, on the other hand,

reflects the universal human values and therefore, aims to elevate the Arabs,

and all the Muslims, to these universal values. The lower level abrogated the

higher level.130 The problem of the Muslims is that they think of this

abrogation as eternal and irreversible. Taha, on the other hand, preaches that


41

abrogation is neither eternal nor irreversible, and calls Muslims to move

from the lower level to the higher level by reversing the process of the

abrogation, and to build a new renaissance on its basis.131

As demonstrated by the above selection of the Qur'anic verses and the

Prophetic hadiths, in the lower level of discourse, white and black are used

to symbolize good and evil, good omen and bad omen, and happiness and

sadness. The transitional level of the Qur'an and the hadiths reflects the

Arabs prejudice against the black people, and standardizes the white color.

On the basis of the foregoing one can say that there are visible elements that

show that the mainstream Arabic Islamic culture sees itself as a white

culture.

Alienation from the Self

The Arab’s cultural identity is an outwardly projection of the Arab

self. It reflects their sense of the world, which must be different from others’

sense of the world, for people make sense of the world in a cultural way not

in a natural way. The Arabic language reflects the world as seen through the

Arabs’ eyes, for there is a strong relation between the word and the world,

between the discourse and the universe. What in the universe is verbalized in

a given discourse. In his psychoanalysis of western cultures, Lacan

concluded that western cultures and languages are masculine. In using these

languages, women cannot be subjects as women. In so far as women can

speak, they speak male language. Within such language order women cannot

fulfill their desire as speaking beings.132 Lacan also showed how the child

enters the world of language through its “social symbolic”. This process

takes place through identification with the father and alienation from the

mother. As a speaking being, the child proceeds into the father’s world.


42

An analogous point could be made in relation to Northern Sudanese

and Arabic language. When a Northern Sudanese enters the world of Arabic

language, he or she enters into a process of identification with the Arab

father, and alienation from the African mother. But Northerners feel the

visible presence of the mother in their faces and skins, and as Deng has

explained, “it does not require a professional social psychologist to presume

that such a disdain for elements visible in their physiognomy must at some

degree of consciousness be a source of tension and disorientation”.133

Northerners’ way of resolving this tension, however, was rather unique.

Instead of trying to reinvent or indigenize the Arabic language to fit their

physiognomy, they fantasize about their physiognomy in order to fit the

language. Hence the avoidance of using the word black to describe

themselves, and the over-emphasis of their Arab origin. Ahmed al-Shahi,

who studied the Shaiqiyya tribe, tells us that: “it is rude to refer to a Shaiqi

person, “as being azraq (black) even though if his skin is of this color

because such reference equates him with the ‘abid”.134

A stark example that demonstrates this tension is the following

passage which was uttered by al-Sharif Zein al-‘Abdin al-Hindi, a prominent

political leader in the North. He said:

I am an Arab. I know I am an Arab. No one can dispute this fact with me. I have a genealogy. I am so, son of so, (fulan ibn fulan) son of Muhammad Rasoul Allah (Prophet Muhammad). Yet, on the other hand, nobody can dispute my Africanness. … We have come and mixed with them, and the result is these ugly figures of ours.135

“We”, in the quotation, indicates the Arabs, “them” indicates the Nubians,

and the expression “ugly figures of ours” indicates present day Northerners.

The statement reflects identification with the father (We), alienation from the

mother (Them), and detestation of the self (ugly figures of ours). This is an


43

optimal example of Du Bois’ black person who “sees himself through the

revelation of the other world”, and who measures “one’s soul by a tape of a

world that looks on in amused contempt and pity”.136 Northerners'

identification with al-Mutunabbi, in his satirical poetry against Kafur, the

Nubian, is yet another example of a dislocated psyche.

Northern cultural and political elite feels the need to reiterate

frequently that they are Arabs. They also feel uneasy with the word Sudan.

Altayeb Salih, a novelist of international fame, said the following:

I wish that our leaders had named this country Sinnar. May be one of the reasons behind the instability of this country that its named (Sudan) does not mean anything to its people. What is Sudan? Egypt is Egypt, Yemen is Yemen, Iraq is Iraq, and Lebanon is Lebanon. But what is Sudan? The colonialists have given this name to the area from Ethiopia in the east to the Senegal in the west. The other nations have given their countries names that mean something to them, and we were left alone bearing this legacy on our shoulders.137

Loathing the name “Sudan” stems from the detestation of blackness.

Detestation of blackness stems from identification with the Arabs and

adopting their worldview. The suggestion to change the name of the country

was not new, it came into being immediately after independence. The main

reason behind the suggestion was its meaning and connotations. The word

Sudani is used by Northerners in a way identical to aswad, and abd (slave).

All these terms are used by Northerners to refer to "slaves, or those of slaves

descent, whose relatives belonged to a non-Muslim group of the South or

Nuba Mountains".138 For the Northerner, being Sudani meant being black,

and being black meant in turn of a low social status and low origins. Many

Sudanist scholars, such as Heather Sharkey, and Ahmed Shahi, are in

consensus that the stigma of "blackness" is rooted in the legacy of slavery,

especially that almost every family in the central riverain North used to hold


44

slaves.139 Although this is true, but to my mind, it is not the whole story.

There is a deeper level in which stigma of "blackness" is rooted, and that is

the Arabic culture, which despises the blacks, as we have seen earlier.

Northerners internalized not indiginized, the Arabic culture, and the Arabic

language and value system. This is why they see the world through the

Arabs' eyes, despite the paradoxes, and the self-debasement that such an

outlook generates. It is generally observed that the more the Northerner

becomes learned in Arabic language and literature the more he exaggerates

his Arabic identity, and the more he detests blackness and the word Sudani.

Osman tells us that members of the prominent literary society Abu Rawf

Group "refused, after independence, to apply for passports because they had

to register themselves as Sudanese nationals before they could get one".140

Al-Tayeb Salih’s statement represents a continuation of an old Northern

wish to break away from the curse of the name Sudani. And if we read it

along with al-Hindi's passage we can identify a wish to escape from one’s

own skin, or to bleach it, through discourse, to resemble that of an Arab.

Deng rightly explains the tendency of Northern Sudanese to exaggerate

Arabism and Islam and to look down on the blacks as slaves as “a deep-

seated inferiority complex, or, to put it in reverse, a superiority complex as a

compensational device for their obvious marginality as Arabs”.141

Conclusion

We have mentioned that Northerners believe that they are descendants

of an Arab father and an African mother, and that they identify with the

father and reject the mother. To the average Northerner, the mother

symbolizes the Southerner within, and unless Northerners accept their

mother, and identify with her, they will not accept Southerners as their


45

equals. Recognition of the long denied African component within the

Northern self, and accommodation of the long suppressed African mother

within their identity, are the prerequisite for Northerners to recognize and

socially accept Southerners as a little bit different but equals.

The problem of the war could be resolved through cessation of the

South from the North. This could probably solve the Southern problem with

the North, but will not solve Northerners’ identity crisis. It is obvious now

the crisis of identity in the North has reached its peak, and the equilibrium

started to swing again. Questions about identity have been posed, and

Northerners have to make a choice; to continue to lurk in the margin or to

create a center of their own, to continue to be second rate Arabs, or to try to

be first rate Sudanese. Cultural and political entrepreneurs are split between

those who suggest a construction of a new identity that enables Northerners

to see the world through their eyes, and those who are defending the status

quo.

However, destabilizing the old identity is the point of departure for the

construction of a new identity, and exposure of the paradoxes of the old

identity is essential for the purpose of destabilization. This is what this paper

set to do. Notes 1 The term Northern Sudan here does not designate the geographical North, but rather the ideological North, whose geographical confinements are limited to the Muslim, Arabic-speaking, central riverain Northern Sudan. 2 Oedipous’ words in Sophocles’ play Oedipous Tyranous, in Antony D. Smith, National Identity, (England: Penguin Books, 1991), 2. 3 See Address to the United Nations Human Rights Commission in Geneva by Dr. John Garang on March 24, 1999, News Article by UNHR on March 27, 1999. 4 Francis M. Deng, War of Visions: Conflict of Identities in the Sudan, (Washington, D.C.: The Bookings Institution, 1995).


46

5 Ibid., 4. 6 Philip Babcock Gove, Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged, (ed.) (London: G Bell & Sons Ltd, 1959). 7 David Laitin, “A Theory of Political Identities”, in Identity in Formation: the Russian Speaking Population in the Near Abroad, (Ithaca and London: Correll University Press, 1998). 8 David L. Sills International Ensyclopaedia of Social Sciences, ed. (The Macmillan Company & the Free Press, 1968), 7, 61. 9 Ibid. 10 Maurice R. Stein, Arthur Virdich, & David M. White, Identity & Anxiety, eds. (New York: Free Press , 1960). 11 Laitin, “A Theory of Identities”, 13. 12 Ibid., 20. 13 Deng, War of Visions, 1. 14 Julius Ground & William L. Kolb (ed.) A Dictionary of Social Science, London: Tavistok Publications 1964, 314. 15 Sigmond Freud, The interpretation of Dreams, trans. J. Starchy, (London: Allen & Unwin, 1945), 150. 16 J. P. Seward, “Learning Theory and Identification”, Journal of Genetic Psychology, 84, (1954), 202. 17 Sigmond Freud, Group Psychology and the analysis of the Ego, trans. J. Starchy, (London: The International Psychological Press, 1922), 65. 18 M. Scheler, The Nature of Sympathy, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1945), 18, 19. 19 Laitin, “A Theory of Identities”. 20 Ibid., 14. 21 Erik H. Erikson, Identity: Youth and Crisis, (New York: Norton, 1968), 19-23 22 H. M. Johnson, Sociology: A Systematic Introduction, (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1960), 128. 23 Laitin, “A Theory of Political Identities”. 24 George A. De Vos, “A Psycho-cultural Approach to Ethnic Interaction in Contemporary Research", in Marthsa E. Bernal and George P. Knight, ed. Ethnic Identity: Formation and Transmission among Hispanic and other Minoroties, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 235-68. 25 Laitin, "A Theory of Identity". 26 Ibid., 18. 27 Charles Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition”, in Amy Gutmann, ed., Multiculturalism Examining the Politics of Recognition, (Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1994), 25. 28 Laitin, “A Theory of Political Identities”, 21. 29 Ibid. 30 Ibid., 23. 31 Ibid., p. 22. 32 Ibid., p. 23. 33 Ibid.


47

34 Erikson, Young Man Luther, New York: Norton, 1958. 35 Erikson, Identity: Youth and Crisis, 19-23 36 Laitin, "A Theory of Identities", 17-18. 37 Ibid. 38 Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition". 39 Ibid., 25. 40 Ibid. 41 The writer attended this meeting which took place after a Friday prayer in 1990, in Martin Luther King Hall at Aston University in Birmingham. Most of those who attended the meeting were members of the National Islamic Front (NIF). 42 Many of my informants contested the title of my research on grounds that Northerners are not black, but brown, and accused me of being influenced by the "western" color concept. 43 A Sudanese joke says that a Northerner, who is very dark and has very soft and straight hair, was taking a taxi in Syria, and was chatting in Arabic with the Syrian taxi driver. After a while the taxi driver said to his passenger: “Are you from Senegal? ”. The offended Northerner directed the driver's attention to his (the passenger's) soft hair saying: “ Do you think this is wig?". 44 An average chap in the North usually seeks to get a white or light skin girl with a soft long hair. Girls also prefer light skin boys. 45 Janice Boddy, Wombs and Alien Spirits, Women, Men, and the Zar Cult in Northern Sudan, ((Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1989), 64. 46 The Northerners' use of the word akhdar instead of aswad is probably an effect of the Arabic culture. The early Arabs used the word akhdar to describe people of unquestionable nobility whose color, for one reason or the other, was black. An example of these is al-Fadl ibn 'Abbas ibn 'Abdel Muttalab ibn Hashim ibn 'Abd Munaf. He is said to have got the black color from his grand mother. He said about hiself: "I am the akhdar (green) for those who know me, my skin is akhdar but I am a son of an 'Arab noble home". See Abduh Badawi, al-Shura' al-Sud wa khasaisuhum fil-shi'r al-'Arabi, (Cairo: 1973), 93. 47 The use of chemical creams that lighten dark color is widely spread among young girls in the North. The side effects that these creams caused have recently become a matter of concern in the local newspapers and among Sudanese discussion groups in the Internet. For a detailed description of the local methods used by brides in Northern Sudan to soften and lighten their skin color see Boddy, Wombs and Alien Spirits, 64-65. 48 Deng, War of Vision, 5. 49 Ahmed al-Shahi, “Proverbs and Social Values in a Northern Sudanese Village”, in Ian Cunnison and Wedny James eds., Essays in Sudan Ethnography, (London: C. Hurst & Company, 1972), 97. 50 'Awn as'Sharif Qasim, Qamus al-Lahja al-'Amiyyah fi-s-Sudan, (Cairo: 1985), 298. 51 Boddy, Wombs and Alien Spirits, 64. 52 It is observed that probably all the earlier generations of Northern Scholars who studied in the west, and who married European or America women, got married to white women.


48

Neither my informants nor myself know of a single case where one of them got married to a black woman. Even among the younger generations the vast majority is married to white women, and very few of them married black women. 53 Because marriage between Muslim women and non-Muslim men is forbidden in Islam, Northerners, in case of Europeans, usually accept the nominal Islam declared by the individual before marriage is conducted. 54 Mohamed Ahmed Mahgoub, Democracy on Trial, Reflections on Arab and African Politics, (Cheshire: Andre' Deutsch, 1974), 59. 55 This period is from independence in 1956 until the end of the second democracy in May 1969. During this time "Arabism" was the undeclared identity and ideology of the governments. However, starting from May 1969, governments took "socialist" and then "Islamic" identities and started to take sides with their allies in the Arab countries. For an elaborate discussion of Sudan's foreign policy, during these eras see Mansur Khalid's Nimeiri and the Revolution of Dismay, (London: Boston Routledge & K., 1985); The Government they Deserve: the Role of the Elite in Sudan Political Evolution, London / New York: Kegan Paul International 1990). 56 Mahgoub, Democracy on Trial, 136. 57 R.S. O’Fahey, Arabic Literature of Africa, the writing of Eastern Sudanic Africa to c. 1990, (Leiden, New York, Koln, E. J. Brill, 1994), xi. 58 For more information about the White Flag League of 1924 see Yushiku Kurira, Ali Abdel Latif and 1924 Revolution: Researching the Origins of the Sudanese Revolution, trans. Majdi al-Na'im, (Cairo: Center for Sudanese Studies, 1997). For more information about the unionist movement see Khalid, the Governemet they deserve; Mahgoub, Democracy on Trial. 59 Although I have not so far come across a study of this phenomenon, it is widely observed. 60 Abdellahi Ali Abrahim, al-Thaqafa wal-Dimogratiyya fil-Sudan, (Cairo: Dar al-Amin, 1996), 31. 61 Ibid., 30. 62 Ibid., 31. 63 Al-Sharif Zein al-'Abidin al-Hindi, see end note 131. 64 Abdella al-Tayeb, in the Sudanese Studies Association triennial Conference in Darham in 1990. 65 Salah Ahmed Ibrahim, a well known statement. 66 Al-Sadiq al-Mahdi, Interview, Masarat Jadida, (Cairo: 1998), 171. 67 Mohammed Omer Beshir, Revolution and Nationalism in the Sudan, (Barnes and Noble, 1974), 2-3. 68 Lloyd A. Binagi, The Genesis of Modern Sudan: An Interpretive Study of the rise of Afro-Arab Hegemony in the Nile Valley, A.D. 1260-1826”, Ph.D. Dissertation, (Temple University, 1981), 3-4. 69 Abd el-Fatah Ibrahim el-Sayed Baddour, Sudanese Egyptian relations, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960), 17. 70 Ibid. 71 William Y. Adam, Nubia Corridor to Africa, (Prenciton: N.J.: Prenciton University Press, 1977).


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72 R. S. O'Fahey and J. L. Spaulding, Kingdoms of the Sudan, (London: Methuen & Co LTD, 1974), 15. 73 Ibid., p. 31. 74 Ibid, p. 30. 75 Ibid., p. 30. 76 Ibid., p. 31. 77 Ibid., p. 28. 78 Muhammad Ibrahim Abu Salim & Jay Spaulding, Some Documents from Eighteenth-Century Sinnar, (Kartom: Kartoum University Press, 1992), 8. 79 There are many theories trying to explain the Funj conversion to Islam. One theory is that they did it out of fear of the Turks who eventually invaded and destroyed the kingdom. Another theory maintains that they did it in response to a persuasion from the 'Abdallab, their Muslim allies. For more information see R. S. O'Fahey and J. L. Spaulding, Kingdoms of the Sudan, 31-33. 80 Islam, of course, reinforced the use of Arabic, for the Muslim population "held Arabic in great esteem for religious reasons". See R. S. O'Fahey and J. L. Spaulding, Kingdoms of the Sudan, p. 31. 80 Ibid., p. 31. 81 Ibid., p. 75. 82 Ibid., p. 86. 83 Laitin, "A Theory of Political Identities". 84 Ibid., 40. 85 Muhammad Ibn Jarir al-Tabari, Tafsir al-Tabar: Jami' al-Bayan 'An Ta'wil 'Ulum al-Qur'an, ed. Mahmoud Mohammad Shakir, (Cairo: Dar al-Ma'arif, no date), vol. 8, 104. 86 Yusuf Fadl Hasan, The Arabs and the Sudan from the Seventh to the Early Sixteenth Century, Edinburgh: EUP, 1967), 146. 87 It is known that Muslims purify themselves by washing their limbs and faces five times a day in preparation for prayer. The idea is that in prayer you will stand in front of God, and therefore you should be pure. The physical washing of the limbs is a means to and a symbol of the moral and psychological washing of sins committed through these limbs, by the mouth, the tongue, the ear, the eye and the nose. The process of purification includes worship, doing good and abstaining from evil. 88 See The Qur'an, 33:33. 89 Aya (verse) 103 in sura (section) 16 says: "And the tongue of whom they wickedly refer is foreign 'A'jamiyyun and this is a clear pure Arabic tongue (lisanun 'Arabiyyun Mubin). 90 C. G. Seligman and Brenda Z. Seligman, Pagan Tribes of the Nilotic Sudan, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul ltd., First published in 1932, Revised 1965), XVIII. 91 J. S. Trimingham, The Christian Approach, 25. 92 Heather J. Sharkey, Colonialism and the Culture of Colonialism in the Northern Sudan, Ph.D. Dissertation, (Princeton: Priceton University, 1998), vol. 1, 40. 92 Deng, War of Visions, 4. 93 Sharkey, Colonialism and the Culture, vol., 1, 40- 58. 94 Ibid., 34. 95 Ibid., 34.


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96 Ibid., 35. 97 Ibid., 40. 98 Paul Doornbos, "On Becoming a Sudanese", in Tony Barnett and Abbas Abdelkarim, eds. Sudan: State, Capital and Transformation, (London, New York, Sydney: Croom Helm, 1988), 100 &101. 99 99 Sharkey, Colonialism and the Culture, vol., 1, 34. 100 'Abduh Badawi, al-shu'ara' al-sud wa khasa'isuhum fi-l Shi'r al-'Arabi, (Cairo, 1973), 223-4. 101 John Hunwick, West Africa and the Arab World: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives, (Accra: Ghana Academy of Arts and Sciences, the J. B. Danquah Memorial Lectures, series 23 Febryary 1990, 1991), 2. 102 'Abduh Badawi, al-shu'ara' al-sud, 223-4, in Hunwick, West Africa and the Arab World, 12. 103 This story is common place knowledge in the Muslim world. 104 B. Lewis, "The African Diaspora and the Civilization of Islam", in M. I. Kilson & R. I. Roteberg, The African Diaspora (Harvard University Press, 1976), 48-9. 105 Ibid, p. 7. 106 Abduh Badawi, al-Sud wal-Hadara al-'Arabiyya,(Cairo: al-Hay'a al-Masriyya al-'Amma Lil-kitab, 1976), 22. 107 Hunwick, West Africa and the Arab World, 1990, 6 & 7. 108 Ibid., p. 5. 109 Ibid., 5. 110 Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah, trans. Franz Rosenthal (2nd edn, Princeton University press, 1967), i, 186-9. Cited in John Hunwick, West Africa and the African World, 6. 111 Badawi, al-shu'ara' al-sud, (Cairo: 1973), 223-4, in Hunwick, West Africa and the Arab World, 11 & 12. 112 Ibid., 108. 113 Ibid., 6. 114 Ibid., 6. 115 Badawi, al-Shu'ra al-Sud, 31. 116 Badawi, al-Sud wal-Hadara al-'Arabiyya, 23. 117 Carolyn-Fluehr-Lobban, “A Critical Anthropological review of the Race concept in the Nile Valley”, a paper presented at the Fourth International conference of Sudan Studies at the (American University in Cairo, 1997), 5. 118 Ibid., 5. 119 Abduh Badawi, al-Shu'ra al-Sud, p.78. 120 Ibid., 42. 121 Ibid., 34. 122 Ibid., 5. 123 Ibid., 111. 124 Ibid., 111. 125 Badawi, al-Sud wal-Hadara al-Arabiyya, 185-186 126 A. Yusuf Ali, The Holy Qur’an, Text, Translation and Commentary, 3rd ed., (Cambridge, Massachusetts, Murry Printing Co, 1938). 127 Ibid.


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128 Ibid. 129 Ibid. 130 Mahmoud Muhammad Taha, The Second Message of Islam, (Beirut: 1968). 131 Ibid. 132 Teresa Brennan, History After lacan, (London, New York: Routledge, 1993). 133 Deng, War of Visions, 64. 134 Ahmed S. al-Sahi, “Proverbs and Social Values in a Northern Sudanese Village” in Ian Cunnison and Wedny James, eds., Essays in Sudan Ethnography (London: C Hurst & Company, 1972), 95. 135 Al-Hindi is the current Secretary General of the democratic Unionist party (DUP General Secretariat), the minority faction which has split from the mainstream Democratic Unionist Party led by Muhammad Osman al-Mirghani. This statement was made in a speech he delivered to a Sudanese audience in London in 1995. 136 W. E. Burghardt Du Bois, The Souls of the Black Folk, Essays and Sketches, (Chicago: A. C. McClurg & Co, 1908), 3. 137 Al-Tayeb Salih, al-Majala Magazine, issue 78, 18/6/1989. 138 Sharkey, Colonialism and the Culture, vol. 1, 36. 139 In the 19th century the influx of slaves flooded the Northern markets, causing a sharp fall in the prices of slaves to the extent that as Sharkey puts it "even the humblest families in the central riverain North were able to purchase a slave or two". Sharkey, ibid., 37. 140 Khalid H. A Osman, The Effendiyya and the Concept of nationalism in the Sudan, Ph.D. Dissertation, (University of Reading, 1987),122; See also Sharkey, ibid, 71. 141 Deng, War of Vision, 64.